A History of Philosophy
17 Greek and Roman Skepticism
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Okay, now today, we want to take a look at the skepticism of the Hellenistic period. And keep in mind that this is the third philosophical movement of the period that we've been talking about, the Epicureans and the Stoics being the other two. And anticipate with this as well, that it's going to recur and have a very important role during the Renaissance.

In fact, in the vacuum, epistemological vacuum created by the Protestant Reformation and the rise of modern science together, that is to say, the loss of church authority in matters other than religious matters, in that epistemological vacuum, Sextus Empiricus and the skepticism of the Hellenists loomed very, very large. So, in the Renaissance, the philosophical starting point, the challenge was always how to overcome skepticism. How to avoid being a skeptic, you may remember that from your awareness of Descartes.

The point is that Sextus Empiricus outlines Pyrrhonism, which was and is one of our main sources for knowledge of this period of skepticism. Sextus Empiricus's work was first printed in 1560 in France. And of course, 1560 is right in the middle of that period, after the Reformation, when things began to be up for grabs.

And so anticipate hearing more about skepticism when we get to people like Pascal, Descartes, and the major French philosophical skeptic of the time, a man by the name of Montaigne, so forth. So that in order to underscore the historical importance of the movement we are focusing on today. If the Epicureans had an earlier kickstart with the Cyrenaics, and if the Stoics had an earlier beginning because of the Cynics, I suspect it's true to say that skepticism had its roots in a combination of cynical attitudes towards the authority of institutions and traditions, but also in the relativism and skepticism of some of the sophists.

In other words, skepticism was not brand new. In fact, historically skepticism seems to emerge at those historical junctures where some systematic approach or method in philosophy is coming apart. So you get skepticism at the end of the classic Greek period, you get skepticism at the end of the medieval period, you get skepticism at the conclusion of the Enlightenment, that sort of thing.

Now, we usually trace the development of Hellenistic skepticism, however, back to a Greek by the name of Pyrrho, a native of Elis, Pyrrho of Elis, who posed three questions. One, what is the nature of things, which was, of course, the question with which Greek philosophy began, what's the basic nature of everything, the basic stuff.

What's the nature of things? And to that, his answer was that it's unknown, and it's unknown by virtue of the inadequacy of all purported human knowledge.

The senses, as Plato and others before and after have said, yield nothing but changeable opinion. And reasoning, as nowadays the political correctness movement tells us, is always loaded with subjective prejudice. And equipolent positions, equipolent means things of equal weight.

So equipolent arguments are such that the case for a position is of no more weight than the case against it. Or the case for position A is cancelled out with the case for position B, equal weight, equal arguments. And since that seems to be the way it is with all human knowledge, Pyrrho's conclusion is that we simply don't know the nature of things.

His second question follows from that skepticism about the first. What then should be our attitude to things? Our attitude to reality? And his answer? Suspend judgment. After all, why do you have to make up your mind? Withhold judgment.

And the Greek term epoche was the term used for that suspension of judgment. You'll find that it's a term that continues to be used, even in the 20th century, in the phenomenological movement, 20th-century methodological development in Europe, that underlies the work in hermeneutical theory of people like Gadamer and so forth. But in any case, the roots of this modern phenomenological movement is the work of a man named Edmund Husserl.

And he talked of epoche, suspending judgment about the nature of reality in order to probe other foundations. It's the skeptical term. Suspended judgment.

Pirro's point was that it's better to withhold judgment than to prejudge. To dogmatize without grounds. To search and not to know is better than premature dogmatism.

Well, his third question then is, what's the value of that attitude to reality? What's the value of suspending judgment? Which really amounts to the question, what's the value of being a skeptic? And the value of it, as far as he is concerned, the value of skepticism, if you like, is a kind of quietude. At least, that's the word that's often used in the translation. I think the best, better idiom would be simply peace of mind.

The less you know, the less you have to worry about. Peace of mind. If ignorance is bliss, it's folly to be wise.

We have our proverbs for saying it. The interesting thing is that in talking of this peace of mind, this quietude, the skeptics quite freely use rough synonyms like

apatheia and ataraxia. And, of course, apatheia was the Stoic attitude of freedom from passion, difference.

Ataraxia, the Epicurean value of freedom from pain in the body and trouble in the soul, which is another way of saying peace of mind, as well as peace of body. So, in the end, it turns out that all three of these Hellenistic movements are after, in terms of the value they find in their position, they're after something very similar. In the troubled fragmentation of the traditions, you see, in a Hellenistic age, which had produced a veneer of unity to the culture.

In that, what attitude is going to help? Well, don't worry. Peace of mind. And that in common across the scene.

Now, if you look at the anthology at Kauffman on page 491, let me just note what Sextus offers by way of a definition of skepticism. And you'll see how seriously this sort of thing is taken. At the bottom of 491, second column, chapter four, what skepticism is.

Skepticism is an ability, a mental attitude. You see, it's not a theoretical position. It's rather an attitude of knowing it all.

It's an attitude that opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever. Now, here's the judgment you've made, but look at the way things appear to us. Conflicts.

With the result that owing to the equipolence of objects and reasons, thus opposed, we are brought first to a state of mental suspense, suspend judgment, next to a state of unperturbedness or quietude. We call it an ability, not in a subtle sense, but simply in respect of being able to have an undisturbed mind. So, it's an attitude.

Now, if you attempted to say, but the skeptic seems to contradict himself. The skeptic knows that he doesn't know. You see, and that sort of self-referentiality argument has become one of the standard objections to some forms of skepticism.

No, the Pyrrhonic skeptic, Pyrrho, would not say that he knows he doesn't know. We don't know whether we know or we don't know. That's where the ambiguity is.

We just don't know. And we don't know that we don't know. We're just not sure even of that, you see.

Now, in that way, they made a distinction between skepticism and dogmatism. You can be dogmatic about not knowing, you see. But it also distinguished them from another position that Sextus talks about, that of the academics.

and is usually referred to as academic skepticism. Now, academic skepticism had nothing to do with universities because there weren't any such. The academy, of course, was the name of Plato's school that he had established in Athens.

And what happened to the academy after his death? Initially, it fell into the leadership of a man named Spucipus, who was a Neopythagorean. But that Neo Pythagoreanism didn't sustain itself for any great length of time, and so some in that academy tradition became skeptical. And in the sense that's not altogether alien to the spirit of Socrates, who on many occasions would say in the dialogues, I don't know, remember? So there is this academic skepticism.

And it's Carneades' name that's associated with this. Now, Carneades is equally clear that there is no indubitable knowledge in which sense perception is relative. Sure, Plato had told us that.

Reasoning processes have to have first premises, as Aristotle had pointed out. And the danger is that if we're trying to find a first premise, we might go all the way in some infinite regress of premises, or else end up in a circular argument, the problem that Aristotle had indicated. So reasoning processes, inference, do not give us firm knowledge, unless we've got firm knowledge of the first premises.

The Stoics talked of intuition, of irresistible concepts, to which the skeptics replied in effect, sorry, we don't find them irresistible. After all, if somebody says, well, it's obvious to me, the simplest refutation is to say, I'm sorry, it isn't to me. So what? It may be more a commentary on you than what it is that you think is obvious.

And as far as the dialectic is concerned, Plato's analysis of alternative hypotheses, as to the essence of things, well, the dialectic may simply reveal the equipolence of alternative positions, rather than settling the thing. So, Carneades agreed, knowledge isn't possible. But, there's enough of the Platonic academy in Carneades, to be able to say, knowledge isn't possible, but opinion is.

Belief is. And in talking about opinion and belief, Carneades introduces the notion of probability. Probability.

Now, it's not in a modern mathematical concept of probability that he has in mind, obviously. It's probably more in the popular common sense of the term. When you, somebody asks if you're going to shop at Stratford Centre tomorrow.

And you say, well, probably not. Doesn't mean to say you've done any calculation of chances. Or a statistical survey of all the past Saturdays, to see what the predictability is for tomorrow.

You see. Nothing of the sorts involved. You're simply saying, well, I don't know for sure, but I don't expect that's the case.

You see. Probability. Probabilism admits the fallibility of the opinion that's expressed.

And so, what you have in Carneades is a recognition, an acceptance of beliefs and opinions, but in a fallibilist sense. In a fallibilist sense. So that Carneades would make an assertion.

Yes. Recognizing that it may be false. Whereas the kind of knowledge, of course, which Plato and Aristotle are after, and the sceptics are criticizing, is the kind of knowledge which is, it's claimed, not even possibly false.

You see. Knowledge with certainty. Belief with probability.

And the recognition that it could be wrong. There's a note of fallibilism in Oliver Cromwell's famous statement to some dogmatist around him. I beseech you, sir, by the bowels of Christ, consider that you may be wrong.

You see. What Oliver Cromwell was doing was, I take it, simply recognizing the fallibility of human judgment. And insisting that that's a proper human attitude, to recognize the fallibility of human judgment.

So while Carneades is spoken of as a sceptic, in antiquity, he was treated as a sceptic, and is argued against by Saint Augustine as a sceptic. You see. By, I suspect, later, more modern standards, Carneades isn't so much a sceptic as one who's willing to speak of knowledge, as we do today, as a kind of justified belief.

You see. Belief that is justified, but not indubitably so. Could be wrong.

So forth. Well, this is the kind of picture that you get. The Roman sceptics themselves, like Sextus Empiricus and some others of his general period, tended to classify the arguments for scepticism into various types of arguments.

Types of arguments. Those are called modes of argument, or tropes. Trope is a form, a category of argument.

And on page 494, you have some material which outlines five kinds of arguments. Five, actually, that go back to a man named Agrippa. Others of them had made ten classifications.

Agrippa boils it down to five. The five kinds of arguments are very simple. One, an argument from conflicting views.

Well, that's the equipollens. The second is an argument from infinite regress of premises. That's familiar, too.

Third, an argument from the relativity of appearances. That's classic, too. Fourth is an argument from the over-dogmatism that people have about their opinions and hypotheses.

That's classic, too. And fifth, the argument that points out the circularity in a case that's being made. Begging the question.

So, those five forms of argument for scepticism are none of them new. You see, we've come across all of those criticisms at one point or another. And the sum total impact for the sceptic is to undermine the possibility of indubitable knowledge altogether.

Not only knowledge of forms and unchanging realities. Knowledge of causes, as well. All four kinds of causes.

Knowledge of mathematical truths and relationships. Knowledge of the laws of logic, even. You see.

You take Aristotle's famous negative proof for the law of non-contradiction. He calls it a negative proof because he can't prove it positively. The negative proof is simply to challenge anybody to deny the law of non-contradiction without assuming it.

They can't do it. You have to assume it in order to make any statement. Well, that's not proving the law of non-contradiction; it's simply proving the negation is false.

So you get all of these criticisms and the sceptical tradition arising from it. Not only are there these stock criticisms of knowledge, arguments for scepticism, but there are also all sorts of stock arguments that developed against scepticism. And we'll see some more of this when we get to Saint Augustine.

One of his first philosophical writings was a book called Against the Academicians. Now, keep in mind the academy. When you read Against the Academicians, don't think he's against all college teachers and such like.

He's against the academic sceptics. You see. And what he does is to try and argue, for instance, that even the most complete sceptic must know that he exists in order to think he may be wrong about something.

Even if you accept fallibilism and say you may be wrong, well, in order to be wrong, you have to exist. And the way Augustine puts it is in the little Latin phrase si fallur, if I'm wrong, sum, I exist. What does that remind you of? Descartes, cogito ergo sum.

The first version of it was dubito ergo sum, I doubt therefore I exist. Where did Descartes get it? Stole it from Augustine. Yeah, so Augustine gets into this.

He tries to argue that the sceptics who will admit that either we know or we don't know, and knowing that either they know or they don't know, even though they can't make up their mind which it is, know in that the truth of the law of non-contradiction. Either A or not A. So he tries to find logical truths that even the sceptic has to admit. And that's one of the standard responses to scepticism.

The other response that perhaps is most traditional is to try to find that elusive first premise. Where the Platonists go at it with dialectic, the Aristotelians go at it with their attempt to abstract universal first principles from their experience of an entire species. And that's the way it went on through the Middle Ages.

And when the Platonic and Aristotelian views were called into question in the Renaissance, Descartes, what did he do? Well, he tried to find a first premise the way mathematics tries to find a first premise. Axioms on which mathematical systems are built. Self-evident truths.

Intuitive. So the development in epistemology of what we call today, what we call foundationalism, that we usually trace back to Descartes, was in Descartes a response to the scepticism of his time. But that is only because the scepticism of an earlier time triggered approaches to the first premises of a Platonic and Aristotelian sort.

Get the picture? And the thing that's been happening in epistemology increasingly since Kant, much more increasingly in the last half century, second half of 20th century, is a rejection of foundationalism, along with a rejection of scepticism. And the defining of some sort of a third position, a sort of fallibilist position, that speaks of knowledge as justified true belief, you see, in some way. Rather than looking for a knowledge of complete certainty, rejecting the hard division of Plato's divided line, and eliding the complete gap between knowledge and belief.

So that knowledge becomes a certain subset of believing. Beliefs. Well, so much then for Greek and Roman scepticism.

Any comments, queries? Further things? Yeah, Bob. How does one believe in something if you really believe it? Do you? No, you see, they're not using belief in your religious sense of a total commitment. You see, that's a different sense of belief.

Distinguish the sense of belief in epistemology from the sense of belief in talking of religious trust, or interpersonal trust, you see. More like opinion. Yeah, yeah, more like opinion, yeah.

The interpersonal kind of belief, you know, when I talk about believing in my wife, I mean I trust her to be the sort of person I've come to believe she is. I believe in her. When we say in the Apostles' Creed, I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, you know, Archbishop of Canterbury back in the forties, William Temple, said, when we confess the creed, we don't say, I give assent to this, that it is my opinion.

That's not what we mean at all. What we mean is I commit myself to living on this basis. You see.

On the other hand, belief in Plato's sense is having an opinion you take to be true. Which may well be true. Might not be.

You can't prove it, you see. So it's in that sense of belief, then, we're talking of belief without certainty. It's epistemic.

Being prepared to affirm something. Having reasons for affirming it. Some supporting evidence, perhaps.

But short of the kind of demonstrable certainty which you would want in a mathematical proof. Something like that. Yeah.

Yeah, Jess. I'm sorry. Did you expect the police to say he didn't prove God? That's what I'm saying.

Yeah. That's basically what you were saying. Yeah.

I think the complete skeptic would be careful about saying we cannot know. That sounds too dogmatic. He's closer to saying we do not know.

And we do not know how to find out. But we'll keep looking. You see.

We do not know. Now, do we know that we do not know? No, we don't even know that for sure. That's why we're still looking.

You get it? In other words, every time you try to pin someone like Pirro down and say, ah, here's something you know. He'll say, no, I don't know it. That's just the way I feel about it at this juncture.

That's opinion, if you like. You see, having that distinction between knowledge and opinion is an easy escape mechanism for the skeptic. Oh, yes, he's... That's right.

Yeah, he will admit that. But if I don't think I know, it could possibly be that I do know, but I don't know that I do know. Well, I'm still a skeptic.

I don't know. The appeal of it. Well, one, the logical appeal is the problem of finding how you can know for sure.

Five kinds of argument against knowing for sure. You see. That's the logical appeal.

The psychological appeal, I think, is in avoiding the bewildered confusion of holding to a particular sectarian view with dogmatism in a world where there are 101 other views booming in on you. You know. And the advocates of those views are saying, Jesse, how can you say what you say when... Oh, come on, give me some peace of mind.

You see, it's much easier in the middle of an argument when you've got your back against the wall to say, I don't know. Much easier. Well, you know, that's an oversimplification, but I think that's the psychological appeal.

Notice this, that the 200 years of pre-Socratic arguments in which nobody seemed to agree with anybody else led to the skepticism of the sophists about the whole business. The development of Greek philosophical systems, including Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism, is a kind of democrat and materialism, you see, likewise led to an attitude. Now, how am I going to know what's right if these guys don't know? You see? Skepticism.

Have any of you ever been tempted like that when philosophy comes at you like a cafeteria line? Take your pick of 101 possible answers to 53 different questions, you know, and you want to throw up your hands and back away and say, why should I bother myself? You see? Now, that's the psychological appeal of skepticism, which is one reason why I try not to teach the history of philosophy like a cafeteria. You see, I try to show that there is some process going on. And we'll say more about that later on.

But, you see, as a theist, believing in divine providence in history, it would be grossly inconsistent for me to think of the history of philosophy as having no point to it, no direction to it, no outcome at all that makes any sense. Get the point? If you have a Christian philosophy of history, you need to have a Christian philosophy of the history of philosophy. Right? Well, having said that, maybe I should go one step further and let you in on a few things.

Basically, it seems to me that the history of ideas is like the story of the wheat and the tares. They grow up together. They grow up together, and they get intermingled.

If you try pulling too many weeds out, you pull out the wheat. Now, I think that's the basic analogy, if you like. What I'm saying is this: there are perhaps three possible views of the overall shape of the history of ideas.

One is a view that I saw and heard Francis Schaeffer develop one time, I guess not here at Wheaton, but at a nearby institution, where he went something like this. Here's Plato developing his system. Along comes Aristotle, says, he's wrong, this is what's right.

Along comes the Stoics, that's wrong, this is what's right. Along come the Epicureans, that's wrong, this is what's right. You know, and that's the whole history of philosophy, a series of mistakes.

I think that's a misreading. They don't see the interrelationships at all. They don't see what's in common, what is preserved, and what is lost.

You see? That's an atomistic reading of the history of philosophy. I think it's very misleading. It's a pessimistic view.

And, frankly, I don't have that pessimistic view of God's providence in history and in the history of the human intellect. Now, there's an overly optimistic view of history that sees everything emerging in one direction, a unilinear evolution. Until the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth emerges.

That's the sort of optimism that you get in the 19th century. Hegel saw his philosophy as the philosophy to end all philosophies, so that all subsequent philosophy would just be a series of footnotes to Hegel. And I think that's far too optimistic a view of history and of human intellect.

Now, in between, and this is the wheat and the tares business, in between is what I call a picture of multilinear development. That is to say, a plurality of philosophical trends in parallel with each other. And you can cut the cake various ways, but let's say what we have is some kinds of idealism, metaphysical idealism, some kinds of materialism, or naturalism, and some kinds of theism.

If you like, three different worldview traditions. And each of these is itself a pluralistic tradition. Give it a little more time along here.

Each of these is a pluralistic tradition. So that in the course of history, you get a lot of different kinds of idealism, different kinds of philosophical naturalism, different kinds of theism. At any one time, you might.

There are at least three major theistic religions after all in the Middle Ages. And today. Islam, Judaism, Christianity.

Not to mention theological subdivisions of each of those. So you might get all sorts of diversity. Now, in each case, what you have is philosophy being done from this kind of overall perspective.

In the light of that overall vision of things. And the input that helps to affect things in the course of history is the input of things like the history of science. Where you have a succession of scientific models.

Model 1, Model 2, Model 3. Model 1, Greek science, Pythagorean, Aristotelian, emphasis on form and matter. Familiar? You see, in that scientific model, it is eclipsed in the scientific revolution of the Renaissance, and you get a mechanistic model, Number 2. Which gradually is phased out in the 19th century with more organic interrelational models, field theory, and so forth. Process models.

So each of these you see provides an understanding of nature, which is filtered into these worldview traditions. The result is that you get idealism in the Greek context. You get idealism working with a mechanistic model in the Enlightenment.

You get idealism in the 19th century with a more evolutionary model. So forth. And similarly in these other traditions.

Multilinear development. And because of the common inputs with methodologies that come with changing scientific models, there are a lot of common philosophical issues you see that keep these traditions in dialogue, in interaction with each other. Often making common cause, agreeing on certain things, often not.

So my picture of the history of philosophy is much more complex than this is wrong, this is right. And much more complex than the evolutionary thing of the 19th century. The wheat and the tares grow together.

Multilinear development. I've asked you to read chapter two in Gilson's book for next week. The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy.

Which bears on this in a way. Because Gilson Gilson's book was the Gifford Lectures that he gave in the 1930s in Scotland. The Gifford Lectures are supposedly the most distinguished lectures on religious thought that there are.

And he gave this series of lectures on medieval philosophy. And before it came out, there burst on the scene in Europe a debate over the question: Is there a Christian philosophy? A debate triggered by a French philosopher, Emile Brehier, who in the French journal the Revue de la Métaphysique et de Moral had published an article in which he argued in effect, if it's philosophy, it's not Christian. Because philosophy is neutral, and Christianity is committed.

And if it's Christian, it's not philosophy. Brehier was a rationalist foundationalist who thought everything could be proven. And that spurred all sorts of responses.

Responses that have, in a way, gone on to the present day. But Gilson had just done the Gifford Lectures and was getting them ready for publication, so he added a couple of chapters at the beginning. I'm asking you to read one of those chapters.

In which he said, is there a Christian philosophy? Sure. Lots of them. Look at the Middle Ages.

In effect, he's saying that Christian philosophy is philosophy that is done with a Christian intention, a Christian sense of direction. What I call the Christian perspective. That's all.

Yeah. Philosophy conference this month, at the end of the month, is on the contributions of medieval philosophy to 20th-century philosophical issues. You see.

Contributions, that is to say, of Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages. Promises to be good. Yeah.

Pardon me. Sure. Yeah.

It wouldn't be there if he hadn't. Well, you're asking about my eschatology. I'm a pre-millennialist.

I don't think he's going to push them into one. You know, there may be some weed in idealism as well as tears. He'll sort it out.

But in the meantime, you know, in harvesting what we have to harvest, we can do some sorting. You know, I don't want to make fun of your question, but seriously, your theology affects your philosophy of history. If you ask me how it's going to come out in the end, I have to talk about eschatology.

See, I see the millennium as an age of philosophical flourishing for Christian thought as it's never flourished before. Yeah, yeah. Well, yes and no.

Yes and no. How many of you are familiar with this? It's tangential, but I think it's important. How many of you are familiar with Nicholas Wolterstorff's little book on Reason Within the Bounds of Religion? None of you? Shame on you.

Okay, it's in the bookstore. It's in the library. You can read it in an hour.

Do it. Nicholas Wolterstorff', Reason Within the Bounds of Religion. Okay, the title for the book is a parody on Kant's book Religion Within the Bounds of Reason.

Wolterstorff, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion. Okay, inverted. Now, what Wolterstorff's does is to talk about the formation and criticism of theories in any discipline.

Theory formation, theory criticism. And points out that a theory is accountable in two regards. It's accountable to what we call data, which it explains.

And it's accountable to other theories, other beliefs, which he calls control beliefs. Control, because they exercise some control over the kind of theory on another subject, which we would come up with. You don't come up with a theory that contradicts your other beliefs.

So, theories work in that way. Theories aren't just empirical generalizations, they're part of a whole network of concepts and understandings. Now, his point is that you might think of three different sets of control beliefs in relation to three alternative theories.

Okay? And it might be that with the first set of control beliefs, theory one, theory two might each be perfectly compatible. Interestingly, theory two might also be compatible with CB2. Even though theory three is compatible with CB2, it is not compatible with CB1.

Moreover, T1 might be compatible with CB3, along with T3. So you might find yourself if you are working with CB1 among your control beliefs, your Christian control beliefs, you see, you might find yourself holding to a theory, considering a theory, which might be considered by somebody with a very different perspective. Sure.

Why should that be a problem? The fact is that Christians do agree with other people on some theoretical matters. We often make common cause even on ethical issues. So the relationship between the, what he calls control belief, what I call perspective, the relationship between the control belief and the theory is not one of strict implications, so that T1 and only T1 and nothing else can possibly be consistent with CB1.

No. No. Variety of possibilities.

Now, if that's the case, then from the standpoint of CB1, there is some wheat that we might glean from in CB3. You can learn from others. Which is why the guy who first talked about all truth is God's truth, back among the church fathers, said that the task of the Christian is to regather the fragments of truth wherever they're

found, wherever they're found, and to reunite them to the body of the whole from which they've been taken.

You can find them in all sorts of places. Just because Plato said it doesn't make it wrong, does it? Just because Aristotle wasn't a Christian doesn't make everything he said false, does it? Obviously not. Now, think of the providence of God in history in relationship to the whole notion of common grace and the goodness of God that makes the sun shine on the just and the unjust.

He makes the light shine in people's minds, as John says in his first gospel, first chapter. The logos is the light that lightens everyone who comes into the world. Perhaps in different degrees.

Different regards. Does that make sense? Okay. Feel free to come back to that and question it, challenge it, work it out.

To my mind, it's one of the most important things I want you to get out of this course. You can forget the details, but unless you get a sense of the role of Christianity in the history of thought or the history of anything and the history of our day, what's the point of a Christian higher education? And I think the history of philosophy is what demonstrates this pattern and that multilinear thing. So beautifully.