A History of Philosophy
54 Kant on Metaphysics
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Okay, then, this afternoon, looking at Kant's transcendental dialectic, we're dealing really with his attitude to metaphysics. The two earlier sections of the Critique of Pure Reason introduce epistemology, the transcendental aesthetic, of course, having to do with sense perception, the transcendental analytic having to do with judgments we make, the understandings we have, because of the a priori categories, those concepts which interpret experience. Now, the purpose of the whole critique is really to inquire whether rational metaphysics, rationalistic metaphysics, is possible.

Is the project that Descartes began possible? Is the kind of metaphysics which, with similar ambitions, was proposed on an empirical basis by somebody like John Locke, is that really possible? The possibility of metaphysics. And already in the first two sections of the Critique of Pure Reason, dealing with epistemology, he's made it pretty plain that our knowledge extends only to phenomena, appearances, things as they seem to us, rather than to things in themselves, the noumena, reality, the thingamajig. So you have an anticipation already of a negative response to the question.

Is rational metaphysics possible? No. At least not rational metaphysics with its certainty demanded for knowledge. Now, what he does in the dialectic, however, is to examine dialectically the arguments that metaphysicians have put forward.

It's one thing to say in advance of looking at it that it's not possible. It's another thing to look at the metaphysician's proofs and to show that they don't work. And that's exactly what he's doing.

So that the transcendental dialectic is his attempt to analyze arguments concerning the mind, the physical cosmos, and God, and to show that by virtue of their inevitable use of a priori concepts that don't apply as far as we know to reality, the proofs themselves don't give us any knowledge of reality. So that's the overall direction that he's going. And you recall my comment earlier that in the introduction, he observes that he's going to do away with knowledge in order to make room for belief.

So he does that in the dialectic, and then he gets to talking about belief at the end. We don't have metaphysical knowledge, but we may have all sorts of metaphysical beliefs. And it's that knowledge-belief distinction which is crucial for Kant, as it is, of course, for David Hume.

Okay? So if your mind goes back to Plato's divided line, you see the Enlightenment has been pressing the whole area of human knowledge with certainty and finding that not possible, retreating to the level of belief. But it still becomes important, as it was for Plato, to distinguish between beliefs that seem to be justifiable and, on the other hand, what is fiction, mere imagination, or illusion. And Hume has already made that distinction for himself.

Kant, obviously, is going to have to. So, the dialectic has its three parts. Now, in each case, what he's trying to do is to point out logical problems, and he labels the problem, in the case of the mind, arguments for the existence of the mind; he labels the problem a paralogism.

Now, a paralogism is a step that goes beyond logic. Beyond logic. In other words, the arguments fail because the conclusion goes beyond what can be proven logically.

Beyond what the premises require. Paralogisms. When we come to the cosmology section, he talks of antinomies.

An antinomy occurs when the argument for a thesis and the argument against the thesis can both be given. You can prove both A and non-A. Ouch.

What are you going to do then? Now, in that case, again, you have something which violates the laws of logic. It's against nomos, law. What's against the laws of logic? Well, the law of logic is the law of excluded middle, A or non-A.

And now you've got both, A and non-A. So an antinomy is against the law of logic. In the case of the arguments for the existence of God, he doesn't give a name to the kind of fallacy involved.

He does say that what the arguments come up with is an ideal. An ideal for human thought. He's free to say it's an ideal that the human mind seeks and wants and needs to round out and unify our understanding of things.

But it's an ideal which, in the end, is not proven, though it may be postulated. To be postulated, to postulate something, is, of course, to propose it, to set it forth, to posit it. Rather than to prove it.

So, in all three cases, the same result occurs, namely that the theses are unproven. Now, let's start with the rational psychology, the paralogisms there. And I think you can see rather quickly the way this goes.

I think this is the easiest of the three sections. What he does is to point out that the whole science of rational psychology, as it's called, begins with Descartes' cogito, I think. And from a historical standpoint, really that's correct, because the kind of

metaphysics he's talking about is the kind that developed since Descartes, and in that German rationalist tradition, particularly, where it was customary to divide metaphysics into three sub-disciplines, given precisely these labels, metaphysics of the day.

And going back to Descartes, certainly rational psychology begins with his cogito. You remember Descartes' cogito, ergo sum. I think, therefore I exist.

What am I? I'm a thinking thing. Res cogitans. A thinking substance.

A thinking thing. Now, that's the Cartesian type argument, followed by others like Locke and Berkeley, the argument for a soul substance. The mind, the soul, is a thing.

The thing that thinks. Now, his objection is to introducing the term race or substance. And if you, as I suspect you did not, memorized those 12 Kantian categories, I told you you didn't, but you can check back on them, and one of them is the category of substance.

You'll see. So that if you go back to that material earlier in the critique, on page 389, in the table of categories, you remember quantity, quality, relation, and modality, the categories of relation begin with the relation between substance and accident. Substance and quality.

Substance and accident. Now, his point is that the connection between an accident and its underlying substratum, that relationship is an unknown relationship. We have the concept that we impose on things.

So what's happening in this cogito ergo sum argument? It's fine as far as the sum is concerned. I am. But as soon as you introduce the race, you are adding to what is known directly.

You're adding the notion of a substance. Now cogito, all right, that's the property, the quality, the attribute. But if we don't know of any connections between properties and their substances, then we cannot make a logical inference from the property, I think.

Therefore, in conclusion, I am a thinking substance. It is that the a priori conception of substance has intruded itself, and it has no objective reference that we have any knowledge of. Now, having said that, Kant, on the other hand, appreciates why it is that we are led to make that logical jump.

To say I'm a substance, a thinking thing, implies continuity of existence. So it's a vehicle whereby I affirm that the I who thinks now and the I who thought back then when I remember I'm thinking, and it's the I that will be thinking tomorrow when I

think about having thought this today. So that the intrusion of the concept of substance is not a bad thing.

It is simply that it affirms more than is logically possible. It also guards against the danger of materialism. And for Kant, that is a danger.

He doesn't like it. We'll see more of this subsequently. But Kant is very much afraid that a realistic reading of Newtonian science, with its blind causal mechanisms, would produce some kind of deterministic universe in which there is no such thing as freedom and no moral responsibility.

As a result, he wants to guard against the dangers, as he calls them, of materialism. And the intrusion of the idea of sole substance, of course, is a denial of any reductionism of a materialist sort. But what happens is that introducing a sole substance introduces a mind-body problem.

What is the relationship between the mind substance and the body substance? Now, keep in mind that's that awful pun again, keep in mind that neither mind nor body is, according to Kant, known as substance. So the mind-body problem, in the sense of the relationship between two substances, is a pseudo-problem. But it's a pseudo-problem created by the intrusion of the concept of substance.

And you'll find there's one place in which he observes there are three kinds of answer to that problem. There is the answer that there is some kind of causal connection. Physical causation is involved.

That sounds like Descartes, you say. But obviously that's going to introduce another a priori concept, the concept of causation. The alternative is to say that there is some pre-established harmony between the two.

That's Leibniz. And the third alternative is to say that there is supernatural assistance. And that, of course, is the occasionalism, which says that it's God who produces the corresponding effects.

But that again would be speaking about something of which we do not know. So the fact that we hypostasized is to treat it as a substance. Hypostasis, the Greek word for substratum, substance.

It's the term used in the Trinitarian language of the early church. Three hypostases in one osea, came out as three persons in one essence. But to hypostasize is to treat as a substance, as something with enduring entity.

And to hypostasize mind and body, as we do, is logically a paralogism. It goes beyond what logic allows. Now, that in fact is only one of the paralogisms involved in rational psychology.

And it's the one which were given in the anthology. But there are three others as well. And if you look at page 418, you can see very quickly what the others are.

And if you want, you can get a complete copy of the Critique of Pure Reason from the library and read what he says about all the others. But they follow very naturally from the first. It's not just that the soul is substance.

That's within the categories of relation. But number two, as regards quality, the categories of quality, it is simple. That is to say, it is what it is, indivisibly.

Indivisibly. And if you go back to the categories as listed on 389, the categories of quality, of relation, negation, limitation, from the logical qualities, affirmative propositions, negative propositions, and indefinite propositions. So this, to say that it is simply what it is, is to ascribe reality.

So that is another a priori concept introduced. Number three, he says, has to do with different times in which it exists; it's numerically identical in its unity. This seems to be a category of quantity.

Quantity, it has its own singular identity through time. That's another a priori concept. And then number four, in relation to possible objects of space, that's implied in the mind-body problem.

In relation to possible objects of space, possibility, and necessity, that's yet another category. So he runs through the four kinds of categories, quantity, quality, relation, and modality, and shows how, in rational psychology, all four of those kinds of categories are involved. And so what you really have in that branch of metaphysics is really an imaginative construct made up out of those a priori concepts imposed on our actual experience, reflective introspection.

Now, does that come through clearly? Comments? Questions? You're staring. You mean it's that easy? Yeah, that in effect is it, you see. His point is that these a priori categories are categories of understanding; they're not categories of reality.

Because they're not categories of reality, they crunch the empirical input into unreal ways of thinking. And as a result, not only the cogito ergo sum, what am I, race cogitans, but also is that going beyond logic, but so is the claim that I as a thinking thing stand in a relationship to extended things. That doesn't apply either.

I, as a thinking thing, extend back through time and so forth, but that doesn't apply either. I, as a thinking thing, can possibly extend into the future, but that doesn't apply either. I'll cover up these cables before I trip over.

That would be another paralogism. Okay, anything then on the rational psychology? Sound straightforward? I said Kant should have said it much more briefly. Can be done.

Okay, keep in mind that he's not denying the existence of soul substance. He's not denying the existence of soul substance. He's saying you don't have a valid argument.

Maybe all sorts of bad arguments for good causes. He's not denying it. He's not affirming it either.

When it comes to talking about God, we'll see that he affirms the existence of God even though he says you don't have a good argument. And in regard to soul, he seems to say you don't have a good argument, but he's not prepared to affirm it, at this juncture at least. Okay, rational cosmology involving these conflicting truths.

And here, if you would, turn to, let's see, page 428. 429 in there. 428, 429.

His point here is that the terms soul and world should both be regarded not as representations of reality, but as what he calls regulative concepts. In the sense that they regulate what we then say. Soul is regulative in that it keeps us from materialism.

The world is also a regulative concept. It regulates the way in which we synthesize our thinking about physical things. The way in which we project our experience.

Now, on 429, you see him doing much the same thing in this case as he did with psychology. Here you have, again, the identification of four areas of cosmology, as he puts it, just above the breakdown, according to the four titles of the categories. Quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

So, you notice that the first one, dealing with absolute completeness of composition of the whole, the second deals with division, infinitely or finitely divisible. The first is whether the cosmos is finitely or infinitely extended in time and space. So, the first has to do with that infinite extension, space, and time.

The second is with finite or infinite divisibility, choppability. The third has to do with the relationship, the origin. And the fourth has to do with modality, the complete dependence, contingency, or necessity.

So, each of the categories is again involved. Then he gets to taking up each of these in its turn. And on page 433, you can see the structure of his thinking.

The thesis is that the world has a beginning in time and is limited also with regard to space. It's finite in duration temporally and in extension spatially. The antithesis is the opposite.

The world is no beginning, no limits, but is infinite in regard to both time and space. And he is going to show... Now, his procedure is what in logic we call a reductio ad absurdum. Where you may recall, you should, I hope, recall from your logic course, and if you haven't taken a logic course, you are impoverished.

A reductio ad absurdum starts by assuming the falsity of the thesis. If the thesis is false, what follows from it? And then you go on to show that what follows and should be true on the basis of the falsity of the thesis, what should be true, is itself false. So if that is false, then the denial of the thesis is false, and the thesis is true.

Now, did you catch that? Get it out in writing, and you'll see. Okay, to prove A, what you do is start by asserting non-A. If non-A, then B. But B is false, therefore A is true.

Again, you're looking blank. Must be Valentine's Day or something. Don't you just love this? Valentine's Day, don't you just love this? All right, the wiggly line is the negative.

At least you're awake. The wiggly line is the negative. Not A. All right, not A implies B. Okay, but not B. Now, if you deny the consequent, you deny the antecedent.

Not A. That is to say, A. So you've proven A. Now, that's his procedure in these proofs. And you can trace it through for yourself. In the first case, he starts, you see, if we assume that the world had no beginning in time, then an eternity must have elapsed up to every given point of time.

And therefore, an infinite series of states of things must have passed in the world. However, here it comes, an infinite series consists in this, that it can never be completed. So an infinite series is impossible.

And the beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence. The world had a beginning. This was what had to be proved.

QED. There it is. So he does that sort of thing on the thesis and antithesis.

In both those cases, the result is that both the thesis and the antithesis are proven to be true. Oh, that is an antinomy, isn't it? Contradiction of the law of non-contradiction. Well, he does the same again with the second one on 436.

Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts. Nothing exists anywhere but the simple or what's composed of it. There are indivisible units, you see.

In the antithesis, no compound thing consists of simple parts. There exists nowhere in the world anything simple, indivisible. Well, his proof starts by assuming the opposites.

In the thesis, he says, let us assume that compound parts, compound substances, did consist of simple parts. And off he goes on the reductio ad absurdum. The same again in the third conflict on page 440.

Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not only causality from which all phenomena of the world can be deduced. In order to account for these phenomena, it's necessary to admit another causality, that of freedom. In the antithesis, there's no freedom.

And off he goes again. And in the fourth one on 444, and so forth. So, what he does in these cases is to argue, then, that we can prove nothing because of these contradictions.

We can prove nothing about the infinity of the cosmos in time and space against its finiteness. We can prove nothing about divisibility as opposed to indivisibility. Nothing about determinism as against freedom.

Nothing about necessity as against contingency. Because the arguments have equal weight on both sides, we really can prove nothing at all. And as a result, what we end up with on page 447.

His conclusion to this section is what he calls transcendental idealism. Notice that phrase is italicized. Transcendental idealism.

Yes, transcendental realism would change mere representations into things themselves. Then, in the second column, transcendental idealism, on the contrary, allows that the objects of external intuition may be real as perceived in space and time as represented, but space itself, as well as time, with all phenomena, are not things by themselves. They cannot exist outside of the mind.

And so his phenomenal-noumenal distinction is upheld. Do you follow that line of thought? I see David nodding his head. Okay.

Straightforward enough. Then turn your attention finally to the rational theology section, which begins on 463. And here, here, what he's doing involves the three arguments for the existence of God, which up to his time were the traditional proofs.

They are, one, the ontological argument, second, the cosmological, and the third, which he gives the fancy name of a physico-theological, is really simply a version of the teleological argument. Okay. These are also the three arguments discussed by Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Okay. So it's the same agenda, at that juncture. If you say, no, wait a minute, isn't there a moral argument for the existence of God? Yes, but Kant is the one who first introduced it.

So that comes later on. Now, the ontological argument, then, first of all, you're familiar with it from Anselm, from Descartes, so forth, the idea of a being who necessarily exists. What's the problem here? Well, his problem is that it introduces the conception of necessity.

It introduces the conception of necessity. Put it this way: a God exists. What sort of a proposition is that? Now, be careful.

Kant says that it is not a proposition. A proposition has a subject and a predicate. Existence is not logically a predicate.

You see. Because when you predicate something, you ascribe a property. Existence isn't a property.

To say God exists is simply to say, to leave the rest of the sentence blank. So when the ontological argument says God necessarily exists, it says God is a necessary being. You've got to predicate something.

But as soon as you predicate necessity, you're invoking an a priori concept. You see. One of the categories of modality, contingency, and necessity.

So the ontological argument, you see, trying to unpack the concept of God as a necessary being, I guess I did it along here, is invoking the concept. He asks, is this an analytic statement? You see. No.

It's not an analytic statement. Logically, the term God, a definite name, whatever, isn't logically the same as necessity. It's not analytic.

It must be synthetic. But where, then, do you get the idea of necessity? You see. So the ontological argument involves a priori.

It's problematic. It is simply a copula, linking the subject and the predicate. Now, the cosmological argument, the cosmological argument, really depends on the ontological.

Because the cosmological argument is arguing about causal dependence. Causal dependence. That is to say, it assumes the contingency of the cosmos on a necessary being.

So it assumes the very thing which the ontological argument assumes. The cosmological argument presupposes the conclusion of the ontological argument. Now, of course, he could also have said that the concept of causation itself is an a priori category.

You see. All right. And then the teleological, the physico-theological, the teleological argument.

Well, what it's trying to do is to talk about the orderedness of the cosmos. The orderedness of things. The ordered unity which we observe.

And to draw an inference from that. But that sort of an argument is arguing from the form, not the material existence of the cosmos. To argue from the form that it has is to argue for some architect or designer.

You see. But you cannot affirm the existence of such a designer without having as your premise the existence of this ordered universe. But that would entail a cosmological argument for the existence.

So the teleological argument would depend on the cosmological argument, which depends on the ontological argument. And since the ontological argument fail, none of them work. Now that's his line of thought there.

Do you want me to run that again? Okay. The conclusion, and then we'll go back. The conclusion is that the teleological argument depends on the cosmological argument, which depends on the ontological argument.

Since the ontological argument fail. Okay. Have a teleological.

Okay. The teleological argument is an argument from order to an orderer. So if an ordered universe exists, its cause must necessarily be an orderer.

Now you've introduced something else, which is the subject of the cosmological argument. And the cosmological argument says it must be a necessary cause. But the idea of a necessary being, God is a necessary being, is what the ontological argument is about.

So. Okay. Yeah.

You know, and obviously, the thing you find yourself asking is, well, why didn't this put an end to all theistic arguments of this sort? You see. And the answer, I think, is twofold. One very obvious one, not everybody agrees with Kant's epistemology.

And if Kant's epistemology is mistaken and the categories are not just purely a priori, then Kant's whole disproof of the arguments doesn't work. You see. In other words, if you can establish the objective reality of such things as contingency and necessity, causal dependence, then you could make them work.

You see, I have a friend who used to teach here with us, Stuart Hackett, who wrote a book called The Resurrection of Theism, in which he argues that the categories, Kant's categories essentially, are not only categories of thought, but are categories of reality. You see. Now his argument for that is, what are the alternatives? One of the alternatives is skepticism.

That's an absurd possibility. You see. And so if you're going to have any knowledge at all, then the categories have to apply to reality.

In effect, he argues that way. But if the categories apply to reality, then the proofs must work. Or at least Kant's objection doesn't work.

And so he adopts what Leibniz calls the pre-formation theory. Pre-formation between thought and things. Since our thinking is adapted to the way things are, the categories work.

So that's obviously one way of going at it, whether Hackett's way with categories or a different way, more empirical. The other alternative, of course, is to argue that existence is a proper predicate. If existence is a proper predicate, then the conclusion of a proof can simply be, therefore, God exists.

And you don't have this business of necessity hanging around to confuse things. So you get those kinds of alternatives coming up. But this is the classic passage in Kant.

I'm inclined to think that of the two treatments, Hume's and Kant's, Hume's treatment of the arguments has had a more lasting influence. Possibly because dialogues are more readable than Critique of Pure Reason. Yeah.

I think Kant's position has had a tremendous influence, but simply because of his epistemology, not because of the way in which he worked it out in these disprobes. So Hume is, in that sense, the more important in the actual discussion of the proofs. Okay.

Now, with this treatment of metaphysics, where does this leave him? Well, it leaves him on page 480. And check that. Check that.

Kant says we cannot prove the existence of God. We cannot know, in that enlightenment sense of knowledge, we cannot know that God exists. Any more things we can know about the cosmos?

Or know that you're a soul substance. We can't know those things. The idea of God is, however, an ideal.

It's an ideal, a concept, that we come up with because it completes the whole scope of our purported knowledge. It caps off everything else. Look on page 480, second column, new paragraph halfway down.

The purely speculative use of reason, therefore, the supreme being remains an ideal only, but an ideal without a flaw. A concept that finishes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. The objective reality of which, though it cannot be proved, cannot be disproved.

So, if there should be an ethico-theology, not a physico-theology, he's contrasting the two. The teleological argument he labeled physico-theological. Now he's thinking of another possibility, ethico-theological argument.

If there should be an ethico-theology to supply that deficiency, transcendental theology, which before was problematic, would prove indispensable in determining its concept, in constantly testing reason, which is so often deceived by sensibility, not always in harmony with its own ideas. So this is an ideal. And if it could be proven that this being exists, then the ideal that we have from the teleological argument can come into play.

And we can affirm that God is indeed the orderer, the architect, the wise designer of the entire cosmos. Okay. Yeah, because, and this is the previous paragraph, in spite of the insufficiency of the proof, transcendental theology has a very important negative use.

You see, it's a regulative concept. It regulates your thinking about God. So if you can prove that God exists some other way, then what you think God is like will be regulated by this transcendental ideal.

Okay. Now, that leads him into the final section labeled opinion, knowledge, and belief. And I urge you to read those two, two and a half pages very carefully, because they're crucial to understanding Kant's intention in the whole critique, and essential to understanding what comes later on in his other writings.

Why, for instance, is his shorter work on metaphysics called a prolegomenon to any future metaphysic? You see, he has signed off on the rationalistic metaphysics of the past, but he's signing on to a future metaphysic. You see.

And here you get his initial hint of something of a future metaphysic. On 381, he talks of doctrinal belief. He talks of doctrinal belief.

And he talks of moral belief. Those two kinds. Two kinds of belief.

Doctrinal belief has to do with this ideal that leads us to believe certain things about God as a supreme intelligence who has ordered things for the wisest of ends. You see. But, on the other hand, moral belief takes us further.

Doctrinal belief is quite unstable because you can't prove the existence of that being. But moral belief is different. Look at the bottom of the second column on 481.

Because moral belief is based on action. That is to say, it's based on the fact that I must obey the moral law on all points. You see.

And he goes on to suggest that if I must obey the moral law, then this has further implications of a practical validity about the existence of God and the future world. And at the very top of 482, he says nothing can shake this belief. It's a conviction that's not logical, but a moral certainty.

It rests on subjective grounds, on the fact that I'm morally certain. You see, there's not a logical certainty, but there is a moral certainty. If we are morally bound to a moral law, then whatever follows from the existence of a moral law, I'm morally committed to.

And he helps us then to anticipate the moral argument for the existence of God, which he develops not here, but rather in the critique of practical reason, on the basis of a developed ethic. So that the outcome of the critique of pure reason, you see, as he says in the introduction, is that he's doing away with knowledge, making room for belief. Get it? Well, that's a quick survey of the dialectic.

Covers the ground. Okay, questions, comments, discussion. What? You're not talking as much today.

On the ideological argument, in his response to that, what would he be able to do? If there was a different theological view, not that the creator was the designer, but that in some way the matter already existed, or the world existed in the designer's order. If he started by saying, " We know the existence of a material world, that material world is also very orderly, he would have existence in the premise, and he

could get it into the conclusion. He'd still have to work on that concept of cause and effect.

But how would he be able to say that matter exists if he hasn't already made his peace with the critics over the concept of cause and effect? You see? Yeah. Now, you see, that's the sort of thing that the Scottish realists do. People like Thomas Reid.

Thomas Reid, I don't know that he does this at length, but he seems to say that by virtue of our natural beliefs, human faculties being made to work this way, our natural belief in the existence of material things and the existence of causal connections and so forth, we can go on to prove the existence of God as the designer. And when you read Charles Hodge, the Princeton theologian from about 140 years ago now, 130, whose systematic theology is one of the standard Presbyterian theologies, he's building on that Scottish realism. So what does he do? He makes use of the cosmological and the teleological arguments.

He doesn't need to bother with the ontological ones. If you don't work from the concept, you work from what realistically confronts you. Yes, sir? But couldn't Kant respond to that type of an argument by saying that since we impose that order, then you can't argue from the order because you impose it yourself? Yeah, but you see, that's where the epistemological difference is between Kant and the Scottish realists.

They would not admit that we impose our concepts, no. We get those concepts from our direct experience of the world. They are more Aristotelian in their epistemology.

Not in the sense of real universals, but in the sense of learning to think abstractly on the basis of experience. I was wondering, since Kant affirms that at least we know of our existence and of the categories of things within us, couldn't he have argued from a teleological argument for God's existence from what we know of ourselves? Yes, and you'll find that in the Critique of Judgment, which we'll get into if not Wednesday, Friday of next week, in the Critique of Judgment he does that. He talks about two kinds of judgment.

One is aesthetic judgment in our sense of aesthetic. The other is teleological judgment. And he argues that there are four different ways to explain teleology.

Four different worldviews, and the notion of a worldview begins to arise. And the one he opts for is the physico-theological. Namely, one in which the orderedness of nature is divinely created.

And it is a kind of teleological argument. But there he's arguing from the way in which the human spirit, with its categories, is so perfectly adapted to having experience of nature, to the enjoyment of the beauties and grandeur of nature. So it's more an argument from our aesthetic capacities than from our logical capacities.

So Kant originates not only moral arguments for the existence of God, but he also begins aesthetic arguments for the existence of God. Yeah, the moral argument comes up in the Critique of Practical Reason. The aesthetic argument in the Critique of Judgment.

And I don't think of any dependency between the two. I could be wrong in that, but I don't think of any way in which one would depend on the other. They may both depend on certain aspects of his epistemology, but I don't think they are dependent one on the other.

Well, okay, let's call it a day, call it a week, call it a weekend, and see you next Wednesday.