A History of Philosophy
72 Other Phenomenologists
By Dr. Arthur Holmes of Wheaton College

Three hours on the examination, usual rules, and due at the beginning of class next Wednesday. I ask you, please, to observe the spirit of the rule by not trying to read the thing through the envelope. It's not exactly morally kosher.

And today should be our last day on this European tradition, 19th and 20th-century European. And of course the examination covers through Sartre. Optional discussion, Monday, 7 o'clock.

Is that good? Is any time as good as any time? And if it's impossible for you, then stop by the office on Tuesday 10:30, thereabouts in the morning. I'll probably be in the office most of the morning on Tuesday. And what we want to do today is to talk about some other recent phenomenology other than Sartre.

And the first two I want to mention are, among other things, responding directly to Sartre. Gabriel Marcel is a French Catholic philosopher, one of those whom I called a religious existentialist, though he renounced the term existentialist because of its associations and called himself a philosopher of existence, trying to avoid the connotations. And Marcel does quite a lot in describing the phenomenology of interpersonal relationships, the phenomenology of hope, interesting, hope, yeah, that sort of thing.

His complaint about Sartre is that his dialectic between the for itself and the in itself is just overdrawn. The idea of a constant negation, whereby the one always negates the other, there's always alienation, fails to distinguish, according to Marcel, between negation and simply disengagement. When there is no act of turning against or overcoming the other, it's simply a drifting apart.

And so the dialectic then is exaggerated, and the resultant picture is distorted. His point is that in any kind of relationship, there are two poles that are possible: alienation and love. And in between those two poles, the relationship may move to and fro, but it's not all alienation, it's not all vehement antithesis.

So Marcel then presents a more positive kind of description and is a more, I said, optimistic kind of existential thinker. Incidentally, his work seems to be followed by an American historian of the movement, James Collins, who taught at the University of Washington, no, Washington University in St. Louis, I beg your pardon, Washington University in St. Louis. James Collins, who criticizes Sartre for assuming that there are just two modes of being, bourgeois and non-bourgeois, and that these are antithetical.

Says James Collins, this postulate is just unjustified; descriptively, there is so much more than that, so many more modes of being. So that kind of complaint. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who after Sartre became sort of passé, Maurice Merleau-Ponty was the most distinguished French philosopher in the, I would say, in the 50s and the 60s.

He rejected Kant's view of the self as only intentionality. That is to say, he was willing to accept Husserl's description of the intentionality of consciousness. But the thing that Sartre does in the book you're reading, The Transcendence of the Ego, where he denies any transcendental ego and reduces the self to simply that which I create by the act of intentionality, again and again and again.

That's what Merleau-Ponty repudiates because it eliminates the subject, eliminates the subject of the subject-object relationship. So that if there is no subject pole, there can be no relationship, you see. There can be no object without a subject.

And just from that phenomenological standpoint, he wants to maintain that there is at least some personal identity, some continuing personal identity that isn't simply being created over and over again. And so he tries to do a closer phenomenology of other aspects of the subject-object relationship and, particularly, as far as Merleau-Ponty is concerned, perception, the phenomenology of perception. He has a whole book by that title, The Phenomenology of Perception.

And what becomes known as the lived body is bodily experience. You notice how Sartre talks of er-lib-ness, er-lib-ness, isn't that the way it's spelled? Yeah, lived through-ness, lived experience. Well, what Merleau-Ponty is trying to argue is that our lived experience, concrete experience, is lived bodily experience, lived bodily experience.

And whatever more there is to self-identity, and to the nature of the self, that at least, that lived body that is given in experience is something with enduring identity. And so he's not satisfied with reducing it all to simply the act of intentionality. Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Following Merleau-Ponty, the leading figure in French thought, Paul Ricoeur, in the 70s and I suspect on into the 80s, he's still alive, retired, I suspect he's about 80 by now, Paul Ricoeur. I think I mentioned him before, did I? French Protestant, reformed tradition. He has been very interested in a phenomenological hermeneutic.

That is to say, interested not just in a philosophy of existence, no, he's gone beyond the existential concerns. He's not an existentialist. His is more of a general phenomenology.

But he's interested, therefore, in a hermeneutic, in the interpretation of various aspects of human life. What do we make of the voluntary and the involuntary? How are we going to interpret the experience of freedom? What about the phenomenology of guilt? Which is obviously going to be significant in terms of moral objectivity. The phenomenology of language.

So what he has done is to try to get at the essential structures of these aspects of our being in the world. Our language, our sense of being free, our sense of guilt, of finitude, so forth. And has done some sterling work in those regards that have involved him in critique, for instance, of Freud on guilt.

Of the structuralists like de Saussure on language, and simply artificial structure superimposed. Paul Ricoeur. And then I note Paul Tillich, not in any sequence with the three previous ones.

Paul Tillich, a Protestant theologian, whose approach to theology has really involved a phenomenological method. He has a book, for instance, a little book called The Dynamics of Faith. The Dynamics of Faith, which is a phenomenology of faith, which he calls an ultimate concern.

So the act of faith is a centered act in which the whole being comes into unity in its intentionality towards the object of faith. And as far as phenomenology of faith is concerned, it's a very helpful, very enlightening sort of study. He has a book called The Courage to Be, which is another way in which he talks about faith.

So he does a phenomenology of this existential courage in contrast to the lesser kinds of courage. And if you look at his massive three-volume systematic theology, about which somebody has said it's the only theology in which there are no biblical texts, what he is doing is a phenomenology of the human condition so as to pose the existential questions. And then what he does is to address the heritage of Christian thought to those existential questions.

He calls it a theology that answers those questions. In that sense, an apologetic theology. Apologetic means, of course, one that speaks to the existential questions.

So it's the phenomenological account that poses the questions. And he does that in a sort of Heideggerian fashion, like Heidegger's Being and Time. Okay, sort of Heideggerian phenomenology.

And then in response to that, you see, what is God? Well, if the existential condition is one of ultimate concern, then God is the object of our ultimate concern. Phenomenologically, we see the intentionality in ultimate concern. Well, what is the object, then, for which we're leaning? Well, that's what we call God.

So in effect, his is an argument from religious experience. Religious experience, described phenomenologically, points to God. So a phenomenology of religious consciousness, in that sense.

So, Tillich's work accordingly. Gadamer. Okay, and this is where we get to the mainstream of contemporary hermeneutical thought.

And if you want to tap into its development up through Gadamer, not after Gadamer, but up through Gadamer, take a look at the book by Richard Palmer, called Hermeneutics. It's in the library. Palmer teaches, I think it's at McMurray College downstate here in Illinois.

And it's a good book which goes back to old people like Schleiermacher and traces the development of hermeneutical theory up to the 1970s. Gadamer is still alive. In fact, most of you remember Bruce Benson, who was with us.

He's been studying with Gadamer for his dissertation in Germany. Though apparently Gadamer is beginning to get beyond even that sort of thing. All right then, what about this phenomenological hermeneutic? Well, back up in your thinking to the Enlightenment, the 18th century.

There, the emphasis, of course, was on the objectivity of our knowledge and understanding. Not only of physical objects, but also of texts, written material, other people's actions. The objectivity of understanding.

So interpretation is a purely objective activity in which one examines the objective data and draws logical conclusions. Kind of an inductive method. By the time you get past Kant and the Copernican Revolution, all that changes.

Obviously, the Copernican Revolution is going to say, we bring our own grids to reading, to interpreting anything. And that becomes increasingly evident. The initial step, I think, following Kant, could be Schleiermacher, who you remember was one of those German idealists around the time of Hegel.

Friedrich Schleiermacher, theologian. Inasmuch as we impose our subjective grids on what we think and do, Schleiermacher gets interested in the subjective intention of the author. That is to say, he's not thinking of the grid that the reader brings, but rather of the subjective grid of the author.

So for Schleiermacher, the function of any interpretation, any hermeneutic, is to get behind the text that the author has written and to discover the author's own intention. Now, read intention there, in the sense of intentionality. Direction.

Tell us. What is it that he is pointing towards, moving towards? Because Schleiermacher, being a monistic idealist, thinks that there is one overall creative spirit, an all-encompassing divine spirit, that is immanent within every individual. This is that immanentistic theology, that panentheism.

And so this creative divine spirit that runs through all things, like Hegel's absolute, is what is manifest in the author's intention. In the author's subjectivity. So in getting at the intention of the author, you are getting at the overall intention of the divine spirit.

And in that sense, there's something of inspiration in everything that's written. Not just religious texts. But in any case, his emphasis is on getting at the subjective grid of the author, the subjective intention.

That phrase, authorial intention, has often been picked up out of context and used by enlightenment-type interpreters. You hear it used a lot among evangelicals. Who are trying by objective means to understand what the author meant by his language.

Now, in that sense, meaning, what the language means, what you are trying to say, is not the same as intentionality in Schleiermacher's sense. Where intentionality is a much more pervasive direction in things working out in the course of history. So watch the phrase authorial intention, which has a different use than Schleiermacher's notion of the intention of the author.

But Schleiermacher, as I say, is simply interested in the subjectivity of the author. Because of his overall idealism. An unconscious intentionality on the part of the author is very often.

But the further thing which comes into play in this development is, of course, Husserl with his doctrine of intentionality. So that what reading or giving attention to anything is, is a meaning-constituting act. A meaning-constitutive act.

So in the act of reading, trying to interpret something, what I'm doing is bringing my meaning to that and making it for me. You see, the meaning-constitutive act. The subjectivity gets stronger, the subjectivity of the reader gets stronger.

In Heidegger, you recall that understanding itself is a way of being in the world. It's a mode of design. So that's how I understand something is simply an expression of my subjective grit.

Of my intentionality. And so Heidegger is not doing a hermeneutic of any objective text, but a hermeneutic of the reader. Of my design.

Well, what you get then arising out of this quite plainly is the recognition that there is subjective intentionality on the part of both writer and reader. Both the author and the interpreter. And so you have two subjectivities.

And interpretation then becomes very much like an interpersonal dynamic. An I-Thou relationship. In which each is trying to understand the other.

The thing is, however, that in interpreting historical materials, there is a great big gap. There's a time gap. So that the mutual understanding is significantly harder to achieve.

But the procedure that Gadamer proposes is essentially the same. There must be a dialogue. Dialogue is a two-way street.

Which provides an encounter between the two subjectivities. Between the two horizons. If you like, the two perspectives.

So, in practice, what happens is that you come to some text asking questions of the text out of your own subjective grid. Which he calls a pre-understanding. Your pre-understanding, you'll see a subjective grid is a pre-understanding.

Sometimes that is translated a pre-judice. Except that he spells it, or the translator spells it without the hyphens so that it looks like prejudice. What is a prejudice? It's a pre-judgment.

What is a pre-judgment but a pre-understanding? What is a pre-understanding but subjective intentionality? You see? So you bring your pre-judgment, your pre-perception of what is being said to the text, and in dialogue with the text, that is to say, with the author, in dialogue with the text, you find that your questions become reshaped, recast. Your understanding gets modified. And as the dialogue continues, so the two horizons begin to come closer, one to the other.

Questioning the text, the text answering and changing the questions, and I come again, and it answers again, as it were. And as you live with the text, interacting with the text, the historical gap is narrowed, and the two horizons begin to merge. Now you'll notice that that's essentially the way it is with interpersonal relationships.

You see, if you're not sure, if you understand what somebody is thinking or where they're coming from, you pose a question, is this what you're saying? And in the light of the response, you say, well, do you mean this? And then as the dialogue continues, oh, I see, so you mean this? Well, not quite, but, you see, and on it goes, and the horizons begin to meet. Now, what makes this possible, what makes this possible, is that the two subjectivities share a common history, a common cultural tradition that is carried by a common language. And so it is by means of that

historical connection, the cultural connection, the linguistic connection, that the dialogue is possible.

And we get what he calls effective history, effective history. But what is basically going on is that the reader, in trying to understand, the interpreter, in trying to understand, is trying to make the text he's trying to understand for me. So you have that for me approach to the text that already is in itself, you see, you're trying to understand it.

Now, you might say, well, that Sartrean language with its Kantian basis of the thing for me and the thing in itself is simply a guise for another representational theory of knowledge. You see? To which not so, not so, because in this phenomenological tradition, the intentionality gives you the existence of the object, makes it present to you. The question is, what is it saying, what does it mean? So this phenomenology is more of a kind of critical realism, not a naive realism, but not an anti-realism.

Critical realism, with its claim that we know that an object exists, but what it is, we have to be subject to correction. You see? There is no infallible interpreter, if you like. So the representational thing is not really correct.

However, as subsequent hermeneutical theory develops after Gadamer, the problem begins to develop. Because people like Jacques Derrida, let's see, let's get his name down on the list. People like Jacques Derrida, the deconstructionist, seem to be an anti-realist.

So that the text becomes inscrutable in the sense that you cannot get at any fixed meaning. Why is this? Well, for Derrida, the language that is used, you see, the language that is used has a structure that is given to it by the author. But a structure that is, if you like, unconsciously given, and which simply never gets completely uncovered.

The idea, going back to structural linguistics, is that language is an artificial structure that is imposed on things. And what the deconstructionist is doing is trying to take apart the structure and show it doesn't work. Whatever interpretation you give, what is supposed to refer to something just doesn't seem to refer consistently.

So that any interpretation, any construction that you put upon it seems to fail. Your interpretation is as much an artificial superimposition as is the language that the writer himself has used is an artificial imposition. And therefore it's impossible to understand what is happening.

The dialogue is useful. But what precisely the reference of the language is, that cannot be understood by rational means. So, in that sense, Derrida is an anti-realist

about interpretation and maintains, in effect, that a plurality of interpretations is legitimate, is possible, and so a relativism of the whole plurality.

Now, inasmuch as that kind of deconstructionism is applied not only to the reading of a particular text, but also to the understanding of the phenomena of religion, it applies to religious pluralism. And so the kind of relativism of the plurality of religious traditions, such as was discussed in the religious pluralism conference, reflects the same kind of emphasis, that we cannot see what all this makes, because the structures we put upon it vary from one subjective grid to another. Now, this European tradition that has developed out of the Kantian-Copernican revolution through the notion of intentionality into deconstructionism has been picked up in Anglo-American philosophy, even though it's a European tradition.

So that the work of Richard Rorty in his book entitled Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature I mentioned his name before in a Deweyan context Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature appeals as much to this phenomenological tradition of Heidegger as it does to the pragmatic tradition of Dewey as it does to the Wittgenstein tradition that we'll be tapping into in another couple of weeks, you see. And bringing these together, common themes in these come up essentially with the claim that we simply are unable to get at the truth about anything. The title of his book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, you recall from when I mentioned it before, the mirror of nature refers to a representational theory of knowledge, so that we have mental images like mirror images within our mind that are copies, true copies of.

Well, what he's doing is arguing with this subjectivist tradition coming out of Kant, arguing with the instrumentalist, phenomenalist tradition of people like Dewey, get it? You see, both of whom are anti-realists. What he's doing is arguing that any such realistic mirror image representation is just impossible. And what he does is essentially what skeptics about knowledge have done through history, which is to say, if I can't know exactly and with certainty, I'll be a skeptic, you see, a skeptic about that.

So he advocates simply engaging in interesting dialogue rather than trying to settle questions. And he moved from teaching philosophy at Princeton to an interdisciplinary humanities program at Virginia. If philosophy is trying to answer questions, then he can be part of that.

My point is that my point in saying that he does the old move, saying if I cannot have an exact understanding with certainty, I'm a skeptic, he's appealing to an illicit disjunction. That's not an all-inclusive classification of possibilities. There's always been a kind of probabilistic tradition in between.

And contemporary epistemology, of course, works a great deal with other traditions than those two in terms of the justification of belief. So, really, what this boils down

to is a skepticism resulting from exaggerated epistemological expectations. Which is the kind of phenomenon you find among freshmen in a beginning philosophy course, as well as among others?

You see, if they come expecting knock-down, drag-out proofs so that you can know this or that with complete certainty, then if you can't have that, you're utterly at sea. There's nowhere else to turn. And while it's an oversimplification to say that's what Rorty is doing, at least it's the same kind of move, either certainty or skepticism.

Rather than recognizing that all through the course of history, there have been third alternatives introduced to slip between the horns of the dilemma. Okay, let's pause there. Questions? Comments? Discussion? Yeah? When you speak of the structure of language with Derrida, what's an example of that? Or what sort of structure? Well, if you're going back to the structuralist linguistics, where the name that's usually referred to is the Frenchman de Saussure, whom I've never read but I've read about him.

What he seems to be doing, and let me put it this way. What he seems to be doing is taking a position, something like what we'll be finding in 19th and 20th-century positivism. The 20th century, particularly.

Where in their analysis of language, they speak of two ingredients in language. One being factual references and the other being the formal structures of language. Okay, so the formal structures are things like the subject-predicate structure.

Okay, formal structures. The rules by which language functions. And they separate these two, insisting that it's the meaning that is carried by the formal structure.

And that's essential. Now, what the deconstructionist is doing is challenging that whole scheme. Rejecting that whole scheme.

Now, you can see that most clearly if by the structure of language you refer not to the whole formal structure of a logical language like, I was going to say, English. But if you refer rather to the language used in a particular, what, philosophical text, literary text. Okay, the way in which the words are put together.

That's structuring. That's structuring of the story. Structuring of the account other than the story.

So forth. And the attempt is made to show that when you try to grasp what the structure is, how it is put together, how the parts of the story interrelate, what are they referring to? You see, no interpretation really hangs together in words. Get it? What does it mean for an interpretation to work? Well, to make sense of the parts in a coherent fashion.

You see? No interpretation does that. Makes sense of the parts in a coherent fashion. So deconstruction is named as the antithesis to be the antithesis of structuralism.

Language simply doesn't work for conveying unequivocal meanings with any certainty and clarity. I'm inclined to say, do you remember the pre-Socratic Gorgias? The sophist? Does anybody remember Gorgias? Who said, he said, nothing exists. If anything exists, I couldn't know it.

If I knew it, I couldn't talk about it. You find scepticism extended not only to whether something exists, but also to knowing about something, and scepticism about the viability of any language. Linguistic scepticism.

And this is what's involved. Is that both on the author's intentionality and on the theory? Yeah. I realise the term critical realism doesn't have much content at this juncture.

It will be done in another ten days. But the nearest anticipation we have of it, I think, is Scottish realism. Back to Thomas Reid.

Okay. Where Reid is a realist about the existence of things. Maintains that we have an immediate awareness of something's existence that is given to us, which becomes self-evident, is given along with certain sensory qualities that are signs that something is there.

So you don't have to infer the existence of something. In other words, in the relationship between the mind and its object what you have is a direct awareness of the existence of the object. So existence is given directly, you see.

But the nature of the object we seem to gain through reflection on those signs, those sensory stimuli, and so forth. Critical realism. Critical of what it is.

Now, the term critical realism itself comes from the 1920s and 1930s, when there was an American philosophical movement known as critical realism. Which was essentially a continuation of the Scottish realist tradition in the 1920s and 30s. That's what we'll be talking about in a short while.

With this linguistic structure problem, how does an author understand what you've written? He doesn't. Same problem. He doesn't.

Do you ever discover that a teacher finds something in what you've written that you never thought was there? You see, doesn't the literature teacher tell us all the time

that a text begins to take on a life of its own? You see? I find people writing reviews of stuff I write. I want to set them straight all the time. I've given up trying to do it.

But, you see, they think I'm saying something I don't think I am saying. Once in a while, when I get into a conversation with someone, but you said, oh yes, but I didn't mean that. The text says something I certainly didn't intend, consciously.

Was there a subconscious? How do I know? Do I ever really understand what I mean? That's the way the argument would go. Oh, can you tell me about that? I'm rusty on that. Yep, Eleanor Stump.

Can you delineate the levels of interpretation? Yeah. Did she talk more than just an allegory? Yes, yes. Like, you know, you'd read it, and then the author didn't necessarily mean that.

Yeah, I don't remember precisely what that was. I remember very roughly that it was analogous to saying that a given passage has several levels of meaning. So that if you were taking, for instance, the Book of Jonah, just as a hypothetical example, if you take the Book of Jonah, you could read it as a narrative of something which actually happened.

Whether or not it's intended to be or not is another question. But you could read it that way. If you do or if you don't, you can also read it as an analogy to what happened when the people of Israel ran away from God and got swallowed up by the Assyrians.

You see? You could read it as that level of understanding. And, of course, if you're reading it from the standpoint of the New Testament, as some people have tried to, you could read it as anticipating the resurrection of Christ coming out from the jaws of death. You see? Three levels of meaning.

Now, that was the sort of thing. But I don't remember precisely what she meant, so don't read that to her. Didn't she also say that God reveals a meaning once to you? Yeah, yeah.

And that was, I think, the salient thing that stands out in my memory of what she was doing. You remember she talked of a deistic interpretation. Now, obviously, she didn't literally mean deist.

She was just saying that some interpreters act like deists in that they regard interpretation as an entirely human, rational, almost mechanical process. Fixed laws in the absence of God, who established the laws and left us to function by the laws. Sort of a deistic view of interpretation.

And that Aquinas was, she suggested, more of a theistic kind of interpretation, in the sense that God is active in the interpretive process. In showing, illuminating a meaning which might not be accessible by strict mechanical laws of interpretation. And I don't know what to think about that.

Yeah, or at least it seems to open the way to shifting meanings. Or what I sometimes call freshman Bible studies. You know, let's share what the text means to you.

You know, it can mean contradictory things to different people, but we all share our meanings. Well, that's not what she meant, I'm sure. But, you know, I'd like to talk with her further and see how those things fit together.

Yeah, you need checks on it. I guess I want to know if it's just traditional checks. I'm sure she'd say the first check would have to be the text itself.

But if you say the text itself, then you're talking about appropriate rules for handling a text. And if it's participating in the tradition of the church, then you're talking about their faithfulness to the text and what has grown out of the use of the text. Now, there may be, however, two further things.

One is perhaps a rejection of an old distinction between interpretation and application. Okay? And Gadamer explicitly rejects any dichotomy, any complete disjunction between interpretation and application. Because if what interpretation does is to make the text the text for me, it's already applied in the act of interpretation.

Yes. The other thing may be that the suggestion is that the history of the church shows a history of growing theological understanding. Okay? So that the history of theology begins with, for instance, an attempt to understand God, triune, Chalcedonian formulation.

That develops over a period of three centuries, four centuries. And going on through the Middle Ages in trying to understand the atonement, Anselm's Courteous Homo. And trying to understand how we're acceptable to God, the Reformation, justification by faith.

You see, that sort of growing understanding in the history of theology. Things are being clarified and extended as it goes on. It could be that what Aquinas is saying is that that sort of process is the case in the history of the interpretation of any passage.

And just as we ascribe the development of Christian theology to the providential activity of God. So perhaps we should ascribe the history of the interpretation of a

biblical passage to the providence of God. Over spring break, I was down at a college in Tennessee.

And one of the people there gave me a copy of his doctoral dissertation. Which was concerned with the interpretation of a certain passage in one of the gospels. That was crucial to a certain theological issue.

In illustrating the history of interpretation methods. Get it? Now, a large part of the thesis was simply a history of the interpretation of this passage in the gospels. And by looking at the historical development of the interpretation of this one brief passage in the gospels.

He was able to crack open the history of interpretation and the way it varied. Now, is that what's meant by different levels of meaning that open up? Now that would be my guess that that's the direction. But it raised so many issues that we just weren't able to get into them in that one session.

Troy. I'm still wondering how. It seems to me that there are three parties.

And the author, the word, the subject, and the reading. I'm wondering how Gadamer deals with this. Because he has this idea of a historical gap.

It seems like there's more than a historical gap. There's also the gap of the Roman structure. Yes, yes.

What he does is to lay emphasis on the language bridge. Which is part of the culture bridge. Now, if you're talking about two different cultures.

Then the bridge is a narrower one. But it's still there, a cross-cultural bridge of some sort by virtue of commonalities. There's always a human bridge.

But plainly, it's much easier to understand things in your own linguistic and cultural tradition than in another. Now his appeal then is to language. Paul Ricoeur, in his approach, which is in the same general ball field, lays emphasis specifically on the text.

Much more strongly. I think that's Ricoeur who does that. Let me check my notes a little bit.

Somewhere, somewhere, somewhere. Where did it go? Well, in any case. And then there is a man, E.D. Hirsch, at the University of Virginia.

Who, as I recall, also lays emphasis on the text. Incidentally, that's the Hirsch who wrote that book, Cultural Literacy. That was so popular a few years ago.

Maintaining that there are various classic texts that any literate person ought to be acquainted with. His emphasis in interpretation is on the text. So in that sense, the point of connection is the text.

So if you like, the subject and the object, the author, if you like, meet in the text. That's what they're talking about. Now that seems obvious in a way.

But I think it's fair to say that Gadamer has a little more emphasis on intention than Ricoeur and Hirsch, who are more text-oriented. Therefore, with a little more objective check on the interpretation.