

A History of Philosophy

26 Aquinas' Moral Psychology and Ethics

By Dr. Arthur Holmes of Wheaton College

Alright, this afternoon we want to give our attention to another area of Aquinas thought, moral psychology and ethics. Now, what I'm going to say about his moral psychology may help you to latch on to the papers on Aquinas that you perhaps heard at the conference last weekend. Since the paper on Aquinas' view of the emotions, Aquinas on the will, freedom, and the good, those three papers during the day really were all dealing with his moral psychology.

And what I'm going to do with that, frankly, I have organized with what you could have heard last week in mind. Hopefully, it'll pull the thing together in such a way that you may want to go back to the papers and re-read them. And if you didn't get sets, they're still available.

Now, the place to start with Aquinas is essentially where we finished last time. Because like any theist, Aquinas thinks of everything in terms of this relationship between God and creation. And if you're going to talk of human nature and ethics, you have to do so in terms of the relationship between God and his creatures.

Now, as we saw last time, the proofs for the existence of God, which Aquinas offers, show him to be not an Aristotelian God, just a final cause. But show him to be genuinely a theistic being, namely the efficient cause. In fact, as the first of Aquinas' proofs makes the point, the second, rather, makes the point, he is the cause of the whole causal order.

The premise is about an order of causes, of efficient causes. And there must be a cause for this order of efficient causes. In that sense, God, as the cause of all causes, is all-powerful.

He empowers those secondary causes. And those secondary causes of which God is the cause, those secondary causes operating as part of the causal order in the creation, include human agency and human nature. Because what we are in our natures is part of the causal order.

So human agency, then, is a secondary cause of which God is continually the cause. The cause of the whole causal order. So then, when we focus our attention on human action, human behavior, the efficient cause of human action is the will.

The will is the efficient cause. But we have to be careful how we understand Aquinas' concept of will. And that's what all the eager and sometimes heated argument last Friday was about.

Namely, that you have, in the history of Western thought, at least two concepts of will. There is one concept of will that emerges in the 17th century, perhaps a little earlier, with William of Ockham. That would be in the 15th century.

But the concept of will that emerged at least clearly in the 17th century, and I would suggest, is your concept of free will. Because we've all ingested it in the very intellectual atmosphere of our times. It's the concept of free will operating in a causal vacuum.

That is to say, a free will which is not directed, influenced, or determined by any causes at all. Now, notice I said a range of things. Directed, influenced, now that wouldn't be a sufficient cause to determine.

Let alone being determined, it's not directed or influenced by causal forces if it's free. And so part of the dispute last week was between modern libertarian views, completely indeterminist. That is to say, free will is independent of all causes.

Completely libertarian views, completely indeterminist. And a concept of will which does not talk of free will in those terms. And this other concept of will is not the indeterminist one.

And this concept of will, which Aquinas develops, you see, is the concept of will as intellectual inclination. The emphasis is not on choosing in a context where there are no causes affecting the choice, but on choosing where there are causes affecting the choice. But there is still a choice.

Now, how does that work? Well, what basically is involved in the difference is this. The 17th-century conception of will is part of a mechanistic worldview. Where everything is understood in terms of movement and change due to forces at work.

Billiard ball type universe. All that you have to consider are material and efficient causes. On the other hand, what you have in Aquinas is a teleological worldview.

Obviously, since Aquinas' philosophy is a modification of Aristotle's. What you have to consider in talking of will is not just whether there is any other efficient cause than the will itself. But you have to consider formal cause and final cause as well as material and efficient cause.

So, whether or not there are other efficient causes pushing you to choose, there are final causes luring you in a direction. There are formal causes, your own nature, inclining you naturally in a direction. It's a teleological universe.

And therefore, he has a teleological conception of human personality, of human nature. Human beings, that is to say, are end-oriented, like all of nature. There is a matter of intention, of inclination that is native to us.

But it's an intention, an inclination, which still needs to be informed. Needs to be informed. And it is informed by two kinds of things, basically.

One is by the natural inclination with which we're endowed by virtue of our human nature. And, you know, I say it plural because of individual natures in Aquinas. Because of the human natures that God has given to us.

Natural end-orientation. A natural inclination towards the good in general. Whatever that good may be.

Towards our good, however, we conceive our good. A natural inclination. This is Aquinas's echo of the Augustinian line at the beginning of the Confessions.

Thou hast made us for thyself, O God, and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee. You see, this is the built-in inclination of the human soul. Of the human person.

And that same notion of God as the good. Towards which, knowing it or not knowing it, we all have an inner built-in inclination. Orientation.

So this is one of the things that informs the inclination, the orientation of the person. The other thing that informs our orientation is the intellect. That is to say, in what we see, what we hear, what we learn, what we know.

We perceive things that seem to us good or things that seem to us bad. And those good things attract us. Bad things tend to repulse us.

So in that sense, our inclinations are informed by the intellect. And as Aquinas examines our sensory inclinations. Inclinations that have to do with the sensory soul.

Sensory appetites. Like Aristotle, he distinguishes the rational soul from the animal soul. You see, with its sensations and so forth.

So the sensory soul, the animal soul, the passive intellect, has its sensory inclinations of two sorts. There are inclinations, passions, that are concusable. That is to say, these are desires for inclinations towards what is pleasing.

What is desirable? The concupiscible. I said concusable.

Concupiscible. Concupiscible. I think that's it.

And the other sensory inclinations towards the irascible. The concusable, what we perceive as good. The irascible, what we perceive as bad.

Bad in the sense of being threatening. Unpleasant. Dangerous.

So this is the natural psychology with which we function. Inclined towards, inclined away from. The concusable and the irascible.

But in addition to the sensory inclination, there is an intellectual or rational inclination. That is to say, the inclination of the rational soul, rather than the sensible soul. And the inclination of the intellect, of the mind, is towards that which is perceived as good.

Known in that sense as good. Thought to be good. Now, will operates in relationship to intellectual inclination.

With the sensible inclinations, these are simply spontaneous emotional responses. So there is no matter of will or freedom involved, except insofar as by virtue of intellectual inclinations, we transcend and move in a different direction than sensory inclinations. You see.

Now, the intellect then needs to be informed. And it can be informed in a variety of ways. Hypothetically, God might directly inform it.

It might be informed by our knowledge of scripture. And yes, indeed, he does a lot with theological ethics. Might be informed by reason, in terms of a natural law ethic.

But in any case, the intellectual inclination is what provides the direction of orientation of the will, which is the efficient cause of human action. Now, there may be human behaviors that are not actions. Behaviors that are automatic.

Behaviors that are unthinking. But where the will is involved, intellectual inclination. Now, in that sense, one of the writers, the one who did the first paper on Friday morning, Westberg, suggested that the term will in Aquinas may be akin, the equivalent perhaps, of the biblical use of the term heart.

Out of the heart are the issues of life. The heart is the guiding core of the whole personality, as the moving force, the motivating force. Now, if the will is intellectual inclination, you see, it's out of the heart and its orientation, its inclination, the will is not in a vacuum, in a causal vacuum.

It has a natural direction, a natural set, which is influenced and guided and shaped in its particulars by what we know, what we perceive, by experience. So you get this

picture, then, of Thomas's will and intellect interrelationship. Now, Doug? What role will he allow the spirit to play? Now, what do you mean by spirit? Two things, I think.

One, what I just said, is that God could inform the intellect directly. Second, the Holy Spirit is the agent of divine grace. And his view of nature and grace, therefore, comes into play.

And the view of the relationship between nature and grace is roughly akin to the view of the relationship between reason and revelation. Okay? That is to say that just as revelation presupposes reason and what we can know by nature, so the operation of grace presupposes nature and the normal operation of human psychology. So that what revelation does, and remember our discussion of faith and reason, if what revelation does is to reiterate some things that reason tells us, and then to tell us things that we cannot know by reason alone, so the operation of grace, you see, operation of grace sustains the normal operation of human psychology and adds certain causal influences, the work of the Holy Spirit, you see, in that operation.

Yeah? Under my understanding of this, the will is the efficient cause. Correct. We can perceive different things.

We can perceive something as good or bad using the intellect, but the will automatically chooses the good. No. It will automatically choose, no, incline towards rather than choose, incline towards what it perceives as good, which may not, in fact, always be good.

But if the intellect perceives something as good, the will, because of its nature, has an ability to control and incline towards what it perceives as good, right? Yes. Well, my question then is that it seems like the will in just being in the efficient cause has a static nature, but comparing it to the heart that that lecture did, it seems that it was... Now, what do you mean by a static nature? Well, just in the fact that it seems like it always inclines towards what it perceives as good. So the perception may change, the intellect part may change, but it always inclines to what it perceives as good.

So if the will inclines to what it perceives as good, to relate it to the heart wouldn't seem to match because it speaks in the Bible of us being able to change our... Oh, I see what you're saying. Yeah. In other words, you're saying that Westberg's analogy between the will and the heart breaks down at that point.

It seems like the heart is more, perhaps, more towards the intellect because the intellect can change. You can perceive certain things as good because you become more informed. Okay, well, what I hear you saying is that if you want to sustain the analogy, you would have to say that the will may actually orient itself towards the evil.

But the question is, how does it do it? And I think Thomas would say it does it by saying, evil be thou my good. But isn't that a process of the intellect, saying that? It's a matter of perceiving what is evil as being good. Now, then the question is, what are the causal factors involved? Where the will is one, but it's not the only one.

You see, there may be other causal factors, environmental factors, involved in the confusion of understanding. Now, there's more to it, however, than that. Because you have to distinguish between the ultimate good, towards which, by nature, God has inclined us, and the ultimate good.

And, on the other hand, immediate goods. An immediate good, which is, in a sense, a means towards the ultimate good. And in regard to that immediate good, to which you may be inclined, there may be other lesser ends that you choose.

And there are places where Aquinas seems to be saying that we choose the means, the will chooses the means, whereas the intellect determines the end. But inasmuch as the end down here is involved, that makes it sound as if will and intellect are both somewhat involved in these lesser goods, immediate goods, which are also means. Example.

You may say that, towards the ultimate good, you see the means to which you're inclined, which you take to be the good for you, to be the life of a... You name it. Monk. But, in saying that, the immediate good is the life of a monk; there's more of a chance of being mistaken than there is up there.

And, in moving towards the life of a monk, what are you going to do? And there are more choices to be made, all the way down. Now, in that sense, the means and the ends get tangled up together. And so the perversion of the personality of the heart, Aquinas could well say, comes out in that interplay of will and intellect.

Jeff? How much strength does he put on the power of the will? Because it seems like if you put... I don't know, I'm just sort of interpreting this as him being a libertarian, because he has an awful lot of strength in the will, even though it has causal influences, it's still freeing. It is still a cause. Yes, it's a cause in itself.

An initiating cause, yeah. I can really see how the libertarian interpretation would fall into it in the same way. Because it has so many causes, it's sort of a cause-to-cause, which it seems to interpret as.

Yeah, I'm not happy with the claim that what you get is a contrast, a conflict, between libertarianism or indeterminism and Aquinas. The conflict, as I see it most clearly, is between a mechanistic and a teleological worldview, and making sense of

freedom of will within those two different systems. So that freedom is not being in a vacuum and having to choose.

Freedom is having an inner directedness towards an end that you gladly pursue. You see, freely, spontaneously pursue. So it seems to me that the difference is between the worldviews.

And I suspect that's why Hasker, in responding to the discussion, was pinpointed because he's written in defense of libertarianism. He said, I think, well, I'm not sure that's what I mean by libertarianism. You see, and right, because I think that some libertarians, indeterminists, would certainly say that that position does not require that one be in a causal vacuum.

But only that there be some element of indeterminism in the whole situation, allowing the possibility of contrary choice. Now I saw somebody else here. Kristen.

This is kind of a different question, I guess, but on the third Friday session, where he was discussing the virtuous person and the choices. Are those choices that relate to the ultimate good, then? Because the example that Professor Stone brought up about her teenage son, he could have justified that choice for his immediate good. Yeah, I think that Aquinas would have to say that the choices people make are made consciously or unconsciously out of their built-in natural orientation towards the ultimate good.

Now, the fact is that they may never have stopped to ask themselves what the highest end is. What is the ultimate good? But the natural orientation is such that one doesn't have to have thought about what the highest good is to have an orientation towards it. For Augustine, you don't have to have actually heard Augustine say, Thou hast made us for thyself, O God, to have what Schaeffer used to call a God-shaped hole in your heart, or however he put it, a God-shaped vacuum or something of that sort. No, there may be a natural inclination that we're not aware of.

Now, insofar as we're not aware of it in those terms, insofar as we have never conceptualized what the ultimate good is, there is a much greater chance of that confusion of intellect resulting in our choosing as lesser goods, goods which are not really the best for the ultimate good. Yes, I would think so. Now, back over here, Jess.

So, if you have this built-in drive towards the ultimate good, then why does it seem that the exact opposite is the case? Yeah, you see, and I think the clue to that, Aquinas would say, is in the phrase that I quoted, which comes from Milton, where, isn't it in Paradise Lost that Satan says, Evil, be thou my good? You see? A misapprehended good. But you say, that was deliberate. Yeah, but it was deliberate,

he would say, in the sense that there is a natural hankering for what I want, what I think is good, what I desire.

And in saying, not this but that, Evil, be thou my good, why would one say that if he didn't regard that as good? Right, but it seems to me that he's not instilling us with a desire for what we perceive as good, but his ultimate good, isn't that what he's actually doing? Yeah, but you see, the fact is that inasmuch as there is this built-in desire for good, ultimately God, you see, we make gods of our own. God substitutes. This is why material-mindedness can become an idolatry.

You see? When the highest good is to make money, gain power, you see, that's God. You see? So, the point is that the substitution of some higher good, deliberately or unthinkingly, is still idolatry. You see? So the question, what is the highest end of man, Westminster Shorter Catechism, you see, becomes so basic.

Darlene? I just thought, at this point, when I read through, the keyword there is perceived good. Yes, yes. And I was wondering what presupposition you might suggest may refer to the following, which is a simple statement.

Yeah, well, notice that the Genesis account of the Fall has to do with a deceiver. A deceiver causing misperceptions. You see, I'm answering as I think Aquinas would answer.

A deceiver who produces misperceptions. I think so. Yeah, yeah.

You see, the will is not acting if there is an empty mind. No thought, no perceptions. How can you choose if you're not choosing something? You see? And if you choose something, you're choosing what you either ought or what you want.

Or both. No, no, the term good in this whole tradition, this whole teleological tradition, the concept of a good is the concept of an end, a goal, a telos. Yeah.

It seems to me that while that end is there, it doesn't seem to elaborate on what exactly that end is. That's right. It doesn't seem to be innate with us.

Yes, exactly. That's why the first question regarding the existence of God, the first article, is whether the idea of God is innate. And he says no, except in a very vague way.

There's no innate idea of God. But there is an innate inclination towards, you know, we hunger and thirst for, what is it? You see? The vague way. Yeah.

Now, of course, you might ask, why is it so vague? You see, and you could say that vagueness is due to the Fall, which was precisely what John Calvin said. Read the first

seven chapters of Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion. Calvin talks of a vague sense of the deity, a *sensus deitatis*, you see, which is so vague as a result of human fallenness that we need the special divine self-revelation.

You see? Yeah. Now, you see, this discussion is focusing on what the effect of sin is on human personality, the effect of the Fall on moral psychology. And remember what I was saying before, that Aquinas makes a distinction between the image of God and the likeness of God.

Such that in the Fall, it's the moral likeness to God which is lost. Now put that in the context of his whole worldview. What he's saying is that everything in creation, every individual thing in creation, should manifest by its own degree of what it is, should manifest, should imitate the goodness of God.

The likeness of God is something that everything in creation bears. That's lost. We've lost our place in the creation.

You see? But he says the image of God is not lost. Intellect is still functional. But oh, how we misperceive.

Does that help to put the pieces together? David? This is a quick question. You said that the will is informed by both the natural creation and the intellect. But I was wondering, the sensory cell and the rational cell, but I was wondering why you were focusing, is it that the intellect plays a stronger role? Yeah, yeah.

The point of Westberg's paper was that will, emotion, and intellect, in Aquinas, are all interwoven. There are emotional and intellectual causes at work on the will, in the will. In contrast to what I'm calling the mechanistic worldview, which develops a three-faculty psychology of unrelated faculties.

You see? So that will is independent of emotion and intellect. No, not in Aquinas. No, these natural inclinations involve emotional inclination and intellectual inclination.

So when you study the intellect and will, we're just focusing on one aspect. We're not saying that it's more important than... That's right. Yeah, it's not.

Okay. Let's see. Now, let me push this a little bit further.

First of all, these inclinations to the good, which we have, need to be developed. And as these inclinations develop, so they form a network of inclinations that becomes the conscience -- *sundaresis*.

The conscience. In which the basic natural inclination is to live for the good in accordance with reason, it may be stated. These inclinations.

Inasmuch as the emphasis is on inclination, you can see this is an ethic in which there is going to be emphasis on the intention as well as the act. The intention may be towards the good, even though the act is not right morally, nor is it good morally. The intention could be good without the act being good.

You may just plain bungle, you see. And moreover, he makes a distinction which comes out in the selection you have on page 537. We won't stop at this juncture to look at it.

A distinction between a primary and second intention. And this doctrine of double intention is one of the key factors involved in Thomistic ethics and, to this day, in Roman Catholic ethics. Double intention.

The idea is that, in addition to the last end, the ultimate end, or the further end towards which you are acting, there are immediate ends. And if one's moral intention is to the ultimate end, one is not necessarily morally culpable for the intermediate end and the bad which it does. Now, that has come out, for instance, in Roman Catholic teaching with regards to the conduct of war, where if the final end is appropriate to just war, namely the restoration of a just peace for friend and foe alike, therefore the resistance of unjust violent aggression, if that is the final end, the final intention, the immediate intention may be to take out a bridge which may involve the death of enemy troops.

Maybe the collateral, that's the term that's used, remember, collateral damage to property and even the loss of civilian lives. But you see, the secondary intention of doing damage to bridges and troops and the collateral damage which is known would result, you see, that is not the primary intention. The moral judgment is made in terms of the primary intention.

If the primary intention is, however, to wipe out a civilian population, that's morally culpable. Though if civilians are killed and this is collateral to a secondary intention, then that's another matter. So the doctrine of double intention becomes pretty important in the application of ethics to troublesome cases.

And it's been very much criticized as too casuistical by some Protestant ethicists, but it's an important thing to be aware of. That is more by way of a parenthetical footnote. Now, in this development of inclination and the development towards the ultimate good, there are a number of things that need to be underscored.

If the ultimate end, the ultimate good, is God, then you have on an Aristotelian basis a non-Aristotelian highest good. The highest good for Aristotle was the actualization of a life lived in accordance with reason. Perhaps the highest state for Aristotle that a person could achieve was to be a practical-minded philosopher living a full life.

Did I say Aristotle? To be like Aristotle. Yeah, okay, okay. But for Aquinas, the highest end is not to be, as Jeff says, like Aristotle.

The highest end is to be like God. The highest end is not a philosopher but a saint. You see? And isn't that what you'd expect of a Christian ethicist? So watch that difference from Aristotle.

Now, inclinations, as they develop, become habits. Become habits of the mind, of the will, of the soul. And it is these habits or dispositions, settled, established inclinations, dispositions, if you like, habits of the heart, that are, as they were for Aristotle, virtues or vices, as the case may be.

And so Aquinas has really an ethic of virtues. A virtue ethic. He's concerned in his moral psychology about the development of a good person whose goodness bears the likeness to God, which was lost in the fall.

And in developing that, he lays emphasis on four cardinal virtues. And you have a section on that on page 538 that's very accessible. Four cardinal virtues, which are, in fact, the classic four Greek virtues that you met in Plato.

Justice. Wisdom. Courage.

Self-control. But he's not satisfied with those four cardinal virtues, so he adds three theological virtues. And the three theological virtues, of course, are faith, hope, and love.

Now, while these are additional virtues dependent on grace, the natural virtues are achievable by the natural processes of moral psychology. Nature and grace. Though obviously, grace is going to infuse human nature and contribute to the development of the cardinal virtues.

But he's not so naive as to say there are no people who are not Christians, who are nonetheless temperate, courageous, wise, or just. That is to say, those natural virtues are possible otherwise, but not the theological virtues. Now, the emphasis, however, on the development of virtue in the Aristotelian tradition, the emphasis on the development of virtues requires all the time that we develop these virtues as habits.

Habits, by Aristotle's definition, are repeated choice and repeated action. So the question arises, how do we know which to choose and how to act? And it is there that the natural law ethic of Aquinas comes into play. This is a teleological conception of natural law in the sense that the natural moral law written in our hearts, and he quotes that passage from Romans 1, the natural moral law written in

our hearts is written in the inclination of the heart, the inclination of the will, that intellectual inclination.

So his question regarding various kinds of human activity is about the natural inclination towards. It's an end-oriented natural law. Now, about that in a little more detail, the picture he gives us overall is that there are four kinds of law, so that he distinguishes between the eternal law, which is in the mind of God.

This, if you like, is the archetypal law in the mind of the divine logos, the eternal wisdom and counsels of God. Which eternal law is revealed, or using governmental terminology as he does, is promulgated in two ways. It is promulgated in natural law, and it's promulgated in divine law, the divine law being given in scripture and entrusted to the church.

And, as the medievals would say, this is applied to particulars by the church in its canon law. Whereas natural law is applied by rulers to society in human law. But in his treatise on law in the Summa Theologica, it's the four main ones that he discusses.

Eternal law, divine law, natural law, human law. And he has a generic definition of law that involves all four causes. Law is an ordinance of reason, formal cause, made by him who has the care of the community, efficient cause, material cause, the ruler, efficient, the community, material, for the common good, final cause.

So, the four causes apply to all. And the point is that while natural law has as its aim our earthly good, divine law has as its aim our eternal good, and for that reason, while divine law may reiterate matters of natural law, as the Ten Commandments do, Ten Commandments are matters of natural law, on the other hand, divine law goes further, and touches on the interior matters of the heart. So, natural law and divine law.

The natural law, however, is accessible to all people. And you have a couple of selections from the treatise on law which make plain why it's universal. The natural law is entrusted to all people.

And I have here a handout which will help you to see how this works. So, let's get this around. Let me have any spares afterwards, if you would.

Okay, if you look at this on the left-hand side, whether the natural law contains several precepts or only one. And I want you to notice the teleological picture that comes out in this. A certain order is to be found.

Here's the causal order. A certain order is to be found in things that are apprehended universally. For that which before all else falls under our apprehension, perception, if you like, Dr. Chappell, is being.

Now, that's the primary and the most general sort of thing we are aware of, being. The notion of which is included in all things whatsoever one apprehends. Wherefore, the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time.

Where did you hear that before? Law of non-contradiction. Being is being, not non-being, isn't it? Now, as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of practical reason, directed to action. So every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.

Aspect, yes, as perceived, good. So the first principle in practical reason, the first principle of natural law, if you like, is one founded on the notion of good. That good is that which all things seek after.

Oh, there's the teleology. Good is that which all things seek after. Hence, the first precept of law is that good is to be done and evil is to be avoided.

Isn't that the first thing your mother ever told you? Do what's right, don't do what's wrong. Do good, avoid evil. All other precepts of natural law are based on this, so that whatever practical reason naturally, by nature, apprehends as man's good or evil belongs to precepts of natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end and evil, its contrary, all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended as good, an object of pursuit, conversely with evil. Wherefore, the order of the precepts of natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. There's the teleology.

Because in man there is, first of all, an inclination to good in accordance with the nature that he has in common with all substances, inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, doesn't it? You're a substance, a thing. Everything seeks the preservation of its own being. This quarter does.

I can't break it. It seeks the preservation of its own being. This paper? No, initially it resists.

It seeks the preservation of its own being. There's a law of self-preservation that applies to every kind of thing. That's why things resist destruction.

So that's applicable to everything in nature. Warding off obstacles. That's the irascible inclination, warding off obstacles.

Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially according to the nature he has in common with other things, which nature has taught to all animals. Yes, we are animals akin to other animals, and so there are natural inclinations that as animals we have, such as sexual intercourse, education, raising of offspring, and so forth. Yes, we take these things to be good.

Third, an inclination to good according to the nature of reason, which nature is proper to him as a human being. So, a natural inclination to know the truth about God takes a rational being. Living in society and organizing a just society takes a rational being.

In this respect, what pertains to this inclination belongs to natural law, like shunning ignorance, avoiding offense to those among whom one has to live, and other such things. You see, that's his introductory outline of how natural law works. Natural inclinations based on the nature of it.

Generically, with all beings, being has its natural end, which is good. So being is to be good. What is good for anything, any substance? To be self-preservation, resisting threats to self-preservation.

In our bodily lives, what is it that's good? For instance, a sexual relationship leading to the raising of children is good; it's something to be sought. And so forth, and as he develops his applied ethic more fully, he fleshes these out in appropriate ways in immense detail. The interesting thing is that he develops a lot of this under the rubric of love.

His discussion of war and just war is under the rubric of love. What does the virtue of love require? Because those theological virtues affect the formation and exercise of the natural virtues. But it's from a natural law ethic that we're able to determine more clearly what the good ends are we should pursue.

You see, the good ends we should pursue. And he quotes the first chapter of Paul's letter to the Romans, as natural law ethicists usually do, that there are some things which are contrary to nature. You see, the classic argument about homosexuality is rooted there in that Romans 1 passage, that homosexual behavior is contrary to natural law, to the natural end, to the natural use.

Well, the second page, whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by natural law. Well, our time's gone, but you can see that again. But you can see how he speaks of virtues as rooted in our nature.

So there are certain natural virtues, virtues by virtue of natural law. There is, in other words, for Aquinas, a very clear metaphysical basis. A basis in reality for the morality which Christians have espoused, you see.

A natural law basis for ethics becomes very clear -- the teleological ethic.