

## **A History of Philosophy**

### **78 Ordinary Language Philosophy**

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In the last couple of weeks, we've been tracing the development from 19th-century to 20th-century empiricism of the positivist movement with its insistence that all knowledge claims must meet the standards of what is supposedly empirical science. And in a real way, this crests in logical positivism. We've commented about some of the things that led to the demise of logical positivism, and one of them was the rise of ordinary language philosophy as distinct from ideal language philosophy.

That is to say, the ideal for Russell, and some at least of the positivists, was to couch our knowledge in a language that is free from all loose connotations because the symbols are defined with reference to explicit empirical points, and to show the interrelationships in terms of formal logical inference. And so the use of symbolic logic was the sort of ideal language of a formal logical sort. Well, that, as I say, led into the logical positivist movement and the ordinary language movement, the latter, Wittgenstein and others, we'll be talking about today, reacted against that, insisting that the ideal language is far too reductionist.

You remember Quine objected to the reductionism. It's far too reductionist. The fact is that language in its ordinary usage performs many different kinds of tasks, not just the analytic and descriptive tasks of empirical data.

And so the appeal, then, is to the much greater variety of language uses. Now, at first, that's not an easy notion to get a hold of, so I think it might help if we start with a particular example, namely the debate over religious language, which we can get into through the unfinished part of our agenda in Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic*, where you recall last time in commenting on Chapter 6, *Ethics and Theology*, we succeeded in talking about his treatment of ethics, but not his treatment of theology. Well, it's a very straightforward account that he gives, and you can sum it up as follows, if you like, that in view of the verifiability criterion for meaning, for factual meaning, the proposition that God exists is not factually meaningful, because it's not empirically verifiable directly or in principle.

God is not a sense object. In fact, the term God is a metaphysical term, meaningless, because it has no empirical reference. There is, therefore, no factual meaning to any talk about God.

So all theological language, language about God, all theological language is devoid of factual meaning. Now, the consequence is not that he is an atheist or an agnostic; the consequence is that theism, atheism, and agnosticism are all equally meaningless. They don't assert anything.

That is to say, anything that's factually meaningful. The consequence is that there is no logical conflict, really, between religion and science, because science asserts things, but religion doesn't. So how can there be any conflict? And the outcome is that religious experience can provide no evidence, because religious experience is talking about psychological states, language about religious experience, talking about psychological states, which can be empirically described, but talking about experience as such does not give us empirical reference to God.

And he talks about the way in which the mystic, in classic ways, has talked of God as inscrutable, indescribable. We can only speak of God by way of negation. So, no factually meaningful theological language.

Now, that was Ayer's account, and it was sort of reiterated in 1944 in an article by John Wisdom called simply Gods. It appeared in one of the British journals, the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, in which he said that discussion of God, or gods, that sort of language, is more dealing with people's feelings than with facts. More with feelings than with facts.

Has no empirical reference. Now, it was John Wisdom's article that triggered a discussion that has become quite famous. I believe it was originally on BBC, and the pieces have been printed and reprinted again and again.

You find them in all sorts of philosophy of religion anthologies. But what was involved in this university discussion, or what was being discussed, was the topic of theology and falsification. Theology and falsification.

And you can see obviously the empiricist criterion of meaning that underlines this. Now, there were three people involved in the discussion. One was Antony Flew, and I've put their names on the board so that you can catch them.

One was Antony Flew, who, in order to try and make sense of the way in which a believer talks of God to a skeptic, told a parable of an invisible gardener. An invisible gardener. That is to say, some explorers come across an area where there is a piece of land surrounded by a wall or a fence or something like that, and is plainly being cared for.

It's cultivated. It's been weeded. It's been, in a word, gardened.

And so they want to see who it is who's doing this. And they can't find anybody. They hang around, and nobody appears.

And so they start talking to themselves about an invisible gardener. This is the explanation they come up with. Now, in terms of verifiability, falsifiability, what are

you going to say? How could you falsify the existence of an invisible gardener with empirical data? Just not possible.

Well, so it is the way in which believers talk about God's care and God's love. So that everything that's involved in the picture of providence and grace and God's activity could be encompassed in this sort of a story. It's not empirically verifiable, but lo and behold, those explorers find it a very, very meaningful discussion.

The second participant was R.M. Hare. R.M. Hare. And he comes closer to wisdom's emphasis on religious discussion as simply an expression of feeling.

Perhaps existential feeling, but feeling nonetheless. In his story, the story that he tells, of an Oxford don, an Oxford professor, who has a certain blink. Now, a blink is an irrational kind of hang-up.

It's something he's convinced of. A feeling he has, in this case, the feeling that somebody is trying to murder him. And that governs all his behavior.

He's always watching out. It explains the way in which he behaves. You see, the invisible gardener was an explanation of certain things.

But now Hare is talking of the explanation of an individual's behavior. The invisible gardeners were sort of detached observers. But this Oxford don is very much involved.

He cares. This matters to him intensely. It's more of a matter of religious concern here.

Now, of course, what he is saying is not an empirically verifiable or falsifiable assertion. So it avoids the ... So it is subject to the criticism of the logical positivist. And yet, here it is.

That doesn't dissuade him. You see, the professor has a blink. Well, the third individual is Basil Mitchell, who was himself a theologian at Oxford.

Basil Mitchell, who told another parable, another story, of the stranger. The story of the stranger. And keep in mind that this is done in the late forties.

And he's talking about occupied France. You just tell someone of what they're doing and where they get their directions. No, and the fact that they get their directions.

And that they are supplied with the necessary military supplies for their underground activities. And they explain that they're doing this because a stranger had come. A stranger who had told them to fight against the evil occupiers.

That he would provide them with the means and that he would come again to achieve the complete victory. And because they believed the stranger, this is the way they behave. Now, obviously, the theologian is talking about the Christ who came and the second advent that is promised, which will achieve the complete victory.

But the impression created by the stranger's words, promises, deeds, and personality is such that they are completely convinced. So even though their account of the stranger is not amenable to empirical verification or falsification at this juncture, it certainly explains their behavior. So what you have then in these three cases is a story that is told to explain the beliefs and behaviors of religious people.

A story that is not empirically verifiable. Though you might notice that the story about the stranger is amenable in principle to future verification. What John Hick later on was to call eschatological verification.

Verification in principle in that way. Okay. But the point is, in all three of these accounts, that there is a much looser use of purportedly factual language.

In all three cases, there is language about either a gardener, a stranger, or some would-be murderer. You see? In each of these cases, there is a factual statement being made that is not capable of passing the logical positivist criteria. And this discussion was widely accepted as the stimulus to ongoing debate.

It was representative of the ordinary language view that the positivist criterion is too reductionist, too narrow. There are many broader uses of language, even factual language, than the positivist is able to account for. Now, some of the other views which developed in the following ten years, through the 50s, in fact, this was the issue in philosophy of religion throughout the 50s until the 60s began to pose other questions.

Some of the other views are rather interesting. There was a Cambridge professor by the name of Braithwaite who said that religious language is simply about amoral commitments. I remember hearing him speak one time in which he said that when he goes to church and recites the Apostles' Creed, I believe in God the Father Almighty, what he's really doing is just committing himself to a certain way of life.

Not to the truth of the propositions on which the way of life traditionally has been grounded, but simply committing himself to a certain way of life. Taking, if you like, a Kantian view of religion as being a symbolic expression of moral obligations. Alasdair MacIntyre, yes, the same MacIntyre that we now hear of in terms of virtue ethics and so forth, who's now at Notre Dame, Alasdair MacIntyre was then a young Scotch-Irish professor, and he tried to maintain that religious language is itself a distinctive language game.

That is to say, religious uses are distinctive from all other uses. Cannot be reduced to moral language, cannot be reduced to metaphysical language. He called it idiosyncratic.

And so what he was arguing for was an idiosyncratic platitude. And of course, if religious language is idiosyncratic and has no empirical ingredients, then it's not amenable to any kind of empirical evidence. You might be quick to realize that he was coming at that juncture with a Barthian kind of theology, in which natural theology and any kind of rational evidence for the existence of God simply wasn't kosher.

And so the idiosyncratic platitude was sufficient. Now, it's in this same context, however, that another individual, Paul Van Buren, who was then, I think, at Temple University, published a book called *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel*. The Secular Meaning of the Gospel.

Which launched the death of God theology, as it was called in the late 50s, early 60s. The death of God theology. His point was that in a secular age, a secular scientific age, we have to make new sense out of religious language.

We have to make new sense out of religious language. God language, in its traditional supernaturalist sense, its metaphysical sense, God-language is a dead language that has no meaning in a secular scientific age. Why not? Because anything that has factual meaning is amenable to empirical verification.

So, on the basis of the verifiability principle, he was saying that God is dead. And what he meant by that is that God-language of a traditional sort is a dead language. Has no meaning.

And the kind of meaning, therefore, that we make of the gospel is essentially that of some sort of secular humanism. It's a language that veils other commitments and concerns. Well, a whole variety, then, of alternatives were explored.

And by the time you get to the, pretty well, the late 50s, logical positivism seems to have crested, been declining, and philosophy of religion is coming back in as completely kosher. Let's see, I met William Alston, who's now one of the leading voices in philosophy of religion in this country. I met him in the late 50s first, when he was an agnostic teaching philosophy of religion at the University of Michigan.

Now, well, as I say, he's one of the leading figures in philosophy of religion, working on argumentation for the existence of God based on religious experience. One of the other earliest people to take it up was George Mavrodis, who, in the late 50s and early 60s, published a little book called *Belief in God*, which, again, was able to make

this kind of assertion. So the surge in, renewed surge in philosophy of religion began in the late 50s, in the early 60s, and now, as most of you know, has reached perhaps its largest crescendo since then, with work not only in philosophy of religion, but in philosophical theology, and nobody thinks of saying that it's meaningless because it's not empirically verifiable.

So that introduces us, then, to the larger diversity of uses that language can have. Now, with that introduction, let me say something about the later Wittgenstein, because in many ways it was his impetus, his work in philosophical investigations, which gave rise to this. This book was published in English in 1953.

The first part of it was published in German in 1945. So you can see that this was going on at the same time as the changes that I've mentioned. Now, Wittgenstein sees language as a kind of social behavior.

That is to say, language is not simply tied to two functions, cognitive and emotive, the way the positivists have said. But it is rather a social phenomenon that is used in all sorts of different ways. There are various forms that life takes, that human life takes.

Language is a tool that is used; it has a function in whatever kind of life form one is involved in. And therefore, the diversity of what he calls language games, games you can play. It's an analogy he draws from the fact that you can get, let's say, certain cards, a deck of playing cards, and play many games with the playing cards.

So there are all sorts of card games. Well, and obviously, you can get English language and do all sorts of things, play all sorts of games with the English language, language games. Now, let me read a couple of passages which, well, you get both his style and what he's doing.

He says, think of the tools in a toolbox. There's a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue pot, glue, nails, screws, and the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. So you think of language as a box of tools for doing all sorts of jobs, not just one or two.

Or again, a few pages later, how many kinds of sentences are there? Now, he's not saying propositions. A proposition is just one kind of thing. Sentences, language forms.

How many kinds of sentences are there? Say, assertion, question, command. Oh, there are countless kinds, different kinds of use. And this multiplicity is not something fixed once and for all, because new types of language, new language games come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.

The term language game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, a behavior, a form of life. Now, review the multiplicity of language games in the following examples. Giving orders and obeying them.

Describing the appearance of an object, giving its measurements. Constructing an object from a description, a drawing. Reporting an event.

Speculating about an event. Forming and testing a hypothesis. Presenting the results of an experiment.

Making up a story. Reading a story. Acting in a play.

Singing in catches. Guessing riddles. Making a joke.

Solving a problem in arithmetic. Translating from one language to another. Asking.

Thanking. Cursing. Greeting.

Praying. You know, he's quick to say, this is just a few. Because here you have different behaviors, different behaviors that involve different uses of language, rather than the reductionist view.

And he makes the point that his concern is that we don't confuse different uses of language and, in that way, create logical puzzles and problems that are really not problems at all, but just arise from abuses of language. This is the way he puts it. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose.

If you tried to advance philosophical theses, it would never be possible to question them because they'd have to be about words and everybody would agree. So philosophy does not develop theories of its own. It is still a therapeutic kind of activity.

Dissolving problems. Answering the question which he puts, how do we get the fly out of the bottle? Ever get a fly in a bottle and have to get it out? How do you get the fly out of the bottle? Puzzle. So philosophy really is in this business of clearing up confusions on the basis of a much looser, broader kind of empirical approach to human behaviors and human language behaviors.

Now one example which he uses may help. He has a little book that actually comes from some lectures he gave called Uncertainty. Now obviously the topic is epistemology.

And what he's doing is taking on one of the demands of Enlightenment epistemology. The demand for certainty. If you like, he is a post-modern, criticizing Enlightenment epistemology.

Now he starts by referring to G.E. Moore's famous lecture before the British Academy in which he was going to prove that two material objects exist. Remember, here is one. Here is a hand.

I know this is a hand. Now what do we mean when we say something like that? I know this is a hand. Where my behavior and Moore's behavior show that they know this is a hand.

And the words simply reiterate it. Well it means, makes no sense to doubt it. Makes no sense to doubt this is a hand.

I know is sort of a guarantee I give you. My personal assurance that it's a hand, not a false something or other, I'm just holding up to you. But in addition, the claim that I know is claiming that a whole picture of the world is basically correct.

I know it is part of a much larger, coherent worldview in which there are certain basic beliefs, as he calls them. So he has, if you like, a common sense realism that is argued for from the verbal behaviors that are involved. That's Ryle.

I take it back. That's Wittgenstein. Now a couple of words about Gilbert Ryle who on into the 50s and 60s was still publishing.

Two books of his that I'll refer to. One is called Dilemmas, and the other is the Concept of Mind. Dilemmas, yeah, it's about philosophical disputes, philosophical problems, realism versus idealism, freedom and determinism, mind and body, science and religion, which is right.

And posing them as alternatives seems to put you on the horns of a dilemma. Well, he has a whole book dealing with these dilemmas. And his point is that they are false dilemmas, pseudo-problems.

There are disputes over the territory that language covers. They represent what he calls, and this is a notion for which Ryle is quite famous, they represent category mistakes. Category mistakes.

Where one word is used in two different categories, so that you're equivocating and there's no real dispute. Now he illustrates the notion of categories, and he's talking of different language games. Words used in different language games can sometimes lead to confusion about language games.

But he illustrates what he means. Take, for instance, that notable, worthy, delightful British sport of cricket. He says, well, there is the batsman, there's the bowler, I'll call him a pitcher.

Here are the wickets, that's the sticks in the ground. There's the pitch, that's the 21 yards in between. But where's the team spirit? Oh, that's in a different category.

It's not an empirical object like these other things. So he maintains that this is the way in which philosophical problems arise, the problem of sense perception. Do we perceive material objects or only sense data? Well, it depends on whether you're using the language of neurophysiology or ordinary experience.

If you're talking of perception in terms of ordinary experience, the language game is such that you see material objects. If you're talking of sense perception in terms of neurophysiology, the language game is such that you see sense data. What about freedom and determinism? Well, if you talk of human behaviors in terms of causal conditions, that's what the determinist does.

But if you talk of the same behaviors in terms of responsibility, that's what the indeterminist does. You can talk about the same things and play two different games, the determinist game and the indeterminist game. Science and religion likewise.

Mind and body likewise. Now, some people have picked up on that and said, oh, okay, then two languages can be complementary. And so they invoke the scientific complementarity principle.

Remember the complementarity principle from physics, perhaps? How do we describe the way in which light is transmitted? Is it transmitted in waves or in particles? Well, why does it have to be either or? Complementarity suggests wavicles. There are two complementary things, complementary pictures of the same phenomenon. What could that be to say in this case? Well, in his concept of mind, he's not at all clear that it is the same, because there he talks about the mind-body problem.

And what he's trying to do is to map out, and notice the vocabulary here, he's trying to map out the logical geography. That's a very familiar, popular phrase. You're doing logical geography when you're trying to sort things out.

And if you're doing logical geography, you're trying to do some map work. So you're trying to map out the logical geography of the knowledge we already possess about the mind. You're trying to find some new information.

But to map out the geography of the knowledge we already possess. Already possess? Yes, in our language behaviors. Because the way we use language has

developed, been tried, refined, and tested over centuries in the history of a language.

And so it hides within those behaviors all sorts of tacit knowledge. And what he's trying to do in the concept of mind is to map out that tacit knowledge. Now, you notice that mind and body are both nouns.

And so we slip into the habit of treating mind and body as two separate things. Mental states and physical states as two different categories of things. All that just because mind and body are both nouns.

Misled by a superficial grammatical similarity rather than probing to the actual usages of the words in language behavior. So he suggests we should think rather in terms of mind language and body language as having to do respectively with private as distinct from public behaviors. Conscious behaviors as distinct from physical behaviors.

So that emotions and motives are simply private inclinations to behave in certain ways. That's subjective behaviors that incline us to certain objective behaviors. And when you say, I'm angry at what's going on in L.A., you're saying something like, I want to yell at someone.

You say the private feeling is a disposition to overt behaviors. Well, in that fashion, what he does is to translate all statements about mind and mental activity into behavioral statements. So he comes up with a version of the mind-body problem known as linguistic behavioralism.

Mind language is simply language about private behaviors. Linguistic behavioralism. Not metaphysical language, no.

But mental language is about actual or intended or possible bodily behaviors. That way. Well, it was that book of his, *The Concept of Mind*, which started a debate going on the philosophy of mind which has been going on from the 1950s to the present day.

And some of you have been taking philosophy of mind courses, so you know something about it. Incidentally, we've had two approaches to philosophy of mind recently. We've had the course that Roberts did, which is much more philosophy of mind in terms of psychological states.

Emotions, inner dispositions. Okay. And you may have noted that Roberts' way of dealing with it is in terms of an analysis of what we mean when we say, what we are doing when we say, what we have in mind when.

You see, because his philosophical method is very much influenced by this ordinary language technique from Wittgenstein. He occasionally teaches a Wittgenstein course, which he learned in his graduate work at Yale under Paul Holman. You see.

So this is a method that he uses with a great deal of effectiveness, without limitations about metaphysics that some people have. On the other hand, if you've done some of the philosophy of mind stuff, which O'Connor does in contemporary metaphysics, you see, you've got a different method. But the point is that in the development of post-positivist metaphysics, the metaphysical side of philosophy of mind has developed as well as the philosophical psychology side of philosophy of mind.

So that Roberts' interest is in the philosophical psychology side, more in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle, Wittgenstein. And O'Connor's approach is much more in the metaphysical side, in relation to the philosophy of science. David.

No, he's, you know, if you try to pin him down on what is your view of mind, he would come out, I think, as something of an epiphenomenalist. That is to say, what is the reality underlying these brain processes? And there are mental phenomena that are the side effects of brain processes.

So I think that Ryle is some kind of epiphenomenalist. Now, sometimes called a behaviourist, but only if you have the preface linguistic behaviourism. Talking about the mind is talking about private or public behaviours.

And his view would be that the language about mind is translatable without remainder into behaviour language, language about behaviours. So it's this translatability thing again. Okay, now that was Ryle.

Do you want to pause and reflect there before I add on? He introduces one thing that's become quite famous in the concept of a machine. He labels Descartes' view of the mind as somehow or other in the body, as the myth of a ghost in a machine. Now that phrase, the ghost in a machine, has become famous.

And you hear it quoted in all sorts of things. It's almost as famous as Cogito Ego Sum. Really.

It's one of those phrases that you find journalists pick up on, and so on and so forth. The myth of a ghost in a machine. What he's doing there is simply that he's in the process of arguing that simply because words mind and body are both nouns doesn't mean there is one entity inside another entity.

You see? The myth of a ghost in a machine. Okay, of the three people I'm discussing here, J.L. Austin by all means is the most fun. That's not a criterion, a philosophical acumen, though it certainly helps the medicine down.

Tremendous sense of humor, really. His book, *How to Do Things with Words*, published in 1955, tried to systematize different types of language usage. In other words, he thinks that in all this multitude of uses that Wittgenstein has introduced, there may be certain major types of utterance.

And he tries to systematize those in a way that has been quite influential. He distinguishes, let's see, he distinguishes cognitive utterances in the sense of assertions and propositions from performative utterances of a more varied sort. You remember I said that according to Ayer, the phrase, it is true that, is just a performative utterance.

It doesn't add anything. It's better to do something rather than assert something. It's a performative utterance.

All right, what he talks about are locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts. Now these are what we come to call language acts nowadays. That phrase, language acts, having been coined, I think it was coined, by John Searle, who teaches at Berkeley, John Searle, in his book, *Speech Acts*.

Notice that in the notion of language acts, speech acts is the idea that the use of language is a kind of social behavior. All right then, distinguish the locutionary from the illocutionary. A locutionary act is simply an act of saying something.

Very general category. A locution, an utterance. But an illocutionary act is where you act in saying something, hence illocutionary.

Perlocutionary, you act by means of saying something. Perlocutionary. Now, the example, an illocutionary act, the saying is itself the act.

You're acting in saying it. Announcing a verdict. Answering a question.

Giving advice. In talking the way you're talking, you're giving advice. Perlocutionary, the language is just a means.

You're persuading somebody to do something. You are stopping someone from doing something. You are annoying someone with what you are saying.

The significance is not in what you are saying, but what you are trying to accomplish by means of saying it. You could have said something else, and it might have worked as well. Again, getting to the variety of things we use.

Well, that sort of thing introduces the notion of language acts, language behaviors, and makes it very popular. But the other thing about J.L. Austin that you will be interested in is his book *Sense and Sensibilia*. Now, notice the name is Austin.

Are you familiar with another Austin? Jane Austin, whose book was *Sense and Sensibility*. That was a novel. This is J.L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia*.

Not Jane, but John. *Sense and Sensibilia*. Just the title is a joke, and that's typical of Austin.

I don't mean the whole book is a joke. I guess that makes it a perlocutionary act. He's telling a joke by means of language he's doing something else with.

Okay. Now this book is an attack on the sense datum theory of A.J. Ayer. Not the A.J. Ayer of language, truth, and logic.

But the A.J. Ayer of his book, I think, is *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*. Because Ayer developed the view, a phenomenalist view, that all we know is sense. Now Austin argues in *Sense and Sensibilia* that this is due to his obsession with a few words and an oversimplification of their uses.

Words which denote sense data, like blue, square, etc. Or expressions like looks, appears, and seems, which are all twisted and taken to mean that ordinary sense perception suffers from such an illusion that we can never be sure whether we're seeing a material object or not. So we say it appears, it looks, it seems.

Okay. So to get something of the style of the man, here's the way he begins. My general opinion about this doctrine is that it's a typically scholastic view attributed first to an obsession with a few particular words and second to an obsession with a few half-studied facts.

The fact is, as I'll try to make clear, our ordinary words are much subtler in their uses and make many more distinctions than philosophers have realized. And that the facts of perception, as discovered, for instance, by psychologists but also as noted by common mortals, are much more diverse and complicated than has been allowed for. So I'm not going to maintain that we ought to be realists to embrace the doctrine that we do perceive material objects.

That question is too simple and entirely misleading. The important point is that the two terms, sense data and material things, live by taking in each other's washing. What's spurious is not one term, sense data, but the antithesis of the two.

There's no one kind of thing we perceive, but very different kinds. The number is being reducible, if at all, by scientific investigation and not by philosophy. So what we have to do above all is to rid ourselves of certain illusions argued by those like Berkeley, Hume, Russell, and Ayer who have been most adept at working with the argument from illusion based on the relativity of sense data.

And in that way, he goes on to defend what really amounts to a common-sense realism that, in seeing sense data, what we're doing is seeing material objects anyway. He is here attacking, let's see, I guess I erased that. He's attacking a view which Ayer developed that was linguistic phenomenalism.

Now, Ryle had a linguistic behaviorism. That is to say, the language of the mind can be construed as the language of behaviors. Ayer had developed a linguistic phenomenalism.

That is to say, the language of sense perception can be all interpreted, reduced to nothing but the language of sense data phenomena. Linguistic phenomenalism. In both cases, the argument hinges on the supposed translatability of real object language, mind, matter, into some other kind of language.

Its reducibility in this case to sense data language. And it's that which Austen argues against, contending that ordinary uses of language are totally different. They are much more subtle; they enable us to talk about both.

So what you get then in this ordinary language philosophy, and I use Gilbert, Ryle, and Austen as further examples because they're dealt with by Stott. What you get you see is a loosening up of the whole positivist approach, a breakdown of that scientific reductionism, a rejection of the verifiability theory and the way in which it was posed. And that leads to the reintroduction not only of religious language, but also of metaphysical language, ethical language, philosophy of mind, and so forth.

And that's what we want to look at next week. I'm not quite sure which order we'll take it, I'll give some thought to that. But we'll want to look at what has happened to ethical theory since Ayer thought he put an end to it.

Certainly, what has happened to philosophy of language, because obviously that's the crux of the matter, and what has happened to philosophy of mind. Those are the topics I'd like to get at in what remains. Three minutes.

Comments. Do you follow what I've been saying? Clear enough? The loosening up of the thing, a change of methodology. It's noticeable, I think, that after a period of philosophical skepticism in the history of thought, people realize they have to juggle their marbles into new configurations and develop changes in methodology.

You see, after the sophists, you get the dialectic of Plato. After the skepticism of the Hellenists, you get the kind of dialectic which Augustine used, and the introduction of a Christian perspective into the thing. The skepticism of the Renaissance produced the new methods of Bacon and Descartes.

The sort of skepticism of Hume led to Kant's transcendental method. Well, similarly, the skepticism, if you can call it that, of the positivists led to ordinary language and to the changes that have been happening since. Okay, let's call it a day.