

A History of Philosophy

58 Hegel's Phenomenology of the Mind

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How are you finding him? The report I got right away at the beginning from Robert Fitch down here is that he's awful. After Kant, after all, after Kant, if somebody's awful, then it sounds strange. I would think after Kant, everything would be easy.

But I suggested to Bob that the difficulty is not the translation. He was blaming it on the translation. I think the difficulty is rather the mode of thought.

Oh, somewhat limited vocabulary, but you get used to that. But the mode of thought. You see, Kant was still involved in what nowadays has become known as linear thinking, tracing out a line of argument, trying to identify the underlying presuppositions or the transcendental presuppositions, those hidden concepts.

And then in the dialectic, he's simply examining the logic of the argument and finding where there are non-sequiturs. And you're accustomed to that sort of thing. What he's using is basically Aristotelian logic engaged in linear inference, step by step.

And so you can follow step by step. But that's not Hegel, you see. Hegel is more like diving into a pool and trying to get your bearings.

And I mean that because it's sort of like a pool in which you've lost sight of the perimeter. You're trying to get some sense of what's in this direction and what's in that direction. You're trying to locate yourself.

But to do so, you have to find points of reference in all sorts of different directions. And so it's as if what Hegel is doing is landing plump in the middle of something and sending off feelers in all directions, vectors, to try and locate himself in relationship to other things in the environment. So it's a different kind of reading experience.

Putting it more formally, tying it back into what we were saying last time. Kant is engaged in deductive thinking, tracing the logical connection between propositions. His is a logic of propositions.

And of the logical inference from one proposition to another. Hegel is not dealing with propositions. He's dealing with concepts.

He's analyzing concepts. Unpacking concepts. It's a different ball game.

That's mixing the metaphors after being in the pool. But it's a different mode of thinking. You see, that grand layout of his system, which I gave you in outline form with all of the one, two, three, thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

You see, all of it begins with the most abstract conception, being. Everything else is trying to explore the concept of being. Make it more concrete.

No. What do you mean, being? You see. It's as if Kant has told us that existence, being, is not a predicate.

It's not a concept. To which Hegel responds, that's what you think. I'll show you.

Oh boy, it takes him a whole book to show us. And then some. You see.

The bare fact of existence. No, that may not be being. It's just given, that is.

That bare factuality. Fact without meaning. Existence without essence.

But you don't find that in Hegel. You see. Hegel, as I intimated last time, is much more back into the Greek ethos in that regard.

You see. Because the concept of being is loaded with all sorts of implications. He's trying to unravel them, unpack them.

How do you get inside a concept? Well, his way to get inside it is to sort of meander, asking himself, well, in this sort of free-floating mode of reflection, if I say being, what comes to your mind? Huh? Yeah. Non-being. To be or not to be, that's the question, isn't it? Whether it is better to, you know.

Being, non-being, is or it is not, well, is it that way? Because if you ask whether somebody is or is not, in what respect do you mean? At what time do you mean? And immediately you begin to see that being and non-being, while they seem to be like antitheses, either mutually contradictory, they sort of combine when you think of becoming. Because in anything that's in the process of becoming, it is what it was not, and it is not what it was, you see. It is what it is not quite yet, but it is that almost, you see.

There's no such thing as static being in a world of change. And so you realize that what is not is just about to be. And what is is about to be is not.

This is the nature of becoming, which is the concrete conception of being. And so what he's doing is trying to make that a little bit more concrete. And then you have the outline there.

He moves on through other dimensions of the concept of being, not just affirmative or negative, but how much, quantity, all, some, so forth, but then from existence to essence. Because, while on the surface, in a static kind of logic, it looks as if essence and existence stand over against each other. The bare fact that it is is distinct from what it is.

Existence, you might say, precedes essence. That's what Sartre's going to say. And Sartre's breaking with Hegel.

Because for Hegel, there's no existence without essence. So that while the two concepts in the abstract stand over against each other as opposites, in concrete reality, they come together. You see.

And so he has to move his logic to the real concept of being. Notice he says, the concept. Yes, being is a concept.

Not an empty, meaningless fact. But a meaning-laden concept. You see.

And so he works on in that way. So this is the mode of thought, you'll see, Bob. And if you keep this in mind as you read, then you come a lot closer to what he's doing.

And we'll get some illustrations of this as we go along. But for the moment, let me just, if I can find it, read you one short snatch from his logic. From the section on essence.

And I think you can see what he's doing here. It says he, in the doctrine of contradictory concepts, one notion, say blue, stands over against the other notion, not blue. This other would not be an affirmative, like yellow, but merely kept in the abstract negative, not blue.

The negative, in its own nature, is something quite positive. But the inane opposition, inane is his word, the inane opposition between what are called contradictory notions is fully exhibited in the grandiose formula of a general law. That everything which has the one and not the other of all predicates which are in such opposition.

In this way, everything is either blue or not blue. You're either blue or not blue. White or not white.

Yellow or not white. Informative, isn't it? You know, it's empty, it's inane. It doesn't tell you anything.

It's forgotten that identity and opposition are themselves opposed and that there is the principle of contradiction. But in contrast to this doctrine of contradictories, he

talks about the conception of polarity. So that if you like, being and non-being are at the two poles of a continuum.

You see. And by implication, this is a much more correct definition of opposition on the polarity. And he therefore talks of a whole variety of polarities, not only being and non-being, but finite and infinite, ideal and real, one and many, universal and particular, appearance and reality, reason and reality.

You see, these stand in the static logic as antitheses. But in reality, everything partakes in both polarities. Well, we see that in Hegel.

Right after a break, we'll be reading Whitehead. And I'll draw your attention to this again because in the preface to his major work, *Process and Reality*, he says that he is very much influenced by F.H. Bradley, the British Hegelian, in rejecting all of these polarities. So keep in mind then that the Whitehead you're going to be reading is, like Hegel, rejecting these polarities and working with something of a dialectic.

And the big difference is that he's not a metaphysical idealist. Whitehead isn't. Whitehead is transferring the Hegelian scheme onto a more naturalistic basis.

You see, onto a more naturalistic basis in terms of natural processes of evolution and development. And the same can be said of John Dewey, whom we'll be reading the week after Whitehead. You see, they both started with their philosophical roots in the Hegelian tradition and then moved into a kind of naturalistic metaphysics.

So keep this in mind. It's tremendously important. If you remember the course syllabus, you'll remember that everything now is in existentialism; I've called the 19th and 20th centuries the heirs of Hegel.

That's true of Whitehead and process theology. It's true of John Dewey and American pragmatism. It's true of European phenomenology and existentialism.

It's true of Marxism. And it's this dialectic that's the significant thing. Now, keep in mind what the word dialectic means.

Literally, *dialego*, to think something through. You see, it's not to follow a chain of inference, it's to think something through. Analysis.

So what the dialectic does, this mode of thought, is to think through the concept of being and then of subsidiary concepts that emerge in the process as aspects of being. Okay. Does that help a bit? Hopefully, it gives you some context for what you're doing.

All right. Let me mention one other book that's helpful. I may have referred to it along the way.

But it's a book by one of our graduates, Meryl Westfall. And to my mind is one of the most readable things written about Hegel. It's called *History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*.

History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. Westfall has a more recent book on Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion* that I haven't read yet. But this one I found particularly helpful.

Okay. I wonder, then, if there are any comments before we move on? Comments, queries? Okay. Did everybody get a copy of the Hegel outline from last time? Anybody not? Everybody has it.

Okay. So let's turn our attention, then, to the *Phenomenology of Mind* or *Geist*. The term, the old Anglo-Saxon word, ghost, spirit.

If I say, keep in mind what he means by mind, I'm not trying to pun. But reflect for a moment that by mind or spirit, his primary reference is not to some kind of soul substance. Because Hegel isn't working with a substance metaphysic.

His is a process metaphysic. That's an important distinction that goes all the way back to the pre-Socratics. Where you remember, some of them were looking for the basic stuff, the underlying substance, unchanging.

And I suppose substance metaphysics in that sense is epitomized by Parmenides. And others of them were more concerned with understanding process and took process to be more ultimate than unchanging substance, Heraclitus. Remember Heraclitus, who never stepped into the same river twice? Well, that alternation, those opposites, between process and substance have been with us ever since.

But by and large, the philosophical movement that began with Descartes is substance-oriented. Now that may have been because of the influence of mechanistic science. Where matter was often conceived as inert stuff.

Permanent, unchanging, indivisible pellets of inert stuff. Well, with that concept of unchanging stuff, it's easily transferred to the concept of mind or soul as an unchanging substratum. Well, I think it's fair to say that Kant put paid to that.

One of the things Kant did was, of course, to more than suggest that the concept of substance is our idea. It's a subjective conception we superimpose on things. And Hegel isn't concerned with that question.

He's interested rather in mind-spirit as in the sense of creative vitality. In the sense of emerging consciousness and self-consciousness. The creative spirit that pulsates through everything to pick up the Romanticist notion.

So that if we are trying to characterize Hegel's metaphysics, and I've already characterized it last time in several ways, but you could well characterize it as a Romanticist idealism. Yes, a conception of everything ultimately of the nature of mind or spirit, but understood in a Romanticist sense of creative freedom bursting out all over. Or if you like, it's an evolutionary idealism.

Where everything that is potentially creative is moving towards a full manifestation of its creative spirit. Its freedom of spirit. And so not only is biological evolution seen in those terms, vitalism, but the same token, cultural evolution is seen in those terms.

Historical development is seen in those terms. The history of art is seen in those terms. The history of religion is seen in those terms.

More and more unfolding of the freedom of spirit reflected in religious belief, imagery, practice, and so forth. So it's evolutionary idealism. And dialectic is simply the logic that traces the process.

Yes, the logic that traces the process. It's geared to the process. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis is the process of reflection, and it's the process of reality.

You see, the rational is the real. So that the reflective process is also the real process. It matches.

Well, it's with that in mind that we've seen that Hegel moves from the original grand thesis of logic, which is the abstract form of thought, to nature, which is the unconscious manifestation of thought. Bearing that form. The spirit, which brings the abstract form and the unconscious manifestation together in developing consciousness.

And he's concerned with the development of the individual self-consciousness. He's concerned with the development of social consciousness, both in the sense of your social consciousness and the developing self-identity of a society, a state, a nation. And he's concerned with the development of the full self-freedom, self-consciousness in the history of the absolute, the all-inclusive spirit.

All three. So that while the first looks like a piece of introspective psychology, reads like that, and the second reads like a book of ethics, you see, the third sounds like a treatment of cultural history. Art, religion, and philosophy in their unfolding.

Until you come to the consummation of it all. If philosophy down here, art, religion, philosophy, if philosophy is the synthesis over here, well, what's the culmination, the grand synthesis in philosophy? But Hegel's philosophy. You see? Where in the flowering of the German spirit and German nationhood and German culture, you get the concept finally grasped clearly, unpacked fully.

So in a sense, Hegel views his philosophy not as a philosophy to end all philosophies, but as a philosophy everything after which is such a series of footnotes to Hegel. You see? Yeah. Yeah, you see, you get to the final synthesis and the details, all of the wheels within the wheels have to be worked out.

But there's nothing after the final synthesis. Now, you know, you chuckle, but that's the way the Hegelian dialectic was, even when transferred into Marxist theory, which is on a materialistic rather than idealistic basis. You see, the Marxist view is that you move from the thesis of capitalism to the antithesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the synthesis of a classless society.

What comes next? Nothing. Because in a classless society, you have embraced all opposites. It's now classless; there's now no class conflict, no dialectic left.

And so that's the end. That's the millennium. You see? So this is the evolutionary optimism of the 19th century.

And this is where the evolutionary optimism of the 19th century came from, Hegel. This is where it came from. Yeah.

If we can resolve all of the dialectical opposition, then we've achieved. Okay, so that's the overall picture, and we want to look a little more closely at some of the things within it. What's going on within the subjective spirit is the gradual freeing.

We said this was the unfolding of freedom. The gradual freeing of reason from the senses. The gradual freeing of reason from the senses.

Now that's the kind of idealism he's concerned with. Now, why this freeing of reason from the senses? One, he's obviously not going to be an empiricist. Why not? Well, because empiricism, as Plato realized, is the world of change.

And if what we're trying to do is to move on towards the unchanging conception, the grand synthesis, you see, then in the final analysis, the process of change is not governed by the sensory. It's governed by the source of form, order, and the unchanging. And so, Hegel, understandably, is interested in seeing reason freed from its bondage to the senses.

And that reaches its culmination, you see, when in the arts, oh yes, you are working creatively with sensory material. You see, reason is really working, and particularly if you're a romanticist, imaginatively, not slavishly, working with sensory material. And in religion, even more so.

And in philosophy, yes. That's where you get most concrete. Yeah.

Most concrete thought comes in philosophy. You see? Because thought deals with concepts, not with sensory objects. So this is what he's after.

The avoidance of what is static, abstract, and the development of the concrete. Now, when he's dealing with this, remember that the lens through which he sees things on this vast screen is the lens of our own self-consciousness. Okay? So what he's doing in this phenomenology, remember phenomenology is a description, what he's engaged in is sometimes impersonation.

Role play. Empathetic description. He's entering into the reflection, the feelings of the individual in the situation he's describing.

Entering into it empathetically, not standing outside describing behaviors. But entering inside to capture what it is like in the emerging consciousness. You see? Phenomenology, we'll find as it moves on into the 20th century, is concerned with the structures of our conscious being in the world.

You see? He's trying to trace out the dialectical structure of our conscious being in the world. He's not trying to deal with the consciousness in abstraction from the world. That was Descartes' mistake, shutting himself in a stove-heated room of all things and asking if the world exists.

How abstract can you get? You see? William Temple, who was a neo-Hegelian philosopher in England, became Archbishop of Canterbury in the 1940s. He has a chapter in one of his books entitled Descartes' faux pas. His faux pas was to shut himself up in a room and ask himself if anything existed.

Can't you imagine Descartes stoking the stove to keep warm while wondering if his body exists? You know, the self-contradictoriness of the abstract. But, no, the concern is with the structures of conscious being. Notice the term being.

You see the concept of being. What being is, is revealed through our self-consciousness. So you look at our self-conscious being in the world, in relationship to.

Now, you see, there was a tendency back in the 17th and 18th centuries for the individual to be regarded as a Robinson Crusoe. Robinson Crusoe was a social philosopher. He wasn't just a kid story writer.

What he was writing was a piece of social satire when he wrote Robinson Crusoe. In his more philosophical writings, what Daniel Defoe writes about is the isolated individual, ruled by reason, self-sufficient, living alone on his island with his goats and his guard. Isn't he? And he doesn't need others.

He's able to bring nature under the rule of reason and provide for himself. When the savages come, he keeps away from them until he sees them just about to make dinner on Friday. So he rescues Man Friday, but keeps him in submission until he becomes rational enough that they can enter into a social contract.

When the Spanish sailors come, they keep away from them. They're not rational. When the British sailors come, it's another story.

They enter into a social contract and sail back to England. Yet Defoe knew what he was doing. The individual is an isolated island, self-sufficient, not so for Hegel.

There's no such thing as an individual in isolation. Even self-consciousness does not exist in isolation. You see, he's interested in the structures of our conscious being in the world.

There's no other being in the world for the individual. I just wish Hegel had written another Robinson Crusoe to depict this. It would have been a little bit better than my phenomenology, wouldn't it, Bob? Maybe you should do that.

Well, he starts then with the subjective spirit. And if you have the outline with you, you notice that the realm of subjective or individual spirit begins with a thesis having to do with sense consciousness. Now, you'll see, sense consciousness is not the same as self-consciousness.

Sense consciousness is something which, indeed, the animal has. In fact, that level of the dialectic simply carries over from the end of the grand antithesis about nature dealing with organisms that worked down to a description of physiology, which physiology gives rise to consciousness on the part of animal life. So sense consciousness is simply the, if you like, part of the synthesis in nature now becoming the thesis for a new antithesis.

Sense consciousness is rooted in the biological brain processes and sensory awareness. But sense consciousness is simply consciousness of the other. Consciousness of the other.

And that stands in antithesis to consciousness of oneself. Sense consciousness, self-consciousness. But you don't really have mind, spirit, reason at work, free, until that self-consciousness in dealing with the world of sense consciousness achieves its freedom in that world of sense consciousness.

And so it's not just self-consciousness isolated, but rather self-consciousness at work, reflectively, rationally, freely, creatively, doing something to shape the world of sense consciousness. And that is the stepping stone over into objective spirit, into talking about law and order in society. Because what is law and order? But the work of reason ordering the world of sense consciousness.

Get the transitions? Now, you have in the anthology two pieces taken from the section on subjective spirit. One is the master-servant, and the other is the stoic, skeptic, unhappy consciousness. What's going on in those selections? Well, I think in the light of what I've said, you can already anticipate what's going on.

The master-servant piece is famous. You find it referred to again and again. The concept of alienation arises out of this.

The concept of alienation was at work in the early existentialists, at work in Marx and Engels, and at work even in the political correctness movement today. You see, asserting political correctness to overcome the alienation of minority groups. Concept of alienation.

We'll find in Sartre that we come back to this. Basically, what it's about is the fact that one only achieves self-consciousness in relationship to the other. You see? You only achieve self-consciousness in relation to the other.

So this is, if you like, a phenomenology of emerging self-consciousness. It's an empathetic description of what the master goes through, what the servant goes through, what they go through in relation to each other. You see, even in terms of the meaning of the words master and servant, there is no such thing as a master who doesn't have a servant.

He's not a master if he doesn't have one. There's no such thing as a servant if he doesn't have a master. You see? What is he? He doesn't know.

He's out of work. So that one's identity is dependent on that relationship. One's identity is dependent on that relationship.

But by the same token, there is no subject without an object. There's no object without a subject that it's the object of. These are relational terms.

These are polarities. There we go. Polarities.

And the dialectic is what he's tracing, the dialectic within this polarity. The isolated self is always incomplete. We have to see the individual self in relationship to the other.

Now, in order to achieve self-identity, the one standing in opposition to the other thinks he has to cancel out the other, negates the other. I'm the master. Whereupon the servant proceeds to make the master utterly dependent on him.

Now who's the master? You see, the self-destructiveness, the self-contradiction in affirming that I am the master independently, because to be a master, I have to have a servant on whom I depend, who then is the master. There's a self-contradiction involved. Master-servant relationship.

So that in order to be certain of myself, I negate the other, but in doing so, I negate myself. Now that the word negate is used a lot in Hegel and in literature on Hegel. It simply means there is an antithesis.

The antithesis negates the thesis. They're opposites. The German term is Aufheben.

Which means, literally, as you can translate it, to have had it. To have had it. You've had it.

You negate it. You're done with it. The thesis does that to the antithesis.

The antithesis does that to the thesis. But then, gradually, their interdependence begins to emerge. The master thinks of himself as independent.

The servant is dependent. The master is what he is for himself. The servant is what he is for another.

But the master is only independent through his dependence on another. And the servant in his being for the other achieves not only his dependence but something of an independence. He is for himself what he is.

Do you remember the Upstairs Downstairs movies? Are they from before your era? Blank looks, you must have been. Well, it was an Edwardian scene in England where the aristocratic family upstairs had family servants downstairs, of whom the butler stood out. So when European nobility came to dinner, they wanted to meet the butler.

Can you imagine it? You see, that butler, in being the servant to his master, had achieved such an identity that the nobility wanted to meet him. He couldn't have

done it by himself. And the master couldn't have been the master he was without the servant.

The final scene in the series was a very happy synthesis where the servant, the butler, is so sick he's having to retire and be pensioned off, and the master goes and sits down beside his bed in the basement, and they talk like old buddies. And the barriers have gone. And there's a relationship, a synthesis that's achieved.

Now, I don't know if the author *Upstairs Downstairs* had read Hegel, but it sure sounded like it to me. Master-servant relationship. The interdependence, you see, is not a matter of individuals being dependent.

It's not a matter of individuality meaning independence. That's what's broken up marriages with the development, I'm afraid, of some aspects of the feminist movement, because the feminist movement has tried to achieve independence rather than mutuality of interdependence. They've tried to avoid dependence and have striven for independence rather than interdependence.

And it's been very problematic in our society. I think we have to overcome overdependence, but not in impossible independence. That's the individualistic 18th-century note.

It's interdependence where the thing comes together, the synthesis. Well, you get the same sort of picture in the stoic, skeptic, unhappy consciousness. The stoic, that's really the thesis stage, because a stoic in the freedom of his thought asserts his independence of all externals.

Remember the stoic attitude? In the freedom of my mind, I'm independent of whatever may happen to my body. Remember Epictetus, the slave whose master broke his leg? He stoically took it. Okay, so there's the thesis stage, the stoic.

The skeptic takes that freedom even further. The skeptic negates the very reality of the other in his thinking. Rules him out.

Treats him in a fickle way. But then, where does that leave? You move from the stoic kind of thing to the skeptic kind of thing, denying the other altogether, to the unhappy consciousness. That's the individual alienated from himself.

Yeah, because in denying the other, I'm denying my own identity in relationship to the other. And so the skeptic, who knows nothing about anything in relationship to himself, is going to be a mighty unhappy consciousness. It makes me think that Hegel must have taught undergraduates at some stage.

Because I think that's a phenomenon that we all observe, you see. A person who, for a while, moves into some skeptical phase in the process of developing, finds a lot of inner dissatisfaction. Because there's no identity in relationship to what is.

We're not isolated individuals in a vacuum, in a stove-heated room, but in relationship to others. Okay? So that divided self, then, incomplete self, is the unhappy consciousness. Well, the synthesis, then, within the subjective spirit is a truly rational spirit.

A reason that gets beyond simply observing the world of the senses and the other, gets beyond simply contemplating his own independent identity, and becomes a reflective, rational being addressing the orderedness of the world to which we're related. If there is liberty for Kant, it's always going to be liberty within a framework of law. It's never liberty to do anything at all, whatever you want.

It's liberty within a framework of law. That's the rational one. And that's because there's no such thing as existence without essence.

Because there is a logos structure running throughout all being. So you have to have the individual in a relationship with the other, in a legal structure. Well, does that help to make sense of what's going on? Comment? I have to leave you to unravel the more detailed aspects of the dialectic of the master-servant relationship, but I think if you can see what's going on, you can unravel it fairly well.

Okay? Then a few words about objective spirit. Objective spirit. And here you notice the triad moves from the abstract concept of law.

Okay? The concept of law is, after all, an abstraction. To the antithesis, dealing with matters of individual conscience and morality. Law in the abstract, to the most concrete.

To the synthesis of social morality, social order. As I say, law in the abstract provides the context for dealing with freedom. Law in the abstract is the rule of reason.

It's the Kantian conception of universal duty. And you have to admit that Kant's conception of duty is an abstraction, very abstract. Law in the abstract has to do with rights.

Human rights are conceived as being something objective. Rooted in reality. Sure, that's the abstraction.

But you have to unpack the concept. You have to unravel the concept. And you begin to do so when you turn from those universalized abstractions about law and rights.

To questions of individual consciousness. From something like law, which is completely objective. To something like conscience, which is very inward.

Very subjective in the sense of inwardness. From talking of objective duty to talking of my own consciousness. Now, of course, Kant works with both.

Acting out of a sense of duty. His is sort of like a moral sense philosophy. As well as one of the objective rights and duties.

The thesis and the antithesis. But what Hegel tries to do is to bring these two together in a synthesis of a social ethic. Addressing the social order.

You see, that's where he makes a big step forward. At least a big step beyond Kant and Kant's predecessors. For the simple reason that Kant's predecessors and Kant himself thought of individuals as free individuals.

Thought of individual rights as the last point of reference. Robinson Crusoe theory. Hegel, on the other hand, sees individuals achieving rationality only in a relationship.

And so, which is the more ultimate concern? Individual or social institution? Well, of course, social structure. Ordered relationships. Which is what we mean by social institution.

A law-governed pattern of relationships among individuals. Social institution. And so, in the synthesis, he sees it getting much more concrete.

It's in social structures that we live out our morality. It's in social structures that we have to act rationally. That is where the rule of law pertains.

And so, he has a lot to say about family. And if social structure predominates over the individual in terms of concreteness and level of development, he's not very much in favor of divorce. In fact, he's very much against it.

And it's there in that context that he talks about the state. And his political philosophy begins to emerge. And he wants to say that we find our individual consciousness, our individual freedom, maximized in the context of the sovereignty of the state.

Yes, you can say, if you like, that you have much greater freedom within marriage than outside it. And you have much greater freedom within the state than in some anarchistic realm. You see.

And the ideal for a state, as far as he is concerned, is some kind of constitutional government where the representation comes not from just individuals amassed

according to their population density, but the representation comes from different social groupings, from different social orders, structures, from corporations, from estates, as well as from municipalities. Because spirit finds its free expression in the freedom of those groups, as well as in the individual. But the fullest embodiment of absolute spirit is the state.

The fullest manifestation of freedom is the sovereignty of the state. And it's in that sort of way that his philosophy of history develops. Because if the emergence of the nation-state, which was the phenomenon of 19th-century Europe, if the emergence of the nation-state is the growing manifestation of the freedom of the absolute spirit, then those nationalistic movements represent the work of divine providence, as he understands it, in the course of history.

You see. And the nation-state embodies that to which our highest loyalty belongs. And there are the philosophical roots of 19th-century nationalism.

Well, it's in that context that the British Hegelian F.H. Bradley wrote that essay I referred to on my station and its duties. You see, my duty is to fulfill the expectations that society has for me. My duty, overriding everything else, is to my family, and beyond that to my nation, you see, and beyond that to the absolute, to God.

Well, this affects his view of things like war. So he speaks of war as a manifestation, as an expression of the spirit of the nation, of the sovereignty of the state. War is what helps to develop the spirit of a nation.

And I think it's in that Hegelian emphasis that you see Tennyson's famous poem about the Crimean War, *The Charge of the Light Brigade*. Do you know it? I remember I had to memorize it in school as a kid, and I don't remember all of it. But *The Charge of the Light Brigade* was one of those stupid strategic blunders in which the cavalry charged right into the cannons of the Russians.

So it goes something like this, cannon to the left of them, cannon to the right of them, volleyed and thundered, even though they knew someone had blundered. You know, and it's held up as the most glorious thing in the annals of military history because it manifests the spirit of a nation. One big stupid blunder, you see.

Yeah, that's the Hegelian view. Well, I said that out of the Hegelian philosophy emerged some extremes of statism, particularly Italian fascism in the 20th century. Okay, and you have a couple of pieces in the anthology dealing with his philosophy of history, and you'll be able to catch what's going on in that quite readily.

Okay, question, comment. Do you see the way in which it unfolds, how it's going? This is a survey-ish sketch, and the anthology gives you depth at selected points. All

right then, on Monday, we'll deal with the absolute spirit, which will include getting into his philosophy of religion.

And that will wrap up our time with Hegel.