A History of Philosophy
39 Leibinz's Monads
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All right, are we all set then? Today, we want to focus on Leibniz's monads. Last time, we introduced Leibniz rather briefly, pointing out that he saw conflicts emerging between the mechanistic science, which was shaping the philosophy of the 17th century, and the Christian religion, both in terms of its materialistic direction in people like Hobbes, and in terms of its determinism in people like Hobbes and Spinoza. And he didn't like Spinoza's naturalistic pantheist interpretation of mechanistic science.

And so he tries to come to grips with that kind of science and religion conflict by working out an alternative metaphysical understanding that doesn't ignore the science of the day, but, shall we say, puts it in a limited role, more of a phenomenal direction, the level of appearances, rather than in terms of telling us about the underlying reality. Now, the underlying reality, then, is that everything that exists ultimately consists of monads, which are indivisible units of force or energy. Indestructible, yes, because not being composites, they cannot be disintegrated and destroyed by any natural means.

That is not to say that they are eternal, always were, and always will be, inasmuch as their existence is being given to them by God. Now, we noted last time that these monads, these units of force, are analogous to each other in such a way as to compose this kind of hierarchy of being. Where the supreme monad has perfect apperception and appetition.

And monads lower on the hierarchy have lesser degrees of apperception and appetition. The term apperception is obviously an adaptation from our term perception, because he is willing to grant that some animals, and so monads, may have sensed perception. And even things which have no conscious awareness, at the bare monad level, seem to know their place within the overall picture.

This is the intelligible order manifested in things having their place and function. When you come to humans with spirit monads, they have not just sense consciousness, but self-consciousness. Reflective, reflecting on their own consciousness.

And therefore the capacity to interrelate their own ideas, to reason actively. Reason. And to that could be given the name apperception, where there is self-consciousness.

But God has perfect apperception. Awareness of everything. Perfect self-understanding.

So there are degrees of apperception, appetition, desire, yes, directed energy, in the sense that there is a natural function that is being exercised, actualized in degree. Here's where the final causation becomes evident, in the very nature of all monads, with natural drive, appetite, desire, inclination, and disposition. Those terms that were associated with final causation in the scholastics.

So then we have these indestructible units of force, varying by infinitesimal degrees within this hierarchy of being. No gaps in the hierarchy. Every conceivable distinction is represented in this complete chain of being.

And so Leibniz speaks of a principle of continuity or plenitude. Continuity, yes, there are no gaps, no discontinuity in the chain of being. Plenitude, yes, it's filled; there are no empty seats.

Principle of plenitude. And of course, that is simply the conception of the hierarchy of being which the scholastics had. That the whole creation, everything in its place, you see, together comprises the fullness of things that find their existence in relationship to God.

So there is a principle of sufficient reason. There is a reason for everything that exists within the whole hierarchy. And for every event that occurs within the whole hierarchy.

Sufficient reason. And this is such an interwoven, choreographed whole that the principle of perfection, this kind of being is good. Now, essentially, those three principles could have been used to describe the hierarchy of being in Thomas Aquinas.

He would essentially agree. As I mentioned last time, what Leibniz is doing is trying to resurrect the scholastic conception of being, the scholastic metaphysic, closer as we'll see to Scotus than to Aquinas. And to ascribe to it the kind of goodness which, as in the medievals, manifests the perfection of God.

His creation. Manifesting his goodness. So you have that carryover.

And what he's going to have to do is to find a place within this arrangement, within this overall understanding for mechanistic science. This is the nature of ultimate reality, you see. And one of its manifestations is the kind of mechanistic function he's talking about.

But we can't really get at that until we get down to talking about the distinction between minds and bodies. And how bodies behave and what constitutes bodies. It's there in the operation of bodies that are composed of many, many moments.

Bodies are composites. It's in the operation of bodies as composite substances that you get the mechanistic operations, of course, and the effect going on. So, then, these monads are indestructible units of force.

Each one is different in degree from every other one, so each has its own individual nature, its own individual essence. Remember how the medievals struggled to explain in their theory of forms how calm individuals differ from each other as they do. Until Scotus, Don Scotus, introduced the conception of hykaeotas.

That is to say that in addition to the form of the species and the signet matter that is compounded with the form of the species, there is also a principle of individuality, of thisness, hykaeotas. So God creates individuals with their own natures. Now, that's what Scotus said.

And that's what Leibniz is picking up from Scotus. So that these individual essences are like, you see, the principle of hykaeotas in Scotus. But the individual essences are obviously alike in that they have common attributes.

What the scholastics called the transcendental attributes of all being. And they had talked of those transcendental attributes, you remember, as unity, goodness, beauty, truth, you see. Well, what Leibniz is doing is doing the equivalent by talking of apperception and appetition.

Apperception and appetition. That is to say, each has its own nature and therefore knows its place within the whole. Knows, in quotes, depending on the degree of consciousness.

Apperception, rather. And appetition? Yes, in its functioning. It is acting out, acting in accordance with, actualizing the potency, the potential of its own essence.

Its own inner resources, its own nature. So then, these individual monads are understood by him to be windowless. Interesting metaphor that he uses.

You see, in a windowless room, there is no contact with the outside. No cause-effect relationship to anything external. Everything inside the room is, as it were, hermetically sealed.

It is self-contained, self-operating, by virtue of the resources stored within the room. So, these monads, then, are, as it were, programmed in their own nature. So that the

knowing, which goes on by virtue of apperception, is all innate, innate ideas that come to our awareness, to our consciousness.

If you like, I'll recollect it. Because the monads are windowless. There's no external stimuli affecting the mind.

And not only is the knowing that goes on innate, but the desires, the appetition, is not something that is a response to external stimuli, but is simply the expression of the inner potency, the inner need, the inner direction, in which the spirit monad is set. And the same is true of all monads. So, to say they're windowless means that there are no causal connections between monads, whether in relationship to thought or in relationship to overt activity.

No causal connections. But then you have to go one step further and ask, well, then, how do they exist? What's their source of energy? And sometimes Leibniz uses the term creation and says God creates them. But in other places, he tries to be more descriptive and uses the term fulguration.

He says they're continuously being fulgurated by God. Now, I bet you've never run across the term fulguration before. Nor did I when I first read Leibniz.

But my Webster dictionary back then, and I assume it still does, says that fulguration has to do with generating energy. It's used, for instance, when you strike a match, and it catches flame. You are fulfilling the heat, the light, you see.

So it's the idea that the energy, that their particular degree of force, is constantly being generated and infused by God. God is the power source, giving existence. But in the act of giving existence to monads, he gives them the degree of force which gives them their individual existence of that nature.

And so, rather than the conception of creation, which was becoming apparent in the beginnings of deism, the view that God created and then things become self-existent and self-operative, God is continuously imparting existence. If you like, this again is the thing that the Medievals said, Thomas Aquinas. Which is why, when Aquinas argues from the order of cause and effect in the cosmos, to the first cause, he doesn't simply mean, in fact, he doesn't particularly mean in that proof, the first in the whole series of causes.

But rather a meta-cause that continually empowers the whole causal series. At whatever stage it is. So God is the one who not only initiates existence, but who sustains existence by continuing to impart existence.

And Leibniz is simply reiterating that within the conceptual scheme that he's developing. Fulguration by God. Somebody was asking since last time, isn't this,

Stumpf seems to take it as if monads are, as it were, of the very being of God? Is this another kind of Spinozistic pantheism? And I'd argue no.

No. Because he doesn't claim that these are eternal. He claims that their force, their energy, their existence is given by God.

Yes, continuously. But not that God is the totality of them. It's not a pantheism.

So it's his attempt to explain the traditional Judeo-Christian conception of creation. Now, even though each of these monads is windowless and has no causal connections, its existence is sustained by God. Its nature is what it is continuously because of God.

But having that individual nature knowing its place in the whole, Leibniz is able to say that each, by virtue of its own essence, mirrors the whole. Each is, as it were, a microcosm of the whole. You see? So if you understand your own individual nature in terms of these attributes of apperception and appetition, you have in that a glimpse of what the whole is like in terms of appetition and apperception.

You see? So this metaphor of each knowing its place, he takes rather literally. The nature of the thing is such, the nature of the individual monad is such, that its own nature mirrors what it needs to be in order to fill this particular slot in the whole. As if it's a distinct, unique piece in a jigsaw puzzle that wouldn't fit anywhere else.

And so in its own nature, there are implications for everything else. So each mirrors the whole. Now let me pause there and see if you're digesting it.

Do you get the picture of what he's saying? Ruth? When you say there's no causal connection between monads, is that like Spinoza's, that everything comes from the vertical relationship and there's no interaction across the extension of thought? Yes, yes. With this exception that we caught last time, that is where Spinoza has a double aspect theory, so that thought and extension are two sides of the same thing, Leibniz has different entities, so that that which thinks is a spirit monad, that which is extended is a composite of bare monads, perhaps with a soul monad, but they're different things. So we speak of Leibniz as a parallelism, never meeting, which you can't really say of Spinoza, since they're really two sides of one thing.

But otherwise, apart from the conceptual scheme, the notion that there's no causal interaction is similar. John? No? I'm a little bit confused about the final conclusion that each mirrors the whole. I'm trying to go back to your visions two and three.

It seems that, given the concept of thisness and a windowless thing, how could I have a perception that I would mirror the whole or that anything else would? You see, and there I think you're probably playing on a conception of thisness, of individuality,

which suggests that every individual is absolutely unique. Now that the modern conception is simply false. Now it's false for Leibniz, and I think it's false anyway.

We throw around the term unique so loosely. You know, all snowflakes are unique, they say. Well, we imply that uniqueness means it has boundless value because it's unique.

But, you know, not every snowflake has boundless value; it's not uniqueness that gives things value. But in any case, for Leibniz, the term unique would stress any lack of close similarity. You see, suppose you have an identical twin.

Now you're not completely identical. Leibniz talks about the identity of indiscernibles. If you have two things completely indiscernible, one from the other, then you don't have two things, you have one and the same.

The identity of indiscernibles. But an individual is different from another, like an identical twin, in some infinitesimal way. And because the differences are infinitesimal, you see, you have an immediate understanding of those who are like you in certain ways.

Now, the further you reach out, admittedly, there are no immediate approximations. But there is still some analogy. So that in the hierarchy of being, if you were here, oops, I put you as a low-grade spirit.

That wasn't my intention. But by virtue of being there, you have some sense of affinity for animals. You find yourself sympathizing with dogs, especially your pet dog that you love.

And some people write papers and books about animal rights. Animal rights. Interesting how far the analogy will take us.

You see. Similarly, by virtue of spirit beings, humans have some understanding of what God must be like when we think of God as a person in whose image we are made. So simply by virtue of the analogy, you can say that I mirror in my nature something of the nature of animals, of God, of living things generally, of physical things, you see.

And add to that the notion that since nothing else can fill the slot in the overall picture that I'm filling, you see, by virtue of the principle of plenitude, since nothing else can fill the slot, then there is in my nature an echo of the whole of being. So the windowless idea is simply a causal one. So, as far as perception and language and all those things are concerned, you can interrelate because of analogy? No, wait a minute.

Perception, if you mean sense perception, where we get external stimuli. No, if you mean conception, and incidentally, I notice those words are appearing mixed up in the outlines. Descartes, as well as Hobbes.

Perception is usually used to refer to sensory perception. Sense perception. Whether it be the inner sense or the outer sense.

Sense perception. That is to say, awareness of particulars and of particular qualities. Okay.

Conception is used to refer to concepts, general concepts. Perhaps abstract ideas, you see. So keep the two distinct.

Incidentally, the term sensation is different again. Sensation is used to refer to the particular senses and what they deliver. A sensation of light.

A sensation of heat. A sensation of bitterness. A sensation of... a minty smell.

I have to say minty at Christmas rather than rosy. So we have particular sensations which are the ingredients for our perceptions of particular things. You see.

Both of which are distinct from concepts in the more general or abstract sense. So yes, we have, according to Leibniz, concepts which are innate. Innate in the sense that they bubble up out of our mental activity.

Perceptions. But they, too, emerge out of our mental activity. We have sensations, feelings.

But they too emerge out of the inner mental activity. And amazingly, they correlate with what's going on elsewhere. That's the parallel.

You see. Where Descartes would say that you have a particular sensation because of some stimulus to the sense organs, which is transmitted through the brain and the animal fluids to produce a change of conscious state. He has a cause-effect theory of sense perception.

You see. But not so Leibniz. There are no cause-effect processes producing sensations or perceptions.

That is to say, in terms of external causes. The synchronization of the idea with what's going on, that synchronization is God's doing in this perfectly harmonized system. One other phrase that he uses, the whole system operates as a pre-established harmony.

A pre-established harmony. Now that's what leads him, and we'll see this next time as we get into the problem of evil. That's what leads him to say this is the best of all possible worlds.

The best of all possible worlds. Yeah, that's what individuates. Distinguishes individuals.

Does this pull together what you're getting from the reading? I re-read all the Leibniz stuff this morning, and it seems to me that both the monadology and even more the principles of nature and grace are really very, very clear. You have to read them carefully. But they're pretty explicit and pretty clear in these regards.

Now, whatever else we do in connection with Leibniz, we've got to have this monadology straight. Now, isn't that the case with all of these figures? That if you want to know why they think as they do about epistemology, about ethics, about God, about the problem of evil, you have to get to the underlying metaphysical scheme. The metaphysical assumptions are just foundational to the whole thing.

In fact, you can pretty well take that as a rule of thumb for whatever subject you're discussing, not just philosophical topics. But if you're discussing Buchanan's candidacy for the presidency, yes, and why his particular kinds of America First values, all right, start asking yourself about what the underlying metaphysical assumptions are in that sort of thing. Well, how do you get at that? Well, certain kinds of values have certain assumptions about the nature of the reality that he regards as a value.

But always go back to those assumptions. Well, we've seen that all the way through from, I suppose, Plato onwards. That all of the various pieces of Plato's philosophy come together once you get that divided line straight with the distinction between forms and particulars.

You remember in the diagram we drew, that was the hub of the wheel, the divided line, from which, along the spokes, you can work out to talking about art and education and ethics and history and so on and so on and so forth. Same with people like Leibniz. Okay, now, let's move on to this number six.

Mind and body. Aha. This, after all, is one of the major issues that divides these three continental metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century.

Descartes, Spinote's alignments. The mind-body problem. Now, I've already indicated some of the basics that are involved in this.

One is that monads are causally disconnected, one from the other. Okay, they're windowless. Causally disconnected.

Another is that bodies, physical bodies, material bodies, are composites of monads. And if it's a living thing, then there is a unifying monad. The soul monad.

And notice that he's using soul in much the same sense as the Greeks. Where the soul is the source of life. It's what gives life.

It's related to form. What gives a particular nature? It's related to entelechy, the particular function of the thing.

So, the body of an animal is unified by a living soul. Okay? A living soul. Which makes that hunk of matter a living animal, which otherwise it wouldn't be.

With appropriate life functions involving degrees of appetition and apperception. Now, if we're talking about bodies, then there are cause-effect relationships between bodies. Between these composites.

Because when you get myriads of monads, and he says millions, when you get myriads of monads organized and unified, they begin to take on spatial extension. Now, monads themselves don't have spatial extension. To begin with, they're not substantive in any solid sense.

They're infinitesimal. They don't take up space. So they don't have size, shape, density, or other spatial occupancy characteristics.

What we've learned to call primary qualities. They don't have them. But bodies, which are composites, do occupy space.

They do have primary qualities. And now you can begin to see how he's going to make room for mechanistic science. It's the science of the relationships between bodies.

It doesn't tell us anything about monads. How does he explain that one monad, which has no space, or takes up no space, plus another monad, which has no space, and it doesn't make any logical sense? Courtesy of Zeno's paradoxes. You remember Zeno's paradoxes of weight, for instance? If one millet seed weighs nothing, and you have in a sack 100,000 millet seeds, each weighing nothing, how come it makes a thud? The only clue that I see in Leibniz is in his use of the term infinitesimal.

By infinitesimal, he doesn't mean it has no size. It means it has no measurable size. So infinitely small.

So that when you get a very large number, then you begin to get size. I don't see any other explanation within him. Is it somewhat like an atomistic idea? No, you see, if atom means a little pellet of matter, no, it's not atomistic.

And he rejects the term atom for precisely that reason. Democritus' atoms were little solid pellets. A monad is not a little solid pellet.

Now, if on the other hand you mean, is this atomistic, like our more contemporary conception of atoms, as composed of subatomic particles, which particles may just be functions of energy, but for that you've got to get an energistic physics going, in which matter is derivative from energy, rather than the other way around. Okay. Now, I think the problem that Christen has is how matter is derivative from energy at that stage of understanding.

And really, he doesn't have a good explanation apart from what I suggest about the term infinitesimal. So you'd have to say, well, wait until we understand energistic physics. Okay.

So there are causal relationships between bodies, but not between monads. Now, the soul monad, or in the case of humans, the spirit monad, is the unifying, organizing principle, as well as the life-giving, thought-giving, direction-giving principle for the whole. Otherwise, you wouldn't have the ordered whole.

So it is as if the soul does for a body what God does for the universe, apart from the orderers of things. And he explicitly says that the things that God does in those regards, we do in a much lesser degree, at a much smaller level. We make things much smaller than what God has made.

But we make unified, individual, organized things of a bodily sort. Now, let me point out a couple of things about that. If you will turn in the monadology to, let's see, to page 212, 213.

212, 213. First of all, paragraph 74. Philosophers have been, have greatly puzzled over the origin of forms or souls.

But today, we know by examination of plants, insects, and animals, that the organic bodies of nature are not products of chaos or putrefaction, spontaneous generation, but always come from seeds, in which there was some pre-formation. Okay? It's been thought that not only was the organic body there before conception, but also the soul in this body. In a word, the living animal itself.

And that by means of conception, this animal has merely been prepared for a great transformation to become an animal of another kind. Something similar is seen

outside of birth, as when worms, caterpillars, worms become flies, and caterpillars become butterflies. The transformation to a different kind of being.

Now, what he's dealing with here, and he names it later on, is the animalcualism of the day. The view that the offspring in miniature, body and soul, is contained in the father's seed. Complete.

So that in that sense, the soul monad is an outgrowth of the soul monad of the father, which was the outgrowth. Okay? And you recall that we made mention of this back when we were talking about the Stoics, because this was the basis for the Stoic traducian theory of the transmission of the soul and the origin of the individual soul. Now, here's Leibniz then, adopting this kind of animalcualism.

Dot, this is your field. Can you tell us, there was a renewal of this kind of approach, wasn't there, in this juncture in history? Can you give us the rough picture? Okay.

Little animalcules. There you go. Yeah, this is part of the philosophical view known as vitalism, which views life as something distinct from simply physical, chemical things.

Okay, and vitalism continued to flourish, really, until about the mid-20th century. It was concomitant with the development of the microscope, which opened up that new world of life. Great.

Spinodes as lenses, in other words. So this is his view, then, of the origin of souls, including human souls, spirits. So the sperm contains the soul.

And the body. Provides a nice warm place for it to grow. Now, say that again.

Traducianism just has the seed that it will develop into, or does... No, I'm roughly identifying these two views. In biology, talking about genetics. Okay, animalcualism is the name that's used for this view.

In theology, talking about the transmission or the origin of the individual soul, traducianism, the view that it is transmitted, is the name that's used. But traducianism introduced into Christian thought by Tertullian, you see, was really an adoption of the Stoic view, which was a kind of animalcualism. And Leibniz seems to be pointing in that same direction.

Okay. And obviously, the development of modern genetics changes the picture significantly. Biological vitalism is a rarity now.

In the 1940s, it was quite popular in some circles, particularly in France. Fifty years make quite a difference. Okay.

Paragraph 75. This comes out again. The animals, some of which are raised from conception to the grade of larger animals, may be called spermatic.

Among them, which remain in their class, that is, the most part, are born, multiply, and are destroyed like large animals. It's only a small number of chosen ones that pass to a larger theater, and so forth. This is only half the truth.

I've therefore held that if the animal never commences by natural means, neither does it end by natural means, that not only will there be no birth, there would be no utter destruction or death, strictly speaking, and so forth. Let's see. Then in paragraph 80, he begins to criticize Descartes and notice the difference.

Descartes recognizes that souls cannot impart any force to bodies, because there's always the same quantity of force in matter. Nevertheless, he believed the soul could change the direction of bodies, an external cause only. Nevertheless, he believed that the soul could change the direction of bodies.

This was because in his day, the law of nature, which affirms the conservation of the same total direction in matter, wasn't known. If he had known this, he would have lighted upon my system of pre-established harmony rather than causal interaction. Yeah.

According to this system, bodies act as if, which is impossible; there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and both act as if each influenced the other. Poor old Descartes. As to spirits or rational souls, although I find that the same thing that I've stated, namely that they begin and end only with the world, holds good at bottom with regard to all living beings and animals, yet there's this peculiarity in rational animals that they are spermatic animalcules, there's your bird, as long as they remain such, have only ordinary or sensitive souls.

Okay, that low degree of perception. But as soon as those who are, so to speak, elected, yeah, he is a Protestant Calvinist, those who are elected attain by actual conception to human nature, God does the selection, their sensitive souls are elevated to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of spirits. Among other differences that exist between ordinary souls and minds or spirits is this also.

Souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of creatures. Their nature is the mirror. But minds or spirits, in addition, are images of the divinity itself.

We're in the image of God. Able to know the system of the universe, and imitate something of it by architectonic samples, each mind being like a little divinity in its own department. Spirits are capable, therefore, of entering into a sort of society with God, so that he is a father to his children.

And so the idea of the city of God, a universal monarchy, a moral world within the natural world, the most divine of the works of God, and so forth. So the role of mind or spirit comes through pretty plainly. Now, one, hopefully two further things.

What about epistemology? This is part of the mind-body question. And I've already said that with windowless monads, the conscious awarenesses arise from within rather than from without. Yeah, and he's pretty plain that soul monads, at most, can have sense perception and lingering memories.

Animals can have sense perception and lingering memories, therefore recognition and conditioned behaviors, and so forth. But when you come to spirit monads, there we get more. There, we get reasoning.

And what he does is to distinguish two kinds of reasoning that we have. There are, first of all, truths of fact that we can know, and there are truths of reason that we can know. Truths of fact are contingent.

That is to say, they're about what happens successively, and our awareness of them accordingly depends on these successive events of which we have this inner awareness. So truths of fact are contingent, whereas truths of reason are logically necessary truths. Logically necessary truths that have the logical form of the laws of thought, that A equals A, A equals non-A.

Now, truths of fact depend on the law of sufficient reason, whereas truths of reason depend on the law of non-contradiction. Okay, that distinction. The distinction between truths of fact and truths of reason is, I think, pretty clear.

We make some factual assertions. Leibniz was a German who wrote in French and Latin. German was not then a literary language, but a scholarly one. Truths of fact, you see, are dependent on the contingency of certain events of a historical sort.

Truths of reason? Well, anything, for instance, of the nature of a definition which simply unpacks what is already logically contained within the concept. Like Descartes, the three angles of a triangle add up to two right angles. You cannot have a mountain without a valley, because these are logically necessary given the concepts, not the perception of things existing, but the concept, the general concept of a triangle or a mountain.

So there is a distinction between truths of fact, nothing new there. Nothing new about saying one is contingent, the other is necessary. Nothing new about saying one depends on the law of sufficient reason, the other on the law of non-contradiction.

You see, Aristotle could have said the same. What is distinctive is that both kinds of truths are innate inasmuch as we're dealing with windowless moments. Now, even

Descartes seems to allow that sense perceptions are physically caused by virtue of sense stimuli and the mind-body causal interaction.

But not Leibniz. Even sense perceptions are innate. Even the sense perceptions of animals are innate.

The pre-established harmony works that way. Now, what does this say about freedom, human freedom, will, and intellect? That cluster of questions. Well, here you have to be very careful because the discussions of freedom and will and intellect that occurred in Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza were discussions entirely in the context of the notion of efficient and material causation.

Just that. On the other hand, Leibniz tells us that monads are both material cause, efficient cause, formal cause, and final cause. He's back to the four Aristotelian causes.

So he's going to have a conception of the will not in terms of caused or uncaused efficient causation style, determinism or indeterminism, so that it looks as it does in Descartes, he says, as if a free will chooses in a causal vacuum simply in the light of how much he knows. No. Free will is rather a matter of apperception and appetition.

That is to say, there is an inner directedness, there is an inner drive, there is final causation, and you have to define what it is to be free, not just in terms of efficient causation but in terms of final causation. There's no vacuum of final and formal causes in this monadology. And I think he's right, at least in this, that much modern contemporary discussion of freedom and determinism is premised on the notion that free will is one where there are no efficient causes determining the outcome.

That is to say, equating freedom with indeterminism. He won't buy that. I think he's right that if we're purposive beings, if there is a teleology running through human behavior and human existence, that you've got to get a teleological conception of freedom.

Now the question is whether his teleological conception of freedom will do it. So tune in, same time, same station. And we'll pick that up and then work into the problem of evil.