

A History of Philosophy

49 Reactions to David Hume

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Okay, I said last time that we would start today with a recap of Hume's ethics to allow opportunity for discussion, feedback, and it seems to me that this is an appropriate way in any case of introducing the moral sense philosophers of the 18th century that we've made reference to along the way. So let me start with the recap of Hume's ethics. Where you recall the overall question is whether morality is based in reason or sentiment, reason or sentiment.

And plainly, the option of it being based in reason is that of John Locke and the Cambridge Platonists, with their innate knowledge, of course. As far as Hume is concerned, the question is about what we mean by reason. It has to do with relations of ideas and matters of fact.

Relations of ideas, yes, reason can help you to define ethical terms and to interrelate ethical concepts. That's all. And in terms of matters of fact, it can help with empirical anticipations, predictions of consequences, hence his emphasis on a principle of utility.

But when he gets that far, the point is that matters of fact can tell you what is, as a matter of fact, the situation that you're facing. What is likely to happen if you take certain actions? But how do you get from the is to the ought? And it's to David Hume's credit that in the history of ethics, he's the first one to really point up that question.

The is-ought question, as we call it. Previously, it has been assumed that there are certain objective, intellectually accessible moral truths that sort of carry an ought of their own or else represent the ought that God has laid on them if the truths are about God's commands, God's will. But Hume, without that religious basis for an ethic, is committed as an empiricist to deriving ethical obligation from nothing more than the empirical.

You see? How do you get an ought from an is? And this is the problem that haunts empirically oriented ethical theory from Hume's day until, oh, well past mid-20th century. We'll be coming back to it again and again. It seems to me that the problem is related to the fact that the empiricism which Hume is talking about is essentially the method of empirical science.

He sees it as Newton's method. So the problem is that the 18th-century conception of scientific method is that scientific thinking, scientific method, is value-neutral. You

see? Or if you like, that the world which science is investigating, the Newtonian universe, is a value-free world.

A world of value-free facts. And indeed, if all that you have is, in the Newtonian picture, particles of matter and blind forces at work, then there is no inherent purpose to the natural world. You see? Now the theists among them, like Lark Descartes earlier, see God's purposes involved in the way in which the mechanisms of nature work.

But if all you've got is the mechanisms of nature, you have a world devoid of any moral significance in and of itself. You see? And I think it follows that if that's the case, the only way in which values arise is because of their instrumental worth as a means to something else, hence the utilitarian. As a means to some end that you assert, postulate, but you've still got the question of how do you get the ought, what you ought to do, the ought out of the is.

There is a moral obligation. Now it's in regard to the source of moral obligation as well as moral knowledge, knowledge of what is good, that he has to appeal to sentiment. So while reason does contribute indeed in those matters, and particularly in terms of knowing something about the usefulness of alternatives, utility, it's the sentiment that he has to turn to in order to get at any kind of moral obligation.

And you recall the picture that we were talking about, what kinds of sentiments or feelings? Well, initially, the appeal is to benevolence, a universal, natural feeling of benevolence, literally wanting what is good for others. This is in contrast to the sheer egoism of somebody like Hobbes.

There's a natural benevolence. Why natural benevolence? How does he explain that? What's the psychology of benevolence? Well, it involves feelings of pleasure or pain about what is happening to other people, which we describe in talking of the sentiment of sympathy. Sympathy, which we feel because of the factual similarity that's empirically observable between us and other people who are going through tough times, so that underlying the sympathy, there is a significant dose of self-interest.

So that even though benevolence is not by itself reducible to self-interest, it's related to self-interest. There's some combination of egoism and altruism. Now these are all feelings, moral sentiments, impressions of reflection, if you like.

And it's out of this that there arises then the sense of ought, so that the ought means simply that I feel I ought, I want them to have good, and so forth. And underlying this is that tinge of self-interest related to it. So that, in a nutshell, is Hume's ethic.

And so the rules that amount to justice, you see, arising from that, justice is utilitarian in its intent. He calls those rules laws of nature. But the laws of nature are the sort of thing which we want for utility's sake in this context.

Well, let me pause there for your reaction to what we were doing last Friday. Yeah? Where does he get the ought? Yes, after all, any ethic is more than a description of what, in fact, people do. That's not ethics.

That's sociology. No, if you want to talk about ethics, you're talking about something that's normative. What ought I to do? What is the good that I should pursue? Why be good? Why do good? That's the question, you see.

Age-old question. And Hume's response is that we have an inner compulsion to do so. So in that sense, the ought is self-imposed, whereas for Hobbes in the Leviathan situation, in the long run, it turns out that, while it originates in a sort of self-imposed contract, it turns out to be socially imposed by the Leviathan.

In Divine Command, ethics, where the ought is the will of God, divinely given. But in Hume, with his ethical subjectivism, it's a kind of self-imposed thing. They don't jump to the conclusion from that that he's an ethical relativist.

No, because the universal sameness of psychology is that the same kind of benevolence is characteristic in different degrees of all human beings. So he's trying to find a basis for morality, for moral obligation that is universally the same. And you have to look for something that's universally alike for that.

And human psychology is where he looks. David. Does the feeling of sympathy necessarily arise just because of the pressure of pain in someone else's life? Aren't there some people in our society who get pleasure from seeing other people in pain? Well, there you see, if that is the case, would you say, David, that there are some people whose natural benevolence is completely altruistic, unrelated to their own pleasure and pain? Then you've got a difference of fact about human psychology.

How would you argue yours? How would you argue his? Well, the same juncture, and we'll sing a little bit more about him later on, you may remember from your intro course, you may, Dave, I don't know if the others read the same piece in theirs, but Joseph Butler has a classic response to ethical egoism, or rather to psychological egoism, the view that everybody pursues their own self-interest above all. His response is not that there are some human actions that are totally disregarding of self. No.

His response is that they may have reference to the self, but the primary concern in such actions is not that self-interest, but the object that one is after. It's not self-absorbed. Egoism says self-absorbed.

No, but even Butler, the principal opponent of egoism in that context, doesn't say even self-referential. No, he allows that. And I guess, I think if you can allow that, it defuses the situation, because the egoist response is going to say, well, don't you get some degree of satisfaction out of seeing other people getting along nicely when you've had a hand in it? You see? Yeah.

You do. No. It's much more satisfying and pleasing to see people able to make ends meet than to see them starving.

It's painful to, you know. You've got to take that sort of phenomenon into account. So the factual question becomes one of, are there any human actions that are totally disregarding of all possible self-interest? And Butler's inclined to say no.

You see, the egoism is not the view that there is self-interest, but that self-interest is the dominant, overriding, final, all-absorbing. So I guess I'm not worried about that. But what I was thinking of more was, rather than someone who is that, you know, someone who is the opposite, someone who is so alone, that they enjoy, they know they would receive pleasure from seeing other people in pain.

Oh, malevolent. Yeah, malevolent. Oh.

Yeah, I think that Hume would argue no. No, that even, and Butler and people like that do as well, even though there are some very sadistic brutes who love to see other people squeal, they still have some degree of benevolence for some, if only a pet dog, you see. That some degree of benevolence is never completely eradicated.

The gangster who's got such a soft spot for his own kids, but doesn't think twice about killing a lot of other people. The Hitler who was very tender with his girlfriend. Well, that's a question of psychological fact.

Anything else? Okay, you see what Hume is doing? All right, let me move on then and say just a little about the moral sense of the philosophers of the 18th century. Four of them I've mentioned. In actual fact, of course, there were a lot more.

But the four, the Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, that's the Adam Smith of Wealth of Nations, he was professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh, wrote a book on the theory of moral sentiments, and Joseph Butler. Joseph Butler, who was an Anglican clergyman in a city pulpit in London. Most of his ethical writings that have come down to us are sermons he preached.

They are much more like philosophical lectures than like any sermon you heard, I would wager. But that was the 18th century, I guess. All right, so this school of thought, the moral sense philosophers.

Like David Hume, they are rooting ethics in human psychology, in moral psychology. They are affirming that we have some kind of moral sense in addition to the five senses. Some kind of moral sense, sentiment.

And as we noted last time, Hume himself uses the phrase moral sense in talking about the sentiments in his own case. Now, this moral sense philosophy seems to have arisen in opposition to Thomas Hobbes' egoism. And in that regard, it sort of picked up the baton from the Cambridge Platonists of the 17th century.

We talked about a little bit when we were dealing with Locke. The Cambridge Platonists, of course, with their innate ideas, opposed the mechanistic view of nature. Broad church people in the Anglican tradition.

But with their belief in real universals, therefore objectively real ethical ideals, the Cambridge Platonists were 100% opposed to Thomas Hobbes. But not only to Thomas Hobbes. They were also opposed to the strong Calvinism that had flourished during the Cromwellian Commonwealth.

This is true of the moral sense philosophers as well in the 18th century. Opposed to that strong Calvinism with a pessimistic view of human nature. That maintained that there is no natural beneficence in human beings.

That we're all completely egoistical. You see the issue facing up? Egoism versus altruism. I remember when I was in graduate school, I heard a lecture by one of the early 20th century descendants of those moral sense philosophers, a Britisher called Broad, B-R-O-A-D, C-D Broad.

He was lecturing on the question, egoism or altruism? He argued that he was either some sort of an egoistical altruist or some kind of an altruistical egoist, he wasn't quite sure which. But the method of his reasoning was by appealing to what seemed to him perfectly obvious. That is to say, we have a moral sense that enables us to perceive when we understand a situation what's right.

Moral sense. Yes, in Broad's day, it was called intuition. So the 20th-century descendants of this are called ethical intuitionists.

You see, ethical intuitionists. Broad was one of them. We'll meet a couple of others of them later on, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross.

But the moral sense philosophers, anticipating that you see, are talking of a natural kind of benevolence that is inherent in our moral sensitivity. We're benevolent because of this moral sense, this moral faculty. Which enables us to perceive right from wrong.

The moral faculty indeed has three functions. It enables us to perceive the moral quality of an action or a situation. It enables us to approve or disapprove of that action or situation.

And it motivates us to do what is good in regard to that situation. So it involves perception, moral perception, knowing the right, the good. Moral approbation, making moral judgments.

And moral motivation. So that again, as you can see, the moral knowledge comes there, and the ought, the obligation, comes from both the judgment and the motivation. And you'd have to translate the notion of duty or obligation to the motivation, I've got to do this, the motivation that drives.

Now, on this account, beneficence is not reducible to things like pleasure or self-interest, David. It doesn't rule it out, but it's not reducible just to that. It wasn't for Hume either.

The moral sense is a kind of *sui generis* thing. It's distinctive; it's not reducible to any other human faculty. It's simply part of how God made us to function.

So while you still have the ethical subjectivism like in Hume, there's a theistic basis for it, which makes the motivation and approbation much more weighty than would have been otherwise. Now, while that's the overall picture for these moral sense people, there is still a major question which divided them. The question is whether this moral sense is basically cognitive or emotive.

Is it a matter of reason or is it a matter of emotion? The same question that David Hume was dealing with. And on that issue, the ones who said it's basically non-cognitive, a matter of taste, a matter of sentiment, though universal, were Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, the first two that I've got up here. Adam Smith as well, though not as fully, not as clearly.

But at least there are writers like Thomas Reid, the Scottish realist, who accuse him of having this ethic of feeling rather than of knowledge. On the other hand, Butler and, as we'll see, Thomas Reid in Scottish Realism, who is very similar to this on ethics, Butler and Reid both say that this sense is a cognitive faculty, that it is a kind of knowing, not a kind of feeling. It involves ideas, clear ideas, rather than just some feelings of pleasure or pain.

What is it that good taste provides a feeling of? If it's taste, good taste is what? Satisfaction? Pleasure? It's hard to avoid the term pleasure if you're talking about the emotive. So this is the issue over which they divided. Now, of these people, you might find Joseph Butler, perhaps, particularly interesting, a bishop in the Church of

England, and for some people, he's of interest because he uses the word conscience to denote, to name, the moral sense.

This moral sense that we all have is conscience. And he goes to great lengths in developing this, and you can see how it parallels the kind of thing that he and the others are up to. Conscience, for Butler, is simply one of a whole variety of what he calls mental propensities.

Propensities of the mind. In other words, we're made with certain capacities and tendencies. As he says, God-given tendencies.

Tendencies which, as they function, provide this moral sense. Now, these four kinds of propensity are, first of all, particular passions, where he seems to be speaking particularly of desires. Desires for satisfaction.

And so the feelings, the emotions, the desires associated with hunger, with sex, with anger. Particular desires for particular objects. Propensity as well for self-love.

That's the self-interest. A propensity for benevolence, loving others. And the fourth propensity that he calls conscience.

Now, self-love and benevolence provide rational checks on our passions. So that out of self-interest, you'll check your overindulgence. Out of benevolence, you'll bridle in your anger.

So forth. Conscience, on the other hand, is the propensity to balance self-love and benevolence. You see, if you've got two principles, self-love and benevolence, trying to guide the passions, how do you know self-love isn't going to be dominant? And you're going to turn out as a thoroughly selfish kind of animal.

Or so utterly selfless you can't function. Well, that's where conscience maintains the balance in choosing ends and means to pursue those ends. Conscience is both cognitive in the sense that it helps us to perceive, to see what the right balance is, but it's also authoritative in that it approves or disapproves.

It motivates you. And it's out of this authoritative aspect of conscience, what a teacher of mine used to call the conscience prick. Your conscience pricks you.

It's out of that conscience prick, you see, that the ought comes. Well, this is another kind of moral psychology, very, very similar to David Hume's. With perhaps two differences in the case of Butler.

One is its emphasis on the rational dimension, the cognitive dimension of the moral sense, called conscience. And the second is the fact that the propensities, the

makeup of the human psyche, the propensities of the mind, passions, and so forth, are intended by God to function in a certain way. So the virtuous person is one who functions in the best way possible.

A properly functioning human being is a virtuous human being. That sounds like Aristotle. Remember Aristotle's conception of the good as happiness? Is the proper functioning of a rational being in a whole life? You see, the functioning of a whole life in accordance with reason.

So it seems to have an Aristotelian flavor, but it's a moral psychology of this sort. Okay, well, maybe that's enough of a glimpse for now of the moral sense philosophers. They used to be the object of a great amount of study.

They're of interest now more as historical reactions against people like Hume and Hobbes. More as anticipations of 20th-century ethical intuitionism. More as starting the debate on cognitive versus emotive non-cognitive ethics.

But interesting and significant people. I think one of the things that they do is to help us see that an ethical subjectivism, an ethic grounded on moral psychology, can provide a universal, as opposed to a relative, ethic. That's so in Hume, but it's even more so, I think, in these people.

You might wonder about the biblical use of the term conscience. I'm inclined to think that Butler has packed a lot more into the word conscience than the New Testament does. Where, if I'm not mistaken, the word itself, which is *synodesis*, the verb *ideo*, and the preposition *sun*, together mean simply the ability to see things together, to put two and two together, to make judgments.

The French word for consciousness is simply conscience. Consciousness is conscience. You see, it's simply that there is a capacity to make judgments, to see, put two and two together.

And it seems to me that that root meaning is pretty close to the biblical use of the term. Conscience certainly isn't the infallible kind of Pinocchio stuff that mythology has. It's something that can be blurred and very inaccurate, and needs to be informed.

Well, in any case, Butler goes further than that, I think. It doesn't seem to me that he still answers the question of why. And if it's more common, shouldn't there be an answer to why? Yeah, I think it's there in several ways.

One is this. These are God-given with the purpose of providing moral direction. Therefore, ought equals God says do it.

And the other is down here with regards to this approve or disapprove. Because if this moral sense is a capacity for making moral judgments, this is okay, it passes muster, that's awful, don't do it. Then it's intrinsic in that very approbation, sense of approbation, disapprobation.

So the way in which you are made to function cries out its command. I think that's the way he'd respond to that. And if you find that a little bit odd, I'd find it hard to credit, ask yourself if there's anybody here, or for that matter get a much larger audience, any sort of mixed audience, anybody here who morally approves of torturing innocent infants for sheer sadistic delight of watching them scream in torment and watching their mothers go crazy in anguish.

Obviously, there are some things that every human being is going to revolt against. Well, it's that sort of psychological phenomenon that underlies this. Maybe there are exceptions to that.

Just like the Satanist parts? Yeah. And then the question arises, what do you do with some of these exceptions? Do you just find other cases where they are benevolent? Or do you, in those cases, say, as I think Butler would, there's something that's not functioning right? And we have that way of talking about it in moral psychology today.

We say there are certain people who, for whatever reasons, are morally non-functional. They just have no capacity to say right and wrong. They have no moral sensitivity at all.

That apparently, for whatever psychological or biological reasons. Troy. I'm wondering how you, especially, not so much with a moral sense of logic, how they can get a substantial, I mean a normative, universal ethic out of... The content of it.

How much really can we all agree on that moral sense of logic? Yeah. Yeah. That's a very apt question.

But I think, as with any other question asking about what's relevant and what's universal, you have to distinguish. Do you mean would they all handle these cases in exactly the same way, or a particular case? Are you talking about a particular case? Are you talking about general rules with regard to areas of responsibility? Like a rule against killing? There may be exceptions in some cases, but a rule against killing. Or are you talking of exceptionless principles? Like the principle of benevolence.

Because whatever the basis on which the principles lie, relativism is going to occur at some of these. And I think that what these moral sense philosophers are saying is that what is plainly universal is there. Overall, moral principles like benevolence.

Like a limited self-interest. Those are overall moral principles that generate general rules. I mean, what constitutes benevolence is very subjective.

No, what constitutes it is doing what you believe to be good for other people and doing it out of the wish to do good. Right, but what you believe to be good is subjective. Ah, yeah, but you see, what you believe to be good is going to depend on a lot of cases in any ethic.

Take a commandment, thou shalt not kill. What is killing? Does it include eating chicken? Does it include cutting the grass? You see? No, you've got to define it. And defining it in context in the case of the commandment, it's plain that to the general rule against killing, there are exceptions that are allowed in the Levitical context for various reasons.

So that's a matter of specification. But you see, ethical relativism says there are no universal principles at all. The definition of ethical relativism, which you get in, or a selection from Ruth Benedict that's in the introductory text that I use, defines ethical relativism as the view that all environmental conditions, well, that's not a definition of ethical relativism that any ethicist will accept.

You see, because we recognise that there are situational differences depending on economic conditions, climate, and so on and so forth in terms of some beliefs and practices. Nobody's going to claim that all the detailed beliefs and practices are universally the same. Biblically, the classic example of that is the business of eating food offered to idols.

You see, that's a cultural concern depending on the context and so on and so forth. No, so the relativist is going to say that all of these are relative. Now you'll get a very legalistic absolutist, like some of the Reconstructionists, who will try to make it out all the way through to here is absolute.

You see. But it seems to me that biblical ethics is laying emphasis here. What does the Lord require of you? To do justice, to love mercy, as you walk humbly with your God.

And then spells that out with regard to general areas, as in the Decalogue. To which, in particular cases, there may be some tragic exceptions. As with capital punishment in the Old Testament.

So I think if you ask the moral sense philosophers what is absolute, and if they can sustain simply the overall principle of benevolence and a limited egoism, then in that regard they have broken with relativism. Yes, Hume also. Yes, Hume also.

He may not have done it in the way you would like him to, but he's done it. No, I think it's an oversimplification of a Christian ethic to say in a Christian ethic that everything is absolute. That's just not true.

That's not the case. Ours is a limited absolutism, I call it. Alright, anything else on this moral sense philosophy? Oh, I should say that people like Butler and so forth, as they work it out, will try to derive general rules and apply them to cases.

And in the instance of C.D. Broad, the guy I heard some years back, his tendency, you see, with general principles in mind, was to address a particular case. And as he went through it and came to one stage in the decision-making process, after reviewing all of the considerations, he'd say, well it seems to me in the light of this principle that it's perfectly obvious that such and such is the thing to do. Now, let me say just one thing more about this moral sense intuition approach.

It strikes me that there are two different kinds of ethical intuitionism or moral sense philosophy cutting the cake in yet a different way. There is one kind that makes the overall principles known intuitively by this moral sense. There is another that makes out that what you do in a particular case becomes evident to the moral sense.

And then I suppose there would be some that combine the two. The 20th-century intuitionists, I think, are speaking of this. It's the overall principles that are known intuitively.

I think Butler and the moral sense people are, but they may go on to the particular cases as well. I mentioned G.E. Moore as a 20th-century intuitionist. He says that the concept of good is an intuitive notion.

That's his principle. What are you to do in a particular case? For Moore, that's a utilitarian decision. It's not intuitive.

It's what maximizes the good. Oh well, that's stuff for the ethical theory course for some of you next year. Okay, let me clean this off a little bit.

Now, turn our attention to David Hume's epistemology and the response of Scottish realism. One of the questions that may have been lurking in the back of your mind or perhaps filling up the front of your mind last week was how to avoid David Hume's skepticism, granted the skeptical conclusion that he draws from the theory of ideas, the representational theory of knowledge. Is skepticism the inevitable result, logically? And is Hume's psychology of belief the only way to avoid that being the ultimate conclusion? Is his psychology of belief the only way out? Well, let me mention five attempts that developed in post-Hume thinking.

To handle this epistemological issue. Now, one of them undoubtedly is Hume's. That is to say, a psychology of belief that has a pragmatic basis for belief.

That is to say, there are certain things that just plain work to believe. It works psychologically to believe. In fact, insofar as the passions take their usual course, it would be the most natural thing in the world to believe.

And so following this psychology of belief, what emerges then is a kind of pragmatism. A kind of psychology of belief that leads to pragmatism, or that is parallel to pragmatism. Now, various people I have in mind here.

The most obvious case is William James, the American pragmatist. Some of you may have run into his essay called *The Will to Believe*. If you haven't, you probably will sometime.

In which he simply argues that if on a given issue there is no clear weight of evidence or argument on one side or the other, you turn to passionate grounds for belief. Passionate in the Hume sense. That is to say, on non-cognitive grounds.

And so belief then becomes simply an outcome of one's own psychological makeup. It's not at all clear whether, for James, he intends that to be a universal or a relative psychological makeup. And it seems that in some essays he says one, in some essays he says the other.

But at least belief is a function of psychological makeup. The pragmatic route. An earlier kind of psychology of belief than William James, and less pragmatic, is John Henry Newman.

In the 19th century at Oxford. Who wrote a book called *A Grammar in Aid of Ascent*? *A Grammar in Aid of Ascent*.

I think the paperback that's still in print goes under the title *A Grammar of Ascent*. Simply that. Well, what he does really is to make a distinction between two kinds of certainty that he calls certainty and certitude.

Certainty and certitude. Where certainty has to do with logical certainty. Demonstrative certainty.

And certitude has to do with psychological certainty. And as you might expect, he argues for certitude rather than certainty on those matters. Okay, that's one route, a somewhat pragmatic psychology of belief.

The view that there are some beliefs that are psychologically unavoidable. Psychologically, they're unavoidable. Logically, they may be avoidable, but psychologically, they're not.

Now you'll find that something of that note runs through a lot of later realists in addition to the Scottish realists. You'll find them saying, for instance, that if somebody doesn't believe in the reality of the external world, material things, you offer them a glass of arsenic and see what they do. Things of that sort.

Obviously, their disbelief is not a disbelief they live with. G.E. Moore says one time of a Scottish idealist who had said that time is unreal. Apparently, when he says that he had breakfast before he lectured, he didn't mean it at all.

He didn't mean that at all. Well, what did he mean? And obviously, the very pragmatics of language and action are such that there are certain affirmations we make in the process. And it's paradoxical if people deny when they speak what in action they affirm.

So the pragmatic is involved with the practical dimensions, the unavoids in practice. A second obvious alternative is to reject the representational theory. You know the view that we found in Descartes and Locke, and following that, the direct object of our thought is simply ideas.

And if we want to refer to anything extra-mental, we have to have proofs that they exist. Now that notion that ideas keep us distanced from realities would be the representational theory. And the alternative is to reject that.

To maintain, in other words, a kind of direct awareness, a direct realism. Direct realism. And that is precisely what these Scottish realists do.

They reject the representational theory, the theory of ideas, explicitly, and try to argue for direct realism. So we'll come back to that a little more closely in just a moment. A third alternative is to reject the atomism of the theory of ideas.

You see, Locke and Hume both maintain that simple ideas come to us discreetly, one after another. Beep. Beep.

Beep. And to combine ideas is something else. We don't immediately perceive complex ideas.

We do the combining, according to Hume, by principles of association that we can't justify, like cause and effect. You see. Well, obviously, one alternative is to reject that atomism of discrete ideas and to maintain that experience comes to us more as a gestalt than as a series of discrete behavioral stimuli.

You see. That is to say, a structured whole. Structured whole.

And you know enough about Gestalt psychology to know that the empirical evidence certainly seems to favor that view of experience rather than the atomistic view in terms of conditioning. So, rejecting the atomism of ideas. So you'll have to argue in that way that we have a direct awareness of wholes, not just of the atomistic ingredients.

A direct awareness of relations, therefore, like the causal relation. And that is precisely what the Scottish realists are doing. They're taking both those paths.

Okay. A fourth, very plainly, is to reject nominalism. The nominalism of Hume and Berkeley.

And to go back at least to a conceptualism like Lockhead. That we can and do indeed entertain abstract ideas such as the idea of substance, the idea of space, the idea of time, so on and so forth. And in that way to develop an overall conceptual scheme which, as an overall scheme, may have empirical reference even though some of the ingredient concepts may not have immediate reference.

And I think you find something of that in the Scottish realists, though not as overtly as in later thinkers. Later thinkers. When we get to Whitehead, it's very explicit in his case.

There's a touch of that in Immanuel Kant, by the way, certainly in Hegel. And then the final alternative, of course, number five, is to reject empiricism itself. The claim that our only factual knowledge comes from experience.

To reject empiricism. Which would involve introducing a priori principles. Like Aristotle did.

Structural principles, categories. Or like Plato did, innate ideas. Well, Kant goes that route.

Kant introduces a priori principles in addition to empirical input. And, of course, what remains to be seen as we get into Kant, well, maybe at the end of this week we'll get started. But what remains to be seen as we get into Kant is whether his way of introducing a priori principles gets you any further than Hume.

And I guess it depends on what you're talking about in Kant. If you're talking about his ethics, perhaps it does. If you're talking about knowledge of the space-time world, it doesn't.

But obviously that's another alternative. So, there are alternative ways to David Hume's epistemology. Well, in addition to his own, other variations on the pragmatic.

And then four other kinds as well. And we'll run into all five of those as we go on into the 20th century.