

## **A History of Philosophy**

### **69 Nietzsche and Introduction to Phenomenology**

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You remember that last time I was underscoring his voluntaristic view of human nature. The influence of people like Schopenhauer becomes pretty evident in his discussion of the strong-willed and the weak-willed, the Dionysian and the Apollonian, and his view that all of our values are ultimately traceable to this will to power that runs through everything. So that our non-egoistic values are simply a revenge turned inwards against ourselves, and so forth.

Then, as well, we're talking about his naturalism because he finds a biological basis to all of this. A biological basis in the sense that while he thinks as an evolutionary naturalist, his evolutionary theory is not that of Darwinian natural selection. That is far too gradual a kind of process, and all it would produce is weak-willed conformists adjusting to an environment rather than overcoming it.

His biology is rather biological vitalism. That is to say that life is a creative force that pervades all of organic existence. Analogous in some ways if you like to what you read about Bergson in the chapter on Whitehead and Bergson, who sees in all of nature a static as well as a dynamic or creative aspect, tendency, which comes out in two different kinds of human thought.

The analytic and the creative, intuitive. Don't write about two sides of a brain, that's not the kind of biology they're talking about. Biological vitalism, rather.

Now, this biological vitalism is plainly, along with voluntarism, going to affect whatever he says about human knowledge, human thought, and epistemology. And in order to pick up on that in particular, which nowadays I suspect is the most influential part of Nietzsche, because it feeds into postmodernism, in order to pick up on that, would you turn in the anthology to page 323? 323. And you'll be bemused by the first paragraph, even though it's the second paragraph I'm after.

The first paragraph will help you to get the continuity indeed. It says here, after Buddha was dead, people showed his shadow for centuries afterwards in a cave, an immense, frightful shadow. God is dead, but as the human race is constituted, there will perhaps be caves for millennia yet in which people will show his shadow.

And we have still to overcome his shadow. Now, this is his satirical way, you see, of saying, as he does in other contexts, God is dead, but you must become the meaning of the earth. You should be his god, you see.

Well, 109, there on 323, says what this new superhuman needs to guard against, if this is going to be. Let us be on our guard against thinking that the world is a living being. Raises all sorts of questions and says that disgusts me.

And then, eight lines down, let's now be on our guard against believing that the universe is a machine. It's assuredly not constructed with a view to one end. We invest it with far too high an honor with the word machine.

Let's be on our guard against supposing that anything so methodical as the cyclic motions of the neighboring stars obtains generally and throughout the universe. And the bottom line, the general character of the world, on the other hand, is, for all eternity, chaos. Not by the absence of necessity, but in the sense of the absence of order, structure, form, beauty, wisdom, or whatever else our aesthetic humanities are called.

And then on 324, about halfway through that first paragraph, let's be on our guard against saying there are laws of nature. There are only necessities. There's no one who commands, obeys, or transgresses.

When you know there's no design, you also know there's no chance. For it's only where there is a world of design that word chance has a meaning. Let's be on our guard against saying that death is contrary to life.

The living being is only a species of a dead being, a very rare species. Yes, those of the weak-willed are just a living death. Let's be on our guard against thinking that the world eternally creates the new.

There are no eternally enduring substances. Matter is just another error. That's the God of the Eleatics.

Now, look back over that, and you notice that what he is doing is, and I use the word advisedly, deconstructing every known theory about the universe. You see? Here are these attempts at rational explanation, none of which work. That seems to be his point.

You see? So you might just as well say, let's be on our guard against thinking. Period. You see? And I take it that's his main point.

Let's be on our guard against thinking. And if you turn later on to 340... Now, take it back three... Let's see, let's see, let's see, what was the one I was after? That was what, 323? 333, I think it is, that I'm after. No, 326 first, I beg your pardon, 326.

Section 111. On the origin of logic, where has logic originated in men's heads? Undoubtedly out of the illogical. Yes, there's a creative impulse that's unpredictable, irrational, so forth.

The domain, which must originally have been immense. And towards the bottom of the page, no living being would have been preserved unless the contrary inclination to affirm rather than suspend judgment, to mistake rather than wait, to assent rather than deny, to side rather than be in the right, unless that had been cultivated with extraordinary assiduity. The course of logical thought and reasoning in our modern brain corresponds to a process and struggle of impulses, which singly and in themselves are all illogical and unjust.

We usually experience only the result of the struggle. So rapidly and secretly does this primitive mechanism now operate in us. Now, you remember that in people like Hobbes and Spinoza, determinists, there was the notion that the process of reasoning is often just the alternation of alternative emotions, alternative impulses of some sort.

Now, here this is, you see, in nature, with the difference that instead of one being just weighing heavier than the other, and so the decision is made this way, here it's an arbitrary creative force which simply affirms one over against the other. And accordingly, the whole matter of rationality is ultimately an illogical process, with no ground to it. And then on 333, 333, paragraph 4, the falseness of an opinion is not for us an objection.

Now, it's here perhaps that our new language sounds most strange. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we're fundamentally inclined to make the falsest opinions, to maintain that the falsest opinions are the most indispensable to us, that without a recognition of logical fictions, without comparison of reality to the purely imagined world, without a constant counterfeiting of the world, man couldn't live. The renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life.

To recognize untruth as a condition of life, philosophy that ventures to do so has thereby placed itself beyond good and evil. So that the quest for truth is not an issue. That's not the point.

He has a purely instrumental value to the theories and beliefs we come up with. We create them for our own purposes, an expression of the will to power. And so on the next page, page 344, you get some of his rather typical satire addressed to some of your favorite people.

So that half a dozen lines down on 344, he talks of the spectacle of the tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic byways

that lead to his categorical imperative. Makes us fastidious about one's smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Then he says, or still more so, the hocus pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask.

You know, and how can you assault Spinoza with his rigid logic? So he's taking this view of human knowledge, of truth claims, and applying it to those 18th century Enlightenment times, completely. And finally, on page 366, where he's talking of moral knowledge, you have this paragraph. My demand upon the philosopher is that he take his stand beyond good and evil.

That's the title of one of Nietzsche's books from which this is taken. Beyond good and evil, and leave the illusion of moral judgment beneath himself. Moral judgment is illusory.

This demand follows from an insight that I was the first to formulate. He's not afraid of egoism, you see. Any rejection of egoism would simply be an attack on himself.

Keep that in mind. He's a thoroughgoing egoist. But the first to formulate this is that there are no moral facts.

Moral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities that are no realities. Morality is merely an interpretation of certain phenomena, more precisely, a misinterpretation. Moral judgments, like religious ones, belong to a stage of ignorance at which the very concept of the real and the distinction between what is real and imaginary are still lacking.

Thus, truth, at this stage, designates all sorts of things which today we call imaginings. Moral judgments are therefore never to be taken literally. They always contain mere absurdity.

Semiotically, they remain invaluable. Semiotically, that is to say, they are a sign of something. They reveal, at least for those who know, the most valuable realities of cultures and inwardnesses that did not know enough to understand themselves.

So we think our values are objectively real in some way. For those who understand, realize it's simply the wishful thinking language, mere symptomatology. One must know what it's all about to be able to profit from it.

Okay, so no such thing as truth, no objective moral qualities, no basis in reality for moral knowledge, no basis for any kind of knowledge. Now, you see why I write on the board Nietzsche, parentheses, and postmodernism? Because I suspect that in the radical postmodernism of our day, it's Nietzsche who's the most influential force.

That is to say, the postmodernism that has turned from more modest epistemologies still wants to make truth claims, but more modestly so; the radical postmodernism of today has turned from that, from talking about truth altogether, to essentially power politics, you see.

And the politicization of the university, which you read about in the press these days, is simply in the Nietzschean will to power of certain interest groups, you see, turning itself inside out in order to assert that sort of thing. So we create our own truth by virtue of the utility that we force upon those who oppose it. Politicization.

Okay, does that make sense? You see where he's coming from? I should say where he's going, Nietzsche. Okay. He says the same sort of thing in other places.

Let's see. Yeah, here's one. Behind logic stand value judgments, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands for preserving a certain kind of life.

You see, all your arguments prove is something about why you find it necessary to do that at all. And he speaks of positivism with its objective empirical data as a democratic self-glorification of the free intellect. Democratic because anybody can gain empirical data.

You see. And skepticism is a vague physiological quality which in common language is called nervous weakness. A sickness that lacks decisiveness.

Lacks the will to truth. You see. If you don't have the will to power to assert something is true, you're weak-willed.

Nervous weakness. That's sick. Well, and if on the other hand you say to Nietzsche, well, is all this that you're telling us true? You see, I remember asking that in a graduate school course one time, to which the professor responded, Ah, Nietzsche would just have a good belly laugh at that.

And in fact, I find in one of his books, he says one repays a teacher badly if one remains nothing but a pupil. I bid you lose me and find yourselves, and only when you've denied me will I return to you. Get the point? The one thing Nietzsche wanted to insist on is that nothing is true.

Not even what I'm telling you. Not even that. Now, you know, that obviously poses the old liar dilemma from antiquity when a certain Cretan says, All Cretans are liars.

Now, if a Cretan tells you all Cretans are liars, is he telling the truth? If he's telling the truth, he's telling a falsehood. If all Cretans are liars, then he's a liar. But if he's telling you a falsehood, then he's not telling you the truth that all Cretans are liars.

And it's not true that Cretans are liars. You see, and you've got that dilemma. Well, similarly, Nietzsche, you don't know what he means.

Beyond repudiating the quest for any kind of knowledge. Truth. And he is particularly emphatic about that when it comes to ethics and religion.

I think that's particularly right. Okay. Well, I said that he deconstructs various theories about the universe because, of course, deconstructionism is post-modernism in literary interpretation.

The interpretation of anything. Okay. Do you want to comment at all about Nietzsche? Kierkegaard? Yeah.

Yes. Yes. Yeah.

Keep in mind that Nietzsche's underlying thesis, and don't ask me if he thinks it's true. He thinks it's useful at least. You'll see.

His underlying thesis is about the will to power. And it's biologically rooted. This is a useful thesis.

Now, in that case, what drives the evolutionary process is not the desire for some conformity. It's not the desire for harmony and resolving all of the adjustment problems. What drives it is, if you like, red tooth, bloody claw.

We shall overcome. So not Darwinism. But rather this vitalistic, what in Bergson is called creative evolution.

Sudden outbursts of novelty that are unpredictable in terms of all the mechanisms. Okay. That biological vitalism was popular through the 19th century until about 1940, 1950.

The gradual development of biochemistry and the recognition of the Watson-Crick model, and so forth, about DNA and the like. That is so outdated vitalism, you'll see, that we no longer viewed life as itself a creative force distinct from the material elements on which it works. But rather as a function of certain highly complex biochemical compounds.

Different view. So, vitalism is not very popular now. Oh, the emotivism in his ethic.

Yeah, I should have linked that up. That last thing, there are no moral facts. That is to say, there is no truth about right or wrong.

Virtue and vice. There are no objective moral facts at all that can be known. Well, what then are moral judgments? Expressions of emotion, of will to power or weak-willedness, as the case may be.

What are we doing when we approve of something or disapprove of something? We're asserting emotion about that. So you get this emotivist interpretation of ethics, which is paralleled, of course, in positivism, as we'll be finding out in the Anglo-American tradition. It's not simply a subjectivist ethic.

Ethical subjectivism is the view that when I say something is right and wrong, I'm talking about my subjective attitudes. No, for Nietzsche, you're not talking about your attitudes. You're just venting them, putting them to work.

That's something different. Okay. Yeah.

Rorty. No. Yeah, Rorty draws on a number of sources, of whom Nietzsche is one.

Dewey is another. Wittgenstein is another. So there's a whole potpourri of things.

Does Rorty see Nietzsche as making truth claims? I don't think so, but I'd want to go back and check Rorty on that. He seems to call it a natural amendment of his thought. Okay, now I suppose that an inverted Platonism would be to the effect that theory is down here, or better still, ideology is down here.

Would that be it? And factual assertions are up here. So, in that sense, the factual assertions we make are driven by our ideologies. Okay, now you see, I think that would be sort of Nietzschean if you're willing to say that the ideologies are basically expressions of will to power.

Emotion in that sense. Yeah, and that perhaps is helpful because it helps you to see that there are similarities between Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx. Did you get that? You know this much about Nietzsche.

You know something about Freud that he talks about the subconscious. Which asserts itself in all sorts of ways in our thinking as well as our acting. The role of the Oedipus Complex in Freud.

His book, *Moses and Monotheism*, in which belief in God is the projection of an Oedipus Complex. You see? That is to say that the substructure here is the emotional life of Freud. Marx, yeah, there the substructure is the material conditions of existence and the alienation that that creates.

And because of the conditions of alienation, from one's own labor, from one's own self, and so forth, you have again, if you like, a non-rational substructure to the

theories that you develop and the social structures that you build. You see? And if you've read the Communist Manifesto, you find the assertion that all our moral standards are simply expressions of class conflict. So you have this sort of thing in these three.

And the name of Max Weber, the sociologist, belongs along here too. Because while Weber talks a great deal about values, they seem to be relative, the projection of ideologies. You see? Now, you referred to royalty, but another writer who picks up on this very significantly is Alan Bloom.

I'm trying to pull out of my mind the title of Bloom's book, *The Closing of the American Mind*. How many of you have read that? I suspect maybe, except for the center section, in which he deals with these people. At least most people I talk to who've read Bloom haven't read the center section, which is very philosophical.

Maybe you have. I hope so. But Bloom begins that book with the complaint that the contemporary university student talks as if there is no such thing as truth and falsity, right and wrong.

Have you heard that before? Well, you've heard it today. He has lost any sense of personal identity and has no worldview on which to ground any of those things. Now that's his complaint.

Alan Bloom is a professor of social theory at the University of Chicago. Well, what he does is to trace this situation to these continental thinkers, whom he takes to be the source of the problem. I guess my reaction to it, and I wrote a piece responding to it, is that that's not the whole story.

That at least in the English-speaking world, the influence is as much, I think, from the positivist tradition. With its assertion that we, well, the pragmatist tradition, that we only have an instrumental view of truth, meaning. The positivist tradition holds that all values are just expressions of emotion.

You see that whole thing. So there's a complex that has produced that in society. I think perhaps one of the ways in which royalty is different from Bloom is that he pulls in the Anglo-American influences as well as the continental ones.

But this is part of the post-modernism of the day. All right. The influence of Nietzsche philosophically, think of Nietzsche around 1900, his influence philosophically certainly continued well into the first half of this century.

People who sort of echo what he's doing are Carl Jaspers. And most of the literature on existentialism talks about Jaspers, even though I think by now his influence is much diminished. But in the first half of the century, quite prominent.

Jaspers was not satisfied with what Nietzsche was doing. It seemed to him that people like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche put too much of a gap between human subjectivity, that is to say, these deep dimensions of the inner life, of which Nietzsche speaks, and Kierkegaard. Far too much of a gap between those inner dimensions and what he calls the empirical existence, which we have as beings in this world.

If you like, there's too much of a gap between the scientific and the existential. And so what Jaspers does in a book of his called Reason and Existence, existence being the means for existential authenticity, what he does is to point out that it shouldn't be either or, but rather both and. And he distinguishes three dimensions of human being.

There is our empirical existence, what he calls Dasein, literally being there, being there just another object, another entity. There is consciousness as such; there he's thinking of Kant's emphasis on the transcendental ego, Descartes, Cogito Ego Sum; there is that inner mental life. Then, in addition, there is spirit, the term Geist in the European sense that we got familiar with in Hegel, that has to do with cultural creativity.

The third has been stressed by the idealists, the second by the Enlightenment, the third by empirical science. And you don't really have authentic human existence, according to Karl Jaspers, until you have these three dimensions integrated appropriately, embraced by virtue of some ground of being of which we become aware. Some all-encompassing ground of being, the *umgraffende*, is the term he uses.

And what Jaspers talks about then is transcending a purely impersonal, inauthentic, empirical kind of existence. Transcending simply that Enlightenment notion of being a conscious, rational being. Transcending even the life of the culture, do you get the Kierkegaardian note in this? Stages on life's way? Transcending all of that in an act of faith that begins to sound almost as if it's religious.

And the identity, the nature of that transcendent being, the all-encompassing being, is something we only speak of in symbols and ciphers. We can't conceptualize it. It's as if in Hegel's phenomenology of mind, the triad of art, religion and philosophy is such that you can have your artistic symbols, you can have your religious symbols, but there's no synthesis.

That is to say, you can't have the philosophical conceptualization. And so what is involved is an existential kind of attitude rather than a cognitive grasp in the act of faith. Well, Karl Jaspers, an interesting person.

His wife was a Jewess, and when, I forget which city it was, she was liberated by the Allies in the invasion of Germany, it was discovered that Jasper and his wife were listed to be deported to the extermination camp the following week. So he just escaped in that way. All right, Nietzsche.

And I think Jaspers is a good critique of Nietzsche. What he's called is simply one limited aspect of human concern. The creativity of the human spirit, that third dimension without the others.

What I want to do then is to go on to our next particular topic within this business of existentialism. Namely, to try to introduce what phenomenology is in the 20th century. We recognize that the term, the method, is rooted in Hegel, all right.

But 20th-century phenomenology is much more developed, much more complex. And I think even if we're going to simply talk about existentialism, we have to understand phenomenology. The history of the thing goes something like this.

That you have Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the first phase of existentialism in reaction against the Enlightenment. Okay, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. And you notice that their work is indeed descriptive.

It's more like an introspective kind of psychology of self-discovery or something of that sort than anything else. There's no rigorous philosophical method involved. But as you move into the 20th century, you find that the influence of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is combined with the more rigorous phenomenological method that is being developed out of the original Hegelian roots.

A phenomenological method that we usually ascribe in its most rigorous form to the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. Though it also operates earlier and in parallel to Husserl in a whole variety of other philosophers. In the European tradition.

This sort of description is of the structures of the inner consciousness. So that combination then becomes evident in Martin Heidegger, who at one time was the graduate research associate working with Husserl. And then in his thinking, part in company with Husserl in some regards.

And by the same token, people like Sartre. So that Sartre, whom you're reading next week, represents this more philosophically rigorous phenomenological method in an existentialist way. Now, it's appropriate to call Kierkegaard and Nietzsche existential thinkers.

Existentialist. Yes. It's appropriate to call these two people existentialists.

But they're often delineated from the others as phenomenological existentialists. By virtue of the phenomenology. What they use, that is to say, their method is a kind of existential phenomenology.

A phenomenology of human existence. Of the existential dimensions of human existence. But that's not what Husserl's phenomenology was developed to do.

Husserl was more interested in a phenomenology of the transcendental ego. And so his original work is spoken of as transcendental phenomenology to mark it off from existential phenomenology. In no sense would you want to talk about all Husserl and existentialism.

You'd flunk if you do that. What he's doing is developing a method. Now, there are other European writers who appear.

Who also, I think, are more influenced by the earlier Husserl. And among them, I'd list the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I'd list the French philosopher Paul Ricœur, probably the greatest living French philosopher today.

He's still alive, retired. Taught at the University of Chicago for half a year for the last several years. Teaching occasionally at the Université de Montréal.

But still teaching half a year at the Surabat. Now I think he's retired. Incidentally, maybe 20 years ago, we had him as the keynote speaker for our philosophy conference.

When he was teaching in Montreal. He's a French Protestant in the French Reform tradition. Paul Ricœur.

Now, another name influenced by the early Husserl, very much, is Hans-Georges Gadamer. Who is really the main figure? Doesn't look very much like Gadamer, does it? Who's really the major figure in the development of what we call phenomenological hermeneutics?

Because the kind of hermeneutics that talks about subjective grids and influences intruding in the interpretive process. You see? To talk about that involves doing a phenomenology of how the subjectivity is at work in the interpretation. And it's Gadamer who has done that par excellence.

And that subjectivity is given an excessive role in deconstructionists like Paul de Man. But it's Gadamer who really is the key philosophical figure. In the development of that modern hermeneutic.

Incidentally, for those of you oriented to theology, let me say the word hermeneutic is used much more broadly than just in terms of theology. It means interpretation. So it's used in relation to science.

In relation to the social sciences. It's used in interpreting situations. Interpreting human actions.

It's used in history. It's used in literature. All the rest of it.

It's used in terms of reading a philosophical text. So forth. So, that.

Now, what we want to do, first of all, is to get clear on the phenomenological method. We'll start on that today. I want to get clear on that.

I want to say something about what Heidegger does with it. Then, more extensively, of course, Sartre, because you're reading Sartre, as a sample of this phenomenological method. And then I want to say something about the hermeneutical tradition, and particularly Gadamer.

Okay, so that's our agenda through to the end of next week. Now, what is phenomenology? Which, as a philosophical method, dominates European philosophy. In this country, it is dominant in Roman Catholic philosophy.

Due, I might say, to almost a cloak-and-dagger story. The story being this, that in the early days of World War II, or was it just before, word got out to Husserl's former students, he was dead, that the Nazis were going to seize all his writings and destroy them because of his Jewish background. So, in the depths of the night, a Catholic priest who was one of these students secreted all of the Husserl papers in the back of his car and raced across the Belgian border to the University of Louvain, Catholic University of Louvain, and secreted Husserl archives.

Now, the University of Louvain has been a major Catholic university in Europe, very influential. Back in 1878, the Pope had issued an encyclical in the light of all of the religious, social, and philosophical developments of the 19th century, an encyclical called the *Aeterni Patris* of the Eternal Father, calling for a return to the philosophical and theological resources of Thomas Aquinas. This marks the beginning of the Neo-Thomist movement that has continued into the 20th century.

University of Louvain immediately seized the initiative, got on the bandwagon, and became the center for Neo-Thomist studies in Europe. Cardinal Mercier, a French cardinal, located there, wrote vigorously along those lines, maintaining that Thomism was the Christian philosophy of the day. To this day, incidentally, some Catholic philosophers, if you use the phrase Christian philosophy with them, they'll be thinking of Thomas Aquinas.

I remember when the Society of Christian Philosophers was organized some ten or twelve years ago, we were discussing what the society should be called. The initial proposal was that we call it the Society of Christian Philosophy. Then it became apparent that our Catholic friends in the group thought of Christian philosophy as Thomism.

I'd been accustomed to using the term Christian philosophy for a pluralistic tradition of doing philosophy from a Christian perspective, and the ambiguity became evident. So we called it the Society of Christian Philosophers, and that eliminated the ambiguity. But in any case, the fact that in 1945, 46, 45, I guess it was, Louvain woke up to find that the Husserl Archives changed its philosophical identity.

And it became the center for phenomenological studies. And Catholics still going there became phenomenologically oriented. Among them, incidentally, was the present Pope who, going back to Poland, has actually published phenomenological studies of his own.

So, a cloak-and-dagger story. Well, not quite cloak. Yeah, cloak, but not quite dagger.

Okay, on that story. So, the influence there. Phenomenology is not a theory.

I underscore that again. It's not a system of thought. It's not a philosophical position.

It's a method. A project. And phenomenological description, as I've said, goes all the way back to Hegel.

And informally, in people like Jaspers. And some of the other existential writers I've mentioned, like Marcel, Buber, and so on and so forth. But the method as such was formulated by Husserl.

At least a more technical method was formulated by Husserl, who died in 1938. Now, Husserl has three primary concerns. One is what he takes to be the failure of philosophical naturalism.

The failure of philosophical naturalism. Now, he's using naturalism in the sense of purely scientific explanations. Explanations of things.

So, in terms of trying to find the foundations of logic. Yes, on what grounds do the laws of logic rest? Or the foundations of mathematics, which is much the same thing. Or the foundations of natural science.

You see, all of which have presuppositions about human knowledge and truth. In trying to provide those foundations for math, natural science, and logic, all the

naturalist has done is to say they're all due to non-rational processes. Psychological explanations in terms of certain psychological processes, which give rise to identifying this, that, and the other.

If you like, Nietzsche is giving a psychological explanation. Freud is. Or historical explanations.

This is the way it happened historically. Or sociological explanations. Cultural influences.

So, Husserl is criticizing psychologism. Historicism. Sociologism.

Scientism. Now get the isms there. The claim that everything can be explained through those scientific methods.

Including the foundations of logic, mathematics, science, and all human learning. Now, that's what Husserl was opposed to. He wants more solid foundations.

So that logic, mathematics, and philosophy can really be founded on unquestionable premises. In other words, he wants a new foundationalism. He wants a new foundationalism.

And his idea is that the phenomenological method can get us back to those foundations. That's in the very structure of human nature. The structure of consciousness.

Incidentally, last year we had Dallas Willard from the University of Southern California speaking. Did any of you hear him? He gave a series of lectures against postmodernism. Against the anti-realism of the day.

Now, Willard is a Husserl specialist. And his argument was drawing on the phenomenological method in order to oppose the postmodernism and anti-realism of the day. In other words, trying to say that phenomenological description can open up a sufficient understanding of certain structures of consciousness.

To avoid skepticism, the relativism that is involved in that anti-realistic view. I'll come back to that in a little while. The second concern that he has about naturalism is that it perpetuates the subject-object dichotomy.

Perpetuates the subject-object dichotomy because it wants to talk simply about objective matters. Historical causes, objectifying psychological processes, and sociological processes. It's only interested in objectivist explanations that exclude the role of human subjecthood.

There is, therefore, a loss of the creativity of the constructive contribution of the human spirit. That is to say, the naturalist has bypassed the Kantian Copernican revolution. So what Husserl wants is a new foundationalism that acknowledges Kant's Copernican revolution.

It must be a science of the creative, constructive activities of the human spirit in organizing experience. And that is why it has to be a phenomenology of the transcendental ego. That ego that transcends all of the particulars of concrete experience.

That ego which is, in Kant, the thing that has the forms and the categories all nicely schematized in a transcendental unity of apperception. He wants to take a much closer look at that sort of thing. Well, next time we'll try to say how he does it.