

A History of Philosophy

57 Hegel

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Well, we're starting then to read Hegel. I'm not unrealistic enough to expect that you have already read Hegel since you've just been doing an examination. But you will find that Hegel, when you get his vocabulary and his style, is fairly straightforward reading; he seems verbose.

There's a little book by Brent Blanchard called *On Philosophical Style*, the literary style, if you can call it that, of philosophers, in which he suggests that people like Jonathan Swift and George Bernard Shaw would say that Major Andre was hanged. F.H. Bradley, who was a British idealist at the turn of the century, would say that he was killed. One of his colleagues, Bozenkett, would say he died.

Kant would say his mortal existence achieved its termination. And Hegel would tell us that a finite determination of infinity had been further determined by its own negation. But if you were listening, you caught in that final statement of what it means to say that Major Andre was killed, you caught an expression of Hegel's dialectic.

Listen to it once again. A finite determination of infinity. Yes, the infinite, the absolute, the all-inclusive being.

Now, a finite determination of that, that's an individual. Okay, the thesis. He exists.

Had been further determined by its own negation. Yes, his existence is negated, giving further specificity to that event, to that period in history. So, to say a person is killed comes, you see, with all sorts of trailing implications.

And what Hegel is doing is simply seeing the simple idea that this guy was killed as part of a much larger picture. Well, it may be a matter of literary style, but quite plainly the philosophical framework that he's working with comes out in his style. So, let me start our discussion of Hegel by reminding you of the things that I said last time concerning these German idealists generally.

I may not be realistic, I may not be unrealistic enough to think that you've already read Hegel, having just done an exam, but I am realistic enough to think that you have likely forgotten what we said about the German idealists last time. So, let's pick up a little bit there. I said we were going to get a new metaphysic, absolute idealism, in which every individual event and entity is an expression of the all-inclusive process.

So that your self-consciousness is just a passing moment in the self-consciousness of the divine. The divine is working out its full freedom and self-expression in the course of history. So Hegel saw, for instance, Napoleon.

They were, after all, contemporaries. He saw Napoleon that way as embodying in an individual way, distinctive, but in a world-significant way, the free, creative movement of the spirit of a culture in history. Overcoming all opposition in the past.

The sovereignty of the creative spirit. Now, this is obviously not a mechanistic cause-effect model. It's a process model that sees organic interrelatedness of everything within the all-inclusive one.

So, if you're talking about the place of Napoleon in history, Hegel would do it this way: that all history converges on that individual, that event, and all history opens up from that point on. History gave birth to Napoleon. And the Napoleonic event is pregnant with all the future history.

So, he calls Napoleon a world-historical figure. A world-historical figure. One in whom the past is summed up, and one that is loaded with the future.

The notion of process, organic interrelatedness, and the very figures of speech are biological figures. So, that metaphysical monism, absolute idealism, a monistic idealism, everything is spirit at work, freedom bursting out all over, is Hegel, very much a romanticist. Now, while that's one side of his metaphysic, it is, I think, one which has come to be appreciated more in the 20th century, perhaps the second half, second two-thirds of the 20th century, than it was appreciated in the early part of the 20th century.

If you pick up works on Hegel that were written in the period from 1900 to about 1930, 40, you'll find that he's depicted as a rationalist rather than a romanticist. And, well, maybe, but certainly not in the 18th-century sense. He's depicted as a rationalist because he says that the rational, no, the real is rational, and the rational is real.

So, he seems to be saying that whatever you decide is rationally necessary, that's the way reality is, which sounds very rationalistic. But what does he mean by the statement? That's the question. What does he mean by the statement? He means that the real is a creative manifestation, everything that's real is a creative manifestation, oopsie, I'm not even spelling it right, manifestation of mind, spirit.

That's what the real is. And so, of course, to say that everything that's real is a creative manifestation of spirit is to say, in that sense, it's as rational as spirit is. The real is rational.

And to say that the rational is real is simply to say that the categories of thought which structure creative thinking and creative activity, that the categories of thought are also categories of reality, which is, of course, just what Aristotle had thought. That the categories of thought are also categories of reality. So that when we get into his logic in just a little while, we'll be seeing that he spells out all sorts of categories, logical categories, that remind you, in a way, of Kant's categories.

Kant had said the categories of thought are purely subjective; they're only categories of thought. Hegel says phooey, they're categories of reality, except that he says it in German. How did he move from Kant's position to his position? Well, that's what we'll have to see.

Obviously, a good question. But the categories of thought are also categories of reality. So keep in mind that the starting point for Hegel is the all-inclusive creative spirit whose creativity is being freely manifested in the ongoing movement of history.

Now that's the second theme in his metaphysics, but there's a third theme. And the third theme, in a way, is an echo of the earliest Greek thought, Now, if you can cast your mind back to about 400 or 500 B.C., or alternatively just to last August and September, you'll remember that even before the pre-Socratics got going, in the Greek poets like Hesiod, to some extent Homer, Sophocles, Aeschylus, there's the recognition that the universe as a whole is an ordered unity, of which a just society, a well-ordered society, a city-state is a microcosm, of which a just person with a well-ordered moral life is a further mini-cosm. So that you get this macrocosm-microcosm business.

And the individual and the historical state and the universe as a whole are all made in the same image. Ordered unity. Now, that's what underlay the Logos concept of the pre-Socratics and the theory of forms that develops in Plato.

You remember that story, I hope. Well, Hegel likewise, and he uses the term Logos. Hegel sees the individual as a microcosm of the whole.

You're a microcosm of what absolute spirit is. You're in the image of God. And the state, and he's thinking of the nation-state since this is Romanticism in the 19th century, and the nation-state is a further microcosm of the whole, a manifestation of creative spirit at work in history.

You see? So, when we get to his major work, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, the German term is Geist, which is perhaps better translated as spirit, like the old Anglo-Saxon word, ghost, Geist. In *A Phenomenology of Spirit*, we'll find that his description, while he talks of self first, and then society, and then culture in a whole historical sense, what he's doing is unfolding, as it were, this mental meandering that traces the dialectical unfolding of self-consciousness. But you never know whether

he's talking just of the self, or of a society and social consciousness, or of history and the unfolding of history.

You see? Simply because what goes on in one is sort of like what goes on in the other, and what goes on in the whole, the individual, the society, the universe as a whole. So that as you read that thing about the master-servant relationship, which I think is the first selection, you'll say, yes, this is about how the individual achieves some sort of self-awareness of position in relationship to. You see? But you could read the same sort of thing about how a nation achieves its own identity in relation to.

You see? And this whole process is the process of the absolute in the dialectical unfolding of things. So keep in mind that analogy to the early Greeks, particularly the microcosm, macrocosm kind of aspect. And the way in which these processes are ordered at the micro and the macro level is always rationally ordered.

You see? Rationally ordered. Because the real is rational. And all processes of history are rational in his sense of rational.

Yes. What is his sense of rationality? Well, that moves us, of course, from his new metaphysic to a new methodology. To a new methodology.

What we've had in the preceding century, or two, is the attempt at a demonstrative metaphysic. Demonstrative knowledge. Deductive reasoning.

Syllogistic, mathematical reasoning. Starting with either self-evident truths or empirical generalizations. And, of course, it's that kind of demonstrative metaphysics that both Hume and Kant were so critical of.

And, in effect, Hegel agrees with their criticism. He's not trying to do that kind of demonstrative metaphysics. He's not trying to prove things.

His conception of reason, in other words, is not the conception of deductive proofs. His conception of reason is what you might call thinking. Trying to understand.

Trying to get clear about something. For that 18th-century business, reason involved ideas that form propositions, judgments, which are developed further in syllogisms. So that, in effect, the unit of thought in the tradition from Descartes on is really the proposition.

The judgments we make. And it was because Kant was likewise committed to that that Kant tried to find the categories that underlie the judgments. Now, the key difference for Hegel is that Hegel makes the focus of thought reason, not the proposition, but the concept.

The begriff. The concept. That's quite a difference.

You see, if you're thinking in terms of propositions, you try to see what a proposition logically implies, and you try to state it in another proposition. But if you're thinking in terms of concepts, you're trying to clarify a concept. You're trying to explore conceptual relationships.

One concept gives rise to another concept as your mind meanders along. And I use that term meandering intentionally. It doesn't always go in a straight line.

Meandering doesn't. It's almost a trial-and-error process working through various concepts. So that, as you try to get an understanding of a particular concept, the concept of being, or the concept of justice, whatever it is, you start with something of an initial idea that first comes to mind.

You start, that is to say, with a direct awareness. You're directly aware of some concept. You'll see.

And that initial concept you begin with is mediated by a process of reflection in which you say to it, well, yes, no, you know, and you're not satisfied with it. You see another side of the picture. So there is a process not only of direct awareness but of mediation through that reflective meandering, you see, to a clearer, fuller outcome, a clearer conceptualization.

It seems to me this is much more descriptive of the way most people think. Isn't that the way it is for you? Is it for me? You know, there's a sense in which the kind of reflection that goes on throughout a college career could be seen as something like that. You start with some sort of an idea of an education, and then you're confronted with an idea of liberal arts education that you never really assimilated before, and you move from a pragmatic to a purist liberal arts one.

You know? And then the two seem to come together in your mind by the time you graduate, and you begin to see all of the possible transfers of learning that are possible from a philosophy major to every occupation you can imagine. Which is true. Which is true.

Yes. That's how we think. Sorting through our ideas.

Or, if you prefer to say, playing with your marbles. But trying to get clear about things. So, he's much more concerned with this conceptualization.

Now, it's that creative thinking process that is the life of the mind. You see? The life of spirit. And your outward life becomes a manifestation of the inner conceptualization.

So that human life is the life of the mind, the life of the spirit. And in the German sense, that's culture. Yes.

The spiritual life is culture. And what's embraced in culture in the final analysis is art, religion, and philosophy. Where art gives some sort of sensory image as a way of playing with the concepts.

And religion uses symbols in playing with the concepts. It's philosophy that gets straight to the heart of the thing. Conceptualizing it.

So, the whole process is going down there to that end. Now, in talking of this new method, notice two things. I called the new method phenomenology last time.

Yeah. A phenomenology of mind, of spirit. Phenomenology is a description of the Logos structure.

You see? Logy is a study of. A study of what? A study of the Logos structure. The Logos structure of what? The phenomenon of thinking.

The phenomena of the life of the spirit. The life of the mind. You see? It's a descriptive process.

So, you get the new method there, but you also get the new logic, the dialectic. You see? The thesis, antithesis, synthesis. And it's at that point that we can turn to this outline that I gave you just now.

Now, you notice that on this outline, you have all sorts of triads. Three points. Three points.

And three points within each of the three points. And three points within each of the three points that are within the other three points that are within the first three points. Wheels within wheels are turning.

Yeah. The overall three points, you see, are first, logic. Second, nature.

Third, spirit. You see? It's not until you get to spirit that you get the conscious outworking of the concept. What you have in logic, of course, what you have in logic, is nothing but the logical structure.

If you like, the form. Forms that conceptualization follows. And for that matter, that history follows.

Whereas in nature, what you have is the world of natural sciences. Here you have the objective material on which, in which, the spirit is manifested at a pre-conscious level. Remember, I called this gradualism, in which there are varying degrees of the manifestation of the spirit.

Well, look at the logic, and we'll look at the others later on. You notice that everything numbered one is a thesis. Everything numbered two is an antithesis.

Everything numbered three is a synthesis. Okay. The thesis is what is immediately apprehended, comes to the mind immediately.

The antithesis is the mediating stage. The synthesis is where it comes together with comprehension. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

The initial concept is always very abstract. And as comprehension grows, it becomes more and more concrete. So it's a movement from the abstract to the concrete.

And the most concrete expression of thought is in culture. Well, let me try an overhead and see if that will help us get on with what he's doing. And this will be a little bit of an exercise in reading a paper.

Is that too small? It is, isn't it? Move it back a bit. Do you want to nurse it? Is that better? Let's sharpen it up. Yeah, that's a bit better.

Okay, I should have blown it up. I mean, enlarged it. You see, we want to get the process concrete.

No, that's not very... That's about it, I think. Okay, remember that the traditional laws of logic begin with the law of identity. A equals A. In fact, maybe I should begin right there and swing over to the other one.

Notice what he says there. When the principles of essence are taken as essential principles of thought, they become predicates of a proposed subject. Which, because they are essential, is everything, true of everything.

And the propositions thus arising have been stated as universal laws of thought. What propositions? Propositions that are principles of what it is to be. Of essence.

What is being? On your outline of logic, you notice that you start with being and then move to essence. What it is to be.

That is existence. What it is. Essence.

Incidentally, where did Sartre get his famous terminology for existence precedes essence? Hegel. You see. Sartre is using a Hegelian dialectic.

As we'll see when we get there. Okay, so the universal laws of thought. Thus, the first of them, the maxim of identity, reads, everything is identical with itself.

A equals A. Negatively, the law of non-contradiction, A cannot at the same time be A and not A. This maxim, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing but a law of abstract understanding. Now, remember that I said that he regards the traditional laws of logic. It's true.

But trivial. You see. Trivial, why? Well, because he's not concerned with some proposition, static proposition, about a static reality.

Such that A equals A at every time. No. He's not concerned with such sheer abstractions from reality.

Reality is a process. The unfolding meandering of thought. And in that process, nothing stays the same.

Now, that doesn't violate the law of thought, which says A equals A at the same time. The trouble is, there's no same time tomorrow as yesterday. It's a different time.

And so, the law of identity may deal with abstract understanding, but not with the concrete conceptualization of process. You see. So, come back to the other one.

Identity is, in the first place, the repetition of what we had earlier as being, but has become, through supersession of its character of immediateness. Yes, if you look at the outline of the logic, you'll notice that within the quality, the logical quality affirming, you remember that quality in logic is affirmative or negative. You see, you start with being, and then you move to the negative non-being.

Okay? From the affirmative being to the negative non-being, to the synthesis of the two, becoming. You see, am I the same as I was yesterday, identical or not? Yes. Both are the same.

And not? The same. Because I'm in a process of becoming. So then, identity is the repetition of what was being, now is becoming, because the immediateness of being that was has been superseded, supersession.

It's been superseded. It's therefore being as ideality that we talk about if we're talking of identity. Some ideal abstraction that isn't in a process of becoming.

It's important to come to a proper understanding of the true meaning of identity, and for that purpose, we must guard against taking it as abstract identity to the exclusion of all difference. And that's the touchstone for distinguishing bad philosophy from what truly deserves the name of philosophy. Identity, in its truth, as an ideality, an ideal notion of what is, is a high category of religious modes of being as well as other forms of thought and mental activity.

The true knowledge of God begins with knowing him as he is. Identity. Absolute identity.

Unchanging. You see? Does that apply to anything in time? Is there any such unchanging identity in time? In history? To know so much is to see that all the power and glory of the world sinks into nothing in God's presence because he is who he is. Unchanging identity.

In the same way, identity as self-consciousness, my own personal identity, you remember the question of personal identity in John Locke and others, what constitutes my identity as a person? Identity as self-consciousness and what distinguishes man from nature, particularly from brutes, which never reach the point of comprehending themselves as I, that is, a pure self-contained unity. So in connection with thought, the main thing is not to confuse the true identity, which contains being and characteristics transfigured in it, changing processes. Don't confuse true identity with the abstract identity of bare form.

All the charges of narrowness, hardness, meaninglessness directed against thought from the quarter of feeling, there are some of your romanticists, rest on the perverse assumption that thought acts only as a faculty of abstract identification. Formal logic confirms this assumption by laying down the supreme law of thought, A equals A. If thinking were no more than abstract identity, we couldn't help but own it to be futile, tedious, and trivial. No doubt the notion, the idea, too, were identical with themselves, but identical only insofar as at the same time they involved distinction.

Well, you follow that line of unfolding the concept of concrete identity, which is identity through difference, rather than the abstract ideal identity of something in which there is no process of change. Now, but by the same token, take a look at what he says about non-contradiction, which is in the second paragraph. Now, this is the excluded middle law, sorry.

Excluded middle. Instead of speaking of the maxim of excluded middle, remember that something is either A or non-A, there's no third alternative. Instead of speaking of the maxim of excluded middle, which is a maxim of abstract understanding, we should rather say that everything is opposite.

Neither in heaven nor on earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anything such as an abstract either or, as that law of excluded middle maintains. Whatever exists is concrete with difference and opposition within itself. I'm one thing, I'm becoming something else.

The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, what I am now, and what they essentially are. You see, I am not yet fully what I am in essence, in principle. We're all in process.

Thus, in inorganic nature, the asset is implicitly at the same time the base. It's only being consistent in its relationship to its other. The asset is not something that persists quietly in contrast.

It's always an effort to realize what it potentially is. It's in process. Contradiction, in that sense, is the very moving principle of the world.

It's ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable. Sure, you can think both A and not A, insofar as they apply at different times or in different respects. Aristotle knew that.

Contradiction is the moving principle of the world. It's ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction is not the end of the matter.

Contradiction contradicts itself. You move from the antithesis to the synthesis. It's only one side of the contrariness.

So the proximate result of opposition, realized as contradiction, is the ground of being. The ground, which contains identity as well as different superseded, deposed to elements in the completer notion. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

Now, does that make sense? See what he's saying? The traditional laws of logic, Aristotle himself qualified, with the phrase, at the same time and in the same respect. So, to think that those laws of logic give you a corner on a changing process is obviously mistaken. They're dealing with something you hold in your mind in abstraction from the concrete process of reality.

Where you think of the essence of something in abstraction from the process of actualizing that in reality. You know, you can look at a squealing, squalling, weak old baby, one of those things that takes in liquid at one end and lets out both constantly, and say this is a rational being. Well, you are speaking in abstraction about an ideal essence, which plainly has not yet been achieved.

But, obviously, also, inasmuch as there is that, what Aristotle calls potency, potential, the process of actualization is going on, is going on, at an early stage. In what it is now, in reality, is being negated by what it is becoming, namely, toilet trade, to the parents' great relief. And, that charming childhood in antithesis to the babyhood is somehow or other going to be itself transcended in a way that both contradicts and preserves what the youngster was in infancy and what it was in childhood, but going far beyond that.

Now, if everything, every finite being is actually in the process of becoming. You see, in the first dialectical movement under logic, those categories, the concept of being is sheer abstraction, if by that you mean unchanging. The process of non-being is sheer abstraction.

You move from those abstractions to the more concrete concept, becoming. The more concrete it is, the better the comprehension of the concept. And it's not until the concept of being is amplified and fleshed out in the great overall synthesis that you finally get what being is in its fullest reality, namely absolute, all-knowing, completely free sovereign spirit.

Hegel's absolute. So, when he says that contradiction is the moving principle of the world, he's not saying that the world is teeming with contradictions; self-contradictory propositions are true. No.

He's simply saying that in the process of history, things are changing. Does that relativize everything? Does it relativize ethics? Not for Hegel. Not for Hegel.

We'll have to see why. Okay, do you want to pause there and reflect? Steve? Yeah, I'm glad you raised that. I'll take this off if you want it again, say.

But I'm glad you raised that, Steve, because he does indeed, and I wanted to make that point. We have, well, actually, on this table of logic, let's see. Where is it? No, I guess, yeah.

Under logic, three, the concept, one, the subject, and a small one, the initial immediate concept. At that stage in expounding the categories, he points out that concepts and here's another triad, can be universal, in particular, or individual. Well, you know that's the case already in ordinary logic.

Universal. All men are mortal. Particular.

Some people are liars. Individual. Socrates is mortal.

Okay. Individual. Now, what he's doing is pointing out that the universal concept, which you might come up with, is sheer abstraction.

It's an abstract idea, and the traditional way of talking about it. It's an abstract idea. There are no real universals running around separately in some Platonic heaven.

You see, it's abstract thought. On the other hand, the notion of particulars, isolated, discrete particulars of an atomistic sort, as in John Locke and Descartes and so forth, these little Lucretian atoms of thought, without any intrinsic connectedness to anything else. That is a further abstraction that stands in antithesis to the first abstraction.

Thesis, antithesis. Reality, concretely, is neither universal in that sense nor particular in that sense. You're not an island.

No man is an island. You see? We are what we are in relationship to everything around us. So that the individual, the concrete individual, you see, who is what he is by virtue of everything, every relationship that has fared into making Steve what he is and everything that will go out from Steve, the history-shaping things that emerge, you see, all of that, that relationality is what defines your identity.

You see? What you are doing as an individual, and what we all do as individuals, is to concretize universal possibilities. And the universal is simply abstract possibilities. You see? And what we're doing is concretizing, realizing, actualizing those abstract possibilities.

You see, all of history has had a potency gradually coming, coming, coming, closer and closer to producing fruit for Steve Schonholtz. Now he's emerged. You see? Now, obviously, a world historical figure like Napoleon is vastly different.

Or the Winston Churchill. Gorbachev. You see? But for every one of us, this is the same sort of thing.

Who would you be if it weren't for those four bears who got together? Who would I be if my dad had married the other girl he was going with first? How can you tell when the point of emergence is? Well, you sound as if there's a static point. Emergence is a process. Takes a long time.

Well, no, because actually, if I were to draw it accurately, remember a diagram is an abstraction too. The one would flow into the other, you see. No stop.

No stop. Process change. So, this is how he deals with the theory of universals, Steve.

You see, are there abstract universals, concepts? Yes. Are there real universal potentials? Yes. Are there real universals? Well, only as they're concretized in individuals.

The individual synthesizes, you see, these antitheses of universality and particularity. To concretize a universal is to actualize possibilities in particular ways. So, his theory of universals is no, there are no platonic universals, but there are embodied universals.

Incarnated universals. Which is sort of an echo of Aristotle in another way. Ryan.

If you were to take this onto an atomistic level, would it be like what Leibniz conceptualized? They're affected, they're kind of like reflections. But not windowless. No.

You see, the atomistic model of the 17th century was of pellets of matter that are indivisible and have no intrinsic relationship to any other. He's rejected that. Leibniz is of individual units of force.

Windowless, without any intrinsic causal relationship to anything else. And Hegel doesn't want that. The process is one of interdependence.

Yeah. Think of it more as a biological process. How is Hegel's monism different from Parmenides? So that, you know, I have problems with Parmenides.

Well, yeah, remember that for Parmenides the basic issue, or the basic theme, is that there is a way of truth and a way of illusion. Now, Hegel is not calling individuality an illusion. He's not calling change illusion.

You see? If you like, he has synthesized the two concepts of permanence and change. What's permanence? What's permanent? Form, structure. Reason at work in history.

The creative unfolding of the concept, the self-understanding of the absolute. Yeah. The structure of the process is there.

But, no, this isn't Parmenides saying individuals are illusory. Now, at the same time, when we get to his social philosophy, we'll begin to see that Hegelian thought tended to generate conservative political thought. And you can see why.

Conservative political thought, which views the state as having more significance than what we would call the individual. Italian fascism was a kind of neo-Hegelian political philosophy. The philosopher of Italian fascism was a man named Giovanni Gentile, who was Mussolini's minister of education for a while.

And he was a Hegelian philosopher. Neo-Hegelian. Now, don't equate fascism with Nazism.

Philosophically, that pulls apart. Pulls apart. But that's the tendency.

And in more, oh, ironic forms, you get conservative political thought coming out in Britain. So Hegelianism provided a philosophical framework for certain kinds of political conservatism there. An emphasis on taking your place in society and doing your duty.

We'll talk later about F.H. Bradley, British philosopher, who has a classic essay on ethics entitled, *My Station and Its Duty*. And if you say it with a broad English accent, you begin to get the point. *My station and its duty*.

You know, and you get the idea of the person with his place in society, knowing his place and his responsibilities that come with that. Something that's unknown in American society with its fluidity. All right, let's see.

Take a look at the outline on logic, would you, in the light of this. And notice the triads all the way down. You can't mistake them.

If you think that quality and quantity are antithetical concepts, quality and quantity, well, they are until you synthesize them in rather concrete measures. So much of such a sort. You'll see.

You'll find that Stumpf talks about the being, not being, becoming business. And, in essence, notice that the initial notion is of a ground of existence. This is a theoretical concept.

Being as it is in itself, in its own identity, that's what you're after. In contrast to mere appearance, which is the antithesis. You see.

And then you get the concrete actuality. You don't talk simply of substance in the actuality or causal processes, but of reciprocity within an organic whole, the interdependence of things within an organism. Okay.

But then more concretely, the concept *begriff*, where you see, yes, in talking about a subject, you have the concept of the subject, then the judgment, then the syllogism. Well, you say, that's the structure of traditional logic. Yes, ideas, judgments, and syllogisms.

Sure, that's the most abstract way of thinking. It's an abstraction. The antithesis is when you don't look at the subject that way, but at objects, if you like, sheer experience empirically.

But you need to bring the rational structures together with the object in order to grasp the idea, the concept. Now, what you have under logic, as I say, is simply sheer categories. Structures of thought.

That's all. Structures of thought that apply to reality, unchanging structures. And when you get into the realm of nature, you notice that he's dealing with abstraction first, namely, laws of nature, which are generalized abstractions.

Laws of nature. Under the mechanism, he's thinking of cause-and-effect mechanisms. So, what you have under that first thing with space, time, motion, matter, and cause-effect mechanisms is the mechanistic science.

But then you get beyond the abstractions of mechanistic science to the actual interplay of forces, and by now, chemistry is a science. You see, where you see that there are interactions, not just one-way cause-effect relationships as in mechanics, but reciprocal causation. But the thing that's really beginning to emerge is the biological concept.

The organism, the organic model. And here he sees emerging the idea of teleology. Because biological processes are end-oriented.

Growth with a view to producing fruit. The biological process. So he gets back into the teleological layer.

But it's a teleological process all the way through. Okay. Next time we'll be dealing with the section dealing with the mind and spirit.

Picking that up. Keep in mind that we constantly remind ourselves that there are certain polarities. Do we have five minutes? No, we don't.

It's gone. But polarities like subject and object. Universal and particular.

Appearance and reality. Ideal and real. These polarities are antitheses that we have to get beyond.

That's why, and this is getting back to your question, how do we know that the rational is the real? You see? If the difference between appearance and reality is abstraction, then you take immediate appearances as real. In degree. Appearances, that is to say, the first appearance of something, the immediate awareness, provides you with an awareness of reality, but with an imperfect conceptualization.

And so knowledge is always a matter of degree. Understanding is a matter of degree. Well, isn't that the way it is if you're trying to gain a conceptual understanding of anything? But even though we know in part, we still know the part we know.

Which is why in response to most conceptualizations, the evaluation is yes, no, yes in this regard, no in some other regards. All right, we'll pick up next time.