A History of Philosophy
30 Thomas Hobbes
By Dr. Arthur Holmes of Wheaton College

Okay then, Thomas Hobbes. And you notice that I want to introduce Hobbes by talking about his motives. And in the case of many philosophers, this is important, but I think particularly so in Hobbes.

I've spent all my reading research time this semester reading nothing but Bacon and Hobbes and secondary materials on Bacon and Hobbes. And the more I've plowed into the Hobbes literature, the more I become aware that his motivation shapes not only what he thinks, but how he goes about setting it forth. Notice he was born in 1588.

And any of you who are familiar with English history may know that's the day of the Spanish Armada. In fact, he reports in one place that he was born prematurely because his mother was so scared when the Armada was sighted, which is a rather troublesome way to come into this life. And living as he did over into the early 17th century, he lived through the English Civil War in the 1640s.

In that political turmoil, he remained in his sympathies a royalist, but opposed to the divine right of kings, which was, of course, the basis adduced for the absolute authority of the monarch. And so, without that basis for authority, he has to wrestle with the question, what basis is there for political authority, if not that? Moreover, he has lived through conflict, the war with Spain, and the English Civil War. He becomes convinced that human beings are not, by nature, as they come into this world, ready to live in society.

Somehow or other, we have to find a basis for establishing law, order, peace, in a natural condition where the natural condition is, as he puts it, the war of all against all. The natural condition of man is such that life is nasty, short, and brutish. Well, he has a pessimistic view of human nature, a pessimistic view of the human condition.

So not only does he need a basis for political authority, but he needs some basis on which social order, some degree of harmony, and certainly self-preservation are possible. Now, add to it the religious conflicts, religious conflicts which underlay both the war with Spain and the conflict with the monarchy in the Civil War. Hobbes' sympathies were with what is sometimes called the broad church, the Latitudinarian tradition in the Anglican church of the day.

And in that broad church, there was an attempt constantly to avoid religious conflict, to avoid churchly authority that could be the source of persecution of minorities. He wants to avoid sectarianism. Now, remember that the kind of vacuum of authority,

the epistemological vacuum left by the breakdown of the medieval synthesis and by the Protestant Reformation, seemed to be leading precisely into sectarian conflicts, into a kind of individualism that is intolerant of others.

And Hobbes is tremendously anxious to avoid that. So that in that broad church tradition, his view of church-state relations is essentially Erastian. That is to say, beyond the basic minima of a very broad Christian faith that would affirm the deity of Christ, his work of redemption, beyond basics of that sort, he was content to leave it to the authorities to say what should be affirmed by the church.

Hence, a state church, a state church in which the governmental authority establishes the details, rather than leaving it to individuals and to sectarian disputes, which can only upset the peace, cause chaos, produce anarchy, and so on and so forth. Now, it's against that background, then, of political conflict, of religious conflict, of violence, and that Erastian attitude of church-state, that Thomas Hobbes comes at his philosophical work quite independently of the philosophy for which he's famous. He was himself something of a Renaissance figure, very much interested in Plato and had done some commentary and translation of Platonic-type things.

He was part of the English Renaissance. He had been, for a while, Francis Bacon's secretary and certainly had an appreciation of Bacon's empirical, inductive kind of approach to science. But he was not altogether satisfied with that.

Hence, motive and method are both necessary for understanding what he's doing. He regarded Bacon's inductive methods as simplistic. Essentially, all that Bacon is doing is defining certain constant conjunctions, as they come to be called later on, certain regularities that we can make use of in the applications of scientific knowledge.

But that's not providing an overall theoretical understanding that can be a basis for what? For a view of human persons, human behavior, and political order. So somehow or other, he wants to make the transition from empirical science to the development of an ethic and a political philosophy. And how are you going to do that? Well, he finds his clue in the scientific method that is traced to Galileo.

I was going to say it was developed by him, but I'm not sure of that. But at least traced to Galileo. The method of reconstruction, as it's called.

The method of reconstruction. That is to say, if in analyzing natural processes, physical objects, human bodies, we dissect, we analyze, that's not enough. What we need to do is to reconstruct in some intelligible, rational order our findings.

So that from the broad generalizations of empirical science, we can proceed deductively to draw further conclusions. So essentially what he's calling for is empirical premises. Empirical generalizations as premises.

Empirical premises, then deductive inferences to further conclusions. So that the overall scheme that results has the logical form of a deductive system, such as we find in mathematics and geometry, for instance. Now, it's in that regard that Hobbes was impressed by Descartes.

Because Descartes, as we've mentioned, and we'll see more as time goes on, Descartes wanted to do philosophy using the method of mathematics. So his initial skepticism is simply a methodological ploy, enabling him to identify and lay aside everything which can even in principle be subject to doubt. So that he can identify what is completely indubitable, beyond doubt, completely axiomatic, and self-evident.

So Descartes wanted to start, as it were, with axioms, the way Euclid did, and proceed deductively to the development of his system. Now, Hobbes is not a rationalist to believe in a priori knowledge that is axiomatic. Hobbes is an empiricist.

So he cannot start with axioms; he has to start with inductive generalizations. But it is the deductive method of Descartes that impresses him. And so he builds it into this reconstructive method of the sort that he apparently found in Galileo.

So you have this kind of methodological approach. Now, add to that one further methodological assumption. An assumption that I'll put over here because it applies to the whole method.

An assumption of methodological naturalism. That is to say, we'll proceed on the assumption that everything can be explained in terms of natural causal processes. The assumption is that everything is explicable in terms of causal processes.

Cause, effect, cause, effect, cause, effect. And it's for that reason that you have a unity of all the sciences methodologically. The methods that were initially applied to physics and astronomy are going to be applied to psychology and politics.

You see? So that there is a methodological continuity all the way through. Now, in order to see how seriously he takes that, look if you will at the anthology. Yes, the new anthology.

Page 87. Page 87. Where you notice that the chapter heading is on several subjects of knowledge.

Okay, the whole scope of knowledge. And look at that magnificent chart. Where the all-inclusive subject on the far left, science, is knowledge of consequences, which is called philosophy.

As we were commenting yesterday, last time rather, science and philosophy are roughly synonymous until 1900 or so. Science means a kind of theoretical knowledge, simply that. So, knowledge of consequences.

Of what? Cause, effect, consequences. Okay. But then he divides that whole body of knowledge into two parts.

Consequences from the accidents of natural bodies, called natural philosophy, is what we would call natural science. And consequences from the accidents of political bodies, the body politic, which we call politics or civil philosophy. Now, if you look over the range of natural philosophy, swing right over to the right-hand column, and notice that it goes from prime philosophy, which is the basic concept of being, to geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, geography, in other words, mathematics.

Then into the physical sciences, into mechanics and the applications of it in engineering, architecture, navigation, and meteorology. Into sciography, what we would call astronomy, and then astrology, the influence of the stars. That's an interesting thing from our standpoint.

But optics, music, yes, the physics of music. Ethics, yes, having to do with human passions. In other words, he sees psychological causes for moral behaviors and moral desires.

Okay. Poetry, rhetoric, logic, and the science of the just and the unjust. Yeah, that's the consequences of speech, the things we do with speech.

Oh, we not only please, like the Renaissance gentleman pleased his lady with poetry. If you're familiar with Renaissance literature, you'll see. Not only pleasing, but persuading, persuasive functions, that's cause-effect.

Reasoning, yeah, watch for that when we get to talking about reason in a few moments. It's a cause-effect process. It's controlled by brain processes.

And ethics, a consequence of some psychological causal processes. So the whole thing, then, has to do with cause-effect. And when you look at the second division, where you're dealing with bodies politic, well, there you have consequences of the institution of commonwealths.

Notice that the term commonwealth is the term that Oliver Cromwell used for the form of body politic, which he established. The Cromwellian commonwealth. Commonwealth means the common good.

So then, civil philosophy, political philosophy, has to do not with the individual, but with the common good. And then the consequences of that for duties and rights, and hence for legislation, and so forth. So the distinction is simply between individual bodies, the physical sort, and bodies politic.

But throughout, it's cause-effect, cause-effect, methodological naturalism. Now, that raises the interesting question, of course, as to whether he is not only a methodological naturalist, but also a philosophical naturalist. Is he, metaphysically, a materialist? Since all he's going to be investigating is, in effect, matter and the forces which cause changes in material bodies.

Matter and motion, the mechanistic view. That's the science. But is he, then, a materialist? Well, that's a good question.

Pretty well as good as the question, is he really a determinist? Or is he just investigating the causal processes? Yes, sir. I'm inclined to think he is a materialist. Yeah.

Well, there seems to be an indication that while he says it's natural to believe in God, because we have to ask the question of the cause of all the other causes, the existence of God as the first cause, on the other hand, reason says nothing about the nature of God. By cause and effect, we can't argue anything about the nature of God, other than that there is this powerful first cause. And he seems to indicate that he regards God as, in some sense, a material being.

And, of course, that tradition goes back, does it not, to the Stoics? The idea of a rarefied material being pervading everything, influencing everything, that sort of thing. In which case, Thomas Hobbes, then, would seem to be something of a theistic materialist, a Christian materialist. Likewise, in his view of the human soul.

Well, there was something of that back in Tertullian, you remember, who drew on the Stoic philosophy in trying to resist the Gnostic dualism of the day. In Thomas Hobbes, likewise, and occasionally, you run into such. But at the same time, the influence of his Christianity continues to appear throughout his thinking.

So, if you look at page 90, notice what he says. The second column on page 90, halfway down. Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect to seek the cause, and to gain the cause of that cause, till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal, which is it men call God.

So it's impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe that there is one God eternal. And at the very bottom of the page, by the visible things of the world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God. The visible things of the creation.

Remember the phrase that Paul uses in Romans 1. But then on 91, at the end of that first complete paragraph, he says, this fear of things invisible, invisible causes like God, this fear of things invisible, remember that's a theme which ran through Lucretius and Epicurus, their materialism. This fear of things invisible is the natural seed of religion. Now that phrase, the seed of religion, the Latin semen religionis, is the very phrase used by John Calvin in the opening chapters of his Institutes of the Christian Religion in explaining widespread human belief in God.

That there is in us something of a seed of religion by virtue of some undefined sense of a deity. There is a sensus deitatis, the sense of a deity, which is the seed of religion. Now you see what Hobbes is doing, essentially expounding on that belief.

He was raised, actually, because of the death of his parents; he was raised by an Anglican clergyman who was a Calvinist. So he was pretty surely familiar with Calvin's way of thinking. And what he seems to be saying then is that this causal inquiry leads to some vague idea of a first cause, some sense of a deity, which is in turn the cause of the development of religion, in which, of course, particular religions flesh out the concept of God much more fully.

So, some general, undefined conception of God is fleshed out in the religions to which that universal sense of a deity of some sort gives rise. And in the beginning, therefore, of the next chapter entitled On Religion, he says, Seeing there are no signs nor fruit of religion, but in man only, there is no cause to doubt that the seed of religion is only in man and consists in some peculiar quality or some eminent degree thereof not found in living things. This kind of inquiry, curiosity, and that leads him into thinking about the natural condition of human beings, which would give rise to that.

And so he goes to talk on about the human condition. So this is the pattern of motivation, the method that's involved in what Hobbes is doing. Any questions? Come in.

I find that a fascinating background, utterly fascinating. Oh, I think very much so. In fact, there's one writer who takes that to be the dominant motive, dominant motive.

Some have even said that he wrote the Leviathan, the major work on political thought. He wrote that in exile during the Cromwellian era. He wrote it in exile in an

attempt to make his peace and save his skin as much with Cromwell as with the Stuarts.

Yes, sir? Here he is, trying to play both sides. Yeah, yeah. From Bacon, he gets the inductive approach to understanding the causal order, what Bacon called forms in his sense of forms.

Patterns, of course, affect relationships. He gets from Descartes, Galileo, the deductive system ideal. He adds to that his methodological naturalism, that generalization, that everything is explicable in those terms.

And off he goes. That's fair, those three ingredients. All right, well, how does this actually work? And you have to come at it, first of all, in terms of his epistemology.

And you can trace this quite readily in the anthology. The way he works us through the whole process of the origin and development of human thought, starting with sensation. And granted what I've said about the method, it's obvious that he's going to start there.

One, he's an empiricist. But if he's interested in cause-effect mechanisms, then the first consciousness that we have, that we can start talking of causes of, are our physical sensations. Physical sensations are caused by something physical in the external world.

So he sees all of our sensations as the effects in the human self of physical processes in the external world. That is to say, particular, and I stress particular because he is going to be a nominalist. The influence of Occam is explicit in Hobbes.

Okay? Particular objects have particular qualities which cause changes in our sense organs, the nervous system, and the brain, and that stimulus produces reflex responses from what he calls the heart. You know how your heart pounds with the appropriate stimulus? Responses produced by the heart in thought or overt action or both. So he has a purely causal explanation in which our sensations, our images that he calls phantasms, our sensations, our images, the phantasms, are mental states with sense qualities.

And these phantasms involve awareness of both primary qualities and secondary qualities. And this distinction becomes crucial from this point on in empiricism. Primary qualities are the qualities that objects and bodies have.

Now, in the mechanistic science of that day, what's going to be Newtonian science, what are the intrinsic properties of physical objects? Well, what is matter like? Well, matter just has spatial properties. Size, shape, density, weight, and spatial occupancy properties. And, consequently, it is those that are the primary qualities.

But those primary qualities, the qualities that bodies have, have the capacity to produce additional effects in the consciousness so that we see not just shapes, but colored shapes. Not just a surface, but we feel a rough or smooth surface. Not just a body that moves from one place to another, but also makes sound in our consciousness.

So the secondary qualities are the qualities that are dependent on our five kinds of sense capacities. Color, to do with the sight. Sound, to do with hearing.

Texture, to do with touch. Taste and smell. Five senses.

Now, his point is that when we therefore talk of a colored shirt, my blue shirt, we fancy it is blue, but the shirt isn't blue. It is rather that the shirt causes you to see blue. It appears to you blue, but it's not blue.

Okay? This is talking about what becomes known as the subjectivity of secondary qualities. The objectivity of primary qualities. That's what's going to make it possible when we get to Berkeley, for Berkeley to say, Is the tree that falls in the forest when there's nobody around to hear? Make any noise? Because if noise is a secondary quality, it's subjective.

Is there a noise as noise when there's nobody to hear it? Nobody on whom the sound waves register in consciousness. So sensation, then, is the beginning of it. Now, after the cessation of the cause, you stop looking at my shirt, but you still have a mental image of my shirt.

This is simply the product of decaying processes, changes in the sense organs, and the brain. It's what he calls imagination. Notice that the term imagination at this juncture is simply nothing but having mental images.

Having mental images. You don't get the idea of imagination as creativity until you get to Romanticism, the 19th century. That begins with people like Kant, but you don't get it in the Enlightenment.

Imagination is simply images left over, dying off, getting confused, mixed up with each other, like the image I have of a fairy giraffe with butterfly wings mixes up all sorts of other decaying images. So imagination, then. Operative in waking, when we remember something, and the picture comes to mind.

Or in sleep, when we dream something pretty vividly. This is all decaying sense images. And he moves from that into what he calls reason.

Reasoning. What is reasoning? Well, at the conscious level, reasoning is simply a process where one idea is followed by another idea. If I say 2 plus 2 equals... Well, that process ends up saying 4. 2 plus 2 equals 4. But, you see, that mental conscious process is caused by brain activity.

The brain somehow or other combines what ought to be combined and separates what ought to be separated. So it's by virtue of causal processes that the causal stimulus of 2, followed by an added causal stimulus of 2, produces a causal stimulus to the idea of 4. So that reasoning is entirely a process determined by brain causes. Okay? Brain causes.

We have no way of originating ideas because consciousness is entirely a byproduct of brain processes. So there are no innate ideas in the consciousness. There's no a priori knowledge independent of the cause-effect processes producing sensation.

And so his pure empiricism is established. But what about language? What about language? Now, here's the place where nominalism becomes explicit. Because he says in as many words that words are just particular signs that stand for groups of particular things.

So that in his, not in the Leviathan, but in his work, The Elements of Philosophy, he says the universality of one name, one name applying to a whole class of things, the universality of one name has been the cause that men think that things are themselves universal. But it's plain there is nothing universal but names which are called indefinite, indefinite nouns. Because we don't limit them but leave them to be applied by the hearer.

But universal is just a particular name that applies to a whole group indiscriminately. Applies to a whole group indiscriminately. And he's very, very plain about that.

He says there are no such things as abstract names. So he's rejecting conceptualism. We don't name abstract ideas.

What we have is simply general ideas. So that words name whole groups of things in general by virtue of their similarities. But without reference to any universal concept held in abstraction in the mind.

And certainly without reference to any real universal. So he's explicitly nominalistic. Okay.

Does that make sense? Notice how true he is to his method. Start with the methodological assumption. Cause-effect explanations for everything.

Start with sensations, cause the way they are. Brain processes, neural processes, cause everything that follows from that. And the use of language, signs, is simply part of the response mechanisms.

In the stimulus-response mechanisms, the experience of the world produces a response. Verbal responses. And the sophisticated responses that humans have involve language.

Independent of sense experience. Yeah. If everything is cause-effect through physical processes, then there cannot be ideas originating independently of causal processes.

The illustration of... Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

No. There's no magic, I think, in using the example of blue rather than yellow, red, black, or white. Yeah.

Yeah. I don't think they were aware of the pigmentation issue. Now, having said that, there may be some significance in the fact that the prime example used wherever we're talking of primary and secondary qualities is color.

That is to say, the sense of vision, the sense of sight. Because it's much easier when you're talking of sight and color perception to say that color is subjective, granted the physics of color vision. It may be a little harder with the sense of taste or touch.

Yeah. Yeah. That's a different thing.

Okay. David. How would you say it's more... Well, you see, the semen religionis is the effect, the fact that religions arise from some sort of a seed is the effect of the sense of a deity, some idea of a first cause.

But that sense of a deity is the result itself of causal inquiry by virtue of which we keep asking, what's the cause of that cause, and push it all the way back? Yes, sir? So, what he's saying is that this type of thinking is so characteristic of human beings, I was going to say so native to human beings, so characteristic, that we push it all the way back, come up with the idea of God, and that's the cause of the sense of a deity, the cause of religion. Now, why would it be so natural to humans to think causally? Well, I suspect it's simply because we experience causal processes from the very beginning. I mean, the youngest infants soon begin to realize that certain things they do produce responses.

Yes, sir? I remember when our grandson was about, what was he, about three months old, I remember lying on the floor with him and hovering over him and going to him, he looked up at me, he made, you know, stimulus response, cause and effect.

You know, and they're just aware of that from the beginning. So we learn that cause-effect type thing.

It's built into the way we experience the world around us. So he'd give a thoroughly empiricist explanation. You don't need a Kantian category of cause and effect to handle that.

Okay, now, that much is simply foundation. Now we get to where he wants to go. You see, granted the things that are driving him, he wants to get to talking about the body politic, about ethics and politics.

But he moves into that by talking of the human person and coming up with this notion of consciousness, because all of this business of sensation, imagination, reasoning, and using language, all presupposes consciousness. Whatever else you say about a human being in a materialistic account of human nature or any other kind of account, human beings have consciousness. What is the cause of consciousness? That's the question.

And he argues that consciousness is simply a byproduct, an epiphenomenon. That is to say, it is an appearance produced by, added to, bodily existence. Yeah, consciousness is simply a byproduct of brain processes, just as sensations are byproducts of brain processes, and reasoning is a byproduct of brain processes.

So all consciousness is a byproduct of brain processes. Physical changes produce consciousness. Now, sometimes directly, as in the case of sensations.

Sometimes indirectly, as, for instance, where the causal processes, physical changes, have involuntary physical effects, so that we automatically breathe, and there are physical reflexes that our nerves and limbs produce that we become aware of after the fact. You see? So sometimes the originating cause directly produces conscious states. Sometimes indirectly produces conscious states.

And among the conscious states produced are desires and aversions. Desires and aversions. Maybe the ideas of Thomas Hobbes produce aversion in your mind.

Maybe attraction. You see? But the point is that experiences don't simply register cognitive content. Their effect on us physiologically is such that they produce an emotional reaction.

He thinks of the brain as the seat of consciousness, sensation, thought, and the heart as the seat of aversion and desire, of the emotions. And it's from those desires that we, out of those desires, that we act, so that human action is not governed by reason. Human action is governed by passion, by the emotions, and desires.

Now, that again seems to be a natural consequence of the way he's thinking. And so on page 85, you can see how he enumerates all sorts of different desires. And you can see that he has a psychology of the emotions that's pretty well worked out.

And that raises questions about freedom and determinism. About freedom and determinism. And he speaks of freedom in two senses.

One, when I'm free from external constraints, free to do what I desire, that's freedom. Now, even though my desires cause my actions, desires cause my actions, my actions are caused. But he takes freedom to mean self-caused, an inner self-determination, caused by my own desires, appetites, passions.

There's a second sense of freedom that he explores a little bit when we make a decision. Make a decision. But what is it to make a decision? A choice.

Freedom of choice. What's that? Well, there are times when we have alternating desires. What am I going to order from that menu? What am I going to pick up over there in Anderson Commons? You've got a choice to make.

And in that alternation of desires, you move first in one direction, then in the other direction, sort of see-sawing, teeter-tottering between the two. In the consciousness, you're deliberating. Well, I want this because, but I'd like this because, the deliberation goes on.

And choice is simply one desire outweighing the other. In that emotional see-saw, you simply give way to one desire, and the last desire is the one that wins, and you say you've chosen that. So the sense of being free to decide is simply a by-product of the ambiguity of your own desires.

The sense of being uncaused is caused by alternating desires. But you are not free in the sense of having uncaused actions, uncaused choices. There is an inner determinism that runs all the way through.

This is sometimes known as soft determinism. Well, it's on that basis that he comes out as a psychological egoist. A psychological egoist is one who pursues self-interest, and that's an empirical generalization. Egoism is the view that... Egoism is about pursuing self-interest.

Primarily, dominantly, the bottom line is self-interest. Psychological egoism is simply a descriptive assertion. It's a psychological fact, we do.

As distinct from ethical egoism, which would say that we ought to. He's a psychological egoist. He's not saying we ought to pursue self-interest.

No. In fact, later he'll deny that. But he is a psychological egoist.

We do pursue self-interest. It is our fears that drive us. It's the desire for self-preservation that drives us.

Self-interest. What we desire, we think of as good. What we dislike, we think of as bad.

So while we might have some common goods, like survival, we have a lot of very different goods and bads. And so we have a lot of ethical relativism between us. But we are drawn perpetually by a restless desire for the power that we need to survive.

Power. Yeah. So life becomes a power struggle, you see.

And in that power struggle, what gives the power? What did Bacon say? Knowledge is power. Scientific knowledge is power. If you know and understand the causal processes, then you can survive.

How? Well, you see, he makes a distinction. He makes a distinction between the natural state and natural law. The natural state is one of conflict, power struggle, and the war against all.

Life is nasty, short, and brutish. There's no such thing as a natural right other than the desire to survive. There's no such thing as any natural law in Aquinas' sense, grounded in some inbuilt teleology.

No, this is a mechanistic universe. Causal processes determine everything. What, then, does he mean by natural law? He means the dictates of right reason.

Have you heard that phrase? William of Aca, the dictates of right reason. In other words, consequentialist thinking. Yeah? And you can think consequentially.

You can do right reasoning if you understand the causal processes. And so, knowledge, in this case right reason, about the consequences of human actions, is power. And so what sort of natural laws, then, does right reason, out of prudence and for self-preservation, lay down? One, seek peace.

Well, you blame it on a civil war, or on the war with Spain, or on religious conflict, or when he's living in exile. Come on, make peace with Cromwell. Seek peace.

Second, keep a covenant with others. When you enter into an agreement, into a contract, keep it. And he goes on, therefore, to propose that what we need in a body politic is some covenant that, out of right reason, we'll keep.

A covenant in which we vest authority in an absolute ruler. Cromwell was as much an absolute ruler as Charles had been. But we vest the authority, by covenant, if you like, by contract, in an absolute ruler, who has complete authority over us, except if he tries to destroy us.

Then, the desire for self-preservation takes precedence. But since the contract is for the sake of self-preservation, absolute power goes to the ruler, and to what he says. So, instead of divine right of kings, you see, you have a contractarian basis, if you like, a social contract basis, for political authority.

And that ruler has authority in matters of religion. Remember, I said Hobbes was an Erastian? God's laws are binding on us, yes, by virtue of right reason, or direct revelation, or the authority of those in authority. And it's the interpretation of the ruler that tells us what God's commands are going to be, what they are.

The authoritative interpretation of the ruler will settle religious disputes. And so, in that way, he has come to the conclusion that he was trying to establish. Yes, sir? We need a way of surviving amidst political conflict.

We need a way of surviving amidst religious conflict. Overcoming sectarianism. Partisan spirits.

And this is where right reason, in view of the consequences, leads. Well, I wish we had ten minutes to toss this around. Intriguing? Yeah, tremendously influential.

Pessimistic view. Some people have surmised it's because he was brought up on the Calvinist doctrine of total depravity. I think it's because he was brought up in times of conflict.