**Dr. Robert A. Peterson, Christology, Session 6,  
Modern Christology, Part 1, Kant, Schleiermacher   
and Ritschl**

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This is Dr. Robert Peterson in his teaching on Christology. This is session 6, Modern Christology, Part 1, Kant, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl.   
  
We continue our lectures on modern Christology by providing more background information about modern Christology.

Liberal Protestantism. The 19th century belonged to Protestant liberalism in Europe. In North America, but especially the United States, the liberal era only began mid-century, and it ended later than in Europe.

There, its demise was marked by both the beginning of World War I and the rise to prominence of Karl Barth. In North America, liberalism flourished into the 1930s when it became the victim of both the Depression and the influx of neo-Orthodox ideas from Europe. On the Roman Catholic side, Christology was not an issue over which there was dissension, or for that matter, much creative thought.

The Council of Trent, 1545-1563, which meant to rebuff Reformation theology, made no pronouncement on Christology. This was not a point of controversy. In the Counter-Reformation period that followed, Catholic theologians merely repeated and refined previous schools of thought.

The single exception to this was the eruption of Catholic modernism, 1890-1910. The modernists, though always insistent that great differences existed between them and the liberal Protestants, actually reproduced many of the ideas current in liberalism. The movement was snuffed out, but after a suitable interval, some of the same ideas were accepted by the Second Vatican Council, 1962-1965, and had become a part of Catholic orthodoxy.

The 19th century, of course, also belonged to the eras of the Enlightenment thinkers. This was an important factor in the formation of Christology in both Protestant liberalism and Catholic modernism. Both movements were apologetic in nature.

Both were occasioned by the fear that modernity was passing Christianity by. Proponents of these movements countered that it was not the essence of the Christian faith that was antiquated but its doctrinal encasing. Schleiermacher, therefore, sought an accord with its cultured despisers, his term, not in common doctrinal agreement, but in common inner core of consciousness, which could be identified as religion and with which an amalgam of Christian elements could be formed.

This consciousness was, however, shaped by the culture in which it was formed, and therefore, the kind of faith of which Schleiermacher spoke was essentially one that stressed continuity between Christ and culture. Remember the very first introduction to this series of lectures. We must distinguish between Christologies from above, which start with the Eternal Son, who becomes a man, and Christologies from below, which start with a man, Jesus, and can never really reach above.

Or, another way of saying the same thing Christologies that emphasize discontinuity between God and the created order, God comes into the creation in Christ, in the Incarnation, or Christologies, which emphasize continuity between God and the created order, Jesus is a mere man, albeit the finest flower of humanity. Likewise, George Tyrell, the prophet of English Catholic modernism, spoke of their strategy as necessitating the creation of a synthesis between faith and modernity, in which what was essential to both would be preserved. To understand the synthesis, therefore, we need to keep in mind the essentials of modernity to which faith was allying itself.

There were at least three broad impulses that were central to the formation of the 19th-century consciousness, which was bequeathed to it by the Enlightenment. These were, first, an anti-authoritarian bias; second, the emergence of human autonomy; and third, the focus on inner consciousness. Number one, the anti-authoritarian mood, of course, took many forms.

But anti-clericalism and a distrust of the Bible were among the more important. Both the Bible and the Church were seen to be part of an older order whose removal was necessary for the emergence of the new. This produced mockery of Christian faith by intelligentsia like Thomas Paine, and in Europe, it also resulted in violence against the Church.

In the place of the Church as a source of meaning was substituted the empirical world. This, too, took many forms, some like Hegel, books to history, others like Freud to human nature, and others like Darwin to the natural world. The point was. However, that meaning and values were being sought in ways other than those that had prevailed in Medieval and Reformation Europe.

They were being sought in realms other than the traditionally religious ones. Two concurrent with this development was the emergence of human autonomy. The interpretation of life in the world was now being sought, not from the Church or from the Bible, but from the perspective of the unaided human interpreter.

It was, after all, the interpreter that, according to Descartes, can find the one true meaning that is certain in the world. It is, he argued, possible to doubt and question everything else. But when this doubting process had run its course, one thing remained unscathed, and that was human consciousness.

It was then in human consciousness that a point of integration was sought, from which understanding of all of the diverse elements of experience would result. The shift from outward authority, such as the Bible and Church, to the authority of the interpreter, therefore, moved on into an elaborate discussion on inner consciousness. The sanctity and inviolability of this consciousness were, however, severely undermined from two entirely different directions.

In the late 18th century, Kant demolished the confidence in reason that the rationalists had maintained, and in the 19th century, Freud shook to confidence in the innocence and simplicity of consciousness. Kant's argument, of course, was that reason can only function in conjunction with the stream of sensory perception. This means we can know no more than our senses can deliver to us, and what we know is not to be directly equated with what exists, for reason categorizes and organizes the information received from the senses.

Reason is interposed between the object that is perceived and what the object is perceived to be by the person. It's a screening device, and the reason is that its function is to organize sensory perception. The consequences of Kant's philosophy were enormous, but the most important for theology were those that followed from his empiricism.

Nothing can be known except what reaches us through our senses or what is constructed as meaning and imposed upon the world by our reason, an example of the latter being cause and effect by which we make sense of what occurs in the world, but which is not made known to us from the world empirically. The senses cannot know the relations of things to one another, only their empirical qualities such as size, shape, texture, and position. In Kant's sequel, however, what I have just discussed was his critique of pure reason; now, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, he wants to retain Christian ethics in some form.

Maybe he saw what would have been obtained if he had totally demolished the foundation, which he did, of the understanding of the world. He didn't want there to be no belief in anything. In Kant's sequel, however, what had been taken away from religion on one hand was now reintroduced on the other.

Given his strictures on reason, it would have appeared that God-talk was quite impossible. On the old basis, Kant had argued that it was, but then he went on to assert the presence of moral consciousness, which is in itself both unreliable and inexplicable, leads us to postulate that there is a God who is the explanation of this consciousness. Kant's conclusion was awkwardly ambiguous but seminal for the modern period.

Unless we postulate the existence of God, we cannot explain the fact that we are moral creatures, but in explaining ourselves we cannot utilize the knowledge of God, for God has located himself beyond the range of reason. He's in the noumenal realm to which we have no access. We only have access to the phenomenal realm, and we put our own stamp upon it because we don't know things as they are in themselves.

We know them as we perceive them with our senses. We automatically distort them. So, the result is skepticism, especially as it concerns divine knowledge.

You know what? Paul sort of agrees with him. The eye has not seen nor ear has heard the things which God has entered into the heart of man, the things that God has prepared for those who love him. 1 Corinthians 2, but God has revealed them to us by his spirit.

We cannot know God directly, but the Bible asserts that God has revealed himself, and the Bible is a revelation from God. Prostate liberalism flourished largely in the period between Kant and Freud, which undoubtedly made its task a little easier, for Freud, in fact, demolished the naivete with which Kant had spoken of this moral consciousness. Morality, Freud argued, is simply the artificial barrier that society forms in its members to protect itself from the dark subterranean forces that lurk beneath the surface of consciousness.

The moral sense is but a trick of our nature and society. These currents have, of course, flowed into the 20th century. Kantian thought, which is itself, which is the basis of virtually all modern epistemology, has easily bent itself to scientific habits of mind in which experience is treated as if it were composed of atoms as is matter.

Experience has been broken down into discrete, isolated units, which impend upon the experiencing subject as atoms do upon atoms. This is the assumption that runs through Russell, much of Wittgenstein, and into A. J. Iyer and most of the current linguistic philosophy. This has been rapidly followed by a comparable dissolution of the self.

It, too, is treated atomistically. Indeed, in the process, thinkers perceive it to be changing in a way that is comparable to the way atoms move and change. The dissolution of the self, and especially of its significance as created in the image of God, has made meaning hard to find.

In the 20th century, we have seen Nietzsche's supermen rise, dictators of both the political left and right, who believed that they could impose totalitarian rule because people had no intrinsic worth or meaning. Experience and the experiencing subjects have been dissolved, and their place has been taken by dark, impersonal forces arising out of history and moving relentlessly to the predestined goal. Interestingly enough, the most vigorous protest that has been made against this situation, which is that of existentialism, still concedes the point that human nature has no reality.

This final outcome, however, was far from clear when liberal theology entered into a partial alliance with this kind of thinking. The movement, of course, came to focus in several different schools of thought. In Europe, these were principally the Schleiermachians on the one side and the proponents of the Ritual, Adolf Harnack emphases on the other.

The differences between these schools have, David Wells argues, been exaggerated. The Ritschlians, it's hard to say, Albrecht Ritschl's followers, and the followers of Harnack will not suffer unduly if Schleiermacher is considered as representative of liberal Protestantism. In America, the leading proponents were people like Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbusch, who accepted the axioms of liberalism but often allied these to social activism.

Schleiermacher is justly described as the father of modern theology because of the method he established in doing theology. Where Kant had argued that religious predictions must be built upon the moral consciousness, Schleiermacher substituted for the moral consciousness a religious consciousness. There is, he argued, within all people a sense of absolute dependence.

It is this which Christianity clarifies, but its presence is not exhaustively contained within Christian communities, nor is it alone described by Christian theology. For Schleiermacher, therefore, the disclosure of God within the historical Jesus was not the sole dominating center of his theology. Though Jesus is to form and reform the meaning of faith, he does not exclusively define it.

It was this contention that aroused more of Barth's ire than perhaps any other. There's truth in all religions to Schleiermacher. There's most truth in Jesus; he is the finest representative.

In him, the moral consciousness was most acute, but he started from below. And so Jesus is a mere man, continuous with the world, not discontinuity between God and the creator order. Those distinctions, from above to below, discontinuity, and continuity, run through the whole thing.

And so, being too simple, patristic Christology emphasized Christology from above and discontinuity. Modern theology emphasizes Christology from below and continuity. It's too simple, but there's a lot of truth to it.

There are all kinds of variations and so forth and nuances. Although Schleiermacher was not entirely explicit about the generic relationships of his theology, it seems reasonably clear that his operating assumptions were derived from Romanticism. And in many ways, these brought him into line with the earlier Greek theology.

He assumed that human nature, all human nature, is the natural receptacle of the divine, that the divine infuses and suffuses the human morally, psychologically, and epistemologically. In this sense, human nature is sacramental in as much as that to which it points. The divine is the self-communicated in and through human nature.

Jesus, therefore, was important because in a measure unparalleled in anyone else, he focused, identified, and then submitted himself to the divine. But was he the God-man? No. In him, we see the clearest exposition of what the divine is in life, though it's not an exclusive exposition.

He had the greatest sense of the consciousness of God, of anyone. And because of the divine, we are also able to recognize what our own nature is like as it reflects Adamic purity. The specifically Christological focus in Schleiermacher's great book work, The Christian Faith, a Systematic Theology, is astonishingly brief.

Schleiermacher's comparative indifference to the questions that had troubled earlier thinkers laid the groundwork for the barrage of criticism that came later from the neo-orthodox scholars led by Barth, who, when he became a professor, taught Schleiermacher every year, again and again. He saw it as the enemy, along with the liberalism of Harnack that he had been taught. On both fronts, he opposed those things and really, in a sense, had a neo-orthodoxy.

Equal with the reformers and Puritans? No. But in many ways, much better than the old liberalism or the Romanticism of Schleiermacher. Obviously, Schleiermacher thought of Jesus as the perfection and ultimate exemplar of God-consciousness, a feeling of absolute dependence, which is the English translation of his German words.

That is what everybody has, and Jesus has it supremely, and Christians cultivate it with faith in him. What set Jesus apart from others was not his humanity but, quote, the constant potency of his God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in him. Close quote.

Schleiermacher equated the “absolutely powerful God-consciousness quote unquote with the quote existence of God in him.” This represented what he understood by incarnation. The incarnation of God was his overwhelming self-communication within and through this man, Jesus.

Schleiermacher was at some pains distinguishing this from pantheism. And his argument was that God does not come to such expression in all things but only in people. And that he has only come to this ultimate expression in one person, namely Jesus.

He then struggled to assert that this consciousness of God in all people cannot, in effect, in fact, be called an existence of God because it's always insufficiently focused and realized. Only in Jesus was this God-consciousness an “existence,” and in this sense, he was unique. Whether Schleiermacher was successful in combining the enlightenment notion of universalized religion with the Christian conception of the uniqueness of Christ is most doubtful.

Schleiermacher did not favor the human, the historic, excuse me, he did not favor the historic Christological statements such as the two natures, divine and human, inseparably united in one person are one Christ. He contended that the name Jesus Christ could only be used of the earthly period of life and that it could not be extended backward into eternity as had become, as had He felt it was inappropriate to use the same word nature to describe both the divine and the human and that this was the source of all the confusion in the past. The abolition of the two-nature doctrine was the condition for theological clarity, and since he was out of harmony with the traditional understanding of the Trinity, Schleiermacher could not look with favor on the use of the word person.

He made this feeling of absolute dependence his theological norm, his norming norm, so that in his Christian theology, the Trinity, which is not the common experience of people's God consciousness, is put as an appendix as our heaven and hell because they don't pass that test. It is amazing. I mean here's a genius at work.

There's no question. But once again a genius who strays from the truth. Schleiermacher also took issue with some of the proponents of the unhypostatic union.

That is, Jesus' humanity is in hyphen personal in union with the word in Mary's womb, who had argued that the human nature of Christ, though full in every respect, did not come to completion outside of the person. There is not any mere human man Jesus. What we can affirm, he declared, is that in ordinary people, there's only the germ of the imperfect and obscure God-consciousness.

But from the very beginning of Christ's human development, there was a quote from the absolutely powerful God's consciousness. Oh boy. Close quote.

Thus, the divine influence quote came upon human nature and, at one and the same time is that one in the same time the incarnation of God in human consciousness and the formation of human nature into the personality of Christ. Close quote. For this development to have occurred, no virgin birth was necessary.

Nor are the New Testament stories related to this to be considered as doctrinally significant. He was the son of a godly Lutheran pastor. So, he often has a religious impulse, and that's the case.

And yet he did minister to culture despisers. They read him, and his thoughts became the topic of coffee houses and so forth. Whereas the more traditional stuff wasn't.

It was considered boring. It was considered confessional boring, rigid, and that kind of thing. His thought was stimulating and stimulating and creative and, unfortunately, heterodox.

How, then, were the natures related to one another in the person of Christ? Schleiermacher argued that the divine was active, taking the human into itself, and the human was passive, allowing itself to be filled and directed by the divine. The communicatio idiomatum, the communication of properties, however, needs to be banished from the system of doctrine, he said. Because the communication of divine qualities to the human nature or of human qualities to the divine nature would result in contamination of their essential characteristics.

You'll see later on I'm going to argue and it's not anything new with me that the Bible itself teaches the communication of properties. That is it speaks of the one person of Christ in one sentence with a title that belongs to his divine nature and an action that pertains to his human nature. The fathers noticed this.

It's a most curious development. 1 Corinthians 2. The rulers of this world didn't know God's knowledge. They thought they were knowledgeable, but they were fools, for if they had known the knowledge of God revealed in the cross and the wisdom and power of God revealed in the cross, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.

Lord of glory, or you could translate glorious Lord, is a divine title. Crucifixion doesn't pertain to deity. Crucifixion pertains to humanity.

Hebrews 2:14 says that the Son took flesh and blood to himself so that through death he could defeat the devil and redeem his people. There is one sentence that speaks of the incarnate son as the Lord of glory and ascribing to him mortality. Even crucified mortality.

That is a communication of attributes. It's a sharing of human qualities with a person denominated by a divine title. That is most curious.

Now what Schleiermacher is opposing is a Lutheran understanding of the communication of properties which is very different from a reformed understanding. Luther himself taught for Eucharistic reasons. In order to have the real presence of Christ in with and under the elements in the supper Luther taught in the resurrection divine attributes were communicated from Jesus deity to his humanity so that his human nature could be ubiquitous or omnipresent.

Calvin was greatly respectful of Luther. He called him the apostle of the reformation, and rightly so. I don't know if anybody else would have had the courage to do what Luther did.

But he was wrong on that point and Calvin affirmed the communication of natures exactly in the sense I had said. That is it is an unusual biblical way. I had no half dozen places where you find it.

1 John 1. The word of life is a divine title. The living word. The word of life.

And what is said of the apostles is that they saw, they heard, and their hands handled the word of life. The first thing to say is a Greek would be abashed at this. You're crazy.

You can't touch God, and indeed, you can't. But the one they touched, the God man, was God. So human predicates, being susceptible to the senses, being able to be seen, heard, and touched are attributed to one who is called by a divine title, the word of life.

What scripture is doing is affirming the unity of the person. Understand? It calls him God, but then it ascribes to God, humanity. It's quite remarkable.

The father saw it. Anyway, that's what Schleiermacher rejects, the Lutheran understanding, and I don't blame him. I should say that Bible-believing Lutherans are fellow reformed, reformational Christians with Bible-believing Calvinists.

And I want to appreciate our common confessional heritage and that kind of a thing. However, on this particular point, I decidedly take the reformed view of the communication of properties and not the Lutheran view. The communication of properties, however, Schleiermacher argued, needs to be banished from the system of doctrine because the communication of divine qualities to human nature or of human qualities to divine nature would result in contamination of essential characteristics.

The human would be other than human, and the divine would be less than divine. What Schleiermacher really presented was not so much a doctrine of incarnation but of inspiration. It was a view of Jesus as a God-filled man starting from below.

See? If you start absolutely from below, you cannot attain orthodoxy because you have a man that God somehow divinizes, indwells, empowers, perfects, whatever you want. And as a result in the most modern theology of our day, that divinization of Jesus is what the liberals, Protestant and Catholic, envision as the fate of all human beings. Undoubtedly, Schleiermacher was able to elude most of the problems inherent in traditional formulations.

But at what cost? He did not have to address the problem of the relationship between a nature that was divine and one that was human, between that which was absolute and that which was relative. Nor did he have to formulate the relation between these natures and the single person in which they were united. Jesus was simply a man with a powerful sense of God.

The immediate gains for Christology were, however, serious losses for the Christian faith. Struggle as he did, Schleiermacher never quite succeeded in saying how Jesus was unique. The God-consciousness dwelt in him in the most potent way.

And thus, the father of modern theology, as brilliant as he was, misled many others. Jesus was not a unique invasion of the divine in the human, Christology from above coming down, truly down, but only the perfection of what was already present in all people. Continuity with creation, you get it? Between God and the created order.

Those things are determinative of the whole of Christology. Nor was the uniqueness of Christian faith thereby forfeited. But it was not clear why Jesus was really important to faith.

It is true Schleiermacher saw him as the clarifier of God, the expositor of divine par excellence, and in the end, what was important was the idea, but in the end, what was important was the idea and not the person in whom it came to expression. And this idea and the consciousness by which its presence is registered is a common human possession. All people have this awareness of God.

That is why Schleiermacher addressed his cultured despisers, and they resonated with that. But once again, at what cost? Schleiermacher's theology was therefore an admirable statement of the common 19th century assumptions about human life. But it was profoundly out of touch with the essence of the apostolic witness.

It was on this point that Schleiermacher was called to account by the neo-orthodox thinkers and rightly so. Another very important figure at the time, I can hardly find much about him in the contemporary textbooks on Christology, which I think says something, is Albrecht Ritschel. With the exception of Schleiermacher, this is going to be very brief. I'm sorry, but that's just the way it is; no one has exercised a greater influence on present-day theology; this is written by Louis Berkhof in 1930, okay, than Albrecht Ritschl.

You see the spelling in the overhead. His Christology takes its starting point in the work rather than the person of Christ. There's an emphasis, and it was exaggerated more even in later theology, that we know Jesus not in some Greek abstract way, talking about essences and natures and the person and that kind of stuff, but rather we want a functional Christology.

That's what the New Testament gives us. It's not concerned about essences and Greek terminology; it presents a Jesus in motion, and thus, you start with the work and not with the person. I better evaluate that before I forget.

It is true that the New Testament presents a functional Christology. I would say the New Testament also presents a functional Trinitarianism. It doesn't speculate as to abstractly the being of God and the persons and that kind of a thing, but behind both its functional Christology and its functional Trinitarianism is an ontological Christology and an ontological Trinitarianism.

Furthermore, the Bible does sometimes, as we'll see in Hebrews 1, speak of the Son; he is the exact representation of the essential nature of God. Greek word, apostasis. Used differently than it was in the Christological census, but it's saying the word means essence, essential nature, very being.

Jesus is the exact representation of that. So sometimes it speaks rarely of this, of the essence, usually of function, but we argue from a function back to the essence. We don't reduce the New Testament witness, either of the Trinity or of Christ, to a mere functionalism.

That is to emphasize function to the denigration of person, and that is a big mistake. The work of Christ determines the dignity of his person. He was a mere man.

Do I sense a Christology absolutely from below? Yes, I do. This is the old liberalism. He was a mere man.

The old liberalism took great time to attack fundamentalism, and I wouldn't defend every aspect of fundamentalism. The liberals won the schools. The fundamentalists countered with Bible schools.

They were not on par with the establishments of education, which the liberals took over. I would say today, evangelicalism has done pretty well. The American Association of Theological Schools may have more evangelical schools than liberal ones, and many of them are academically good and capable.

There still are liberal schools that are academically capable, but liberalism was busy attacking fundamentalism, and in some ways, it was justifiable, but in other ways, they denied the fundamentals of the faith, which is where fundamentalism got its name, and that included the virgin birth, the deity and miracles of Jesus, the blood atonement, and his second coming, and that is denying the Christian faith itself. I wouldn't defend every fundamentalist explanation of those things, but the truths they were expressing, however better or worse, were biblical truths, and liberalism went awry in rejecting those truths. Jesus was a mere man to Albrecht Ritschl, but in view of the work which he accomplished and the service he rendered, we rightly attribute him to him the predicate of Godhead.

What does that mean? The next sentence helps us understand, as Birkhoff explains, again this is from Louis Birkhoff's Systematic Theology, page 310. Ritschl rules out the pre-existence, the incarnation, and there's no Christology from above, no orthodoxy, and the virgin birth of Christ. Since this finds no point of contact in the believing consciousness of the Christian community, Schleiermacher believing consciousness of individuals, ritual more communal in his epistemology.

Christ was the founder of the kingdom of God, thus making the purpose of God his own, and now, in some way, induces men to enter the Christian community and to live a life motivated entirely by love. He redeems man by his teaching, example, and unique influence, and is therefore worthy to be called God. This is virtually a renewal of the doctrine of Paul of Sabbath, an early heretic known for modalism.

Notice that Christ redeems by his teaching, example, and unique influence. There's a sense that those things are true, but most profoundly, he redeems by dying in the place of sinners and rising again on the third day, according to the scriptures. The old liberalism is indeed liberalism, and it falls short, and I'll give a preview of our following lectures concerning modern Christology.

Bart Bruner, who we really will discuss maybe a little bit, and Bultmann at first, anyway, represent a strong break with the old liberal tradition. Bultmann then went in his own existential direction, and he and Bart really disagreed tremendously, but they rejected the old liberal immanentism and started from above with a real incarnation. That was incredible.

That was a major shift to the transcendence, the otherness of God Bart talked about. We'll talk more about not only the quest for historical Jesus, the original quest, we've done something with that with Schweitzer's bashing them, but Bultmann's reductionism of the New Testament to a couple of pages that might have gone back to Jesus led to such futility. I remember talking to a student, an evangelical student at Princeton Theological Seminary, which at the time was dominated by Bultmannians.

I said, let me ask you a question. Did you go there to prepare for the ministry? Yes, sir. This guy loved the Lord.

He was determined to fight for the truth within the United Presbyterian Church, and he needed to be ordained. he had to go to Princeton or one of the approved seminaries, all right? Not to Westminster or Covenant or Reformed. That didn't work in that day. I said, I have a question for you.

What do you possibly preach from the remains of the New Testament? He said, that is a good question, and they actually devised a course based upon, after the teaching of the Bultmannian New Testament professors on that very topic. Oh, my word. The reductionism is enormous, and so it was that Bultmann's disciples, he was a genius.

They were gifted men. Gunther Bornkamm, Ernest Kasemann, and others started a new quest for the historical Jesus and had much more of the New Testament than he did. I mean, what are we talking about here? Much more than you.

I mean, the whole thing is so distorted, but they did. And I don't know. I don't know.

That was better than his business, but my goodness. And then, we'll consider more recent, the most influential. Barth was the dominating theologian of the 20th century, at least for much of it, but toward the end of it, Wolfhard Pannenberg and Jürgen Bultmann, two German theologians, were very influential.

We'll examine their Christologies. They're certainly better than Bultmann's, and they're orthodox in some regards but not in others. We'll consider some Roman Catholic thinkers.

Hans Kung, who got himself, I don't have the right terminology. He was made no longer an official teacher of Catholic doctrine at Tübingen in Germany, because of his disagreement with the infallibility of the Pope. We'll examine his Christology and that of Karl Rayner, a brilliant existentialist Roman Catholic theologian who was greatly influential at Chalcedon, excuse me, at the Vatican II, the second Vatican Council.

Man, that was a Freudian slip, a great moment. Rayner influenced Vatican II in the mid-60s, and the whole direction of the Catholic Church changed. We'll think about his Christology in light of his teaching about the Trinity, how the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, the ontological Trinity, and his notion of anonymous Christianity, where Catholicism now hopes for universalism.

Those are important matters. We'll look at the British Bishop J. A. T. Robinson, a legitimate New Testament scholar who blew the minds of common Brits with his book Honest to God, in which he questioned all kinds of things and denied all kinds of things. We'll have just a brief look at a process theologian's Christology.

Pittenger is the only one who's actually written that, and then we'll conclude, Lord willing, with a presentation that shocked the British populace and churchgoers, the myth of God incarnate. Famous professors at Cambridge and Oxford say they don't believe in the incarnation and so forth. It was followed in the same year as a writer, historian, and editor of a number of volumes.

I can hardly comprehend this. In the same year, a book called The Truth of God Incarnate was written by evangelicals. The former book had made such a splash and upset the faith of so many people.

The Truth of God Incarnate came out. These are some of the things we'll begin to take up in our next lecture, but in the meantime, thank you for your attention, and God bless you.   
  
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