

A History of Philosophy

44 George Berkeley's Idealism

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Good afternoon. We want to get acquainted with George Berkeley, 18th-century British philosopher, and with his idealism. Idealism in the metaphysical sense.

That is to say that all that exists is of the nature of mind, immaterial spirit. In order to get a handle on what he is doing and why, let me say something first of all about his overall philosophical project. And let me start that by indicating that he was a very practically minded man.

A bishop in the Anglican Church in Ireland, he tried to establish a school for American Indians on the islands of Bermuda, which never got off the ground because of financing and because he didn't realize that they had no natural water supply, and depended on rainwater. So instead, he settled in Newport, Rhode Island, and to this day, you can see his house there, where the local Berkeley Society will provide you with tours that will tell you all you ever wanted to know and far more besides about Berkeley, his life, and his doings, and his vegetable garden. He was interested in developing some sort of medical panacea from tar water.

Such was the state of medicine in his day. But I say those things to indicate that he was a man of affairs, something of an activist with all sorts of socially related projects. And now I go on to tell you that he denies the existence of matter.

In fact, one person, a man by the name of J.O. Wisdom, has tried to do a posthumous psychoanalysis of George Berkeley in a book called *The Unconscious Origins of Berkeley's Philosophy*, in which he sees the venture with tar water and his idealist metaphysics as equally delusive attempts at finding a panacea for our physical woes. Treat them with medicine and deny the existence of materiality. Due to some pathological aversion that he had to dirt and excretion, such is the psychoanalysis posthumously of George Berkeley.

Take it with all the pinches of salt that it deserves. In reality, Berkeley was very much concerned about the world of ideas in his time. It was a day in which materialism was on the rise.

Not always the more religiously benign materialism of Thomas Hobbes, but often associated with atheism. And in addition, the deism of the day was built upon a foundation of Newtonian physics. For if nature operates according to its own fixed mechanical laws, then a god actively involved and imminent in nature becomes superfluous.

And so deism was the major religious alternative to Christianity in his day. And all this concerned the learned bishop. His project was related to that.

Now, how was he going to do something about that? In fact, tar water is no solution. So, what George Berkeley did was to consider John Locke's epistemology carefully. John Locke's epistemology.

You know the story. That the mind has as the object of its thinking what it is, the only thing the mind thinks. Ideas.

Ideas of sensation and reflection. Ideas of sensation involving primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities have some objective reality in the matter.

Whose substratum is, according to Locke, something we know not what. But the point is that ideas are, some of them at least, representations. It's a representative theory of knowledge.

Representations of material objects. Now, seeing this scheme, Berkeley's strategy becomes relatively simple. Namely, to deny that there is any objectively real representation of our ideas of primary qualities.

You'll see. To deny that you can break through this cognitive barrier and get to what is extra-mental, outside the mind. Locke thought you could do it by causal inference.

What's the cause of my sensations? And that's the sort of thing, therefore, that Berkeley questions. So that whereas Locke is a realist about materiality, Berkeley is what nowadays we would call an anti-realist about matter. Denying the independent reality of matter.

That's characteristic, of course, of metaphysical idealism. Because by definition, if an idealist says that all that exists is immaterial, then there is nothing material that exists. So idealism is a kind of anti-realism about matter.

And we'll run across other views that question the reality of matter that become known as phenomenalism. Phenomenalism. That is to say, assert that all we know are appearances of things like material objects.

But whether in reality there is matter is another question. Phenomenalism. Now, if you like, idealism is one subset of phenomenalism.

That is to say, the idealist says all we have are the ideas, the appearances. There is no matter as such. It's a kind of phenomenalism.

But there are other kinds of phenomenalism besides idealism. And we'll see that Immanuel Kant is some sort of a phenomenalist. And characteristically, all of 19th-century German idealism is phenomenalist.

And the idealist movements which blossomed throughout Europe and America in the late 19th century, in fact, if you think back to the ancients, Plotinus, yeah, really, he's a phenomenalist too because matter has no independent existence. There are souls, world of ideas, but as you sink lower and lower on the chain of emanations, the hierarchy of being, you get down towards non-being, and there is no substratum of reality down there called matter. It's non-being.

And so the Platonic tradition likewise is potentially a kind of idealism. It's certainly a kind of phenomenalism. Now go one step further with Berkeley's project.

The thing which has encouraged the rise of materialism and with it the rise of deism, the rise of atheism, is unintentionally on the man's part, Newton's physics. Because what Newton is asserting in the mechanistic physics that he systematized in his day, what he is asserting is the independent reality, independent of whether we're aware of it or not, the independent reality of matter, of force, causal power, of uniform absolute space and uniform absolute time. Those are the key essential formative concepts for Newtonian physics, for mechanistic physics.

Newton assumes that all four of these are objectively real. Berkeley argues that all four of them are objectively unreal. Now, if you can pull matter, physical force, space, and time out from under the materialist's feet, he can't stay standing.

You'll see. So essentially what Berkeley does is to pull the rug out from under their feet, and materialism collapses. That, at least, is his project.

That's his strategy. The cause of the difficulty is the mechanistic science that emerged with the scientific revolution. It was a difficulty that we've seen emerging a long, long time before methodologically with Bacon.

In terms of the philosophical position built on it with Hobbes, with Descartes, with Spinoza, you see. Leibniz was one who fought it, denying that matter in the Newtonian sense is the ultimate real, the basic stuff, substratum. You see.

Because for Leibniz, the basic stuff, what he calls monads, are units of force, units of energy. He was proposing a kind of realism, but a realism not about matter, but about what we would call energetic physics. Not mechanistic physics, but energetic physics.

You see. Well, Berkeley then is facing this kind of situation. His strategy is obviously suggested to him by Locke's epistemology.

Obviously so. So that we usually think of the history of British empiricism as moving from Locke to Berkeley and then on to David Hill. His method, therefore, is going to be thoroughly empiricist.

With Locke, he's going to insist that the only resources we have for natural knowledge are the ideas that comprise experience. Simple ideas. And with Locke and with Descartes, he's going to affirm that the empirical faculties which God has given to us are quite trustworthy if we use them aright.

If we confine our assertions to that for which we have evidence. So Berkeley, if you like, is an evidentialist. Locke is kind of an evidentialist.

Proportion your beliefs to the evidence. The difference between Berkeley and Locke is that Berkeley doesn't think there is evidence. Sufficient evidence for the existence of matter, physical force, absolute space, and absolute time.

Why not? Well, that's where we make the transition from his project to thinking about the principles on which his case rests. Let me pause, though. Any comments or questions about the project? Ryan.

This is something from a little earlier. When you drew the Kantian X, or the X with Kant. Yes.

And rationalism, or continental rationalism, is feeding in on one side of British empiricism. I thought it was that rationalism continued on in German idealism. That's right.

And then the empiricism continued on in phenomenism. Yes. Did you just say that idealism is under phenomenism? Okay, let me clarify.

What we had done was to diagram this way. The development of continental rationalism from Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz until the point where Kant, around 1800, is forced to bear the thinking of David Hume as well. Awakened from those rationalist slumbers, as he puts it, by reading David Hume.

Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Now, I just said that, or you just said rather, that that empiricist trend continues in the phenomenism of the 19th century. Yes.

And my reference there is to people like the French philosopher Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. And subsequently, 20th-century logical positivism. Yes, they're all the continuation of that British empiricist tradition.

But, lo and behold, what we find in 19th-century German thought, French as well, is the development of a metaphysical idealism out of the roots of continental rationalism. And you find that a little bit confusing, understandably, because Berkeley is also an idealist, but he's in the empiricist tradition. So what? You know, you can be an idealist with two different epistemological traditions.

You can be a rationalist who's an idealist. You can be an empiricist who's an idealist. No problem there.

If you're ingenious enough at what you do with it. But the other thing that confuses you is that there are two kinds of phenomenalism. So what? You can have phenomenalism on an empirical basis and phenomenalism on a rationalist basis.

Yeah. Yes. Now, to, however, respond to your curiosity, how come the rationalists become idealists? Well, rationalism is talking about the intellectual resources, this kind of rationalism, the intellectual resources innate within the human mind, innate knowledge, a priori knowledge.

Now, you move from the age of reason into the 19th century, and the emphasis is upon innate resources, not for knowledge, but for creative self-expression. You see? So what you get here is an idealism that is more of the Romanticist sort than of the Enlightenment sort. You see? An idealism that depends upon the recognition of the inner realities, the springs of activity, action, and thought that are within the human spirit.

You see? Whereas for Berkeley as an empiricist, no, his idealism doesn't stress the creative resources of the human spirit. It stresses the passivity of the human mind as a recipient of certain kinds of sense stimuli. Very different picture.

Does that help? Okay, that's a jump ahead in anticipation, but don't be confused by the fact that you can sometimes hold similar positions for different reasons. Yeah, there's not always just one line of argument for a position. There might be two utterly incompatible lines of argument, but for the same position.

Yeah. Take republicanism as an example. There are all sorts of incompatible arguments for a position like that.

It doesn't make the position right or wrong. It's just that if you're starting at one point, you may happen to come out at the same conclusion. David? I was going to ask, so is phenomenalism the belief that we can, the mind can only know phenomena, or that only phenomena exist and no reality? Berkeley's position as an idealist is that matter does not exist.

All that exists is minds and mental states, ideas. Yeah. The phenomenalist may not be as assertive as that.

The phenomenalist may say, all we know is phenomena. Yeah. And that's more characteristic of John Stuart Mill.

So if he disproves materialism, then he can have a better argument for dualism? Yeah. You see, if it turns out that there is no evidence for the existence of matter, then our ideas of sensation must come from another source. And in brief, what he's going to tell us is that since ideas are mental things, they must have mental causes.

The cause must be like the effect. If my mind is not the cause of my ideas of sensation, another mind must be the cause of my ideas of sensation. And since we all have essentially the same ideas of sensation about the same objects viewed from the same viewpoint under the same conditions, there must be some supreme mind giving us all those ideas of sensation.

And he has a causal argument for the existence of God. And God has to do this all the time, so it has to be theism rather than deism. What was it? Oh yeah, it's clever.

Clever. You know, the initial problem getting a hold on Berkeley that students have in introductory courses, in 101 particularly, is crediting the fact that somebody could deny the existence of matter. You see? I'd like to think that you're beyond that.

I'd like to think that you're beyond saying, you mean my hand is an illusion? No, Berkeley never says it's an illusion. I think it was the famous essayist Johnson who said he was going to refute the learned bishop and kicked a rock and went away holding his toe and said, that pain was real! You see? To which Berkeley replied, yes, it's what we call, quote, real, because it was an involuntary kind of pain. Now, at the same time, there are voluntary kinds of pains as you imagine the idea, but that was one cause.

The only question is, what's the cause of the pain? What's the cause of this involuntary idea of pain that you have? And so it's not a silly position. It's a well-measured, serious position. I still don't like it, but as you know, religious thinkers, not only in the Judeo-Christian tradition, but in Eastern traditions, have often adopted metaphysical idealism as what they find to be the best way for talking about the ultimate reality of the divine.

As an immaterial being. In fact, when Spinoza said that everything is God and God is everything, weren't you wishing he would say that it was immaterial? If he's going to be a pantheist, come on, be an idealist. And maybe he disappointed you in being more a materialist.

But there are natural affinities between metaphysical idealism and theism, pantheism, and religions in those traditions. So there's a long tradition, particularly in British thought, of Christian idealism, particularly of a Platonic sort. Well, you remember I mentioned the Cambridge Platonism of the 17th century.

And that sort of thing has kept recurring ever since. Okay, what about Berkeley's principles, then, on which this kind of argument rests? Well, keep in mind what the problems are that he is addressing. That he's trying to work with Locke's epistemology to other conclusions than Locke's conclusions.

And so his first move is to argue against John Locke's theory of abstract ideas. That's why we're careful to take time to spell out Locke's theory of abstract ideas. It becomes crucial.

This, of course, is dealing with the philosophy of language. And so in the opening introductory section of the material that we have from Berkeley, he talks about language, and he talks about abstract ideas. And he argues for a nominalist position in opposition to John Locke's conceptualist position.

Now, his point is that language gets thoroughly abused. We tend to think that wherever there is a general term, there must be some real object corresponding to it. We tend to assume that all nouns and names, they name things.

So if there are general nouns, they must name general things. And if there are no real, objectively real universals, what do general nouns, common nouns name? They name abstract general ideas. The conceptualists' abstract ideas.

But that, Berkeley's convinced, is a mistake. Language can do many other things besides naming. Not all words name.

Not all language is referential, pointing, signifying, or denoting. Many other things that we can do with language. There isn't necessarily any one-to-one correlation between words and ideas, like Locke had thought there was.

Words often have no fixed meaning in any case. But in addition to referring to things, words can be used to comfort, to encourage, to exhort, to blame. All sorts of things we do with language.

Now, when you read that section in Berkeley, you may think it sounds very much like Wittgenstein. If you've run across the 20th-century Wittgenstein. Or the Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy, as it was called in the 1950s and the 1960s.

Because there was a group of philosophers then, of whom Wittgenstein was a very significant one. There was a group of philosophers at Oxford, Cambridge, and other

places who were applying the positivism of the 1930s and 40s. That insisted that all language must have reference, signify.

Who said there are all sorts of other things we do with language, and Wittgenstein called them other language games. You see, other language games. Sure.

We do all sorts of social activities using language. Yeah. It has all sorts of functions.

Well, Berkeley recognizes that. And so he thinks that we've been misled in supposing that all words must refer to something out there. And consequently, general terms must be names for abstract general ideas.

No. And some of the examples and arguments that he gives are helpful, I think. He says, for instance, that according to Locke, we have an abstract idea of motion.

Or an abstract idea of color. Or an abstract idea of extension. Now, take the notion of extension, because that means primary qualities.

Size, shape, density, and so forth. These are properties that, when put together, amount to what we call spatial extension. Spatial occupancy.

Spatial extension. Yes, sir. Well, do you have an idea of spatial extension in general? Berkeley asks.

No, you have an idea of a particular shape, a particular size, a particular area that is occupied. But extension? What about color? That's secondary qualities. Color.

Do you have an abstract idea of color in general? Oh, no. You have an idea of the shade of blue that my shirt has. I was careful to put a blue shirt on today.

The shade of blue my tie has. The shade of blue my eyes have. And so on and so forth.

But do you have an idea of blue in general? No, the word is simply a catch-all for all of these shades and hues classified in certain ways. Yes, sir. So he denies, then, that there are such things as abstract ideas.

Now bring it home to roast. Do you have an idea of matter? Abstract? Well, even Locke didn't. He said, it's something I know not what.

Oh, that comes home to roost. No, you don't have an idea of matter. You have an idea of a particular apple, a particular tree, a particular rock, a particular chair.

But no matter in the abstract. Do you have an idea of space in the abstract? No, of certain spatial relationships, of distances, of areas occupied, in particular, but not in the abstract. Do you have an abstract idea of time? Same problem.

Do you have an abstract idea of power? Remember, Locke had a long section about that. Oh, no, you have a general term, power, that refers to certain felt, experienced forces, but not power in the abstract. You can feel the tension in your muscles as you lift a heavy, heavy weight.

You feel the force, the power. But that's particular, it's not an abstract idea. So he denies that they're abstract ideas, and there are times when his rhetoric on the subject is very persuasive.

When, for instance, he says this, whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they can best tell. But for myself, I find I have a faculty of imagining, of representing to myself the ideas of particular things I've perceived, and of compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse, or a fairy giraffe with butterfly wings.

I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself, separated from the rest of the body. But it must have some particular shape and color. I cannot, by any effort of thought, conceive the abstract idea described.

It's equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body that's moving, neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear, and the like. To be plain, I own myself unable to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, etc., etc. But I deny that I can abstract those qualities and frame a general notion by abstraction.

And then he goes on to talk of a certain distinguished philosopher who thought you could, and proceeds to disagree specifically with paragraphs that he cites. So, in effect, Berkeley is saying, whether you guys can do it, I don't know. You'll have to say, but I certainly can't.

I can't think abstractly about abstract general ideas. Now, what sort of an argument is that? It's an empirical argument. He's telling Locke, of all people, that he's not sufficiently empirical.

He's telling Locke that he's not sufficiently empirical. On this matter of abstract ideas. And I suppose if Locke wants to reply, if Locke, the empiricist, wants to reply, the only response he can give is an empirical response.

What is there in our experience of using general terms that relates to thinking about abstract ideas? Thinking about abstract ideas. Well, I put the question that way, so I suppose I should pause and suggest how you might try to answer it, how others try to answer it. You have to think of words not as names but as symbols.

Not as names that point to objects, but as symbols that build into a whole language where symbols relate to other symbols. So when you think abstractly, what you think is in terms of a language. And within the framework of that language, thinking that language, you are thinking in abstraction from particular objects.

It's the way it is in mathematics. The square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides. Now, don't try to picture that, it won't be accurate.

You're not thinking about a particular. You've got to think in the language of mathematics. So I think the point is that it's language seen as a symbol rather than a denoting device, a denoting device.

Language is seen as a system of symbols that is a vehicle for abstraction. Well, that's something which, of course, gets going in the 19th century. And it's the kind of idea that has been picked up in all sorts of literary theory and so on.

Alright, any questions, comments about Böckler's nominalism then? How does the bishop speak of justice, laws, and ethics in nominalism? Yeah, I'd rather hold that until we get to his replies to objections, but two things perhaps. One, he doesn't write a treatise on ethics. But you say he was a bishop.

Well, bishops don't always write treaties on ethics; they preach. So perhaps the question is, how did he preach? How did he counsel? How does a nominalist do ethics? You see, that's the question, isn't it? Well, go back to William of Ockham. What did he do about ethics? Go back to Thomas Hobbes.

What did he do about ethics? Go back to Luther, who was a nominalist. What did he do about ethics? And there's a two-fold formula that you find running through that whole nominalist tradition and on into some conceptualists. Calvin as well.

Right reason and the word of God. What's the right reason? Right reason is thinking in terms of consequences. A breakdown of the medieval synthesis with its metaphysically grounded ethic, its natural law ethics.

That's why the breakdown of that medieval synthesis bred utilitarianism, consequentialist ethics. And the word of God, yes, divine command to you. So justice is what God says.

And my guess is, though I don't have any place in Berkeley that says that, that he's tuned in enough to the nominalist tradition. You see, which is very real, very powerful in the 17th and 18th century, that he would follow along in that tradition. Yeah, I think that's the case.

I was pausing for a moment to ask myself, what about any influence of Cambridge idealism on Berkeley? From what I've read, I don't see much influence of Cambridge idealism on Berkeley. If there were, it would involve more moral intuitions. You see, an immediate mental awareness of some moral truth.

Because the Cambridge Platonists believe in innate ideas, innate moral ideas. But that's, you know, innate moral ideas is so alien to Berkeley's empiricism. No, I don't see that there.

Okay. Take the second step then. And ask ourselves more directly, all right, what about his argument against materialism? His argument against materialism.

And here his attention is turned to the theory of ideas. And he argues for a position that has become known as mentalism. Mentalism.

The view that only minds and their ideas exist. Only minds and their ideas. That is to say, what goes on in the minds.

Only minds and their ideas exist. Oh, and if you want to know how he thinks the mind exists, how does he know any mind exists? He'd pull a Descartes on you. I don't know about you, he might say, but I think.

Therefore, I exist. So at least one mind exists. But why only minds and their ideas? Where's his argument for that? What's his argument related to the theory of ideas? Well, basically, you see, his argument is that if ideas are indeed the initial stuff out of which knowledge is composed.

Sure, simple ideas, compound ideas, related to each other with affirmations or denials, that's the stuff of which knowledge is composed. If that's the case, and if ideas are mental things, mental events, then if the cause must be like the effect, then ideas must have mental causes. So the ideas that flood through my mind must be caused either by my mind or by other mind or minds.

Like cause, like effect. Now, right away, you see that he has realized the awfully difficult problem Descartes had posed for himself with his mind-body dualism and causal interaction. How can bodily changes produce mental changes? How can physical stimuli to the senses, producing brain processes, cause changes in that immaterial soul? What's the causal connection? And by Berkeley's time, nobody took Peniel Glenn seriously.

Moreover, there was a tradition that had developed in Europe known as Occasionalism. One representative of which, Malabroche, a Frenchman, was himself a metaphysical idealist. Now, Occasionalism is the view that there is no direct causal connection between mind and body.

But rather, when something physical happens to me, that is the occasion on which God causes a corresponding mental state to occur. And when in my mind I decide to do something, that's simply the occasion on which God causes the physical action to occur. That's a somewhat attractive sort of position if you're groping for some causal explanation, and Peniel Glens don't do it.

And Berkeley seems to be somewhat influenced by that, although obviously his position is somewhat different. But the idea that God is the causal agent. You see, the thing that the Occasionalists were trying to do, trying to protect, was a certain strong Calvinist view.

That is what we mean when we say God is almighty, all-powerful; we mean that he has all the power there is, and nobody else has any causal power. Nothing else. That's why Peniel Glens don't work.

Nothing physical has any causal power. Now that was the Occasionalist attempt to avoid the implications of mechanistic science, in which natural causal powers sufficiently explain all of nature's processes. Matter, this inert, slimy stuff, doesn't have any causal power.

God is the one who has power. He's all power. So, somewhat analogously to that, Berkeley is going to say that it's God that is the cause.

But in order to get to that, he has to deal more closely with John Locke's theory of ideas. And you'll find that he's working with, I think, at least three arguments in this section that runs from 247 to 254 in the anthology. Three arguments.

One is that unperceived things, some things I know not what, unperceived things, unknown, like Locke's unknown substrate. So, talk of unknown things has no reference, no point of reference. It doesn't refer to anything.

So when you're talking of matter, that substratum that supposedly has primary qualities, the language has no empirical meaning. If it's unknown, it's unknown. And you're not referring to anything when you talk about it.

Now, the same for that matter is true of force, of space, of time, of argument. The second is the cause-effect, like cause, like effect. But the third argument, a little more subtle, has to do with Locke's doctrine of primary and secondary qualities.

Primary and secondary qualities. You see, the thing that bothers Berkeley about it, where Locke is not sufficiently empirical, is that Locke seems to speak of primary and secondary qualities as if, in our minds, we can separate them and think of them separately. As if you can think of a primary quality without a secondary quality, and a secondary quality without a primary quality.

Whereas in actual experience, common sense experience, and Berkeley's always appealing to common sense, in common sense experience, I never perceive color that is not spatially extended. Even a small blob of blue must have extension. And if a spatial extension were to be perceived at all, it would have to have color.

Something at least which enables me to see it. Not just an empty extension. What's an empty extension? Empty space.

What's that? Nothing. Nothing empirical. So if you never have primary qualities without secondary qualities, or secondary qualities without primary qualities, where does that lead us? Well, Locke has said that secondary qualities are subjective.

Caused by whatever causes them. Locke has pointed out that secondary qualities can be somewhat relative to all sorts of observation conditions relative to the perceiver. Secondary qualities.

Yeah, it depends on whether you washed your ears out, and how clearly you hear the sound. Depends if you've got your spectacles on whether you see it clearly. Sure, I can't even see to read the alarm clock when I wake up without my spectacles on.

It gets worse all the time. One of these days I guess I just won't bother. What you see, secondary quality, is relative to the condition of your sense organs and all sorts of other observation conditions.

And therefore, he says it's subjective. There's no objective correlate. But the same is true of primary qualities associated with those secondary qualities.

And he points to an old castle keep on the horizon. You know, those great square Norman castles. And he says, what shape is it? Somebody says, square.

No, no, look, what shape do you see from this distance? Well, it's not exactly square. It's more like a tiny round blob. And then as you get closer, what shape does it become? Notice, become.

Well, it becomes huge, square. It fills the whole horizon. Obviously, primary qualities like secondary qualities are relative, and so they must be subjective.

Now, if both primary and secondary qualities are relative and subjective, what is left of objectively real matter independent in its existence? Empirically, nothing. There's not a trace of empirical evidence for the existence of matter as an objectively real substrate. Well, that doesn't mean to say I don't see a castle.

Sure, I see a castle. It doesn't mean to say the alarm clock isn't something that I see something of. Of course, I see something of.

It's reading that I have trouble with. No, the question is not whether we have the experiences we have. No empiricist would deny we have experiences of the sort we have.

The question is whether what we experience has an independently existing material substrate. And for that, there's not a shred of empirical evidence, according to Berkeley. So, on the theory of ideas, his conclusion is mentalism, all that exists is minds and ideas.

If you like, it's a kind of phenomenalism about physical objects. The thing that keeps him from pure phenomenalism is that he asserts the reality of mind and the reality of God. And if God and minds are for real, then he's not completely phenomenalist.

He's a phenomenalist just about physical objects. So, it's a lesser kind of phenomenalism than John Stuart Mill is going to get us into. Okay, questions, comments? Well, I think we'll hold it at that point.

This clock runs about five minutes slow, I've discovered. And we'll pick it up next time with his third underlying principle, his theism, and the replies to objections. So, we should do all we need to do with Berkeley next time, and your outlines of Berkeley are also due then, I believe.