

## **A History of Philosophy**

### **38 Spinoza (continued), Leibniz**

#### **By Dr. Arthur Holmes of Wheaton College**

All right. What I'd like to do today is two things. One, in abbreviated form, to sum up what I was going to say on Friday last concerning Spinoza on reason and emotion.

I gathered from the discussion that you are getting to feel fairly familiar with the main contours of Spinoza's thought, and so we can summarize that rather readily. Then get started on who occupies us for the rest of this week. So, on reason and emotion, then in Spinoza, there are four things that I've written on the board that I want to stress.

Not the same outline as I had up there on Friday because I decided to abbreviate and condense, but this, I think, is it. As I recall, we got into the discussion by talking about Spinoza's determinism, which is presupposed in his view of both reason and the emotions. And we can see that quite readily when we note his definition of an emotion, which you can check for yourself if you want.

It's on 134 in the anthology. An emotion is a bodily modification increasing or decreasing its active power. Now, a couple of things to underscore in that.

First, that an emotion is physically based. Okay? It's a bodily modification. A modification is a temporary mode of bodily being.

Remember, finite modes. So an emotion is a temporary mode of one's bodily existence. And it has to do with the active power of the body, either increasing or decreasing it.

Power of the body? Yes, the causal energy with which one bodily state is followed by another bodily state. So when the adrenaline flows, the power is increased. When you feel utterly dejected emotionally, the power is reduced.

An emotion is a bodily modification increasing or decreasing active power. Now, that is the basic definition. So it's apparent that emotions, then, are physically caused.

But keep in mind that the parallel, the accompaniment of every bodily change, is the other aspect of our being. That is to say, if thought and physical extension are the two attributes of being, then there is, corresponding to the physical emotion, a changing state of consciousness which we feel. And so if we're talking of emotions as we're conscious of them, we're talking of feelings.

Or if the emotions act on us mentally, we tend to call them passions, in which we're mentally passive. So a bodily modification, increasing or decreasing the active power of the body, is accompanied by a changing state of consciousness. Now, he's very explicit in the context of talking about both will and intellect, being involved in the conscious side of the process.

But the emotion is basically a physical thing, and we talked of it last time in the discussion, in terms of what Spinoza calls conatus, that driving energy that we associate with willing or wanting or desiring various conative functions, as we call them in psychological language, the conative. So emotion, then, is what underlies that. Appetite, yes.

And in the conscious life, wanting and willing are the ways in which we refer to these emotional states, wanting or not wanting, liking or disliking, so forth. So, the definition of emotion, then, is fairly clear. Now, the most significant thing about Spinoza's theory of the emotions is that the emotions hold us in bondage.

And you may have noticed that the last two sections of his major work, *The Ethics*, are entitled, respectively, *Human Bondage* and *Human Freedom*. Sounds like an echo of what, Luther or something of that, but human bondage. Yes, because when in the consciousness we have inadequate ideas, that is to say, when we lack clarity and distinctness in our thinking, then what we have is a confused idea woven into the emotional feeling, and it is the emotional feeling that drives the consciousness, rather than the clarity and distinctness which should rule.

And so bondage to emotions, then, arises from the lack, the absence of clear and distinct ideas. And by the same token, freedom from being emotionally driven, human freedom comes with clear and distinct ideas. Clarity of thought dispels the passions that would otherwise drive us, rather than clear thought.

So it's going to follow in the development of his ethics that virtue, and you can follow this through on pages 145, 148, and so forth. Virtue is going to be a life ruled by reason, rather than controlled by emotion. The rule of reason over emotion.

Virtue is something which we acquire not by fear of evil, that would be emotion, emotionally driven, but only by virtue of a clear, distinct understanding of the consequences of what we're doing, or what we're about to embark on. And that life of reason, then, means that we have to gain clarity about the causal forces that are determining our circumstances. The causal forces at work in us are physically, emotionally, and the causal forces at work in the world around us, since all are part of the one all-inclusive substance.

In other words, it is by understanding the causal mechanisms of nature, and accepting them as given, something that we cannot contradict. It's in that acceptance

of natural law that we find freedom from emotional upset. And here's where that stoic ethic comes out, you see, because it's in that acceptance that there comes peace of mind.

In that sense, virtue, living a life in accordance with reason, is its own reward. And no future award is needed. Virtue is its own reward.

Now, he talks, then, of that rational acceptance. But an intellectual acceptance of the orderedness of nature is an intellectual acceptance of God or nature, one or the other. And in loving the ordered magnificence of nature, one is loving God.

And so, this highest state of virtue is what he speaks of as an intellectual love of God, simply enjoying the contemplation of the orderedness of nature and all the natural forces that are at work. Now, to speak of loving God in that way is obviously the language of Spinoza's Jewish heritage. Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one, and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your mind, with all your strength.

And so, that's where he picks that up. But because he is a pantheist rather than a theist, item four necessarily follows. That God has no passions.

He is not affected by our love or our hate. God loves himself wholly, understanding himself in the totality of all clear thought, but he loves himself through our love for him. Now, you see why that is? Because if God understands himself through those finite modes of thought, which are our ideas, then God loves himself through those finite modes which are our love for God.

So, God does not love us. We're not a separate being to be loved. But God loves himself through our loving him.

And so, there is no reciprocation; how can there be, from God when God is all in all, which includes us. Now, that's my summary of Spinoza's view of reason and emotion. Do you want to mull that over for a little bit? Or was it predictable by this stage of our thinking in Spinoza? I just have a question on... Could you speak up a little louder? I don't understand exactly his concept of the will and how it fits into this.

I mean, I know he doesn't necessarily believe it, but how does he interpret the will? I'm still confused on that. Yeah, well, if by will you mean the consciousness that we have of a free choice, then will is nothing more than another idea, you see. It is a consciousness of preferring, of affirming, or denying.

It's nothing more than another idea. And like all other ideas, it is caused in the whole stream of antecedent ideas. So, an act of will is a state of consciousness, confusedly conceived as free, whereas it is causally determined.

How would he explain certain aspects of things that are exemplified in the, I guess, the agape love of the Bible in the sense that sometimes it seems people will things that are contrary, maybe to... To self-interest? I suppose, I don't know that he talks about it anywhere, but my guess is that the way he would respond is that self-denying love is simply one aspect of that kind of intellectual love of the totality which is God, which then surpasses one's love for one's own pleasures or desires or whatever other emotionally driven states we have. How does he make a distinction between our loving God and his loving us back through that? No, no. Did I say his loving us? What I should have said, what I intended to say, is God loving himself through our loving him.

Well, okay. Okay, well then how does that work out then? If God is all in all and in effect we love God, wouldn't that mean that somehow God would love us back if God said all in all? Well, no, because you can only say God loves us back if us is something other than God. Now, we're not.

We can love God because God is more than we are. We are part of the divine being, and therefore we can love the whole of which we're part. Get it? But there is no such focused love because, in effect, what we need is a diagram like this, where this segment loves the whole.

But the whole in loving itself doesn't focus on particular segments. David? His ethics. You were talking about how we have to understand all the mechanisms of nature and accept them, but he also says something about consequences.

Yeah, there is this note that runs through his thinking, and I think it's around page 148. He speaks of the knowledge of consequences. Let's see if I can find that exact passage.

Let's see. No, I don't catch it now, but check with me later, David, and maybe we can track that down. Okay.

Consequences for us would involve a relationship to the whole, but I'll have to track down the particular passage. I'm not sure that I understand. I think you said that God is not affected by our love.

Right, right. He loves himself through our love for him. I don't understand how he can be affected by our lack of love.

I mean, if he's not affected by our hate, then how can he be loving himself? But you see, our lack of love is accompanied by confused ideas. Now, we have confused ideas, but God does not. So God has perfect clarity of thought and therefore has no lack of love for the object of thought, which is himself.

So if we hate him, he still loves himself? That doesn't keep God from loving himself. So even if we all hated him, he would still love himself? I wonder how he would respond to that. You see, if he says, yeah, wait a minute.

Yeah, he would respond. God is more than the sum total of all humans. You see? And humans are in a minority in comparison with the totality of nature.

Now, the totality of nature that may not involve conscious loving, nonetheless accepts its place within the whole. And in that acceptance of the whole, there is that equivalent of love, which therefore outdoes your little hates. Okay, now I'm extrapolating there, but I rather think that's the way he'd go.

Because it's not only in humans that you have the double aspect. It's in all aspects of being. Now, other aspects of being may not be conscious.

Spinoza doesn't talk like the Prince of Wales does about talking to the flowers and the plants and so forth. No, but he does recognize that there is the intellectual side of things that is manifest not in consciousness all the time, but at least in intelligible order. And that intelligible order is there.

You see? What we see is degrees of consciousness in different things, ranging from the fullest clarity of complete self-consciousness in God to moments of, modes of, clear and distinct consciousness in us, though not all of our consciousness is clear and distinct, to more confused consciousness in animals, to no consciousness but responsiveness to what's going on still in vegetative life. You see? So there is this intellectual ordering throughout. Is there a conscious being known as God, or is he just employing the terms that are sort of popular? Yeah, he seems to mean a conscious being.

And I say that because if God has full clarity and distinctness of thought, as he claims God does have, then that implies consciousness. In that whole hierarchy of understandings, God is the clearest and the fullest. Yeah? He mentioned that God does not love us, but then I was just wondering how, he says that our salvation consists mainly in the constant and eternal love for his guide and one God's love toward man.

How does that work? Where's the passage where he says that? 158. Bottom right column. Okay, from what has been said, we clearly understand where our salvation consists, and notice he equates with salvation, blessedness, freedom, namely in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men.

Now, either or, or are they one and the same? Now, as you read on, you notice in, let's see, if I can pinpoint that passage. 158. Let's see.

Yeah. The corollary right above the note that you drew attention to, God, insofar as he loves himself, loves man. Consequently, the love of God towards man and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.

Okay? So, constant and eternal love towards God is God's love towards man. So, there's no focused, individual love of God in response to the individual. Now, this love or blessedness the Bible calls glory, not undeservedly, that whether it be referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit.

There's that acceptance, you see, acquiescing. It's not really distinguished from glory. So, that is, that salvation, that blessedness, is nothing more than the enjoyment of that contemplative love of God.

Nothing more than that. Just that he loves us and that he's loving himself because we're in his love. Yeah, but he loves us, but no, God doesn't love us in return.

You see? Rather, it is that God understands and accepts fully the whole cosmic order of which we're part. You see? Of which we're part. The whole cosmic order, which is himself.

But that doesn't mean to say that there is a personalized affection on God's part for you as an individual. Okay? That's the thing he's backing away from. So, if you're thinking of salvation in the personalized sense of scripture, the individualized sense, or in terms of a life hereafter, that's not Spinoza.

That may be the Jewish scriptures, but it's not Spinoza. Okay? All right. I'm ready to leave Spinoza at this juncture.

Okay? That little wrap-up. Not yet. Yes, Cale? Yeah.

In 20th century terms, he wants to demythologize it. That is to say, to reinterpret it in terms of his rationalistic pantheism. Detaching what he sees as the essence of the Jewish faith from the narrative story within which it came.

Including the notion of Yahweh as a being who acts in special miraculous ways and so forth. That's part of the story within which the essence of Judaism is communicated. Are you familiar with the distinction between Reformed Judaism and Orthodox Judaism today? Reformed Judaism is analogous to some sort of... I was going to say Unitarianism.

But a Unitarianism in which the emphasis is on certain ideals for humankind and for nature as a whole rather than on personal relationship to a moral deity who is concerned with justice and love. Get the distinction? Would he say that all religions

have some sort of truth about the essence of God? That basically, their faith is what they shall be? Well, yeah, I don't know whether he would say that. I think he would have to say probably that all religions are really confused understandings of the God who is the one all-inclusive being such as he has spelled out.

I think he'd have to say that. And I think he would probably say that some are more confused than others. Which I guess anybody who has a preference would say anyway.

But he would say it about all. One quick question. How do you clarify your ideas? And I think his response is really twofold.

One, by the kind of contemplation that involves an inner Socratic kind of dialectic, gets ideas cognitively clear. But secondly, in dispelling emotion, which confuses and distracts our thinking. So you need a focused and undistracted mind.

Now, those two things I pick up not only from Spinoza but from his predecessor Descartes. When he's talking about clearer and distinct ideas, he talks about a concentration of an undistracted mind or words to that effect. Tie that into the theory of emotions.

And you get the two criteria. Now I thought you were going to ask this question. If that is the way we gain freedom, but if we are in no sense free to choose to do it, how do we get ourselves to do it? You see? And the only thing that I can say to that is that there is, I guess, we have it over here, there is this pervasive drive that runs through nature, including our mental meanderings.

So that you're like the cat with a mouse, you won't let it go. In fact, isn't that what's going on now? We won't let Spinoza go. You see, we want to get clear.

How can this be? So it's as if there is a natural drive that keeps pushing us, keeps pushing us. And when we think we're choosing to concentrate on this it's really the alternation between some confusing emotion and the other. Okay.

All right. Now, in leaving Spinoza, don't imagine that we're leaving this kind of agenda. We're not.

In fact, in this segment of the board, I've put up a very summary comparison between Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz on three of the main features in Spinoza's agenda. Namely, the relationship between the one and the many theme, which goes back to the pre-Socratics. The mind-body issue and freedom and determinism.

And obviously, these are the key themes all the way through. In the case of Descartes, you've got a dualism of the course of mind and body. A dualism within a theistic context, so let's call it a theistic dualism.

Okay. And when we talk of dualism in Descartes, we're speaking qualitatively. There is a qualitative duality between mental and physical substances.

Thinking things and extended things. They're qualitatively different things. Distinguish a qualitative view from a quantitative view.

How many minds are there? How many bodies are there? Well, I know you have only one of each, but all together. Now that would be the quantitative. And of course, the significant thing in Descartes is the fact that he is a qualitative, not a quantitative, dualist.

Obviously. Qualitative dualist. Spinoza, we say, is a monist.

Yes, he's a qualitative monist. Now take it back. He's a quantitative monist.

A quantitative monist. Numerically, there is one substance. One being.

You see. Now there are qualitative what? Qualitative aspects of the one being. But he's a quantitative monist with a qualitative dualism.

Pluralism. Leibniz, on the other hand, is a pluralist. How many substances are there? Many, many substances.

He's a quantitative pluralist. An indefinite number. Quantitative pluralist.

But he's also a qualitative pluralist. Because this vast number of different substances differ qualitatively by degree. By degree.

What he is doing is reintroducing the medieval notion of a hierarchy of being. An analogy of being. In which all beings have analogous qualities but differ proportionately by degree.

So you have degrees of difference qualitatively within the quantitative plurality of Leibniz. Now we'll flesh that out just a little while. I want you to get the contrasts first.

Now when it comes to mind-body, Descartes, of course, causal interaction. Spinoza, of course, double aspect. Leibniz, parallelism.

Yes, mind and body are different substances. The body is a very complex substance. Mind is a simple substance.

But there's no causal interaction. No causal interaction. They simply are so made and, if you like, pre-programmed that they keep step with each other.

They keep time with each other perfectly. The idea corresponds to the bodily state perfectly, pre-arranged, pre-orchestrated. So parallelism in the case of Leibniz.

On freedom and determinism. Well, with regards to freedom of the will, Descartes is an indeterminist. The will is free to affirm or to deny.

That's why it has to be restrained, has to be restrained. Spinoza is a determinist by virtue of the inner causal processes. An inner determinism.

Leibniz, different again. He finds freedom and determinism compatible. Compatible.

Because he's thinking of freedom not as freedom from mechanical causes, mechanistic, but as freedom to pursue goals, aims, to actualize one's inner entelechy. Does that sound like scholasticism? It is. You see, these things in Leibniz arise because he is rejecting mechanistic science as an ultimate explanation.

He's not satisfied that it's ultimate enough. It's only dealing at a phenomenal level. He asks this question.

This mechanistic science tells us that everything is explained in terms of matter and motion. Well, what is there when matter disintegrates, and motion ceases? What's left? And his answer? No matter, but energy. Force! Force.

In other words, Leibniz is conceiving of energistic physics around 1700. Energistic physics in a teleological metaphysics where everything is end-oriented, and there are inner entelechies. Yeah.

Everything has its own nature. And it's in the outworking of that nature that the teleology is evident. So, that initial picture then introduces what Leibniz is up to.

Let's see. Yeah, let me put it this way. Leibniz, living as he did around 1700, saw emerging conflicts between science and religion.

He thought it was evident enough in people like Hobbes and Spinoza. Conflicts between science and religion. And fairly widespread.

Way beyond those individuals. Mechanistic science poses problems for Christianity. Problems about human freedom.

Problems about the human soul. Problems, therefore, about a future life. And problems about the nature of God and how he is related to, and how he relates to, the world of nature.

And because of these implicit problems within mechanistic science, accepted as a philosophy that tells you about the ultimate nature of reality, he rejects mechanistic science as an account of the ultimate nature of reality. He is an anti-realist about mechanistic science. Though a realist about the kind of science he envisions.

Now, I might add that Leibniz was not professionally an academic. He was a German diplomat. Constantly engaged in shuttle diplomacy.

Constantly on the road. Which is why he doesn't ride along systematic treaties like Spinoza. But the shorter works that we have some of in the anthology.

He's concerned about the religious wars that were raging throughout Europe in his day. And is trying to work for a united Europe and a united Christendom. So, he's trying to engage in those kinds of negotiations.

And, of course, in order to do that, bringing together opposing conflicting parties, he needs something of a philosophical worldview to provide some foundations to which to appeal. And he's convinced that a mechanistic science, which can only talk of opposing forces, cannot impart any sense of purpose, underlying purpose, which can provide the basis for the kind of Europe that he envisions. So, the conflict between religion and science.

Now, in effect, what we see when we get to Leibniz is a questioning not only of the mechanistic system and the devising of a new system that will focus more effectively on the human mind and human freedom. Not only a questioning of the mechanistic system, but also a questioning of the rationalist approach. What you find in Leibniz is theological ideas feeding into his thinking in a way in which they did not in Spinoza and not even in Descartes.

Descartes was content with conclusions that harmonized with his religion. What Leibniz is after is some underlying vision of a purposeful creator, active in the creation. And that's what runs throughout his whole thinking.

Now, with that in mind, one step further, and still by way of introduction. Quite evidently from what I've said so far, the crux of the matter for Leibniz is going to be the concept of substance. The concept of substance.

He is opposed to Descartes' view of substance, material substance in this case, as simply extended stuff occupying space. Because that notion of matter fails to explain

other very basic properties of material bodies, such as inertia. The fact that a body continues in the state of motion or rest, in which it naturally is.

And he therefore argues that extension is not a basic primary property. It's derivative rather than basic. An extended substance is a composite of more basic ingredients.

And the properties of extension are due to the relationships between those basic ingredients. Rather than being simply compilations of extended substances, as Democritus and the atomists have said. A body is a composite of non-extended entities.

An extension is a result of the composite. The ultimate ingredients of substance, therefore, are what he calls monads. And they, the basic units of all reality, are units of force, energy, rather than units of extended stuff.

Now, by the same token, he is dissatisfied with Spinoza's conception of substance. Because with Spinoza's determinism, there is nothing really contingent in the entirety of nature. Everything has its own necessities.

And there is no contingency on the incidental, accidental that may happen. He does not like the Aristotelian conception of substance. Because for Aristotle, a primary substance is still a composite, rather than what's basic.

And even Aristotle's analysis of substance into prime matter and form doesn't tell us enough about matter. Prime matter does not explain inertia any more than Descartes' concept of substance explained inertia. And when he looks at Newton's physics, he dislikes Newton's conception, not only of matter, substance, but of space and time.

Because this uniform, infinite, empty space, which has fixed locations where you can put substances, says Newton, is a sheer abstraction with no basis at all in reality. So he argues for the relativity of time and space. Relativity in 1700.

Now, I realize the debate over which came first, science or philosophy, is sort of like the chicken and the egg debate. But it's very interesting to see how Democritus was hundreds of years before mechanistic science and Leibniz a couple of hundred years before what came later. Well, here's what he says about space.

As for my own opinion, I've said more than once that I hold space to be something merely relative. I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successive events. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things existing at the same time, considered as existing together.

And when many things are seen together, one perceives the order of things among themselves. And then a little later, he says, in fact, in the next paragraph, space is absolutely uniform. Without things placed in it, one point of space does not absolutely differ in any respect from another point of space.

From hence it follows that it's impossible there should be any reason why God, notice how God is involved in having reasons, you see. It's impossible that there should be a reason why God, preserving the same situation of bodies among themselves, should have placed them in space in one way and not another. Or why wasn't everything placed in an entirely contrary way by changing east into west?

If space is nothing but order, relation, nothing at all without bodies, then those two states, one such as it now is, the other, the quite contrary, wouldn't differ at all from one another. If space is entirely empty and nothing. Space is the empty possibility of ordered relationships of things in time.

Well, the same is the case with respect to time. Supposing anyone should ask, why did God create everything a year sooner? And the same person should infer that God has done something concerning which it is not possible that there should be a reason why he did so and not otherwise. The answer is that this inference would be right if time was anything distinct from things existing in time.

If there were no events of a space-time sort, there would be no time, you see. So he abandons the Newtonian conceptions of space and time. Now, what's happening? There are four key concepts of mechanistic science, Newtonian science.

Matter, force, or motion, motion explained in terms of forces, matter, space, and time. Space and time by themselves are nothing. The words don't refer to anything.

Matter and motion are not the ultimates. The ultimate is force, energy. So what you have is a complete rejection of the four key concepts of Newtonian physics, replacing them with a conception of force or energy in a teleological system.

God's purposes have to be involved. Well, let me pause there. We have a few moments.

Questions? Comments? Or do you want me to go on and elaborate on his monads and monadology? I gather you do. Dr. Chappell? Yeah, maybe I'd better go on and elaborate to provide a framework for answering the question. All right.

Let me say something more about his monads. There's a tendency, when you first get acquainted with Leibniz, to view his monads as the product of a wild imagination. Resist that tendency.

View it rather as a quasi-scientific hypothesis, anticipating contemporary discussions about the nature of matter, particle, or unit of energy, or just what. Regarding it, in other words, as a hypothesis about energetic constituents of matter, as distinct from solid pellets of matter. Okay.

Now, with that in mind, what he does is to propose that monads are units of force, differing only in their degrees of appetite and apperception. Degrees of appetite and apperception. What is appetite? But, essentially, Spinoza's *conatus*, that drive, that forcefulness, that inner push, which seems to run through all of natural processes, including our own bodily energies and our desiring, willing, and wanting.

You see? There is always, then, this *conatus*, this appetite, this drive. As if, and here I'm picking up on the teleological notion, as if there is some lure attracting towards a goal. The notion of final causation is involved.

Yeah, the *conatus* in Spinoza seems to be entirely an efficient cause, push. In Leibniz, I want to say it's pull, but it's no push. It's sort of push and pull, both.

In other words, he combines efficient and final causation. You see, a push and pull. The whole process of nature is energized.

So, degrees of appetite. So that rocks resist your crushing them. And plants and seedlings grow.

And bodily processes keep going on. So forth. But also degrees of apperception.

Now, apperception, obviously, is a mongrelization of the word perception. Awareness, consciousness. There are degrees of awareness, of consciousness, of relatedness to the environment.

Responsiveness to environment. Not always conscious, but a low degree analogous to consciousness. Like the way in which the grass seed I sowed this fall after that summer drought.

Quite unconsciously germinated and began to show its head. And, yeah, some of it's still surviving above the mud. There's an awareness of what it's supposed to do, an awareness.

Well, very, very low degree of responsiveness to warmth and moisture. So there are degrees of appetite and low-degree analogues of human appetite. Degrees of apperception and low degree analogues of human perception.

Running all the way down the hierarchy of being. And in this hierarchy of being, he accordingly distinguishes various kinds of monads. At the bottom, you have bare monads.

Bare monads. Then, as you go one step further, you have soul monads. Or, if you like, life monads.

And then you have spirit monads. And at the very top, you have the supreme monad. Now, bare monads have no distinct awareness or consciousness.

At one point, he says it's as if they are dazed, stunned, unconscious. Well, that doesn't mean to say that there is no built-in appetite or apperception. You can have living things that are unconscious.

And organic processes continue. And the analogy he has is more to an organism than an unconscious organism, than to an unconscious machine. An unconscious machine by itself does nothing.

An unconscious organism by itself does a lot. So, bare monads at the bottom. Soul monads, those giving life to the animal.

So, here you have inanimate matter. Here you have animal life. And, of course, all degrees in between on the hierarchy.

And in soul monads, you have some conscious perception of a consecutive sort. In some advanced animals, you have some memory in the sense of retention. You have habits that have been formed in soul monads.

Well, in spirit monads, this is where the human spirit comes in. You have abstract thought. Reasoning processes.

Self-consciousness, not just sense awareness of stimuli, but self-awareness. We reflect on ourselves. Human animals are the only ones who worry about the meaning and purpose of life.

As is sometimes said. And so, the spirit monad is the ruling thing, the ruling entelechy in human nature. And then there is the supreme monad.

God. The supreme monad. Full consciousness, that is to say, omniscient, all-knowing.

And he would add, with complete clarity and distinctness, that God is fully conscious and all-knowing. Fully powerful, that is to say, boundless appetite, drive, impetus, sovereign will. God, who is a necessary being, has as his very essence to exist.

So Leibniz, too, is open to ontological arguments, you see. Now, the point is, then, that you have these different kinds of monads in various kinds of composites. Let us say, bare monads in composites produce just material things, physical objects.

Soul monads, combined with bare monads, produce animals. Spirit monads, combined with soul monads and bare monads, human beings, you see. So, rather like the Aristotelian and scholastic thing, where you have vegetative soul and animal soul and rational soul, you see, a reconstitution of that whole hierarchy.

Well, which do you prefer, the hierarchy of being or the mechanistic metaphysic?  
Well, we'll pick up on this next time. Thank you.