

A History of Philosophy

50 Scottish Realism

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This afternoon, we want to focus our attention on the Scottish realists, and as you may notice from the outline on the board, this will get us making the transition to Immanuel Kant, so that I plan to spend next time, Friday, orienting us in broad contours to Kant before we get into the detailed exposition of what he's doing. So you might anticipate that accordingly. A little attention has been paid to the Scottish realists and their place in the history of philosophy, largely because the scene was dominated by the British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, against whom Immanuel Kant reacted, yet whose influence persisted in 19th-century and 20th-century empiricism, John Stuart Mill, and positivism.

Yet the Scottish realists were a group of thinkers in the Enlightenment Reformation, in the Edinburgh circle of the Enlightenment, I'm sorry, Reformation got in there somehow, in the Scottish Enlightenment there in Edinburgh in the late 18th century, whose influence persisted into the 20th century, not only through its effect by virtue of those who came to the United States, powerful influence at Princeton, but even in British thought. So that when we come to early 20th-century realism, and I'm thinking particularly of G.E. Moore, we'll find many similarities to the Scottish realists. In fact, some years ago I traced a whole collection of actual verbal similarities between G.E. Moore and Thomas Reid, and it was one of those vain hopes of a historical article which would change the picture until when I submitted it to the British journal *Mind*, it came back with note about a recent book that had just appeared, that did the same thing, and so that was the end of that little venture.

Out of it, I did succeed, though, in getting an autograph on the Dear John letter from the editor, who happened to be Gilbert Ryle at that time, a rather distinguished British man. But Scottish realism is quite a significant movement. And as we'll see at the end of this, a movement that Immanuel Kant was well aware of.

So that its influence is not simply in strings of thought that have continued in the direct realist tradition. Now, let me add one other preliminary note, that it's not at all clear that Thomas Reid interprets David Hume correctly. He seems to understand Hume to say that there is no basis for believing anything.

As if Hume's skepticism was his very last word, rather than a belief. And that reading of Hume seems to have been one which persisted in many circles. And I suspect that this is the popular image of Hume, until you obviously read further.

Let me make some comments on four topics that Reid addresses. And the first, as you might expect, is that very influential basic theory of ideas. The representational view.

The view that the immediate object of our mental awareness is simply the ideas in our minds. The content of our own minds is all we have direct awareness of. That theory, says Reid, is a fiction created by philosophers.

And you'll find that kind of criticism occurring in Reid again and again and again. He feels that common sense, as he calls it, is much closer to the truth of things than the philosophical tradition that has proceeded from Descartes and Locke. Now, by common sense, he seems to mean the beliefs held by every man in an unphilosophical way.

But at the same time, his own views seem to echo some of the Aristotelian influence that had been very present in philosophical matters prior to the theory of ideas. So I think you have to say not that common sense is closer to the truth than philosophy, but common sense is closer to the truth than the theory of ideas. That's where the thing went astray.

His point is that ideas do not have secondary qualities. Your ideas don't smell. It's roses that smell.

You see? Your ideas aren't dazzlingly bright. It's the light that's dazzlingly bright. And so to talk of the subjectivity of qualities seems to falsify what we seem to know already, namely that roses smell and light can dazzle.

In more philosophical jargon, he is arguing for a presentational view of perception rather than representational. That is to say, the view that objects are not represented to us by ideas, but are directly presented to the consciousness, so that I have a direct awareness of physical objects. Now you notice I said direct.

This is a theory of direct awareness, direct knowledge, and direct consciousness as distinct from the indirect view of the representational theory. It's called direct realism. Direct realism.

Sometimes it gets labeled epistemological monism, rather than the dualism of the representational view, which has both ideas and objects that it has to play with. So you'll find it referred to in these very ways. Now the term realism, of course, stands in contrast to phenomenalism, that we only see appearances, and we only know our ideas.

It's realism in two senses. One, the independent existence of material objects and their qualities. The independent existence, and you'll notice this term independent used repeatedly.

The independent existence, independent of minds. That is to say, the objects of our knowledge are there and exist whether we know them or not. They're not mind dependent, as Berkeley had said.

So it's over against not only phenomenalism, but over against idealism as well in that sense. The independent existence of material objects, but also the belief that we have true knowledge of that independent reality. Not only do objects exist independently, but I suppose a phenomenalist could say that.

But that we actually have knowledge of what it is that exists independently. Objectively, independently of whether we know it or not. But it also means we know it.

It's that way. Direct awareness. So this theory of ideas, what does he do then with ideas? And it's obvious you've got to do something with ideas.

Both for the obvious reason that we play with them in our minds all the time. In reflection, in memory, and so forth. In epistemology, moreover, it is the existence of ideas that we refer to.

When we talk of entertaining, what is not true? How can I have an illusion or a misconception if there are no mental states that we call ideas? An illusion is a mental state that is not true to reality. A misconception is an idea that's not true to reality.

So you've got to have room for ideas in addition to direct awareness. You want perhaps direct awareness in order to get at the independent reality and truth of a thing. But you've got to have ideas to account for error.

So what does he do with ideas? Well, Reid's point is that when we talk of having an idea in popular language, we're still referring to direct awareness. It may be direct awareness of something that actually exists. Or it may be direct awareness of an idea that we've made up.

Or that has arisen in our minds, sort of imaginatively constructed from memory without our being aware of it. The ideas are there. But the ideas are, in their normal functioning, signs rather than objects of knowledge.

That is to say, in my awareness of a rose or of a prosaic, smelly marker like this. You see, there is a two-fold mental act. One is the immediate apprehension of this object with its qualities.

And the other that sort of spins off from that is the ideas that I have in my mind that when I'm not aware of it, I use in referring to it. It has a distinctive smell. If ever I run across that smell elsewhere, I'll immediately think of this sort of thing.

So, ideas then play a role, but not as intermediaries. They play a role rather as signs of what may or may not be present, but not as intermediaries. The only time the ideas are intermediaries is when you're thinking of the idea, and there's nothing present.

So then, we have to talk not only about the theory of ideas, but about natural belief or common sense belief. Common sense belief. Sometimes this is called common sense realism.

Watch the phrase common sense. It has at least two meanings. You remember in Aristotle, the common sense was a sense that coordinated and unified the other senses.

The *sensus communis*, as it was called. The common sense. It worked with the other senses in common with them all.

A unifying sense. Now, that's not Reid's usage of the term. Reid's using it more in the way we use it.

When you say in response to your first reading of George Berkeley's idealism, oh, that just violates common sense. That is to say, the natural and analytic assumptions with which we grow up. It seems to be common to many people.

Now, the problem with appealing to common sense, of course, is that what is common in one culture may not be common in another culture. So that there may be certain common sense matters for Americans that are utterly alien to common sense in Timbuktu or Timbukthead. Yes, sir.

And so, in a way, the term natural belief may be a bit safer. And from a philosophical standpoint, it's certainly a term that has a much more meaningful history. Natural beliefs.

After all, we've had a tradition all the way through to Hume talking about the laws of nature. Now, they've been understood differently in ethics and in the sciences. But the use of nature in a philosophical context goes all the way back to Aristotle.

You recall. Who is always saying, on any subject whatsoever, from physics to ethics, by nature, by nature, by nature, that's the sign, by nature. So what Reid is doing is appealing to the intrinsic nature of things.

Natural beliefs depend upon the intrinsic nature of human beings. They're not artificial beliefs that we make up. You know, as it is in the post-modern view.

That we create our own values, and we create our own meanings, and we create our own beliefs. No. Not for Reid.

There are beliefs that arise naturally in the course of nature. Spontaneous, not artificial. Now, in that regard, there's significant resemblance to David Hume.

You see? Because Hume's psychology of belief enables him to affirm that certain beliefs are natural beliefs. They arise in the course of nature. And you remember that curious little chapter in Hume's inquiry on reason in animals? You see, what he's really saying in that is not that animals reason out their beliefs.

Animals don't reason. Animals seem to behave as if they have beliefs, too. They believe in the reality of external objects, like the pile of hay.

You see? They believe in the reality of this, that, and the other. They seem to believe certain things about these entities. And these are beliefs, quasi-beliefs, that arise simply in the course of nature by virtue of the intrinsic nature of horse psychology.

So, you've got an analogy here between what Hume is doing in talking about belief and what the Scottish realists are doing in talking about natural belief. The difference is this. Not that the Scottish realists affirm that human nature universally tends to produce certain beliefs.

Hume believes that. But Reid's emphasis is on the fact that God made us in such a way that we would, in the course of nature, come to certain beliefs. He has a theistic justification for paying attention to natural beliefs.

Now, even that is not novel. After all, Descartes had a theistic justification for trusting irrational faculties. So did John Locke.

And now, thanks to Berkeley and Hume, it's become evident that your rational faculties of intuition and demonstration are not all as good as Descartes and Locke had thought. If it is, indeed, that the rational powers are more limited, the fact is that we have natural proclivities towards belief. So you can thank God for that.

Yes, sir. So it's the same sort of theistic undergirding for an epistemology that we had in Descartes and Locke, but with an updated view of the role and limitations of rational demonstration. Now, having said that, Reid still thinks a lot of rational demonstration.

Reid is still a foundationalist of sorts. You know, a foundationalist is one who thinks there are certain foundational truths from which we can deduce a whole lot more. Well, Reid thinks that way.

But the foundational truths are not indubitably certain. They're not rationally certain. The foundational truths are natural beliefs.

And it's from these natural beliefs that we make our deductions. So, from our natural beliefs about the existence of the physical world, the orderedness of the physical world, the magnificent order of this world of nature, sure, we can then produce deductive arguments for the existence of God. Cosmological and teleological.

Which is the way it went in the thinking of Charles Hodge, the Princeton theologian, about 1860, who built the theistic arguments on a Scottish realist basis. And it's therefore the basis of the so-called kind of inductivist apologetics, which came out of Princeton Seminary for decades on into the 20th century. Scottish realist.

Well, among these natural beliefs that Reid has are beliefs about the laws of logic. Beliefs about the axioms of mathematics. Euclidean geometry, for instance.

Beliefs about the existence and nature of material things. And incidentally, he didn't buy into the atomism of matter. Isolated particles with no interrelations.

No. Beliefs about causal connections. Oh, yeah.

The necessary connection between what we call cause and effect is directly known. We experience it. And I think you can argue that way rather well.

The traditional arguments that we met in people like Locke, saying that we have the closest awareness of it in our own inner experience, in our ideas of reflection. The causal connection between the will and the body is when you decide to do something and make yourself do it. Well, I think in our own bodily feelings, by the same token, we have an awareness of causal force, causal power.

When you lift heavy weights, you feel it in the muscle, the strength there. I sometimes use the illustration of carrying these large 40-pound sacks of softener salt that we have to use in water softeners around here, into the house. You have one in each hand, you know.

And with one in each hand, you brace your arms, and you carry them along, tottering as you go, you know. And you feel it all the way up. You feel the causal connections in some parts of the body.

Well, that's the sort of way in which Reid argues. But keep it in mind, because this is a point that Immanuel Kant is going to come back to. The crucial question, as Hume pointed out, is for our knowledge of things, matters of fact, beyond present experience, outside the mind.

The crucial question is the question of cause and effect. Do we know there are cause and effect connections? Hume said no, but we come to believe them. Reid says knowing is simply having true belief.

And we have natural belief. And Kant isn't satisfied with either. So he tries to find some other source for the idea of a cause-effect connection.

It's going to be crucial. Well, we have natural beliefs as well about memory. Does any of you doubt that I just said that? No, you naturally believe because you remember that I said it.

Natural beliefs about human freedom. Natural beliefs about moral principle. These are rooted in the human constitution.

In the proclivities. It's an interesting word. In the proclivities of human nature.

And you may recall that's the very word that David Hume uses when he's talking of moral psychology. The proclivities. In fact, this morning I was reading Keith Yandel's book on David Hume's philosophy of religion.

And he has a whole chapter dealing with the proclivities of human nature in David Hume. Because while Hume says, in effect, that the self is simply a bundle of mutually independent and isolated ideas, perceptions, and impressions. With no underlying mind or soul substance that we can know of.

Yet paradoxically, he also says that human nature has certain natural tendencies that persuade us. It's curious. There's no relationship between the bits and pieces in the consciousness.

But somehow or other, we join them together in certain standard ways. You see, Yandel argues that that's an inconsistency in Hume. He's got two different views of the self that don't belong together.

Well, what Reid is doing is then building on this notion of human proclivities. Rooted in the human constitution. By virtue of which we don't see relationships between atomistic, discrete ideas.

But by virtue of which we achieve beliefs in a natural process. And you can even say that for him, these are necessary beliefs. They are necessarily true.

Now, the word necessary in this case seems to mean something like psychologically necessary. Given human psychology, you cannot help but believe certain things. Psychologically necessary.

Which is different, is it not, from the notion of what is logically necessary. Where a necessary truth in the logical sense is one whose only alternative, the contradiction of it, is self-contradictory and therefore false. So if the alternatives are A or non-A, and non-A turns out to be self-contradictory and therefore false, then, of logical necessity, A is true.

You see, that would be a logically necessary truth. Now the interesting thing is that G.E. Moore, who picks up on this right after 1900, maintains that these natural beliefs are logically necessary. Why? Because their contradiction is self-contradictory.

How come? Well, take, for instance, that guy that I mentioned last time, who said that time is unreal. Okay? Time is unreal. He contradicts that every time he says, I've got to do something before I do something else.

It's a self-contradictory view. Moore calls it the paradox that philosophers are constantly denying by what they do the things that they say. Which sounds very much like Thomas Reid, doesn't it? The contradiction is between theory and practice.

If you believed what you say, then you wouldn't act that way. And so the claim is that that contradiction makes it a logically necessary truth. It's never been very favorably received by people who are not realists, but some people, understandably, will think that there is some slip of categories going on there, mixing the practical and the theoretical.

All right, so we have these natural or common-sense beliefs. Listen to what Reid says about your friend Descartes. A man like Descartes, who doubts his own existence, remembers meditation one, is surely as unfit to be reasoned with as a man who believes that he's made of glass.

There may be disorders in the human frame that produce such extravagances, but they'll never be cured by reasoning. Now, in addition to the sort of ad hominem remarks, and in addition to the sense of humor, the obvious point is that if you think you don't exist, there's something that's not functioning right. You've got some psychological problem.

Your natural proclivities are misfiring. Because natural beliefs are spontaneous, they're not voluntary. They're spontaneous interpretations of experience.

So that when you have a sensation, a physical sensation, it's a sign to you that there is some material object around. And so belief in the thing signified is a natural, spontaneous kind of reaction, response. You see, what's happening there makes it sound like behavioristic stimulus-response mechanisms.

So that the nature of direct awareness is such that if that's the eye, there's a stimulus, sensation, which immediately produces a response, affirming that something's there. You didn't blink; you were supposed to. Because your blink would affirm the recognition of something there.

I'll do it a little better next time. Now, while Reid, of course, is pre-behavioristic psychology, after the development of behavioristic psychology, Watson and so forth, yes, realists did start appealing to the stimulus-reflex mechanisms in explaining the direct nature of sense awareness. So a sensation, then, is a sign that God has arranged we should get.

A remembrance is a sign. I'm remembering something, something's coming back, I say to my mind. Coming back? It's a sign that there is something there to come back.

And spontaneously, I respond and affirm what I remember. And an imagination, what you know is simply imagination, is a sign, knowing it's something you're imagining, it's a sign that there is nothing there that you're believing. So that when I talk about my fairy giraffes with butterfly wings, you see, knowing that that's an imaginary kind of specimen, you don't take it as an indication of a material object, you take it as an indication of Holmes' crazy ideas.

Nothing but that. Well, then, it's due to human constitution as a whole, and it's common to all human beings, not a result of reasoning processes that we have these natural beliefs. Now, these Scottish realists were, not surprisingly, Scottish Presbyterians.

And their theism comes out in the ways I've indicated. But I'm interested to find a parallel kind of statement, not identical, but a parallel statement in John Calvin. And I don't want to suggest that Thomas Reid had read the same edition of Calvin's Institutes that I happened to read, or even that he had noted this passage in his own edition of Calvin's Institutes.

But listen to it, and you'll note the similarity. This is John Calvin. The manifold agility of the soul, which enables it to take a survey of heaven and earth, to join past to present, to retain the memory of things heard long ago, to conceive of whatever it chooses by the help of imagination.

You see, there's perception, surveying heaven and earth. Memory, things long ago. Now imagination.

And its ingenuity in the invention of such admirable arts, and he goes on to name some, are certain proofs of the divinity in man. In other words, human nature, the way we're made, provides evidence of a creator giving us these proclivities. So while Calvin takes this as evidence for the existence of God, Reid, dealing with epistemology, takes the existence of God as given, and finds there the justification for natural beliefs.

I might say that when you get to the 20th century, people like G.E. Moore, there's no theistic justification. G.E. Moore remains sort of agnostic, religiously. Okay, so the theory of ideas, natural beliefs.

Let me pause there for a moment. Comment, feedback? Yeah, Troy. Two views on... Oh yeah, yeah.

I'm wondering if there's some sort of order that Hume receives in this bundle of perceptions, and I'm wondering if maybe this is really rigid, but I'm wondering if Whitehead has to deal with the same problem, if he does so through the process rather than... Yeah, yeah. One, Hume does not, that I recall, talk about the inner order of this bundle of perceptions. No.

His language is simply that of ideas appearing and passing on the stage of consciousness. On the other hand, when he comes to talk about memory, he recognizes we have some natural belief that we draw on at that juncture, a natural proclivity, if you like. But he doesn't explain how that could be.

What is it that has the proclivity, if all there is are perceptions? So no. Now, the Whitehead question, yes, Whitehead does have to deal with this. We'll... You may want to come back to this when we get to Whitehead.

But you see, Whitehead takes roughly Hume's view that the self is simply a temporal stream of occasions of consciousness. Now that's half Whitehead's language and half translated. But a temporal stream of occasions of consciousness.

That does develop its own inner character, its own inner characteristics, you'll see. So he has to deal with Hume's question. He does deal with Hume's question.

And the debate among the Whitehead scholars is whether he does it adequately. How does he do it? By virtue of the fact that he rejects the view that every moment of experience is devoid of causal power. For Whitehead, following the realists, every event that occurs is a unit of causal force.

So he's overcome the causal power problem. That's how he does it. Okay, human freedom.

David? No, not natural ideas. He rejects the view that there are intermediary ideas between the mind and the object. He has natural beliefs.

A belief is not an idea. A belief involves a judgment. You see? A judgment that recognizes and affirms the agreement or disagreement of ideas.

Now that's different from an idea. Incidentally, some of you in your Hume outlines weren't seeing clearly the distinction between ideas and the two kinds of knowledge. Relations of ideas and matters of fact.

And tend to view relations of ideas and matters of fact as further kinds of ideas. No, they're two kinds of judgment, two kinds of knowledge. Ideas are simple, complex, and preceded by impressions.

Okay, freedom and determinism. Recall David Hume, who said that while we have no knowledge of necessary connection, the constant conjunctions of the same pairs of things, antecedent, consequent, again and again and again, lead us to believe in causal connection. And inasmuch as those kinds of regularities occur in human experience and are admitted by both the advocate of human liberty, human free will, and the advocate of determinism, necessitarianism, there's really nothing to choose between the two Humes.

Now, Reid disagrees. Disagrees strongly. Reid says that there is a causal power involved in human action that is distinctive.

He calls it human agency. As a result of this, in the 20th-century discussion, we distinguish between agency causation and simple physical causation. Agency causation involving the human agent.

Now, what Reid is maintaining is that our own causal agency is a kind of power, causal power, of which we have direct awareness. Our own causal agency. Is a causal power of which we have direct awareness.

We know with immediate awareness that we have the power to initiate events, to make something happen. So I have the power to say that's the end of class, and you can leave. And I'm sure it would initiate a happening.

But not yet. This direct awareness of having the power, of exercising the power, is one of these natural beliefs. That's unavoidable.

Now, the question, of course, is whether the exertion of that power, the exercise of that power, is itself free or is determined. Hume says we can be free to act, but we don't have freedom of choice. Because the constant conjunction between the

motives and the actions leads us to think that the actions are determined by the motives.

And it's here that, again, Reid disagrees. Freedom is the ability to choose to cause something or not to cause something to happen. That freedom is not just an act of reasoning.

Our reasoning may be determined by antecedent ideas and beliefs. But freedom is not an act of reasoning or the result of that. It's not just motivation.

Because our motives, as Hume has pointed out, may be determined. But the choice is a choice that we have between alternative reasonings and between alternative motives. And sometimes we choose without appealing to stronger reasons or without conscious motives.

In other words, our reasonings and our motives may be determined, but on the other hand, they may not. And inasmuch as we are aware, direct awareness, of the freedom in choosing alternatives, that's the introspective argument; there arises the natural belief in freedom, which he affirms. Now, he faces three counterarguments to it.

One counterargument is that there surely has to be sufficient cause to explain everything. Everything must have a reason, the law of sufficient reason. To which Reid's response is, agency is a sufficient reason.

There are occasions when I'm the cause. And my choice. If there are no causes, it's capricious and dangerous.

To which he says, agency is not an uncaused act. I am the cause of my agent's acts, and I don't act capriciously, but deliberately. The third objection is that free choice is in fact possessed only by God, who causes everything.

You remember the view that God is the all-powerful one, who has all the power. So the objection is, if God has all the power, how could we have the power as agent causes? To which Reid's response is that for knowledge, the fact that God might know what's going to occur, for knowledge does not force it to occur. That is to say, there are secondary causes, such as agents, who are the causes involved in producing things.

So he responds to those rather standard kinds of arguments, however adequately, of course, is what is often debated. Okay, any comment there, or ready to take a look at his ethics? It's almost predictable what he's going to say, isn't it? Once you get the notion of natural belief, it's almost predictable. Is there any way of describing the act

of making a choice that makes it seem free? Awareness of physical causation, yes, and the strain in the muscles, choosing.

Yeah, do you ever struggle with two alternatives, where, as you look at the two alternatives, there's no overwhelming case, so that the decision is sort of, we say easy, but sort of made for you? Yeah, there are times when you do that, you see. You realise you could go either way. And perhaps at the last minute you change your mind.

You see, there is that experience of agonizing freedom of choice. It's the sort of thing to which he appeals. All right, Reid's ethics.

I said just now that Reid was a foundationalist, so that all reasoning starts with first principles. Okay, that's the way it is in ethics. So ethics, like any science, has its first principles.

That's a very revealing statement. Ethics, like any science, has its first principles. Hume says that ethics is not a science.

Metaphysics is not a science, because there are no first principles from which you deduce. But Reid says that ethics is a science, and there are first principles from which you deduce. Now, he talks about these first principles in various ways.

Let me list the ways in which he talks about them. These are sort of synonymous phrases, as best I can see. He says that first principles are self-evident principles.

Self-evident. To everyone who has a conscience and has taken pains to exercise it. Natural proclivities.

Nothing. He says that there are natural desires and passions that fit us for a moral life. Natural inclinations.

He talks of the intention of nature. He says that there are axioms that lead to social virtue. And good government.

He says there is intuitive evidence that I cannot resist. He says that conscience is the law of God written in the heart, which he cannot disobey without acting unnaturally, contrary to nature. He says that moral judgment and conscience grow to maturity from an imperceptible seed planted in us by the Creator.

Natural proclivities. He says by an impulse of nature, we venture to judge for ourselves. So his appeal, again, is to natural proclivities.

Now, the first principles of ethics that he derives in this way or thinks of in these terms are very general. Some things merit approval. Others merit blame.

All right, there's a difference between right and wrong. First principle, you need that somewhere. Again, we ought to use the best means we can to be informed of our duty.

We have a moral responsibility to find out. Those are the sorts of things he regards as first principles, and it's in the light of those that we make our judgments about particular cases. Now, it's in that context that he criticizes Hume.

He says that Hume's theory of ideas led from the subjectivity of secondary and primary qualities to the subjectivity of beauty and of right and wrong. Hume's ethical subjectivism. But his own view sounds remarkably like Hume in some ways.

He says that feeling, okay, that's the emotive, feeling, and judgment, that's the rational, are inseparable in giving moral approval, making moral judgments. Both reason and feeling. Now, that's what Hume said.

One cannot replace the other. One is not reducible to the other. When I approve of something, I'm consciously making a moral judgment.

It's a judgment. It's not just an emotional response. But the difference is that the judgment is not just about the facts of the case.

As it is for Hume. With his empirical approach to consequences. His utility approach.

The reason is to go beyond facts to explore the relationship between ideas. Agreement or disagreement is what's involved in a judgment. So when on the basis of a principle like we should prefer a greater good to a lesser.

On the basis of something like that, I judge that there is greater good in one alternative than the other. It logically follows that I should prefer that one with the greater good. And so, accordingly, the moral judgments, real judgments, are based on intuitive principles.

Well, that's not as complete as I wish he had made it. But it's as complete a picture as I've found in Locke at this juncture. In Locke, at this juncture.

Comment? Question? Reason and feeling. Differing from Hume in the role of reason. Okay, I guess we'll have to save this comment about Kant for next time.

Which simply means it'll give us the opportunity to recoup our awareness of the Scottish realists.