A History of Philosophy
64 American Pragmatism
By Dr. Arthur Holmes of Wheaton College

The end of the hour on Friday, when we finished some commenting on Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, said that we'd try and take some time at the outset today for any discussion that you'd like. So realizing that heated up leftovers on Monday aren't always exactly things we're ready for, this, in order to summarize the change that's represented from what's gone before, at least from classical metaphysics, instead of substance, some enduring identity of a substance being the ultimate reality, its process. And the ingredients are events that come and go.

So there's no enduring identity through extensive periods of time, though there are enduring strains in long, extended events. After all, the history of the cosmos is an extended event. The change is, of course, from the 18th-century mechanist model to the organic model, if you're thinking of this business with model 1, model 2, model 3. So it is the development of new science in the 19th century, developmental biology, something other than mechanistic explanations of life, and relativity physics, energistic physics, breaking down the solidity of matter, so forth.

And so that more organic, if you like, relational model, it's worth noting, perhaps, that Whitehead remains a quantitative pluralist, that is to say, in terms of how many events there are. Obviously, many, many, many, many events. How many processes are there? Oh, endless processes.

He's a quantitative pluralist, numerically. But in terms of the nature of those events and processes, they're all fundamentally the same, qualitative monism. So the same description of an event applies to God and to a particular sense perception that we have.

So qualitative monism. It seems to me that that's the source of some of his problems, that he gives insufficient weight to qualitative distinctions between God and creation. And again, if you like, between the human person and natural phenomena.

The person is, in a sense, a natural phenomenon. There's something distinctive about persons. So it's that qualitative monism which seems to overgeneralize and to bring everything into the same process.

The mechanist model, of course, had external relations as in the causal interaction of Descartes' mind-body dualism. In the organic model, the relations are internal and are of the very nature of the terms of the relationship. Internal relations.

Because of the external relations, the 18th century was able to seek and claim complete objectivity of knowledge. The mind is a passive recipient of data, you see. And while Kant upset that apple cart, by the time you get to Whitehead, subject-object continuum.

Well, that is to say, in every knowing situation, I'm tripping over this code here. In every knowing situation, there is already what is contributed by antecedent events before the new data comes in. And in addition to that, there's the decision that's made in terms of the eternal possibilities that are offered in the new event.

So the subjective as well as the objective contribute in this case. And of course, of major concern to Whitehead is the fact-value separation in the mechanistic view, which gives way in Whitehead to the unity of fact and value in the overall teleological nature of ISCI. And obviously, there's a lot here that's very important.

I find this extremely helpful. His criticism of the fact-value separation. And then his criticism of the mechanistic model.

My complaint is about his universalization of the organic model, the way he describes it. It seems to me that just as for most in this tradition, they'll say that the organic model, now take it back, the mechanistic model may apply to some things that do indeed operate quite mechanically. And the organic model, all right, may be an overarching sort of thing with regard to mechanistic phenomena.

There seems to be a need for something else, a more personalistic model. And I think that's the sort of thing that you find in some of the personalistic existentialism. People like Kierkegaard, Martin Buber, and so forth, are trying to emphasize the category of person as distinct from anything else.

All he can do for a person is to say that you and I as persons have continuity in terms of some strain carried by memory, which maintains certain qualities in this stream of experience through the years, which is you, personal identity carried by the stream of experience. And that's a slim sort of identity. In fact, articles have been written saying that Whitehead's ethic really doesn't provide a basis for holding anybody accountable, simply because of the successive events without one continuous agent.

Who can today be held accountable for yesteryear, or perhaps even yesterday? So there are problems that arise in that sort of an ethic. Well, that's my summation of what we've been talking about all last week. Do you want to pursue this at all? Or is it, after the weekend, cold? Janelle.

In talking about what he pursues as reality, it seems to me that it's an overall kind of feeling that it's a process. And yet, he says that you don't want to misplace, you don't want the fallacy to misplace concretion. This process seems very abstract.

And then I went back and looked at the category, the ultimate, as something that pulses through everything. But this pulse and creativity are still abstract to me. And yet, he gives it concreteness.

I wonder if you're using the term abstract in a different sense than he is. I wonder if what you're saying is that this is a novel concept, which I still don't have a firm handle on. Abstract in the sense that I have difficulty pinning it down as something immediately experienced.

Whereas, I think he would use the term abstract to mean it's a mental construct quite unrelated to experience. Whereas the process, as he describes it, he believes, is really descriptive of experience. You haven't really assimilated the description.

Maybe that's what he would say. Do you get it? It takes a while for the descriptive words to get beyond the words into something that really captures the experience. You might try seeing if his description of an event applies to other things than a moment of sense perception.

Take, for instance, an event like what do you want to say, going to college for the first time. Do you remember that event? I presume you do. Strange, it felt.

You came with that odd combination of adolescent gawkiness, self-confidence, and complete uncertainty and apprehension. Well, open-ended event, you see. In other words, you come with a history, some ongoing experience that's given.

Then it hits you with objective data. Such as what? Well, the orientation thing. Having to find your way around a strange campus.

Teachers who seem to expect you to do things independently. Whatever else it is. And these all fit into the hopper, and there are all sorts of possibilities that could emerge from that.

One of the possibilities is that you select out from the whole range of things some ideal, some goal you're going to pursue. You're not going to be siphoned off into all the extraneous things. You're going to get an education.

Subjective aim. The decision. And so the course is set.

That's the event. And then you can describe the subsequent events growing out of it. Here, as a freshman, you're in Philosophy 101.

The objective data of that course. What are you going to do with it in yourself? And for Whitehead, the importance is not what you do with it, utility style, but what you

do with it in the sense of assimilating it into yourself. What does it make of you? What does it do to you? There are various possibilities.

And a great deal depends on that decision, conscious or otherwise, which selects among those possibilities. If you describe an event in that simple style of the objective data, it's very broadly applicable. I guess I'd say if you find that description abstract, you'll say, reflect on it, and doesn't it fit? You'll say in a good description, it's one that fits.

Yeah, when we singled out the move from mechanistic model to organic model, back value separation and back value unity, I'm wondering what's unique in the move from mechanistic model to organic model that's not already intrinsic in the move from substance to process and from external... Yeah, I'm not sure that I'd buy that form of a thing. It seems to me that this is the basic thing. And then once he defines the process in terms of events following the threefold description, threefold ingredients, then you begin to see that this is an organic model.

These are internal relationships. There is this subject-object continuum. So these are all ingredients in his description of the process.

Yeah, you're right there. These are not separate items. This is simply unpacking the one concept.

Which is another way of saying that this is a beautifully coherent scheme. David? I'm just pursuing an idea that came up when I was reading Saxon Modernism. Can you hear David back in the corner? Bob? A bit louder, please, David.

What I was reading about is this. On page 54 of his book, he talks about how if poets had followed a mechanistic, rather than reactive, worldview, they would have written poetry about the human mind, instead of writing poetry about nature. If they had been consistent.

Didn't that happen as well? I don't know much about literature, but didn't they talk about the greatness of the human mind during that time period? You're thinking of Alexander Pope's essay on man, for instance. Where he says the proper study of mankind is man. Yeah, they do.

But they still, while writing about and exalting the human reason, they still take this objectivist stance. So in that sense, they're not consistent. They're not consistent.

Taking an objectivist stance, they regard primary qualities as objective. They think they're being quite objective about the secondary qualities, which are effects of primary qualities on their own sensory apparatus. The inconsistency is if they ascribe those secondary qualities to things out there.

As if the rose is indeed red. As if the rose indeed smells. You see.

I could see that some of them might say, oh listen, there are just verbal conventions and shortcuts. When you say the sun rises, you don't mean the sun's moving, do you? When you say the rose is red, you don't mean the rose is red, do you? You know, the sun rises; the sun appears to rise from our standpoint. The rose looks red from our standpoint.

So they could defend themselves that way. In which case I suppose what Whitehead says in that regard is not so much a criticism as a rhetorical expose of the problem of developing an aesthetic of objective aesthetic values on a mechanistic basis. And indeed, as you look at the aesthetic theories of that period, Hume, for instance, sees the aesthetic more in terms of subjective feelings, passions, taste, that sort of thing.

What pleases our taste. You see. So it's not that there is aesthetic value intrinsic in the rose.

The aesthetic value is in its user satisfaction. As with moral value in user satisfaction, the utilitarian direction. You see.

Does that make sense? Okay. Do you want about this juncture in the course to have a free for all discussion some late afternoon or evening? Would that be helpful? Hegel? Post-Hegelian stuff through Whitehead, or shall we wait till we're through with Dewey? What's your choice? Come again? Let's do it after Dewey. After Dewey? Okay.

After Dewey, it is. Which means sometime next week. I'll try to identify a time.

Next week will be better than this week for me anyway. This week looks like a busy one. All right.

Now, let's turn our attention, shall we, then to American pragmatism. And let me initially, before I say anything else, say there are similarities between pragmatism and process philosophy. In fact, years ago, for the philosophy conference, we did the conference on process metaphysics in which Whitehead was discussed, and Dewey was discussed, because Dewey's also is a process metaphysic of a different sort.

And you'll find a lot of the terminology that we're getting acquainted with in Whitehead comes out in Dewey. No, not his technical description of events and that sort of thing, but the terms concrete and abstract. Dewey, too, has some notion of an event that's at the heart of his thing.

He calls it a situation, a problem situation. The emphasis certainly is on process. The model is organic.

The relationships are internal and not external. There's a rejection of sheer objectivity in knowing for some sort of subject-object continuum. And there's an attempt again to find a fact-value unity rather than fact-value separation.

So I put these things about Whitehead on the board in order to spark some discussion on Whitehead, but they serve a double purpose. They serve a double purpose. I'll take off this business of qualitative and quantitative.

I'm not quite sure I want that. But otherwise, I think it can serve Dewey as well as Whitehead. Now, with that in mind, some general characteristics of American pragmatism.

First of all, some general characteristics. And the first is, as you might gain from the term pragmatic, it asserts the primacy of the practical over the theoretical. The primacy of the practical over the theoretical.

Or if you like, the primacy of concrete experience over abstraction. So, Janelle, that should please you too. The primacy of the concrete over abstraction.

And for Dewey and James and so forth, as for Whitehead, the British empiricists are guilty of abstraction. So that the appeal to the concrete is an appeal to the concrete in, shall we say, the Hegelian sense. Where Hegel's dialectic moves from the abstract to the concrete.

The concrete being concrete experience. Experience as it is lived. Rather than experience as it is theorized in people like Locke and Berkeley.

With their theory of simple ideas and so forth. So, the primacy of the practical, of the concrete. Their concern is with the relationship between thinking and doing.

Or, as the language is in some traditions like Marxism, the relationship of theory to praxis. Their concern is to see experience holistically as not just cognitive, but affective experience. And incidentally, you can get that in Whitehead as well.

Not just conceptual prehension, but physical prehension. The cognitive and the affective. So that you find pragmatists objecting to intellectualism.

James uses that phrase for wanting a logical theory for theory's sake. Or spectator empiricism, which is Dewey's label for Locke. Spectator empiricism.

You know the epithets that some people cast at spectator sports. Like, let's say, football. Where you have a handful of people getting, as they say, too much exercise.

And several tens of thousands are getting too little. Spectator sports. Dewey's point is that experience is reduced to a spectator sport by John Locke.

Rather than an active involvement. Misconception of experience. Experience is active, not passive.

Or the quest for certainty in the Descartes tradition. John Locke's tradition, as far as we can. Dewey has a book by that title, The Quest for Certainty, in which he disparages the quest for certainty.

For pragmatic purposes, who needs certainty? The quest for certainty is a misguided quest. All you need is practical certainty. Practical confidence.

Sufficient to act on. Now, underlying all of this appeal to the practical, to concrete experience, is an underlying thesis that experience is reality. Experience is reality.

And in case you are still thinking of experience as consisting of Locke's simple ideas, which are merely representations of reality, two comments. One, perhaps the pragmatist would say, human experience is our reality. Which is what a sociologist of knowledge would likely say.

Human experience is our reality. Meaning, the thing as it is for me. Oh, and you begin to see a phenomenalism in the pragmatism.

A phenomenalism in pragmatism. I had a graduate professor who said one day, to the surprise of many people in the class, that to his mind, pragmatism and positivism amounted to the same thing. There's no difference between them.

They're both equally bad. That was his introduction to a course on another alternative. You see, in the days when pragmatism and positivism were the big things.

But human experience is our reality. My other comment is that's the Hegelian tradition. Because what Hegel was trying to do, you see, was to look through the lens of self-consciousness.

Of human experience. And finding the dialectic unfolding in human experience of anything. Projecting that onto the whole of reality.

So very much in the Hegelian tradition. In Dewey, you'll find that especially. In Dewey's early years, he was part of the American neo-Hegelian tradition.

His first publications were articles in a journal called The Monist. Interesting title. The Monist.

Which, in those days, was the Journal of the Hegelians. Hegel, the absolute monist. Well, The Monist went out of circulation for a long time.

When it came back in, it was simply a journal interested in metaphysical topics. But in Dewey's day, it was the Hegelian journal. So, really, what you have in Dewey is another Hegelian converting Hegel to a naturalistic basis.

Now, Whitehead was converting Hegel's disciple Bradley to a naturalistic basis. Dewey was converting the old man to a naturalistic basis. Or perhaps he was converting the American disciple Josiah Royce.

But it's this Hegelian tradition again. Okay, so that's the first characteristic. The primacy of the practical over the theoretical.

The primacy of concrete experience. The second characteristic is the emphasis on organic relationships. Organic relationships.

And again, that should ring a Whiteheadian bell. The organic relationship. Yeah, the interconnectedness.

So, to varying degrees, the pragmatists are all critical of the atomistic view of experience represented by John Locke's simple ideas. Ideas that come without any intrinsic relationships to anything else. The relationships are purely external.

In the sense that the laws of association impose relationships on them. Well, that sort of thing is taboo. James speaks of the stream of consciousness.

A stream of consciousness, an interrelated thing. Organic relationships within the whole stream of consciousness. And Dewey speaks of present experience as looking forward to, as referring to future experience.

And you see that in his notion of an idea. Because an idea, for Dewey, is an idea about what we do in the future. Where do you get your ideas? From past experience.

That is to say, into the future. They're all interrelated, you think. So that organic interrelatedness, then, is fundamental.

And it's for that reason that they refuse any dualisms of mind and body. There's an interrelatedness of the physical and the mental. They refuse any dualism of fact and value.

Separation of fact and value. Values emerge in the context of experience and in relationship to future experience. So the interconnectedness of things.

And then the third characteristic, philosophical naturalism. Philosophical naturalism. Naturalism is used, the term naturalism is used in two senses.

One, methodological naturalism. And the second, metaphysical. Methodological naturalism is, of course, referring to the methodology of the natural sciences.

So the methodological naturalist universalizes the use of the scientific method. The scientific method is applied to every kind of inquiry. And you'll find that's one of the dominant themes in Dewey's book, The Reconstruction of Philosophy.

The reconstruction he wants is a reconstruction by means of the universal application of the scientific method. If you like experimental thinking. He has a book called Essays in Experimental Logic.

The universalization. And I think that it's fair to say that's the case with William James as well. We'll see that in regard to James.

His famous pragmatic view of truth is really the view that you want experimental confirmation of a hypothesis. That's the way to test for the truth of a belief. And Charles Sanders Peirce, we'll see, says the scientific method is the way to fix a belief amidst the ebb and flow of ideas that are unstable.

Scientific method. So methodological naturalism, pretty clearly. Metaphysical naturalism, methodological naturalism in all of them.

Metaphysical naturalism, I think, is very explicitly in Dewey. Not in James. James is a theist of sorts.

Oh, it's a finite god that James seems to have. God is limited in power. But he's a theist of sorts.

But Dewey is very explicitly a metaphysical naturalist. All that there is are natural processes. Natural processes that are amenable to evolutionary explanation.

And so you'll find that in Reconstruction in Philosophy, he not only wants to universalize the application of the scientific method, but he also wants to universalize evolutionary explanation. And treat the history of philosophy as itself an evolutionary process. Theory of natural selection.

This eliminates any fixed forms, fixity of species, and such. So forth. So these three characteristics, the primacy of the practical, the organic interrelatedness of everything, and methodological naturalism, are metaphysical in Dewey's case.

Clear enough? Terminology familiar enough? So I assume it at least registers sufficiently to be mulled over. Okay, let me say some things, then briefly about Charles Sanders Peirce. If pragmatism means to you, if the term means to you relativism, a relativistic theory of truth, then Peirce is not a pragmatist.

In fact, to disassociate himself from the other two I've listed, Peirce preferred to call himself a pragmatist. A pragmatist. The point being that Peirce did believe in the objectivity of truth.

The objectivity of right and wrong. He was, in fact, a practicing scientist. Worked with the United States Coastal Survey.

And was simply sold on the scientific method as a way of knowing. But it's Peirce's work, and he called it Peirce rather than Peirce's work, it is, which laid the foundation for James and Dewey. And so the history of American pragmatism is always told beginning with Peirce.

One of the interesting things from our standpoint is that his two most influential articles appeared in Popular Science Monthly, which isn't exactly the place you go for philosophical edification these days. But in 1877, he published an article called The Fixation of Belief. And in 1878, another one called How to Make Our Ideas Clear.

Now, plainly, the first of these is dealing with the question of ensuring truth. The second is dealing with the question of meaning. How do we get at the meaning of something, and how do we make our ideas clear? And really, in both regards, the answer is the same.

Look at the practical consequences. Look at the practical consequences. If you want to know whether a conception that you have, an idea that you have, a theory you have, if you want to know what it means, ask what it means in practice.

What would it mean if it were put into operation? And in The Fixation of Belief, the same essentially applies with regard to ascertaining the truth of a matter. If you want a belief to be fixed with confidence, there are various ways that you might go about it. He rejects three of the ways and advocates the fourth.

The first is the method of tenacity, which says, in effect, I'm not going to change my mind, whatever you say. Don't face me with the facts, I've got my mind made up. The method of tenacity.

And his point, obviously, is that there is no way of ascertaining the truth. It may be a way of fixing a belief in your mind, but not a way of ensuring truth. The second is the method of authority.

The problem there is that there are conflicting authorities. So how do you judge between conflicting authorities? And what they say. The third is the method of tradition.

Whose tradition? Whose convention? And of course, that's very much like the method of authority. So what he advocates is the scientific method. Scientific method.

Not some a priori tradition that affirms something prior to any observation. But rather the method of confirmation of a hypothesis. Where there is an appeal to public evidence within the community of observers, the scientific community.

A process that is self-corrective. I should have said that the method of tradition is an appeal to what various traditions find intuitive. His point is that intuitions vary from tradition to tradition.

So this is what he's advocating. Now, why not the old concerns for rational proof? Why not the foundationalist approach of finding first principles and then deducing from that? And that really gets to the nub of the matter. Because what Peirce is doing, basically, is critiquing the Cartesian tradition.

And here I have a print-off that will get that before you. Oh, you've got one. Okay, everybody got one? Okay, let me have any spares afterwards if you would.

You notice that this is taken from his collected papers, which is what everybody goes to in trying to get at Peirce. Most of it was essays. Most of his writings were essays.

Notice that he says at the beginning that Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, distinguishes it from scholasticism as follows. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt, whereas scholasticism never questioned fundamentals. The ultimate test of certainty is found in the individual consciousness.

Stove-heated room alone. An intuitive test for truth is always private. Scholasticism had rested on the testimony of the sages and the Catholic Church.

Third, the multiform argument of the Middle Ages involved many reasons and arguments for a certain position. Remember Aquinas? How many arguments will he give for something? The multiform argumentation of the Middle Ages is replaced by a single thread of inference, often depending on inconspicuous premises. Think of

Descartes' Meditations and how one thing follows another all the way through to the end.

Number four, scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things. While there are many facts that Cartesianism not only does not explain but renders absolutely inexplicable, except to say God makes it so. Now, in some or all of these respects, most modern philosophers have been Cartesians.

And I think you can see how that is essentially true up to Kant, at least. And his response follows. On point one, we cannot begin with complete doubt.

Why not? Well, we always miss something that we haven't thought to doubt because we weren't aware of our own assumptions, not always aware of our own beliefs. Yeah, beliefs. You may not be aware of your own beliefs.

That is to say, you say, oh, yeah, I guess I do believe that when somebody points it out to you because you're taking it for granted. So we cannot begin with complete doubt. In practical terms, it's not possible.

Second, the same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: whatever I'm clearly convinced of is true. Well, obviously, the quest becomes moot because if everybody were convinced, then there would be no further question. And there's a great deal of difference between being convinced and something being true.

I had a friend who used to say when somebody said to him, well, that's perfectly self-evident. My friend would say, well, it may be to you, it isn't to me. You know, and by implication, even if it were to me and everybody else, so what? His point is that clarity and distinctness are criteria of meaningfulness rather than truth.

To say it's clear and distinct means, oh, I see what you mean, rather than necessarily it's true. Though sometimes truth rides piggyback on meaning. Number three, philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods and to trust the multitude and variety of those arguments rather than the conclusiveness of any one.

That's like saying Descartes put too much stock in mathematical method, which, of course, in continental science in his day was the method of continental science, dominantly optics and mechanics. But in later experimental science, mathematics is not the method. It's just one.

The experimental method is far more significant. And then number four, every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable ultimate. In short, something resulting from mediation itself, not susceptible of mediation.

Now that anything is thus inexplicable can only be known by reasoning from science. Well, the only justification of an inference from science is that the conclusion explains the fact. To explain, to suppose the fact inexplicable is not to explain it.

And hence the supposition is never allowed. And he repeats some things written in opposition to Cartesianism, saying we have no power of introspection. We have no power of intuition.

We have no power of thinking without signs. And so we have no conception of what's absolutely incognizable. That is to say, if you can't think without signs and you don't have any signs for what's not thinkable, then you can't think of the unthinkable.

I suspect that the last sentence has reference to a British philosopher around the same period. Herbert Spencer, who divided all he wanted to write about into the knowable and the unknowable. And it became quite a quip among his contemporaries to say how much Spencer seemed to know about the unknowable.

If you cannot talk about it, and so forth. But I take it that in addition to saying this with regards to lots, something I know not what, any of those unknowables that we cannot speak of. And later on, Wittgenstein will tell us that of that which we cannot speak, we should keep silent.

Which is like telling some people to shut up. Well, that's Peirce then. Notice that this has the marks of, what shall we say, another methodological revolution.

You see, Descartes represents a methodological revolution in philosophy from the scholastic method. Bacon's methodological revolution of the inductive method. Kant, the methodological revolution of the transcendental method.

Trying to get at the subjective preconditions of the possibility of. And now, another methodological revolution in experimental methods. Scientific method, universalized.

Well, as I say, Peirce was a realist. He believed there were universal laws of nature. There are objects, what he called reals.

Not R-E-E-L, but R-E-A-L. He wasn't just fishing, even though he was in the coastal survey. Objective realities that can be known.

Now, it's this methodological naturalism, then, methodological naturalism. The methodology of natural science is universalized. It's this methodological naturalism that is picked up by the pragmatists proper.

James and Dewey are the outstanding ones. James calls pragmatism a method of settling philosophical disputes. Which sounds sort of like the fixation of beliefs.

How to fix a belief, how to settle disputes. A method of settling philosophical disputes. By anticipating the consequences of a belief.

And seeing if those consequences actually occur. The same pattern as with experimental verification of hypotheses. However, it's important to see that in James, it's not just a matter of simply fixing beliefs that way.

You have to watch the concept of experience. This is what changes. And here you see the difference, not so much from Descartes, who was Peirce's antagonist, but rather Locke, with his analysis of experience into simple ideas.

Passively received. Conjoined or separated in terms of the psychological processes of association, merely. That atomising of experience.

Now, instead of atomistic experience, what James is after is a more holistic, interrelated, if you like, and organic experience. Experience in that sense. Which is much more experience in the sense that we actually experience it.

Do you remember trying to get the idea of what an atomistic sense datum is? You see, an atomistic sense datum is not a patch of color. It's a patch. Color is a separate atomistic sense datum that you impose on the patch.

You see, the whole notion of an atomistic sense datum, an experience in that sense, is a high level of abstraction. You see? Concrete experience does not separate primary and secondary qualities, does not atomize into simple ideas. Concrete experience is a continuum, a stream, a process.

And so it's this concrete experience that he's after. But with James, concrete experience is always psychological experience. It's not a question of what are you thinking, but how are you feeling it.

Not what are you thinking, but how are you feeling it. And notice how different those are in our common ways of talking. You see, by and large, in class, I say to you, well, what do you think? What's on your mind? As if the experience you are having is one of thinking ideas, thinking theories.

But James is talking of experience not in that sense, which is the objectivizing sense. He's talking about experience rather than how you feel about this? You see? How do you feel about it? Do you feel some inattention? In your experience, do you feel

inattentive? Or do you feel satisfied? Now, get that? Inattentions, satisfied. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

Satisfaction, one of Whitehead's terms. Do you feel inattentive? Do you feel satisfied? You see? The psychological experience. The fact of the matter is, as you likely have read, if you've been reading on Stumpf for this week, that James's initial education was in medicine.

Emphasis on physiology. He got into psychology by studying for a while in the first experimental psych labs in Germany in the 19th century, late 19th century. Physiological psychology experimentally.

Get the scientific method background? Now, that was before psychology was thought of as a separate science. I think it was until 19, was it 1910, 1911, the Journal of Philosophy was called the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, Scientific Method, etc. A mouthful.

The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, Scientific Method, etc. So when James came back to this country and got a job teaching psychology at Harvard, he was in the Department of Philosophy. He never took a course in philosophy in his life.

And gradually moved from writing about physiological psychology to writing about introspective psychology to writing about philosophical psychology to writing about philosophy. Oh, in those days, much more possible to do that than now. It wasn't until after World War II that philosophy really started becoming highly technical, highly specialized.

But particularly back then, it was sort of the intellectual inquiry that any educated person could read. That's why Peirce could publish in Popular Science Monthly and make an influence. You try doing that now.

So with that, you find James, for instance, writing a book on varieties of religious experience, psychology of religion. Now, admittedly, philosophers are still interested in religious experience. And the argument for religious experience.

Some of you may remember Yandel's lecture from last year. They're interested in religious pluralism. Not just theologians, as this week.

But philosophers are interested in religious pluralism as well. Yandel gave a lecture on that last year. So he's interested in concrete experience on the basis of his, or under the influence of, his psychological condition, psychological preparation.

So the question then, in terms of fixing belief, in terms of understanding the meaning of a philosophical theory, is what does it mean psychologically? So he defines materialism. Now here's his definition of materialism. Pragmatic definition.

Materialism means the denial that moral order is eternal and the cutting off of ultimate hopes. In contrast to materialism, what he calls spiritualism, roughly equated in his vocabulary with theism, means the affirming of an eternal moral order and letting loose of hope. So, the reference point in defining materialism as against theism, antithetical worldviews, the reference point is the psychology of hope.

The psychological experience of hope. How do you test for the truth? And his answer is simply, if it provides you with the experience of hope, that sort of satisfaction, then we say the theory has cash value. It works.

And truth, he defines simply as workability. Truth is workability. So, from the psychological cash value of a belief, he backs up to a redefinition of truth.

And he can do this because of this pragmatic view that experience is our reality. So the reality we experience is the reality of hope or no hope. And it's that which is referred to when we speak of truth.

Well, time is gone, but I'll sum this up and give a couple more examples of how he applies it next time, and then we'll move into John Dewey.