SOCIOLOGICAL-STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS UPON
WISDOM: THE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL MATRIX OF
PROVERBS 15:28-22:16
By
Brian Watson Kovacs
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, PH.D., 1978
© Brian Watson Kovacs, 1978
Used with permission
Digitized by Dr. Ted Hildebrandt and Dr. Perry Phillips,
Gordon College, 2007
PREFACE
This dissertation represents an attempt at
synthesis—and closure—to an intellectual odyssey that
has lasted nearly fifteen years. It combines disparate
elements, which may ultimately prove incommensurable. Its
conclusion has been much delayed, causing pain and frus-
tratin not only to me but to those who thought they saw
something of value in it and in the lines of inquiry sug-
gested by it. Time has made it a more thorough and mature
document, especially the analysis of Proverbs IIb itself,
though at the cost of some inconsistency and, loss of
clarity. Parts of this work were written at various times
over an eight-year period. Ideas change. Approaches
change. The writer who finished this work is far different
from the one who started it. From it, however, has de-
veloped a conception of interdisciplinary research and
teaching that may justify its deferral. Such integration
means that much impinges on what is actually said here that
cannot be dealt with adequately or at length. I have
faced the difficult choice of whether or not to cite my
other work. For one whose career and research are less
integrative, the choice is easy. Humility usually wins out.
I doubt the humility, however, of failing to mention what
iiii
is an inherent part of the formulative process. So, I
choose to cite myself, at the risk of seeming arrogant,
to clarify the synthesis which this work represents.
I wish that I could do justice to the encourage-
ment and support that I have received over so many years
in producing this dissertation. To mention some people is
to do injustice to others by leaving them out. I am
fortunate to have such good and caring friends, whose coun-
sel and whose friendship I value above all else in the
world. Jim Crenshaw has been friend, colleague and teacher.
I know that I am a mystery to him and that that mystery is
more grief than glory. His guidance and influence pervade
this work and the life that is represented through it.
Phil Hyatt ordered me to create a synthesis in my disserta-
tion.1 hope some measure of what he sought can be found
here. John Gammie offered insight and encouragement when
the vision seemed to have been lost. Norman Gottwald pro-
vided a superb critique of the theses underlying the chapter
on Proverbs IIb. The Dempster Graduate Fellowship under-
wrote travel and research for some of the work on this
dissertation. To my Committee, working under duress—
Walter Harrelson, Dan Patte, Doug Knight, Howard Harrod—
I offer my thanks and condolences. Gene Floyd made sense
of the senseless and converted it into typed manuscript, for
which thanks are hardly adequate recognition. Many other
iv
people should see themselves and their influence among
these pages; that friendship is beyond value or mere men-
tion. For all of them, this work at last is finished.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE iiii
LIST OF TABLES vii
Procedure
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION 1
Background 1
Procedure 13
II. THE DEFINITION OF WISDOM 31
III. A WISDOM TYPOLOGY 105
IV. HE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK OF PROVERBS 246
V. THE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL MATRIX OF
PROVERBS 15:28-22:16 317
Introduction 317
Space 322
Time 475
VI. CONCLUSION 516
APPENDIX 519
SELECTEb BIBLIOGRAPHY 580
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Terms for "Wisdom," "Understanding,"
"Knowledge" . 520
2. Terms Relating to Folly or Ignorance 521
3. Additional Technical Wisdom Terms 522
4. Additional Technical Wisdom Terms
Peculiar to Proverbs 10 ff 523
5. The Semantic Field of Wisdom (Adapted
from Fohrer's Analysis) 524
6. Characteristics of Wisdom, Late Wisdom
and Myth (Adapted from H. H. Schmid) 527
7. Antithesis 534
8. Sayings Dealing with Yahweh 535
9. Architecture of Proverbs 15:28-22:16 538
10. Royal Sayings 540
11. Twb-mn Sayings 540
12. Twb Sayings (Word "Twb" Appears, Irrespec-
tive of Form) 541
13. Admonition or Vetitive Form 541
14. Propriety Sayings 542
15. Wisdom Terms 543
16. Elements of Wisdom 546
17. Lb Sayings 549
18. Ignorance 549
19. Folly 550
vii
Table Page
20. Discipline 550
21. 'Instruction' Sayings: Mwsr 551
22. Speech 551
23. Irony 552
24. Friend/Neighbor Sayings 552
25. Law Courts 553
26. Elements of Evil and Folly 554
27. Simple Retribution: Without Yahweh's
Agency 558
28. Gulf Between Wisdom and Folly 558
29. Adversity Sayings 559
30. Altruism 559
31. Noblesse Oblige 560
32. Wealth 560
33. The Powerful 561
34. Poverty 561
35. Hisd Sayings 561
36. Wisdom Standard of Values: Implied "Higher
Standard 562
37. Status Quo 562
38. Slave Sayings 563
39. Intentionality 563
40. Miscellaneous Special Concepts 540
41. Familistic Sayings 564
42. Contagion 565
viii
Table Page
43. Vulnerability 567
44. 'Way' Sayings: Drk 568
45. Observation (Form) 568
46. Descriptions 569
47. Pragmatic Sayings 569
48. Teaching 570
49. The Righteous 570
50. Purpose/End of the Wicked 571
51. Weights-Measures-Scales 571
52. 'Abomination' Sayings: Twcbh 572
53. Naturalistic Savings [Or, Neo-
Naturalistic] 572
54. Animals 573
55. War Sayings 573
56. (Rhetorical) Questions 573
57. Attitude 574
58. Light/Lamp Sayings 574
59. 'Spirit' Sayings: Rwhi 575
60. Correction, Admonition 575
61. Tradition 576
62. Npš: Sayings 576
63. Yr't-yhwh Sayings 577
64. Life Sayings 577
65. Death Sayings 578
ix
Table Page
66. Sayings Involving "Fate" 578
67. Future 579
68. Sickness 579
x
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background
As both literature and philosophy of life, the
Hebrew mashal holds a powerful elective affinity for the
Modern reader. Its seeming assurance about the means and
ends of 1ife is tempered with a certain irony. It often
exhibits a humanistic concern. Together, the sayings en-
capsulate and hold up to view features of human experience
that transcend a separation of considerable physical,
temporal, social and cultural space. Superficially, their
settings and their objectives seem to require no elaborate
translation. Literatures and philosophies arising from
entirely different social and historical settings may have
a special saliency, as it were an "elective affinity," for
a particular group at some specific time in its social
history.1 Such is the case, I suggest, in our (hermeneutic)
1Max Weber originally coined the term Wahlver-
wandtschaften--"elective affinities"--as sociological term-
inus technicus in the articulation of his theoretical
approach to the study of religion's development as social
ideology. He appropriated the word from the title of a
lesser-known novel of Goethe's. In his usage, it refers to
the dialectic relationship that exists between social
1
2
re-discovery of wisdom and wisdom literature.
Because the original setting is no longer relevant
in such affinities and because the new social application
invests these works and ideas with quite different meanings
and emphases, the literary historian must be scrupulous to
avoid anachronism which arises from attributing historical
validity to saliences that are in fact creatures of his
own time. The biblical scholar of this wisdom finds him-
self or herself today operating under just such prudential
admonitions. Certainly, intellectual understanding is
hermeneutic, indeed it may even be normative.1 The scholar
structure and its legitimating ideology: each alters the
other in systematic, if not determined, ways. The explana-
tions that groups develop to interpret their social reality,
which are often derived through historical processes from
the cultural stuff of other peoples at other times and
places, have a basic compatibility with the social organiza-
tion which values, preserves and transmits them. This com-
patibility increases with time. Ideas change social struc-
ture; social organization alters its legitimating interpre-
tive system over time. Thus, all ideology is hermeneutic.
Elective affinities--the interactions between groups and
their interpretive realities--become powerful but creative
social forces. Weber's archetypal case is laid out in his
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans.
Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958);
and his "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,"
in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed. and
with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 129-56. See
also his Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive
Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittig, trans.
Ephraim Fischoff et al., 3 vols. (New York: Bedminster Press,
1968), 2:447-529, 583-90.
1Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation
Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer,
3
must somehow strive to manipulate this tool of our under-
standing without being in turn controlled or manipulated by
it more than some hermeneutically essential minimum.
Literary historical research is a cumulative and approxi-
mative science. As all our scholarly implements become
more sophisticated, as our application of them is refined,
issues we believe to have settled must be raised, debated
and answered again. We observe this kind of flux in current
studies of wisdom in general and of the mashal collections
of Proverbs in particular.1
Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existen-
tial Philosophy, ed. John Wild. (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1969), pp. 12-32. See also Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Truth and Method, A Continuum Book (New York: Sea-
bury Press 1975); and Karl Löwith, Nature, History and
Existentialism, and Other Essays in the Philosophy of History,
ed. with a Critical Introduction by Arnold Levison, Northwestern
University Studies in Phenomenology and Existen-
tial Philosophy, ed. John Wild (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1966).
1James L. Crenshaw surveys this development in his
introduction to an important collection of essays reflect-
ing research into wisdom and the directions it has taken in
the last generation or so of scholarship, "Prolegomenon,"
in Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom, The Library of Bib-
lical Studies, ed. Harry M. Orlinsky (New York: KTAV Pub-
lishing House, 1976), pp. 1-60. See also his article
"Wisdom in the Old Testament," in The Interpreter's Dic-
tionary of the Bible: Supplementary Volume (Nashville:
Abingdon, 1976), pp. 952-56. In the same volume, see
Ronald J. Williams, "Wisdom in the Ancient Near East," pp.
949-52; and Hans G. Conzelmann, "Wisdom in the New Testa-
ment," pp. 956-60. Also, James L. Crenshaw, "Wisdom," in
Old Testament Form Criticism, ed. John H. Hayes, Trinity
University Monograph Series in Religion, vol. 2, ed. John H.
Hayes (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1974), pp.
225-64; Gerhard von Rad, Weisheit in Israel (Neukirchen-
4
All historical criticism of literature requires the
operating assumption that a work somehow, in form or con-
tent or motif, betrays and conveys the setting within which
it was constructed into its present form, however composite.
In a complex work, if we can isolate the earlier constituent
elements, we may be able to discern important aspects of
its socio-historical development, as well as the lineaments
of its literary history. Individual works may resist such
analysis, perhaps because they are too brief, their lan-
guage too ambiguous, or the effects of later redaction too
gross; but, to reject this working assumption is ultimately
to deny the possibility of doing meaningful study of lit-
erary works as the stuff of social and intellectual history.
How we retrieve this history is a question, of methodology.
If we accept, albeit with some generosity the implications
of affinities as hermeneutic, we may admit that different
methodologies will be effective with different elements or
aspects of this history. There is a congeniality--affinity
--of methodology and material, as well as of social struc-
ture and ideology. Indeed, we may need to be methodologi-
cally eclectic if we are to deal adequately with this
Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1970): On this concept of in-
terpretation as it applies to the development of exegesis,
see Georg Fohrer, et al., Exegese des Alten Testaments:
Einführung in die Methodik, Uni-Taschenbücher, vol. 267
(Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1973), pp. 9-30.
5
history at all.1
The problem of setting resembles in its implica-
tions the aesthetic issue of intention, though the Biblical
scholar seldom has the opportunity to raise the latter, and
often then only by indirection. What may at first seem to
be a marginal change in setting can have considerable in-
fluence on the interpretation to be given to a work. The
"what-it-meant" side of hermeneutic's dialectic of analysis
includes not only the bare meaning of the words used, but
who communicated through them (i.e., their social location)
and how they were used. We can be frustrated by knowing
what the words say without knowing what they said: what
they meant in that social and historical context.2 The
phenomenologically-informed researcher sees the problem of
setting divided into two poles of investigation.
First, within what objective social order did this
literature arise and acquire its meaning? We seek a his-
tory of the society’s institutions with their system and
1Fohrer, et al., pp. 9-30, 148-71.
2Hans-Georg Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of
Hermeneutic Reflection," trans. G. B. Hess and R. E. Palmer,
Continuum 8 (1970):77-95; and his Philosophical Hermeneutics,
trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976). See also, Paul Ricoeur, History
and Truth, trans. with an Introduction by Charles A.
Kelbley, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology
and Existential Philosophy, ed. John Wild (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1965).
6
order projected against the comparative background of the
histories and institutions of neighboring societies. This
aspect of meaning also includes the question what standing
the works and their authors both held and acquired within
the community. Thus, the question of canon finally is
relevant to the objective meaning of a work.1
Second, how did the writer(s) perceive and struc-
ture the experiential world to achieve that understanding
which he attempted to communicate in his work? Here we are
concerned with the subjective pole of meaning. A work be-
speaks the worldviews of its authors and editors. Where
the literary history is convoluted and the internal con-
struction of the work has become complex and interwoven,
the search for consistent and intelligible world-views can
become quite demanding. Here again, the danger is that the
researcher's ideas of "intelligible" or "consistent" which
are his cultural and personal perceptions of rationality
may be imposed on the work. Since the wise seem to have
been attempting to organize and interpret the realm of
1Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Intro-
duction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorothy Cairns (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), cp. 56-88; Alfred Schutz, The
Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and
Frederick Lehnert, Northwestern Studies in Phenomenology
and Existential Philosophy, ed. John Wild (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1967), pp. 1-44; Peter L. Berger
and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality:
A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Co., 1966), pp. 45-85.
7
experience in order to cope with it more intelligently and
successfully, the danger of anachronistic rationality is
far more immediate than its opposite: accepting any con-
tradiction or inconsistency, even to the controversion of
common sense, on the appeal to cultural difference or even
the oriental mind soi-disant.1
This second pole of analysis is especially important.
In order to comprehend a work adequately, we need to under-
stand it as itself a hermeneutic act: an attempt to give
coherent meaning to experience. A literary work reflects
both subjectivity and objectivity. It results from the in-
teraction of the author(s)'s subjectivity and "objective"
experience perceived through traditionally-defined. objec-
tive social reality given an objective literary form. For
a time, biblical criticism attempted to deal with the sub-
jective dimension of hermeneutic by psychologizing biblical
writers as they were then historically understood. As
authors became schools, as biblical works unveiled their
complex composite character to researchers, psychological
1Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 89-151; and
his Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy
as Rigorous Science and Philosophy and the Crisis of Euro-
pean Man, trans. and with an introduction by Quentin Lauer,
Academy Library of Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper &
Row, 1965), pp. 188-89; Schutz, Phenomenology of the Social
World, pp. 102-7, 144-76; Berger and Luckmann, Social Con-
struction of Reality, pp. 135-73; Peter L. Berger and Thomas
Luckmann, "Sociology of Religion and Sociology of Knowledge,"
Sociology and Social Research: An International Journal 47
(July 1963): 417-27.
8
analysis of biblical literature became untenable in most
cases. Subjective analysis, however, was often discarded
with psychologizing.
Literature is virtually the only historical arti-
fact which provides the scholar access to the subjectivity,
the mind or minds, of people in their historical matrix.
What it meant to be a person of such-and-such an ancient
social world is accessible, if at all, only through litera-
ture. Moreover, the only vehicle we have to accomplish
that reconstruction is our own individual subjectivities as
literary and social historians. The objective literary
artifact becomes the tool through which to project that co-
herent understanding which a particular layer or segment of
the work reflects. The objective document is the con-
ceptual product of a subjectivity.
Since we can approach the work only through our in-
dividual consciousnesses, unnormed by access to any other,
our interpretation of the document and our projection of its
meanings are biased by our own hermeneutic of our own
reality, however much it may be the informed and structured
product of a process of social learning. The phenomenolo-
gist argues that certain standardized procedures can con-
trol, but not eliminate, this bias. To omit any attempt to
project the subjective hermeneutic pole is to omit one of
the most important social, historical and theological con-
tributions of this literature. Socially accepted
9
interpretations of the world arise from the interactions
of individual consciousnesses, socially in-formed, with
socially-defined experiences. Meaning is both subjective
and objective.1
We are both the beneficiaries and the slaves of
the western distinction between faith and reason. We
recognize the need to ask how dedication to understanding
relates to the religious faith of a people, while we are
therefore compelled to investigate an issue that people, or
lEdmund Husserl clearly states the problem in The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy:
An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. and
an introduction by David Carr, Northwestern University
Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, ed.
John Wild (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
He develops a subjective analytic in The Phenomenology of
Internal Time-Consciousness, ed. Martin Heidegger, trans.
James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1964). Another approach can be found Alfred Schutz and
Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-World, trans.
Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., North-
western University Studies in Phenomenology and Existen-
tial Philosophy, ed. John Wild (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1973). Cf. Hans-Joachim Kraus, Geschichte der
Historisch-Kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments, 2d
rev. and enlarged ed. (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Ver-
lag, 1956, 1969). A variety of methodological essays deal-
ing with such a program may be found in Maurice Natanson,
ed., Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, Northwestern
University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philoso-
phy, ed. John. Wild (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1973); Karl-Otto Apel et al., Hermeneutik und Ideologie-
kritik, Theorie-Diskussion. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1971); James M. Edie, Francis H. Parker, and Calvin
O. Schrag, eds., Patterns of the Life-World:. Essays in
Honor of John Wild, Northwestern University Studies in
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, ed. John Wild
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
10
at least the intellectual classes of that people, would not
have granted validity. In consequence, we may tend to take
silence on cultic or formal religious matters as dis-
valuation or outright rejection, rather than take it as a
result of the focusing of their attention. We speak here
not merely of the notorious argument from silence; it is
admittedly quite difficult to establish the givens of a
society. Whatever some group takes for granted is not open
to discussion, except either when it is no longer a uni-
versal social given or when it is confronted by a direct
challenge from within or without. The most important ele-
ments in the foundation of a people's understanding and in-
terpretation of the world are taken-for-granted.1 They are
so basic that they need not be expressed. Rationalizing
objective reconstruction may overlook this taken-for-granted
1Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: The
Problem of Religion in Modern Society (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1961); Schutz, Phenomenology of the Social World,
pp. 86-96, 144-63; Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, vol. 1:
The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Maurice Natanson, 2d ed.
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967); vol. 2: Studies in
Social Theory, ed. Arvid Broderson (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1964); vol. 3: Studies in Phenomenological Philoso-
phy, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff„ 1966);
1:15-19, 224-31; 2:12-19, 53-63; 3:116-32. Cf. Norman K.
Gottwald, "Biblical Theology or Biblical Sociology: On
Affirming and Defining the 'Uniqueness' of Israel," in The
Bible and Liberation: Political and Social Hermeneutics,
a Radical Religion Reader. (Berkeley: Community for Religious
Research and Education, 1976), pp. 42-57; and in the same
place, Norman K. Gottwald and Frank S. Frick, "The Social
World of Ancient Israel," pp. 110-19.
11
dimension since it is never stated within the work. Sub-
jective analysis may reveal it to us as we attempt to pro-
ject a coherent and meaning-full perspective on the world.
The demands of our subjectivity for coherence may reveal
what objective analysis must omit. Silence is a legiti-
mate tool of the literary historian, though it is among
the most difficult to wield.
While great progress has been made in understand-
ing wisdom during the past decade, the interest in wisdom
studies has not carried as far as some of us might have
wished. Considerable debate has been devoted to the prob-
lem of definition: identifying what it is which distin-
guishes this phenomenon wisdom from other understandings of
the world.1 The issue remains undecided.2 While the ap-
parent secularism of wisdom has been called into question,
its rationality has endured.3 Still, the literature
1Crenshaw, "Prolegomena," pp. 1-60; James L. Cren-
shaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence upon 'His-
torical Literature," Journal of Biblical Literature 88
(June 1969):129-42.
2 Crenshaw, "Wisdom in the Old Testament," p. 952.
Cf. John G. Gammie, "Notes on Israelite Pedagogy in the
Monarchic Period," paper prepared for the Consultation on
Wisdom, Society of Biblical Literature Annual Meeting,
St. Louis, Missouri, 28-31 October 1976; R. N. Whybray,
The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament, Beiheft
zur Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 135,
ed. Georg Fohrer (New. York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974).
3Walther Zimmerli, "The Place and Limit of the Wis-
dom in the Framework of the Old Testament Theology,”
12
fragments on examination. What seems to be a single
literature either atomizes under analysis into a wide
variety of literatures having little in common, or else
wisdom becomes so broadly defined that it threatens to
absorb materials and modes of thought and expression whose
distinctive character we hesitate to surrender.1 Either
wisdom as such hardly seems to exist at all, or everything
seems to be wisdom. We face a version of Moore's Paradox
of Analysis: every definition is either trivial or false.2
Every analysis of wisdom either does not adequately dif-
ferentiate wisdom from other material or it excludes from
wisdom what we obviously must include.
In the chapters which follow, we shall try to ac-
complish two objectives. First, we shall try to resolve
the methodological difficulty of differentiating wisdom.
That is, we shall attempt to show what has been misleading
Scottish Journal of Theology 17 (1964):146-58; cf. his
earlier "Zur Struktur der Alttestamentlichen Weisheit,"
Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, n.s.,
10 (1933):177-204.
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence,"
pp. 129-42.
2G. E. Moore in his Principia Ethica (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1903); on which see Richard B.
Brandt, Ethical. Theory: The Problems of Normative and
Critical Ethics, Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series, ed.
Arthur E. Murphy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
1959), pp. 164-66.
13
in existing efforts to resolve the problem of wisdom: that
these efforts operate from fundamentally incompatible
methodological presuppositions. We shall then argue that
one approach, the social-historical (sociological), has
certain elements which here make it a more analytically
powerful and useful definitional methodology for the lit-
erary historian. Second, we shall take an instance from
wisdom, Proverbs 16:1-22:16 (which we are calling Proverbs
IIb for simplicity's sake) and endeavor to show how sub-
jective analysis based on this methodology can help us re-
fine our understanding of this literature and its social,
historical, literary and theological character.
Procedure
My research into wisdom began as a suitably modest
enterprise. I wanted to demonstrate that it was possible
to project a distinct, clearly delineated world-view from
the material contained within one of the major biblical
proverb collections, Proverbs IIb. If convincing, such a
demonstration would show that the material stemmed from an
identifiable social milieu which might provide us insight
into the nature of wisdom—social and theological—at that
time. It would serve as a benchmark for developmental
theories of wisdom such as those of Schmid, Skladny and even
von Rad. The project would be self-validating. If it
14
could be done and done convincingly, then a fortiori the
material used in that projection would have to constitute
something more than a loose editorial Gemisch. At the
least, it would demonstrate stringent selection criteria
at work in whatever earlier or outside material might have
been chosen for inclusion in the collection. At most, it
might help prove that the collection so—called should be
considered essentially a composition, however much it might
draw on traditional poetic conventions and stylistic or
—rhetorical techniques. Rhetorical analysis of the collec-
tion lends credence in fact to the latter position.
Gradually, however, I came to realize that the
argument. being developed concerning Proverbs IIb represented
the linch-pin of a much larger, more convoluted and more
far-reaching argument concerning the nature of wisdom and
the wisdom movement. The analysis of Proverbs IIb cannot
readily be separated from this larger argument. On the
other hand, the lineaments of this latter would not be
clear by implication from an examination of the passage
alone. There is, moreover, a methodological issue here.
I am making a plaidoyer for the applicability of a certain
methodology, and its operating presuppositions, to the prob-
lem of the nature and development of wisdom as a Hebrew and
early Jewish religious phenomenon. The discussion which
follows is not essentially a methodological treatise,
15
especially since it argues for the necessity, not merely
the utility, of methodological eclecticism, a point in-
creasingly being emphasized in biblical exegesis. Rather,
it is an attempt to restructure some of the debate con-
cerning the nature and development of wisdom by an appeal
to the evidence.
We begin by listing a number of different approaches
to the problem of definition that have been taken in wisdom
scholarship. Each has contributed to the refinement of our
understanding of wisdom as a socio-historical phenomenon
and has held significant sway in the scholarly debate. Each,
however, has been opposed by other persuasive approaches to
the problem of defining wisdom, and no one approach seems
to offer a clear and convincing superiority in its analysis.
The analytic paradox spoken of above remains: either we
exclude what common sense dictates including or include what
common sense dictates excluding, without decisively justi-
fying either alternative. The dilemma nay be insoluble.
Wisdom may be undefinable. Perhaps wisdom is a primitive
term whose definition ought never to be attempted as such.
Perhaps, as we shall argue, wisdom is not a single phenome-
non, but a variety of sometimes related phenomena which
must be distinguished from one another if our language is
16
not to betray us.1
In reviewing the various approaches to definition
we should be aware that this debate has made significant
progress. Even without definition, important elements of
wisdom's modes of perceiving and relating to the world have
been established. The theological underpinnings of wisdom
have begun to appear.2 The problem of wisdom's claim over
1Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, pp. 1-5; Crenshaw,
"Method in Determining Wisdom Influence," pp. 129-42;
Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon,” pp. 3-5.
2Berend Gemser, “The Spiritual Structure of Biblical
Aphoristic Wisdom," Adhuc Loquitur: Collected. Essays, ed.
A. van Selms and A. S. van der Woude, Pretoria Oriental
Series, vol. 7 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), pp. 138-49;
James L. Crenshaw, Prophetic Conflict: Its Effect upon
Israelite Religion, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Alt-
testamentliche Wissenschaft, vol. 124 (New York: Walter
de Gruyte, 1971), pp. 116-23; von Rad, Weisheit in Israel,
pp. 75-148; Hartmut Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit in der
Alten Weisheit: Studien zu den Sprüchen Salomos und zu dem
Buche Hiob (Tübingen: J. C. 3.: Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1938),
pp. 29-50; Horst Dietrich Preuss, "Erwägungen zum Theo-
logischen Ort Alttestamentlicher Weisheitsliteratur,"
Evangelische Theologie 30 (1970): 393-417; Horst Dietrich
Preuss, "Das Gottesbild der älteren Weisheit Israels,"
in Vetus Testamentum Supplements; vol. 23 (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1972), pp. 117-43; Hans Heinrich Schmid, Wesen und
Geschichte der Weisheit: eine Untersuchung zur Alt-
orientalischen und Israelitischen Weisheitsliteratur,
Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissen-
schaft, vol. 101 (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1966);
Roland E. Murphy, "Wisdom—Theses and Hypotheses," in
Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in Honor
of Samuel Terrien, ed. John G. Gammie, Walter A. Bruegge-
mann, W. Lee Humphreys and James M. Ward (Missoula, Mon-
tana: Scholars Press, 1978, forthcoming); and in the same
place, Hans-Jürgen Hermisson, "Observations on the Creation
Theology in Wisdom."
17
its adherents has shown its authoritative nature.1 On
the other hand, the flow and ebb of the tide of wisdom's
popularity in the past decade may be related to our in-
ability to make more progress than we have in developing
any decisive new in-roads in this research. Zimmerli's
reassessment of his position statement of 1933 gives ground
to modern critics but stakes out a territory not yet far
removed from that earlier one.2 The attempt to place wis-
dom at the center of Hebrew religious thought and practice
seems to have led to a proliferation of studies which
identified wisdom in virtually every strain of Hebrew re-
ligion.3 So much did this occur that hardly a biblical
book, hardly an era, hardly a literary form and hardly a
stratum of Hebrew religious thought, practice or society
remained free from wisdom involvement. This cannot be.
If everything is wisdom, then what is distinctive about
wisdom? The theological rehabilitation of wisdom almost
1Crenshaw, Prophetic Conflict, pp. 116-23; Gese,
Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 29-50; Hans Heinrich Schmid,
Gerechtigkeit als Weitordnung: Hintergrund und Geschichte
des Alttestamentlichen Gerechtigeitsbegriffes, Beiträge
zur Historischen Theologie, vol. 40 (Tübingen: J. C. B.
Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1968); cf. von Rad, Weisheit in
Israel, pp. 102-30.
2Zimmerli, "Place and Limit of Wisdom," pp. 146-
58; Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 177-204.
3Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence,"
p. 129, n. 1; Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, p. 1, n. 1.
18
created a monster that seemed poised to invade and devour
the rest of Hebrew religious thought.1 This apparent ex-
cess revealed a methodological weakness--in the sense of a
lack of precise and controlled research technique--which I
would suspect has also discouraged many wisdom enthusiasts.
Do we really know what we are talking about? Are our
methodologies and perspectives sufficiently conformable
with one another that we can engage in coordinated and
systematic research? While I submit that the answer is an
unequivocal “yes,” I also Imagine that some people have not
waited around for the answer.
Thus, enumerating definitions becomes increasingly
unsatisfactory, not because it does not further the wisdom
debate, but because everything else seems to hinge on a
dilemma we have been slow to resolve. I propose, then, that
we work around the issue by recognizing the inherent multi-
vocality of 'wisdom.' I suggest a typology of wisdom con-
sistent with the ways in which wisdom seems to appear for
us historically. We ought to be able to talk far more pre-
cisely and cogently with respect to a specific type of
wisdom than we can to "wisdom in general"--whatever that
might be. Again, perhaps part of our difficulty is that
we have been trying to compass too much: incompatible
1Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," pp. 3-6.
19
types of wisdom that, because of the methodologies or con-
texts out of which they appear, cannot be conformed to one
another, even for definition's sake, without producing in-
superable problems at the present stage of our knowledge.
The problem of wisdom, however, goes far beyond
epistemological or linguistic clarification. Fundamental
historical issues will not be solved by stipulation. Some
of these types of wisdom are trivial; others are arbitrary;
many are secondary or derivative. The question becomes:
what provides the fundamental conceptual power inherent in
the use of the term 'wisdom' that enables us to apply it to
find historical unity or coherence in what seems to be a
diverse variety of literarily-expressed historical phenomena.
If we must, we may ultimately trace the term to an in-
ference made by the historian. In other words, we may find
ourselves forced to argue that the Hebrews never explicitly
conceived of wisdom as a distinct social or religious or
intellectual phenomenon.1 We would then see relationships
that people in that milieu never explicitly saw nor identi-
fied. Such a conclusion would be very costly. It would
gravely undermine arguments for the historical development
--evolution--of wisdom in any form. Combined with the
atomization inherent in some theories of wisdom, it would
1Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, p. 54.
20
threaten to leave us without a phenomenon as such to study
at all.1 Thus, we potentially face precisely the opposite
threat to the current direction in wisdom studies. In-
stead of finding wisdom diffusing itself throughout Hebrew
life and thought, we might find the concept breaking down
as a powerful historical conceptual tool. It would be less
than edifying to be left with little more than a loose col-
lection of literary forms, perhaps an elite but diffuse and
undistinctive social milieu, or a semiotic of 'wisdom' and
related terms held together by little more than their
semantic field. What is at stake is the conceptual and ex-
planatory power of 'wisdom' for the literary historian.
Evolutionary theories of wisdom, which predominate
in the field, force both the methodological and the his-
torical issues. Most of these approaches depart from some
explicit or implicit philosophy of history which postulates
a series of compatible historical processes that can be
discerned behind the literature and its formal expression.
These theories represent an attempt to unify wisdom. One
type evolves into another as a result of historical
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," p. 131.
2I develop this point in my "Evidence for the De-
velopment of a World-View in Proverbs: An Assessment,"
paper presented to the Southeastern regional meeting of
the Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 17-19 March
1977.
21
processes whose effects can be discerned elsewhere in
Hebrew society at that time, as well as at other points
in time and places in history.1 A few of these positions
rely on pan-historic principles: the same fundamental
processes of change underlie the entire sweep of human his-
tory regardless of the scale of the analysis, the time-
period or the culture under study.2 Evolutionary ap-
proaches raise the question what provides the coherence or
1Typical, though by no means exhaustive, of such
approaches and methodologies are Otto Eissfeldt, Der
Maschal im Alten Testament: eine Wortgeschichtliche
Untersuchung nebst einer Literargeschicntlichen Unter-
suchung der mšl Genannten Gattungen "Volksprichwort" und
Spottlied," Beiheft zur Zeitscnrift für die Alttestament-
liche Wissenschaft, vol. 24 (Giessen: A. Töpelmann [vormals
J. Ricker], 1913); Udo Skiadny, Die Ältesten Spruchsammlungen
in Israel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962);
William McKane, Proverbs: A New Approach, Old Testament
Library (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970) ; Schmid,
Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit.
2Formalism derived from the work of Andre Jolles
seems to have had a significant impact on the theories of
Schmid and von Rad. Andre Jolles, Einfache Formen: Legende,
Sage, Mythe, Rätsel, Spruch, Kasus, Memorabile, Märchen,
Witz, ed. Alfred Schossig, 2d ed. (Haile [Saale]: Veb) Max
Niemeyer Verlag, 1956); cf.. Hermann Bausinger, Formen der
Volkspoesie, Grundlagen der Germanistik, no. 6 (Berlin:
E. Schmidt, 1968). While Jollesian formalism is by no
means the dominant theory in Germanistic studies, nor has
it been, its influence seems to have been pervasive in Old
Testament form criticism, if the nuances of vocabulary and
methodology are any guide; proving such influence, however,
is often difficult. Alternatively, Hegelian evolutionism
often seems to underlie exegetical methodologies. The.
argument for such an implicit historical philosophy goes
far beyond the scope of the present discussion, but it has
at least been sketched out in my paper, "Development of a
World-View."
22
continuity that underlies and unifies such seemingly di-
verse or diffuse phenomena. What entitles us to postulate
of them such transformations? Obviously, we cannot appeal
back to the processes of change grounded in our philosophy
of history: the argument would be circular. The unity is
surely not self-evident: why should one form or type of
wisdom evolve at all, let alone develop into another specific
kind of wisdom? What does it mean to label these 'wisdom'
at all? The coherence cannot be an inference of the his-
torical researcher without being circular. Something about
wisdom, from the data, must justify bringing together ma-
terials that differ in type. The problem becomes more
poignant when one wants to begin talking about wisdom
evolving into rabbinic-legal or apocalyptic thought, or
literature, or social movements.1 What can such a hy-
pothesis possibly mean?
If the ground for such arguments is that there is
1Jean-Paul Audet, "Origines Comparées de la Double
Tradition de la Loi et de la Sagesse dans le Proche-Orient
Ancien," in Trudy 25. Mezduradnego Kongressa Vostckovedov:
Moskva 9-16 Avgusta 1960, vol. 1 (Moscow: Izdatelystvo
Vostocnoj Literatury, 1962), pp. 352-57; Gerhard von Rad,
Old Testament Theology, vol. 1: The Theology of Israel's
Historical Traditions; vol. 2: The Theology of Israel's
Prophetic Traditions; trans. D. M. G. Stalker, 2 vols.
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 1965), 2: 300-15; cf.
Gunter Wied, "Der Auferstehungsglaube des Späten Israels
in seiner Bedeutung für das Verhältnis von Apokalyptik und
Weisheit," unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Bonn, 1967; cf.
Peter von der Osten-Sacken, Die Apokalyptik in ihren
Verhältnis zu Prophetie und Weisheit, Theoiogie Existenz
Heute, vol. 157 (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1969).
23
formal unity, it would obviously be invalid. The same can
be said for perceiving some coherence or continuity of
world-view. Indeed, the problem is to find unity in what
is superficially diverse. To argue that wisdom and rab-
binism or apocalyptic represent essentially equivalent or
related thought-worlds would be patently absurd. While the
evolutionary argument is sometimes stated in terms of form
or thought, ethic or context, none of these is sufficient
for a valid and convincing argument, especially in light of
our epistemological (definitional) and linguistic (typolog-
ical) analysis. Implicitly or explicitly, such theories re-
quire, and are appealing to, another ground. Only if there
is a continuously-existing, identifiable and self-identi-
fied social group who seek, develop, preserve and transmit
'wisdom' can evolutionary theories have a convincing—
and valid—argument concerning this literature. If
the continuity is not sociological, then the very
diversity of the phenomenon undercuts the validity of de-
velopmental or evolutionary arguments, except as the
otherwise ungrounded expressions of a particular philoso-
phy of history. On the other hand, if some specific group
can be identified as the carrier of 'wisdom,' then its
typological diversity is secondary to a sociological and
socio-historical continuity. If there are no wise as a
specific historical group, whatever they may have called
themselves and however they might have derived their
identity, then 'wisdom' as a category of historical analy-
sis threatens to fall apart. Such divers forms, theologies,
24
and social milieux do not provide their own unity; the
scholar's inference of unity or coherence must rest on
something beyond his methodology per se.
The assumption that such a group existed is, on
the basis of present methodology, no less tenuous than the
assumption that 'wisdom' has a clear pre-analytic meaning.
Whybray has shown that the assumption is not clearly
grounded in the historical evidence.1 The literature
does not explicitly refer to such a group, and references
elsewhere scarcely require such a hypothesis. Indeed, the
absence of an overt Standesethik is an often-noted pe-
culiarity of the Hebrew wisdom literature.2 The fact that
such a group is methodologically necessary unfortunately
does not mean that it actually existed. To resolve this
problem, we need a new approach.
1Intellectual Tradition, pp. 6-54.
2Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, pp. 6-54; von
Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 39-148; von Rad, Old Testa-
ment Theology, 1:418-41; "Struktur," pp. 177-
204; Zimmerli, "Place and Limit of Wisdom," pp. 146-58;
cf. Hans-Jürgen Hermisson, Studien zur Israelitischen
Spruchweisheit, Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten
and Neuen Testament, vol. 28 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neu-
kirchener Verlag, 1968), pp. 94-96; Ephraim E. Urbach,
Class-Status and Leadership in the World of the Palestinian
Sages, Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and
Humanities, vol. 2, no. 4 (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of
Sciences and Humanities, 1966); cf. Brian W. Kovacs, "Is
There a Class-Ethic in Proverbs?" in Essays in Old Testa-
ment Ethics: (J. Philip Hyatt, in Memoriam), ed. James L.
Crenshaw and John T. Willis (New York: KTAV Publishing
House, 1974), pp. 173-87; Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," pp.
20-22.
25
The analysis of Proverbs IIb, therefore, turns out
to have direct relevance to the problem of establishing
historical continuity to wisdom and therefore of being able
to speak meaningfully of 'wisdom' at all. An inquiry into
one work will not resolve these problems, but it may point
the way to a means of resolving them; or, it may show that
no resolution is possible at all. Here, the wide-spread
assumption that the Proverb material reflects a process of
collection becomes pivotal to the argument.1 What we are
trying to do is address the problem of wisdom in a method-
ologically minimal way.2 Clearly, if we can speak
lEissfeldt, Maschal, pp. 45-52; McKane, Proverbs,
pp. 10-22; Crawford H. Toy, A Critical and Exegetical Com-
mentary of the Book of Proverbs, Internatonal Critical
Commentary, vol. 16 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1899), pp. vi-viii; Helmer Ringgren, "Sprüche," in Sprüche;
Prediger; das Hohe Lied; Klagelieder; das Buch Esther,
trans. and ed. Helmer Ringgren, Artur Weiser, and Walther
Zimmerli, Das Alte Testament Deutsche: Neues Göttinger
Bibelwerk, vol..16, 2d rev. ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and
Ruprecht, 1967), pp. 7-10; Berend Gemser, Sprüche Salomos,
Handbuch zum Alten Testament, 1st series, vol. 16, 2d rev.
and expanded ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck],
1963) , pp. 10-11; R. B. Y. Scott, The Way of Wisdom in the
Old Testament (New York: Macmillan Company, 1971), pp. 51-
59; Otto Plöger, "Zur Auslegung der Sentenzensammlungen des
Proverbienbuches," in Probleme Biblischer Theologie:
Gerhard von Rad zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Hans Walter Wolff
(Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1971), pp. 402-16; cf. Skladny,
Spruchsammlungen; cf. Hermisson, Spruchweisheit.
2Norman K. Gottwald helped clarify the logic and
methodology at this point in his "Response" in the same
session to my "Social Considerations in Locating the Wise
of the Mashal Literature," paper presented to the Section
on the Social World of Ancient Israel, Society of Biblical
26
meaningfully of wisdom at all, and if any literature re-
flects the existence of an identifiable social group in a
clear and unambiguous social milieu, it has to be the four
mashal "collections" in Proverbs: Skladny's A, B, C, D.1
If these do not pass such a test, then the presumption
would be against any work passing such a test. If we can-
not ground our inferences, at least for Hebrews, here, then
it is unlikely that we can ground them socio-historically
at all. On the other hand, if we can demonstrate socio-
historical coherence within this material, then the weight
of the argument swings the other way. We are thereby en-
titled to infer such grounding for similar or related
materials--by form, context or world-view. Can we project
enough of the taken-for-granted world from this literature
to decide the question? I submit that we can, and that it
supports the postulation of an identifiable social group as
its source and matrix.
To show such a group, we have to show three things.
First, we must show that they perceived themselves to be a
group, that they had a sense of self-identity. Second, we
would have to show that they formed a network of trans-
Literature-American Academy of Religion annual meeting,
San Francisco, 28-31 December 1977.
1Spruchsalmmlungen, p. 6.
27
mission whereby that sense of identity was preserved well
beyond the lifetimes of individual members of the group
through certain identity-giving symbols (here, religious
and linguistic, at least in their expression). Third, we
have to show that there is a 'grammar' underlying their
world-view. That grammar represents a consistent set of
assumptions or symbolic interpretations of the world that
gives structure to what they say about it. The grammar is
not the world-view; it is a higher-order consistency from
which coherence of world-views derives.
We argue, in effect, that for Proverbs IIb all
three criteria can be met. To do this, we have to under-
take the subjective analytic proposed above. We seek to
project the taken-for-granted world out of the material
using certain norming parameters--space, time and in a
sense word. These are ineluctable phenomenological struc-
tures. They ground and are expressed through the grammar.
How do these people locate themselves within space and time
as they perceive them; how does word become the expression
of that location? If no group provides the matrix, if the
material is atomic and derived from a variety of diverse
social milieux as some suggest, then the attempt to pro-
ject should fail. Coherence should be lacking. Behind the
obvious inconsistencies and rhetorical peculiarities of the
material would lie nothing more specific than the general
28
Hebrew cultural grammar.1
Can we find a subjective interpretation of space
and time which makes objective sense? We argue yes. If
so, then evolutionary hypotheses make sense on that basis,
but are also subject to critique on that basis. In other
words, while the world-view may change, the grammar must be
preserved. To change the grammar of the message is to ob-
literate the message. Its forms of expression, its prac-
tical presentation may change, but the grammar on me-
thodological grounds cannot. From a Structuralist point
of view, structure must be preserved (i.e., the grammar),
because only in terms of such a continuous synchrony is any
communication (here, historical coherence, continuity and
unity of expression and interpretation) possible at all.
In effect, to allow the grammar to change is to undermine
the possibility of sociality beyond any hope of restoration
on some other ground. Thus, what we are undertaking is a
species of sociological and phenomenological Structuralism,
though linguistic Structuralists may balk at the use of the
1Erhardt Güttgemanns, "Generative Poetics," ed.
Norman R. Petersen, trans. William G. Doty, Semeia 6
(1976), pp. 181-213; Brian W. Kovacs, "Philosophical Founda-
tions for Structuralism: Grounding the Generative Poetics
of Erhardt Güttgemanns," paper presented to the Consulta-
tion on Structuralism of the American Academy of Religion
and the Society of Biblical Literature, San Francisco, 28-
31 December 1977.
29
term.1
We contend that the outcome of the analysis, a
clear grounding of wisdom and certain hypotheses concern-
ing wisdom, is self-justifying and -validating. The up-
shot for evolutionary theories is that those which do not
preserve the structure, the grammar, are ruled out of
court. This happens to the von Rad hypothesis: we submit
that it is grammatically untenable because it does not pre-
serve socio-structural synchrony in the subjectively struc-
tured world of space and time. The evolutionary theories
1Güttgemanns, pp. 198-213; Kovacs, "Philosophical
Foundations for Structuralism"; Schutz and Luckmann, Struc-
tures of the Life-World; Gottwald, "Biblical Theology or
Biblical Sociology?" pp. 42-57; Gottwald and Frick, pp.
110-19; Paul Ricoeur, "Biblical' Hermeneutics," Introduction
by Loretta Dornisch, ed. John Dominic Crossan, Semeia 4
(1975); Daniel Patte, What is Structuralist Exegesis?
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976); Daniel Fatte, "Universal
Narrative Structures and Semantic Frameworks: A Review of
Erhardt Güttgemanns "Generative Poetics,'" paper presented
to the Consultation on Structuralism of the American Academy
of Religion and the Society of Biblical Literature, San
Francisco, 28-31 December 1977. The sociological side of
this methodology was detailed in my paper "Contributions of
Sociology to the Study of the Development of Apocalyptic:
A Theoretical Study," paper presented to the Consultation
on the Social World of Ancient Israel of the American
Academy of Religion and the Society of Biblical Literature,
St. Louis, October 1976; also my "Toward a Phenomenology of
History in Sociological Theory," paper presented to the
Mid-South Sociological Association meeting, Monroe,
Louisiana, 3-5 November 1977. A theoretically important
exegetical word-study that deals with spatio-temporal issues
in wisdom is John R. Wilch, Time and Event: An Exegetical
Study of the Use of ceth in the Old Testament in Comparison
to Other Temporal Expressions in Clarification of the Con-
cept of Time (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969).
30
of Skladny and Schmid are not ruled out, but require fur-
ther proof. The phenomena they point to, to show develop-
ment are intrinsic to the grammar in a number of cases,
and therefore are invariant. The remaining evidence tends
to be insufficient to prove the case except as a philosoph-
ical assumption.
We begin with a minimal enterprise: to show that
certain structurally norming dimensions of experience,
phenomenologically understood, can be inferred from what
must incontrovertibly be regarded as wisdom if anything is.
We infer only what emerges through this socio-structural
approach. Our conclusion is hardly earth-shattering, for
we do not drastically revise the postulated social matrix
for this literature. We do show its compositional co-
herence, at least in terms of its structural grammar. That
coherence, however, has direct application to the problem
of how we are to speak of wisdom at all. From such minimal
analysis comes the possibility of a ground—group with
identity, continuous existence, grammar—for talking mean-
ingfully about the continuity and development of what are
otherwise apparently diverse and incommensurable phenomena.
If the sociological argument stands, then we have a com-
paratively powerful, historically-evidenced basis for making
valid and clear statements about 'wisdom.'
CHAPTER II
THE DEFINITION OF WISDOM
So far, we have spoken uncritically of 'the wise,'
'wisdom' and 'wisdom literature.' We have not yet at-
tempted to specify the relationship which might obtain
between the wise person and his wisdom, whether it be as
a system of thought or a body of literature. What sorts
of meanings lie behind these terms? Here we need to be
careful for we should not resolve critical issues in wis-
dom research by definition. We do not wish to assume
what we should only conclude after thorough study. Still,
cursory examination or simple reflection will show that
'wise' and 'wisdom' are by no means univocal. Not only
can they refer to entirely different classes of people or
entities (when indeed they may be said to refer at all),
but they can be used as quite different analytical cate-
gories.
'Wise' can mean whatever the equivalent Hebrew
term hākâm meant. The meaning of the English term becomes
a function of the historical analysis of language, in-
corporating the vagaries, ambiguities and multiplicities,
even contradictions, of the Hebrew. 'Wise' may refer to
one system of thought, or another. It may refer to one
31
32
or more groups of people in the ancient world, or it may
designate their writings. It may serve as a term of con-
venience within the discipline to identify a discrete
group of writings which otherwise defy ready categoriza-
tion. It may designate a broad social force whose inter-
play with other forces helps explain the general dynamic
patterns of Hebrew history. 'Wisdom' may stand for a
particular intellectual ideal, or style of life, which
some group of writings may be deemed to reflect. The
evidence educed to establish the meaning of 'wise' in one
of these senses may be entirely irrelevant in deciding
another.
While a meticulous author may successfully manipu-
late the same word in several different senses without
material ambiguity, at least for himself, certainly we
need to clarify the alternatives in such a broad and dis-
perate realm of discourse. We should locate our position
clearly within it both to be intelligible and to be valid.
Two basic questions provide the basis for our
terminological and typological discussions. (1) When we
refer to Proverbs IIb as 'wisdom' and its author-editor as
'wise,' what do we mean? (2) What justifies our regarding
Proverbs IIb, not to mention the other mashal collections,
as wisdom? First, we shall ask how 'wisdom' may function
as a defined theoretical category. We shall list
33
alternatives, some albeit quite obvious. Under certain
rubrics, we shall need to consider the scholarly contri-
butions which represent or summarize the options under
that mode of approach. In the next chapter, we shall turn
to a wisdom typology. A number of these categories re-
flect distinctively different settings, literary forms,
and patterns of life and thought within "wisdom." Rather
than treat them either as a function of particular me-
thodologies or presenting them in the form of a history of
scholarship, we shall treat them systematically. These
distinctions will be used to differentiate types of wisdom.
This discussion should help us decide what meanings and
types of wisdom are, or could reasonably be, relevant to
the study of aphoristic wisdom and the mashal literature.
We recognize that the distinction between definition and
type is somewhat arbitrary. Still, it may prove to be
useful for analytical clarity and intelligibility.
As a scholarly term, 'wisdom' serves a number of
theoretical and practical ends. The list which follows is
intended to incorporate or represent the most important
of these. Important uses will require some discussion and
develop at the risk of digression. Given the present
stage in the development of wisdom studies, we have to
show how it is possible to talk about wisdom in this ma-
terial before we can begin to talk about wisdom there.
34
1. Wisdom is a field of study. In this view,
whatever wisdom is, it is a distinct phenomenon in Hebrew
history and religious experience, as well as in Hebrew
literature. Therefore, one can distinguish it as an as-
pect of Hebrew life and culture to be studied and reported
upon. This sense of wisdom is obvious; its presupposi-
tions, less so. It assumes that wisdom is sufficiently
distinct yet internally coherent that one can study it as
a subdisciplinary specialty. Setting boundaries in a
discipline is rarely easy, especially in recent studies of
wisdom which find evidence of it in prophecy, myth, his-
tory and priestly-legal material.1 Wisdom used in this
sense tells us something about the self-identification of
scholars, a legitimate concern, but not about wisdom as a
historical phenomenon.2
2. Wisdom is a body of literature. The tern may
function either as a description--to relate works with
affinities of form and content--or as a convenient term, a
name, to associate works with certain traditional relation-
ships. Thus, Canticles is sometimes included as wisdom
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," p. 129, n. 1; Whybray, Intellectual Tradition,
p. 1, n. 1; Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," pp. 1-13.
2Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp. 226-27.
35
literature because of its traditional attribution to
Solomon, its apparent secularism, and its lack of fit with
any other category of Hebrew scripture. As a description,
wisdom entails that there is something common to these
works which transcends the obvious diversity.1
3. Wisdom is a system of thought. Whether this
system is a theology, sacrally founded and ordered, or a
“philosophy,” in the non-anachronistic sense of secular
and ordered, systematic and consistent, remains to be
demonstrated. Most attempts to define wisdom fall some-
where within this rubric. This sense is potentially one
of the most restrictive. It may exclude those writers and
works which adopt wisdom motifs but employ them in the
service of their own theological ends.2 On the other
hand, it is potentially the most powerful way of using
'wisdom.'
“A coherent system of thought” closely accords with
some commonsense definitions of wisdom. Since our sources
are principally literary, we would expect them to express
1Roland E. Murphy, Introduction to the Wisdom
Literature of the Old Testament, Old Testament Reading
Guide, vol. 22 (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical
Press, 1965); Scott, Way of Wisdom, pp. 19-22.
2Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," p. 133; Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," pp. 1-13; Cren-
shaw, "Wisdom in the Old Testament," pp. 954-55.
36
an orientation toward life which can be readily and sys-
tematically understood (i.e., learned) and intelligibly
communicated (taught).1 We might, without undue violence,
subsume much of the history of wisdom study under this
rubric. We shall find, however, that there is often some
ambiguity between wisdom in this sense and wisdom in the
sense of one of the categories following below: e.g.,
between wisdom as conceptual system and wisdom as a pattern
of behavior. Wisdom seen as conceptual system--system of
thought--is the sense which follows most naturally from
our attempt to project a world-view from the literature,
though we shall have to deal with other approaches to
wisdom as well.
We should consider the alternative kinds of defi-
nitions offered when wisdom is taken as a conceptual system
and pay some attention to the scholarship underlying each
of these alternatives. Among the terms which recur in
such discussions are "knowledge," "understanding" and "ex-
perience."2 The wise man recognizes the patterns that
develop in his experience. He objectifies these patterns
1Ernst Würthwein, Die Weisheit Ägyptens und das
Alte Testament: Rede zur Rektoratsübergabe am 29. Novem-
ber 1958, Schriften der Philipps-Universität Marburg, no.
6 (Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1960).
2Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," pp. 3-9, 36-37;
Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, pp. 6-14.
37
into a more encompassing description.1 He "knows how" to
apply this description to interpret and respond to novel
situations. Consider the interesting double-entendre in
the English word "experience." To undergo something is to
experience it: it is the occurrence of a single event.
To have undergone a wide range of diverse occurrences is
also called experience. To know how to deal with a wide
variety of often-novel situations is experience. Com-
petence can be experience.
a) Wisdom as Geistesbeschäftigung. Jolles'
work with basic literary forms could certainly be classi-
fied with wisdom as form below. On the other hand, his
work provides the theoretical foundation for many subse-
quent theological studies in biblical wisdom. These build,
implicitly or explicitly, from the assumption that there is
a pattern of human conceptualization that corresponds
uniquely to each basic form. Wisdom represents a particu-
lar use of man's capacity to create his reality through
language.2
Jolles' three terms for the basic functions of
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 13-27; Schmid,
Wesen and Geschichte der Weisheit, pp. 79-84.
2Jolles, Einfache Formen, pp. 218-19.
38
language are erzeugend, schaffend and deutend.1 These
correspond to archetypal social roles: Bauer, Handar-
beiter and Priester.2 To give a word to something, a
thing or an event occurring in nature, is to create. It
becomes an independent existent through the word. The
word not only names by direct reference to a specific
situation, but it creates new applications beyond the an-
ticipation and power of the word's user. Superstition
reflects our attempts to do something effective about the
power of the word. Not only is the word potent, but it
organizes and structures the world of experience: not
erfüllen now but dichten. The reality which language
creates not only gives us direct access to history--what
we might call objectified experience--but it virtually
builds a separate reality, poetically. We can summon it
to mind, understand it and use it as understanding. The
world of poetry is independent of the existence of the
factitious world of experience. Finally, language gives
meaning. It is recognition and thought (erkennen and
denken). It structures life's patterns, helping one to
interpret new aspects of existence. Analogies and simi-
larities are perceived through language. Understanding,
1Jolles, Einfache Formen, pp. 9, 15.
2Jolles, Einfache Formen, pp. 9-15.
39
then, is a linguistic process.1
Each spiritual task in human life (as Geistes-
beschäftigung) calls up a corresponding elementary form
of speech event: legend, saga, myth, riddle, saying,
"Kasus,"2 memoire, fable and joke.3 While fable and
riddle are regarded as also being characteristic forms in
the study of Hebrew and ancient Near Eastern wisdom,4
Jolles' analysis of the saying or Spruch form in particular
seems to have had the greatest influence on scholarly
studies in wisdom especially those which treat wisdom as
somehow related to "experience."5
Suffice to say that Jolles regards the saying as a
popular high-order abstraction from experience which so
tersely objectifies repeatedly experienced situations that
1Jolles Einfache Formen, pp. 13-18.
2Case-in-point, legal case, situation--the novel
falls under this rubric.
3Jolles, Einfache Formen, pp. 218-22, passim.
4Hans Meinhold, Die Weisheit Israels in Spruch,
Sage und Dichtung (Leipzig: Verlag von Quelle und Meyer,
1908), pp. 13-21; Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp. 239-47; Brian W.
Kovacs, "Reflections on Ancient Hebrew Riddles, Fables and
Allegories," paper presented to the Seminar on the Form
Critical Study of Wisdom, Society of Biblical Literature
annual meeting, Chicago, 30 October-2 November 1975,
5Von Rad, certainly in his Old Testament Theology,
1:355-459, and probably in Weisheit in Israel; perhaps
Schmid in his Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit; cf.
Hermisson, Sprüchweisheit, pp. 29-34.
40
it is instantly intelligible. Its truth and application
to one's situation is immediately obvious. It recreates
the situation that led to its first utterance.1 Since his
influence in Germanistic and linguistic studies is so
great, though perhaps somewhat idiosyncratic, we may sus-
pect other emphases to owe something to his work as well
wisdom as pragmatic and worldly-wise (the concern for ob-
jectified experience over systematic speculation; applica-
tion to life), wisdom as popular in use and form of ex-
pression, wisdom as secular (experience is general and re-
created; opposed to myth), wisdom as universal (the Spruch
is not culture bound), wisdom as immediate intuition (Jolles
in accord with Grimm), wisdom as knowledge objectified by
and expressed in language.2
Since Jolles recognizes that a saying must origi-
nate with a specific individual and a particular situation
1Jolles, Einfache Formes, pp. 128-29.
2Walter Baumgartner, Israelitische und Alt-
orientalische Weisheit, Sammlung Gemeinverständlicher
Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie and
Religionsgeschichte, vol. 166 (Tubingen: Verlag von J. C. B.
Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1933); Johannes Fichtner, Die Alt-
orientalische Weisheit in ihrer Israelitisch-Jüdischen
Ausprägung: eine Studie zur Nationalisierung der Weisheit
In Israel, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Alttestament-
liche Wissenschaft, vol. 62 (Giessen: Verlag von Alfred
Töpelmann, 1933); Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 177-204; Gese,
Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 7-11, 42-50; von Rad, Weisheit
in Israel, pp. 13-27; Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, pp.
6-14, 75-76; Gemser, "Spiritual Structure," pp. 138-49.
41
before it can be re-formed and re-formulated in popular ap-
plication, his influence cannot be dismissed because a
scholar also recognizes the theological nationalism of ben
Sirah, the Wisdom of Solomon and IV Maccabbees through a
theory of the theologizing of wisdom. On the contrary,
Jolles' interpretation of the saying readily lends itself,
in fact invites, treatment in terms of an evolutionary
theory of history, especially one with elements drawn from
Hegelian dialectic. Thus, secular and practical wisdom
based on international models is re-formed and re-formu-
lated gradually to suit its new Israelite setting--re-
applied to experience a la Schmid—acquiring an appropri-
ate theological cast.1
b) Wisdom as know-how, savoir-faire. Fichtner
defines wisdom:
Weisheit ist die Kunst, das Leben in jeder Beziehung
und in alien Lagen wie ein Meister zu führen. Das
setzt voraus, dass überall eine von Menschen zu
erfassende Gesetzmässigkeit herrscht, nach der dem
jeweiligen Verhalten ein bestimmtes Ergebnis ent-
spricht. Diese Gesetzmässigkeit.meint der Weise im
praktischen Leben des Tages, im Beruf, ira Verkehr
mit den Menschen, überall beobachten zu können:
mit einer Regelmässigkeit, die dem Beobachter als
Gesetzmässigkeit erscheint. . . . Aus seinen
Beobachtungen formt der Weise Ratschläge allgemeiner
Lebenserfahrung und Weltklugheit. --Weiter sieht er,
dass das Gemeinschaftsleben von dem einzelnen die
1Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, pp.
145-96.
42
Anerkennung der in der Gemeinschaft geltenden
sittlichen Norm fordert. Von ihren Geltungsrecht
innerlich erfasst erklärt er Unglück und Verderben
als Folge der Übertretung der Norm, Glück und
Gelingen als Folge normgemässen Handelns.1
The wise so often saw this retribution which social norms
demanded that they conceived of it as a governing order.
Fichtner postulates a theologizing of wisdom in time,
"ohne freilich ihren Zusammenhang mit der übrigen alt-
orientalischen Weisheit völlig zu verleugnen."2
Baumgartner points out that the Hebrew wise did
not develop systematic philosophy like the Greeks' but
“praktische Lebensweisheit. Weise ist, wer seine Leben
so einrichtet, dass es zu einem guten Ende führt."3 He
adds:
Freilich was wir sonst im Alten Testament als
spezifisch israelitisch kennen, tritt hier auffallend
zurück: Sinai-Offenbarung und Gottesbund, Israels
Erwählung und heilige Geschichte. Ja, von Israel als
Volk ist überhaupt kaum die Rede. Die Chokma wendet
sich an den Einzelnen, nicht ans Volk. Sie unter-
scheidet nicht Israel und die Heiden, sondern Weise
und Toren; und diese Unterscheidung geht mitten durch
das eigene Volk hindurch.4
c) Wisdom as anthropocentric counsel, erfahrungs-
gemäss. Zimmerli followed on the work of Fichtner and
1Fichtner, Altorientalische Weisheit, p. 12.
2Fichtner, Altorientalische Weisheit, p. 59.
3Baumgartner, Weisheit, p. 1.
4Baumgartner, Weisheit, p. 2.
43
Baumgartner with his classic study,'"Zur Struktur der alt-
testamentlichen Weisheit"1 Taking Proverbs as a starting
point, he finds that the archetypes of the wise man and the
fool represent alternative total patterns or styles of life
(Gesamtlebenshaltung), which resolve the question of life,
rightly and wrongly respectively. Neither the answer nor
the question are in themselves interesting for purposes of
our interpretive understanding. Rather, we are concerned
with the kind of prior understanding, presupposition
(Vorverständnis) or preconception (Vorentscheidung) which
everywhere runs throughout and informs the wise' total
pattern of life.2
Zimmerli does not present a simple definition of
wisdom's preconception of life. He does, however, set out
a number of characteristics that together typify wisdom.
First, it is anthropocentric; it is concerned with human
possibilities.3 "Sie behält ihren Schwerpunckt im ein-
zelnen, ungeschichtlichen Menschen, nach dessen Glück sie
fragt.”4 Second, though man is autonomous, he is a creature
1His revision of this 1933 position falls under a
slightly different classification below.
2Zimmerli, "Struktur," p. 177.
3Zimmerli, "Struktur," p. 178.
4Zimmerli, "Struktur," p. 178.
44
and bound to the order of the creator.1 Third, in Israel,
wisdom tends to depart from its aristocratic international
origins and become democratized. It becomes the property
of the people.2 Fourth, the admonitions of wisdom carry
authority, and they guide man through the "profane world."
This “authority” is not that of law or command; it is im-
personal while authority in the strict sense is personal.
The power of wisdom lies in its counsel (Rat, cēsāh).3
Fifth, wisdom is a summation of experience upon which the
advisee is to reflect, and from that reflection to act:
'grundliche Überiegung der 'erfahrungsgemäss' sich ein-
stellenden Folgen."4
Der Schwerpunkt liegt also hinter dem Wortlaut der
Anweisung in der Begründung, in den Erfahrungssatz,
der von dem Menschen einkalkuliert werden soll, den
er überlegen, aus dessen Überlegung heraus er
handeln soll. Das konkrete Handeln ist im Grunde
freigegeben.5
Thus, Zimmerli calls attention to the existence of
two characteristic wisdom forms side by side, the simple
saying (Aussage) and the motivated admonition (Mahnspruch,
Mahnung). The first is obviously counsel. The second
1Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 179-80.
2Zimmerli, "Struktur,” p, 181.
3Zimmerli, "Struktur,” pp. 181-88.
4Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 188-89.
5Zimmerli, "Struktur," p. 188.
45
acquires its power through its assessment of consequences
on the basis of experience. That is its authority.1
Es ist überhaupt kein Gehorsam von Wille zu Wille,
sondern ein freies Verfügen des Hörenden auf Grund
der ihm aufgewiesenen Zusammenhänge und Gesetz-
massigkeiten.2
Sixth, even in religious matters, wisdom thought
begins with man's possibilities and his interests. Yahweh
does not appear as the imponderable authoritarian creator.
He is viewed from man's context in terms of his effect on
human activities.3 Thus,
Auch die Begründungssatze der Mahnungen . . .
lassen eine letztgültige Berufung auf gesetzte
Ordnung vermissen und orientieren sich am ein-
zelnen Ich und seinen Vortei1.4
Seventh, Zimmerli finds the "better"-sayings (tôb-
min) quite significant. The wise did not hold a view of
absolute good in spite of the paired opposites (Zwillinge
--wise and fool, rich and poor, good and evil) so common
to the literature. Absolute good would imply clear-cut
duties for the wise. Rather, they compared possible values
and calculated outcomes. They considered advantages and
disadvantages. Zimmerli, therefore, takes over Fichtner's ,
1Zimmerli, “Struktur,” pp. 188-92.
2Zimmerli, “Struktur,” p. 188.
3Zimmerli, "Struktur," p. 192.
4Zimmerli, "Struktur," p. 192.
46
term "eudaimonistic" to describe this calculation and self-
determination (selbst-verfügen).1 The naively optimistic
attitude of Proverbs reflects the perspective of normative
(international) wisdom, which asks the question, "Wie
steigere ich mein Dasein durch Glück, und Leben?”2
Job and Ecclesiastes, however, call the mēden agan
of normative wisdom into question when they pose the ques-
tion how man secures his existence in its negative form,
"Wie bewähre ich mich vor Unglück, vor all vor vorzeitigen
Tod?"3 They concern themselves with the limits of man's
control over his destiny. Divine retributive justice still
acts in areas of life where man is powerless. They do not
reject the wisdom question. They do not curse God and die.
Nor do they see these limits as a direct conflict between
divine justice and human possibility, thereby negating the
wisdom hierarchy of values:4
Der Weiseempfindet keinen Bruch zwischen seiner
Einstellung und der Gottbedingtheit der Welt. Die
Ansprüche Gottes und der Menschen brauchen nicht in
Konflict zu geraten. Sein Glaube ist es vielmehr,
dass in der göttlichen Weltordnung für des Menschen
Lebensverlangen aufs beste gesorgt ist, dass der
eigentliche Glücksanspruch des Menschen im bereit-
willigen Einflügen in die göttliche Weltordnung voll
1Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 192-94, 203.
2Zimmerli, "Struktur," p, 198.
3Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 198-99.
4Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 194-204.
47
befriedigt wird. Auch Gott kommt zu seinem Recht,
wenn der Mensch (auf dem richtigen Wege) sein
Glück sucht. Und ebenso umgekehrt: Auch der
Mensch kommt am allerbesten und sichersten zu
seinem Glück, wenn er Gott fürchtet.1
Last, the fundamental orientation of wisdom is
a-historical because its fundamental concern is to under-
stand all of reality rationally, in its diversity and com-
plexity ("der naive Optimismus und die Geschichtlosigkeit
des Lebens als notwendige Ausstrahlung dieser rational-
istischen Grundhaltung").2
As developed by Zimmerli and later summarized by
Schmid, this perspective on wisdom could be characterized
as rationalism, which could therefore well be sub-category
d). Schmid summarizes this view succinctly:
Utilitarisch, eudämonistisch, rational, ursprünglich
profan, später religiös, geschichtlos, überzeitlich:
das sind die Attribute, welche die Weisheit während
der letzten dreissig Jahre zu tragen hatte.3
What intellectual debt--if any--Baumgartner, Fichtner and
Zimmerli might owe to the work of Jolles would be difficult
to establish. They continue to see wisdom as founded on
common human experience and oriented toward “secular” ends.
Wisdom is knowledge; it is learned by and communicated as
language. For them, the archetype of wisdom seems to be
1Zimmerli, “Struktur,” p. 203.
2Zimmerli, “Struktur," p. 204.
3Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, p. 3.
48
the saying. Von Rad's work proceeds from this view. He
himself expressly acknowledges Jolles' contribution to his
work.1
e) Wisdom as gnomic apperception. In his earlier
studies, predating Weisheit in Israel, von Rad speaks thus
of wisdom:
Wie alle Völker, so verstand auch Israel unter
"Weisheit" ein ganz praktisches, auf Erfahrung
gegründetes Wissen von den Gesetzen des Lebens
und der Welt. . . . Dieses Ausgehen von ele-
mentaren Erfahrungen ist das Charakteristische
fast für alle ihre Lebensäusseruncen. In alien
Kulturstufen steht ja der Mensch vor der Aufgabe,
das Leben zu bewältigen. Zu diesem Zweck muss er
es kennen und darf nicht ablassen, zu beobachten
und zu lauschen, ob sich in der Wirrnis der Gescheh-
nisse nicht doch da und dort etwas wie eine Gesetz-
mässigkeit, eine Ordnung erkennen lässt.2
. . . The means of laying hold of and objectifying
such orders when once perceived is language. . .
Undoubtedly [the Pairs of Opposites] are to be
understood as primitive attempts to mark off certain
orders and tie them down in words.3
Here we find unmistakable parallels with Jolles.
Remembering that sayings represent normative wisdom, we
may continue with von Rad:
Now, when we bear in mind that every people expended
a great deal of trouble and artistry in the formation
1Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:421-22.
2"Die Ältere Weisheit Israels," Kerygma und Dogma:
Zeitschrift für Theologische und Kirchliche Lehre 2
(1956) :54-72; cf. his Old Testament Theology 1:418.
3Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:418.
49
of this kind of Wisdom literature, and that gnomic
apperception is in fact one of the most elegant
forms of human thinking and a weapon in the
struggle for spiritual content in life, it will
be apparent that there are two completely dif-
ferent forms of the apperception of truth for
mankind--one systematic (philosophical and theo-
logical) and one empirical and gnomic. Each re-
quires the other. Where the one employed by the
Wisdom literature is wanting, men are in danger
of reducing everything to dogma, and indeed of
runing off into ideological fantasy. Empirical
and gnomic wisdom starts from the unyielding pre-
supposition that there is a hidden order in things
and events--only, it has to be discerned in them,
with great patience and at the cost of all kinds
of painful experience. And this order is kindly
and righteous. But, characteristically, it is
not understood systematically--and therefore not
in such a way as to reduce all the variety ex-
perienced and perceived to a general principle of
order. . . . As Jolles says, conceptual thinking
cannot possibly apprehend the world to which
gnomic thinking applies itself. Wisdom examines
the phenomenal world to discern its secrets, but
allows whatever it finds to stand in its own
particular character absolutely.1
To von Rad, the growing scepticism of Job and
Qoheleth does not represent a repudiation of wisdom.
Their conflict is only intelligible from wisdom's pre-
suppositions about the world. Thus in this respect, he
follows Zimmerli.2
f) Wisdom as humanism. One finds quite a
different approach from the fore-going definitions and
1Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:421-22,
2Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:441-59;
Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 198-204.
50
descriptions of wisdom in this section when one turns to
the work of Rankin. His basic operating concept is
humanism.1
The Wisdom literature may be called the documents
of Israel's humanism, not in the sense of a re-
jection of the supernatural, or even as intending
a concern chiefly with man's welfare, but because
its general characteristic is the recognition of
man's moral responsibility, his religious indi-
viduality and of God's interest in the individual
life.2
All wisdom writings concern themselves with the
ordinary individual--even when wisdom becomes hypostasized
into an intermediary being between God and man.
Because the interest of the Wisdom books is of
this nature, they yield not merely a vast body of
moral teaching but complete the foundation of
thought upon which a theology could be built.
. . . They [the wise] are the rationalists of
Hebrew thought and religion.3
While prophetic and priestly thought took only
the community into account, the wise looked at a person's
peace, welfare and happiness in the context of family
and community. In wisdom thought, attention is paid to
the basic motives behind human conduct: "gratitude,
1O. S. Rankin, Israel's Wisdom Literature: Its
Bearing on Theology and the History of Religion; the Kerr
Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, Glasgow, 1933-36
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, n.d.), pp. 1-9.
2Rankin, p. 3.
3Rankin, p. 3.
51
friendship, love, hate, wealth, reputation."1 "Wisdom is
the ability to assess truly the values of life."2
Weinfeld, in his studies of the relationship be-
tween Deuteronomy and wisdom, takes over the term
"humanism" from Rankin, following in the tradition of
S. R. Driver, Delitzsch and Cheyne.3
The humanistic ideology which characterizes
sapiential teaching scrutinizes all matters
from the human point of view and consequently
seeks those ends which will prove to be for
"man's good."4
. . . The conventional sapiential view identi-
fies wisdom with the knowledge and understand-
ing of nature's laws. . . 5
Weinfeld approves Rankin's view that "the social
ideas of Proverbs are, properly speaking, distinctly
sapiential ideas, based on the concept of the 'equality
of men,' which in turn derives from the sapiential concept
1Rankin, p. 4.
2Rankin, p. 4.
3Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic
School (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); Moshe Weinfeld,
“The Orgin of the Humanism in Deuteronomy," Journal of
Biblical Literature 80 (September 1961): 241-47; Moshe
Weinfeld, "Deuteronomy--the Present State of the Inquiry,"
Journal of Biblical Literature 86 (September 1967): 249-62;
C. M. Carmichael, "Deuteronomic Laws, Wisdom, and His-
torical Traditions," Journal of Semitic Studies 12 (1967):
198-206; Jean. Malfroy, "Sagesse et Loi dans le Deuteronome:
Études," Vetus Testamentum 15 (1965): 49-65.
4Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, pp. 308-9.
5Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, p. 257.
52
of the 'Creator of man' predominating in wisdom litera-
ture."1 In this respect, scholars in this tradition
approach a view which we shall not discuss, wisdom as
creation theology g). Continuing, Weinfeld contends that
this humanistic ideology is international. Still, he
argues that a special kind of theologizing process in
Israel led to deuteronomic thinking. The yir’at yahweh
upon which wisdom is then said to be grounded reflects a
growing conflict with the conventional sapiential view
that wisdom is universal knowledge:
The sapiential authors of these dicta apparently
wished to say . . . that man's wisdom lies in his
moral behaviour. They realized that the human
mind could neither fathom the mysteries of creation
nor acquire universal knowledge . . . and that the
only wisdom man could aspire to was that which per-
tained to human affairs, i.e. Lebensweisheit and
not Naturweisheit.2
The ideology upon which the humanistic ethic is founded is
thus theologized and circumscribed. The deuteronomists
combined this new humanism with Torah.3
The application of the term "humanism" to wisdom
tends to shade together several different conceptual
1Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, p. 295.
2Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, p. 258.
3Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, pp. 158-319; Weinfeld,
"Humanism in Deuteronomy," pp. 241-47.
53
categories. "Rationalism" (Rankin) and "ideology"
(Weinfeld) suggest a system or body of thought which
unites all of wisdom, as we have discussed above.1 But,
“moral responsibility” and "moral behaviour" reflect wis-
dom as ethos: that wisdom distinguished by a certain
pattern of action.2 The more, since there seem to be
severe limitations to the wise' ability to know. Wein-
feld also seems to use “wisdom,” "sapiential," and
"humanism" as theological categories to unite common
strands out of seemingly diverse intellectual movements
and divers social groups.3
h) Wisdom as the perception of a divine or supra-
mundane universal order. This approach to understanding
wisdom takes its point of intellectual departure from
Egyptian wisdom and its doctrine of maat. Gese quotes
Frankfort's dismissal of eudaimonistic-pragmatic explana-
tions of wisdom:
The usual comment on this type of advice is
totally inadequate. It is neither a rule of
1Rankin, p. 25; Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, p. 189;
cf. Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, pp. 1-14.
2We shall deal with wisdom as behavior or ethos
below. Of course, one can only infer what behavior was
historically from evidence, generally literary what. has
been said about the supposed behavior.
3Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, pp. 158-89.
54
good conduct, nor a plan for making a man popu-
lar and likely to gain advancement--in fact,
can think of no behavior more likely to get one
into trouble.1
Here, Frankfort refers to Kagemni's counsel not to eat
until a greedy man is sated nor drink until the drunkard
has taken his fill. His and Gese's remarks reflect a
general dissatisfaction with the rational-pragmatic inter-
pretation.2
Frankfort argues that we have read a modern con-
trast back into history. We distinguish worldly savoir-
faire from religiously motivated ethical behavior. The
Egyptian perceived no distinction. He lived in a world
suffused by a single order that was at once social, ethi-
cal and cosmological:
The Egyptians recognized a divine order, estab-
lished at the time of creation; this order is
manifest in nature in the normalcy of phenomena;
it is manifest in society as justice; and it is
manifest in an individual's life as truth. Maat
is this order, the essence of existence, whether
we recognize it or not.
The conception of Maat expresses the Egyptian
belief that the universe is changeless and that
all apparent opposites must, therefore, hold each
other in equilibrium. Such a belief has definite
consequences in the field of moral philosophy. It
puts a premium on whatever exists with a semblance
1Henri Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion: An
Interpretation, Cloister Library of Harper Torchbooks
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 71; Gese, Lehre
und Wirklichkeit, p. 9.
2Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 7-11.
55
of permanence. It excludes ideals of progress,
utopias of any kind, revolutions, or any other
radical changes in existing conditions. It al-
lows a man "to strive after every excellence
until there be no fault in his nature," but im-
plies, as we have seen, harmony with the estab-
lished order, the latter not taken in any vague
and general way but quite specifically as that
which exists with seeming permanence.1
Order, maat, is no impersonal force. That would
be a modern concept. But, deviation from order is also no
act of rebellion. Disharmony brings about the inevitable
intervention of some deity in an act of retributive jus-
tice, but the operation of act and consequence is not
automatic. The world is permeated by a profound religious
order. It is man's religious and ethical responsibility
to recognize this order and to put himself in harmony with
it. Thus, authority becomes significant.2
Gese expressly applies the analogy of maat to
wisdam in Israel. There, he finds the notion of order,
not pragmatism:
Wir müssen uns auch hier im Alten Testament vor
der eudämonistischen Interpretation hüten, wenn
wir nicht auf Grund der uns eigentümlichen
Scheidung von innen and ausseren Erfolg, Mass-
stäbe an die Weisheitslehre herantragen wollen,
die ihr--zumindest in ihrem Ursprung--wesentlich
fremd sind. Vielmehr wird hier in der Weisheit
1Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, p. 64.
2Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, pp. 64-71,
passim.
56
auf Grund der Erkenntnis einer der Welt inne-
wohnenden Ordnung gesagt, lass der Fleissige
durch sein Tun reich, der Faule arm wird; und
ebenso wird der Gerezhte Erfolg, der Ungerechte
Misserfolg davontragen. Wir könnten fast von
einer naturgesetzlichen Weise sprechen, in der
sich die Folge aus der Tat ergibt.1
Gese notes the Unverfügbarkeit of this order in
both Egypt and Israel. Man is inescapably bound to the
fundamental order that gcverns the world. Act and result
are inextricably bound together (Tat-Ergehen-Zusammenhang)
in human action. Man is utterly incapable of interposing
himself in this complex.2
Israel differs from Egypt. It breaks through the
fateful working out of this process (schicksalwirkende
Tatsphäre). Yahweh is independent of this order. We do
find royal ideology in wisdom; the king is the guarantor
of order. But, in the same way that Yahweh can act freely
with respect to the king, so Yahweh is completely free from
the order's jurisdiction. Israelite wisdom is not rigidly
determinist. Job emphasizes Yahweh's freedom with respect
to his created order, and strengthens the implicit double
standard in Hebrew wisdom: that wisdom is nothing with
respect to Yahweh. Job however accepts the fundamental
premise of order which typifies Hebrew wisdom. Its
1Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 34-35.
2Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 44-45.
57
solution leads us again into wisdom thinking.1 Gese's
concluding sentence reflects the paradox of Hebrew wisdom:
Die grossartige und tief religiöse altori-
entalische Weisheit ist in Israel aufgenommen
und bewältigt worden, die Bindung an meta-
physische Ordnungqn wurde durch den Glauben an
Jahwä überwunden.2
In sum,
. . . The wisdom literature of Israel--like that
of Egypt--seeks above all to discover the order
that is inherent in the world and human life,
making it possible for man to accommodate himself
reasonably to this order. This inherent order,
however, is righteousness. That is to say, the
Hebrew sedaqâ corresponds in function to the
Egyptian concept of m3ct, "truth," or better
"righteousness," "orderly management."3
i) Wisdom as the knowledge of authoritative
divine will. Gese's view of wisdom, in terms of order,
the relationship of act and result, and the freedom of
Yahweh, over against the anthropocentric-eudaimonistic
definitions, has steadily gained ground in wisdom studies.
Both von Rad and Zimmerli have substantially revised their
positions to respond to this line of reasoning
1Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 42, 45-78.
2Gese, Lehre und Wi.rklichkeit, p. 78.
3Helmer Ringgren, Israelite Religion, trans.
David E. Green (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), pp.
133.
4Von Rad in his Weisheit in Israel compared to the
views expressed in his Old Testament Theology and "Ältere
58
Gemser was one of the first to recognize the im-
plications in Gese's proposals. His article on the
"Spiritual Structure of Biblical Aphoristic Wisdom" did
not propound a drastically new definition of wisdom so
much as pose certain problems that implied redefinition.1
First, he asked, with what authority does wisdom
teaching confront its hearers? For Gemser, as for
de Boer,2 cēsah is not discussible advice:
The counsels of the wise are not advice offered
without obligation to the free discussion and de-
cision of the addressed, they claim to be listened
to and followed up and put into practice.3
Second, from what does this teaching derive its
authority? If Gese be right, authority derives from
divine order, permeating and interpenetrating the struc-
ture of the world.4 Von Rad points out that the search
for order is inherent in language itself:
Weisheit Israels"; Zimmerli in "Place and Limit" as op-
posed to his earlier "Struktur."
1pp. 138-49.
2P. A. H. de Boer, “The Counsellor,” in Wisdom in
Israel and in the Ancient Near East: Presented to Pro-
fessor Harold Henry Rowley, ed. Martin Noth and D. Winton
Thomas, Vetus Testamentum Supplements, vol. 3 (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1955), pp. 42-71.
3Gemser, "Spiritual Structure," p. 146..
4Gese, Lehre and Wirklichkeit, pp. 33-45; Gemser,
"Spiritual Structure," p. 142.
59
Parallel and intertwined with this universal
ancient belief in an impersonal, yet authoritative
world-order was the conviction that wisdom was a
prerogative and gift of the gods; wisdom and word,
intelligence and speech were even, in Egypt as well
as in Babylonia and Ugarit, thought of as personal
divine beings. No wonder that in ancient Israel
with its fundamental belief in a personal, even one
personal Deity wisdom was seen as one of the most
essential qualities of God, and the teachings of
wisdom as the expressions of his will.1
Third, if all have equal authority, how does the
counsel of the wise differ from the words of prophets or
the torah of priests? The fact that these groups are dis-
tinct implies a clear difference in the types of authority
appropriate to and held by each. Gemser quotes himself in
reply, analyzing the semantic role of the motivating
clauses:
"The motive clauses with their appeal to the common
sense and to the conscience of the people disclose
the truly democratic character of their laws, just
as those (the motivations) of the religious kind
testify the deep religious sense and concentrated
theological thinking of their formulators."2
Motivations are a pedagogic device. “They are appropriate
to what is being taught; they are not an appeal to ex-
perience, nor evidence of one. We wonder, however, whether
Gemser has replied to precisely the question he set
1Gemser, “Spiritual Structure,” p. 147.
2Gemser, “Spiritual Structure,” p. 148 quoting
from his "The Importance of Motive Clauses in Old Testa-
ment Law," in Copenhagen Congress Volume, Vetus Testa-
mentum Supplements, vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1953),
p. 63.
60
himself. This distinction must derive from didactic in-
tent and from setting, suggesting some unstated assump-
tions about the nature and objective of wisdom. Still,
Gemser clearly stated his intent to pose questions, not
necessarily to answer them, except perhaps by implica-
tion.1
j) Wisdom as artful life-mastery in the context
of a divinely created and ordered world. In response to
the growing emphasis on authority, theology, and divine
order, Zimmerli has modified some of his views on wisdom
thought, though not so much perhaps as Gemser has sug-
gested. Zimmerli continues to emphasize wisdom's anthro-
pocentrism. He points out, as Baumgartner had long
before, that "Wisdom has no relation to the history between
God and Israel."2 While people and king appear as socio-
logical elements in wisdom, one misses there even a
theologizing of the obvious Solomonic connection with a
possible covenant theology.3
1Gemser, "Motive Clauses," pp. 50-66; Gemser,
"Spiritual Structure," pp. 138-49.
2Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," p. 147; Baumgartner,
Weisheit, pp. 1-2.
3 Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," p. 147; Crenshaw,
"Prolegomenon," p. 2.
61
Zimmerli raises to central importance a point he
had made in his earlier article. "Wisdom thinks resolutely
within the framework of a theology of creation.”1 This
theology, however, is not based on an immutable order or
an instruction to trust in Yahweh.
Wisdom is per definitionem tahbūlôth, ‘the art
of steering,’ knowledge of how to do in life, and
thus it has a fundamental alignment to man and
his preparing to master human life.2
Zimmerli repeats the importance of history as he
finds it in the mashal. The saying (Aussagewort) appre-
hends the elements of experience, defining and delimiting
them ("establishing them").3 The admonition applies what
is thereby understood to man's life-situation. It tells
him how to behave. It shows him how to gain his life
"with respect for the surrounding world of order, even the
order of the divine world.”4 “Wisdom shows man as a being
1Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," p. 148; cf. Gerhard
von Rad, "Das Theologische Problem des Alttestamentlichen
Schöpfungsglaubens," in Werden und Wesen des Alten Testa-
ments: Vorträge Gehalten auf der Interhationalen Tagung
Alttestamentlicher Forscher zu Gottingen vom 4.-10.
September 1935, ea. Johannes Hempel, Friedrich Stummer, and
Paul Volz, Beihiefte zur Zeitschrift für die Alttestament-
liche Wissenschaft, vol. 66 (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann,
1936), pp. 138-47.
2Zimmerli, "Place and Limit, p. 149; Gese, Lehre
and Wirklichkeit, p. 47.
3Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," pp. 150-51.
4Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," p. 151.
62
who goes out, who apprehends through his knowledge, who es-
tablishes, who orders the world."1 "Wisdom seeks to be a
human art of life in the sense of mastering life in the
framework of a given order in this life."2
Its theology of creation emphasizes the subordina-
tion of the order of the world to the will of Yahweh.
Even Qoheleth operates from the presuppositions of wisdom,
and sets the bounds of wisdom before its creator. The
attempt to master life can turn into utter foolishness
before Yahweh.
Through his sapiential encounter with the reality of
the world Ecclesiastes caught sight of the freedom of
God, who acts and never reacts. He feels this free-
dom of God as a painful limitation of his own impulse
to go out into the world by wisdom and to master the
world. Nevertheless he holds unswervingly fast to
the creator, who alone has power to allot and to
dispose of the times.3
Qoheleth sharpens the creation theology and sets the
bounds of anthropocentric wisdom; he accepts what is pos-
sible within those limits.
Zimmerli rejects any attempt to equate wisdom's
authority with that of apodictic law or prophetic word. A
tension remains between creation theology and the anthro-
1Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," p. 150.
2Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," p. 155.
3Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," p. 157.
63
pocentric mastery of life; Qoheleth puts this tension in
sharp relief. Wisdom is counsel. The sage convinces the
hearer through argumentative persuasion and by evidence.1
Counsel affords a certain margin of liberty and of
proper decision. Certainly we cannot say that
counsel has no authority. It has the authority of
insight. But that is quite different from the
authority of the Lord, who decrees.
So the weighing of the different possibilities
always belongs to the behaviour of the wise man.2
Zimmerli seems to reject much of the Egyptian analogy.
In doing so, he restates, with important modifications,
the position he set out earlier. Life-mastery is now
divinely conditioned.
k) Wisdom as self-understanding in relation-
ship. Like Zimmerli, Crenshaw is suspicious of the at-
tempt to define or redefine wisdom as a system of thought
on the basis of the Egyptian analogy. He argues that,
while the same motifs may appear, the entire context of
any proposed wisdom statement determines the "nuances" of
its meaning. Meaning is inseparable from context. "Wis-
dom" may serve different analytical purposes, referring to
a literature, a tradition that could be called paideia, or
a system of thought as hiokmāh. Here, Crenshaw moves
1Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," pp. 155-58.
2Zimmerli, "Place and Limit," p. 153.
64
toward a typology which he makes part of his definition.1
Crenshaw stresses the disparate character of wis-
dom thought. It has many settings and serves many objec-
tives. The conflict we observe over definition may
reflect attempts to bring too much together within the
confines of too narrow an intellectual space. He pro-
poses:
Wisdom, then, may be defined as the quest for
self-understanding in terms of relationships with
things, people, and the Creator. This search for
meaning moves on three levels: (1) nature wisdom
which is an attempt to master things for human
survival and well-being, and which includes the
drawing up of onomastica and study of natural
phenomena as they relate to man and the universe;
(2) juridical and Erfahrungsweisheit (practical
wisdom), with the focus upon human relationships
in an ordered society or state; and (3) theo-
logical wisdom, which moves in the realm of the-
odicy, and in so doing affirms God as ultimate
meaning. . . .2
1) Wisdom as a demythicized will to knowl-
edge. Responding to recent directions in wisdom study,
von Rad presents a revised statement of his views in
Weisheit in Israel. Like Crenshaw, von Rad emphasizes
the secondary position of the term wisdom. It is "ja in
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," p. 130, cf. n. 4.
2Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," p. 132.
65
den Quellen keineswegs verankert."1 Rather, it is a
category which has been derived through research and is
subject to revision and redefinition. From Proverbs
1:1-5, he points out the large vocabulary used by the
Hebrews to get at the idea or approach to life which we
have subsumed under a single concept. Von Rad also recog-
nizes that the construction of a social reality, implied
in Jolles' approach to language, cannot be limited to
wisdom. Any social group defines a reality for itself.
Typically, in fact, one is confronted with the demands of
alternative but competing world-views for his allegiance.
While such perspectives have been tested by time for their
stability and their validity, they necessarily simplify
and generalize in their portrayal of "reality" or "what is
so.”2
A certain self-knowledge, a certain ordering and
interpretation of prior experience, a certain perspective
on the world stands behind every experience of reality.
"Voraussetzungslose Erfahrungen gibt es ja nicht.”3 Since
the experience of counter-realities is a threatening one,
Weltanschauungen alternately struggle against one another
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 19.
2Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 26, 384.
3Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 13.
66
and seek to encompass conceptually what they do not yet
adequately include. Certainly, "wisdom" is found in the
attempt to order and comprehend experience, and do this
within some literary form. This effort can be found in
virtually every culture. Our dilemma is that we must
either find what commonalities of thought--not just social
methodology--bind together the phenomena we call in the
abstract "wisdom," or we must abandon the term altogether
as some scholars would have us do.1
We should recognize that we perceive these phe-
nomena, and our own reality, through highly abstract con-
cepts which the Hebrew did not employ. His real and im-
mediate world grasped him in a way and with a directness
and intimacy we can only begin to appreciate if we use the
:most meticulous methodology. Von Rad believes that he can
identify elements of thought which unite wisdom and justify
our use of the term.
We search in vain for some method or some faculty
of the human mind which constituted wisdom for the Hebrew.
Wisdom is a charismatic gift of openness, receptivity,
active awareness of the evidences of a truth inherent in
the created order of the world. It is not some technical
means of manipulated dead matter; that view is strictly
1 Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 13-20.
67
modern. The wise trust creation and believe it worthy of
that trust. Nevertheless, "Der Weg, wie der Weise zu
seinem Wissen gelangt, bleibt in Dunkeln, aber in einem
verheissungsvollen Dunkel."1 Without a commitment of
trust, nothing worthwhile can be accomplished. The cre-
ated order, however, rewards trust. He is the fool who
misplaces his trust or withholds it entirely.
Der "Tor" war doch nicht einfach ein Schwachkopf,
sondern ein Mensch, der sich gegen eine Wahrheit
stellte, die ihm in der Schöpfung entgegentrat,
der sei es aus welchen Gründen, sich einer Ordnung
nicht anvertraute, die für ihn heilsam wäre, die
sich aber nun gegen ihn wendet.2
The basic human search for knowledge and pattern
in the world (Erkenntniswille) has been cut free of that
spirituality which perceives the world in terms of myth-
ology and immanent powers. For the Hebrew,
Es handelt sich um einen Erkenntniswillen, der
eine hellwache Ratio auf entmythisierte Welt
richtete. Aber, nur scheinbar kam Israel mit dieser
Entmythisierung der Welt dem modernen Weltver-
ständnis nahe, denn dieser radikalen Verweltlichung
der Welt entsprach die Vorstellung von einem ebenso
radikalen Durchwaltetsein dieser Welt von Jahwe.
also die Vorstellung von der Welt als einer
Schöpfung Jahwes.3
Von Rad argues that wisdom is discursive and
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 377.
2Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 379.
3Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 378.
68
dialectic. As wisdom thought developed, it became clear
that the impediments and defeats of human life would have
to be reconsidered. Thus, we find a "theologizing of
wisdom." All the old questions are re-ordered in terms of
a new theological groundwork. For the act-consequence-
relationship or synergistic view of life, other wise came
to emphasize the creation, in which Yahweh was hidden from
man and the divine will remained at times only a secret.
Both sides of this discussion agreed that the creation was
the field of divine action within which Yahweh revealed
or concealed himself, his will and his law. The discussion
centered on how to explain an order in which the ordering
will might remain hidden and how to explain a relationship
with Yahweh, who might conceal himself in his creation.
The will to knowledge is common to both.1
Wisdom is dialectic in its emphasis on man's re-
latedness.
Der Mensch--iminer sing es um den Einzelnen--sah
sich wie eingebunden in einen Kreis der mannig-
fachsten Bezugsverhältnisse nach draussen hin, in
denen er einmal Subjekt, einmal Objekt war.
Sprachen wie gelegentlich von den Aufbruch des
Erkenntniswillens Israels auf die Gegenstände seiner
Umwelt hin, so war das eben dock nur die eine Seite
der Sache. Ebensogut könnte man sagen, dass sein
Erkenntniswille einer Provokation gegenüber erst
antwortete, dass er also erst nachzog, indem er
sich in der Zwangslage sah, sich auf Verhältnisse,
1Von Rad, WeisheöOpfungsglaubens," pp. 138-47.
69
ja Bewegungen seiner Umwelt einzustellen, die
mächtiger waren als der Mensch. . . . Aber diese
Bewegungen der Umwelt . . . . liefen nicht in
einem beziehungslosen Draussen nach einem fremden
Gesetz ab; nein, sie waren dem Menschen in un-
endlicher Beweglichkeit ganz persönlich zu-
gekehrt. . .1
Ohne zu einer Gesamtschaudurchstossen zu können,
kreiste das Denken der Weisen doch immer um das
Problem einer Phänomenologie des Menschen.
Freilich nicht des Menschen an sich, sondern um
eine Phänomenologie des in seine Umwelt einge-
bundenen Menschen, in der er sich inner zugleich
als Subjekt und als Objekt, als aktiv und passiv
verfand. Ohne diese Umwelt, der er zugekehrt ist,
und die ihm zugekehrt ist, war in Israel ein
Menschenverständnis überhaupt nicht möglich.
Israel kannte nur einen bezogenen Menschen;
bezogen auf Menschen, auf seine Umwelt, und nicht
zuletzt auf Gott. Auch die Lehre von der Selbst-
bezeugung der Schöpfung ist durchaus als ein unge-
bunden Welt zu verstehen.2
If man is related to a personally perceived world,
even "nature," this world is not torn by a confrontation
between Yahweh and some personalized evil. Herein lies
Job's problem. He must account for life's evils and
hiddenness within a monistic view that Yahweh stands
within creation. This belief in a related and personal-
ized creation becomes wisdom as it is given verbal and
literary expression on the basis of experience. The
office of the wise man is to formulate his experience and
to communicate it. Thus, in restating his position,
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 383.
2Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 400.
70
von Rad takes cognizance of new emphases on order and the
personal nature of creation. He also stresses the role
of subjectivity in the interpretation of experience, a
point important to understanding the relationship between
the wise man and his wisdom.1
m) Wisdom as an existential understanding.
Würthwein has detailed the implications of order in the
Egyptian setting that could be applied with qualifications
to Israel.2 Wisdom seeks to comprehend the world of ex-
perience as orderly and intelligible. The existential
understanding or preconception includes:
1. Das Leben verläuft nach einer bestimmten Ordnung.
2. Diese Ordnung ist lehr- und lernbar.
3. Dadurch ist dem Menschen ein Instrument in die
Hand gegeben, seinen Lebensweg zu bestimmen und
zu sichern. Denn
4. Gott selber muss sich nach dieser Ordnung,
diesem Gesetz richten.3
The last point raises a central issue for Hebrew wisdom:
what is the relationship of Yahweh to the orderliness the
wise seem to have found within their experience?
In sum, there are clearly many different ways in
which one may take wisdom to be a system of thought. This
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 364-405.
2Weisheit, Weisheit Ägyptens.
3Würthwein, Weisheit Ägyptens, p. 8.
71
approach to defining wisdom has been a dominant theme in
wisdom research. In spite of differences in emphasis,
and some significant developments in the history of
scholarship, certain themes recur, though with greater or
lesser stress.
Wisdom presupposes the orderliness and intel-
ligibility of experience, when it is taken to be a system
of thought. As a creation of Yahweh and as the field of
his action and his interaction with men, the experiential
world is on balance worthy of religious trust--this,
despite all its disappointments. Wisdom is open and hope-
ful, though not necessarily naively so. The wise do not
accept the synthetic view of life uncritically. They are
fundamentally concerned with stating exactly what sort of
relationship might obtain between act and consequence
that would reflect the basic justice of the world, in
terms of the context of action. Most scholars argue that
the wise increasingly emphasize the freedom of Yahweh
within his creation and the limits of human knowledge in
the face of divine wisdom to resolve this problem. The
dilemma of theodicy is unavoidable.1
The wise are principally concerned with the world
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen; Schmid, Wesen and
Geschichte der Weisheit, pp. 144-201.
72
of their experience. Wisdom does not mean systematic
reflection or abstract system-building for the Hebrews.
They live in a world of relationships; the wise seek to
give coherent expression to them. Wisdom is anthropo-
centric or phenomenological because it is concerned with
man's interrelatedness and because it has and must have
an intense subjective (i.e., conscious, personal) com-
ponent. Wisdom amounts to the mastery of life. The sage
does not necessarily seek the happy life, but he does seek
to understand life's patterns and structures. He intends
to act coherently, masterfully and "artfully" with respect
to them. Because these patterns derive from Yahweh as
creator, they are neither impersonal nor mechanical. In
what way they are personal, especially apart from Yahweh,
remains to be seen.
The wise are in-the-world. Their knowledge is
derived from and specifically applicable to experience.
Schmid carefully points out that their “worldliness” says
nothing by itself about their view of history.1 The ex-
isting Hebrew wisdom literature, for whatever reason,
shows remarkably little evidence of Heilsgeschichte or
institutional theology, including nationalism, in its
1Schmid, Wesen and Geschichte der Weisheit, pp.
5-7.
73
early and middle periods. The wise believed that their
wisdom could be taught. The records of the wise therefore
contain an inevitable didactic element. The wise taught
with the authority of their experience in pursuit of har-
mony with the created order. While on-going discussions
among the wise seem demonstrable, their teachings had at
least quasi-religious authority.1
The applicability of such a general description
to Proverbs IIb remains one of the objectives of our re-
search. It should already be apparent that "world-view"
as we use it here has particularly close affinities with
wisdom perceived as a system of thought or conceptual
system. It ties in as well with Zimmerli's notion of pre-
conceptions (Vorverständnisse) and with von Rad's "world-
view" and "phenomenology."2 Other notions of wisdom as
well, however, may prove to have relevance.
4. Wisdom is disciplined action or a pattern of
behavior. In this sense, wisdom may be either a) an
ethic or a moral code, or b) an etiquette. In either
sense, this category, except by way of emphasis, is more
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 399; Gese, Lehre
und Wirklichkeit, p. 35.
2Zimmerli, "Struktur," p. 177; von Rad, Weisheit
in Israel, p. 400.
74
ideal than actual. Whatever we may know about the actions
of the wise has been learned indirectly through what they
say about action. We have their ethic implicit in their
admonitions. We infer judgments and patterns of conduct
from their descriptions of experience. We also have cer-
tain portraits of the ideal wise man. What relationship
these values bear to the actual actions of the wise is
virtually impossible to say, and only then as the product
of a theoretical and interpretive reconstruction based on
their apparent thought system and social location. Evi-
dence from other types of literature, whether prophetic or
priestly or other, is sparse, sometimes polemical, and
rather too general to establish a clear pattern of behavior
among the wise. Precisely because our sources are lit-
erary, it is both easier and more logical to seek common
ground in a body of thought than in action. This is true
even if what actually were to have distinguished the wise
in their socio-historical context were a pattern of con-
duct, ethic or etiquette.1
In the wisdom literatures of Israel and Egypt,
there is a distinct tradition of courtly and social eti-
quette. The wise man is reserved, cool of temperament,
1Rankin, pp. 1-76; Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, pp.
282-97.
75
deliberate in his actions. He avoids open conflict,
especially with superiors. While he knows how to manipu-
late wrath when necessary, even that of the king, he
avoids surrendering to his own passions. He is eloquent
when it is needed; he is learned in the ways of the royal
court. He knows how to express his opinion at the most
opportune moment. He does not submit himself to the con-
trol of others, particularly financially, except in his
calling. He is committed to learning. He is judicial in
thought and temperament, suggesting that his vocation is
more administrative than purely scribal. Within his pro-
fession, he observes his responsibilities carefully. In
Egypt, it is expressly said that he pay proper respect to
the instruments of his calling, the tools of the scribe.
He recognizes a certain obligation, which we shall call
noblesse oblige, toward those less fortunate them he, ex-
cept where their misfortune results from folly. Finally,
he delights in his mental agility within his chosen pro-
fession.1 We should therefore consider the possibility
1Hilaire Duesberg and Paul Auvray, trans. [and
ed.], Le Livre de Proverbes, La Sainte Bible: Traduite en
Français sous la (Direction de l’École Biblique de Jérusalem,
2d ed. rev. (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1957); Willam McKane,
Prophets and Wise Men, Studies in Biblical Theology, vol.
44 (Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson, 1965), pp. 15-47;
Ronald J. Williams, "Scribal Training in Ancient Egypt,"
Journal of the American Oriental Society 92 (1972): 214-21;
Hellmut Brunner, Altägyptiscne Erziehung (Wiesbaden: Otto
76
that the wise recognized one another, not by thought nor
by social or occupational affiliation, but by some common
discipline.
5. Wisdom is an attitude toward life, a disposi-
tion.or intention. Elements of a quasi-psychological
understanding cf wisdom can already be seen in the opti-
mistic viewpoint with which it is credited. Further, we
have Rylaarsdam's distinction between optimistic and pessi-
mistic wisdom. The former is that of Lebensweisheit; the
latter is found in reflective and theodically oriented
wisdom.1
Pedersen has attempted to understand wisdom in
attitudinal terms. It is a form of consciousness, a
faculty of the mind:2
Harrassowitz, 1957), pp. 32-48, 65-80; Lorenz Dürr, Das
Erziehungswesen im Alten Testament und in Antiken Orient,
Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Agyptiscnen Gesellschaft,
vol. 32, no. 2 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich'sche, 1932), pp. 20-
22, cf. 5-14, 58-66, 71-73; cf. Les Sagesses du Proche-
Orient Ancien: Colloque de Strasbourg, 17-19 Mai 1962,
Bibliotheque des Centres d'Études supérieures specialisés:
Travaux du Centre d'Études Supérieures Specialisé d'Histoire
des Religions de Strasbourg (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1963); William F. Albright, “A Teacher to a Man
of Schechem about 1400 B.C.,” Bulletin of the American
Schools of Oriental Research, no. 86 (April 1942), pp. 28-31.
1J. Coert Rylaarsdam, Revelation in the Jewish
Wisdom Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1946).
2Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture,
77
Wisdom is a property of the soul or, rather, a
faculty, an ability to produce, a skill in shap-
ing the very thought which yields the right
result. . . . Wisdom is essential in the making
of a soul. If a man lacks wisdom, then he has
no heart. . . . Wisdom is the faculty of the
whole of the soul, just as the will is the direc-
tion of the whole of the soul.1
While European psychology regards action as ex-
ternal to the soul--the end product of ideation, feeling,
volition and resolution--the Hebrew emphasis on the unity
of the soul entails that mental processes are unified.
Actions are implicit in mental activity. There is no
dualism of thought and action. Actions trace the soul's
movements, hence the Hebrew notion of "ways."
The action and its accomplishment are a matter
of course, once the thought is there. . . . As
soon as the thought is fixed, the action is at
once a matter of course. This kind of fixed
thought the Israelite calls cēsā, counsel.2
. . . Wisdom . . consists in the very possession
of the "insight" out of which one creates the
power to make counsels that persist. . . . The
wisdom of God consists in his irresistible fulfill-
ment of what he has in his mind. Wisdom is the
same as blessing: the power to work to succeed.3
. . . Characteristic is such a word as hiśkīl,
which at the sane time signifies to have under-
trans. A. Møller and A. I. Fausbell in collaboration with
the Author, 4 parts (London: Oxford University Press, 1926-
1940; reprint 1959), pp. 127 f., 198.
1Pedersen, Israel, p. 127.
2Pedersen, Israel, p. 128.
3Pedersen, Israel, p. 198.
78
standing, insight, energy and the production of
good results. Sometimes stress may be laid so
strongly on the inner activity that the thought
of outward action is eclipsed (e.g. Deut. 32, 29).
But as a rule the idea of the totality prevails
so strongly that it means to be wise and happy,
and we are not able to say where the emphasis is
laid.1
Rather than speak of attitude, we could perhaps
more accurately say that for Pedersen wisdom is a form of
consciousness or subjectivity. It is a type of inten-
tionality or disposition without which the entire personality
is irremediably distorted.2 Thus aspects of von Rad's posi-
tion in Weisheit in Israel fit within this analytical cate-
gory: specifically, his phenomenology of wisdom.3
Without doing great violence to the concept, one
might also amend the notion of order from a sought-for
structure in the world of experience to a type or dimension
of consciousness. If it be too much to say that the wise
are systematic in their approach to comprehending reality,
their drive toward understanding (Erkenntniswille) is at
least structured and orderly. One might also find a psy-
chological equivalent of the mythic confrontation between
order and chaos: the conflict between the will to deal
coherently with experience (wisdom) and the passionate
1Pedersen, Israel, p. 198.
2Pedersen, Israel, pp. 198 ff.
3Esp. pp. 39-41, 400.
79
devotion (read: surrender) to forces within experience,
subjectively and objectively (folly).1
In a sense, terms like "rational," "pragmatic,"
and "eudaimonistic" are far more satisfactory as attitudinal
or psychological categories than as descriptions of wisdom
thought, especially because of the danger of anachronism or
cultural misinterpretation. Again, with von Rad and
Pedersen, we should pay attention to the subjective and
intentional dimensions of wisdom. The notion of world-
view implies a perspective toward and (dialectic) rela-
tionship with the world.
6. Wisdom is a social or transsocial ideal. Under
our subsequent rubric, wisdom typology, we shall briefly
note the portraits of the ideal wise man offered in Tobit,
ben Sirah, Ahiikar and elsewhere. At least part of our
problem specifying what wisdom really is comes from the
fact that wisdom often takes on an idealistic character
which is difficult to compass under thought, attitude or
ethos.
The ideal wise man is not superhuman, though such
a concatenation of virtues in any one person is highly im-
probable. The wise person enjoys a divine charism which
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 364-405.
80
is attributable to his virtue, not to any specific good
deed or deeds. If von Rad is right that the Joseph story
is wisdom, then these figures assume epic proportions. The
postulated doctrine of retributive justice figures prom-
inently here. The importance of the wisdom equation of
good with wise and evil with folly can hardly be over-
stated. Exactly what is it about the act which calls forth
the appropriate consequence? The disharmony between the
act and the established order of the world, it is often
asserted, leads inevitably to harsh results, even ruin.
The wise are not depicted as faultless paragons of im-
peccable morality, however, nor is the fateful choice among
evils unknown to them. Retribution seems to be tied to what
we shall come to call "character" or "disposition" and in-
clude under the rubric of intentionality. Still, the in-
choate idealistic dimension to wisdom cannot be ignored.
Wisdom as a social ideal--reflecting the aspirations and
ideology of a class or caste--stands in constant tension with
wisdom as a realized intentionality, a formal system of
thought, and a disciplined pattern of conduct.1
1Gerhard von Rad, "Josephsgeschichte and Ältere
Chokma," in Congress Volume [of the International Organi-
zation for the Study of the Old Testament]: Copenhagen,
1953, Vetus Testamentum Supplements, vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1953), pp. 120-27; von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp.
355-63; von Rad, Old Testament Theology 2:301-15; Crenshaw,
"Wisdom," pp. 135-37; George W. Coats, "The Joseph Story
and Ancient Wisdom: A Reappraisal," Catholic Biblical
81
7. Wisdom is the distinctive property of a
specific social group. Something of this category is al-
ready present in the attempts of Zimmerli, Gese and others
to reduce the conflicts between optimistic and pessimistic
wisdom to family disputes.1
. . . Gegenüber dieser Annahme einer Zweigesichtig-
keit der Weisheit ist es wohl verständnisvoller,
in dieser Gegensätzlichkeit eine Auseinandersetzung
innerhalb der Lehre der Weisheit zu suchen, die
beiden Gruppen historisch aufeinander zu beziehen
und im Prediger eine späte Ausbildung der
ursprünglich "optimistischen" Weisheit zu finden.2
Gese expressly rejects any thought of Standesethik
in either Egyptian or Hebrew wisdom. They are "eine Lehre
für die Erziehung eines jeden im Volke,"3 not the instruc-
tions of a restricted social group. Gese seeks for the
origins of Israelite sayings within popular or folk wisdom.4
If this view should prevail, then any relationship between
Quarterly 35 (July 1973):285-97; George W. Coats, From
Canaan to Egypt: Structural and Theological Context for the
Joseph Story, Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series,
vol. 4, ed. Bruce Vawter (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Bibli-
cal Association of America, 1976).
1Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 177-204; Zimmerli,
"Place and Limit," pp. 146-58; Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit,
pp. 21-45; Robert Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages: Es-
says in Biblical Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1971), pp. 160-97.
2Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 1-2.
3Gese, Lehre and Wirklichkeit, p. 30.
4Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 29-31.
82
the wisdom literature and a particular social class be-
comes purely adventitious. That a literature, especially
an oral one, requires literature-preservers to transmit it
on is a historical and social necessity, not a statement
of affinity.
The last point may be an untenable distinction.
Are we not only permitted but entitled to draw conclusions
or inferences about the relationship between a literature
and the identifiable social group which worked to preserve
it and transmit it on? Do groups, with any significant
frequency, involve themselves in preserving works that lack
some salience or affinity for them? Moreover, the evidence
educed by much modern scholarship seems to support a rela-
tionship. First, the popular origin of even some of the
wisdom writings, e.g., the sayings collections, can easily
be denied. Formal, rhetorical and theological considera-
tions seem to bar folk origin for virtually all of the
wisdom literature, even that long regarded as popular or
as Sippenweisheit.1 Second, even apart from the question
1Roland E. Murphy, "The Interpretation of Old Testa-
ment Wisdom Literature," Interpretation 23 (July 1969):
289-301; R. B. Y. Scott, "Priesthood, Prophecy, Wisdom, and
Knowledge of God," Journal of Biblical Literature 80 (March
1961):1-15; Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 15-52; Gordis,
Poets, Prophets, and Sages, pp. 160-97; von Rad, Weisheit
in Israel, pp. 39-53. See Erhard Gerstenberger, Wesen und
Herkunft des "Apodiktischen Rechts," Wissenschaftliche
Monographien zum Alten and Neuen Testament, vol. 20
83
of absolute origin, the wisdom material was adopted, used
and preserved by a fairly restricted social group.1 Appli-
cation seems a legitimate basis for inference. Third,
McKane and others find a distinct social group, the
“hiakamîm," for whom these writings would have had peculiarly
appropriate relevance. Whether this group is identical with
or directly related to the scribal class remains to be
seen.2
Once popular origin and application are called into
question, resolving the social location of wisdom becomes
all-important to understanding it. For McKane, wisdom is
clearly the product of a restricted social class.
(Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1965) , pp. 117-30.
Cf. William F. Albright, "Some Canaanite-Phoenician Sources
of Hebrew Wisdom," in Wisdom in Israel and Ancient Near
East, pp. 1-15; Christa Bauer-Kayatz, Studien zu Proverbien
1-9: Eine Form- und Motivgeschichtliche Untersuchung unter
Einbeziehung Agyptischen Vergleichsmaterials, Wissenschatt-
liche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, vol. 22
(Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1966); Christa
Bauer-Kayatz, Einführung in die Alttestainentliche Weisheit,
Biblische Studien, vol. 55 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener
Verlag, 1969), pp. 13-21; Henri Cazelles, "Les Debuts de la
Sagesse en Israel," in Sagesses du Proche-Orient Ancien,
pp. 27-40.
1McKane, Prophets and Wise Men; Wolfgang
Richter, Recht und Ethos: Versuch einer Ortung des
Weisheitlichen Mannspruches, Etudien zum Alten und Neuen
Testament, vol. 15 (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1966) , pp. 183-
92; Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 15-52.
2McKane, Prophets and Wise Men; McKane, Proverbs,
pp. 1-208.
84
[Wisdom] is empirical in its spirit, with an
emphasis on intellectual rather than ethical
values and so well adapted to the hard realities
of statecraft and government. Its practitioners
were therefore pre-eminently an elite who were
in the higher echelons of government and adminis-
tration and . . . the literature of this wisdom
was directed particularly towards the training
of statesmen, diplomats and administrators in the
schools whose educational discipline was shaped
to this end.1
The wisdom literature is, for the most part,
a product not of full-time men of letters and
academics, but of men of affairs in high places
of state, and the literature in some of its forms
bears the marks of its close association with
those who exercise the skills of statecraft.2
Their posture in life, the intellectual position
whereby they conduct. the business of state, is best de-
scribed as humanism, according to McKane. They are edu-
cated and disciplined to “attain to such a mental grasp
and delicacy of judgment as to be consistently clear
thinkers, perceptive policy-makers and incisive men of
action, poised between the extremes of impetuousity.and
indecision.”3
Interestingly, McKane expressly disagrees with
von Rad, holding that the wise are well aware of a possible
conflict between wise counsel and the Word of Yahweh.
Their world was not amenable to religious assumptions or
1McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, p. 17.
2McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, p. 44.
3McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, p. 46.
85
black-and-white analysis.1
In their professional capacity they thought it
right to challenge the encroachment of religious
authority on their sphere of responsibility, for
they argued that they had to reckon realistically
with the world as it was and not as it ought to
be.2
Gordis, too, locates wisdom within a social elite.
He shares Gese's view that, behind apparent disagreements
within wisdom, lie highly significant shared understand-
ings.3
. . . Wisdom Literature . . . was fundamentally
the product of the upper classes in society, who
lived principally in the capital, Jerusalem. Some
were engaged in large-scale foreign trade, or were
tax-farmers. . . . Most of them were supported by
the income of their country estates. . . . This
patrician group was allied by marriage with the
high-priestly families and the higher government
officials. . . .
. . . The upper classes were conservative in
their outlook, basically satisfied with the status
quo and opposed to change. Their conservatism ex-
tended to every sphere of life and permeated
their religious ideas as well as their social,
economic and political attitudes. What is most
striking is that this basic conservatism is to be
found among the unconventional Wisdom teachers as
well. Though they were independent spirits who
found themselves unable to accept the convenient
assumptions of their class that all was right
with the world, they reflect even in their revolt
the social stratum from which the had sprung
or with which they had identified themselves.4
1McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 53-54.
2McKane, Prophets and. Wise Men, p. 47.
3Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, pp. 160-63.
4Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, pp. 162-63.
86
In Gordis' view, the wise are pre-eminently
teachers in the academies in the larger cities. They seek
to educate the scions of the wealthy, those with the
leisure and resources to enjoy learning. Their aim is
selective, even if they coopted some gifted few from the
poor, for they trained their students for the exigencies
of upper class life. Their ethic reflects that objective.
They retained retributionism, having no strong motive for
rejecting it, but their leisure offered them the oppor-
tunity to develop a sceptical literature. Despair is a
peculiar vice of the well-to-do. The presence of scepti-
cism in wisdom merely reinforces the likelihood of its
location among the social elite. The summum bonum of life
is achieving practical success and economic prosperity.
The utilitarian and prudential wisdom ethic offers the
best means to attain that goal.1
Hermisson also sets wisdom within the school. He re-
gards the skills of reading and writing as far more widely
distributed than Gordis or some other scholars, though not
universal. He notes the presence of works like Sinuhe and
the Succession Narrative in the literatures of the ancient
Near East. They could hardly have been intended for a few
select readers, let alone deposition in musty archives,
1Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, pp. 160-97.
87
While advanced training might have been restricted to high
administrators and public officials, skilled artisans and
argicultural supervisors doubtless required some minimal
literacy to carry out their duties effectively.1
Hermisson thinks that an academic setting for wis-
dom is indisputable. Wisdom is didactic and pedagogic,
though non-wisdom works like romances and travelogues may
have emanated from the same group. Some sort of
Standesethik seems unavoidable. Hebrew wisdom is intended
to be broad and general in its application. It is not
aimed at some particular favored group.2
If the wisdom writings strictly understood are
centered within a delimitable social group and if they
constitute merely one aspect of their social life, perhaps
even relatively unimportant in historical context, then our
understanding of wisdom changes materially.3
1Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, Fp. 113-36.
2Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 94-96; Richter,
Recht und Ethos, pp. 183-92; Kovacs, "Class Ethic?'
3As we examine the world-view underlying and im-
plicit in Proverbs IIb, we shall have to evaluate its
social location carefully. The disagreements here are
astounding: from popular to elite; from common oral tra-
dition, later codified, to the artistic product of indi-
vidual reflection; from reflection to didactic material
for academic reflection.
88
8. Wisdom is a social force. We mentioned earlier
von Rad's view that 'wisdom' is a unifying analytical ab-
straction. It brings together what was far less unified
in historical context and what the Hebrews perceived far
more concretely as well.1 Going beyond von Rad, we might
argue that wisdom is to be distinguished neither by some
specific sets of views nor by location in some determin-
able social setting. Rather, wisdom represents a broad
social movement of successively different groups with a
variety of views, all attempting to achieve a common
series of social goals, some explicit and some implicit.
What justifies calling something wisdom is the scholar's
subsequent determination that this writing, idea or group
contributed to a broad attempt to reach certain social and
intellectual objectives within the context of Hebrew his-
tory.2
When wisdom is understood as humanism or as the
quest for a certain kind of knowledge, this analytic cate-
gory may come into play. There are certainly sound philo-
sophical reasons for arguing that one may be able to name
what he cannot define. Some perceived patterns have no
universally common elements. Wittgenstein proponed the
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 19.
2Scott, "Knowledge of God," p. 11; Rankin, pp. 1-4;
Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, pp. 162-64.
89
notion of 'game' as a classic case in point.1 Perhaps the
search for a specific social group or some determinable
point of view violates Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced
Concretion.2 Because we can discern a pattern and have
given it a name for analytical purposes, we incorrectly
assume that the concept has or stands for some reality
beyond that pattern. The pattern exists only as an in-
ference, a hermeneutic interpretation, of the researcher.
We search for more reality in the term than is justifiably
there. In a sense, we approach Moore's Paradox of Analysis
from another direction here. Perhaps we can classify as a
scholarly interpretation what we cannot define independent
of that interpretation.
We are not saying, however, that we cannot clearly
and unambiguously determine, let alone state, the position
of a particular group or individual at a particular time.
That task is potentially independent of the other. His-
torical evidence can be sorted. Conclusions can be drawn,
apart from inferring that certain works or movements have
a socio-historical affinity which we may attribute to them.
1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3d ed.; New York: Macmillan
Company, 1958), pp. 67, 77, 108.
2Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An
Essay in Cosmology, Academic Library of Harper Torchbooks
(New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 11.
90
Two points follow, if this category is not to be
reduced to one of the others. First, wisdom may be dis-
tinguishable as a succession of individuals, schools or
groups whose overlapping views developed and changed
through time, even radically. "Social force" may be un-
derstood as historical movement. Second, the relationship
which sustains this movement is a role in the intellectual,
political and social economy of the time. Its identifica-
tion and its implications are what the historian qua his-
torian must state fully. This category and the next are
closely associated.
9. Wisdom is a theological concept or theological
movement. The two senses are related. In the former,
wisdom is one aspect of the total divine revelation to
Israel. Wisdom thought and wisdom movement are the means
of its revelation. What is important however is the theo-
logical significance of wisdom for the Hebrews understand-
ing of their relationship to Yahweh.1 In the latter sense,
what unites wisdom is its place within God's progressive
revelation of himself to his people. The views of the
wise constitute one aspect of an adequate theology. The
wise are united by their quest to comprehend what is in
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence,"
pp. 129-42; Crenshaw, “Prolegomenon,” pp. 1-45; Schmid,
Wesen and Geschichte der Weisheit, pp. 1-7.
91
fact only one aspect of the divine revelation.1
Both senses generally entail that wisdom is being
understood in terms of a theology of the Hebrew scriptures.
Wisdom, and the revelation received through the wisdom
movement, thereby play a part in some kind of theologizing
by the investigating scholar. The historical research
functions as theological interpretation, hermeneutic. We
cannot properly raise nor hope to deal with the issue of
the validity of Old Testament theology. We find these
approaches in both Jacob and Eichrodt, who each discuss
the wisdom movement under the rubric “the wisdom of God.”2
For Jacob, wisdom as a concept expresses "the
universality of [God's] knowledge and the omnipotence of
his deeds."3 In practical terms, “the wisdom of God
shines in his works and mainly in the creation whose order
and harmony are a clear witness to it.”4 Wisdom is closely
related to discernment of good and evil, discrimination and
1Edmond Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament, trans.
Arthur W. Heathcote and Philip J. Allcock (New York: Harper
& Row, 1958) , pp. 118-20, 251-53; Walther Eichrodt, Theology
of the Old Testament, trans. J. A. 3aker, Old Testament
Library, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961,
1967), 2:80-92, 490-95.
2Jacob, p. 118; Eichrodt, Theology of the Old
Testament, 2:80.
3Jacob, p. 118.
4Jacob, p. 118.
92
the art of success. Personified, this wisdom which "reigns
in nature should also preside over God's directing of human
life."1
This wisdom movement also has theological signifi-
cance for Jacob:
By regarding man independently of all national
attachment, as a creature governed by certain
elementary laws quite well summarized by the
term righteousness, the wisdom movement affirms
the universality of God in opposition to the
restrictions which the covenant and the law,
manifestations of a jealous God, ran the risk
of introducing. However, . . . it is the
legalist current which ended by absorbing the
wisdom current. . . . 2
Eichrodt argues that wisdom functions to enable
Israel to assimilate what it has learned from other nations
to the needs of its own special revelation. At its best,
wisdom provides a link between all men's quest for truth
1Jacob,. p. 119.
2Jacob, p. 119. Elsewhere.(p. 253), Jacob continues:
“. . . Moses never succeeded in ousting Solomon com-
pletely; by deliberately taking the great syncretist
king as their patron, the wisdom writers set out to
strike a universalist note which will allow Judaism
to become, despite the barrier of the torah, a
missionary religion.
The wise, as dispensers of knowledge under its
cognitive aspect, but especially under its practical
aspect, are one of the channels through which God's
presence is communicated to men, and even though
their person itself lacks the religious prestige at-
taching to the king, to the priest and to the prophet,
they are none the less a sign, in view of the time
when all men will be taught by the author of all
wisdom (Jer. 31.34; Is. 54.13)."
93
and the Old Testament understanding of God.
Yet this assimilation to alien truth did in-
deed conceal dangers. The more important the
divine Wisdom discernible in Nature became, the
easier it was to suppose that from that starting-
point one could arrive at a rational understand-
ing of God accessible even to the heathen. And
the greater the confidence that wisdom could
achieve this goal, the more quickly were men
ready to expect from her a solution to the rest
of life's riddles as well.1
Early wisdom was unprejudiced in its borrowing;
the Hebrews awoke to the realization that other nations had
a share in the deposit of truth. This awareness challenged
chauvinism and "ossification" of the intellect.2 Yet, this
assimilation ignored "the necessary differences between
the basis in morals in Israel and other nations."3 Later
wisdom, rising when Israel was a theocracy under Persia,
was selective, choosing those elements in keeping with
Israel's own nature and refusing to surrender their cul-
tural heritage. This "new flowering of wisdom" includes
Proverbs 1-9, Job, Qoheleth, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch and
the Wisdom of Solomon. Eichrodt is most interested in
this later, specifically hebraized, wisdom, in which "the
concept of wisdom has been radically expanded."4
lEichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:87.
2Eichrodt, Theology of the Old' Testament, 2:82.
3Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:82.
4Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:83.
94
Wisdom has become either hypostasized or extended
to "the purposes and order discernible in the cosmos."1
As a vehicle of revelation, this wisdom ran many of the
same risks as the earlier. The impetus for it, Eichrodt
believes, may have come from the artistic exaggeration of
wisdom diction and from the search of the wise for an
authority to rank with the prophetic Word and the Spirit
of God.2
This literature does criticize its own potential
excesses Job 28 counters the belief that one can attain
total comprehension of Wisdom from creation.
. . . . God's wisdom is not placed in its entirety
within Man's grasp for him to read off from the
works of creation alone. Because Man can discover
only traces of Wisdom, but never Wisdom herself,
therefore there remain riddles in the course of
the universe which Man cannot plumb, but can only
accept in awe and adoration before the all-wise
Creator.3
Equation of the fear of God with the beginning of
wisdom, the yr't-yhwh, means not simply beginning but "its
chief ingredient, its essence, its germ.4 Strictly speak-
ing, wisdom belongs only to Yahweh. In its most developed
hypostasis, Wisdom becomes indistinguishable from Spirit.
1Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:83.
2Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:86.
3Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:88.
4Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:89.
95
They "easily combine to form a homogeneous concept," which
gets in the way of clear explication.1 These writers never
developed a systematic organization of hypostases.
10. Wisdom is a mythos. Like Jolles, Schmid sets
forth the view that wisdom is something quite different
from myth.2 It has a different view of history and another
perspective on man's relationship to the world. Certainly
this position is consistent with the widely accepted posi-
tion that at the least wisdom and myth have nothing to do
with one another; they may even be perceived as somewhat
antagonistic modes of thinking. Hypostatic wisdom suggests,
and personified wisdom virtually requires, some sort of
mythos to explain its relation to Yahweh, to creation and
to man.3
Ringgren carefully distinguishes hypostasis from
personification. Hypostasis means attributing some sort of
independent existence to the attributes, elements or char-
acteristics of a divine being. Personification goes beyond
hypostasis by giving those entities personal characteristics.
A hypostasis is not necessarily a personification. An
lEichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:91.
2Jolles, pp. 75-103, 124-40; Schmid; Wesen und
Geschichte der Weisheit, pp. 3-5.
3Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, pp.
79-84.
96
example of the kind of personification that might derive
from an unknown mythos is I Enoch 42:1-3. Wisdom searched
the earth for a hospitable place to dwell among men. She
found none, and returned to heaven where a special seat was
made for her. Unrighteousness, on the other hand, found
satisfactory lodging on the earth.1 We should remember,
though, that I Enoch is late, dating sometime after 94 BCE.
Rankin typifies the dominant view that such personifica-
tions derive from Persian, Greek and other foreign influ-
ence (the Iranian Amisha Spentas?), and are prima facie
evidence of lateness.2
Recently, Christa Bauer-Kayatz' study of Proverbs
1-9 has called this position into question. She argues
that at least Proverbs 8 is clearly dependent on Egyptian
influences. Maat exists hypostasized much earlier in
Egypt than the proposed Greek or Persian forebears of
hypostasized or personified Hebrew Wisdom. Further,
Egyptian scribal influences go back in Israel to early
times. Scribes presumably brought both Egyptian patterns
of scribal training and the international classics with
them to their new posts in Israel. Their literacy,
1Helmer Ringgren, Word and Wisdom: Studies in the
Hypostatization of Divine Qualities and Functions in the
Ancient Near East (Lund: Håkan Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1947),
pp. 133 ff.
2Rankin, pp. 222-64.
97
administrative duties and linguistic fluency would have
given them access to wide-ranging foreign intellectual and
theological developments. To restrict the hypostasizing
and personification of wisdom to post-Exilic times lacks
sound historical foundation. Such figures could appear
quite early among the Hebrews. If Kayatz' analogy with
Maat is valid, then we must include in it as well the pos-
sibility of some Hebrew analogue to the Egyptian mythos
that incorporates Maat.1
Albright and Cazelles both look to Canaanite pre-
cursors of Hebrew Wisdom. Albright opines that Proverbs
"teems with isolated Canaanitisms.2 The rare "hikmt,"
which appears three times in Proverbs 1-9, may be analogous
to the Phoenician Milkot, "Queen," and therefore the name
of a deity.3 The seven-pillared house resembles a third-
millennium structure that was very late dedicated to
Cyprian Aphrodite. The precursor of the Wisdom figure in
Proverbs 1-9 may well be a Canaanite goddess, according to
Albright.4
1Kayatz, Studien zu Proverbien 1-9; Kayatz,
Einführung, pp. 70-92.
2Albright, "Canaanite-Phoenician Sources," p. 9.
3Albright, "Canaanite-Phoenician Sources," pp. 8-9;
cf. Cazelles, "Sagesse en Israel," p. 37.
4Albright, "Canaanite-Phoenician Sources," p. 9;
Patrick W. Skehan, Studies in Israelite Poetry and Wisdom,
98
Both Albright and Cazelles point out the Ugaritic
application of "hikm" to El. "Thy command; O El, is wise,
Thy Wisdom lasts for ever, A life of good fortune is thy
command."1 Proverbs 8:22-24 may reflect Canaanite imagery:
El created Wisdom before conquering the dragon or estab-
lishing his house.2 Such an analysis, if valid, clearly
requires an underlying mythos.
While the evidence for Canaanite influence is not
great, the Egyptian parallels cannot easily be dismissed.
Both Gese and Schmid have emphasized the analogy of maat
to the Hebrew sidqh, righteousness.3 The opposition of
divine order and primeval chaos in and of itself suggests
mythic motifs. We cannot quickly dismiss the notion of
wisdom mythos.4
The next two analytical categories are closely re-
lated to methodology. The two are distinct in about the
same way form and content are. In practice, the distinction
Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series, vol, 1
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association of America,
1971), pp. 9-14.
1Albright, "Canaanite-Phoenician Sources," pp. 7-9;
Cazelles, "Sagesse en Israel," pp. 35-39.
2Albright, "Canaanite-Phoenician Sources," p. 7-
3Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 11-21, 29-50;
Schmid, Gerechtigkeit, p. 68.
4Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, pp.
144-55.
99
tends to be less obvious. Obviously an adequate discus-
sion of either would involve us in a lengthy methodological
discussion. We must instead be brief.
11. Wisdom is a series of motifs. In this sense,
we may speak of the priestly and prophetic adoption of
wisdom imagery. The metaphor, image or phrase may be
typical of wisdom writings; the nuance remains unswervingly
prophetic, priestly or historical. The spread of motifs
seems to show intellectual influence, but only to the ex-
tent that the image can still be considered wisdom in
nature if not origin.1 The generally unresolved question
of motif study in wisdom is, what relationship obtains
between a motif and its borrower? Was the image still
identifiably part of a larger wisdom mode of thought and
perception, or had it become so much a part of the in-
herited conglomerate that its wisdom origins were no longer
discernible to nor intended by its users?
Even a partial list of such motifs would have to
include the Zwillingformen (Antitheses), the passionate
versus the cool man, the reserved and silent man, the Wis-
dom-figure, the ‘yšh zrh or foreign woman, the sagacious
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence,"
pp. 133-34; McKane, Proverbs, pp. 5-6; cf. Hermisson,
Spruchweisheit, pp. 88 n. 3, 43; Whybray, Intellectual
Tradition, pp. 71-72.
100
king, the charismatic interpreter of dreams, the grateful
dead, the angel-companion, the conflict of evils, the
divine wager (God and the Advocate), the ryb or Joban
(i.e., theodical) lawsuit, the suffering innocent, the
scribal Standesethik, father and son/teacher and pupil,
the satire of occupations, Weltschmerz, the resigned man,
the wise courtier, the man of low estate shown favor be-
cause of his virtue, the debate or Streitgespräch concern-
ing good and evil, "deus disponit," the callow youth, and
what we shall call below the “proprieties.”1
12. Wisdom is a collection of forms. Essentially
the same questions apply here as for motifs. Granted that
some forms seem to have indisputable wisdom settings and
applications, however defined, what does it mean when a
form has both wisdom and overtly non-wisdom applications?
Some wisdom forms would be fables, riddles, numerical and
alphabetical sayings, rhetorical questions, admonitions,
instructions, ironic sayings, disputations over injustice
1The elaboration of these motifs complements the
theological and form-critical analyses of von Rad in
Weisheit in Israel and Schmid in Wesen and Geschichte der
Weisheit; see also Preuss, "Weisheitsliteratur," pp. 393-
417: Michael V. Fox, “Aspects of the Religion of the Book
of Proverbs,” Hebrew College Annual, vol. 39 (Cin-
cinnati: Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion,
“Widow, Orphan, and the Poor in Ancient Near Eastern Legal
and Wisdom Literature,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 21
(1962) :129-39; Schmid, Gerechtigkeit.
101
or Streitgespräche and the ryb, the mashal, apothegms,
maxims, proverbs, by-words, blasons populaires, "wellerisms,"
perhaps romances and novellas, perhaps summary-appraisals,
certain types of drama, tiwb-mn sayings, 'šry sayings, bny
sayings, Wisdom mythoi and satires.1
13. 'Wisdom' is the English equivalent of the
Hebrew root *hikm. Suffice it to say that terms in dif-
ferent languages seldom if ever have the same semantic
field--cover the same range of meanings--or serve the same
syntactic functions. The equation is one of convenience.
Other terms both in Hebrew and English share important ele-
ments of the same semantic field. In the wisdom litera-
ture, some terms appear with striking frequency; others
have undeniable technical applications. Von Rad points
out, however, the virtual impossibility of adequately com-
prehending the common intellectual ground of the wise
through a study of their vocabulary.
Zweifellos liesse sich eine Reihe von Begriffen
zusammenstellen, deren Verwendung in den Lehrüber-
lieferungen besonders auffällt; aber es wäre u. E.
ein aussichtloses Unterfangen, über eine Analyse
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 41-73; Johannes
Schmidt, Studien zur Stilistik der Alttestamentlichen
Spruchliteratur, Alttestamentliche Abhandlungen, vol. 13,
no. I (Münster: Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1936);
Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp. 229-62; A. Taylor, The Proverb
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931).
102
ihrer spezifischen Inhalte and über die Art ihrer
Verwendung zu einigermassen tragfähigen Erkenntnissen
zu gelangen. Die überlieferungsgeschichtliche
Betrachtung alttestamentlicher Texte hat uns gezeigt,
wie innerhalb gewisser Traditionsströme kultischer,
rechtlicher oder didaktischer Art gewisse Begriffe
zwar in grosser Zähigkeit durchgegeben werden, weil
sie terminologisch konstitutiv waren, dass sie aber
damit eine grosse Beweglichkeit ihrer Bedeutung
verbindet.1
Both Barr and Nida have raised serious questions
about the validity of Begriffsgeschichten for this kind of
historical study. It is extremely doubtful that the person
using the term even knew the historical background of the
term he used, much less its scientifically accurate lin-
guistic history. Consider, for example, the Cratylus.
Further, people do not consider the entire semantic field
of a term when they use it for a specific purpose. Ex-
traneous non-functional meanings are not prima facie rele-
vant, except perhaps in a certain psychological sense which
has doubtful historical application. People select a term
on the basis of its functional meanings: the way people
are actually using the word at that time. They seldom
consider the peculiarities of its intellectual, conceptual
or linguistic history, even when these are known.2
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 25.
2James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); James Barr, "Hy-
postatization of Linguistic Phenomena in Modern Theological
103
To counter these objections, some scholars have
turned to semasiology. They argue that the relevant
semantic field should be regarded as that used in a par-
ticular body of literature, usually the Old Testament.
For biblical study, the pertinent senses of a word are
those actually used by biblical writers in the language.1
This approach is valid if one accepts one of two proposi-
tions. Either there is a common determinable religious
history and tradition in which a given word had a particu-
lar intended special application, or there is a common the-
ology uniting disparate works for which this term is rele-
vant. At least for wisdom, we do not see how the former
can be asserted with confidence. Fohrer, for example, has
shown how the technical terminology of wisdom varies among
different works.2 The second proposition reflects the
Interpretation," Journal of Semitic Studies 7 (1962):85-
94; Eugene A. Nida, "Implications of Contemporary Linguis-
tics for Biblical Scholarship," Journal of Biblical Litera-
ture 91 (March 1972):73-89.
1Cf. James Barr, "Semantics and Biblical Theology--
A Contribution to the Discussion," Congress Volume: Uppsala
1971, International Organization for Old Testament Study,
Vetus Testamentum Supplements, vol- 22 (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1972), pp. 11-19; Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, pp. 74-76.
2Georg Fohrer, "Die Weisheit im Alten Testament,"
Studien zur Alttestamentlichen Theologie and Geschichte
(1949-1966), Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fur die Alttestament-
liche Wissenschaft, vol. 115 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and
Company, 1969), pp. 243-74.
104
issue of Old Testament theology, stated in another form.
Von Rad adds another important objection that also
applies to this discussion of semasiology.
Es ist eine Tatsache, dass Israel auch in seinen
theoretischen Reflexionen keineswegs nit einem
einigermassen präzisen Begriffsapparat arbeitet.
Es war an der Herausarbeitung ordentlich definierter
Begriffe erstaunlich wenig interessiert, denn es
verfügte über andere Möglichkeiten, eine Aussage zu
präzisieren, z. B. den Parallelismus membrorum, der
jeden redlichen Begriffsanalytiker zur Verzweiflung
bringen kann.1
Still, if we cannot expect Begriffsgeschichten to
give us an adequate understanding of wisdom thought, an
understanding of the technical terminology of wisdom and
the semantic field of *hikm orients us within the linguistic
setting of the wisdom writers, perhaps locating some neces-
sary uncertainties as well. Table 1 in the Appendix pre-
sents a summary of this semantic data.2.
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 25. Von Rad of-
fers Proverbs 8:12 as an example. The roots are *hikm,
*crm, *ydc and *zmm.
2Tables 2-6 in the Appendix present related
semantic data and interpretations; see Fohrer, "Weisheit
im Alten Testament," pp. 243-74; von Rad, Weisheit in
Israel, p. 75.
CHAPTER III
A WISDOM TYPOLOGY
The proverb collections, if that is what they are,
constitute only one of a number of different wisdom forms
that have been proposed or identified. Their postulated
location within the scribal schools or, alternatively,
within the professional literature of government officials
stands alongside a variety of possible settings for wisdom
thought and forms of expression. The-historical develop-
ment from individual mashal to general collection is hardly
less difficult to establish than the history of wisdom
generally.
Gese, Gemser, Schmid and others have challenged
accepted theories of wisdom's origins. They raise ques-
tions about such accepted concepts as folk origins for
wisdom, scribal mediation, theologization, democratization
and nationalism.1 Albright, Ringgren, Cazelles, and Bauer-
Kayatz raise doubts about the accepted criteria for dis-
tinguishing early wisdom from late. They have suggested
alternative scenarios for the historical development of wisdom
1Gemser, "Spiritual Structure," pp. 138-49; Schmid,
Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, pp. 1-7; Gese, Lehre
und Wirklichkeit, pp. 7-11.
105
106
which make relating different kinds of wisdom in terms of
some postulated historical process an often precarious
affair.1 It would, therefore, be helpful to have some
idea of the other kinds of wisdom, as well as the social
settings that seem appropriate to them.
Such a typology provides us with a standard of com-
parison. Some kinds of wisdom seem so drastically unlike
the mashal literature that it is difficult to know what the
common ground might be, except in the most general of terms.
Such a situation might develop, for example, if wisdom were
in fact not a single body or system of thought but a group
of historically-related or similarly-oriented social groups.
From the linguistic analysis above, we might have to con-
cede instead that the Hebrews applied the terms 'wisdom'
and 'wise' to a variety of distinct social-phenomena. Still,
we should allow for the possibility that other types of wis-
dom may have close affinities to the mashal, though they
may lack the specific two-line mashal form.
The typology may also establish limits to the al-
ternatives we may plausibly propose for the mashal litera-
ture. Barr's objection to certain kinds of linguistic
1Albright, "Canaanite-Phoenician Sources," pp. 1-15;
Ringgren, Word and Wisdom, p. 49; Helmer Ringgren, Israelite
Religion, trans. David E. Green (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1966), pp. 126-50, passim; Cazelles, "Sagesse en
Israel," pp. 27-40; Bauer-Kayatz, Proverbien 1-9.
107
conjecture applies to wisdom study in some important
respects. He argues that some scholars are too hasty in
postulating new meanings for known terms on the basis of
comparative linguistics and Begriffsgeschichten. We look
for unknown meanings of perfectly acceptable words, rather
than attempting to construe a syntax whose awkwardness may
be a reflection of the inadequacy of our grammatical un-
derstanding. As a result, if some Hebrew words bore any-
thing like the possible range of meanings that scholars
have seriously proposed for them at one time or another,
they would have been incomprehensible and semantically use-
less to the speakers of the language. Hebrew would have
been hopelessly inefficient as a means of communication.
Mutual understanding would have been an impossibility.1
Similarly, there is a practical limit to the
varieties of wisdom that could have existed historically.
Israel could have supported only a limited number of com-
peting wisdom groups or parties, for economic, social, re-
ligious and intellectual reasons.2 Equally, 'wisdom' can
1Barr, "Linguistic Phenomena," pp. 85-94; Barr,
"Semantics and Biblical Theology," pp. 11-19; Barr, Se-
mantics of Biblical Language; Nida, "Implications," pp.
73-89.
2Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, pp. 160-97;
Dürr, Erziehungswesen; Brunner, Altägyptische Erziehung;
Albright, "Teacher to a Man of Shechem" (!) ; Williams,
"Scribal Training," pp. 214-21; Urbach; Scott, "Priesthood,"
pp. 1-15; Gerstenberger, Wesen and Herkunft, pp. 117-30;
108
compass only so large a semantic field before, as Barr
contends, it becomes effectively vacuous.1
One cannot make sense of the mashal literature
apart from other kinds of wisdom. Together, they must
make social—as well as intellectual and theological—
sense.
The following list of types is intended to sketch
the range of wisdom and its possible settings. Certain of
these types—scribal, folk and royal wisdom--are especially
important for understanding and locating the proverb litera-
ture. The proverb could have originated in the popular
aphorism. The king's wisdom may have formed its archetype;
the royal court may have been its patron. It may have been
put together into collections, to be preserved as the in-
tellectual or didactic property of scribes. Priests,
Richter; Recht and Ethos, pp. 183-92; Hermisson, Spruch-
weisheit, pp. 15-52; McKane, Prophets. and Wise Men; McKane,
Proverbs, pp. 10-22; see Peter R. Ackroyd, Exile and Restora-
tion: A Study of Hebrew Thought of the Sixth Century B.C.,
Old Testament Library (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1968); Anson F. Rainey, The Scribe at Ugarit: His Position
and Influence, Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences
and Humanities, vol. 3, no. 4 (Jerusalem: Israel. Academy
of Sciences and Humanities, 1968); Morton Smith, Palestinian
Parties and Politics That Shaped the Old Testament (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1971); compare also the
notion of partisanship within a socially restricted milieu
developed in Paul D. Hanson, The Dawn of Apocalyptic (Phila-
delphia: Fortress Press, 1975); also, Duesberg and Fransen,
Scribes Inspirés; Gammie, "Pedagogy."
1Barr, "Linguistic Phenomena," pp. 85-94; Barr,
"Semantics and Biblical Theology," pp. 11-19.
109
prophets and government administrators may all have shared
the training of the academy. They may all have shared its
heritage and traditions, if not its theology.
Precisely because of the difficulties in trying to
relate different kinds of wisdom to one another historically,
our list is not ordered by any assumptions about historical
sequence or some process of evolution. Some types share
many characteristics; we shall try to place them as near
one another as practical.
Our list, however, is neither a history nor a sur-
vey of contemporaneous types. In some cases, we could
properly debate whether those types are wisdom, or whether
in fact they ever existed at all, e.g. apocalyptic wisdom.
Types differ in importance and in the level of confidence
we may assert on their behalf. Finally, this list cannot
be exhaustive; we hope that it is reasonably comprehensive.
With these caveats in mind, we offer the following list of
possible wisdom types.
1. Isolated entities. Here, we refer to wise
animals or plants, not in the context of fables, that ap-
pear within works that otherwise lack any overt wisdom
character. The classic instance of this type is the tree
of knowledge csi hdct tiwb wrc in the J creation story.
If the account does not derive from wisdom historiography,
then the nature of the image and its relation to the story
110
remain obscure. If tiwb wrc refers to discernment rather
than being a meristic reference to "everything,"1 it would
support von Rad and Stoebe, who give the paradise account
a decided Promethean character. 'Man takes upon himself
the "former" divine authority and the responsibility for
1Elsewhere, tiwb wrc may be taken for hendyadis. It
simply means "everything" or "anything"--the totality of
elements or aspects. Best support for this interpretation
comes from Deuteronomy 1:39, II Samuel 13:22, Genesis 31:
24 and 29, and Genesis 24:50. The expression has no special
technical meaning. It is a merism: the essence is ex-
pressed through its extremes. While the term's association
with the mn-cd form supports this line of argument, other
uses weigh against it. While the tree of life may be a
doublet or theological reinterpretation, in the present
redaction it stands as counterpart to the tree of knowl-
edge; the former is a common wisdom image. Among the
other occurrences, I Kings 3:9 is embedded in a royal wis-
dom context; II Samuel 14:17 is the wisdom of the wise
woman. II Samuel 13:22 and Genesis 31:24, 29 would leave
their protagonists speechless if taken meristically; they
call for the interpretation of non-judgmental or neutral
behavior. The same consideration applies in Genesis 24:50,
where Laban avoids passing any judgment on a word stated to
have come from Yahweh. Isaiah 5:20, 23 clearly refers to
ethical or legal judgment; II Samuel 19:36, the powers of
judgment and discernment. Leviticus 27:12 involves the
decision of a priest. For Stoebe, the term is neither ex-
pressly ethical nor intellectual. It reflects a charac-
teristically J image for the power of self-decision and
self-determination. Von Rad on the other hand amplifies
the element of hubris, while emphasizing the noetic dimen-
sion of the tale. Note also the obvious paronomasia of
crwmym (Genesis 2:25, *cwr, naked) and crm (Genesis 3:1,
*crm, crafty, cunning). Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp.
189, 205, 379-86; von Rad, Old Testament Theology 1:141;
Hans Joachim Stoebe, "Gut and Böse in der Jahwistischen
Quelle des Pentateuch," Zeitschrift für die Alttestament-
liche Wissenschaft 65 (1954):188-204; Luis Alonzo-Schökel,
“Motivos Sapienciales y de Allianza en Gn 2-3," Biblica 43
(1962):295-316; D. J. A. Clines, "The Tree of Knowledge and
the Law of Yahweh (Psalm XIX)," Vetus Testamentum 24
(January 1974):8-14.
111
determining whether something is good for himself or not.
Man's knowledge is not at issue; rather, man decides him-
self what is good.1 The snake makes a dangerous sly in-
terlocutor; note the charism of speech. He obviously
knows enough about the tree (trees?) and about Yahweh to
use that information to his own cunning ends. He exceeds
all other creatures in his slyness. The J writer has
united a mythic, cultic figure with the notion of practical
cunning.2 These two motifs seem isolated in the account.
Still, they may contribute to a wisdom or wisdom influenced
historiography or epic/royal wisdom tale.3 We might also
mention in passing, since it appears in an overt wisdom
context, the enigmatic figure of Tobias' dog, Tobit 5:16.
1Gerhard van Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, Old
Testament Library (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961),
p. 94; cf. Ivan Engnell, "'Knowledge' and 'Life' in the
Creation Story," in Wisdom in Israel and Ancient Near East,
pp. 110-17; Susumu Jozaki, “The Tree of Knowledge of Good
and Evil: Its Theological Implications,” in Kwansei Gakuin
University Annual Studies, vol. 8 (October 1959), pp. 1-18;
E. A.. Speiser, Genesis: Introduction, Translation, and
Notes, Anchor Bible, vol. 1 (Garden City: Doubleday &
Company, 1964), pp. 21-28.
2Von Rad, Genesis, pp. 85-91; von Rad, “Alt-
testamentlichen Schöpfungsglaubens,” pp. 138-47; Odil
Hannes Steck, “Genesis 12:1-3 and die Urgeschichte des
Jahwisten,” Probleme Biblischer Theologie, pp. 525-54;
John A. Bailey, "Initiation and the Primal Doman in
Gilgamesh and Genesis 2-3," Journal of Biblical Literature
89 (June 1970):137-50.
3Engnell, "Creation Story," pp. 102-19.
112
2. Wise women. Twice in II Samuel--each time in
connection with Joab--we come across references to wise
women. They are competent in speech; they can analyze a
situation and achieve some sort of intelligent compromise
that had formerly appeared unattainable. The first is the
wise woman of Tekoa. She presents David with a parabolic
legal case in order to show him the political consequences
of banishing his son. Though she appears at Joab's be-
hest, she herself artfully arranges a succession of pleas
that wheedle a self-condemnatory judgment from David.1
The wise woman of Abel beth-Maacah saves her city from
Joab's troops. The city has offered sanctuary to Sheba
in his attempt to resist Judah's domination of Israel.
Joab has the city under siege; ramparts against the walls
bode swift victory. The wise woman offers compromise:
not Sheba, but Sheba's head cast over the wall. She ap-
parently convinces the city to accept the agreement through
her wise counsel.2 In both cases, Joab's identification
1The account is interrupted by the woman's paean of
the king's insight—“the king is like the angel of God to
discern good and evil” (14:17)--and concluded by her
panegyric of his royal wisdom--"my, lord has wisdom like the
wisdom of the angel of God to know all things that are on
the earth" (14:20).
2Significantly, in appealing to Joab, the woman
quotes a popular aphorism, "let them but ask counsel at
Abel” (20:18). Thus, the community is a by-word for its
sagacity, but also for its pragmatic insight: "and so
113
with or participation in the events is evident.
In the context of II Samuel, the figure of the
wise woman may be a motif of the Deuteronomic historian,
or it may be a motif deriving from his source at this
point. The latter seems the more likely. Whichever, the
image itself appears to be a folk figure. The wise woman
comes from the country. She possesses native shrewdness
and rhetorical ability. She uses her "wisdom" or her
counsel or skillful "wisdom techniques."1 No association
with any organized wisdom movement can or should really be
inferred from such a figure.
One can readily search for other such women, though
their association with the image of the wise woman has to
be inferred. One thinks of the "cunning" of Naomi or
Rebekah, though neither is an anonymous figure. There is
a reference in Jeremiah to women skilled (*hikm) at mourn-
ing:2 this passage probably belongs with skilled artisans
below. In Judges 5:29, the women of the Court are referred
to as wise women who can intuit the meaning of ominous
events.3 The context is obscure and isolated; perhaps the
they settled a matter" (20:18). "Then the woman went to
all the people in her wisdom" (20:22).
1De Boer, p. 60.
29:17 ET, hhikmt.
3“Her wisest ladies make answer, nay, she gives
answer to herself.” De Boer, p. 59.
114
reference should be classed with royal wisdom. Other re-
mote candidates for the rubric of wise woman might be
Abigail, Judith, Esther (!) and Huldah.
3. Skilled artisan or competent ritualist. Es-
pecially in the later chapters of Exodus, the P writer
consistently predicates "wisdom" in speaking of the skill
of artisans.1 Ezekiel has a reference to wise/skilled
sailors and repairers of leaks.2 On the other hand, both
II Isaiah and the interpolator in Jeremiah describe idols
that have been made by clever (wise) craftsmen.3 Isaiah
3:3 also has a cultic tinge, although Lindblom has doubts.4
Jeremiah's skilled mourners may belong here.5 Except lin-
guistically, wisdom in this sense is wisdom by courtesy,
since it seems to have no association with either a form
of wisdom thinking or some social movement.
4. Folk or popular wisdom. If wisdom be a funda-
mental psychological or spiritual propensity of man (a
1Fohrer, "Weisheit;" pp. 254-55.
2Johannes Lindblom, "Wisdom in the Old Testament
Prophets," in Wisdom in Israel and Ancient Near East, p.
194. Ezekiel 27:8, 9.
3Lindblom, pp. 193-95. Isaiah 40:20; Jeremiah 10:9.
Cf. Fohrer, "Weisheit," pp. 254-55.
4P. 194.
5Lindblom, p. 194. Jeremiah 9:16.
115
Geistesbeschäftigung) insofar as he is human, so that he
formulates insights derived from experience into concise,
expressive and highly metaphorical statements which give
the world a semblance of system and order, then wisdom is
by definition essentially a folk or popular phenomenon.1
Apart from such an argument, however, some wisdom forms
seem to reflect a popular Sitz-im-Leben even though they
may later have been modified to serve other purposes.
Certain sayings—some “proverbial phrases,”
rhetorical questions and metaphors—are either expressly
cited from popular usage or have such striking imagery and
refinement of phraseology that folk origins must be as-
sumed. The latter criterion, as Eissfeldt has noted, rests
on the somewhat shaky ground of subjective judgment and
individual sensitivity, particularly to differences in
tone and style between the passage and the larger work
within which it is embedded. Eissfeldt develops a list of
thirteen sayings which are introduced by formulae that
seem to attest to their popular currency.2 Four are ex-
pressly designated a mashal.3 The others begin with such
phrases as cl-kn y’mrw, dbr ydbrw br'šh l'mr, and ky
1Jolles, pp. 124-40. Cf. von Rad, Weisheit in
Israel, pp. 13-27.
2Eissfeldt, Maschal, pp. 45-52.
3I Samuel 10:12; 24:14; Ezekiel 12:22; 18:2 f.
116
'mrw.1 Such formulae constitute no absolute guarantee, of
course, that the author or redactor did not originate the say-
ing and set it in a formulaic context for his own purposes.
Indeed, the saying may well have acquired its proverbial
currency through such, or other, use by the author or re-
dactor himself.
In addition, Eissfeldt finds some sixteen other
sayings that seem to be proverbial.2 He also believes
that a number of one-line popular aphorisms were expanded
whether by parallelismus membrorum, constructive expan-
sion, or the addition of an illustrative image--to fit the
later and more literary two-line mashal form. Such ex-
panded sayings may then have found their way into the dis-
courses of wisdom thinkers. If nothing else, the very fact
that so many of these collected sayings could have become
proverbial, popular, attests to the probability that some
or many came from the folk milieu and not the later
1Genesis 10:9; II Samuel 5:8; 20:18; Ezekiel 9:9
(“Man kann freilich mit Grund bezweifeln, ob alle von den
Propheten als sprichwörtliche Redensarten des Volkes
angeführten Worte esauch wirklich sind: diese Formeln
haben die Propheten vielleicht selbst geprägt.” [Eissfeldt,
Maschal, p. 45 n. 8]); 18:25, 29; 33:17; 33:10; 37:11;
Zephaniah 1:12; Isaiah 40:27. cf. Jeremiah 33:24; Ezekiel
8:12; 11:3, 15; so Eissfeldt, Maschal, p. 46 n. 2.
2P. 46. Genesis 16:12; Judges 8:2, 21; 14:18;
I Samuel 16:7; II Samuel 24:15 (see 9:8; 16:9; I Kings 18:
21; 20:11; Isaiah 22:13 (see I Corinthians 15:32); 37:3
(see Hosea 13:3; Isaiah 66:90; Jeremiah 8:22, 20; 12:13;
23:28; 51:58 (see Habakkuk 2:13); Hosea 8:7 (see Proverbs
22:8); Qoheleth 9:4.
117
writer's artistic imagination.1 Whether Eissfeldt is con-
vincing when he argues that the simpler one-line saying
antedates the refined two-line mashal form remains to be
seen. While attractive, the contention that literary forms
become expanded and more baroque with use both suggests a
potentially anachronistic analogy out of European Ro-
manticism and a suspiciously simple evolutionary hypothesis.
Distinguishing originally popular material within
wisdom collections seems a precarious activity. Without a
continuous running literary context, judgments made about
tone and style appear too subtly aesthetic to be reliable.
Readily identifiable popular aphorisms share cer-
tain characteristics. They tend to be terse, usually a
single line, sometimes without internal balance between
their parts. Thus, the bounds of folk wisdom are in-
timately tied up with the question, what is a mashal?
Such folk sayings are brief and pointed comments on
human behavior and recurrent situations. They make
frequent use of metaphor and comparison. Sometimes
they take the form of rhetorical questions to show
that something is absurd or impossible. A large
proportion of Old Testament colloquial proverbs
have a distinctly scornful tone, implying a devia-
tion from social norms.2
lEissfeldt, Mashal, pp. 45-52.
2R. B. Y. Scott, Proverbs; Ecclesiastes: Introduc-
tion, Translation, and Notes, Anchor Bible, vol. 18 (Garden
City: Doubleday & Company, 1965), p. xxvi.
118
The term 'mashal' appears not only in the context
of scornful by-words (the discouraging prospect of becoming
the proverbial victim of some disaster) and blasons popu-
laires,1 it is also used to refer to Spottlieder, prophetic
oracles and even ecstatic visions.2 Though the latter are
not wisdom in any conventional sense, some scholars argue
for a root meaning of *mšl which would encompass both the
proverb and the oracle. Thus, the mashal can reflect the
attempt to establish a rule or order to existence, a
theourgic ritual or spell which has later become metaphori-
cal, a basic sense of "to be like" (resulting in both
theourgy and metaphor), or a fundamental sense of "parable"
or "metaphor" which led to such diverse use and meanings.3
We should be mindful of Barr's caveat. Even if
1Taylor, pp. 97-109; A. S. Herbert, The 'Parable'
māšāl in the Old Testament," Scottish Journal of Theology
7 (1954):180-81.
2J. Schmidt, Stylistik; Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp.
229-39; A. R. Johnson, "Māšāl," in Wisdom in Israel and
Ancient Near East, pp. 162-69; Allen Howard Godbey, "The
Hebrew Māšāl," American Journal of Semitic Languages and
Literatures 39 (November 1922 through July 1923): 89-108.
3Johnson, pp. 162-69; Hans-Peter Müller, "Mantische
Weisheit und Apokalyptik," in Congress Volume: Uppsala
1971, pp. 268-93; McKane, Proverbs, pp. 1-10. Claus
Westermann makes an important methodological and biblical
theological contribution in his "Weisheit in Sprichwort,"
in Schalom: Studien zu Glaube und Geschichte Israels;
Alfred Jepsen zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Karl-Heinz Bernhardt,
Arbeiten zur Theologie, 1st. s., vol. 46 (Stuttgart: Calwer
Verlag, 1971), pp. 71-85.
119
linguistic history should ultimately support the inference
that a common meaning of the term 'mashal' serves to unite
early folk wisdom with a folk or cultic theourgy, that
fact alone would not prove that the two were regarded as the
same or as closely related by those who used the term. We
may exclude the Spottlied, oracle and theourgic spell from
folk wisdom (1) because folk wisdom in the strict sense is
readily distinguishable from them on the basis of both form
and content without significant overlap or ambiguity, (2)
since these forms are neither typically nor commonly as-
sociated with wisdom elsewhere, (3) since 'mashal' is used
to refer specifically to proverbs in a narrower sense (in-
cluding, however, extended poetic compositions in meta-
phoric or parabolic style) in superscriptions to Proverbs,
and (4) because the distinction between proverb and oracle/
spell is so compelling on common-sense conceptual grounds
in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary.1
For those who argue that proverbs concisely sum-
marize experience, the aphorism at I Samuel 10:12 is a
parade example. Saul's (unfortunate?) ecstatic experience
among the band of prophets at Gibeah becomes proverbial:
1McKane, Proverbs, pp. 1-33; Scott, Proverbs;
Ecclesiastes, pp. 3-9; cf. Fohrer, “Weisheit,” pp. 254-62;
cf. Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp. 229-39; see J. Schmidt, Stylistik;
Eissfeldt, Maschal.
120
"Is Saul also among the prophets?" Hgm š'w1 bnb'ym?1 In
Genesis 10:9, we find what Taylor would call a proverbial
phrase, a partial saying that can be adjusted to suit the
situation, with a historical allusion.2 Scott finds a
number of proverbs of consequence, proverbs of analogy and
colloquial sayings among the prophets. He would include
Amos' rhetorical questions under the rubric of folk wisdom.3
Folk wisdom can also be found as riddles and fables,
not just proverbs. In Judges 14:14, a riddle, a counter-
riddle, and their solution form the basis of a tale about
Samson.4 According to Scott, the Samson riddle is
1"And who is their father?" implies that the proverb
is complimentary neither to Saul nor the prophetic band and
suggests the ostensive folly of incongruous associations
(or, demeaning) and misperceived metiers. We might also
include I Kings 20:11 and I Samuel 24:13 ET.
2Taylor, pp. 184-200.
3Scott, Proverbs; Ecclesiastes, pp. xxvii-xxviii.
Compare Hans Walter Wolff, Amos’ Geistige Heimat, Wissen-
Schaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament,
Vol. 18 (NeukirchenVluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1954);
Lindblom, pp. 192-204. Jeremiah 31:29; Ezekiel 18:2;
Hosea 4:9; Jeremiah 23:23. Scott also notes the parallel
between Isaiah 10:15 and Ahikar vii.
4Samson proposes a riddle to the thirty companions
at his wedding, thinking of a swarm of bees that he found
in a lion he had killed. The Timnahites must answer this
virtually unsolvable riddle:
"Out of the eater came something to eat,
Out of the strong came something sweet." (v. 14)
Extracting the solution from Samson's wife, the guests are
able to counter with
"What is sweeter than honey?
What is stronger than a lion?" (v. 18)
121
improbably difficult for the guests to decipher without
aid. Their counter-riddle, however, seems singularly ap-
propriate to the setting. The account is set in "humble
surroundings" suitable to folk wisdom. The difficulty of
the first riddle and the missing answer to the second
suggest that the riddles may have been adapted to this
context, strengthening the argument in favor of their folk
origins. Later, the riddle clearly also becomes a form for
Court entertainment, e.g., Solomon and Sheba, the tale of
Darius' three body-guards.1
The riddle is not automatically a popular form. It
implies that the proponent of the riddle have some symbolic,
parabolic or metaphorical understanding of a situation that
the solver is trying to discover. The world has meanings
which are not immediately apparent in experience but which
the agile and attuned mind may uncover. Thus, the world of
experience consists of layers, of-which the everyday
Presumably, they mean "love between the sexes" in what is
by contrast with the fore-going a rather transparent riddle.
Samson rejoins,
"If you had not plowed with my heifer,
You would not have found out my riddle." (v. 18)
Scott, Proverbs; Ecclesiastes, p. xxix; see James L. Cren-
shaw, "The Samson Saga: Filial Devotion or Erotic Attach-
ment?" Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
86 (Fall 1974):470-504: J. Sturdy, “The Original Meaning
of ‘Is Saul Also Among the Prophets?’ (I Samuel X:11, 12;
XIX:24)," Vetus Testamentum 20 (April 1970): 206-13.
1Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp. 239-45.
122
meaning or interpretation is only the first and most super-
ficial. Where the riddle can be solved through reflection,
the solver is reaching for an attainable insight for which
experience ought to have prepared him. The riddle is a
vehicle which suggests a radical reinterpretation of the
meaning of things. The solver gains new insight into the
deeper significance of his experience by solving the
riddle.
The riddle, however, may be beyond easy solution.
It may be the means of communicating arcane insight or
interpretation. From the riddle alone, the solver, really
an initiate, learns only his inability to discern the true
or basic significance of things. As proponed, the riddle
confronts one with his ignorance. When the initiate is
given the key to solving the riddle, the plain meaning of
things is transformed. The symbolic understanding of the
world transcends its apparent meaning. The solution of
the riddle provides the initiate entree to an elite group
of cognoscendi. They possess a secret knowledge which is
only made available to those who prove themselves worthy.
Insight is the key. The riddle distinguishes the elite
few who have insight from that mass which does not. Thus,
the riddle may function to preserve secrets rather than
reveal them. When it does, it represents the establishment
of an intellectual or "gnostic" elite. The wisdom form is
123
the technical means for differentiating members from non-
members.1
In analyzing the fable, Scott contends:
The fable combines features of the riddle and the
parable. A "fable" in the strict sense is an
imaginative tale in which the actors are animals
or inanimate objects such as trees (which may seem
to be alive because of movement and sound when a
wind is blowing) endowed with human speech. Often,
as in Aesop's fables, the story conveys a message
or carries a moral for human behavior.2
The requirement of speech over parabolic intent appears
rather strict. The tree of knowledge seems scarcely less
fabulous than the serpent, though neither would be folk
wisdom. Further, we question the animistic motivation im-
plied by Scott's parenthesis. Balaam's ass seems to be a
legitimate fable, incorporated into a more elaborate tale,
which points up Balaam's bullheadedness.3 Jotham's Fable,
1 Kovacs, "Reflections"; Hans-Peter Müller, "Der
Begriff 'Rätsel' im Alten Testament," Vetus Testamentum 20
(October 1970): 465-89; Elli Köngäs Maranda, "Theory and
Practice of Riddle Analysis," Journal of American Folklore
84 (January-March 1971): 51-61; Elli Köngäs Maranda and
Pierre Maranda, Structural Models in Folklore and Trans-
formational Essays, Approaches to Semiotics, vol. 10, ed.
Thomas A. Sebeck (The Hague: Mouton, 1971); Benjamin R.
Foster, "Humor and Cuneiform Literature," Journal of the
Ancient Near Eastern Society of Columbia University 6
(1974): 78; compare L. Makarius, "Ritual Clowns and Sym-
bolic Behavior," Diogenes 69 (1970): 44-73.
2Proverbs; Ecclesiastes, p. xxix.
3When his poor, but fabulous (!), beast is re-
peatedly struck for thrice discomfiting Balaam on account
of the angel of Yahweh whom Balaam either fails to notice
124
in Judges 9:7-15, is a fable which is clearly used
polemically, though it has perhaps been adapted to the
occasion.1 Jehoash's Fable depicts the self-puffery of a
thistle that seeks for its son the hand (branch?) of the
daughter of a cedar of Lebanon; it is trampled by a wild
beast.2 Ezekiel is a goldmine of fabulous entities, ex-
tended metaphors and "allegories."3 Scott notes in
particular the fabulous creatures which appear in Ezekiel
17:1-10. It seems to be a fable or allegory of Exile that
has been expanded and explicated, if not written, by the
prophet. It is expressly termed a 'mashal."4
or more likely is not meant to see, the animal must speak
out to call his master's attention to this most out-of-
character behavior. "Was I ever accustomed to do so to
you?" Balaam's answer is a profoundly brief, "No," a
concession which makes a parabolic point. The angel in-
cidentallyis 1śtin lw, for his adversary. Numbers 22:21-35.
1It trades on the irony of a bramble asked to reign
as king over the trees; the tree which has no special gift
that it finds more rewarding than the offer of rulership
not only cannot offer the other trees security and protec-
tion, it is itself a dangerous source of potential fire.
"If in good faith you are appointing me king over you, then
come and take refuge in my shade; but if not, let fire come
out of the bramble and devour the cedars of Lebanon" (v.
15). Abimelech poses such a danger to Israel.
2II Kings 14:9. Since the application to Amaziah
in respect of his conquest of Edom and desire to meet with
Jehoash (presumably to demand fealty or tribute) is quite
inexact, the fable may be in origin folk, applied later
and derivatively to the case at hand.
3Meinhold, pp. 13-21, q.v.
4Scott, Proverbs; Ecclesiastes, pp. xxix-xxx
125
Unlike the riddle, the fable reveals its own in-
terpretation. Defined strictly, the fable requires a
final parabolic interpretation which gains poignance from
its application to the life-situation of the hearer. While
the hearer may initially miss the application, by the end
of the story, he should not be in doubt. In fact, this
sort of fable makes emotionally charged situations ac-
cessible by interpreting them in a more emotionally distant
and objective way. Having made sense of an objective, even
humorously preposterous situation, the hearer can make the
same interpretation of an experience with which he is in-
tensely involved. The fable permits one to say by indirec-
tion what cannot often be said fully and coolly directly.
It can, therefore, be polemical, since it is intended to
change one's understanding of a situation.
On the other hand, because it is self-revealing, it is
not the property of some gnostic elite. There is no secret
(v. 1); see Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp. 245-47; Ronald J.
Williams, "The Fable in the Ancient Near East," in A
Stubborn Faith: Papers on Old Testament and Related Sub-
jects Presented to Honor William Andrew Irwin, ed. Edward C.
Hobbs (Dallas: .SMU Press, 1956), pp. 3-26; Erwin Leibfried,
Fabel (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1967); Hugo Gressmann, Israels
Spruchweisheit im Zusammenhang der Weltliteratur, Kunst and
Altertum: Alte Kulturen im Lichte Neuer Forschung, vol. 6
(Berlin: Verlag Karl Curtius, (1927)); Edmund I. Gordon,
“Animals as Presented in the Sumerian Proverbs and Fables:
A Preliminary Study,” Drevnij Mir (Moscow: n.p., 1962),
pp. 226-49; W. G. Lambert, Babylonian Wisdom Literature
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), pp. 150-212.
126
noesis; no special key is required. All who hear the
fable understand. The story is accessible to everyone;
it is open.1
Less strictly understood, the fable shades into
a variety of other forms which have in common an extended
metaphor which reinterprets the situation of the hearer.
It may, in particular, lack a parabolic resolution. Re-
interpretation may appear solely through the appropriation
of the fabulous in the story. The fabulous stands for,
and reinterprets, what is mundane. Still, the meaning is
readily intelligible to all who listen; it reveals, it
does not conceal. The fable in all its forms is a rein-
terpretation--a wisdom--that is potentially close to the
people. The riddle, by virtue of its implicit inaccessi-
bility, anticipates the development of a social elite or
in-group to whom and to whom only this noesis is available.
In that sense, the fable stands closer to popular wisdom
than the riddle. Whether, however, these Hebrew riddles
and fables are folk and not literary contrivances is less
certain. In their present context, most have been adapted
to serve literary, and sometimes polemical, ends. The
accessibility of a wisdom form to popular comprehension
does not assure that popular instances of such forms have
1Leibfried; Meinhold, pp. 13-21.
127
been preserved. In fact, the trend of present scholarship
is to question systematically whether any preserved wisdom
material can be popular or folk.
5. Royal wisdom. One way to establish a relation-
ship among the divers types of wisdom thinking and
materials is to postulate a historical process of democ-
ratization. For such theories, royal wisdom is the first,
and key, link. One who is wise knows how to govern: an
essential part of wisdom is the capacity to execute the
tasks of imperial justice, administration and governance
well. The king seeks to pass on his wisdom and experience
to his heir.
In practice, wisdom cannot be so confined. Life
is unpredictable. The king is not the only person with
administrative responsibilities. All possible successors
to the throne and the sons of high courtiers must be
trained to rule the land and serve the king. That many
documents drawn from international wisdom, especially
those from Egypt, apparently deal with courtly training
and advice ostensibly conferred by the grand vizier or
even the king himself supports this view. In Israel,
Solomon is the first and foremost of wisdom's patrons,
himself sage in ruling and in administering justice.1
1R. B. Y. Scott, "Solomon and the Beginnings of
128
Samson, the riddle-maker, judged Israel. The woman of
Tekoa offers paeans to David's wisdom; she compares it to
that of a divine emissary in knowledge and judicial dis-
cernment. Hezekiah's men collect proverbs.1 Court offi-
cials have duties that could be connected with wisdom be-
ginning with the time of David and Solomon.2 Ahithophel's
counsel ranks with consulting the divine oracle.3 Yahweh
works through the conflict of counsels to separate Israel
and Judah. Yahweh himself the source and archetype of
royal wisdom finds wisdom in his Council.4 Royal and
near-royal epic heroes possess wisdom: Danel, Adam, Noah,
Joseph, Moses, Solomon aid Daniel.5 Whatever the actual
historical location and development of Hebrew wisdom,
Wisdom in Israel,” in Wisdom in Israel and Ancient Near
East, pp. 262-79; in the same place, Martin Noth, "Die
Bewahrung von Salomos GöttlicherWeisheit," pp. 225-37;
Albrecht Alt, "Israels Gaue unter Salomo," Kleine Schriften
Geschichte des Volkes Israel, vol. 2 Munich: C. H.
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1953). pp. 76-89; Norman W.
Porteous, "Royal Wisdom," in Wisdom in Israel and Ancient
Near East, pp. 247-61; cf. Margaret Pamment, "The Succession
of Solomon: A Reply to Edmund Leach's Essay 'The Legitimacy
of Solomon,'" Man 7 (December 1972): 635-43.
1Scott, Proverbs; Ecclesiastes, pp. xxx-xxxv.
2Scott, Proverbs; Ecclesiastes, p. xxxi; Noth,
"Bewahrung," p. 226; McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp.
15-47; Scott, “Beginnings,” pp. 262-79.
3McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 55-62.
4De Boer, pp. 4.271; cf. Noth, “Bewährung,”
p. 235.
5See Ezekiel 14:14, 20.
129
effective governance, sound administration and judicial
discernment have traditionally been deemed wisdom. Im-
portant royal and court figures are therefore adjudged to
have possessed such wisdom, though that judgment may be
that of a much later writer or historian; in the case of
Solomon, for example, of the deuteronomic historians.1
If Solomon greatly expanded the Hebrew monarchy
in pomp, power and hegemony, especially at a time when its
expansion could not readily be checked by powerful and
jealous neighbors, then the need for an elaborate court
bureaucracy would be evident. Trade and economic records
would have to be kept. Imperial correspondence in all the
official languages must be attended to. Ambassadors,
emissaries, tradesmen, officials, all must report and be
instructed, and those instructions carefully and politi-
cally orchestrated. Since the king has chosen to marry
into the good graces of the Egyptians, the niceties of
court etiquette must be emulated and observed. The con-
quered territories must be governed. Levies must be
supervised so that submission is assured. The corvee
requires detailed administration.2
The social and situational incentives to expand
1Scott, "Beginnings," pp. 262-79.
2McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 15-47; Porteous,
pp. 247-51; Scott, Proverbs; Ecclesiastes, pp. xxx-xxxiii.
130
royal wisdom from the confines of a favored few to a
rather large administrative class would support the democ-
ratization process. This is true however much the glories
of early Hebrew history may have been exaggerated to serve
later political purposes. The basic exigencies still re-
main. Didactic materials must be produced. Writing,
therefore scribal training at no less than an elementary
level, is the sine qua non of competent administration.
The administrator must be in harmony with the royal order;
he must be just and competent in his discernment and in
distinguishing cases.1 Later, with the Exile or perhaps
even before it, would come the weakening of royal influ-
ence. Disillusionment follows. Speculative wisdom de-
velops, and the wisdom movement moves away from the court
and the aristocracy to locate in independent schools.
These serve the needs of a more complex and de-centralized
society in which the middle-class plays an important social
role.2
Especially for Egypt, this scenario is very attrac-
tive. The major impetus for democratization would come
during the Middle Kingdom. Our reading of Egyptian sources,
1McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 23-45.
2Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 84, 133; Walter
Brueggemann, In Man We Trust (Richmond: John Knox Press,
1972), pp. 64-103.
131
however, may be too credulous, weakening the foundation of
the analogy. Where the material attributed to the early
wise viziers even exists--much does not and much of the
rest is fragmentary--the attributions should be regarded
as at best traditional. The "Instruction for King Meri-
kare" reveals striking blunders on the part of his pharaonic
teacher. It seems rather out of character--and culture--
for pharaoh himself to admit mistakes so baldly. The
possibility that this text is polemical or apologetic,
therefore pseudonymous, cannot be dismissed.1 The "Instruc-
tion of Amenemhet" raises undeniable difficulties. It is
the purported teaching of a dead pharaoh to his son and
heir to the throne. The attribution must be pseudonymous.2
1James B. Pritchard, ed., Ancient Near Eastern Texts
Relating to the Old Testament, 2d corrected and enlarged
ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 414-
18. John A. Wilson edited and translated the Egyptian
material presented here., Cf. James B. Pritchard, ed., The
Ancient Near East: Supplementary Texts and Pictures Re-
lating to the Old Testament, Consisting of Supplementary
Materials for "The Ancient Near East in Pictures" and
"Ancient Near Eastern Texts" (Princeton: Princeton Univers-
ity Press, 1969), Section VI. The Egyptian material was
not revised for the third edition, which revisions are the
substance of the Supplement.
2Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 418-
19. Note Wilson's introductory remarks: "The specific
historicity of the text has been challenged, on the grounds
that a dead king is offering the advice. . . . [B]ut the
text is historical in its applicability to the times"
(p. 418). The question, however, is the difference be-
tween the literal activity of the pharaoh and his figura-
tive activity and what such a difference might mean in
132
The later sebayit, Egyptian instructions, come generally
from obscure officials.1 Thus, the evidence for royal
wisdom and for a democratization process in Egypt are in-
tensely problematical. Analogy with Egypt forms the basis
for postulating a democratization process in Israel.
We may add the general observation that any in-
struction committed to writing would seem to be aimed at
some kind of preservation and at an audience significantly
larger than one. While it is not altogether implausible
that a father should communicate his experience and ex-
pertise in government to his heir in written form, the
fact of the writing plus its preservation in scribal
circles would suggest that the original intent was far
broader, and the setting therefore an artifice. Two
aspects of content further support this observation.
First, there are references to a scribal Standesethik, to
humility and circumspection in the face of superiors (and
who is superior to the pharaoh?), and to conventional wis-
dom imagery.2 In the "Prophecy of Nefer-rohu," we find a
literary-historical interpretation and socio-structural
reconstruction.
1See Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp.
420-25; cf. McKane, Proverbs, pp. 90-150.
2Kovacs, "Class-Ethic"; Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon,"
pp. 20-22; Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 94-96.
133
pharaoh learned in the scribal arts.1 Nevertheless, the
paeans to scribal learning and its preservation, to ad-
ministrative shrewdness, and to reading and learning from
the fathers are singularly important to the scribal school.
Conventional wisdom imagery appears: the distinction be-
tween the wise man and the fool, noblesse oblige, the son-
father relationship for that of pupil and teacher2 (the
paradigm for the pharaoh and his son, rather than vice
versa?).3
Second, many scholars have remarked about the al-
most "Macchievellian" tone to many of the instructions.
Yet, some scholars have argued that these wily calculations
are far more appropriate to distanced intellectual reflec-
tion about how rulers act than they are pragmatically
1Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 444-46.
2Cf. J. W. McKay, "Man's Love for God in Deu-
teronomy and the Father/Teacher-Son/Pupil Relationship,"
Vetus Testamentum 22 (October 1972): 426-35.
3See Jean Leclant, "Documents Nouveaux et Points
de Vue Récents sur les Sagesses de L'Égypte Ancienne,"
in Sagesses du Proche-Orient Ancien, pp. 5-26; in the same
work, Baudoin van de Walle, "Problemes Relatifs aux
Methodes d'Enseignement dans l'Égypte Ancienne," pp. 191-
207; Duesberg and Fransen; McKane Prophets and Wise Men,
pp. 13-54. E.g., Ptah-hotep 510 ff., 575 ff.; Merikare
35 ff., 45 ff., 50 ff.; Ani iii 5 ff., 13 ff. (foreign
woman!), vii 20 ff.; Amenemopet chs. 6, 9, 11, 13 (!),
17, 20; Onchsheshonqy col. 7; 8:2-10. For Onchsheshoqy,
see S. R. K. Glanville, Catalogue of Demotic Papyri in
the British Museum, vol. 2: The Instructions of
cOnchsheshonqy (British Museum Papyrus 10508), pt. 1:
134
useful advice on how to proceed as a ruler:
Fill not thy heart with a brother, nor know a
friend. Create not for thyself intimates--there
is no fulfillment thereby. [Even] when thou
sleepest, guard thy heart thyself, because no
man has adherents on the day of distress.1
He who is rich does not show partiality in his
[own) house. He is a possessor of property who
has no wants. . . . Great is a great man when his
great men are great. Valiant is the king posessed
of courtiers; august is he who is rich in his
nobles.2
Note the following excerpt from Ptah-hotep:
If thou hearest this which I have said to thee,
thy every project will be [better] than [those of]
the ancestors. As for what is left over of their
truth, it is their treasure—[though] the memory
of them may escape from the mouth of men--because
of the goodness of their sayings. Every word is
carried on, without perishing in this land forever.
It makes for expressing well, the speech of the
very officials. It is what teaches a man to speak
to the future, so that it may hear it, what pro-
duces a craftsman, who has heard what is good and
who speaks to the future--and it hears. . . .3
Those whose profession requires them to work in the
presence of the powerful, and be subject to their whims and
fancies, want to understand the principles which govern the
Introduction, Transliteration, Translation, Notes, and
Plates (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1955).
1Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, p. 418
(Amenemhet).
2 Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, p. 415
(Merikare).
3Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, p. 414.
135
exercise of great power so that they may conform their
lives and their decisions to that pattern, minimizing
though not eliminating the chance of misstep. The ruler
possesses free discretion: he has little need to under-
stand its principles and structure. The royal bureaucracy,
what we may loosely call the bourgeoisie, have a great
stake in that structure and those principles. Moreover,
their vulnerability, hence alienation, may be reflected
in what they write as a kind of amorality. One who cannot
escape the influence of absolute power must submit to it;
whether it be just, and how it might be so, is quite be-
side the point.1
On the basis of these considerations, we can apply
Egyptian analogies to Israel only with great caution, re-
gardless of how direct the path of Egyptian-Hebrew influ-
ence may seem to be, since the relationship between royal
wisdom and the Sitze-im-Leben of its ostensive texts remains
obscure.
The Egyptian materials do, however, suggest
1 Niccolo Macchiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi
Ricci, rev. by E. R. P. Vincent, The World's Classics,
vol. 43 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Baldesar
Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. Charles S.
Singleton, Anchor Books (Garden City: Doubleday & Company,
1959). See W. Lee Humphreys, "The Motif of the Wise
Courtier in the Old Testament," unpublished Th.D. disserta-
tion, Union Theological Seminary, 1970; and Susan Niditch
and Robert Doran, "The Success Story of the Wise Courtier:
A Formal Approach," Journal of Biblical Literature 96
(June 1977): 179-93.
136
important themes in royal wisdom.1 The king's wisdom con-
sists of formal scribal training, judicial discernment
between right and wrong, successful administration, ency-
clopedic or encompassing knowledge, and concord with the
harmonizing order of maat. In Egypt, the king functions
as the guarantor of order, maat (or, as a goddess Maat),
in his capacity of law-giver. He not only vanquishes the
chaotic force of isf.t, but he establishes a reliable and
fruitful natural order:2
I was the one who made barley, the beloved of the
grain-god. The Nile honored me on every broad ex-
panse. No one hungered in my years; no one thirsted
therein. . . . Everything which I had commanded was
1Hellmut Brunner, "Die Weisheitsliteratur" in
Handbuch der Orientalistik, ed., Bertold Spuler, vol. 1:
Ägyptologie, pt. 2: Literatur (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952);
Georges Posener, De la Divinité du Pharaon, Cahiers de la
Société Asiatique, vol. 15 (Paris: Imprimérie Nationale,
1960); Henri Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods: A Study of
Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society
and Nature, Oriental Institute Essay (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1948); Georges Posener, Littérature et
Politique dans l'Égypte de la XIIe Dynastie, Bibliothéque
de l'École des Hauces Études, no. 307 (Paris: Librairie
Ancienne-Honoré Champion, Éditeur, 1956); Rudolf Antes,
Lebensregeln und Lebensweisheit der Alten Ägypter, Der
Leipzig Alte Orient, vol. 32, no. 2 (LelPzig: J. C. Hinrich'sche
Buchhandlung, 1933); Friederich Wilhelm, Freiherr von
Bissing, Altägyptische Lebensweisheit, Die Bibliothek der
Alten Welt: Reihe der Alte Orient (Zurich: Artemis Verlag,
1955). Compare also Henri-Irénée Marrou, Histoire de
l'Éducation dans l'Antiquité, 6th rev. and expanded ed.
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1965); Siegfried Morenz,
Ägyptische Religion, Die Religionen der Menschheit, vol.
8 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960).
2 Morenz, Ägyptische Religion, pp. 117-43.
137
in the proper place.1
About Maat, Schmid comments:
Die Weisheit setzt nicht eine ewige, ideale,
metaphysische Ordnung voraus, der sich der Mensch
nur zu unterziehen hätte, sondetn behauptet, dass
durch weises Verhalten Weltordnung überhaupt erst
konstitutiert and realisiert wird. Weisheitlichem
Verhalten wohnt eine sehr zentrale, Kosmos
schaffende Funktion inne, es hat teil an der
Eteblierung der (einen) Weltordnung.2
We do not find Mesopotamian materials which sig-
nificantly clarify the issue of royal wisdom. Although a
number of proverbs have been found in Sumerian and
Akkadian collections, their place in royal or scribal wis-
dom is less clearly established, especially since the
attributions have frequently been lost. One instruction
purports to relate the counsel Sharuppak, survivor of the
flood, gave his son Ziusudra: clearly the setting of a
legend.3 Lambert labels some proverb collections "popu-
lar.”4 We question whether any collection can in the
strict sense be considered popular, particularly at this
1Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, p. 419
(Amenemhet).
2Schmid, Gerechtigkeit, p. 51. "Die Weisheit zielt
auf Maat, auf die Eingliederung des menschlichen Verhaltens
in die alles umfassende Weltordnung: wer recht lebt,
steht in Einklang mit der Weltordnung" (p. 50).
3Pritchard, Ancient Near East, pp. 158-59. Robert
D. Biggs, editor and translator.
4Lambert, pp. 216-82, passim.
138
historical remove. The same difficulty applies to fables.
As against either popular or royal wisdom, the
Mesopotamian evidence best fits the scribal and specula-
tive categories which follow. Certainly in Mesopotamia,
as in Ugarit and elsewhere, one can establish the royal
ideology of order: the king serves as the earthly vice-
roy of that "gray Eminence" who has laid out a cosmic
order that confines and restrains the powers of chaos.
The king's law-giving word supports that order, harmonizes
his land and his people with it, and thereby guarantees
both justice and an auspicious Nature which is reliable
in its cycles and bountiful in its harvests. The applica-
tion of this ideology to wisdom specifically becomes con-
vincing only when, as in Egypt, we find wisdom and a royal
setting together.1
1Schmid, Gerechtigkeit, pp. 24-65; Frankfort,
Kingship, p. 6; Humphreys, pp. 58-60. On these issues more
generally see also Edmund I. Gordon,,"A New Look at the
Wisdom of Sumer and Akkad," Bibliotheca Sacra 17 (1960):
122-52; Edmund I. Gordon and Thorkild Jacobsen, Sumerian
Proverbs: Glimpses of Everyday Life in Ancient Mesopotamia,
Museum Monographs (Philadelphia: University Museum of the
University of Pennsylvania, 1959); J. J. A. van Dijk, La
Sagesse Suméro-Accadienne: Recherches sur les Genres
Littéraires des Textes Sapientiaux, avec Choix de Textes,
Commentaires Orientales, vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1953); F. R. Kraus, "Altmesopotamisches Lebensgefühl,"
Journal of Near Eastern Studies 19 (1960): 117-32; Samuel
Noah Kramer, “Sumerian Wisdom Literature: A Preliminary
Survey," Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental
Research, no. 122 (April 1951): 28-31; Samuel Noah Kramer,
"Sumerian Similes: A Panoramic View of Some of Man's
Oldest Literary Images," Journal of the American Oriental
139
There is more to this discussion than the obvious
hazards of an analogy. Ultimately, one is compelled to
ask how wisdom came into Israel. If wisdom is to be as-
sociated with the royal court in social location and de-
velopment, then what is its relationship to the royal
ideology? Theses of divine order, maat/sidqh, and democ-
ratization strongly support the argument that wisdom en-
tered Israel through high scribal officials brought in
under an internationalist king to organize a highly
literate and relatively non-parochial administrative elite.
The theories also establish a convenient relationship among
three kinds of wisdom: royal, scribal and speculative.
On the other hand, we can question what may be in-
ferred about royal wisdom from our Egyptian and Hebrew
sources. Further, the proximity between royal ideology
and scribal wisdom depends on both snowing that scribes
Society 89 (January-March 1969): 1-9; S. Langdon, "Babyl-
onian Proverbs," American Journal of Semitic Languages and
Literatures 28 (1912): 217-43; S. Langdon, Babylonian Wis-
dom: Containing the Poem of the Righteous Sufferer, the
Dialogue of Pessimism, the Books of Proverbs and the Sup-
posed Rules of Monthly Diet (London: Luzac and Company,
1923); T. Eric Peet, A Comparative Study of the Litera-
tures of Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia: Egypt's Con-
tribution to the Literature of the Ancient World, Schweich
Lectures of the British Academy, 1929 (London: Humphrey
Milford at the Oxford University Press for the British
Academy, 1931); Åke W. Sjöberg, "In Praise of Scribal Art,"
Journal of Cuneiform Studies 24 (1972): 127-31; Benjamin R.
Foster, "Wisdom and the Gods in Ancient Mesopotamia,"
Orientalis 43 (1974): 344-54.
140
adopted the ideology as an explanation of their own ac-
tivities and that the order-chaos motif correctly repre-
sents this ideology in its royal and scribal forms.
To the former: in both Egypt and Israel, we
suspect that later writers elaborated received traditions
about royal wisdom in order to serve the needs of their
social class and their academies. Thus, wisdom motifs may
well have been read back into a royal mythos and its im-
plicit ideology. Both may thus have been quite inde-
pendent of scribal wisdom, except as a later coloration.
Cosmic elements of the mythos would shade over into the
postulated creation or cosmic order emphasis of wisdom,
suggesting more affinity between royal myth/ideology and
wisdom than should be considered the case.
To the second: the order-chaos mythos is common
throughout the ancient Near East. It is typically as-
sociated with the king as the guarantor of order. That
administrative classes would give due service to this view
should be expected. Whether the view can be invoked to
explain their ethos and Weltanschauung is another matter.
Here, we must distinguish between manifest and latent
world-views. One may say out of social necessity--with
entire conviction--what one's actual pattern of living
and acting belies. The distinction between wisdom as a
form of thought and wisdom as a form of conduct is by no
141
means idle, especially in arguing this hypothesis.
Finally, we recognize that different models of
royalty functioned in the ancient Near East. In Egypt,
the pharaoh is divine or potentially divine; he is the
guarantor of Maat. He participates in and confirms the
interpenetrating cosmic order. Strong value is placed
on the status quo, although the stability of the political
system and the Egyptian social economy can easily be
exaggerated. The scribal ideal predominates. Later,
eternal life becomes an important focus of all Egyptian
thought, wisdom included. It is both an objective of one's
life and an important ethical consideration.
For the Mesopotamian, eternal life is that unat-
tainable characteristic which distinguishes a god from a
mere mortal. The king is not regarded as divine. Porteous
argues that the executive responsibilities of the
Mesopotamian monarch are far greater. He has a more de-
tailed responsibility for the day-to-day matters of gov-
ernmental administration. The king maintains order by
right administration, which thereby assures nature's
bounty.
In Israel, Porteous contends, the king is charged
with maintaining a covenant relationship between the people
and Yahweh, a relationship which antedates the institution
of the monarchy itself. As in Mesopotamia the king is not
142
perceived as divine. Eternal life does not figure into
the ethical equation. It does distinguish man from god,
though that is perhaps not the primary difference. Since
the institution of the Hebrew monarchy is, in many re-
spects, closer to that of Mesopotamia than Egypt, adopting
Egyptian royal wisdom as the paradigm for the introduction
of wisdom into Israel, for its social location and for
its pattern of subsequent development, would seem a
perilous enterprise except where specific supportive
evidence can be found.1 A brief examination of the tra-
ditional association of Hebrew wisdom with the monarchy
seems to be in order at this point.
Studying the Davidic history, Noth finds two
strands to traditions about government. In one, David is
led by oracles. He continually inquires of Yahweh what he
should do. In the other, his wisdom is almost divine;
note the paean of the wise woman from Tekoa. David acts
on the basis of his own understanding. Significantly, his
counsellor Ahithophel speaks with oracular wisdom.
Divinely founded wisdom takes the place of the oracle
per se. To receive Ahithophel's counsel is as if one had
consulted the oracle of Yahweh.2
1Porteous, "Royal Wisdom," pp. 247-61.
2Noth, "Bewährung," pp. 225-37.
143
Solomon, however, becomes the Hebrew paradigm of
the wise king:
In alledem spürt man die geistige Luft der
salomonischen Zeit. Es ist nicht wahrscheinlich,
dass erst eine späte Überlieferung diese im
einzelnen verschiedenen and in mehreren lit-
erarischen Quellen auftretenden, aber in der
Grundlage übereinstimmenden Züge zusammengetragen
habe für die Erzählungen über die spätdavidisch-
salomonisch-nachsalomonische Zeit. Vielmehr
haben wir es offenbar zu tun mit der Atmosphäre
dieser Zeit, wie sie wirklich war.1
Noth's view is that of many scholars. Solomon's
association with wisdom represents the working together
of a number of different strands of tradition, as well as
free-floating legend, principally by the deuteronomic
historians. The material they use does not appear to
derive from annals. It is not contemporary with the
events it reports. What has already become tradition has
been expanded and developed to serve the historians'
literary, historical and theological purposes. Yet, so
many consonant strands of tradition cannot be without any
historical foundation: there must be a basis for Solomon's
special relationship to the development of wisdom. The
accounts cannot spring alone from Solomon's administrative
competence, discernment and adroit leadership. He would
seem to have been the patron of some sort of wisdom,
1 Noth, "Bewährung," p. 237.
144
whether royal counsellors, scribal schools or court wisdom
forms.1
I Kings 3:3-15 bases Solomon's wisdom on a Re-
quest Theophany at Gibeon.2 The king pleads his ignorance,
like that of a child who does not know how to go out or
come in. "Give thy servant therefore an understanding
mind to govern thy people, that I may discern between
good and evil."3 Pleased with this request (framed in
persuasive speech!), Yahweh also confers on Solomon the
riches, power and longevity which he did not request.
Wisdom derives therefore from a theophanic experience.
Over against this Request Theophany at Gibeon stands the
clearly deuteronomic theophany of 9:1-9. Noth argues that
it was written to set off the other, therefore older and
received, tradition.4
1Scott, "Solomon," pp. 262-79; McKane Prophets
and Wise Men, pp. 15-62.
2"Ask what I shall give you" (v. 5).
3Note the tiwb-rc of administration, the power of
command, v. 9.
4Noth, "Bewährung," pp. 226-28; Scott, .
"Beginnings," pp. 264-65. Noth identifies two strands
to traditions about governance. In one, David is led
by oracles. In the other, his wisdom is almost divine,
a charism. He acts out of his own 'charismatic' un-
derstanding. Ahithophel speaks with oracular wisdom.
The charism of divinely-founded wisdom comes to
145
The Gibeon Theophany serves to introduce a tale
of Solomon's judicial insight, the Two Harlots.1 In their
present form, the two belong together, particularly be-
cause of the inclusio of 3:28. The Gibeonite setting of
the theophany, however, suggests that each has an inde-
pendent history. The second part, the Tale of the Two
Harlots, can be found in a number of other cultures, though
always later and with a. somewhat different situation. The
most notable version comes from India. Originally, two
wives may have been fighting over preference in the eyes
of their husband or over inheritance rights. Gressmann
argues that the tale has been recast to give both women
the same external appearance--rather than one virtuous and
one evil and grasping wife--in order to make the decision
more difficult, and therefore more perspicacious.2
substitute for the oracle. Solomon, in his dream, selects
the latter, charismatic, wisdom through a direct theophany.
The oracular word thus becomes the word of command founded
on insight and discernment. Yahweh directs human judgment
to attain his ends. Hence, Absalom neglects Ahithophel's
sound counsel (!) and Rehoboam rejects the advice of the
elders for his younger advisors. (Pp. 231-37.)
1Noth, “Bewährung," pp. 228-29.
2"Im Alten Testament wäre also mit Rücksicht auf
das üble Verhalten der einen der beiden Frauen die
Geschichte aus dem Milieu des Hauses eines Mannes
mit mehreren rechtmässigen Gemahlinnen in das Milieu
eines Dirnenhauses verlegt worden, and zwar
beide Frauen, da ja die Erzählung notwendig das
gleiche aussere Erscheinungsbild für beide Frauen
voraussetzte, das die Entscheidung des Streitfalles
so schwer machte." (Noth, "Bewährung," p. 229)
146
Noth remarks that the customary procedures of Hebrew law
and Near Eastern legal practice are ignored. A formal
oath is not sworn to seek resolve contradictory testimony;
divine judgment is therefore not invoked, not even by
oracle, lot or other means. Instead, the king's wisdom
becomes a divine charism whereby he stands above estab-
lished legal practice. He possesses the insight to re-
solve the case decisively:1
Zwar ist diese Weisheit eine "göttliche Weisheit",
d.h. ein Geschenk Gottes, wie alles, was ein Mensch
hat; von Gott gegeben ist; aber sie ist doch nun
“in” Salomo, sie ist rein Besitz, mit dem er wirken
kann, and sie erübrigt ein "Befragen" Gottes in
Einzelfällen der Rechtsfindung.2
According to Scott, a common theme underlies this passage:
“Wisdom as the insight to distinguish right from wrong,
with the resulting ability of a judge to render true
justice.”3
Under the rubric of "wisdom as intellectual
brilliance and encyclopedic knowledge, especially of the
world of nature other than man," Scott includes both the
summary of Solomonic wisdom in 5:9-14 and the account of
the visit of the Queen of Sheba.4 The passages, he argues,
1Noth, "Bewährung," pp. 230-32.
2Noth, "Bewährung," p. 232.
3Scott, "Beginnings," p. 270; italics deleted.
4Scott, "Beginnings," p. 271. Sheba: ch. 10.
147
are post-deuteronomic.1 While the deuteronomic material
does not glorify Solomon beyond his building of the Temple
and his judicial sagacity--it presages his defection from
Yahweh-worship, glorification is the sign of a separate
and, here, later source. For the Queen of Sheba, wisdom
obviously encompasses courtly magnificence and ritual
majesty. Riddles and interrogations form a vital part of
the meeting, reminding one of the Three Young Guardsmen
as well as the tasks Pharaoh posed for Sennacherib and
Ahiikar. An actual practice of royal or court wisdom would
appear to underlie such accounts.2
I Kings 4:29-34 (ET) sets forth a paean to
Solomon's wisdom which makes specific reference to a
variety of types of wisdom, including encyclopedic knowl-
edge:
And God gave Solomon wisdom and understanding
beyond measure, and largeness of mind like the sand
on the seashore, so that Solomon's wisdom surpassed
the wisdom of all the people of the east, and all
the wisdom of Egypt. For he was wiser than all
other men, wiser than Ethan the Ezrahite, and Heman,
Calcol, and Darda, the sons of Mahol; and his fame
was in all the nations round about. He also uttered
three thousand proverbs; and his songs were a
thousand and five. He spoke of trees, from the cedar
that is in Lebanon to the hyssop that grows out of
the wall; he spoke also of beasts, and of birds, and
of reptiles, and of fish. And men came from all
1Scott, "Beginnings," p. 271.
2Scott, "Beginnings," pp. 271-72.
148
peoples to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and from
all the kings of the earth, who had heard of his
wisdom.
This, as we have already implied, is grandiose language
indeed. Significantly, Scott argues, this description of
courtly magnificence can be matched only in Esther,
Daniel 1-6, and Chronicles. The first two he regards as
midrashic tales, prominently treating wise men at court.
The last gives the Davidic court equally extravagant
treatment.1
The quantity of proverbs and songs should be re-
garded simply as large round numbers (like the "Thousand
and One Nights"). The term wydbr, "uttered," should not
be construed as meaning that Solomon is merely a collector;
Noth contends that Solomon himself invents and composes
innumerable songs and proverbs.2 The plants and animals
are synechdochic. Presumably, Solomon compiles onomastica
along the lines of the Egyptian Ordnungswissenschaft. He
exceeded the bounds of the conventional list-wisdom form
by treating the materials poetically. This late and
rather legendary glorification of Solomon lets us conclude
little about its actual historical character.3
1Scott, 'Beginnings," p. 267.
2Noth, "Bewährung," pp. 225-29.
3Noth, Bewährung," pp. 225-37; Scott, "Beginnings,"
149
Scott's third and final rubric in this discussion
is "Wisdom as the ability of the successful ruler," a
wisdom which is hardly unique to Solomon. When moribund
King David charges his son to deal with the father's
friends and enemies and appeals to Solomon's wisdom, the
account basically serves as a pre-deuteronomic introduction
to the account of the summary executions.1 While the ac-
counts of Solomon's dealings with Hiram of Tyre contain
two references to Solomon's wisdom, one may belong to
deuteronomic editorial material thematically derived from
the Gibeon Theophany while the other may go back to the
pre-deuteronomic material.2 This sort of royal wisdom,
however, is a far cry from proverbs.
The superscriptions to Proverbs are evidence of a
sort. Scott notes that the references in 1:1 and 10:1 are
vague and indeterminable: they could refer to a literary
style or convention. Claims for authorship only gain
credibility from the passage in I Kings cited above,
which is basically late folklore. Since Proverbs 25:1
already looks to Hezekiah ascriptions to Solomon may not
pp. 271-72; Gerhard von Rad, "Hiob XXXVIII and die Alt-
ägyptische Weisheit," in Wisdom in Israel and Ancient Near
East, pp. 293-301.
1Scott, "Beginnings," pp. 270-71.
2Scott, "Beginnings," pp. 270-72.
150
be a particularly early convention. The allusion to the
"men of Hezekiah" is important, however, because it would
seem to lack ulterior motive.1
. . . this is first-rate evidence that an organized
literary wisdom movement existed at Hezekiah's
court and under his patronage. The king's men
transcribed, published, or carried forward from
tradition a collection of maxims which, in this
later editorial title, are designated "proverbs of
Solomon." There is a double ambiguity: just as
the phrase may or may not indicate-authorship, so
it may or may not imply that the association of
proverbs with the name of Solomon existed before
Hezekiah's time. The significant point is that
such an association did exist at that time, when
a literary wisdom movement and a court scribal
establishment were to be found at Jerusalem under
royal patronage.2
The appearance of the wise as a distinct social
class coincides with Isaiah and Hezekiah, in this view.
Notably, Hezekiah was the first post-Solomonic king to be
sole ruler of Israel. He appears to have set in motion a
national revival, following the lines of his legendary
predecessor. The Chronicler credits Hezekiah with cleans-
ing the Temple and restoring the grandeur of its worship,
an excellent comparison with Solomon. The writer expands
on the military prowess with which the writer of Kings
already credits him, pointing up the peace, admiration,
1Scott, “Beginnings,” pp. 272-74.
2Scott, "Beginnings," p. 273.
151
tribute, riches and honor which graced his reign.1
Far more important, by any standard, are the
pictures of the Hezekian monarchy found in Isaiah. They
are contemporaneous for one thing. More important, they
are entirely incidental to Isaiah's own interests. From
this material, Scott elicits three important parallels
with Solomon:
(i) intercourse with Egypt, with resulting strong
Egyptian political and cultural influence on the
Jerusalem court; (ii) unusual prominence in the
scene of horses and chariots as the basic military
arm, and as a symbol of glory; (iii) the power and
influence at court of organized "Wisdom"; in this
case not so much in the person of the king as in
"the wise" as a professional group. . .2
Not only does Isaiah speak of the wise as an or-
ganized group, but his recorded sayings include clear uses
of wisdom forms (parables, rhetorical questions), re-
flecting his occasional adoption of the role of wisdom
teacher. Scott speculates that Proverbs 25:1 reflects a
literary renaissance in Israel. After the fall of the
North, Judah becomes the repository of Hebrew thought.
Traditions are recorded and reshaped so that they will
not be lost; the fall of Israel has made people conscious
of the potential fragility of their traditions. Note also
1Scott, "Beginnings," p. 275.
2Scott, "Beginnings,' p. 276.
152
the attribution of a psalm to Hezekiah in Isaiah 38:9-20.
After Solomon, Hezekiah is the only king to have literary
associations, both with psalms and with wisdom.1
Scott asks why Deuteronomy 17:14-20 has been
written. "It is a well-known principle of law that a
practice is not forbidden by law unless the situation
demands it."2 Manasseh, he argues, surpassed Solomon only
in cruelty and oppression. Hezekiah seems the obvious
alternative object: subsequently, kings are to be forbidden
to pattern themselves after Solomon. Though the latter is
never mentioned in the passage, the allusion is transparent.
Further, while Solomon had the misfortune not to have a
copy of the law to study(!), hereafter kings must be well-
read in the law. They are commanded to be literate: by
implication Solomon was not! If such a tradition existed,
it would support the lateness of I Kings 4:29-34 (ET) as
well as the late development of a wisdom class associated
with the royal court and its patronage. Since the deutero-
nomic code likely post-dates Hezekiah, the application is
1Scott, “Beginnings,” pp. 276-79; Johannes Fichtner,
Gottes Weisheit: Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament,
ed. Klaus Dietrich Fricke, Arbeiten zur Theologie, 2d
series, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1965), pp. 18-26;
see Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, pp. 18-21 e.s.
2Scott, "Beginnings," p. 279. In studies of
scientific methodology, T. H. White is often credited for
"What is not forbidden is compulsory" (!).
153
logical.1
Scott concludes:
though general historical considerations do not
preclude, but rather favour, the connection with
Solomon of the origins of literary wisdom in
Israel, the ostensible biblical evidence for this
in the first Book of Kings is post-exilic in date
and legendary in character. . . . The first real
impact of Egyptian wisdom on Israel, with evident
results in Hebrew literary production, seems to
belong to the reign of Hezekiah. . . . If "proverbs
of Solomon" were so called before this time, there
is no substantial evidence to show when and how
this came about. . . . The tradition seems to have
been cultivated deliberately by Hezekiah as part
of his grandiose plans to restore the vanished
glories of Solomon's kingdom, for in Hezekiah's
reign appear the first clear evidences of Hebrew
Wisdom as a significant literary phenomenon.2
If proverbs were not the actual products of royal
wisdom, it is safe to say that they must have received
royal patronage. In them, therefore, we may expect to
find evidence of royal ideology, though not to the ex-
clusion of the authors' own views of the world. For that
ideology at least wisdom had several meanings other than
Lebensklugheit. More, if the interest in proverbs and
proverb-collections belongs to a comparatively late period
in the Hebrew monarchies, perhaps to the time of Hezekiah,
then the somewhat more expansive views of wisdom, including
even legend, may well have formed part of the authors'
1Scott, "Beginnings," pp. 272-79.
2Scott, "Beginnings," p. 279.
154
intellectual milieu. Finally, on the basis of the chaos-
order mythos, one would expect wisdom to be predicated of
the king by analogy to the wisdom of Yahweh and his
divine council. Noth contends, however, that this is not
the case.1 The Solomon stories are the earliest that deal
even indirectly with Yahweh's wisdom. There, the orienta-
tion is strictly toward man's sphere of existence. Yahweh
teaches, he gives wisdom, he makes one wise in the same
way that he is said to make one rich or confer prosperity.
Only in relatively late materials do writers speak of wis-
dom as the gift per se of Yahweh. When the reference is
to God himself, and to his wisdom, the sources tend to be
rather late. Most often, then, they speak of Yahweh as
he who created everything "with wisdom." Only in Daniel
do we finally encounter wisdom as the possession of God in
the most general sense. A few older passages do mention
wisdom in the vicinity of' Yahweh, (Umgebung) without
predicating it of him directly--the divine analogy of the
wise woman of Tekoa, the “spirit of wisdom and understand-
ing” which enlightens the messianic king, and the wisdom
of the divine council.2
1Noth, Bewährung," p. 235.
2Isaiah 11:2; "Ratsversammlung Gottes" in Job 15:
8 and Proverbs 30:3. Noth, "Bewährung," pp. 234-35.
155
Es ist ganz deutlich, dass man im Alten Testament
nur sehr zögernd das Prädikat der "Weisheit" Gott
zugesprochen hat, dass man abgesehen von ganz späten
Stellen gelegentlich die Schöpferweisheit Gottes
ausgesagt, in übrigen aber an einer Reihe von
Stellen die Weisheit nur so zu Gott in Beziehung
gesetzt hat, dass sie als eine Gabe Gottes
gepriesen wurde wie andere Gaben Gottes auch, die
von Menschen empfangen werden; auch dies letztere
vorwiegend in späten Stücken der alttestamentlichen
Literatur.1
In sum, the king, his court, and the royal
ideology provide a setting which serves, at least poten-
tially, to bring together a number of subtypes of wisdom.
Royal wisdom is not whole cloth. The evidence even raises
questions about the royal setting of certain forms or sub-
types. Traditionally, the royal court appears as the
cradle and then patron of wisdom. Royal wisdom is crucial
to the democratization theory, which holds that wisdom
began in the king's search for the principles of effective
and reliable governance in which he educated his heir.
The needs of an expanding empire made administrative edu-
cation of the aristocracy necessary. Increasing social
complexity both forced the issue of merit, opening educa-
tion and administrative rank up to a "middle class," and
led to further expansion of education. It could no longer
remain the exclusive property of the elite. Wisdom repre-
sents the Standesethik of the school; it becomes less
1Noth, "Bewährung," p. 235.
156
imperial and elitist as its social milieu changes from
the royal house to the decentralized school. Royal wisdom
evolves into democratic wisdom. For democratization,
Egypt is the model.
Such a thesis would be compatible with wisdom's
origination or early association with the divine council.
Noth finds it lacking in Israel.1 Moreover, the analogy
between Israel and Egypt is weak. The evidence for a
personal wisdom of administration that formed the basis
of the king's education of his heir is doubtful. Early
royal wisdom in Israel becomes an inference from late and
legendary material.
Finally, royal wisdom encompasses subtypes whose
relationship with one another is obscure. Which of these
subtypes do we mean? How do thy relate to one another
historically? We have seen how problematic these issues
are.
A list of subtypes, drawn from our discussion,
would have to include:
a) Royal oracular wisdom
b) Judicial discernment, the wisdom of the wise judge
c) Effective governance, sound administration
d) Royal ideology
1Noth, “Bewährung,” pp. 232-35.
157
e) Imperial guarantor of maat/order
f) Imperial bureaucracy, international scribalism
in royal service, bureaucratic Standesethik
g) Ordnungsweisheit, the wisdom of lists
h) Wisdom of the royal council
i) Wisdom forms of court etiquette (e.g., riddling
exchanges between monarchs or their emissaries)
j) Insight of a royal counsellor
k) Patron of the school and its forms and ethos
1) Patron of wisdom forms, literature, aesthesis
m) Royal stylistic conventions of poetry and speech
6. Epic Wisdom. The epic wisdom category holds
importance for our discussion because it forms an essential
part of the bridge von Rad builds between wisdom and
apocalyptic. If we are interested in locating any wisdom
Weltanschauung within theories of wisdom's evolution, the
von Rad hypothesis implies significant elements are to be
derived from the "structure" of wisdom. The term "epic"
should be taken in its broadest sense, as "heroic" or even
"ideal." There now rages a dispute within wisdom studies
whether what we would include in this wisdom type should
properly be considered wisdom at all.
Crenshaw, in his article on the problem of deter-
mining wisdom's influence on historical literature, sets
out five criteria that should be met before asserting the
158
presence of some kind of wisdom. First, there is con-
formity with definition, a problem we have already dis-
cussed. Second, the material must display "a stylistic
or ideological peculiarity found primarily in wisdom
literature."1 Common cultural expression or experience
does not count. Third, one must explain the nuance: how
are the wisdom elements actually used in the literary and
historical context of the work. Fourth, one must be con-
tinually aware of the predominant negative attitude toward
wisdom evidenced in much of Hebrew literature. Last, the
usage should make sense in terms of what we know of wis-
dom's historical development.2
While Hermisson dismisses Crenshaw's argument,
calling it "superficial" on the basis of an entirely off-
hand reference to I Kings 13,3 he actually takes a more
moderate position than his disagreement would suggest.
Setting out from von Rad's work relating history and wis-
dom to various Geistesbeschäftigungen à la Jolles,
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence,"
p. 132.
2Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence,"
pp. 130-35.
3Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 88 n. 3, 46; Hans-
Jürgen Hermisson, "Weisheit and Geschichte," in Probleme
Biblischer Theologie, p. 148 n. 17. Yet, compare Noth,
"Bewährung," p. 237 (!).
159
Hermisson concedes that a basic consideration in wisdom
study is where to draw bounds.1 In fact, his discussion
of the Succession Narrative and Isaianic wisdom argues
for an integration of wisdom motifs and its presupposi-
tions quite consistent with an appreciation of the
problems of nuance and history, though he weighs them
differently from Crenshaw in the end.2
At the risk of over-simplification, these criteria
might well be summarized in terms of the problem of nuance.
Though a writer may draw on motifs, language and ideas
that otherwise seem related to one or another type of wis-
dom, the ultimate criterion is how he adapts these ma-
terials to serve his own artistic and intellectual objec-
tives. Wisdom imagery is not per se wisdom thought, let
alone wisdom as a social class, force or movement. Further,
that so-called "wisdom" which consistently appears in a
wide range of otherwise non-wisdom contexts becomes sus-
pect; it is hardly good evidence for either wisdom influ-
ence or wisdom thought.
What we are calling "epic Wisdom" raises these
issues in two ways. First, there is the question whether
1Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 14-36, esp. 29;
Hermisson, "Weisheit und Geschichte," p. 147.
2Hermisson, "Weisheit und Geschichte," pp. 136-54;
cf. Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 113-33.
160
the hero or ideal figure should be considered a wise person
tout court, in the strictest application of the term. Is
his or her insight into experience or discernment of
justice in an ambiguous conflict situation patterned on
one of the established models of the wise person? Insight,
shrewdness, discernment, whether native, acquired by
training, or received by divine charism, all are not in
themselves specific characteristics of wisdom thought nor
traits or virtues of the wisdom movement alone. Prophets,
priests and patriarchs, no less than the wise, display such
virtues. We must be cautious not to confuse the technical
sense of 'wisdom' with the adjectival. He who is wise is
not perforce a sage; a sage, however, is surely a wise
person. All parts of the portrait must be weighed against
the motifs, images, forms and thought of incontrovertible
wisdom. One has to account for any deviations, contends
Crenshaw. Thus, while von Rad can provide an elaborate
list of wisdom themes in J's Joseph narrative, Crenshaw
educes a number of non-wisdom elements. He points to
nuances that conflict with accepted understandings of wis-
dom.1
Second, one has to deal with the problem of how
this portrayal is used. Is a wise person being depicted in
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," pp. 135-37.
161
the context of a non-wisdom historiography? Even if
Joseph is an archetypal wise man, what role does the ac-
count play in the whole J cycle? Are we to make J a
wisdom writer or his work wisdom literature because the
J school incorporates the figure of an epic wise man into
its history? When Hermisson contends that wisdom and non-
wisdom thought intermingle in the Succession Narrative or
Isaiah's oracles, he may expand our understanding of the
message underlying those specific works, but at the con-
siderable expense of dulling the analytical precision of
'wisdom' as a category of literary historical research.1
About the Succession Narrative, Hermisson concludes:
Es bleibt abschliessend zu bemerken, dass der
Autor der Thronnachfolgegeschichte wirkliche
Geschichte darstellen wollte, nicht etwa ein
weisheitliches Lehrbuch schreiben. Der Einwand,
den man gegen weisheitliche Einflüsse auf die
Thronnachfolcegeschichte geltend machte, dass
hier als Vertreter der Weisheit zT recht zwie-
lichtige Gestalten auftreten, dass der Rat des
Weisen gerade keinen Erfolg hat (Ahitophel!) u.
dgl., könnte gegen eim Lehrbuch sprechen, nicht
gegen eine Geschichtsdarstellung im weisheit-
lichen Horizont. Als Geschichtsschreiber muss
man den Autor wohl mit den Massstäben seiner
eigenen Welt messen darf ihm dann nicht
vorrechnen, in welchem Mass er geschichtliches
Geschehen stilisiert hat. Denn es ist gerade
das Mass, das ihm Erkenntnis von Geschichte
ermöglicht hat.2
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom influ-
ence, pp. 135-37; Hermisson, "Weisheit und Geschichte,"
pp. 136-54.
2Hermisson, "Weisheit und Geschichte," p. 148.
162
Hermisson makes a clear and valid decision about
where to draw the boundaries of 'wisdom'--it is, in part,
a scholarly choice about the descriptive use of technical
vocabulary. In addition, however, he uses the term to
distinguish peculiar characteristics of this account over
against other Hebrew historiography. It shows concern
for natural causality, without reference to the other-
worldly. It examines individuals and their relationships,
instead of groups, community or the nation. It is in-
terested in the behavior, action and reaction of people.
There is a balance between an order established by Yahweh
and Yahweh's position above that order in attaining his
own ultimate objectives.1 Still, the notion of a wisdom
"horizon" or "influence" seems disturbingly unspecific.
The assertion requires at least that the wise have existed
as a distinct social group with an identifiable world-
view, which could form an influence or horizon, no later
than the time of the Narrative's author. This is no idle
thesis.
The same line of argument applies to von Rad's
analysis of the Joseph story. Such a refined and sys-
tematic artistic composition virtually demands organized,
refined and systematic thought to support it. Von Rad's
1Hermisson, "Weisheit und Geschichte," pp. 153-54.
163
position, like Hermisson's, requires the comparatively
early existence in Israel of organized groups of wisdom
thinkers, whether they be in the royal bureaucracy, an
academy associated with the royal court, or in various
decentralized schools composed of people from a range of
social strata. Such elaborate compositions require not
only a refined and stable religious and intellectual
atmosphere which provides the coherent world-view in terms
of which the materials have been drawn together, they re-
quire a sophisticated audience to appreciate them. It
must be knowledgeable in that implicit and underlying world-
view and its symbolism. Its appreciation must lead to
preservation as well as the literary activity that produced
them.1
If we argue for influence rather than horizon, the
problem becomes even more complicated. What relationships
obtained between the writer and those “influences”? Are
social groups merging or diverging? Is this work the
unique product of a literary genius, an admissible but
historically unilluminating possibility? Did the author
consciously borrow from a competing intellectual movement,
or are the parallels strictly unconscious or inadvertent,
the products of the demands of literary form and content?
1See Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 113-33.
164
Proof of intellectual dependence is notoriously difficult
to establish, far more so than literary dependence. It is
difficult to specify how much similarity must exist before
the argument of influence becomes plausible.
The quote from Hermisson above also points up the
problem of form. Clearly there is no such thing as a mere
assemblage of facts; every composition purporting to report
factual occurrences operates under some set of guiding
principles which determine what is to be reported and what
is to be excluded. To call the Narrative “history” leaves
open the question, what kind? Is it propaganda, novella,
court apology, annal? One of the basic objectives of form
criticism is to bring us nearer the Sitz-im-Leben of the
document. What is wisdom-history and where is it to be
located?1
Again, what is the scenario for the evolution of
a setting for such apparently refined forms? We cannot
hope to resolve here the question of whether there existed
an epic wisdom or wisdom historiography in ancient Israel.
The discussion, however, points up the interdependence of
various lines of inquiry within wisdom research.
1In particular, see R. N. Whybray, The Succession
Narrative: A Study of II Samuel 9-20; I Kings 1 and 2,
Studies in Biblical Theology, 2 series, vol. 9 (Naperville,
Ill.: Alec R. Allenson, 1968); cm. Crenshaw, "Wisdom,"
pp. 259-62.
165
The views of von Rad, Hermisson and Whybray, among
others, require some kind of organized group--which the
former two would regard as wisdom--set sharply at variance
with the literary and historical reconstructions of Noth
and to a lesser degree Scott. These views seem to re-
quire the importation of an organized scribal bureaucracy,
based on the Egyptian model, during the reign of Solomon.
Certainly, it would be the simplest line of explanation.
Our inability to reach to reliable contemporary
sources leaves the situation open to considerable specu-
lation, pro and con. Not only could the argument shift
the date of the proverb collections and subcollections
nearly three hundred years backward, but such an early
wisdom would compel us to read them through different eyes.
These historic epics would effectively counter the view
that early Hebrew wisdom was profane and non-covenantal,
that it gradually became more theologized and nationalized
during and after the Exile. The reinterpretation
becomes even more drastic if we follow some scholars and
add to the Succession Narrative and the Joseph Story the
Second Creation Account (J), the Tales of Moses as Judge,
and the epic Hero Daniel.l Even if the proverbs belong to
1Chs. 1-6. Danel? Cf. "The Tale of Aqhat," Aqht
A, in Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 149-52 ff.
166
another wisdom group and even if they therefore display
an entirely different perspective on the world, they
would have to be seen in dialogue with these other com-
peting forms of wisdom. Most important, the Joseph Story,
through divination, its possible connection with the
Egyptian "Tale of Two Brothers,"1 and the charism of an
elaborately active and single-minded deity, would bring
together both wisdom and myth, sage and priest, teaching
and cult. It would seriously undermine the contention
that the proverbs tend to be neutral or somewhat hostile
toward the cult. We would have to see the proverb collec-
tions coming from a milieu in which some wisdom groups at
least concerned themselves with mythos, national heroes
and historical events of religious significance (Heils-
geschichte!).2
Because of these inescapable historical implications,
it is curious that the battle over wisdom historiography
seems to be fought out entirely on the ground of content:
whether certain motifs or forms are so specifically as-
sociated with wisdom that when a certain number of them
appear together in the same context the passage should
properly be denominated wisdom. We submit that the
1Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 23-25.
2Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 378-86, 391.
167
historical consequences are relevant to such judgments,
especially since the determination is to some extent
semantic in terms we have argued above. It is a matter
of judgment at what critical level one may validly apply
a particular technical term. Even having stipulated the
evidence, scholars disagree.
Consider, for example, the "Instructions of
Amenemope" and the parallel in Proverbs (22:17 ff.).
Scholars have argued, with some persuasiveness, that the
Egyptian material as is is prior, that the Proverbs
passage as is is prior, or that some Semitic or Egyptian
Vorlage must be invoked to explain both texts. Only when
Albright and Cerny all but ruled out a later date for the
Egyptian text and then Williams showed that the Instruc-
tion's stylistic peculiarities are consistently Egyptian
was the issue basically concluded.1 Precisely how much
1Irene Grumach, Untersuchungen zur Lebenslehre des
Amenemope, Münchener Universitätsschriften Philosophische
Fakultät, Münchener Ägyptologische Studien, vol. 23, ed.
Hans Wolfgang Müller (Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1972),
p. 3 n. 9; Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 421-
25; Hugo Gressmann, "Die Neugefundene Lehre des Amen-em-
ope und die Vorexilische Spruchdichtung Israels," Zeit-
schrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 1 (1924):
273-96; Marion Hiller Dunsmore, "An Egyptian Contribution
to the Book of Proverbs," Journal of Religion 5 (1925):
300-08; Hubert Grimme, "Weiteres zu Amen-em-ope und
Proverbien," Orientalische Literaturzeitung 28 (1925): 57-
62; F. Ll. Griffith, "The Teaching of Amenophis the Son of
Kanakht, Papyrus B.M. 10474," Journal of Egyptian Arche-
ology 12 (1926): 224-39; Ludwig Keimer, "The Wisdom of
168
evidence is required to demonstrate direct literary de-
pendence was at issue in this instance: a judgment of
value or method to which the enumeration of specific
parallels was not in and of itself decisive. The his-
torical consequences of such judgments are substantial.
Whybray and Hermisson do not sufficiently explore
the historical consequences of their positions. Whybray
argues that the Succession Narrative is a dramatization
of various proverbs, proving its' wisdom background. And
in a later work he argues against the early existence of
Amen-em-ope and the Proverbs of Solomon," American Journal
of Semitic Languages and Literatures 43 (1926): 8-21; D. C.
Simpson, "The Hebrew Book of Proverbs and the Teaching of
Amenophis," Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 12 (1926): 232-
39; W. O. E. Oesterley, The Wisdom of Egypt and the Old
Testament in the Light of the Newly Discovered “Teaching
of Amenemope” (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927); František
Lexa, "L'Analyse Littéraire de l'Enseignement d'Amenemopet,"
Archiv Orientáni 1 (1929): 129-239. R. O. Kevin, "The Wisdom of
Amen-em-Apt and its Possible Dependence upon the Hebrew
Book of Proverbs," Journal of Oriental Research 14 (1930):
115-57; Albrecht Alt, “Zur Literarischen Analyse der
Weisheit des Amenemope,” in Wisdom in Israel and Ancient
Near East, pp. 16-25; Etienne Drioton, "Le Livre de
Proverbes et la Sagesse d'Amenemope," Sacra Pagina: Mis-
cellanea Biblica Congressus Internationalis Catholici de
re Biblica, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovanien-
sum, vol. 12-13, bk. 1 (Gembloux: Editions DuCulot, 1959),
pp. 229-41; Ronald J. Williams, "The Alleged Semitic Origi-
nal of the Wisdom of Amenemope," Journal of Egyptian
Archeology 47 (December 1961): 100-06; B. Couroyer, "L'Origine
Egyptienne de la Sagesse d'Amenemope," Revue Biblique 70
(1963): 208-24.
169
a specific social class of the wise!1 Could such a milieu
of proverbial wisdom have arisen and stabilized itself to
such a degree by this time? Could it exist in such a form
that this writer could draw upon it intelligibly to arti-
culate his Solomonic court apologetic early in that King's
reign? What is the pre-history of the “cultural and pro-
fessional circle to which the author belonged?”2
Von Rad, in similar fashion, avoids the earliest
history of organized scribal wisdom.
Der Zeitraum, dessen litararische Hinterlassen-
schaft wir befragen, beginnt mit dem Aufkommen
einer Schulweisheit in der frühen Königszeit. Das
Vorhandensain einer älteren Sippenweisheit soll
nicht grundsätzlich bestritten werden, ihr Vor-
handensein ist von vornherein sogar höchst wahr-
scheinlich. Sie ist aber ihrerseits ein so schwer
bestimmbares Phänomen, dass unsere Untersuchung von
ihr als einem Gegenstand suí generis keine Notiz
nimmt. Zudem hat sich die Annahme eines Zusammen-
hangs zwischen ihr und der Schulweisheit als frag-
würdigerwiesen. Grundsätzlich sei hier schon
fortgestellt, dass wir in diesem Zusammenhang .
unsere Aufgabe nicht darin sehen, hinter die
Lehrdichtungen des Sprüchebuches zurückzufragen,
ob sich vielleicht da und dort Formen einer viel
alteren Weisheit abzeichnen. Wir nehmen die
Stoffe so, wie sie von den Sammlern dargeboten.
1R. N. Whybray, The Succession, Narrative: Study
of II Samuel 9-20; I Kings 1 and 2, Studies in Biblical
Theology, 2d series, vol. 9 (Naperville, Ill.: Alec R.
Allenson, 1968); Whybray, Intellectual Tradition; Her-
misson, "Weisheit and Geschichte," pp. 137-48. Cf. R. N.
Whybray, "Some Literary Problems in Proverbs I-IX," Vetus .
Testamentum 16 (October 1966): 482-96 and his Wisdom in
Proverbs: The Concept of Wisdom in Proverbs 1-9, Studies
in Biblical Theology, vol. 41 (Naperville, Ill.: Alec R.
Allenson, 1965).
2Whybray, Succession Narrative, pp. 1-9.
170
werden, and in dieser Gestalt haben wir Grund,
sie als Schulweisheit zu verstehen.1
Ought one so to limit a study of “Weisheit in Israel”?
Can we understand a work in its present form without
making judgments about its social and historical back-
ground? In other words, can we study school wisdom with-
out asking where the school came from? We submit that an
important dimension to our understanding would thereby be
lacking, especially when working with such terse, seemingly
independent and often ambiguous writings as the mashal
literature.
Thus, we would add to Crenshaw's criteria a final
one. Explanations of nuance and comparisons of content
must rest upon a sound socio-historical foundation. At
least, they should not conflict with what is already known,
particularly when the latter has more certainty or con-
viction than the former. They should not require histori-
cal or social conditions or processes, alterations in our
understanding of the socio-historical matrix, that are
intrinsically improbable. We would submit that "improbable"
can often be defined with sufficient (scientific) pre-
cision.
These remarks do not apply merely to the wisdom
type of epic, ideal hero or (heroic) historiography. The
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 24.
171
same considerations apply to prophetic wisdom, especially
in terms of the organization and stabilization of wisdom
schools with refined systems of thought. When wisdom is
connected to apocalyptic, rabbinism, sadduceanism, or
priestly religion, the same kind of necessary, logical
historical scenario seems appropriate, though in terms of
wisdom's subsequent development instead of its origins.
The socio-historical matrix, and the fundamental social
processes at work in history, must be plausible, realistic
and consistent. It should conform as well to what we know
of human nature and the parameters of social organization,
particularly the conditions and time frames that operate
in the formation and evolution of social structures.
Possible candidates for epic wisdom include:
a) Adam. In connection with the J creation ac-
count, we have already mentioned the trees and the serpent.
Pfeiffer has suggested that these function as symbols
within a wisdom text.1 Originally, knowledge is the dis-
tinctive prerogative of Yahweh; man is like the animals,
in no way lord of creation. The story's theme is Promethean.
1Thus, Genesis 1-11, though principally P, reveals
a second Edomite source S, which has close affinities with
Job. S is staccato and disparate in style. While S is
early, perhaps from the Solomonic era, it has suffered late
accretions (e.g., the Melchizedek episode). Its influence
on Hebrew literature tends to be late and Exilic, first
appearing in Ezekiel 28, 32; II Isaiah; then Deuteronomy.
172
Man steals knowledge in an attempt to achieve equality
with god. He evokes the unlimited power of Yahweh in
response.1
Engnell revives the search for wisdom, studying
both creation'accounts traditio-historically. The Adam
figure is variously Urmensch, Urvater and sacral Urkönig.
The two accounts form part of the P-narrative or Tet-
rateuch; they stand in dialectical relationship to one
another that is ultimately indivisible into documentary
trees. While the narrative is not wisdom in the strictest
sense, it evidences wisdom themes. Its view of nature is
fundamentally negative,2 “the earth and its vegetation are
cursed, the lot of offspring is hard work, pain, destruc-
tion and death.”3 The hieros gamos and sacred king sacri-
fice are turned on their heads in an anti-Canaanite polemic.
Wisdom. means vitality or procreation: one cannot have
eternal life and also procreate without then being a god.
Adam's divinity must therefore be limited with respect to
Yahweh. Adam's power of command is profoundly demonstrated
1Robert H. Pfeiffer, "Edomite Wisdom," Zeitschrift
für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 3 (1926) :13-25;
his “A Non-Israelite Source of the Book of Genesis,” Zeit-
schrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 7 (1930):
66-73; and his "Wisdom and Vision in tne Old Testament,"
Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 11
(1934): 93-131.
2So also Pfeiffer.
3Engnell, "Creation Story," p. 118.
173
by the naming of the animals.1
Alonso-Shökel also sees a noetic concern under-
lying the J narrative of creation which he thinks derives
from wisdom influences, over and above the obvious fabulous
entities in the work. He cites a concern with developing
an understanding of man, of his good and evil. The work
reduces Yahweh to a human level, a character in a story.
The fundamental questions of life and being are posed.
Wisdom forms are repeatedly appropriated: mashal,
melisiah and hiidah. While other, heilsgeschichtlich,
themes predominate, the wisdom formulation of the work,
albeit rather late, is evident.2
b. Moses. Certain wisdom heroic themes recur in
the Moses stories--concern for fine speech, judicial
sagacity, sound administration, oracular relationship with
Yahweh and the like—but any association with wisdom would
seem to be extreme.3
c. Joseph. Von Rad sets Joseph up as the arche-
typal wise man. He is an adroit speaker, humble, a com-
petent administrator whatever the assigned task; he
lEngnell, “Creation Story,” pp. 103-19.
2Alonzo-Schökel, "Motivos," pp. 295-316.
3Malfroy; Weinfeld, "Humanism in Deuteronomy,"
pp. 241-47; Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, passim.
174
understands the signs which symbolically present Yahweh's
will. He engages in divination and interprets symbolic
dreams in accord with the will and understanding of Yahweh.
He triumphs over adversity by self-discipline and ac-
ceptance/submission. He devises clever schemes to attain
his, and Yahweh's, goals. Joseph knows the ways of the
royal court, behaving impressively in the Court of Pharaoh
and ingratiating himself by his speech, his insight and
his observance of court etiquette.
Divination gives an interesting dimension to the
concept of knowledge. Yahweh is ultimately above all human
knowledge. He may make use of any person, any setting, to
achieve an order, an objective, that he has determined by
his will. Implicit here is internationalism and super-
naturalism of a high order: everything bends to Yahweh's
will. Inscrutability and ineffability are mixed through
with the inevitable, inexorable. Yet, while Joseph cannot
see into all Yahweh's plans, he has a divine charism which
enables him to detect and interpret the divine signs, i.e.
dream-interpretation and divination. Joseph makes use of
every opportunity, no matter how adverse it may seem.
Joseph's fidelity to Yahweh and his confidence in the
reliability and rectitude of Yahweh's plans constitute im-
portant elements of his wisdom. Humility, know-how and
initiative gain for him every superior's favor. Von Rad
175
contends that, for J, Joseph represents the quintessential
wise man; he stands for an ideal. The narrative forms al-
most a single unified account, molded to the author's
guiding purpose and the high-point of J's literary art.1
To this portrait, Crenshaw dissents.
. . . it is a strange model of education that has
as its hero one who has not been trained at a
school, and a peculiar propaganda for courtly wis-
dom that has the ruler choose a man as his counselor
on the basis of his "spiritualistic" qualifications.2
Consider also Joseph's distinct lack of tact toward his
brothers both in the initial dream story and when he con-
ceals his identity from his brothers. He is highly emo-
tional, "passionate." Crenshaw cites a formidable number
of non-wisdom themes in the narrative: (1) special revela-
tion, theophany; (2) dreams and divining cup as mediating
devices; (3) sacrifice; (4) genealogy; (5) kashrut; (6) the
tax account during the famine; and (7) elements of Heils-
geschichte.3
d) Daniel. If Joseph follows the paradigm of the
wise man, Daniel can certainly not be excepted. Divination,
1Von Rad, "Josephsgeschichte," pp. 120-27; his
Weisheit in Israel, pp. 67-69, 257-58.
2Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," p. 137.
3Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," p. 137. Cf. Noth, "Bewährung," p. 232.
176
the triumph over adversity through loyalty and savoir-
faire, divine charism, oracle wisdom, dream interpretation,
court etiquette, royal counsellor motif, eloquent speech,
the overarching but unknowable plan of Yahweh to which the
hero may gain some limited access by interpretation of
signs given him by Yahweh, all these mark both tales. This
commonality of archetype forms an important bridge for von
Rad from wisdom to apocalyptic.1
Were it not for the von Rad hypothesis and its
emphasis on Joseph and Daniel, the latter would be a com-
paratively poor prospect for epic wisdom. First, the ob-
jections Crenshaw raises to Joseph apply with even greater
force to Daniel. Many of the themes cited can hardly be
considered incontrovertibly those of wisdom, either apart
or in conjunction with one another. Second, the two works
are separated by an enormous social and cultural gulf,
reflecting the years that separate their composition.
Again, Crenshaw's notion of nuance applies. Do these
motifs have the same essential meaning in and to a society
whose circumstances and presuppositions are so drastically
different? The Joseph story borrows themes and situations
from international literature. Its protagonist is omni-
competent. Foreigners appear in a compassionate light,
1Von Rad, Old Testament Theology 2: 301-15;
von Rad, "Josephsgeschichte," pp. 120-27.
177
where suitable. Daniel lacks any formal association with
wisdom beyond the paradigm figure, whose competence is
principally that of dream-interpretation. The story is
intensely nationalistic, even ethnocentric, which thereby
restricts Daniel's capacity to function and presents his
relationship to king and court as at best distant. Von
Rad really constructs his bridge over the relationship
of a divine charism. Is the divine charism of an epic
figure, particularly when limited to favor and a skill at
interpretation, wisdom? Disciplined conduct and stead-
fast trust in divine action are certainly not alone wis-
dom virtues. Third, in spite of the fact that the work
falls during a period when wisdom manifests itself in
literary and speculative form, perhaps in response to the
dissolution of a social institution or class, Daniel does
not evidence such wisdom. To use our earlier distinction,
the use seems more adjectival than technical.
Taking the von Rad hypothesis into careful con-
sideration, however, Daniel cannot so easily be dismissed.
The evidence goes beyond the paradigm, even with its ex-
panded understanding of the nature of wisdom and the wis-
dom figure, i.e., charism. Von Rad argues that a certain
understanding of time, a certain historiography and a
specific kind of dualism accompany this paradigm.1 We
1See Wisdom in Israel, pp. 337-63.
178
cannot deal adequately with the hypothesis here. In
looking at the broader implications of our study, we would
return to this argument and see whether the evidence of
Proverbs offers any support. Von Rad's position is a
logical extrapolation from the kind of developmentalism
we shall want to consider underlying much of wisdom re-
search.
e) The Succession Narrative, as "wisdom his-
toriography." Earlier, we listed some of the elements
which Hermisson thought represented a wisdom strand.1
Whybray finds many of the same: the role of the coun-
sellor and counsel, morally-neutral wisdom, retribution-
ism, Yahweh depicted as the guide and determiner of human
destiny, natural causation (i.e., inner-worldly), and a
de-emphasis of the cult. The work, he argues, was written
shortly after these events take place. Its style is
novelistic. It Is really a form of propaganda, intended
to explain and support the Solomonic claim to the throne.
He calls it “a dramatization of proverbial wisdom.”2
First, it parallels the themes that appear in
proverbs, as noted. Second, the account draws on typical
1Spruchweisheit, pp. 11-36; "Weisheit and Ge-
schichte," pp. 136-54:
2Succession Narrative, p. 75. He quotes Duesberg's
characterization, a comedie humaine (p. 79).
179
proverb forms and devices--simile,1 comparison,2 Zwillings-
formen, rhetorical contradictions,3 and wisdom motifs.4
Ultimately, Whybray summarizes the correspondences he
finds between the Book of Proverbs and the Succession
Narrative under three headings: wisdom and folly, the
education of children, and the king. Various minor topics
complete a sort of fourth category.
Under the first rubric, Whybray subsumes "patience
and the control of temper,"5 "prudent consideration before
taking action," "the ability to learn from experience,"
“avoidance of treacherous companions,” "humility versus
pride and ambition," and the exploitation of wise speech.6
1E.g., the proverb at II Samuel 14:14.
2Tiwb-mn form.
3Inconsistent advice or counsel: explicit juxta-
posed inconsistencies.
4She-bear robbed of cubs, death, knowledge, wis-
dom, love and hatred, father and son. Whybray, Succession
Narrative, pp. 82-83.
5E.g., Absalom silently awaits an opportunity to
revenge Amnon's rape of Tamar.
6A number of speeches in the account illustrate
proverbial themes. Joab faces the dilemma of a faithful
courtier who must tell the king what he needs but does not
wish to hear. Joab does not know how his counsel may be
received--with admiration and reward or with distaste and
vindictiveness. The situation also illustrates the wise'
propensity for juxtaposing alternative or contradictory
counsel when no definitive answer is possible. Whybray,
Succession Narrative, pp. 87-88.
180
Under the second, Whybray adduces the repeated concern of
the Narrative with David's relationship to his children,
their ultimate downfall,1 and the father's "broken heart."
David failed in discipline, mûsār, by failing to control
his children. Under “ideal king,” Whybray refers to a
number of the aspects, of royal wisdom we have already
mentioned: the king's own wisdom, his duties (i.e.,
justice) and his relationship to Yahweh, a God whose pur-
poses go beyond man's freedom and power to determine or
manipulate events, and the king's good courtier. That
last category is a miscellany, including "friendship and
enmity, idleness, rich and poor, humility, death, evil
companions, quarrels, man's insecurity, messengers, old
age, pride, treachery and loyalty."2
Again, Crenshaw raises the problem of using ‘wis-
dom’ in reference to such material. He argues that the
basic criteria have not been met. Nuance is certainly
problematic; there are historical difficulties.. The
Narrative shows in a bad light a number of people who
ought, ex hypothesi, to appear in a favorable light in a
wisdom setting. These include David and Solomon them-
selves, not to mention the exalted and legendary figures
lAmnon, Absalom, Adonijah.
2Whybray, Succession Narrative, pp. 88-95.
181
of Ahithophel and Hushai. For wise men, they are all,
but especially the latter, remarkably ineffectual and dis-
turbingly treacherous.1
As we have before, we may ask whether the lengthy
catalogue of emphases constitutes, prima facie, wisdom.
Crenshaw says no. Many are commonplaces of Hebrew think-
ing, e.g., retributionism. Others represent a dubious
interpretation of the intention underlying the text, e.g.,
David's dealings with his children (is the issue really
discipline?). Still others are the sine qua non of any
discussion of the human situation, e.g., death, evil com-
panions, quarrels, old age. Finally, Whybray sometimes
seems careless of the layers of the narrative. Wise
women accounts may represent an entirely different type
of wisdom whose presence does not argue for the wisdom
character of the document as a whole.2
f) Other epics and historiographic settings:
Ruth, Esther, Tobit, Job, Noah, the King of Tyre, Danel.
We mention the first two because of their novelistic
style and purpose. Tobit is a fabulous tale involving
such figures as the grateful dead, a divine charism, a
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence,"
pp. 137-40.
2Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influence,"
pp. 137-40.
182
disguised angel (disguised divine purpose!), a mysterious
dog, a woman possessed by a demon, and a certain measure
of albeit magical savoir-faire. Ezekiel 14 ranks Job and
Noah with Danel.
The Joban drama, not epic in its present form,
belongs with speculative wisdom; perhaps one could rank
the framework tale with the epics. This fabulous tale
seems to confirm a form of retributionism, which is in
itself hardly distinctive of wisdom. The figure of the
divine wager, however, is fascinating. The rîb or
Streitgespräch is important, though it is not a wisdom
form exclusively. Job's apparent virtue and piety are
significant, especially if the story really should have
Edomite roots.1 Like a true epic hero, Job is a super-
human figure who is brought near sub-human suffering by
arbitrary divine action; by divine action he is restored
to epical estate, at least in the Rahmenerzählung.
Whether possible charism or the fabulous character of the
epic, at least the frame narrative, makes it wisdom on
that account, might be debated.
In sum, epic wisdom deals with a hero, perhaps
tragic, who displays virtues characteristic of one who is
wise. That virtue may consist in part of a divine charism
whereby the person's heroic virtues place him or her in
1Cf. Pfeiffer, “Edomite Wisdom,” pp. 13-25.
183
conformity with the divine will; God then acts to protect
and favor that person in proportion to his faithfulness,
submission and disciplined conformity. Such a charism
gives the hero insight, albeit limited, into the divine
plan, particularly in the form of divination or dream in-
terpretation. Only exceptionally do the wisdom virtues of
the hero manifest themselves in literary form (Job?);
rather, what literary expression they receive tends to be
in the form of the underlying historiography of which the
epic may form a part. Thus, we-may distinguish (i) epic
wisdom from (ii) wisdom historiography as sub-categories
of this wisdom type. The latter most frequently appears
in the Hebrew literature as novellistic style or a
novella-genre embedded within a more conventional interpre-
tive historical account.
7. The Counsellor. More in motif than in office,
the ‘counsellor’ stands intermediate between royal and
scribal wisdom. On the one hand, the pharaoh's epic
counsellor, Joseph, takes over the king's administrative
duties, acting on his behalf and in his name. The
counsellor seems to have held an official position in the
Israelite royal court, as in the Egyptian, to advise both
king and court. Other counsellors may have held office
in the queenly retinue. Absalom, for example, becomes
entangled in the advice of Ahithophel and Hushai.
184
Rehoboam takes counsel from groups of advisers.1
On the other hand, precisely because of his learn-
ing and sociopolitical astuteness, the counsellor must be
closely associated with scribal learning and the estab-
lishment of the scribal schools. In office, the counsellor
would be the ultimate scribe: at once wise in the ways of
the world, politics, and religion yet also intimately
familiar with the day-to-day operations of the administra-
tion as executed by scribal bureaucrats. To counsel, he
must be in touch with activities of principal interest to
scribes. Indeed, the ethic of the counsellor seems to be
that of the ideal scribe when he functions as a high ad-
ministrator: Standesethik.
"Counsel," de Boer shows, is closely related to
wisdom and knowledge. It pertains to the future with
virtually the sense of an oracle. Counsel is an authorized
decision; it leads to salvation, victory, recovery or
security. Since "’b" and "’m" are applied to the counsel-
lor and his counsel, de Boer argues that herein lies the
basis of the so-called hypostasis of wisdom:
I wonder whether one can uphold theories on
hypostatization and even on personification. Wis-
dom has been, for the period over which we have
information, similar to the word of the prophet,
the oracle of the priest. A wise word, counsel,
1And the callow youth mislead him!
185
implies a counsellor, just as prophecy implies a
prophet. Wisdom in Job (xxviii) is pictured as
divine counsel, and hence every true counsellor
is a figure with religious authority. Wisdom in
Proverbs (viii) is Jhwh's counsellor denominated
with her action, counsel, the wise word which is
life–giving. There is, as far as I can see, no
trace of speculation over unity and distinction
in the world of God. A pluriformity is taken for
granted. Jhwh's court numbers dignitaries, even
older than his kingship. At the same time the world
of God can be considered a unit.1
Here, de Boer points out, is the function of the divine
council: to carry out the word of Yahweh and to put his
plans into action, even to the point of overturning worldly
wisdom.2
We should be careful here to distinguish between
the wisdom type of the counsellor and wisdom defined as
advice. In the former case, we are dealing with a dis-
cernible, even stock, figure or role that may or may not
be related to any formal wisdom movement or wisdom thought.
While Ahithophel and Hushai represent the counsellor figure,
there is little in the account that would entitle us to
associate them with any wisdom thought, world-view, social
class or movement. The issue becomes more complicated
when the figure is used in the context of a framework, as
for example in an instruction, but the figure or role is
not per se the instruction. Indeed, the latter often
1De Boer, pp. 70-71.
2De Boer, pp. 42-71.
186
appears as a genre embedded within a larger work of dif-
ferent genre with which the counsellor might in fact be
associated.
In the latter case, wisdom defined as advice, we
are dealing with wisdom as savoir-faire or Lebensklugheit,
knowledge of how to live well, that is convincing because
and only because it works. Its authority is pragmatic,
its utility. Whether literary wisdom is to be taken as
advice or whether members of a wisdom group or movement
perceived their ideology to be advisory1 is quite a
separate question from whether counsellors give advice. To
wit, is the advice that they give wisdom? And, is wisdom
what advice-givers give? We are therefore still left with
establishing a bridge from the counsellor figure to other
types of wisdom, if such a bridge can in fact be built.
8. Prophetic wisdom. Consistent with attempts
to find wisdom influences at work within other movements
and genres, some scholars have argued that a kind of
prophetic wisdom or wisdom influence on prophecy can be
identified. Here, we are not interested in the evidence
from prophetic literature for a growing wisdom class; here,
1Which is most unlikely on sociodynamic grounds,
since ideologies are authoritative, legitimate and de-
finitive interpretations of why things are the way they
are (therefore, authoritative hermeneutic).
187
we are concerned with influence, borrowing or integration
of wisdom and prophetic world-views. Since the evidences
for wisdom thought patterns are drawn from such incon-
trovertible representatives of prophecy as Amos and
I Isaiah, our search for prophetic wisdom must be carried
out with circumspection.
Fichtner dismisses a few slight verbal suggestions
of wisdom in the eighth century prophets, arguing. that
these are strictly later additions. Also, the relation-
ship between prophetic oracles and blasons populaires
lacks any real significance.1
On Amos, however, Wolff differs with Fichtner.
He argues that Amos comes out of a tradition of tribal
wisdom.2 Amos uses its forms and themes to frame, articu-
late and express his messages. Where parallels exist
between Amos and I Isaiah, they evidence the common origin
of both in a special form of folk wisdom, tribal wisdom
(Sippenweisheit), not in any borrowing from the former by
the latter. Supporting his position, Wolff points to such
forms and patterns of thought as the rhetorical questions
1Johannes Fichtner, Gottes Weisheit: Gesammelte
Studien zum Alten Testament, ed. Idaus Dietrich Fricke,
Arbeiten zur Theologie, 2d series, vol. 3 (Stuttgart:
Calwer Verlag, 1965), pp. 9-43.
2Hans Walter Wolff, Amos', pp. 51-52; Samuel
Terrien, "Amos and Wisdom," in Studies in Ancient Israelite
Wisdom, pp. 448-55.
188
which Amos poses to establish a cause-and-effect relation-
ship in 3:3-6 and 8. Amos also makes use of comparisons
and analogies with foreign countries. The woe-oracle
recurs: like Whedbee,1 Wolff wants to make this a dis-
tinctive wisdom form. Amos' Zahlensprüche which begin the
book, the oracles against the nations, are also an adapta-
tion of what seems to be a typical wisdom form.
The way in which Amos uses the admonition (Mahnrede)
is decisive in Wolff's estimation. Such sayings are
founded on an understanding of consequences, therefore on
experience. The apodictic form is not the exclusive prop-
erty of the priest; it is a form typical of tribal wisdom
that has persisted to and beyond the time of Amos. Here,
Wolff finds Gerstenberger's study of apodictic law quite
persuasive.2
Wolff also looks at content for supportive evi-
dence. Amos' viewpoint is indifferent to the cult, even
in conflict, and his perspective is internationalistic.
Amos stresses "nkh," straightforwardness, honesty, recti-
tude; I Isaiah does as well. He also emphasizes right
order and right action, concern for the unfortunate in
1J. William Whedbee, Isaiah and Wisdom (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1971), pp. 111-26, 149-53.
2Gerstenberger, Wesen and Herkunft, q. v.; Wolff,
Amos', pp. 5-36.
189
society (noblesse oblige) and the ascetic life. He uses
antinomies, Zwillingsformen, which contrast rich and poor.1
Fichtner argues that the wisdom elements found in
I Isaiah cannot be adequately explained by any confronta-
tion that may exist between him and the wise. He uses the
technical vocabulary of wisdom, adopts the parable and
proverb forms,2 and emphasizes divine counsel. Together,
these suggest some common background. Fichtner hypothe-
sizes that I Isaiah once belonged to a wisdom group, but
departed it at the time of his call.3
Es scheint mir daraus hervorzugehen [i.e., from
Isaiah's double position as opponent and partici-
pant of wisdom], dass Jesaja vor seiner Berufung
zum Propheten dem Stande der “Weisen” angehört hat
und in der Welt der Chokma, wie sie uns in den
Sprüchen der Männer Hiskias (Spr. 25-29) und etwa
in den Kapiteln 10-22 des Spruchbuches entge-
gentritt, gelebt hat. In der Berufung—die dadurch
eine ganz besondere Note bekäme, wenn sie an Jesaja
als einen Weisen ergangen wäre!—wird ihm deutlich,
dass er sich von der bis zum gewissen Grade un-
verbindlichen Weisheit und ihren Ratschlägen zu
trennen habe und sich als Gottes Bote senden lassen
müsse mit dem eigenartigen Auftrage, so zu reden,
dass die Menschen in all ihrer (menschlichen!),
Weisheit seine Botschaft nicht begreifen, obwohl
sie vernehmen.4
1Wolff, Amos', pp. 37-52.
2Whedbee, pp. 23-79.
3Fichtner, Gottes Weisheit, pp. 18-26.
4Fichtner, Gottes Weisheit, pp. 24-25.
190
Isaiah has to counter the smug and self-secure
attitude of established wisdom, which has led the nation
away from reliance on Yahweh to concern for royal grandeur
and involvement in international alliances. Hermisson
agrees in part. He argues that Isaiah certainly is no
wise man in his view of history, but he does synthesize
two quite different Hebrew traditions.1 To the extent
that these arguments establish the existence of a synthesis
of wisdom and prophecy, or an adoption of wisdom modes of
thought and expression within Hebrew prophecy, we may
speak of a prophetic wisdom type.
9. Hypostatic wisdom. Our discussion of this
wisdom type need only make reference to our earlier exami-
nation of wisdom and mythos, above.2 Under this rubric,
we include both (i) hypostatic wisdom and (ii) personi-
fied wisdom. The former includes wisdom as the divine
1Hermisson,. "Weisheit and Geschichte," pp. 149-
54. As an aside comment to this discussion, we should
perhaps mention Ezekiel’s plaint, “Ah Lord God! they are
saying of me, ‘Is he not a maker of allegories?’” (20:49
ET). Apparently, he is being taken for a 'proverb-maker'
(*mšl noun and verb), but the passage is obscure.
2We should keep in mind the possibility that we
do not have here an elaboration or exaggeration of wisdom's
role, particularly as a late result of theological and
hermeneutic evolution, but an implicit and perhaps much
earlier polemic against hieros gamos based on those very
cultic images and myths. Cf. Proverbs 22:14.
191
ordering principle whereby Yahweh created the world, and
which may also bind Yahweh with its principles of order.
To the extent that Maat and sidqh are equivalents, and
righteousness is the principle of order, world-ordering
righteousness may be included with hypostasis even though
it constitutes an inference from the material. Gese's
argument for the Egyptian analogy is in many respects an
argument for an early metaphysical principle, hypostasis,
in Israel, though his defense of wisdom's authority per se
does not of itself imply hypostasis.1 The latter includes
both early2 and late3 arguments for a wisdom goddess. In
either case, we should distinguish the presence or in-
ference of a wisdom entity, being or (metaphysical) prin-
ciple from a system of thought, even if the latter should
emphasize the concept of order.4
1Gese, Lehre and Wirklichkeit, pp. 11-50.
2Bauer-Kayatz, Albright; Cazelles (?).
3Rankin.
4Ringgren, Word and Wisdom; Wilhelm Schencke, Die
Chokma (Sophia) in der Jüdischen Hypostasenspekulation:
ein Betrag zur Geschichte der Religiösen Ideen in Zeit-
alter des Hellenismus, Videnskapsselskapets Skrifter: II.
Hist.-Filos. Klasse 1912, vol. 6 (Kristiana: Jacob Dybwad,
1913); Albright, "Canaanite-Phoenician Sources," pp. 1-15;
Bauer-Kayatz, Studien zu Prov. I-IX; Cazelles, "Debuts de
la Sagesse," pp. 27-40; Rankin, pp. 222-64.
Von Rad associates the development of the figure
of Wisdom with important changes in hermeneutic perspec-
tive and self-understanding:
"Mit der Königszeit war ja die Epoche einer
192
10. Speculative wisdom. Under this heading, we
include the largest body of wisdom writings, those which
represent some sort of systematic reflection on life.
gewissen Individualisierung angebrochen, in der
man viel angelegentlicher als in der Phase des
archäischen Jahweglaubens nach dem Anteil des
Einzelnen an Jahwe fragte. Der ältere Jahwe-
glaube war aber auf diese vom Individuum aus
gestellte Frage im ganzen wenig gerüstet, denn
auch der Dekalog und verwandte Gebotsreihen waren
keine Hilfe im Dickicht des Einzellebens und
wollte das ja auch gar nicht sein. Diese
Verselbständigung des Individuums mit all den
Fragen, die damit aufstanden, lässt sich anhand
vieler alttestamentlicher Texte einigermassen
verfolgen . . . . Einen Beitrag, gewiss nicht den
unwichtigsten, zur Bewältigung der anstehenden
Fragen lieferten die Weisen in der Lehre von der
Selbstoffenbarung der Schöpfung. Bei ihrem Versuch
einer Aufhellung der den Menschen umgebenden
Wirklichkeit waren sie in der Tiefe der Schöpfung
auf ein Phänomen gestossen, dem eine eminente
Aussagekraft zu eigen war. Die Schöpfung hat
nicht nur ein Sein, sie entlässt auch Wahrheit!"
(Weisheit in Israel, pp. 214-15)
"In dieser Hinsicht könnte die Lehre von der sich
manifestierenden Urordnung gerade als ein Modell-
fall weisheitlichen Tradierens angesehen werden.
Niemand wird sich vorstellen, dass sie eines Tages
von einem originellen Kopf zum erstenman ausge-
sprochen oder gar von Ägypten übernommen wurde.
Ihre Wurzeln sind auch in Israel alt. Sie liegen,
wie wir sahen, in der Grundüberzeugung, von der
schon die älteste Erfahrungsweisheit ausgegangen
war: Es ist eine Ordnung in den Dingen und Abläufen,
und diese Ordnung ist kein Geheimnis, sondern sie
verkündigt sich selbst, womit sich die Lehre nahe
mit Vorstellungen des Hymnus berührt, denen zufolge
sich die Herrlichkeit der Schöpfung verkündet.
Neu daran war zunächst dies, dass diese Ordnung,
die in der älteren Erfahrungsweisheit im Wesent-
lichen noch unkritisch vorausgesetzt war, nun selbst
zum Gegenstand einer eindringenden theologischen
Ausgestaltung wurde." (Weisheit in Israel, p. 221)
193
Precisely because of its size and diversity, it would be
difficult to detail exhaustively the literatures and
world-views that fall under this rubric. Speculative
wisdom is generally used to refer to that literature
which grows out of individual thought and reflection
about the world and one's relationship to it. Whatever
wisdom may be--movement, social force, Weltanschauung--
speculative wisdom is the literature of its maturity.
Wisdom seeks to give a theological and ideological
underpinning to itself, especially when its setting in
the Hebrew social world changes drastically, with Exile
and later restoration. It is no longer enough just to
be. In fact, being, as the older wise understood it,
may no longer be possible at all. What does it mean to
be'wise; what sort of wisdom is possible? Increasingly,
wisdom becomes the output of individual thinkers setting
forth their own specific and peculiar understandings of
wisdom and being wise. Wisdom becomes more individual
and personal. The literature loses its fragmentary and
anonymous character. Forms expand, become baroqued.
Thought is expressed at length, coherently, rather than
briefly, tersely, ambiguously, enigmatically, when a
coherent statement be made at all. The implicit be-
comes increasingly explicit. Thought becomes syste-
194
matic and ordered. In this light, much of the
Hebrew wisdom literature is that of speculation. As
wisdom turns to literary expression, it becomes
literary.1
The various now-redacted materials of Proverbs
have a place here. Each of the mashal books and the
initial series of hortatory discourses are arguably works
of speculation, wisdom expression or ideological self-
interpretation. Job, as a coherent dramatic work, belongs
here. Qoheleth is the very archetype of speculative wis-
dom. We must also include ben Sirah, the Wisdom of
Solomon, and Tobit.
This section includes both the sceptical litera-
ture2 and that of rising religious nationalism. Most of
these works make extensive use of proverbs and extended
proverbial verse forms, most notably Qoheleth. His use is
1Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," pp. 22-35; von Rad,
Weisheit in Israel, pp. 245 e.s. Speculative wisdom, the
literature of reflection, can arguably be considered the
logical, even necessary, outgrowth of a theological crisis
in wisdom: see Schmid's Wesen and Geschichte der Weisheit;
Zimmerli, "Struktur," pp. 193-99; Aarre Lauha, "Die Krise
des religiösen Glaubens bei Kohelet," in Wisdom in Israel
and Ancient Near East, pp. 183-91; James L. Crenshaw,
"Popular Questioning of the Justice of God in Ancient
Israel," Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
82 (1970): 380-95.
2Johannes Pedersen, Scepticisme Israélite, Cahiers
de la Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Relgieuses,
Publiés par la Faculté de Théologie
195
so extensive, and often contradictory, that some scholars
despair of finding any logical outline that will unify
and explain the book as a whole.1 Suffice to say that it
is this material above all that scholars appeal to in
establishing what constitutes the body of wisdom as a
system of thought or (reconstructed) world-view. The
prominence of sceptical literature in the middle period
and nationalistic writings in the later eras has led to
a number of postulated social or intellectual processes:
theologization, the break-down of the doctrine of retri-
bution, democratization, rationalization, privatization
and the like. In most cases, the mashal books of Proverbs
are taken to be normative wisdom, against which the specu-
lative sceptics are reacting but which later wisdom theo-
logians in modified form reaffirm.2
11. Apocalypyic wisdom. If von Rad has raised a
number of provocative historical and methodological ques-
tions by suggesting that the Joseph story be regarded as
some sort of wisdom, he has raised an even greater storm
1Cf. Addison G. Wright, "The Riddle of the Sphinx:
The Structure of the Book of Qoheleth," Catholic Biblical
Quarterly 30 (July 1968): 313-34.
2John F. Priest, "Where is Wisdom to be Placed?"
Journal of Bible and Religion 31 (October 1963): 275-82;
cf. Murphy, “Interpretation,” pp. 289-301; von Rad, Old
Testament Theology 1: 355-459.
196
by contending that the wisdom movement has an unlikely
issue. He calls into doubt the traditional view that
prophetic modes of thinking are preserved in early
Judaism by apocalyptists. He carefully considers the
historiographic principles of both wisdom and apocalyptic,
concluding that the latter would represent a drastic in-
version of the basic prophetic understandings of time,
history, anthropology, theology and will that only wisdom
could form the logical and socio-logical precursor of
apocalyptic. While prophecy is thoroughly theological,
apocalyptic--like wisdom--is largely devoid of any theology.
For prophecy, saving history is now. Apocalyptic devalues
the present and projects the saving history into the dis-
tant future. It concerns itself instead with an esoteric
knowledge, a noesis. Its view of the world is interna-
tional, even cosmic, in scope. Like wisdom, it is time-
less because of its expansiveness: ordinary time is ut-
terly devalued in the face of a majestic but overwhelming
temporal dualism.1
1"The task of . . . priestly theology . . . consisted
in linking the saving history with Creation, in
drawing Creation towards the saving history, because
this was the real position where this theology stood.
The theological thinking of wisdom ran in exactly
the opposite direction. It stood before the world
as Creation, and its task was to find a connexion
from there with the saving history, that is, with
that revelation of Jahweh's will which was pre-
eminently turned towards Israel. Its thesis ran:
197
Like much speculative wisdom of the later period,
apocalyptic is basically pessimistic. The cause is inner-
worldly: the nature of man and of his national orders
bears the corrupt and corrupting seed of human/national
in order to understand Creation properly, one has
to speak about Israel and the revelation of God's
will granted to her. The rational determination to
acquire knowledge which first caused wisdom to
direct her attention to the world certainly saw
many wonders in it, but it also saw that its real
secret evaded her. . . . We should be justified in
saying that only here was the demand to face up to
Creation in its whole unmythological worldliness
made upon Israel. But what was the connexion be-
tween Creation and Jahweh's will for revelation,
of whose totality and penetrating power none had
better knowledge than these same teachers of wis-
dom? Their theology masters this tremendous problem
not only by relating the cosmic wisdom which is un-
attainable by natural knowledge to Jahweh's revela-
tion which comes to man, but also even by identi-
fying them! The word which calls man to life and
salvation is the same word as that which as wisdom
already encompassed all creatures at Creation. It
is the same word which God himself made use of as a
plan at his creation of the world. . . . The ‘No’
in Job XXVIII could not have come as a windfall to
merely occasional questioning; it sums up the total
of a long endeavour after knowledge of the world."
(Von Rad, Old Testament Theology 1: 450-51)
"Will man hier von einer Soteriologie sprechen,
so wäre es freilich eine, die in dieser Ausformung
vom Standpunkt der traditionellen Vorstellungen vom
Kultus and von den geschichtlichen Heilssetzungen
fast als häretisch erscheinen könnte. Denn hier
wird das Heil nicht von ether Deszendenz Jahwes in
die Geschichte hergeleitet und.nicht von irgendeiner
menschlichen Vermittlung, sei es von Mose oder David
oder einem der Erzvater, sondern von bestimmten
Urgegebenheiten der Schöpfang selbst. Damit scheint
eine theologische Spannung gegenüber dem tradi-
tionellen Jahweglauben aufgebrochen, wie sie schärfer
kaum gedacht werden kann. Wohl, wir sahen die Lehrer
198
destruction. The wisdom to understand the world apocalyp-
tically is a charism: it is a divinely blessed attempt to
understand and systematize the rules governing the world,
even the universe, however esoteric they may be. One
prominent means to this comprehension is the interpreta-
tion of dreams.1
The appearance of wisdom legoumena within apocalyp-
tic has been noted by various scholars. Little study of
them has been made outside of their relevance to debates
about the von Rad hypothesis.2 Clearly, wisdom language,
forms and patterns of thinking seem to appear in certain
apocalyptic works. What theological and literary role do
they play? What is their socio-historical role? Even if
we come to reject the von Rad position, the question of
apocalyptic wisdom deserves careful study. The argument
for wisdom influence on apocalypticism ought to be at
dann auch, etwa bei Sirach and in der sogenannten
Apokalyptik, mit der Geschichte, ja mit der Weltgeschichte
beschäftigt. Die Kompetenz der Weisen, die Zukunft zu
deuten, hat diesen Stand in später Stunde noch einmal in
einen Horizont neuer Aufgaben gestellt. Aber so riesen-
haft die von der Apokalyptik erstellten Geschichtsent-
würfe sind--die spezifische Bedeutung als eines Bereiches
einmaliger heilsbegründener Setzungen konnte der Geschichte
auch da nicht mehr zuerkannt werden." (Von Rad, Weisheit
in Israel, p. 399)
1Von Rad, Old Testament Theology 2: 306-07; von Rad,
Weisheit in Israel, pp. 358-59.
2Wied; Osten-Sacken.
199
least as strong as for many of the types of wisdom we
have considered and stronger than some. Yet, of apocalyp-
tic wisdom, we know little.
12. Legal or rabbinic wisdom. a) Gordis traces
the development of the Sadducees and Sadduceic modes of
thought from the wisdom schools.
There are important individual differences among
the various products of the Wisdom schools, but
underlying them all is the outlook which later
crystallized as Saduceeism. This explains the
absence of some of the most characteristic in-
sights of Biblical thought, such as the concept
of God in history, the passion for justice in
society, the union of national loyalty with the
ideal of international peace, the recognition of
freedom as an inalienable human right, the un-
ceasing dissatisfaction with the world as it is,
because of the vision of what it can be.1
Like the Sadducees who follow, the wise are members
of the social elite: wealthy, privileged, self-confident
and assured. They have the leisure to invest in the
academy. While they seek to learn and to teach their
young "how to live in a hard-headed, imperfect world, rich
in pitfalls and temptations for the unwary," they approach
life with the fundamental conservatism of the wealthy.2
Those who speculate recognize the imperfection and limita-
tions of human wisdom, leading to insoluble issues in
1Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, p. 188.
2Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, p. 160.
200
life. Their consequent scepticism, however, is intellec-
tual, for they make no effort to change the world or the
social order nor do they project such change into the
future. They can accept life as it is. The lower classes,
without economic, social and political security, are im-
pelled to action or to a theology of radical social trans-
formation (apocalyptic, prophecy). They form the ulti-
mate core of Pharisaism.
“As the summum bonum in life and the reward of
moral conduct, the wisdom writers universally set up
practical success, in which economic prosperity is central.
Wealth is uniformly regarded as a great good and poverty
as an evil."1
The wisdom moral code presupposes free will,
like the Sadduceean ethic, "not by the theological dif-
ficulty involved in justifying reward and punishment if
men's actions are determined, but by the psychological
need to validate their superior social and economic
status."2
For Gordis, then, late wisdom gradually shades
into the Sadduceean movement. While present canonical
wisdom literature precedes the development of the
Sadducees per se, the latter have a fundamental
1Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, pp. 172-73.
2Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, p. 181.
201
intellectual, theological and socio-economic relationship
to the former.1 Thus, we can postulate and look for a
Sadduceean wisdom, to the extent it may have survived
Pharisaic and later rabbinic attempts to eradicate such
thought and literature. We may hypothesize a sectarian
type of wisdom.
b) It has been traditionally assumed, though
never proven, that the decline of prophecy coincides with
the rise of apocalyptic, which preserves prophecy's in-
terpretation of the world and of experience in the con-
text of a changed social milieu. The prophetic word can
no longer be spoken openly because it has become a word
of judgment against foreign oppressors; prophetic dualism
and ethics persist.
Wisdom and priestly law have a natural congeni-
ality. Both seek order. Both seek to understand the
world as a consistent system which is derived from and
expresses the nature of god. As wisdom becomes increas-
ingly associated with revealed, rather than discovered
wisdom, as the transcendence of god gains significance,
as wisdom becomes increasingly nationalistic, it begins
to accept many of the premises of priestly-legal thought.
Exile set the latter free from a purely ritualistic
1Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages, pp. 160-97.
202
milieu. The development of the synagogue and Torah in-
struction makes priestly-legal thought, as proto-rabbinism,
eminently compatible with wisdom. A democratized academy,
the school, might even be the basis for the evolution of
the synagogue: teaching rather than sacrifice becomes
the form of worship and religious self-expression. This
thesis tends to be more implicit than explicit in wisdom
research
c) Where connections with legal modes of think-
ing have been sought, they have often been in the pre-
cursors of wisdom and law rather than their ultimate de-
velopment in early Judaism. The best example of this is
Audet's attempt to trace both law and wisdom back to
Sippenweisheit. Both go back to the pre-monarchic pre-
settlement family milieu in which the knowledge of how
to live well was passed down in the family as instruction
through quasi-legal maxims. Parental admonition has
virtually the force of law, albeit casuistic. The dis-
tinction between apodictic and casuistic law, in light of
the motivated admonition, can be taken as evidence for a
Sippenweisheit that gave birth to both a form of legal
thinking and a form of, initially, folk wisdom. This
common social base would then provide a natural foundation
1Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," p. 25; Audet.
203
for the later reunification of law and wisdom in rab-
binism. Thus, one may search for an association of
wisdom and law both in early wisdom and in its late
successors.1
Some New Testament scholars are now tentatively
seeking evidence for the continuation of wisdom forms of
thought and expression in later Judaism and early Chris-
tianity. Stendhal’s postulation of a Matthaean school
is one such instance.2 Again, rabbinic modes of thought
and interpretation would seem to be a necessary bridge
for this thesis. The problem of the ultimate dissolution
or reformation of wisdom is certainly worthy of more
study and analysis than it has received.
13. Scribal wisdom; schools.
The wisdom of the scribe depends on the opportunity
of leisure;
and he who has little business may become wise.
(ben Sirah 38:24)
This quote demonstrates how natural it is to equate wise
man with scribe. When we speak of wisdom as the specific
intellectual and cultural property of a definable social
1Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft; Audet; cf.
Richter, Recht und Ethos; Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp.
81-92.
2Krister Stendhal, The School of St. Matthew and
Its Use of the Old Testament, With a New Introduction by
the Author, American Edition (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1968).
204
group, the wise, the almost invariable assumption would
be that we are referring to the scribes. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, Duesberg and Fransen have devoted them-
selves to a massive study of Hebrew wisdom that is really
a comparative literary and social history of “the in-
spired scribes.”1 Since wisdom means their way of life,
no further definition is necessary. Wisdom amounts to
reflection on life from the scribal point of view, even
if its theological implications are by no means class-
bound.
The equivalence is natural enough. Ben Sirah has
laid out many of the accepted reasons. The scribe is the
preserver of written traditions from all segments of
society. He mediates the oral and written interpretations
of his time, culture, people and community. He has the
training and the occasion to examine received literature,
ferreting out all their meanings. Thus, he has the in-
tellectual apparatus to penetrate the arcana of discourse
and render them intelligible. This reflection on the
implicit and explicit meanings of things is second nature.
He travels. He serves the great, in their courts, their
bureaucracies, their every venture; he administrates.
Only the scribe has the leisure as well as the freedom to
1Les Scribes Inspirés, q.v
205
pursue the literary arts, to learn and refine sophisticated literary
devices. Life's order depends on peasants and artisans, but the
wise contribute judgment, understanding and intellect.1
1Ben Sirah contrasts the scribe with the life and
social role of skilled laborers in 38:31-39:11 (JB):
"All these put their trust in their hands,
and each is skilled at his own craft.
A town could not he built without them,
there would be no settling, no travelling.
But they are not required at the council,
they do not hold high rank in the assembly.
They do not sit on the judicial bench,
and have no grasp of the law.
They are not remarkable for culture or sound
judgement, and are not found among the
inventors of maxims.
But they give solidity to the created world,
while their prayer is concerned with what
pertains to their trade.
It is otherwise with the man who devotes his soul
to reflecting on the Law of the Most High.
He researches into the wisdom of all the Ancients,
he occupies his time with the prophecies.
He preserves the discourses of famous men,
he is at home with the niceties of parables.
He researches into the hidden sense of proverbs,
he ponders the obscurities of parables.
He enters the service of princes,
he is seen in the presence of rulers.
He travels in foreign countries,
he has experienced human good and human evil.
At dawn and with all his heart
he resorts to the Lord who made him;
[H]e pleads in the presence of the Most High,
he opens his mouth in prayer
and makes entreaty for his sins.
If it is the will of the great Lord,
he will be filled with the spirit of under-
standing,
[H]e will shower forth words of wisdom,
and in prayer give thanks to the Lord.
He will grow upright in purpose and learning,
he will ponder the Lord’s hidden mysteries.
He will display the instruction he had received,
206
Ben Sirah sets out a late but humane and ideal-
istic account of scribal life.1 Khety's "Satire on the
Trades" is its Egyptian counterpart.2 Sjöberg presents
a Mesopotamian reflection, "In Praise of Scribal Art."3
Literary endeavor requires a high order of
literacy: acquaintance with the stylistic conventions
and standard terminologies, assimilation of traditional
forms, verbal creativity and flexibility, aesthetic sensi-
tivity in terms of accepted canons, logical thinking
within the framework of established patterns of valid
reasoning, familiarity with classic literatures, and
knowledge of alternative ways of life and the interpre-
tations of life upon which they are grounded. Few have
the time and means to undertake such learning in any
society, let alone in the near-subsistence early agrarian
taking his pride in the Law of the Lord's covenant.
Many will praise his understanding,
and it will never be forgotten.
His memory will not disappear,
generation after generation his name will live.
Nations will proclaim his wisdom,
the assembly will celebrate his praises.
If he lives long, his name will be more glorious
than a thousand others and if he dies,
that will satisfy him just as well.
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 309-36.
2Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 432-
34. Cf. “In Praise of Learned Scribes,” immediately
preceding, pp. 431-32.
3Q.v.
207
societies of the ancient Near East. Such sophistication
could not have been wide-spread in Israel. Certainly,
on analogy with Egypt, we may expect that rudimentary
literacy may have gradually become fairly widespread among
tradespeople, artisans and overseers, though probably
limited to the reading, writing and reckoning skills es-
sential to their occupations. Further, literacy in terms
of oral standards is likely far more common than written
literacy.1 Still, the scribes were the custodians of
writing, the people in the social position to be literary
and transmit literature. For precisely these reasons,
we should not hastily equate wisdom with scribal thought
in general.
In Egypt, there existed advanced schools offering
specialized training for apprentice scribes who had
completed their basic education in writing and literature:
particularly for specialists in cult (priestly scribes)
and for future high courtly officials.2 Analogous special
advanced schools may well have existed in Israel, though
we lack positive evidence of them.3 Thus we should not
1Williams, "Scribal Training in Ancient Egypt,"
pp. 214-21; Brunner, Altägyptische Erziehung, pp. 38-55,
passim.
2Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, p. 105; Brunner,
Altägyptische Erziehung, pp. 10-105.
3Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 122-33; Gammie,
“Israelite Pedagogy.”
208
set scribes in general against the posited authors and
custodians of specialized literatures. Certain common
professional standards and training drew them together
--though to what degree remains imponderable--professional
jealousies to the contrary notwithstanding.
For Israel, it is probably fair to credit the
scribes with being the preservers and transmitters of
various literatures--prophetic, priestly-cultic, his-
torical, no less than wisdom. Whether they were at all
a homogeneous group, to what extent competing scribal
schools of thought may have existed, are questions that
relate to establishing an intelligible intellectual and
literary history for the Hebrew documents which come down
to us. In other words, even if Hebrew wisdom thought is
obviously grounded most extensively and securely to the
exclusion of (some) other wisdom types in the scribal
class, we must still specify in what that wisdom con-
sisted and how it was related to a scribal life whose
interests evidently extended much beyond the bounds of
wisdom, however defined. While the permeation of litera-
tures of vastly different sorts by wisdom motifs, forms,
and vocabulary cannot be disputed, what does that mean?
Is wisdom dependent on, say, prophetic pleas for social
justice, or deuteronomic humanism? Is wisdom their source?
Or are these elements part of the professional milieu of
209
the scribe-writer or scribe-copyist/scribe-redactor that
serve an independent artistic goal?1 The breadth of
scribal competence can be demonstrated by Papyrus
Anastasi I. One Hori, an Egyptian scribe, writes his
colleague, Amenemope (!), sarcastically implying the
latter's low level of professional competence. Hori in-
terrogates his friend with wide-ranging questions and
problems assuredly drawn from the scribal curriculum.
In form, the letter may imitate a sort of comprehensive
examination given senior students at or near the conclu-
sion of their formal studies--a basic test for admission
to the guild.2 The document has several important im-
plications. Whether fictitious in situation or genuine,
the letter underscores the scribal sense of humor and
irony: wit and sarcasm constitute valid artistic and
pedagogic devices. If our sense of humor be less than
theirs, in addition to the inevitable cultural differ-
ences and their consequences, then our view of their
world is liable to strange distortions. The letter
evidences the variety of skills--mathematical, geographic,
logistic, literary--the competent scribe should command.
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," pp. 129-42.
2"An Egyptian Letter: A Satirical Letter," in
Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 475-79.
210
It further demonstrates the place of questions (and the
dialogue?), and the master's role as interlocutor, in
scribal pedagogy. While we have no immediate analogue
of this document in the Hebrew Bible, some scholars sug-
gest that the interrogatory form may have been adapted
to other ends in the Yahweh speeches of Job 38-40 and
Amos' rhetorical questions.1 We cannot entirely dismiss
the possibility that some materials are organized as
answers to such (unstated) interrogatories, thus ex-
plaining their disconnected and "oriental" logic.
If wisdom is not scribal thought per se, then
what is scribal wisdom? If wisdom as a system of thought
had its principal setting among scribes, the question
virtually reduces to "What is wisdom?" We are back at
the beginning, even considering the other analytic cate-
gories of wisdom. The problem, however, is not in-
herently circular and can be stated in another way.
While the scribes dealt with many varieties of
written material, most of these served other ends. The
scribe's relationship to documents of commerce could best
be described as impersonal. The goods were never his;
his role in the transaction was that of recorder and
perhaps legal advisor. His power consisted of technical
1Von Rad, "Hiob XXXVIII," pp. 293-301; Wolff,
Amos', pp. 5-12.
211
acumen, expertise; not of wealth, nor capital, nor com-
mercial guile. We could multiply the example.
In court, the scribe's function consisted in
advising the king. Presumably court scribes were the
custodians of the royal annals, therefore recorders and
councillors of historical precedent. In Egypt and
Mesopotamia, certainly, they kept alive the ancient
tongues--though not without error and misunderstanding--
and their literatures. These men also handled all cor-
respondence, thus requiring fluency in languages, both
diplomatic and national, and expertise in their legal,
political, and commercial terminologies and forms. Again,
however, their power in court did not consist of the de-
cisive word, but in their ability to influence the king
(or local ruler) by structuring his decisions.
The instructions of the scribal schools are rife
with admonitions anent courtly conduct. Lofty speech,
knowledge of court etiquette, reserve in non-essentials
(influence used too frequently is soon dissipated), and
decisiveness with insight in important concerns, all
typify the pre-eminent concern of scribes as councillors
with finely honing the skills they needed to affect the
royal decision process.1 The subtleties of courtly
1De Boer, pp. 42-71; Humphreys; Gammie, "Israel-
ite Pedagogy."
212
admonitions and aphorisms remind one of Machiavelli's
"The Prince" or Castiglioni's “The Courtier,”1 although
we should not press the comparison. Just as these
Renaissance works appealed to a small literate "middle-
class" which stood outside but sought to influence the
formal processes of political decision-making of their
time, so, too, did ancient scribal works on the court and
courtier. "The Prince," we might add, was written by a
courtier, at once polemical and ironic, to explain (to
his fellows) how a ruler governs (the ruler perforce al-
ready knows). We may also transmute Frankfort's dictum
about proverbs: a prince would be the most implausible
and impossible of rulers who followed without qualifica-
tion his courtiers' judgments about how he should act,
pace Machiavelli.
We note a caveat. We must keep the description
of scribe as "staff"--councillor, advisor, historian,
linguist, archivist--appropriate the historical setting.
Terms like "administration," "staff," and especially
"bureaucracy" have acquired special connotations in
modern social history. Bureaucracy as presently con-
stituted, with its distinctions between "line offices"
and "staff offices" and its hierarchical structures of
1Q.v.
213
power and communication, grew out of, among others,
generalization of Prussian military organization to non-
military objectives.1 While the efficient and effective
devolution of power as legitimate authority entails some
essential commonalities of organization, we should recog-
nize that such terms are strongly metaphorical, rather
than simply descriptive, and treat them with due caution.
Using this argument, however, we can begin to give useful
meaning to "scribal wisdom."
First, we may state the matter negatively, by
exclusion. Where wisdom serves other ends inconsistent
with the life-situation and world-view of the scribe, even
though the scribe may have been the preserver of that
literature and even though the author may have been a
master scribe, the term 'scribal wisdom' is inappropri-
ate. Thus, prophetic-wisdom and torah- or priestly-
wisdom form distinct kinds of wisdom, even if the higher
priestly and prophetic echelons were trained in scribal
academies. Wisdom themes in prophecy and priestly writ-
ings do not bespeak scribal influence unless, the specific
1Cf. Max Weber's organization theory laid out in
vol. 1 of Economy and Society. The allusion to Prussian
military authority structures I associate with a series
of lectures given by Arthur Vidich on contemporary
American sociological theory in the Spring of 1969 at
the Graduate Faculty of Social and Political Science of
the New School for Social Research in New York City.
214
scribal setting is implicit. Similarly, poets, fiction
writers, and speculative thinkers may have been drawn
from the ranks of scribes, but we regard the creative
work of individual authors as independent except inso-
far as the specific situation of scribal life comes
through.
These remarks should be taken semantically, with
respect to establishing a usable definition of scribal
wisdom, and not sociologically. We do not contend that
an author can absolutely transcend his culture and social
background in the pursuit of some abstract goal such as
wisdom. We do argue that 'scribal wisdom' should not be
redundant but delimit a distinct and identifiable set of
phenomena. This approach allows for 'the possible exis-
tence of scribal schools in which wisdom forms, thought
and motifs can be either organized into a specialized and
detailed world-view not shared by scribes in general or
put at the service of what that group regarded as superior
values and objectives. In both cases, while scribalism
is the sine qua non of literary work, it may not be evi-
denced, except perhaps trivially, in the work or the
world-view. It is taken for granted; the emphasis lies
elsewhere.1
1See my "Contributions" for the theoretical foun-
dations of this argument, which ultimately derives from
215
For example, if von Rad is right that the Joseph
epic is wisdom, one would most probably regard it as
scribal because of the theme of the counsellor, the im-
portance of courtly etiquette, the emphasis on speech,
the connection between intentionality and outcome under
divine direction, and the suggestion of a certain savoir-
vivre.1 This argument becomes still more compelling with
respect to Ahiikar and Daniel 1-6.2 On the other hand,
Ruth, Esther, Tobit, Moses, Adam, the Tyrian king may
display elements of epic wisdom, but the scribal ele-
merits are trivial (Esther) or absent.
The most important exclusion is royal wisdom.
The orientations of the world-views and their relation-
ships to the use of power are entirely different. The
king rules with insight and the power of effective judg-
ment; the scribe knows and imparts his knowledge. The
word of the king is virtually equivalent to the deed
itself; the courtier must take care with his speech that
the ruler be attracted to the proposed point of view.
The king mediates conflicting interests by compromise
the concept of taken-for-granted reality of Schutz and
Berger-Luckmann, q.v.
1Von Rad, “Josephsgeschichte,” pp. 120-27.
2Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 359; von Rad,
Old Testament Theology 2: 301-15.
216
decisions; the courtier only speaks when he can be
reasonably sure of the security and effectiveness of
his position, and he does not cross his superiors nor
those with greater power and influence. The king seeks
sage and competent men to advise him; the courtier has
expertise with which to advise his lord. The wisdom ap-
propriate to each should be quite different.
This distinction may help explain why both in
Israel and Egypt the attribution of formal instructions
to kings remains suspect. The Egyptian "royal" sebayit
and the Hebrew tradition of Solomonic wisdom compositions
both rest on materials much more congenial with scribal
than royal wisdom--instructions, aphorisms and riddles
were the teaching devices of the scribal schools.1
These academies used and preserved the royal instructions
in Egypt. We suggest therefore that in Israel and
probably in Egypt traditions of royal wisdom as the in-
sight to judge and govern and the power of decision were
expanded to include literary and encyclopaedic wisdom--
which properly was set in the scribal academies--to as-
sert and legitimate the role of scribal expertise and
academic learning in government. It justified the cen-
trality of scribal wisdom in important aspects of the
1Williams, "Scribal Training in Ancient Egypt,"
pp. 214-21; cf. Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit.
217
culture, particularly within the government.
Second, we may characterize scribal wisdom posi-
tively. At its most basic, 'wisdom' is what characterizes
the good scribe. Therefore, scribal wisdom sets out the
ideals and the world-view of the academies for the scribal
profession. Certain motifs distinguish scribal wisdom:
the wise courtier, the passionate-impetuous person versus
the person of self-discipline, the rich versus the poor,
the 'way of life,' the callow youth, the fool, the strong
tower or fortified city, the man in surety.
Similarly, as thought, this wisdom carries a
strong scribal ethic--Standesethik. Class-ethic may be
either open or closed with respect to the world. It may
refer to (1) a distinctive world-view common to a group;
(2) an in-group morality which values actions differently
depending on whether the agent and the context are within
or outside the group; or (3) a professional code of
ethics. Scribalism tends to be fairly open toward the
world, though the fool rejects instruction and stands
beyond the pale.1 Both the passage from ben Sirah above2
and the Instruction of Khety3 show the sharp revaluation
1Kovacs, "Class Ethic," pp. 173-87.
238:31-39:11.
3The Sebayit of Khety son of Duauf, "The Satire
218
of the scribal world that we would call 'in-group
morality,' albeit a comparatively paternalistic one. The
Egyptian sebayit show repeated evidences of scribal prac-
tices. The relative absence of such references in simi-
lar Hebrew works will be grounds for further discussion.
Still, there are evidences of courtly etiquette and
scribal discipline which suggest elements of such a pro-
fessional code. Thus, scribal wisdom presents a world-
view with an open class-ethic which is distinguishably
scribal in any of several senses.1
For the present stage of the discussion, however,
the analytic category of form provides the most useful
perspective on scribal wisdom. It includes:
a) Instructions. The Egyptian instructions
generally begin with a brief Rahmenerzählung which sets
out the conditions which led to the writing of the docu-
ment. The earliest carry attributions to viziers and
kings. They purport to be documents of courtly instruc-
tion intended exclusively or specifically to educate the
crown prince. We mentioned earlier that certain incon-
sistencies cast doubt on the attributions: instructions
from a dead pharaoh (though perhaps in a vision), scribal
on the Trades," in Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts,
pp. 432-34.
1Kovacs, "Class Ethic," pp. 173-87.
219
class-ethic directed at a lower official. By the time of
the sebayit of Amenemope, perhaps 1200-1100 BCE, the
Rahmenerzähldngen credit middle-level officials, holding
obscure or indeterminate positions. The late instruc-
tions in Egypt, for example Onchsheshongy, suggest a
still broader perspective.1 We might infer that the
audience has a changing relationship to its classics over
these centuries. Heredity begins to weigh less in the
scales of scribal advancement and merit more; scribal
ranks are filled from widening circles of potential candi-
dates. If so, we should take invidious comparisons of
other professions or crafts with scribal life as rather
thinly-veiled threats rather than hortatory devices.
Following the statement of setting, these in-
structions generally state the purpose and objective of
their teaching in a series of infinitives, paratactically
and asyndetically related. The texts of the instructions
appear random--the organizing principle, if there be any,
does not involve bringing together logically-related
situations in a systematic progression or argument. Ad-
monitions and aphorisms, however, are not entirely inde-
pendent but do frequently form short thematically-related
units. Certain of the later sebayit, Amenemope and
1McKane, Proverbs, pp. 51-150.
220
Papyrus Insinger, are divided into chapters or stanzas,
but on stylistic grounds. The instructions usually close
with a summary statement asserting the value of their
teaching.1 Ani, however, concludes with a dialogue be
tween father and son (master and pupil) in which the
father remonstrates with his recalcitrant son and affirms
the youth's educability.2 It also follows a wisdom
pattern (compare the Egyptian "Dispute Over Suicide"3
and the Akkadian "Dialogue Between a Master and His
Servant"4) of concluding paradoxically with what may be
a play on weaning or the psycho-logic of man's natural
drives.5 From Mesopotamia, we possess the Sumerian
1F. W. von Bissing, Altägyptische Lebensweisheit,
Bibliothek der alten Welt (Zurich: n.p., 1955); Pritchard,
Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 421-25; Griffith; Schmid,
Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, pp. 8-84; František
Lexa, Papyrus Insinger: Les Enseignements Moraux d'un
Scribe Égyptien du Premier Siècie apres J.c., 2 vols.. (Paris:
L’Librairie Orientalist Paul Geutnner, 1926), 2: 40-74.
2Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 420-
21, see Wilson's introductory remarks; Schmid, Wesen und
Geschichte der Weisheit, p. 218.
3Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 405-07.
4Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 437-38.
5Cf. Ronald J. Williams, "Reflections on the
Lebensmüde," in Trudy 25. Mezdunarodnego Kongressa
Vostokovedov: Moskva 9-16 Avgusta 1960 (Moscow: Izdate-
lystvo Vostocnoj Literatury, 1962), 1: 88-95; Ronald J.
Williams, "Theodicy in the Ancient Near East," Canadian
Journal of Theology 2 (1956): 14-26; Morenz, Ägyptische
Religion, pp. 69-84; Sagesses du Proche-Orient Ancient,
q.v.; Eberhard Otto, Der Vorwurf an Gott: Zur Entstehung
des Ägyptischen Auseinandersetzungsliteratur, Vorträge
221
"Instructions of Shuruppak,"1 the "Counsels of Wisdom,"2
and collections of miscellaneous proverbs.3 The form
appears briefer but the evidence is admittedly limited.
The key question, for our present inquiry, is whether
Proverbs or any of its parts is an instruction in form--
a question we shall defer for the moment.
The instruction must assuredly have had its
Sitz-im-Leben in the scribal academies. In Egypt, the
instructions were used to teach writing and the standards
of the profession. Anywhere from a few lines to several
pages (columns) of material would be copied each day ac-
cording to the student's ability and level in the school;
much must have been committed to memory. Since some of
the materials were written in now-archaic forms of the
der Orientalischen Tagung in Marburg, Ägyptologische
Fachgruppe, 1950 (Hildesheim: Gebr. Gerstenberg Verlag,
1951); Eberhard Otto, "Die Religion der Alten Ãgypter,"
in Handbuch der Orientalistik, ed. Bertold Spuler, Series
I: Der Alte und der Mittlere Osten, vol. 8: Religion,
Pt. 1: Religionsgeschichte des Alten Orients, Fasc. 1
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964), pp. 1-75; Eberhard Otto, "Der
Mensch als Geschöpf und Bild Gottes in Ägypten," in
Probleme Biblischer Theologie, pp. 335-48; Aksel Volten,
"Ägyptische Nemesis-Gedanken," in Miscellanea Gregoriani:
Raccolta di Scritti Publicati nel i Centenario dalla
Fondazione del Pont. Museo Egl. (1839-1939) (Rome: Max
Bretschneider, n.d.), pp. 371-79.
1Pritchard, Ancient Near East, pp. 158-59.
2Pritchard, Ancient Near East, pp. 159-60.
3Pritchard, Ancient Near East, pp. 157-58; Lam-
bert, Babylonian Wisdom Literature.
222
language, instruction must have depended on rote memory
and outright duplication of a master model. In fact, we
know these instructions because of their pervasive preser-
vation in student copies, however maladroit. The educa-
tional program in general must have been fairly constant
throughout the ancient Near East as well as through time.
Children of six to eight entered lower schools for ele-
mentary instruction lasting perhaps six years. Though
the curriculum was wide, only the written portions, the
instructions survive. The schools were small; the sys-
tem was that of a master scribe instructing some few
apprentices whom he had accepted. In the lower schools,
training of a specific technical kind may have been pro-
vided for skilled artisans and over-seers who would need
rudimentary literacy and mathematical competence in their
work. Some students would continue in higher schools,
perhaps organized by professional specialties, from their
early teens to their majority. Here they were assigned
the most rudimentary scribal tasks as true apprentices.
In the lower schools certainly, and probably in both, the
discipline was strict; the day was long; physical punish-
ments were often threatened and sometimes invoked (but
Ani's conclusion!). One's education resulted in employ-
ment as a journeyman in some minor state position until
his mid-twenties when he became elegible for regular
223
appointment.1 The system's paternalism is reflected in
its technical terminology of 'father' for 'teacher' and
'son' for 'student.'
Historically, the schools seem, at least in Egypt,
to have first been associated with the pharaonic court--
to train princes and the sons of high officials. The
school of the court began and seems to have remained in
the palace itself. From this institution developed
scribal institutions committed more to recruitment by
merit which trained future officials of all kinds. These
academies, both lower and higher, appear to have been de-
centralized: they existed in every major community.2
Although we know virtually nothing about Hebrew
pre-exilic educational institutions, many scholars are
inclined to follow the Egyptian model for both organi-
zation and history.3 Ostensibly, the instructions are
hortatory—the admonition, Mahnspruch, with a motivation
clause, far predominates over the Aussage--and the
Rahmenerzählungen frequently appeal to initiatory settings.
1Brunner, Altägyptische Erziehung.
2Brunner, Altägyptische Erziehung, pp. 10-55.
3See Gammie, "Israelite Pedagogy."
4Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft; Richter,
Recht und Ethos; Berend Gemser, “The Importance of the
Motive Clause in Old Testament Law,” in Adhuc Loquitur,
pp. 96-115; Rudolf Kilian, "Apodiktisches und Kasuis-
tisches Recht im Licht Ägyptischer Analogien,” 185-202.
224
Thus, they may have been used or originated as material
for scribal professional initiation rites. In Ahiikar,
which should perhaps be treated under another heading
anyhow, the setting is paradoxical, since in some versions
the instructions constitute a judgment on Ahiikar's nephew
and heir who then expires in shame.1
b) Letters. The schools adopted various au-
thentic and fictional letters to their didactic purposes,
so that students might become familiar with epistolary
forms and as settings for various academic problems. A
few letters praise the wisdom of scribal life, hence
forming the functional complement of instructions. Other
letters, like Hori's "satirical" composition, serve as
vehicles for scribal reflection and may be based on the
forms of the academy.2
c) Annals; histories. Since the scribes kept
the royal archives, they must be the custodians and com-
posers of official histories. While history-writing
itself cannot be regarded as wisdom, at least not without
Zeitschrift 7 (1963): 185-202; Anders Jørgen Bjørndalen,
"'Form' and ‘Inhalt’ des Motivierenden Mahnspruches,"
Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 82
(1970): 347-61; Hermisson, Spruchweisheit, pp. 137-86.
1Cf. McKane, Proverbs, 156-82.
2See Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp.
431-34, 475-79; see Pritchard, Ancient Near East, pp.
623 ff.
225
leaving 'wisdom' a hopelessly vague concept, such adapta-
tions as the novella can be considered artistic or
polemical wisdom forms. Advocates of novella-wisdom base
their position on the use of historical or quasi-histori-
cal materials to achieve a literary purpose. What ap-
pears to be simple historiography becomes on examination
something quite different. The author reports conversa-
tions, feelings, by-play about which he could not possibly
have been informed. The historical figures become pro-
tagonists in a literary creation designed to portray types
of character and their (inevitable?) consequences in life.
There is some interest in intentionality. The character
types and the theory of retribution seem to be somehow
beholden to wisdom categories.1 Also, to some extent,
"art for art's sake" may arguably be regarded as strictly
a view of scribal wisdom. J's story of Creation would
rank as a rather speculative wisdom adaptation of his-
tory;2 the Succession Narrative may polemically assert
the validity of Solomonic succession while criticizing
the behavior of its cast.3 In Exilic and post-exilic
1But see Klaus Koch, “Gibt es ein Vergeltungs-
dogma im Alten Testament?” Zeitschrift für Theologie and
Kirche 52 (1955): 1-42; Kovacs, "Intentionality."
2Alonzo-Schökel, "Motivos," pp. 295-316.
3Whybray, Succession Narrative.
226
times, there certainly seems to have been a fashion of
adopting traditional stories to literary ends. Job (de-
pending on one's date for the work), Ruth, Esther, Daniel
1-6 could have been later scribal contributions to the
novella or historically-grounded form [other possibilities:
Jonah, Tobit, Ahiikar (mentioned in Tobit!)].1
d) Epics; portraits of the 'Wise Scribe.' This
form overlaps with the novella to the extent that the
latter's subject becomes a heroic figure based on the
idealization of his scribal character: Joseph, Daniel
1-6, Ahiikar. Since the form is virtually co-extensive
with the epic wisdom we discussed earlier, we need add
only a few further remarks. These character studies can
go a long way toward filling in the gaps in our knowledge
of that scribal wisdom not closely identified with the
academies and their pedagogic, even if the portraits they
present form a projected ideal rather than simple descrip-
tion based in actual experience, but only to the extent
that we can locate these compositions with assurance in
scribal wisdom circles.
Ahiikar offers few problems in this respect; its
pervasiveness in the ancient Near East (copies were found
1Whybray, Succession Narrative, pp. 96-116.
2Schmid, Wesen and Geschichte der Weisheit, pp.
85-143; McKane, Proverbs, pp. 152-53, 156-82.
227
at Elephantine though the setting is Assyria) attests its
popularity and probably the salience of its depiction in
professional circles. Thus, we may infer broad common-
alities among international scribes that justify a cer-
tain amount of argument from analogy from one culture to
another.1 That an instruction (perhaps two) forms an
integral part of the epic, while the epic itself seems to
be too intricate to dismiss as Rahmenerzählung (i.e.,
windowdressing for the teachings), may imply that our
understanding of the instruction form is inadequate.
Here the scribe is a high courtly advisor. The image
reinforces inferences from the admonitions and aphorisms.
The scribe depends entirely on the influence of his ad-
vice; power rests with the king. Character (intention-
ality) ultimately brings its own reward, and such per-
sonality is sufficiently innate that even the wisest of
men cannot succeed in overcoming its deficiencies by the
most intimate of associations and instructions. Further,
such association works to the detriment of the sage; he
becomes caught up in the working out of "retribution."
Since the adviser's power is his word, he is vulnerable
to counsels phrased more craftily (if not more elegantly),
to intrigue, to manipulation of the king's good will. In
1Schmid, Wesen and Geschichte der Weisheit, pp.
85-143; McKane, Proverbs, pp, 152-53, 156-82.
228
the face of invincible royal wrath, the only hope rests
in hiding until the mood changes and the king is again
open to wise counsel. Still, the sage possesses the re-
sources of friends and associates upon whom he may depend.
He also has his wits, and the knowledge that justice will
work itself out in time. The passionate impetuous fool
will get his come-uppance. Importantly, the sages stand
in for royalty in the international games of wisdom:
scribal wisdom is credited to royal patrons. These games
are interesting in themselves because of the association
of riddles and outrageous word-play with wisdom. Notably,
the games display striking visual realism which gives
substance to the humor, unlike the impossibly inconsistent
visions of many apocalyptists: the images are based in
the hilarity of sensible men systematically going about
doing the absurd. The notion of wisdom as game or cam-
petition among wise scribes acts as an important foil to
treatments of wisdom as the purely aesthetic or didactic
product of scribal reflection.1
1Foster, "Humor," pp. 69-86; Edwin M. Good,
Irony in the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1965); Sheldon H. Blank, "Irony by Way of Attri-
butions," Semitics 1 (1970): 1-6; D. F. Payne, "A Per-
spective on the Use of Simile in the Old Testament,"
Semitics 1 (1970): 11-125; James G. Williams, "Comedy,
Irony, Intercession," Semeia 7 (1977): 135-45; Hans-Peter
Müller, "Mythos, Ironie und der Standpunkt des Glaubens,"
Theologische Zeitschrift 31 (January-February 1975): 1-13;
Johannes Hempel, "Pathos und Humor in der Israelitischen
229
The Joseph and Daniel stories, as we noted earlier,
are problematic. They are not similar enough to Ahiikar
in either form or content for the comparison to be de-
cisive in determining whether they should be considered
scribal or wisdom. Indeed, one appeals to the same ele-
ments of the stories in judging both aspects of the
problem: if they treat of a projected ideal scribal
figure, then perforce they are also wisdom. If they are
not scribal, the professional elements being secondary or
purely coincidental, they certainly are also not wisdom.
As the comparison of von Rad's and Crenshaw's views sug-
gested, the decision must be made at least partly on the
relative weights the reader gives various elements in
the stories.1 We submit that two questions decide the
issue.
First, what relationship existed between scribal
wisdom and the cult? If we find that the wise regarded
priestly practices with a distaste approaching on
hostility, then the repeated elements of conventional
religious practice in both stories would conflict with
Erziehung," 'in Von Ugarit nach Qumran: Beiträge zur
Alttestamentliche and Altorlentailische Forschung (Otto
Eissfeldt zum 1. September 1957), Beihefte zur Zeit-
schrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, vol. 77
(Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1958), pp. 63-81.
1Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2: 300-13;
von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 355-63; Crenshaw, "Method
in Determining Wisdom Influence," pp. 135-37.
230
the views of scribal wisdom. On the other hand, if
right cultic practice is the sine qua non of advancement
in wisdom, if one cannot become wise who does not prac-
tice the conventions of the faith (international scri-
balism: the practice of his country?), then these ele-
ments reflect scribal wisdom thought; one could not
appeal to them in deciding the matter of wisdom.
Second, what relationship governs the influence
of Yahweh upon the life and success of these heros
(Crenshaw--"spiritualizing”)?1 Both Joseph and Daniel
enjoyed a divine charism, but based on what? If inten-
tionality looms sufficiently large in scribal wisdom as
against purely formal instruction, then Joseph's lack of
formal instruction may diminish in significance. On the
other hand, if the charism be founded in Yahweh's plans
for the history of a people, scribal wisdom seems to be
ruled out. Our conclusions in the study of aphoristic
wisdom will apply directly to both these questions.
e) Word-games; riddles. If the Ahiikar setting
applies, then we may locate verbal competitions and games
in scribal wisdom as a kind of professional play, not
scribal preservation of a folk genre. That these forms
are associated with wisdom would hardly be worth disputing.
1Crenshaw, "Method in Determining Wisdom Influ-
ence," p. 137.
231
A series of numerical sayings follows the Agur collection
near the end of Proverbs; another can be found at 6:16-
19 in the midst of one of the admonitory discourses (in-
struction?). These sayings may well be the answers to
riddles whose question form has not been retained but
can presumably be projected directly from the response.1
Several of the wisdom psalms seem to have
originally been in riddle—or numerical-form.2 Many
scholars regard acrostic psalms to be wisdom by defini-
tion. The acrostic "Psalm of the Good Wife" which con-
cludes Proverbs strongly counters the supposed misogyny
of the wise. Whether the standards set for woman here
are any more stringent or confining than those the wise
men set for themselves remains to be seen. Psalm 119,
'torah-wisdom" demonstrates the elaborate--albeit some-
what tedious--lengths to which wordplay can be carried
by sheer formalization. It should also remind us of the
sophistication we may expect to find in wisdom word-play.
1W.M.W. Roth, Numerical Sayings in the Old Testa-
ment: A Form-Critical Study, Vetus testamentum Supple-
ments, vol. 13 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965).
2Sigmund Mowinckel, "Psalms and Wisdom," Wisdom
in Israel and Ancient Near East, pp. 205-24; Roland E.
Murphy, "A Consideration of the Classification 'Wisdom
Psalms,'" Congress Volume [of the International Organi-
zation for the Study of the Old Testament]: Bonn, 1962,
Vetus Testamentum Supplements, vol. 9 (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1963), pp. 156-67; von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp.
189-228, 71; Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp. 247-53.
232
On the other hand, whether these should he labeled
'scribal' is less clear. For formal word-play and
riddles found in Proverbs, the matter hinges on whether
one attributes the book as a whole specifically to
scribal wisdom, since there is nothing in the sayings or
their collection which is conclusive.
One might infer a common scribal background to
these forms from their presence in such diverse litera-
tures: proverb "collections," psalmbooks, history,
prophecy (the numerical sayings and rhetorical questions
of Amos, e.g.). While the writers betook themselves to
different professional specialties, the forms they
learned in their apprenticeship continued to hold fascina-
tion for them as rhetorical devices through which they
could express their concrete ideas. This sort of argu-
ment, although eminently plausible, seems rather devious
in the absence of clear evidence for an original scribal
setting in the materials themselves.
Further, the problem appears in vocabulary.
'Hiydwt' and 'mlysiwt' may indicate either riddles and word-
plays, or scoffing and derision.1 The only times the two
words appear together in the Hebrew Bible are in Proverbs
1:6 where they seem to be in synonymous parallel and at
1Müller, "Rätsel," pp. 465-89; Crenshaw, 'Wisdom,"
pp. 239-45; Kovacs, “Reflections.”
233
Habakkuk 2:6 where they are joined together for intensifi-
cation but with their other meanings:
Shall not all these take up their taunt against
him, in scoffing derision of him, . . .
A woe-oracle sequence follows based on a catalogue of
injustices. Mlysih is used nowhere else. Hiydh occurs
frequently with respect to Samson's riddle. In Psalm 49:4
ET and Ezekiel 17:2 the word parallels mšl. Both are
special uses. The former suggests a musical play:
I will incline my ear to a proverb;
I will solve my riddle to the music of the lyre.
Whatever hiydh is, music applies to its sense and resolu-
tion. In the latter, the term refers to the "Fable of
the Cedar of Lebanon." Ezekiel, moreover, is notoriously
replete with fabulous entities used in a quite prophetic-
visionary manner. To treat the visions of Ezekiel as
wisdom would leave that term utterly vacuous. Psalm 78:2
has the same terminological parallel, but the sense is
closer to Numbers 12:8. Hiydh seems to mean the mystery
of divine word and deed in history. The first unveils
the mighty deeds of Yahweh in history by rehearsing the
accounts of his works; the second involves a Yahweh speech
asserting the directness of his communication with Moses
and implies the clarity of his acts. The two uses in
I Kings 10:1 and II Chronicles 9:1 place the term in a
context of royal wisdom that still reminds us of Ahiikar.
234
The Queen of Sheba intends to test Solomon's wisdom and
insight by proposing hiydwt to him. The problem of mean-
ing here is no less acute than with mšl; the range is
similarly wide.1 The same situation obtains with fables--
especially since the figure of the Greek Aesop invites so
many interesting analogies.
We had best accept a more minimal stance in ac-
cord with the evidence. Certainly the scribal wise de-
veloped competitive verbal games. Riddles, word-plays,
fables, all are common forms to many segments of society
that were adopted by some scribes to their own special use.
f) Encyclopaedias: word-lists. To some extent,
one must credit the quantities of, mostly multi-lingual,
onomastica from Egypt and Mesopotamia to the scribal ef-
fort to keep alive accurate knowledge of "dead" languages
as well as the proper symbolics and terminology of their
own. Thus, they must have been encyclopaedic vocabulary
lists, thematic rather than comprehensive, verbal in
structure and not logical. Von Rad argued at one time
that such lists lay behind the Yahweh speeches of Job 38-
41, and perhaps ben Sirah 43, Psalm 148, the Hymn of the
Three Young Men; he later doubted this theory.2
1Müller, "Rätsel," pp. 465-89.
2Von Rad, "Hiob XXXVIII," pp. 293-301; von Rad,
235
Though we lack Hebrew onomastica in the biblical
materials, the process suggests a scribal perspective
with all its implications. They demonstrate an attempt
to order and make sense of the world through naming, the
use of the word. To name an entity is the first essen-
tial step in perceiving it adequately as an individual and
describing its characteristics. Also, lists of things
reflect a concern with nature, with entities of experience,
broadly understood. The step to creation theology then is
short: to give nature and order cosmogenic intelligibility.
The god-listings fit such extrapolation.1 A seemingly
superficial activity therefore may generate profound im-
plications; they permit us to include onomastica in scribal
wisdom.
g) Codes of Decisions. Gemser, in his analysis
of the role of the motive clause in Hebrew law, makes the
suggestion that at least some aphorisms may have been used
as legal summaries. He accepts at face value the humanism
of Hebrew law. He finds that motive clauses, technically
Begrundungssätze, sharply increase in frequency in the
later codes. Since he accepts some kind of covenant re-
newal ceremony, he argues that the oral and popular nature
Old Testament Theology 1: 413-18; von Rad, Weisheit in
Israel, pp. 288-92.
1Von Rad, "Hiob XXXVIII," pp. 293-301.
236
of these recitations required social and theological re-
flection to justify and explain the laws as read. Hebrew
codes are motivated because, unlike other ancient Near
Eastern law-codes, they alone were of and for the people.
Twcbh sanctions indicate the cultic nature of this law.
He then suggests that early prophecy, wisdom, and law have
a common origin in inspired law-givers of the community
or tribe. As in some other cultures, proverbs constituted
catch-summaries of legal principles and case-decisions.
At the conclusion of a legal argument, the pleader would
summarize his case with an accepted proverb, a legal
maxim. Unsurprisingly, then, twcbh-sayings concerning
identical issues appear in legal and proverbial biblical
contexts. Some laws give a most aphoristic appearance in
style and their balanced poetic form, using two-line
structure.
While one may not wish to go so far as admit a
quasi-popular nature to law or wisdom, nor find common
history to three so different social groups, yet the sug-
gestion that aphoristic wisdom at least partly stems from
attempts to summarize cases in succinct generalities sets
out a plausible ground for composing certain kinds of
aphorisms. In Mahnsprüche, Begrundungssätze are common.
1Gemser, “Motive Clause,” pp. 96-115.
237
One can readily imagine scribes coining maxims in pleasing
but traditional form to help them negotiate the mazes of
commerce, politics and the law. The later instructions
in Egypt, however, possess far fewer Mahnsprüche in favor
of Aussagen. In the four great mashal-collections, only
C has significant numbers of motivated sayings. Still,
the setting is eminently plausible and proposes a con-
text for certain proverb forms.1
h) Codes of ethics. In Egypt, the sebayit
typically included references to the scribal art and its
ethical code. While distinct codes did not exist, it
seems to have been an important sub-form, which follows
from its use in the school. Overt statements of such
codes cannot be found in Hebrew wisdom much before the
above passage from ben Sirah. Whether such a code may
be inferred from other evidence is one of the questions
to occupy us in our analysis of collection of B.
i) Ideologies. Narrowly understood, this form
refers to explicit paeans to scribal wisdom. "In Praise
of the Scribal Art"2 and "In Praise of Learned Scribes"3
both display this concern to set in detail the legitima-
1Gemser, "Motive Clause," pp. 96-115; Bjørndalen,
pp. 347-61; Skladny.
2Sjöberg, pp. 127-31.
3Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 431-32.
238
tions of the profession. The value and meaning of scribal
life is explored and explained. The "Satire on the Trades"1
and the "Song of the Harper"2 state the matter more nega-
tively, though in quite different senses. The former justi-
fies scribal life at the expense of other occupations. The
latter suggests a pessimistic evaluation of all learning,
not unlike the more speculative musings of Qoheleth. The
passage from ben Sirah is strongly ideological, as demon-
strated by the decidedly idealistic cast to its "ethic."
Ideology is not to be sharply distinguished from
a professional code; elements of each may, as in the cited
passage, appear together. We treat it separately because
it can be important to differentiate the ethical and
ideological dimensions of a given writing. Thus, ap-
parently ethical statements may recur, not to re-assert
their moral imperatives, but to serve some value-end. The
weight of their meaning rests in the valued perspective
toward life which they justify and affirm. The difference
may seem abstruse here when stated in abstract terms, but
it will prove important to our argument later, e.g., in
terms of noblesse oblige and neo-naturalism.
1Pritchard, Ancient sear Eastern Texts, pp. 432-34.
2Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, p. 467.
239
j) Other forms. Like all groups, the scribes
not only preferred certain forms of their own inven-
tion or elaboration, but they turned other forms to their
purpose, as we suggested was the case with riddles and
word-games. In Egypt, we find two prophecies with im-
portant scribal elements and a wisdom dimension: "The
Admonitions of Ipu-Wer"1 and the “Prophecy of Nefer-
rohu.”2 The latter is proleptic, looking toward
resolution of the woes then besetting the land; it, and
perhaps the other, is therefore taken to be anachronistic.
In these, the triple affiliation, scribalism, wisdom,
prophecy, clearly appears. Both decry the decline of
morals, the collapse of order, and the impotence of
government. They plead for justice and reform; the
moral dimension stands at the forefront. To raise fur-
ther the issue of wisdom and prophecy would lead us too
far afield; however, we take note of the form.3 Whether
aphorisms should be regarded as separate form in the
sense of Aussage collections, remains problematic
since it is in Proverbs that we find a distinction be-
tween instructions or admonitory discourses and simple
1Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, p. 467.
2Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, pp. 444-46.
3Cf. von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, pp. 359-60.
240
sayings-collections, at least in principle.1 (Gordon
attributes the Sumerian proverbs collections to [scribal]
collocations of folk wisdom, however he does not argue
the problem at length nor in detail.2) Thus, there per-
sists the more basic issue whether the mashal-collections
in Proverbs, which have few Mahnsprüche, should be re-
garded as in any sense products of specifically scribal
wisdom. The analysis below should help clarify the re-
lationship between the aphoristic literature and scri-
balism, but we should not prejudge the matter by now
isolating an aphorism-collection form in scribal wisdom.
If we simply equate scribalism with wisdom, then
a history of the profession in Israel can be written,
although it remains somewhat speculative. The evidence
for scribal development alone, however, is rather meager.
The Golden Age of Solomon, which we discussed anent royal
wisdom, may have seen the establishment of an educated
administrative class founded on the Egyptian model and
trained by imported Egyptian leadership (if Elihoreph is
an Egyptian name).3 The legend of Solomon's wisdom
1Crenshaw, "Wisdom," pp. 229-39; McKane, Proverbs,
pp- 1-208.
2Gordon, "New Look," pp. 122-52.
3McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, p. 28; Scott,
"Beginnings," pp. 261-68.
241
could then be traced to his patronage of the academies,
perhaps by the kind of attribution one finds in Ahiikar.
The attractive feature of this theory, in addition to the
fact that it preserves a historical element in the bibli-
cal record, is that it establishes a linear and temporal
relationship among royal learning or wisdom, the csih of
counselors, and the traditional learning of the schools
and professional scribes. We argued, however, that royal
wisdom has an entirely different relationship to power
and its use than does either counsel or scribal wisdom.
The latter, however, have much in common with each other.
Recently, Scott has again underscored the caution
with which we should approach the superscriptions that
attest Solomonic wisdom, since their historical relation-
ship to the texts that follow is completely indetermin-
able.1 From a strictly institutional point of view, we
know that David and Solomon already had men in offices
called "sopher," "scribe," and “mazqir”--remembrancer or
recorder. There is a possible reference to the office
in the Song of Deborah, "wmzbwln mškym bšbti sfr," but the
passage is doubtful.2 The offices are mentioned regularly
from Hezekiah's time on, though the precise duties involved
1Scott, "Beginnings," pp. 272-79.
2McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 15-22.
242
can only be speculated upon.1 McKane contends that they
were royal advisors, and implies that the term "sopher"
takes on a special sense like the English "Governmental
Secretary." They were among the śarim, the cabinet of
the king. The csih of Hushai and Ahithophel shows the
learning and insight, thus hikmh with divine sanction,
that accompanied their rise to position.2
While the prophets adopted a polemical stance
against the advice of royal counselors, McKane also points
out how they used the language of wisdom to their pur-
poses.3 Whether the wise and scribes can be distinguished
in this polemic is unclear. In Isaiah 19:11 ff., the wise
are obviously the advisors of Pharaoh, and wisdom assumes
a distinctly royal coloring. Elsewhere, the wise seem to
be set as a distinct class, who possess however both hikmh
and csih, against prophets, priests, mighty men, the
wealthy. The prophet and the priest and the wise man ap-
pear in Jeremiah 18:18.
Then they said, "Come, let us make plots against
Jeremiah, for the law shall not perish from the
priest, nor counsel from the wise, nor the word
from the prophet. . . ."
1McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 23-36; Scott,
"Beginnings," pp. 274-79.
2McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 23-47.
3McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 41-42.
243
Three classes are distinguished, with the wise having
csih. The wise, in these passages, seem to have secular
advice to offer; theirs is a practical judgment of ex-
pediency that is in conflict with proper reliance upon
Yahweh. While scribes are not mentioned, csih is the coun-
selor's attribute. These men seem to occupy positions
where they pan offer influential advice. The phrase,
"wise in their own eyes," suggests a play on the wisdom
view that arrogance can go hand-in-hand with folly.1 One
might, then, infer from the pharaonic reference that the
wise and the scribal class are identical.
Yet, Jeremiah 8:8-9 raises doubts:
How can you say, "We are wise,
and the law of the Lord is with us"?
But, behold, the false pen of the scribes
has made it into a lie.
The wise men shall be put to shame;
they shall be dismayed and taken;
lo, they have rejected the word of the Lord
and what wisdom is in them?
Compare Jeremiah 2:8.
The priests do not say, "Where is the Lord?"
Those who handle the law did not know me; . . .
Lindblom thinks that the first informs the second--that
the scribes are not to be regarded as identical with the
wise but rather as the transmitters and scholars of the
law who have falsified it. They are therefore "those who
1McKane, Prophets and Wise Men, pp. 63-112; cf.
Whybray, Intellectual Tradition, pp. 6-54.
244
handle" in the second quotation. Thus, by late in the
monarchic period, the wise and the scribes were separate
classes. Indeed, one group of professional scribes had
become so identified with torah-study that they formed a
distinct and recognizable social group, as they most cer-
tainly did in a later time when Ezra was a scribe of the
Law.1
The issue becomes still more complicated when we
consider the passages of reinterpreted wisdom, where wis-
dom is what Yahweh used to order creation:
It is he who made the earth by his power,
who established the world by his wisdom,
and by his understanding stretched out the heavens.
(Jer. 10:12)
These quotations point up the difficulties that
follow attempts to infer about one social group from the
documents of another, and competing, perspective. Fur-
ther, one scarcely knows how to take these few remarks--
do they represent a "family feud," in-house radicalism
that at once evokes and assuages guilt (if there were
guild prophecy), or avidly competing contradictory views
of reality?
We do better to work from within, to evoke the
setting from content analysis of documents if possible.
Thus, we shall address the question of setting and
1Lindblom, pp. 192-204.
245
scribalism in our analysis below. We can say that Isaiah
and Jeremiah attacked that practical view of life, which
centered in the royal councils, that sought to cope with
conflicting social and political pressures by relying on
the collective judgments of pragmatic rationality alone.
No counsel established on purely human wisdom can prevail
against the divine word (spoken, presumably, by the
prophet). The ultimate example which refutes attempts to
build social histories from these prophetic oracles is the
relationship of Jeremiah to his scribe Baruch. Should we
infer a group of professional scribes associated with the
prophetic guild? Or, is the relationship entirely per-
sonal? Is Baruch the faithful amenuensis or the deeply
committed friend, counselor and historian, who preserves
and edits? One can only speculate.1
1In addition to mentioning the royal offices of
"sopher" and "mazgir,' the deuteronomic historian also
credits the royal council with recognizing the importance
of the law-code found in the Temple, reading it over, and
bringing it to Josiah's attention. On his order, they
seek the (wise?) prophetess Huldah's validation of the
document. Apparently this diligence of the śarim did not
much redound to their credit in the eyes of Jeremiah. The
Chronicler makes mention of a scribal family at Jabez. He
locates scribes in the military and among the Levites, and
expands the other offices of the cabinet. A reference in
Psalm 45:1 ET is metaphorical:
". . . I address my verses to the king;
my tongue is like the pen of a ready scribe."
The text appears to be a royal wedding song. It introduces
the term mhyr, which occurs only four times in the Hebrew
Bible: here, in the Amenemope parallel, of Ezra (“skilled
in the law of Moses”), and in an Isaianic oracle of promise
(mahir seideq). It means at least scribal competence and
perhaps legal facility (i.e., in torah).
CHAPTER IV
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK OF PROVERBS
Proverbs without question is a composite work;
still, our use of the term "collection" to refer to
certain blocks of sayings within the Book somewhat begs
questions of structure, form and composition. The say-
ings are diverse; a multiplicity of forms and sub-forms
appears. The motifs are no less diverse than the themes,
whether overtly expressed or merely implied obliquely.
Some sayings are known from international wisdom (i.e.,
they appear in substantially the same form in other
cultures or are "quoted" in the truly international works
of wisdom). Foreign sages are quoted, and scholars have
discerned at least one foreign work in Hebrew dress
(the sebayit of Amenemope). The composite depth of
Proverbs is an open question, since layers of material
can be seen: within the larger "collections" one finds
smaller thematic blocks; other sections are unified by
form; similar and duplicate sayings recur. Further, the
Book has been given a measure of structural and thematic
unity by prefixing a preface and motto, use of super-
scriptions, and segregation of materials by form.
246
247
Clearly, editors composed and redacted the Book
from a wide variety of resources. To speak of editors
and their schools, however, still leaves us far from
understanding their motives, the interpretation and use
they gave the Book--not to mention its constituent parts,
and their contribution to the artistic unity of the work.
To the extent that certain groups of the wise demanded
that the sage be steeped in the authoritative and tradi-
tional words of his fore-bears, the poet-sage could draw
extensively upon the intellectual, artistic and verbal
resources of his class while remaining in every sense an
artist and author in his own right.
In other words, among a class which lays great
stress upon learning some formally-defined and -refined
literature--whether oral or written is immaterial--and
which uses a highly sophisticated and stylized mode of
expression, the question of composition is a murky one.
In such a case, as with Proverbs, interpretation, rather
than the evidence alone or as such, becomes quite diffi-
cult. For this reason, we shall not pursue the tangled
skein of structure at great length--a vital question,
it would nonetheless lead us far afield from our principal
concerns. Rather, we shall sketch the location of II-B
in Proverb's larger apparent structure, and respond to
certain questions which fundamentally affect the
validity of our approach.
248
Superficially, Proverbs presents the appearance
of the instruction form. It begins with a superscrip-
tion that could be interpreted as the Rahmenerzählung,
generally quite brief, which sets the occasion for the
teaching; the Rahmenerzählung appears most consistently
in the Egyptian sebayit. The next five verses state the
purpose of the book in a series of paratactic infinitive
phrases (construct form); the infinitive is implicit in
the second half of the 3 plus 3 synonymous parallelism
but expressed in v. 2. V. 5. is the exception, employing
imperfects with jussive force in both halves. A similar
statement of purpose follows none of the other super-
scriptions, so these verses may have been intended to
apply to the entire work. V. 7 states the motto of the
work:
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge:
fools despise wisdom and instruction.
The preface and motto set out the purpose in the
technical vocabulary of wisdom. The terms are not defined,
but rather reinforced by the repetition of functional
substitutes. They rehearse wisdom's most fundamental be-
liefs. Wisdom is a discipline that can be intelligibly
stated in words. Wisdom can be learned and taught, and
therefore manifested in a pattern of sensible and prudent
conduct. The simple can learn wisdom's caution, but the
youth especially (?) is
amenable to instruction in wisdom.
249
The wise man can amass learning and further guidance in
conduct. The word is the instrument of teaching and
learning.1 V. 6 then focusses on the role of sayings
in instruction. The Amenemope section duplicates a
portion of that work's statement of purpose, though the
infinitives appear only briefly toward the end in the
Hebrew version, in preference to an imperative series.
From 1:8, the first nine chapters are given over
principally to a series of hortatory discourses in which
imperatives and vetitives figure importantly, though by
no means exclusively. The exact number of discourses
depends upon what strictures are employed to distinguish.
them, especially since several seem otherwise to be quite
short. It is possible to reduce the number to seven, to
reach the number of pillars in wisdom's house in 9:1, but
the reduction is necessarily speculative.2 Overtly,
there are some twelve whole or partial blocks of instruc-
tion plus a number of independent blocks of material con-
joined. Most begin with a vocative, bny or rarely bnym,3
followed by an injunction in the imperative to hear at-
tentively these words (of the father-teacher) and work to
1Würthwein, Weisheit Ägyptens, p. 8.
2Skehan, Studies, pp. 9-45.
3Prov. 4:1; 5:7; 7:24; 8:32.
250
retain them diligently--or conversely not to forget them
--and concluded by some statement of purpose, consequence,
or motivation.1
The terms 'b and bny presumably reflect the tech-
nical language of the school in which the master addressed
his apprentice, and was addressed in turn, in familial
terms, apparently reflecting the ideal of intimacy and
obedient respect that bound or ought to have bound them
together. Occasionally the mother, 'm, is mentioned
which does not however argue in favor of a Sippenweisheit
interpretation of this hortatory wisdom. De Boer has
shown that this term too can have a (school) wisdom
application.2 Moreover, the teaching for King Lemuel
(Proverbs 31:1-9). is explained as issuing from his mother:
mś’ ‘sr-yšrtw ‘mw.
To the extent that instructions were utilized by
some social caste, for example a hereditary scribal or
official class, these familial terms could have served a
dual function. Schmid’s paradigm traces Egyptian wisdom
back to a patriarchal setting in which these words would
have had their literal meaning The technical later
1Bjørndalen; pp. 347-61; Whybray, "Literary
Problems," pp. 482-96; Whybray, Wisdom in Proverbs;
N. Habel, “The Symbolism of Wisdom in Proverbs 1-9,” In-
terpretation 26 (1972): 131-56; Richter, Recht und Ethos,
pp. 46-47.
2De Boer, pp. 62-71.
251
derived as the transmission of wisdom and the institu-
tion of the school came to be divorced from the (royal or
aristocratic) family.1 Brunner argues for a progressive
democratization of the Egyptian school. He contends that
originally the apprentice bound himself to a master as a
kind of adopted son. The familial terms applied to the
personal and intimate relationship of chosen teacher and
student who lived together and worked together in a non-
institutional setting. As the later school grew and
formalized these relationships, while recruiting from a
far wider and less nepotous circle, the familial terms
became technical.2 Thus, analogy would lead us to con-
clude that the instructions of chapters 1-9 belong to a
teaching setting, and perhaps to the school. The terms
alone may be literal, or metaphorical i.e., technical),
or for the caste both.
The discourses are brief but tend to be themat-
ically consistent, if not unified, hence composed of
multi-lined sayings and. admonitions. While some dis-
courses are largely composed of individual two- or four-
line sayings connected together by a common idea or phrase,
others consist of much larger syntactic unities. For
1Schmid, Wesen and Geschichte der Weisheit, pp.
8-84; cf. Brunner, Altägyptische Erziehung, pp. 1-55.
2Brunner, Altägyptische Erziehung, pp. 10-32.
252
this reason, it is difficult to establish with certainty
the relationship of what otherwise seem to be independent
blocks of material that intrude into the framework of dis-
courses. These include the extended references to personi-
fied and hypostatic wisdom as well as the extended metaphor
of the "foreign woman," the 'yšh zrh. Two factors fur-
ther complicate the question, one theoretical and the
other an artifact of translation.
First, the characterizations of the foreign woman
seem to involve some inconsistencies so that none of the
four major interpretations offered is free of diffi-
culties: the foreign woman is a common prostitute, hence
the passages reflect the pragmatizing asceticism of the
wise and the Hebrew concern for controlled sexuality; she
is the hierodule, so the wise like the prophets inveigh
against allegiance to foreign-originated cults of sexu-
ality; she is foreign, perhaps legally the Hebrew's wife,
and is attacked out of late Hebrew national exclusivism;
or, she is Astarte, or some other fertility goddess,
humanized and personified, and the imagery is intended to
support Hebrew yahwistic exclusivism. Personified wisdom
1McKane, Proverbs, pp. 262-412; Gustav Boström,
Proverbiastudien: die Weisheit and das Fremde Weib in
Spr. 1-9, Acta Universitatis Lundensis, Nova Series,
Lunds Universitets Årsskrift, Ny Följo, Avdelningen 1:
Teologi, Juristik och Humanistika Ämnen, vol. 30, no. 3
(Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1934); Habel, pp. 131-56.
253
is obviously a foil to the foreign woman, whether wisdom's
figure be original to these passages or a later addition;
so, the two interpretations and their textual and tradi-
tion history are closely intertwined. The last case
could be used to support the argument for an early Hebrew
wisdom rnythos, deriving from a Canaanite wisdom goddess
Hokmot.1 If Wisdom is a polemical figure directed
against the fertility cult, it can also be fairly early
(i.e., early to middle monarchy), derived either by
direct analogy or by extension from Egyptian hypostatic
wisdom.2 Bauer-Kayatz rejects the speculation of Rankin
and others that Wisdom is a Persian figure derived from
one of the Amesha Spentas: with Egyptian influence, the
figure need not be late.3
Second, English translations like the RSV and JB
use feminine pronouns liberally, begging the question
which passages actually demand it. Ringgren distinguishes
hypostasis (treating a characteristic of a deity as an in-
dependent agency) and personification (giving it the
1The unusual form hikmwt appears in 1:20 and 9:1,
at 14:1 (of women? construct), in the discourse section
24:7, and in the wisdom psalm 49:3 (4).
2Albright, “Canaanite-Phoenician Sources,” pp.
1-15; Kayatz, Studien zu Proverbien 1-9; Boström,
Proverbiastudien:
3Kayatz, Studien zu Proverbien 1-9; Rankin, pp.
222-64.
254
attributes of a person).1 Personified wisdom appears
irrefutably only in 1:20-33; 8:1-31 and 9:1-6. These
passages seem to be independent of the discourses.2
Four: l-9 demands at most hypostasis;3 certainly the
personification of RSV and JB is excessive. The foreign
woman and Wisdom as person are interpretive cruces.
The discourses, however, are not prima facie post-
Exilic. They have classic instruction form and could
conceivably have originated in a Hebrew (monarchic)
scribal milieu influenced by Egyptian didactic techniques.
Conversely, there is no reason why that milieu need be
monarchic since doubtless scribal activity continued in
Judah after the Kingdom's fall as the sine qua non of
effective domination. In sum, the Wisdom figure of these
sections cannot be used to prove conclusively any thesis
about the date of Proverbs 1-9 (and by inference the rest
of the Book) on the basis of present knowledge--let alone
prove the hypothesis that wisdom is generally late.
Seams are prominent in the text, both MT and LXX.
The last discourse concludes with 8:36. Nine:1-6 presents
1Ringgren, Word and Wisdom; Schencke.
28:32-36 is an embedded incomplete (?) discourse
independent of the Wisdom image.
3Though the verbs in Vv. 8-9 may not even require
that much: ntn, mgn, hibq.
255
the Wisdom figure and her (astral?) house (related to
ch. 8, presumably). Vv. 7-12 are a collection of unre-
lated sayings, except v. 11 (in the first person!)
which ostensibly belongs to v. 10 but may actually belong
with v. 6. Vv. 13-8 are an isolated passage on the
foreign woman with no clear tie to the preceding verses.
This assemblage of diverse and unrelated materials here
(as elsewhere) suggests a seam, which is confirmed by
the superscription at 10:1, as does the addition of
sayings in the LXX at vv, 10 (1), 12 (3) , and 18 (4
additions).
Chapters 10-5 are composed exclusively of
dystichs, most of them showing antithetic parallelism,
and the majority in 3 plus 3 rhythm. The LXX has a
number of additions scattered through this collection.
Fourteen:1 may be a reference to personified Wisdom if
one is prepared to emend nšym to tśym or delete it
metris causa. As it stands the verse would support the
motif of the good wife and counter the otherwise
misogynic picture of wisdom. The emendation of bnth to
b'ytn then gets rid of the double verb problem (an
emendation necessitated by emendation, let us note) and
produces interesting syntax. As is, there is no personi-
fication, and personified Wisdom appears nowhere else in
collections A through D.
256
In support of this point, we note that the
foreign woman ('yšh zrh or nkryh), apparently the ante-
cedent (?) and foil of Wisdom, is at most suggested at
20:16 and 27:13. Both passages are difficult; both deal
with surety for foreigners. Both are intelligible with-
out, and context seems to support no, reference to the
foreign woman. Hence, the four mashal collections make
no clear reference to either figure, and most probably
make none at all.
In collection A, 14:13 clashes with the supposed
naive optimism of the antitheses. Fifteen:25 is a key
saying for those who seek some doctrine of immortality,
apart from Sheol, at least for the righteous. Whatever
poetic structure unites collection A, the content and
themes of the sayings appear quite random except for
short groups of aphorisms and the unity offered by catch-
words.
Collection B differs from A in form, shifting
from antithetic to synonymous and synthetic parallelism.
Evidence of the change appears to some extent in chapter
15, and from 16 on antithetic parallelism is uncommon.1
Otherwise, the two-line balanced form with 3 + 3 meter
predominating continues. The LXX also evidences a seam
1See Appendix, Table 7.
257
through a series of omissions and a different sequence of
verses from 15:27 to 16:10. Collection B does not begin
unmistakably with 16:1, although that is the point com-
mentators almost invariably choose. Their decision is
probably dictated by the fact that the verse asserts the
intervention of Yahweh between intention and deed.1 This
theme recurs with some emphasis in B, while A seems to
put forth the conventional doctrine of retribution; wit-
ness the distinction between the two collections drawn by
Skladny.2 Not only does the LXX's mingling of these
early verses of chapter 16 with the end of chapter 15
raise some questions about this division, but the decline
of antithetic parallelism and the presence of several Yah-
weh sayings toward the end of 15 in the MT along with the
continuing pattern of catch-words and assonance all sug-
gest considerable imprecision in the precise point of
division between the two collections.
In the LXX, 16:6 appears as 15:27a; 16:7, as
15:28a; 16:8 and 9, as 15:29a-b. Fifteen:31 is omitted
entirely, along with 16:1-3. A few LXX MSS give 16:1
followed by ben Sirah 3:18, generally with a star and
obelus. The LXX then gives a saying not found in MT,
1See Appendix, Table 8.
2Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 7-46.
258
then 16:5, then two more unique sayings, 16:4, followed
by 16:10 et seq. without further notable disruption.
For Scott, this fluidity evidences the hand of a redactor,
hence the transitional section should be treated with
care. He argues that a yahweh-redaction has inserted a
section exalting the active power of Yahweh to precede
the undisturbed king passage, and that certain king-
sayings have been transformed into references to Yahweh.1
While the LXX does not present the primordial text, it
does evidence a different tradition without a long be-
ginning block of yahweh-maxims. The following two verses
precede 16:10--the first is unique and the second follows
16:4 MT which we give for comparison:
He who seeks the lord finds knowledge in accord with
righteousness;
and the ones who seek it rightly will find peace.
All the lord's works are in accord with righteousness,
but the unrighteous will come into the evil day.
Yahweh has made everything to its purpose,
even the wicked for the evil day. [B.K.]
This evidence, however, is amenable to more than
one interpretation. First, while the LXX provides clear
indications of separations in the text, by dislocations
1Scott, Proverbs, pp. 16-27; Scott, Way of Wisdom,
pp. 48-71; R. B. Y. Scott, "Wise and Foolish, Righteous
and Wicked," in Vetus Testamentum Supplements, vol. 23
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. 146-65. See Appendix,
Table 9.
259
and especially through the sites where a number of
additions to the text were permitted to appear together,
Gerleman has shown that the translator of Proverbs had
distinct poetic and philosophic interests that limit the
usefulness of the LXX as evidence against the MT.1 The
LXX substitutes more acceptable Greek poetic forms for
Semitisms which, in excess, would be unpalatable to the
Hellenic reader. For example, the translator signifi-
cantly reduces the number of instances of synonymous
parallelism. Where the MT is obscure, he often substi-
tutes proverbs from his own milieu or he provides a
harmonizing line from his own repertoire. He also is
inexact in his translation, using Greek technical
terminology, dikaiosunê especially, in place of more
neutral alternatives. From his practices, Gerleman con-
cludes that the translator, while not necessarily a
Stoic himself, must have had sympathies with the stoic
point of view and its modes of expression. Insofar as
the material and his own superseding religious commitment
allowed, he conformed his translation to a quasi-stoic
point of view. Thus, we should be chary about postulating
1Gillis Gerleman, Studies in the Septuagint,
vol. 3: Proverbs, Asta Universitatis Lundensis, Nova
Series, Lunds Universitets Årsskrifts, Ny Följo, Avdelnin-
gen 1: Teologi, Juristik och Humanistika Ämnen, vol. 52,
no. 3 (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1956).
260
alternative manuscript traditions, even when we assume
that some alternatives must have existed though they
remain unknown to us, on the basis of the LXX. The
Syriac and Targums offer no help in this matter since
they seem to be derived from the LXX; other versions are
no less derivative.
Second, there is a poetic unity to the materials
that is too easily overlooked--it certainly has not been
adequately studied. Vv. 29-33 at the end of chapter 15
almost certainly form a distinct unit.1 Lb of v. 28 is
echoed in vv. 30, 32; 16:1, 5. Sidyq in v. 28a parallels
sidyqym in v. 29b. While the evil mouth pours out evil
in 28b, the prayers of the righteous are heard according
to 29b--parallel structure. The root cnh may form an
inclusio in v. 28 and 16:1--or the term could refer both
backwards (to v. 23) and forwards, if the B collection
were to begin still further back. Catch-words include
also mwsr, yhwh, *smc, *rsc, twkhit, and hikmh. “Eyes”
and “ears” are in parallel in vv. 30-1. There could
conceivably be a play on the terms "heart," "life" and
“spirit” which successively conclude the first stichoi
of vv. 30-2--further all three have an introspective con-
cluding stich, especially vv. 30 and 32. V. 33 shares
1See Appendix, Table 9.
261
four catch-words backwards. Forwards, it shares yhwh
with the succeeding block in 16; cnwh echoes mcnh in
16:1, cynyw in v. 2 (?), and mcnhw in v. 4. Interest-
ingly, the phrase yr't yhwh mwsr parallels 16:6b's
wbyr't yhwh swr mrc (note the chiastic play of consonants
from mwsr). Further, 15:33 can be interpreted in line
with the active role of Yahweh in 16:1--especially since
33b is a verbless stichos. This view is reinforced if
mwsr is in construct and not paratactic (Beer so emends1)
relationship with hikmh; kbwd would then be an understood
reference to the divine. Also significant is the fact
that while 15:23, 24, 30, 31, 33; 16:3-7 are synonymous,
15:25-9, 32; 16:1-2 (!), 9 are antithetic (16:8 is a
tiwb-nn saying). Yahweh-sayings appear at 15:25-6, 29,
33 and in the first nine verses of chapter 16 with the
curious exception of v. 8.2
Since the first LXX 'dislocation follows 15:27,
and since 15:28 anticipates 16:1 in somewhat "secular"
fashion (the distinction between thought and deed, the
balance between plan of heart and speech), we could be-
gin collection B as early as 15:28 on solid poetic
1BH3 [G. Beer, "Libros Iob et Proverbiorum" in
Biblia Hebraica, ed. Rud. Kittel, P. Kahle, A. Alt and
O. Eissfeldt, 3d ed. (Stuttgart: Württembergische
Bibelanstalt, 1937), pp. 1173.]
2See Appendix, Table 8.
262
grounds. Certainly, the collections also are joined by
catch-words, so this kind of reasoning is never certain
--especially since the fortuitous assonance between ends
of collections is far easier to contrive by judicious
editing than the fortuitous paronomastic assemblage of an
entire work of divers sayings. I could also see a
plausible argument for beginning B with 15:23 since it,
too, anticipates 16:1 and is the verse one can relate to
v. 28 by assonance. Its notion of the proprieties of
time would be a hint of the active role to be assigned
Yahweh. The assonance structure of these verses is some-
what looser than those at the end of the chapter, so
somewhat weaker and more ambiguous; thus there is little
more than the possibility in favor of any still earlier
separation, and the evidence of the LXX against it.
Third, and finally, we have a block of ten
yahweh-sayings in the MT. On the basis of Occam's Razor,
no advantage accrues to us from postulating unnecessary
redactions. Whether there is a difference in the implicit
world-view between the Yahweh-sayings and the rest of the
collection, is a question for the next chapter to answer.
In favor of the integral relationship of these sayings to
collection B1 are the patterns of parallels and
1Aside from trying to explain why a redactor who
otherwise chose to scatter his additions and revisions
263
paronomasia which bind them together and the terms and
concepts which cannot be a re-write of some earlier say-
ing (e.g., of the king).1 To the former, we point to
the elaborate structure of catch-words and assonances
that continues from those noted above. V. la and v. 2a
are chiastically related (‘drm mcrky; drky-'yš). The
word mcnh is echoed in assonance in three following verses
(vv. 1-4). Vv. 2-4 begin kl-gl-kl and v. 5ab has kl.
Other catch-words and word-plays: *kwn, hisb, rc, drky-
‘yš, qm, lb, yhwh, 'dm. Vv. 5a, 6b., and 7a are a cycle
dwelling on relationships with Yahweh (abomination,
reverence, pleasure). Vv. 4, 5 and 6, 7 are virtually
synonymous, with the b stichoi of the last two carrying
forward themes from the first two sayings. V. 8 is far
less closely tied in poetically with the yahweh-sayings,
having perhaps the slightest of similarity of sound be-
tween 7ba and 8ba, but it anticipates the vocabulary of
the king-sayings by suggesting the catch-words sidqh and
mšpt, and it may play on dividing by inference the
hendyadys of v. 6--thematically, it constitutes an ex-
tension of the reasoning in v. 7 (defining šlm) and a
randomly through the text chose to assemble a block of
sayings before this group of king-sayings and this group
only--let alone explain why the secondary source, the LXX,
is evidently more disrupted than the MT primary.
2See Appendix, Table 10.
264
qualification on the king-sayings. We should also not
miss the periodic pattern of twb-mn sayings which this
verse begins (about every ten sayings).1 Sayings which
involve concepts only applicable to Yahweh include vv.
1-4 (determiner of acts, creator, establisher of plans,
weigher of the spirit), 6 (the language is all but cultic
and technical), 7b (?), and 9.
We would argue, therefore, that the shift in
sayings like 16:9 LXX (16:4 MT) is a creature of the
philosophical commitments of the translator made possible
by the shift of technical vocabulary (dikaiosunê for
lmcnhw, e.g.) from which any retroduction is exceedingly
hazardous. To shift many of these sayings from profane
to sacred or vice versa, in Hebrew, is no less compli-
cated than simply writing new sayings to serve the pur-
pose. In a potentially ambiguous phrase like v. 7a, the
term yhwh or mlk gives the phrase its impact: syntactic
identity is not semantic identity. A single author may
use this shift as a poetic device, and indeed the
writer(s) of these sayings use this device of catch-
phrases repeated (shorter duplications). Duplication can
serve artistic ends and is of itself proof only that a
phrase is "stock" not that it has been somehow edited
1See Appendix, Tables 11 and 12.
265
post facto. This argument's principal force is to
poetry, like that of Proverbs, where the phrases are
terse and therefore ambiguous and open to multiple mean-
ings. Meaning depends on precise syntactic relations;
each word contributes a high proportion of the saying's
meaning.
The seam between B and the Amenemope section is
clear, by virtue of the literary dependency of 22:17-
23:12 on the Egyptian work. Dbry-hikmym may be a super-
scription. The Hebrew shortens the original consider-
ably, hebraizes it, and uses the brief portions selected
out of sequence. How one is to get thirty chapters or
sayings, even by using the nondependent portions which
follow, is not clear. Twenty-three:13-4 are found in
Ahiikar. Twenty-three:15-24:22 includes a series of
discourses addressed repeatedly to bny but without the
formulaic pattern of the early chanters of Proverbs. The
hortatory form of the admonition is used frequently, and
the sections are of moderate length. The vetitive '1
with a motivation clause (often beginning ky) recurs.
The foreign woman is suggested (23:27-8) as is hypostatic
wisdom (24:2-7). The theology is somewhat more pragmatic,
at least on the surface, in this section. Witness the
following:
266
Do not rejoice when your enemy falls, and let
not your heart be glad when he stumbles;
lest the Lord see it, and be displeased,
and turn away his anger from him. (24:17-18)
Vv. 21-2 express similar cautions toward dealings with
Yahweh and with the king, "and who knows the ruin that
will come from them both?" At 24:22, the LXX adds five
sayings and then appends 30:1-14, the sayings of Agur.
The MT has a new superscription and some eleven-and-a-
half verses of admonition and development of the theme of
the sluggard. Thirty:15-31:9 follows in the LXX.
The superscription at 25:1 in the MT, even though the
relationship of superscription to text remains imponder-
able, is a crux interpretum. We earlier reviewed Scott's
arguments on Solomonic wisdom versus Hezekiah: it is far
easier both historically and sociologically to imagine an
established traditional scribal wisdom late in the period
of the Judean monarchy than under Solomon himself--if
only because of the difficulty of forming a solidified
didactic (school or oral) teaching in the space of a
single (originating) monarchy.1 The verb *ctq is a
hapax in the sense of “copy,” which does not help clarify
what the superscription intends:
These also are Solomonic proverbs which the
men of Hezekiah, King of Judah, copied. (B.K.)
1Scott, “Beginnings,” pp. 262-79; Scott, “Wise and
Foolish,” pp. 146-65.
267
The LXX has for the first part "hautai hai paideiai[!]
Salomōntōs hai adiakritoi," which reflects some of the
tendencies noted by Gerleman.
Collection C begins with a series of king say-
ings; it starts with only a single reference to God in
the first stichos, using the infrequent term 'lhym. This
fact is an interesting counterpoise to the thesis of a
yahweh-redacticn at work in the block from 16:1 (or 15:
33). C differs from the other four major mashal collec-
tions in its use of longer groups of thematically-
affiliated sayings. The meter and the number of lines
composing a saying vary considerably. The parallelism
continues synonymous and synthetic; two-line sayings are
by no means entirely absent. Vetitives and imperatives
with motivational clauses occur, especially toward the
beginning of the collection. B and C have the only use
of the school vocative bny, each only once, at 19:27 and
27:11. C is distinguished by its frequent references to
the king, to courtly behavior and paradoxically, by its
use of agricultural, husbandry and natural language. In
fact, the collection closes with a block of such ma-
terials.
D differs from C in returning to the preferred
two-line form; like A, it predominates in antithetic
parallelism. Like the seam between A and B, the seam
268
here is identified by the change in form. Unlike the
former, at the beginning of chapter 28, there are no
LXX dislocations or added sayings to point up the
change. Collection D, though fairly unremarkable as to
form, does present some departures from the other collec-
tions in content. It includes four torah-sayings at 28:4,
7, 9 and 29:18; only A, at 13:14, among the four collec-
tions has a similar reference (there, however, as twrt-
hikm which JB and RSV both give as "teaching," obscuring
the-term).1 References to law are not uncommon in the
opening discourse passages; there is a single use in the
concluding psalm (31:26 recalls the mention in A). The
discourses, use twrh for the instruction of the father or
mother which the student must retain.2 In 28:3, there is
a reference to natural evil; 28:13 may indicate a view
that overt recognition of transgression (RSV "confession"
for wmwdh) is essential to their rejection and one's de-
liverance. Twenty-eight:17 asserts bloodguilt. Twenty-
nine:3-decries harlotry, but without any suggestion of
the foreign woman. In 29:18,. law and prophecy (hizwn)
appear in parallel. It is the only reference to prophecy
in Proverbs under either *hizh or *nb'. Twenty-nine:24
1Cf. 31:26.
21:8; 3:1; 4:2; 6:20, 23; 7:2.
269
brings up the robber's code of silence, or "honor among
thieves."
Although both are based on antitheses, D differs
from A in its number of striking and significant (from
the view of theology and ethics) concrete sayings. The
banality which Skladny remarks in the routinized vocabu-
lary of A is therefore not essential to the antithetic
form of aphorism.1
Both B and D are distinguished as separate col-
lections on form-critical grounds; as we have seen,
smaller blocks of material can be discerned at places in
the text. Thus, the exact number of collections one could
theoretically discern depends on the criteria for dis-
tinguishing changes in form and content--what threshold
one adopts for saying that the change in material is so
great that clearly one is dealing with an independent unit.2
Bryce, for example, proposes to find a separate
collection in chapter 25:2-27.3 He argues that Egyptian
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 57-67.
2Presumably meaning at least "written at another
time" or more likely "written or redacted by someone
else."
3Glendon E. Bryce, “Another Wisdom-'Book' in
Proverbs,” Journal of Biblical Literature 91 (June 1972):
145-57.
270
wisdom often includes a statement of theme in the middle
of the work, in addition to one at the beginning and end.
By an ingenious emendation of v. 27, admittedly a diffi-
cult text, Bryce finds a collection of court wisdom with
the theme emphasized by a central transitional rubric in
vv. 16-7. Vv. 2-3 introduce the theme of the king; vv.
4-5, the wicked man. V. 15 concludes the king section
with a renewed mention of the ruler. Vv. 16-7 restate
the theme of the second half, the wicked man. V. 27 re-
calls both v. 2 (searching out the hidden things) and
v. 16 (moderation with honey as an instance). V. 2, in
presenting the world as the hidden order of god in his
glory, frames the entire collection theologically. The
brief work, Bryce argues, both recounted useful points
in courtly life and served as a didactic text presenting
a diversity of literary forms.
Whether or not one accepts Bryce’ argument and
emendation in full, he points out the problem of distin-
guishing the minor structure of the four central mashal
collections. The gross seams are easily discerned; the
finer separations are in part a function of the in-
genuity of one's methodology. Clearly, too, a finer
structure is there to be discovered.
Following collection D, the MT gives the Words of
Agur, son of Jakeh, of Masseh, while the LXX concludes
its sequence with the acrostic psalm. Curiously, the LXX
271
treats the names in the superscriptions at 30:1 and 31:1
as words to be translated; i.e., as text. With the word
ms', the LXX could be right; on the other hand, the LXX
may be influenced by the (also usually prophetic) term
n'm in v. lb. The stichos in lb is almost hopelessly
obscure, though most commentators try to find some
declaration of despair or pessimism in the phrase to
lead to the ky and statement of ignorant futility in
v. 2. V. 4 suggests the first Yahweh speech in Job 38-9
or the paean to the creator in Psalm 104. Probably
Agur's wisdom, remarkably pessimistic, extends only some
four verses, if that. Lemuel and Agur are commonly
taken to have been Arabian sage-kings, already legendary
to the Hebrews. Agur is followed by a collection of
numerical sayings (vv. 7-9, 15-6, 18-9, 21-3, 24-8, 29-31)
that seem to be the poetic answers to riddles.1 The
adulteress is mentioned once (v. 20), filial piety twice
(vv. 11, 17). Vv. 11-14 are each begun with dwr, forming
a unit. The others are mixed sayings.
Chapter 31 actually emphasizes wise women.
Lemuel's wisdom comes from his mother, and he is addressed
by name (a hortatory vocative?) in v. 4. The advice
emphasizes a royal asceticism, circumspection in sex and
1Crenshaw, "Wisdom," p. 242, who points out that
this interpretation goes back to Herder; cf. Roth.
272
drink, and wise governance (i.e., justice and equity
for the déclassé in terms customarily used by kings to
affirm their royal stewardship). The acrostic psalm, a
wisdom form in most cases, would seem to have been at-
tracted to this setting by the common theme of the wise
woman (cf. v. 26). For the most part, her wisdom con-
sists in the diligent performance of her wifely duties,
her speech and reverence (yr't-yhwh) mentioned only
briefly in conclusion.
Since the proverbs seem to be nothing so much as
a random assemblage of unrelated sayings, the four col-
lections are often treated, apart from isolated observa-
tions, as two works or even as an essential unity through-
out. Skladny points out that systematic analyses of con-
tent in support of form-critical distinctions have here-
tofore been lacking. On the basis of his examination,
which relies heavily on statistical comparisons between
the collections, Skladny concludes that a clear pattern
of historical development emerges. The evolution of
aphoristic wisdom appears in the milieu presupposed by
the sayings, the role Yahweh is assigned, and the rela-
tionship assumed to obtain between deed and consequence.
These collections, he argues, do indeed go back to the
period of the Hebrew monarchy and are, as had been held
by many recent scholars, among the oldest wisdom materials
273
in Israel. Thus, an interest in them is consistent with
the continuing search in wisdom studies for the origins
of wisdom among the Hebrews. Skladny arranges the col-
lections A, D, B, and C in a proposed historical sequence.1
Collection A concentrates on the Zwillingsformen,
in particular the contrast between the righteous, sidyk,
and unrighteous man, ršc. To the first follow rewards;
to the second, misfortunes. “Was siedākā aber bedeutet,
bzw. wer ein siaddīk ist, wird nicht direkt definiert;
die meisten, Aussagen erwecken den Eindruck, als handle
es sich hierbei um feststehende Begriffe, deren Bedeutung
darum ohne weiteres vorausgesetzt werden könnte.”2 While
one can amass a list of synonyms, the specification of
what it means to be righteous or what benefits follow
from right action remains obscure:
Es werden verhältnismässig selten konkrete Taten,
Handlungen erwähnt (wie etwa in 11,26b), meist
sind die Sprüche allgemein gehalten und charak-
terisieren an Hand von Abstrakta wie tōb oder
'emet eine ganz bestimnte Haltung: die Haltung
des Gerechten. Die Haltung hat für den, der sie
vertritt, positive Konsequenzen, d.h,, der guten
Lebenshaltung folgt Heil.3
Reward, and misfortune, follow in this world.
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 76-82.
2Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, p. 7.
3Skladny, Spruuchsammlungen, p. 8.
274
Righteousness brings life or its prolongation, preserva-
tion from untimely death, contentment, honor, inheritance,
property. An opposite list accompanies the doing of evil.
Alongside this complex of opposite terms stands another
concerned with the wise man and the fool. A similar
series of rewards and penalties follow from each, and
they are similarly vague about the specific kinds of acts
proper to each.
Skladny concludes that wisdom is an ethical
quality, not intellectual, which follows from yr't-yhwh
and results in knowledge of what is pleasing to Yahweh and
therefore right. Wisdom and righteousness are virtually
synonyms, but wisdom derives from righteousness. "Nicht
der Weise ist der Gerechte, sondern der Gerechte ist
zugleich auch der Weise.1
This analysis leads Skladny to conclude that
collection A does not postulate a Tat-Ergehen-Zusammenhang.
The emphasis lies with general ways of acting, with dis-
position and attitude rather than specific right or wicked
deeds. Further, this disposition is keyed to life, its
fortunes and goods. One should therefore speak of a
(Lebens-) Haltung-Schicksal-Zusammenhang. “Schicksal”
reflects this wisdom's concern with the outcome of one's
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, p. 12.
275
life, not a specific reward keyed to some prior action.
Honor, long life, fortune, contentment are general re-
turns which "Ergehen" would make seem far too particular.
The locution "Haltung-Schicksal-Zusammenhang" also avoids
the juridical implications of "retribution" (Vergeltungs-
dogma) which seem far more external and imposed than the
actual ethical and religious emphasis would justify:1
. . . ein "Gerechter" ist, wer die von Jahwe
gesetzte und garantierte Weltordnung und Jahwes
absoluten Authoritätsspruch in freiwilliger
Unterordnung anerkennt, wer sich also in diese
Ordnung einfügt und damit “in Ordnung” ist.
Dabei geht es ganz selten um konkrete Handlungen,
fast immer aber um die Lebenshaltung eines Menschen,
die für den Gerechten einen Heilszusammenhang, für
den Frevler einen Unheilszusammenhang in Kraft
setzt.2
In this sense, the usual translation "fear" for
the yr't-yhwh misleads. What is referred to is not an
emotional stance nor some basic human experience. The
better interpretation is “honor,” since it positively re-
flects man's insight into and recognition of Yahweh's
created order, his absolute express authority, and man's
free, independent acceptance of a right disposition in
his life.3 A does not concern itself with god's grace;
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 13-24.
2Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, p. 22.
3In "Becket," Jean Anouilh has Becket respond to
King Henry's question whether he has begun to love God,
"I have begun to love the honor of God" [Indeed, the play
is titled, "Becket, ou l'Honneur de Dieu"!].
276
it is interested in man's will and insight into the
divinely-guaranteed order. A displays no effort to un-
cover the nature of Yahweh. It emphasizes his role as
guarant, so that his rsiwn and twcbh, acceptance or detes-
tation, are both evaluation and consequence (Beurteilung
and Verurteilung)--judgment in both senses of the word.
A treats the king seldom, but positively, as also guarant
with Yahweh of the Haltung-Schicksal-Zusammenhang.
A's content reveals a concern for the discrepancy
between poverty and wealth. It recognizes that one may
be unjustly rich or poor. The righteous poor stand
under Yahweh's protection; the unjust rich are no less
condemned than those poor by their own fault. The former
may anticipate deliverance; the riches of the unjust
wealthy will be their windfall. A asserts individual
responsibility at the root of his fate. But A also shows
a concern for collective responsibility, so that a com-
munity's fortunes ride on the individual dispositions of
its members. Person and community form an indissoluble
unity and share a common fate. Righteousness precedes
wisdom, so the emphasis is on conduct in everyday life.
Since cult is a special circumstance, one should
avoid drawing many conclusions from the few references to
cult. It stands outside the area of principal interest,
and seems to have been the sine qua non of righteousness.
277
While A evidences a positive concern for agriculture and
husbandry, some for artisanry, and little for trade or
city life, we cannot easily locate the collection in
Hebrew society. It mentions student and teacher alike,
but without obvious didactic intent. It seems to have
aimed at reaching no narrowly definable social group. A
is an excursus depicting the broadest implications of
righteous and unrighteous patterns of conduct into which
even the most seemingly ethically neutral sayings fit in-
separably.1
Collection D, by contrast, sees to have been a
Fürstenspiegel, to instruct young men in right life and
right governing. This characterization is supported by
the peculiarities of this collection:
1. das starke Hervortreten von Rechtsfragen und,
gesellschaftlichen Problemen,
2. die ausserordentliche Hochschätzung des Armen,
der geradezu mit dem Gerechten (Weisen) gleich-
gesetzt werden kann, and vor allem
3. die sich an den Herrscher selbst wendenden
Königsspruche.2
Over half of all the sayings are directed toward a ruler
or some rich high-placed personage, and the others are
consistent with such an intention. These sayings concern
legal problems of particular significance to the king,
responsibility for the poor and for society in general,
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 7-24.
2Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, p. 66.
278
warnings against the misapplication of wealth, against
acts of violence, usury, extortion and partisanship.
Skladny finds useful similarities in content to the
Regentenspiegel in II Samuel 23:1-7 and Psalm 101, and
infers a relationship to the royal wisdom attributed to
Solomon (i.e., "richterliche Regentenweisheit," a hear-
ing heart, ability to govern the people well).1 He con-
cludes that the collection addresses that young aristo-
crat who is destined to gain power and to rule, to
acquaint him with what he must know in order to discharge
his office or the kingship successfully and competently.
Special emphasis is placed by D on the ruler's
responsibility toward the poor. While D continues to
assert the view that the poor and the rich generally are
individually responsible for their station in life, D
sharpens the poor man's status as a creature of Yahweh
to whom God will be merciful. To Yahweh, riches have no
meaning; he is interested in man's integrity and upright-
ness. Especially at law, the ruler or high official must
adopt a similar stance. D displays considerable sympathy
for the poor, but it also warns against the avariciously
rapid acquisition of wealth. Such greed leads to poverty,
death, and even despoliation of the land.
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, p. 67.
279
In D, the antitheses recur. Again, prime emphasis
rests on the opposite pair righteous-wicked, for which
wise-fool are virtually synonyms in actual usage. As in
A, wisdom is ultimately ethical, not intellectual. The
language supports the imputation to D of a similar
Haltung-Schicksal-Zusammenhang to that in A, of which
Yahweh is once more the guarantor. The same tension
exists, too, between individualism and collectivism.
While one is primarily responsible himself for what he
experiences in life, whether fortune or misfortune, wealth
or poverty, the community shares a common fate. The ruler
in particular bears responsibility for the well-being of
his society.1
In collection B, the differences are of quite
another order. This material evidences a change in the
relationship of action and outcome, a modification in the
understanding of Yahweh, a sharp decline in references to
the righteous man, and a new group to whom it is directed.
This collection, argues Skladny, can legitimately be
compared with the Egyptian instructions. He compares
the themes and reviews the problematic relationship of
wise man and scribe. He concludes that B was written to
educate young men for vocations in the royal service, and
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 57-67.
280
that B constitutes a Beamten- or Diplomatenspiegel.
Sicher handelt es sich bei ihr [i.e., a Sitz-im-
Leben] um eine Unterweisung, die den von ihr
Angeredeten--ausgehend von den sich auf alle
Lebensbereiche erstreckenden Forderungen Jahwes
und von der Anerkennung seiner Souveränität--an
vorwiegend negativ geformten Bildern und Beispielen
ihre Verantwortung im Alltagsleben deutlich machen
soll. Dafür, dass B eine bewusst zusammengestellte
Unterweisung ist, sprechen die Vielzahl der in B
behandelten Themen und die dominierende Stellung
der Jahwe-Königssprüche.1
As soon as one says "instruction," then Egypt
becomes the relevant and obvious point of comparison for
this collection more than any other. The role of Yahweh
has changed, too, based on two experiences: on
1. der Erfahrung des Qualitätsunterschiedes zwischen
Mensch und Jahwe und dem daraus erwachsenden Schuld-
bewusstsein auch des Gerechten,
2. der Erfahrung Jahwes als des souverän Schöpfers
und Lenkers der Welt und des Menschen, der den Weg
des Menschen dirigieren kann, ohne den Menschen
deshalb aus seiner Eigenverantwortlichkeit zu
entlassen und ohne den Zusammenhang zwischen Guttat
und Heil bzw. Frevel und Unheil aufzulösen.2
First, B has discovered an unbridgeable gulf be-
tween human and divine righteousness, so that no man can
stand fully just before his creator. Man's responsibility
to god, the cosmic order and his fellow men rests upon his
recognition of his createdness vis-a-vis god. This quali-
tative separation between Yahweh and people does not lead
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, p. 43.
2Skladny, Spruchsammlungen,.p. 28.
281
the B writer(s) to pessimism or despair as in some other
wisdom literature; B retains the optimism, though not
perhaps the naivité, of A and D. Further, Yahweh is now
more than guarant. He does not transcend the synthesis
of retribution so-called, but he does intervene between
the thoughts and schemes that arise in the human mind and
their enactment so that he emerges as the director and
implementer of a person's life. There is still no doc-
trine of (free) grace. For B as for the other collections,
the cult should remain considered the sine qua non of
right life and action.
The role of the king, however, has become more
elevated consistent with the rising view of god, so that
he is almost more divine than human. The king's charac-
teristics to B are quite positive, for he is identified
with righteousness, goodness, truth, and wisdom. He re-
mains under the superior dominion of Yahweh, though.1
B speaks about the wise man and the fool, the
righteous person and the wicked, in strikingly concrete
terms when compared with the previous two collections.
Here one can list specific actions which identify these
people. Righteous and wicked now take on a distinctly
juridical coloring, which Skladny believes is secondary
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 25-29.
282
to the earlier ethical meaning. B concentrates on the
negative terms and pays close attention to the effects on
others beyond the consequences for the evil-doer himself.
Of course, generalizations and abstractions do not disap-
pear. In discussing wisdom and folly, B displays a rich
vocabulary without discernible preferences. Here, too,
the ethical sense has declined and wisdom acquires the
implication of cunning or wit.
A considerable overlap between wise and righteous-
ness, evil and folly continues. For B, the fool is
virtually ineducable. There is a kind and depth of folly
in the face of which no amount of (corporal) punishment
or censure will avail. The "callow youth," on the other
hand, can be taught; there is a fundamental difference
between ignorance and folly.
Finally, B's interest in concrete acts may mean a
growing scepticism toward the absolute invariability of
the Lebenshaltung-Schicksal-Zusammenhang—as evidenced by
the mounting concern for the poor in A and D and the
sharp distinction between divine and human righteousness
here. B concentrates on specific acts and their conse-
quences; one must speak of a Tat-Folge-Einheit now pre-
dominating, qualified by scepticism:1
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 25-46.
283
Typisch für diese vorsichtigere Beurteilung der
Tat-Folge-Einheit ist die grosse Zahl der Sprüche
(in B), in denen eine Tat durch ein einfeches
"tōb" (bzw. "1'ō-tōb") charakterisiert und ge-
wertet wird, ohne dass von einer konkreten (Heils-
oder Unheils-) Folge gesprochen wird, sowie vor
allem auch ein Spruch wie 19, 10, in dem eine
positive Folge als zu einer negativen Handlung
"nicht passend" beschrieben wird. Hier bleibt
also die (schnelle) Durchsetzung der Tat-Folge-
Einheit völlig offen, denn das "Unpassende" kann
durchaus (zumindest zeitweilig) geschehen--wie
die Erfahrung den Weisen gelehrt haben mag.1
Finally, collection C orients itself toward
simpler folk, while god and king stand at the greatest
remove. C is manifestly, at least in Skladny's mind,
Bauernethik. References to nature, to the weather, to
plants and animals as well as other natural entities, and
to the agricultural life, along with an emphasis on many
kinds of artisanry, support this view. Little mention is
made of trade, but city life recurs. Legal sayings cover
the same topics as other collections. Importantly, the
king and his court are treated with the highest respect
and deference—the mind of the king seems no more search-
able than that of God.
Yahweh is virtually never mentioned except in
passing as guarant of the Tat-Folge-Einheit in a simple
kind of prooftext saying. Instead, C concentrates on
practical grounds for right action, presumably in accord
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, p. 36.
284
with the interests of its hearers. Peasant and artisan
have little use for vaunted theologies; concrete valida-
tion of wisdom is required beyond the simplest sort of
religious justification. Yahweh, therefore, is still
more remote and unsearchable than in B, his mind the
more unknowable.
The distinction between the ineducable fool and
the educable but ignorant youth appears here as in B.
Further, the explicit contradiction at 26:4-5 suggests
that the wise man-teacher had to thread a path between
extremes, using his judgment in applying his learning and
insight.
C is searching for a middle path, not simply giving
concrete action over to absolute freedom. Wisdom as such
is scarcely mentioned, but the fool appears often. Folly
is now an intellectual defect, not an ethical one. Still,
[d]ie meisten Aussagaen über den Klugen bzw. den
Dummen haben jedoch überraschenderweise ein
sittliches Verhalten zum Inhalt (wie Treue, Versch-
wiegenheit usw.) und verwandeln es erst durch die
hinzufügte Begründang für das Bewusstsein dessen,
der so handeln soll, in ein kluges und darum
anziehenderes Handeln.1
The righteous man is mentioned only once. Much more em-
phasis is placed, à la B, on negative than positive
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, p. 52.
285
characteristics.1
Skladny's recognition that his evidence leads to
two opposing chronologies and scenarios is prophetic,
for Schmid actually reverses the processes Skladny postu-
lates. Skladny argues that C cannot be the oldest col-
lection, in spite of its superficial secular tone and
more simplistic setting, because of form-critical con-
siderations: the fairly heavy use of Mahnsprüche, the
presence of many contrasts. If one neglects tone, more-
over, one can argue that a process of progressive abstrac-
tion led from an emphasis on the individual deed and its
specific consequence to broad patterns of life.
Skladny contends that the A and D collections
clearly display a naive and optimistic tone. Pattern
arises not from abstraction but from a failure, or per-
haps better unwillingness, to distinguish the activity
of the mind--plans and intentions--from acts and outcomes.
While A obviously, to Skladny, must be placed early in
Hebrew history, D represents a wisdom that has already
become affiliated with the royal court. Otherwise, they
are quite similar in content and form; thus, they must
reflect a process of courtly appropriation.
B reflects the expansion of courtly wisdom to a
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 46-57.
286
system of education for the official administration.
Wisdom has expanded of necessity to meet the demands of
government. At the same time, B represents a growing
dissatisfaction with the rather naive "retribution" of
A and D in the face of disconfirming experiences. B
sees a requirement for more personal relationship with
god and a more active role for Yahweh in the working out
of events. The B writer(s) finds this possibility in a
(newly-found) space between reflection and action. The
validity of a basic doctrine of recompense remains, but
Yahweh may act to block plans and motives, barring their
fulfillment for purposes of his own. The intention never
comes to deed. At the same time, Yahweh becomes in-
creasingly remote ethically. The assumption that one can
simply be righteous implicit in the earlier dichotomies
declines. Yahweh's' righteousness is so higher than man's
in qualitative terms that by comparison man is sinful by
any divine standard.
C, on the other hand, reflects a movement of wisdom
in the later monarchy, or at the very least before the
time of Ezekiel (whose view of the righteous man living
individually by his righteousness and whose pessimism could
not but have influenced this wisdom if it had already
been disseminated), away from the royal court and into
the smaller communities of the country. It reflects an
287
increasing democratization of wisdom, a decentralization
of wisdom institutions, and a concern for natural life as
the sphere (for whatever reason, perhaps political dif-
ficulties) in which one can still be wise. Nevertheless,
the position of the king remains that of the regent of
god and guarantor with Yahweh of the worldly order. His
position becomes increasingly exalted, alongside that of
his god.1
Skladny's arguments counter Schmid's analysis of
space and time in wisdom, at least with respect to the
aphoristic literature.2 The more inner-worldly wisdom is
later; the naive systematism by comparison is early.
Wisdom finds its place in the world through various his-
torical and social processes: democratization, decentrali-
zation, the quest for personalization of god. Naive-.
optimistic wisdom was first appropriated by the court;
only later did it become historicized. Perhaps, though,
depending on what predecessors one finds for collection
A, early and late wisdom were far more historical in
Schmid's sense (i.e., "genuine wisdom" soi-disant) than
intermediate but not through any process of re-historici-
zation. Further, there is no scepticism equals pessimism
1Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 67-95.
2Schmid, Wesen and Geschichte der Weisheit, pp.
79-84.
288
equation.
Skladny definitely finds evidence for sacred
space in the distinctions made among righteous and wicked,
wise and fool, educable and ineducable. This language
reflects distinct social gulfs, class distinctions and
bounds for (divine?) righteousness. The difference be-
tween fool and ignorant youth is particularly important.
There are gradients of wisdom in "space" (i.e., social
space) that suggest an analysis along the lines of van
der Leeuw's sacred space.1 Skladny finds no proleptic
wisdom, but he also places any activity of Yahweh prior
to deed so as to preserve the doctrine of recompense,
rejecting "retributionism" as too legalistic and mechani-
cal. Skladny's view of late wisdom is far more oriented
toward the present than past or future. The longer view
of time, with less emphasis on the immediate present, is
that of early, not late, wisdom. Synthesis breaks down;
it does not build up.2
Collection B is a vital clue for Skladny because
1G. van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Mani-
festation, trans. J. E. Turner with Appendices to the
Paperback edition incorporating the additions of the
second German edition by Hans H. Penner, 2 vols. (New
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), 1:43 ff. Cf. his
concept of sacred word, 2:403 ff.
2Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 67-95.
289
of its particular attention to the role of Yahweh. It
will be our text for examining these proposals about
space and time to see if they square with the evidence.
It should be evident that Proverbs represents an
admixture of forms. On the basis of our earlier discus-
sion of the varieties of wisdom, we may infer that,
whether or not a single group was behind the production
of the materials later incorporated into the Book, the
Book as we have it has been assembled cut of different
kinds of materials with varying purposes and literary ob-
jectives. From this, scarcely profound, observation, one
can move further to two possible positions. The most ex-
treme is to regard this material as an assemblage of es-
sentially unrelated materials. In this sense, the sec-
tions we discern as collections are spurious structure--
they should actually be taken to point to the still
greater unrelated character of the materials. This view
does not mean that the materials are absolutely random
nor that various kinds of sayings cannot be delimited.
Rather, it says that these distinctions are essentially
immaterial to the Book in its present form, however im-
portant they may be for the history of wisdom thought.
The second position states that while blocks of materials
may have come together, they have been heavily redacted
to reflect the views of a later time--specifically, that
essentially secular wisdom sayings have been theologized.
290
Two versions of the first view have been asserted
with respect to the four mashal collections A through D.
The first is the folk-wisdom position we have already re-
jected on form-critical grounds. These sayings differ
systematically and sharply from what we know of folk
wisdom in Israel.
The second has more recently been set out by
McKane. He rejects Skladny's theories, and himself uses
the word "random" in relegating the poetic and paronomastic
devices to strictly secondary significance.
. . . I do not place a very high value on the con-
cept of a 'collection' as applied to the sentence
literature, and I am sceptical of Skladny's efforts
to discover in 'collections,' of wisdom sentences
such a coherence of theme and consistency of
artistic intention that he can describe a 'collec-
tion' as if it constituted an architectonic unity.
In such literature there is no context, for each
sentence is an entity in itself and the collection
amounts to no more than the gathering together of
a large number of independent sentences, each of
which is intended to be a well-considered and
definitive observation on a particular topic.2
To this position, McKane adds an extremely re-
strictive definition of mashal--as the statement of a
striking image with "high representative potential" and
"openness to interpretation"--in terms of which few of
1McKane, Proverbs, p. 10.
2McKane, Proverbs, p. 413.
291
the sayings in these collections qualify as meshalism!1
Since the sayings are random, McKane contends
that they are best understood through a classification
system which respects the self-contained nature of such
sentences, but uses their content to ascertain the chang-
ing historical circumstances from which they come. Thus,
McKane accepts Gese's position that one cannot draw mar-
ginal historical distinctions between collections, while
rejecting his agreement with Skladny that Mahnsprüche are
derivative from Aussagen.2 In Gese's discovery of alter-
native wisdom interpretations, McKane finds the basis for
arguing that the classifications reflect a progressive
process of reinterpretation of wisdom that went on in
Israel. Statistical analysis of the collections in terms
of these classifications confounds Skladny's distinctions
--materials from various periods in Hebrew wisdom thought
stand side-by-side.3
In fairness to Gese, we must point out that
McKane's interpretation of his remarks anticipates con-
clusions MoKane wishes to draw from his own evidence.
1McKane, Proverbs, p. 414.
2See Appendix, Table 13.
3Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, pp. 37-33; Schmid,
Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, pp. 159-63; McKane,
Proverbs, pp. 13-16; Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 67-95.
292
Compare the following:
The distinctive element in Gese's account is that
he supposes a secondary Yahwistic interpretation
to have operated on certain of the verses in which
there is an explicit mention of Yahweh's action,
and that with this reinterpretation the sentences
are no longer compatible with the concept of order
characteristic of the older wisdom in Israel and
comparable with the Egyptian Maat. According to
Gese, these sentences (10.22; 16.1, 9, 33; 20.24;
21.1, 30, 31; 25.2) emphasize the freedom of Yahweh
from any metaphysical order and are evidence of a
tension between Yahwism and old wisdom which ulti-
mately precipitates the crisis of wisdom in Job
and Ecclesiastes.1
Es ist uns unmöglich, diese . . . Sprüche
chronologisch von den übrigen zu scheiden. Sie
kommen verstreut in den ältesten Sammlungen vor
and sind sicher nicht sekundär eingetragen. Im
Gegenteil, sie bilden mit den anderen Sprüchen
zusammen ein, wenn auch spannungsgeladenes, Ganzes:
Es ist wohl die Liebe zum Paradoxen, das man--
wenigstens in der Formulierung--auch in der
Sprichwortliteratur findet, die das Nebeneinander
zweier Welten in der israelitischen Weisheitslehre
möglich macht.2
Actually, McKane historicizes and expands the
differentiation made by Gese, on the basis of linguistic
confirmations of his classifications. Concepts and words
treated positively in one kind of saying are regarded
pejoratively in another, within the same “collection.”
In other cases the change is less drastic, but necessi-
tated by a growing Yahwism--certain wisdom claims must
be reserved to Yahweh. In one case (13:14 versus 14:27),
1McKane, Proverbs, pp. 15-16.
2Gese, Lehre und Wirklichkeit, p. 49,
293
this change works a substitution. McKane contends that
these differences are less well explained as the result
of conflicting contemporaneous viewpoints (schools) than
as a process of historical reinterpretation--that theologi-
zation is in fact the minimalist hypothesis.
McKane distinguishes three classes of sayings
representing different stages in the process of reinterpre-
tation found generally throughout Proverbs' sentences:
Class A: These sentences are set in the frame-
work of old wisdom, and concerned with the question
of the-individual for a successful and harmonious
life.
Class B: Here ,the centre of concern is the com-
munity rather than the individual, and the sentences
in this class have, for the most part, a negative
character, in that they describe the harmful effects
on the life of the community of various manifesta-
tions of anti-social behaviour.
Class C: These are identified by the presence
of God-language or by other items of vocabulary
expressive of a moralism which derives from Yah-
wistic piety.1
McKane's use of the term "sentence" reflects his
view that most of these sayings are instructions in form;
they are self-conscious literary products intended for
mundane instruction, modeled on the true mashal, which
had a strictly popular origin, Class B, like A, is non-
theological, but concerned with this-worldly existence.
B sayings have interiorized the Hebrew mythology of
death. For this reason, McKane thinks they are the sayings
1McKane, Proverbs, p. 415 (cf. p. 11).
294
the modern reader finds most attractive: death becomes
alienation. Its implicit theological foundation remains
its concern with the life of the Hebrew community.1
We raise two objections to this line of argument.
First, Proverbs in its present form is a literary docu-
ment with a literary history (whether it was originally
oral or written literature is immaterial). Somehow this
document came together into its present form. While
McKane contends that the differences among many of the
collections so-called are small, we hold that small varia-
tions are not therefore to be disregarded. Some principle
of selection must have been at work to produce the present
document, just as another principle of selection was at
work, however implicitly, in the process by which the
wise selected those aspects of their experience on which
to reflect and comment. In-selection and out-selection
do reflect views of the world. McKane refuses to consider
or discuss the principles of selection that led in chapters
10-15 to a dominance of antithetic parallel form, while
16-22:16 emphasize synonymity and synthesis. Some pro-
cess of composition is going on. If McKane wishes to
argue that the material originated in a diversity of
settings, he still must deal with the editorial act that
1McKane, Proverbs, pp. 21-22.
295
brought together certain materials to form a written and
transmittable (because it was in fact transmitted) work.
However inadequate the term "collection" may be to express
the process whereby the literary compositions of the wise
came into being, surely he does not wish to argue that
the Book is the product of an entire class over time--
some person or small group imposed its views on the ma-
terial. It seems methodologically unsound to deny that
the selective principles are recoverable pre-analytically
though he might be correct post-analytically (as a matter
of descriptive fact). Interestingly, McKane can argue
that although these materials are, like "real" meshalim,
self-contained, they reveal enough of the circumstances of
their composition and use that one can, in part on the
basis of form, distinguish the instructions from true
meshalim. They do in fact reveal something of them-
selves.
Our second point follows from this observation.
McKane hauls in the back door what he tosses out the
front. The classifications amount to historical descrip-
tions, in spite of the term "reinterpretation." That
these classes are strewn through the Book in no way
vitiates the implication that at least three separate
historical traditions existed that came to be, by pro-
cesses unknown, interleaved with one another in a single
document. If the sayings were truly random, self-
296
contained and descending from a variety of settings,
then any simple systematic classification would be at
best doubtful and at worst unsound.
These two points are methodological; to them,
we add a practical consideration. McKane's classifica-
tions are, by his own admission, intuitive. Hence, his
statistical analysis is essential to their validation,
to the extent that any such analysis--Skladny's included
--can be valid with such numbers and types of data. His
figures show sharp differences in proportions of sayings
from chapter to chapter, lesser variations from "collec-
tion" to "collection." While the figures disagree with
Skladny, they do not as such prove themselves. Why do
C and D differ so significantly from the norm? What do
the numbers mean? Classification after all is not
theory. For example, the apparent randomness of the
classes could mean that McKane's types are in fact arbi-
trary. Being arbitrary, they appear without notable
pattern, except for the normal variations within an ad-
mittedly small sample. In other words, McKane's-methods
demand the kind of theory he eschews.
Recently, Scott has sided with McKane in reject-
ing the collectional approach to aphoristic wisdom in
Proverbs, but without adopting the view of randomness un-
critically. Thus, Scott represents the second option:
297
that the present work reflects a long process of accretion
of materials from diverse sources.
These bodies of material are not homogeneous, and
there is overlapping between them in subject matter,
phraseology and literary forms. The differences
among them are mainly differences in proportion of
the several elements of their contents.
To call these divisions of the text "collec-
tions" is again to beg the question. . . . The
present Book of Proverbs is better seen as the end
result of a centuries-long process of composition,
supplementing, editing and scribal transmission, a
process which has blurred some lines of demarcation
between its constituent parts.2
We discussed Scott's evidence for these statements
earlier: the uncertain and unreliable relationship be-
tween superscriptions and text, apparent displacements of
the Hebrew text, and the occurrence of duplicates and
variants in a pattern that does not match the supposed
structure of he collections.
Though Scott underplays the significance of his
modification of McKane's position, the emphasis on the
accretion process is critical. Scott postulates no random
and incomprehensible processes. While the redactoral pro-
cess is not known with any certainty, it can and should
be studied--presumably therefore the evidence for that
study is in the text. While the present theoretically
obtained structure of Proverbs is spurious, Scott argues
1Scott, Proverbs, p. 17.
2Scott, “Wise and Foolish,” pp. 146-65.
298
that we can make progress toward understanding the text
through a more elaborate set of classifications than
McKane's. Scott first rejects McKane's B class. He then
postulates the following:
A. Secular sayings (Religious belief is not ex-
pressed or implied, though the writers may have been
religious men).
1. Folk sayings (or literary couplets based on
folk sayings) which are more suitable to exchanges
between adults "meeting in the gate" than to
authoritarian instruction of youth in home or
school.
2. Folk sayings or their derivatives which
seek to impress on the hearers the moral standards
and values of home and community, but without any
indication that these are grounded in an unseen
order of reality.
3. Teaching proverbs in literary couplet form
in which wise men and fools are characterized and
their opposite fortunes are emphasized. The ap-
parent setting is that of schools for youth who
aspire to a "higher education" than was received
in the home or tribal community.
4. Teaching proverbs more specifically directed
to the professional training of scribes and public
officials.
B. Sayings which make use of specifically religious
language or relate teachings of wisdom to those of
religion.
5. Sayings which exhibit the contrast between
the siaddiq and the rašac as in the third group the
hiakam is contrasted with the kesil/’ewil.
6. Sayings which portray Yahweh as a present,
active and determining factor in the life experience
of individual persons.
7. Sayings which introduce the phrase “fear of,
Yahweh” with the meaning “piety, religious belief.”1
Categories three and five explain, for Scott, the notice-
able lack of overlap between these two vocabularies--the
1Scott, "Wise and Foolish," pp. 154-60. This
chart summarizes Scott's distinctions which he elaborates
in considerably more detail.
299
antitheses were opposite in their own terms and not inter-
changeable, except perhaps in the area of "moral recti-
tude."1
Two important points should be noted. First,
Scott recognizes that instructional wisdom may make use
of folk forms modified, so he allows for imitation or
modification in the first two classes (i.e., a redaction
process). Second, at least the last two kinds of ma-
terials may reflect later processes of redaction and
annotation of an already solidified work. Again, Scott
accords redaction a place; McKane denies it.
Both these views undermine our approach by argu-
ing that no view unites any collection, though McKane's
view, if correct, would be the most unyielding. The
final validation of our inquiry must await our conclu-
sions—its proof is its applicability and informativeness.
We can however state some grounds for assuming that some
consistent world-view is discernible within potentially
diverse materials, though the final proof of some points
would require an independent, and perhaps lengthy, in-
quiry to establish with greater confidence. We base our
work on eight points.
First, a long tradition of scholarship, from
1Scott, “Wise and Foolish,” p. 161.
300
Casanowitz to Boström, has shown the importance of
paronomasia, assonance and catch-words to the structure
of Hebrew poetry and particularly to the Book of Proverbs.
Not only are word-plays and puns, repetitions of sounds,
uses of different forms from the same root, spurious (for
poetic effect) roots, and multiplication of synonyms em-
ployed to form individual sayings, but the same poetic
devices appear to tie together successive sayings into a
whole. The importance of such a pattern should not be
minimized; we saw one application at the seam between
collections A and B. Paronomasia clearly establishes
editorial intent when used as systematically as in
Proverbs. The pattern cannot be either random or
fortuitous; to contribute it to abstract verbal associa-
tion or the mnemonic associative process of oral litera-
ture begs the question. Again, one faces both the issue
of selection and the problem of the selector. We sub-
mit, further, that the extensive pattern of verbal
1Immanuel M. Casanowicz, "Paronomasia in the Old
Testament," Journal of Biblical Literature 12 (1893): 105-
67; H. Reckendort, Über Paronomasie in den Semitischen
Sorachen: ein Beitrag zur Allgemeinen Scrachwissenschaft
(Giessen: Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann (vormals J. Ricker),
1909); Gustav Boström, Paronomasi i den äldere Hebreiska
Maschalliteratur: med särskild Hänsyn till Proverbia,
Acta Universitatis Lundensis, Nova Series, Lunds Univer-
sitets Årsskrift, Ny Följo, Avdelningen 1: Teologi,
Juristik och Humanistika Ämnen, vol. 23, no. 8 (Lund:
-- C. W. K. Gleerup, 1928); A. Guillaume, "Paronomasia in
the Old Testament," Journal of Semitic Studies 9 (1964):
282-90. See also Semitics 1 for several related articles.
301
association demonstrated in our discussion of the A-B seam
is typical of Proverb's structure. While Boström has
adequately shown the catch-word structure, much further
work remains to be done on other paronomastic verbal
associations, which would, I think, buttress claims of
systematic compositional or redactoral activity. That
certain blocks of material are related by theme and
poetic structure, therefore form, can scarcely be denied--
it is far too well documented by scholarship.1 One may
take issue with the term "collection" for describing the
process whereby these blocks and other materials became
a written document, but that such units existed seems as
certain as anything in literary history can be. We
argue, therefore, that paronomasia establishes a pattern
of association of sayings. Poetic system added to
thematic organization (of blocks) suggests a determin-
able organization.
Second, neither Scott nor McKane takes sufficient
account of the known rhetorical devices of the wise which
would provide an alternative and less drastic explanation
of some of their evidence. The wise, for example, clearly
prefer in the context of brief sayings to state matters
in general terms, without regard to exceptions and cases.
1See Appendix, Table 9.
302
They speak generically and at some level of abstraction.
The antitheses are definitely general and generic.1 Since
a number of sayings clearly emphasize a propriety of oc-
casion, sayings which conflict may be resolved by appeal-
ing to relevant differences in situation--the wise man
does not respond to life through the rote application of
formulae to experience.2 Part of being wise may be the
ability to sense the relevant characteristic of a situa-
tion so that he may know how to make use of his stock of
experience. Descriptions of the functions of proverbs,
McKane's included, stress the power of the saying to struc-
ture and interpret experience. We should recognize the
confirmatory dimension to this application. Citation of
the relevant saying confirms, proves, demonstrates with
authority the validity of one's interpretation. Part of
its “oracular” power is its affirmation, "this situation
now makes sense and I understand it in (approved) terms
by which I can effectively respond." The suggestion that
some proverbs may have been cited as case-decisions in
law makes sense in this connection. The battle of wits in
Ahiikar suggests the not-unfamiliar battle of the proverbs
from our own milieu: and the appeal to conflicting
1See Appendix, Table 7.
2See Appendix, Table 14.
303
authorities is well-known in virtually all movements.
Further, repetition of sayings, the use of stock phrases,
and repetition of sayings with small but all-important
variations, all are known poetic devices in Israel as
elsewhere. That the wise should use them in poetry
scarcely requires resort to the atomization of wisdom
writing and composition. The replacement of some phrase
by a theological statement may represent theologization;
it may also reflect qol-wahiomer reasoning. If due piety
be the sine qua non of wisdom, the irony of such substitu-
tions would be obvious to the hearer. While one of the
two sayings must be original nevertheless, a long histori-
cal separation or some nationalization process is not
essential. In other words, failure to recognize rhetorical
devices in wisdom, where the use of such devices is widely
attested, may be the creature of our historical presup-
positions about the developments of wisdom thought.
Our third point follows from this statement. We
have seen that some accepted theories about the develop-
ment of wisdom are dependent on Hegelian philosophical
commitments and conclusions grounded in Germanic studies.
The nationalization of late wisdom cannot be disputed,
but a similar shorter process is hard to prove. One de-
pends heavily on the analogy from Egypt and on certain
assumptions about the theological character of international
304
wisdom. One cannot easily prove whether Israel ever had
an essentially secular court wisdom confined to the elite
and their heirs that was a-theistic, so-called, in tone
because so much of the development of early court wisdom
and the official "bureaucracy" is tied up in the legend
of Solomon. Blocks of court material in Proverbs are
really too brief to give assured judgments. McKane's
Class B certainly recognizes the possibility of an im-
plicit community theology. The association of royal and
elite wisdom is ill-founded because of the fundamental
difference in relationships of power (in support of which,
witness the dubeity of "royal authorship" in early Egyp-
tian wisdom). In brief, we should be careful not to
historicize our philosophical pre-commitments, however
useful they be in formulating research hypotheses and
analyzing data. We are always in danger of finding what
we expect to find. We should be careful not to make
'wisdom' so rigid and inflexible, so dogmatic in its as-
sertions of retributionism, that it becomes a caricature,
particularly in light of the humanitarian elements some
scholars see as so bound up with the essence of wisdom
thought. We should preserve the wit, sympathy, and
perhaps "sense of distance from self and world" that
makes a world-view attractive to its adherents. To wit,
we should preserve our methodological sympathy and
305
empathy for a view, even when it does not find in us an
elective affinity.
Fourth, in line with Point Two, we should recog-
nize the relationship between language and context. For
example, the antitheses provide two (or more) opposing
vocabularies, each appropriate to its context. The same
may apply to other dimensions of wisdom, specifically the
yahweh-sayings. Pre-analytically, references to a god
seem to call for a different kind of discourse than
references to people. Hence, what does it mean when we
find that certain views about Yahweh find equivalents in
no non-Yahweh contexts?--The more, if the wise do in fact
rely on rhetorical generalization. To the extent that,
for the wise, Yahweh limited or conditioned experience,
one would expect these qualifications to appear only
within the relevant generic statements, those about Yahweh
himself, and typically not within sayings about the events
conditioned. Further, Yahweh presents a special dimen-
sion to life, since he cannot compassed within the same
kind of antitheses as many other (generic) aspects of ex-
perience. While we might propose a functional antithesis
--wholly implicit--on theoretical grounds as a contrary
to the sacred, in these four mashal collections there is
scarcely the barest suggestion of personalized evil.
That suggestion exists only if one so interprets the
306
‘yšh-zrh of chapters 1-9 and then reads that interpreta-
tion into the very occasional mentions of harlotry. In
the absence of an explicit dualism, the language used to
comprehend Yahweh should naturally differ from that used
other circumstances by the wise. If Yahweh is discussed in
generic terms, the qualifications of experience must
find some other mode of expression than in antitheses. Fur-
ther, if Yahweh stands entirely above the worldly order, as
guarant, rather than within it (so Würthwein), than he
stands outside or above the antitheses as such--the same
kind of generic balanced discourse does not apply to him
that applies to the rest of life. To conclude that the
theological language represents a later redaction on
grounds of content, one must show that they present a
world-view fundamentally at variance with that of the
sayings-context in which they appear.
Fifth, the aphoristic literature is terse, McKane
emphasizes the objective of this literature to open or
unveil experience, its metaphoric character. The sayings
are quintessentially poetry, to be related and under-
stood in poetic terms. One can hardly dispute their use
of poetic devices to achieve their literary purpose.
Though the parallelistic approach of Hebrew poetry en-
ables us to ferret out many of the technical terms of a
particular literature, these sayings' brevity and their
poetic rather than thematic associations plus the enormous
307
diversity of experience that they reflect, all mean that
we discern clearly only some of the technical terminology,
quotations, and stock phrases of the literature. Brevity
and openness limit our ability to specify even those
terms we do know with assurance to be technical. Typical
of this problem is the dispute in wisdom studies over.
Vergeltung--precisely what relationships did obtain
among intent, act and consequence in the Hebrew wise man's
mind? Here again we must be governed by a certain empathy
which enables us to appreciate the wholeness of the ma-
terial without caricature. Still, the poetic structure
of the sayings also means that redactoral efforts should
be fairly apparent through inconsistencies and problems
in the text. The problems of "seamlessly" redacting a
poetic text are nothing short of notorious. The tradi-
tional division of Proverbs into “collections” is founded
on precisely such problems. Alternative, hypotheses of
the composition of the Book should present us with simi-
lar kinds of evidence to be convincing. In sum, the
aphoristic literature, amounts to poetic, not just "ra-
tional," modes of thought given poetic forms of expression.
Poetry imposes certain kinds of limitations on attempts to
comprehend it in terms of another non-poetic logic. On
the other hand, understood poetically, the literature
yields itself both to properly poetic interpretation and
308
to techniques of form-criticism proven in dealing with
other poetic materials.
Sixth, however we understand the proverbs, we
should offer an intelligible redaction-history of the
Book. For example, the catch-word and paronomastic pat-
terns which connect various proverbs simply cannot be
adventitious nor accidental. They are intrinsic to the
literature and require explanation. Groupings of sayings
must be accounted for, along with disruptions and in-
cursions into the text we mean by “intelligible redac-
tion-history” more than just our earlier point that the
document came into being, selections were made, patterns
do appear, and the Book must at some time have served
some literary purpose which "random" outrightly ignores.
Rather, the sequence of events whereby the document came
into being should be historically plausible, consonant
with our understanding of other events and circumstances
of the period, and should present a likely and under-
standable state of affairs and set of social processes
to account for developments. Hence, we question the
citation of the LXX against the MT to show that the yahweh-
sayings near 16:1 come late.1 The poetic interrelationship
depends on Hebrew word-plays and assonances which have few
corresponding Greek equivalents--a sequence of puns,
1Boström, Paronomasi, p. 162.
309
synonyms and sounds would be difficult to represent in
aay language without detailed explanation. The Greek
translator is known to have omitted and substituted when
it served his purposes. The disruption is as or more
easily understood as occurring at the point of transla-
tion or subsequently than in the Hebrew through redaction.
Scott and McKane both depend heavily on a process of
theologization to explain the motives of the redactors
or contributors. Yet, how does one explain the seemingly
arbitrary pattern of revision which allowed duplicates
and variants to remain in the text, which in one place
respected the text by assembling sayings at the seam and
yet elsewhere strew them willy-nilly, and which worked
a cross-purposes in different parts of the text. Thus,
Skladny bases his marginal differentiations upon (to him)
discernible differences in the treatment of Yahweh in the
text. Would not the yahwizing editor-contributor at
least be consistent with himself? Further, some blocks
of material serve clear purposes. The hortatory dis-
courses at the beginning and middle of the Book are clearly
formal instructions: they belong to a didactic setting.
Foreign wisdom is quoted, not accreted--some group pre-
served it. The psalm scarcely came from a folk milieu;.
its association with a group possessing a formalized
poetry and tradition of wise women is obvious. The four
310
mashal collections depart from the instructional form and
must have served some other purpose. Nevertheless, they
are an organized, sophisticated and fairly rigid poetry
with a restricted and quite precise vocabulary (a point
essential to Scott's argument) which is intrinsic to its
view of the world. Whether or not its inspiration may
have lain in folk expression, the materials before us are
neither folk in form nor folk in use. Von Rad may be too
pessimistic when he thinks the distant past of wisdom
thought lies unrecoverable at present, but he points out
the need to deal, as first order of business, with the
(traditional and historical) form of the materials in
front of us.1 Blocks of distinctly-formed materials are
recognizable in Proverbs and should first be understood
as such.2 The classification approach, therefore we sub-
mit, jumps a step in the analytic process.
Seventh, one may doubt whether we have any sig-
nificant amount of the literature of radicalism which has
came down to us from ancient Israel. Were the prophets
religious reformers, or "reactionaries" in search of an
idealized (and never existent) by-gone day? Certainly,
both priest and wise man held tightly to tradition. The
1Von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, p. 24.
2See Appendix, Table 9.
311
authority of both rested on an approved transmission of
the right word in a correct lineage. Though their forms
of social expression differed, both stood upon inherited
words and a sedimented pattern of teaching and learning
them. Both were men of the book. This typification of
the wise applies no matter what the scenario we adopt.
One expects, as a consequence, that they would early-on
value the retention and correct transmission of their
traditions, in this case the wise sayings of learning
and instruction. We know that the latter were preserved;
should the former not also have been? If we credit the
wise with having preserved much of Hebrew literature,
then the preservation of sayings in written form becomes
almost a historical necessity: would they preserve the
learning of other social groups without preserving their
own? If they did preserve it, or may be assumed to have
done so, then the notion of “collection” becomes far less
objectionable. At the same time, one would become more
hesitant to admit that they would heavily and perhaps
heavy-handedly (albeit erratically) redact their own
literature--and certainly not more than others'. Points
Six and Seven join here. We should be sensitive to a
fundamental potential conflict between the theories of
democratization and theologization through wisdom's early
and middle periods (what we called the "shorter history").
312
While the tradition of an early royal wisdom may be
erroneous, certainly wisdom moved from the court elite
and their offspring to the group we anachronistically
would call the "merit bureaucracy." The growth of ef-
fective military and government required trained secondary
leadership. Economic and trade viability required a
certain minimal literacy, along with an expanded record-
keeping and communications class. Since the higher ranks
of priests must have been included (certainly in Egypt
and presumably in Israel as well) in the court elite,
theological language would seem to have been appropriate
more to court cult and priest than to the ideology of a
"meritocracy." If Smith is at all right about the funda-
mental conflict of parties in Israel,1 and he must be at
least partially right, exclusive dedication to Yahweh
could have served the partisan political purposes of the
wise and court priests. Such partisanship in a more
democratized wisdom is harder to explain. Thus, democra-
tization suggests a growing, rather than declining, "secu-
larism" and "pragmatism" in line with the social applica-
tions of wisdom. Finally, early Yahwistic wisdom would
accord with an early and growing nationalism to wisdom
which came to full flower in post-Exilic wisdom. Is
1Smith, Palestinian Parties.
313
pessimistic wisdom also a conflict over growing na-
tionalism? Preuss, however, would reject this interpre-
tation of nationalization.1 The important point is this:
in a movement of conservatism, moving from a hereditary
elite to encompass the "managerial classes," an increas-
ingly strict Yahwism seems at variance with the social
demands of the situation. If the early court circle in-
cluded the priests, must any postulated theologizing, if
it exists at all, be late? Contrariwise, given the in-
creasing sedimentation of ideologies with time, is the
increasing theological inclusiveness of wisdom under the
monarchy consistent with increasing theological exclu-
sivism? We submit that certain hypotheses about wisdom
postulate sociological inconsistencies.
Finally, perhaps Hebrew wisdom really does not
differ so much from other ancient Near Eastern wisdom
theologically after all. Preuss concludes that the same
views of god as the creator of the cosmos, guarant of
world-order, and upholder of the complex of behavior and
consequence can be found throughout ancient Near Eastern
wisdom literature.2 Even in its uses of rsiwn and twcbh
1Preuss, "Theologischen Ort," pp. 393-417; Horst
Dietrich Preuss, "Das Gottesbild der Alteren Weisheit
Israels," Vetus Testamentum Supplements 23: 117-45.
2Preuss, "Theologischen Ort," pp. 414-17; Preuss,
"Gottesbild," pp. 117-45.
314
vis-à-vis Yahweh, Israel does not depart from the theologi-
cal world of its neighbors in wisdom. Clue to this com-
monality, of course, is the oft-remarked absence of norma-
tive Hebrew theology from wisdom:
. . . Erwählung und Bund, Verpflichtung und Gebot
Jahwes, Väterverheissung, Landverheissung, David-
verheissung, Zion, Tempel, Gottesstadt, Geschichte
als zielgerichteter Ganzheit, Eschatologie, Gottes-
volk usw.1
Even the view that Yahweh may interpose himself between
the intent and the act to bring about his own purposes
rather than man's is in no wise peculiar to Israel.
Preuss' citation of parallel quotes from Egypt is de-
tailed.2 The absence of normative theology and the
presence of common theology lead one to the conclusion
that Hebrew wisdom, though set within the social world of
Yahwism and based on it, even in that respect did not dif-
fer from the similar relationship of wisdom to culture
elsewhere in the ancient Near East:
In der Weisheitsliteratur wird vielmehr Theologie
zwar nicht als Anthropologie, wohl aber als Phä-
nomenologie versucht. Daher gehören die Texte mit
theologischen Themen auch kaum den Volkssprichworten
an, sondern sie sind eher Kunstsprüche. Käme die
alte Weisheit Israels wirklich vom Glauben an Jahwe,
vom Kultus und vom Wissen um die Gebote her und
hätte sie aus diesem Grund ihre begrenzte Thematik,
müsste dieses von den ähnlichen Texten der Umwelt
1Preuss, "Gottesbild," p. 119 n.
2Preuss, "Gottesbild," e.g., pp. 128-31.
315
des alten Israel auch gelten, was betr. Jahwe
unmöglich ist und wofür es auch in analoger
Fragestellung keinen Anhalt gibt. Der Jahwe-
glaube wird zwar insofern (ohne dass irgendeine
Heilstat zitiert wird usw.!) auch vorausgesetzt,
als er verwendet(!) wird, als er Motiv mensch-
lichen Handelns werden kam, jedoch eines sehr
eigenständig geprägten Handelns, das mit der
weisheitlichen Weltsicht des Alten Orients eng
verbunden ist.1
The same analysis applies to the yr't-yhwh. Since the
concept is not often found elsewhere in ancient Near
Eastern wisdom, though sometimes elsewhere in the sense
of cultic fulfillment, it is often taken to be the pe-
culiar contribution of Hebrew religious thought. However,
when one considers the actual application of the term,
rather than its postulated history, one generally finds
that it means the realization of wisdom and the confirma-
tion of the (optimistic) doctrine of retribution. Only
very rarely does one find a hint of more--a personal re-
lationship to Yahweh, the numinous--principally in the
revision of Amenemope (22:19), and even there the inter-
pretation is 1ess than certain. Hence, one need hy-
pothesize no yahweh-redaction. The concept is entirely
consistent with early wisdom, whether Hebrew or ancient
oriental. Preuss' evidence certainly cannot be lightly
dismissed. He suggests that the reasons educed for
1Preuss, "Gottesbild," pp. 144-45.
316
postulating either the random accretion of sayings or
their redaction from changing theological needs are es-
sentially phantom.1 Certainly, the question of harmony
between classes of sayings--between yahweh- and non-
yahweh-sayings--should be considered in the analysis which
follows.
For these eight reasons, we hold that there is
ample ground for considering Proverbs II-B as a unit.
While the sayings may not all come from exactly the same
social situation, there should be sufficient consistency
of perspective to make analysis and conclusions possible.
Whether certain classes of sayings are incompatible is a
separate, redactoral, question. That the material can
be studied, recognizing the question of consistency where
relevant, seems to be justified.
1Preuss, "Gottesbild," pp. 136-45.
CHAPTER V
THE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL MATRIX OF
PROVERBS 15:28-22:16
Introduction
Social and conceptual worlds--whether of indi-
viduals or groups or communities--can be interpreted as
and in terms of a gradient structure of saliences. Some
entities, ideas, symbols and relationships fit closely
into the experiences of person or croup. They receive
special attention, detailed examination and thoughtful
interpretation. Fine distinctions are made which reflect
differences in the life interests of that individual or
that particular group. Meanings and values are not givens;
they are interpretations of experience. A social world is
not an epistemological or ontological given. It is the
construction of a group over time.1 It is a selection
from the virtual infinity of experiential elements that
impinge on one based in the life and work of the group.
Incongruent interpretations die cut: they lack salience,
1Schutz, Phenomenology of the Social World;
Schutz and Luckmann, Structures of the Life-World; Berger
and Luckmann, Social Construction of Reality.
317
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the power to give meaning and value to the everyday.
Especially congruent concepts are adopted, driving out the
less compelling with which they compete. The relationship
is not one-to-one; it is not predictive. Given a particu-
lar setting, one cannot predict the conceptual and social
system that will give it meaning for that group to the
exclusion of all others. On the other hand, one can
generally outline the dominant features of a successful
and durable system that is likely to be adopted and re-
tained. Conversely, one can predict features that are un-
likely to persist for lack of congruence. People ob-
viously, have a stake in the meaningfulness of their
world, thus in its interpretation. They will not devote
time, work and physical and emotional resources in a con-
ceptual system that has little relevance in terms of their
actual experiences. Indeed, devotion and investment--
stake--vary directly with the degree of salience. Simi-
larly, conceptual worlds transform relationships. By
conferring meaning and value, these systems conform ex-
perience to the interpretation over time. Thus, con-
gruence is a function of social interpretation and social
1Weber, Protestant Ethic; Weber, Economy and
Society, vol. 2, which lays out his sociology of religion
in terms of his interpretation of 'elective affinities,'
Wahlverwandtschaften.
319
action alike. The process is dialectic.1
This congruence or salience is reflected in the
proximity of elements of experience to the individual or
group. Social proximity appears as an interpretation of
space and time. Whatever objective reality we confer upon
space and time, if any, these categories have an intensely
metaphorical character, which amounts to and reflects an
interpretation of existence.2 What is real for the wise
of this proverb collection is what seems self-evidently
close-at-hand in time or space. In looking at their in-
terpretation of relationships, we look also at the tem-
poral sequence of relevant circumstances, motives, actions
and consequences that give sense and meaning to their own
acts and those of others. Thus, we are interested, not in
describing the world of these wise, but in seeing its
relative proximities to them. What differentials divide,
distinguish, order and relate their conception of the con-
stituent elements of experience? We do not look just for
1Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction of
Reality, develop their sociology of knowledge in terms of
a dialectical methodology drawn from Schutz.
2Palmer, Hermeneutics, pp. 12-32; Gadamer, Truth
and Method. This realization, within the German intel-
lectual tradition, goes back to Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason and informs a variety of dialectical theories:
Phenomenology, various existentialisms, Critical Theory
and neo-Marxism, hermeneutic theory, and much Struc-
turalism.
320
what they conceive but how they conceive of and order it.
Indeed, order is a good term for what we call saliences,
congruities and proximities, except for its other tech-
nical meaning in wisdom studies. Social-conceptual worlds
are spatio-temporal worlds. To give order is first to
give sequence and proximity.1
In what follows, we are not concerned only or
principally with cataloging the linguistic usages that de-
limit space and time for these wise.2 Rather, we seek to
infer and project categories of space and time that have
this metaphorical and interpretive character from what the
wise say about their world. Hence, our work is inferen-
tial rather than descriptive in the strict sense. Such
projection is founded in the principle that people take
for granted that which is most fundamental in their ex-
perience. They do not discuss, much less defend, what
they assume as the fundamental or social sine qua non.
Indeed, what is defended and discussed in detail is no
longer taken for granted as such. In a sense, assumptions
which must be argued for have already lost what makes them
effective: their pre-interpretive, pre-linguistic,
1Schutz, Phenomenology of the Social World;
Husserl, Internal Time-Consciousness.
2Cf. Wilch.
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pre-conscious character. To discern at least the crucial
lineaments of this taken-for-granted structure, we must
project and infer. Descriptions are the consequence of
interpretations; they are not the interpretations them-
selves.1
From such projections, we may begin to be able to
make distinctions among various hypotheses about the
social setting of these wise. For the literature to have
warranted formulation and preservation, it must have been
salient in some respect not only for the writer-collectors
but also for the collector-preservers, however we may in-
terpret these roles. Thus, our projections have some
validity not only for the setting of particular sayings but
also for that which preserved them as part of an intel-
lectual and symbolic aesthesis. Thus, the broad and meta-
phorical understanding of space and time becomes all the
more important. How does this world of space and time be-
come a congruent symbolic reality? How does it make ex-
perience intelligible and plausible? How does the every-
day experience of the life-world acquire (an order of)
1What Schutz calls the epochē or "bracketing" of
the natural attitude, a form of phenomenological reduction,
leads to the "appearance" (showing forth as 'phenomena')
of the taken-for-granted as uncritically-accepted ground.
Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Mac-
quarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Row Pub-
lishers, 1962), pp. 51-60.
322
meaning and value?
Space
Under the rubric of space, certain recurrent themes
emerge that reflect the independent and distinctive value
system of these wise. Though they likely formed an inte-
gral part of the intellectual and social elite of this
period, we shall see that the wise evidence in these say-
ings a symbolic social hierarchy that is far from being
the existing social system writ large. Their criteria of
judgment are their own, at times supporting, at times dif-
fering from the values we would associate with a privileged
elite. Their value system neither naively defends nor
seeks to justify the status quo and privilege per se. They
know power; they live their lives in its shadow. Still,
it is not power that they value. They apparently had to
live and work in the public view, yet that publicity re-
mains subordinate to other things they esteemed more. They
do not justify a style of life they serve but do not ex-
perience themselves, though in justifying their own way of
life they produce a kind of class ethic. Personal, rather
than power, relationships count for much. They concentrate
on a person's disposition, what we might loosely term
'character,' in making ethical judgments. Here, the ethic
is not founded in a direct synthesis of deed and consequence,
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but in a manner of deportment to which particular deeds
must be referred before they can be interpreted and assessed.
Theirs is an ethic and an ethos of propriety. They observe
a congruence or appropriateness of person, place, time and
event that forms the basis of 'aesthetic' evaluation.
These people value reserve. They esteem restraint and dis-
cipline of character and action, an aesthetic of economy
reminiscent of mhden agan. They remark the coherence and
sufficient intelligibility of one's life, not the compre-
hensibility of the cosmos as such. With propriety goes
what we shall call 'demesne,' that realm of experience and
action over which one has effective control. To be re-
strained is to recognize the boundaries of one's demesne
and observe them. To overreach those limits is to court
disaster, the more when it is done with (foolish) con-
fidence.
To say that the experiences of life make sense for
these wise is to say that one can conceive their pattern.
The recognition is Gestalt--one perceives the interre-
lated whole or one does not perceive at all. Thus, the
demarcations within their social-intellectual world tend
to be sharp. These compartments of experience are not
purely intuitive. What can be known and understood can be
expressed. The wise do not rule out the ineffable. They
perceive limiting conditions and crucial boundary questions
324
in their experience, as we shall discover. Still, the word
has its propriety and cannot be made properly to overreach
itself either. "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof must
one be silent," to quote Wittgenstein.1 At most one can
say that the world, too, observes the proprieties, each
domain unveiling itself in an appropriate way. While the
crucial temporal boundary question for the wise is that
demesne bounded by death, spatially, it is the power to
know and by knowing to control. In each case, the ques-
tion becomes freedom and justice. In each case, the mys-
tery of that which is in principle beyond human demesne,
Yahweh, is implicit. On an individual basis, the spatial
limit becomes adversity, confronting an irreconcilable
conflict of values which cannot be realized without sacri-
fice. These wise perceive these experiential dilemmas and
integrate them into their aesthetic of value. The dis-
tance and objectivity that come with reserve and restraint
produce a sense of irony in the ethically sensitive ob-
server of life.
In order to project what we are calling the
spatial dimension of the social and intellectual world of
these wise, we shall analyze five aspects of wisdom. We
1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philoso-
phicus (London: Kegan Paul, 1922), Sentence 7.
325
shall begin by considering the nature of wisdom as they
perceive it. "Where is wisdom to be found?" What does it
mean to be wise? How does wisdom differ from a simple
legitimation and affirmation of the social status quo?
Second, we shall consider the life-world and its structure.
What features of experience occupy the attention and con-
cern of these writers? How do they stratify society: who
fits where in their view? What sorts of people are there,
in terms of the value criteria that most concern them, and
how does these people relate to the life of the person who
is or strives to be wise? Third, we shall consider the
concept of “demesne”--that realm of experience which an in-
dividual can control and "master." What can one know and,
knowing, control? What is the proper and appropriate
range of individual competence? What is relevant in as-
sessing ethical accountability? How does individual
demesne relate to the life of some distinctive social
group of which the wise person is a part (Standesethik)?
Next, we should consider the implications of the wise'
rhetorical style here. The word is the vehicle whereby
the world of experience becomes intelligible for one who
is wise. The capacity to master and then transmit that
mastery to others rests in the ability to verbalize what
is. To order is in part to state. In the way in which
they present this understanding here, we may find some
326
evidence of how that experience is organized. Since what
is taken for granted is implicit, rhetoric becomes rele-
vant to the problem of projection. Rhetorical style is
at once implicit and commonly understood. Finally, we
shall consider the limits to their experience and their
control. To have a demesne--as we shall argue the wise
here believe they have--is also to have limits beyond which
one cannot act, certainly not with impunity. What limits
do these writers perceive? Where and what are the crucial
boundaries in experience?
"Wisdom"
The obvious point of departure for any discussion
of the world of the wise has to be what that wisdom might
be. Our earlier attempts to define wisdom were not alto-
gether satisfactory in the sense that we confronted
irreconcilable multivocality in the term. Thus, we have
been forced for the moment into such rather inelegant cir-
cumlocutions as "these wise" and “wisdom as evidenced by
these sayings” to refer to the wise and their wisdom who
appear in and through the B proverb collection. These
phrases beg the question. Further, we find no clear ref-
erence in these sayings to the existence of an identifi-
able (self-identified) and coherent group whom we could
unarguably call the wise. The closest we might come is
327
15:31, which we include in the introduction to B though
it traditionally has been assigned to A:
He whose ear heeds wholesome admonition ['zn šmct
twkhit]
will abide among the wise.
Since "abide" is used figuratively, the context does not
require a specific group: the sense may be "reckoned
among" and thus categorical rather than appelative. Ref-
erences to wisdom tend to be general and disconcertingly
abstract. We look in vain for a proverb we might quote as
a simple, satisfactory, unambiguous definition of wisdom,
particularly one which does not lead us into a thicket of
other equally technical and equally difficult terms.1
Consider 18:15,
An intelligent mind acquires knowledge,
and the ear of the wise seeks knowledge.
Here, we must pursue lb, nbwn. dct, and ‘zn. This wisdom
and the group to which the author(s) who produced it belong
exist by and as an inference from the work. The B composi-
tion, like early Hebrew wisdom generally, makes no unam-
biguous references to the technical implements of scribal
class or school--a point already made. For clues then,
we must turn to the semantic field of "wisdom" and related
1See Appendix, Tables 15 and 16.
328
terminology.1
The word *hikm appears seventeen times:2 nine
times as a noun or adjective froth hikm,3 three times as a
verb, and five times from hikmh.4 An essential condition
for the acquisition of wisdom is the ability to learn from
instruction.5 The fool lacks the capacity to benefit from
wisdom's discipline:
Why should a fool have a price in his hand to buy
wisdom, when he has no mind? 17:16
If we were to include the last verses of ch. 15 in this
collection, then the person's appropriate relationship to
Yahweh is a second precondition:6
The fear of the Lord is instruction in wisdom,
and humility goes before honor. 15:33
Certainly, other sayings also suggest this interpretation.7
We shall argue below that righteousness is the necessary
precondition for attaining wisdom.
Wisdom involves learning, the ability to generalize
1See Appendix, Table 15; also Tables 1-5.
2See Appendix, Table 15, Part A.
3Also, 15:31.
4Plus 15:33.
5Cf. 17:10; 19:20.
6Cf. 18:12b.
7Cf. 22:4; 19:23; perhaps 16:6, 20; 22:12.
329
from experience:1
Listen to advice and accept instruction,
that you may gain wisdom for the future. 19:20
Wisdom is cumulative. It is not a closed body of informa-
tion that is acquired once for all time. While wisdom is
associated with dct, knowledge, it is not knowledge-about
or knowledge-of.2 It is insight which is gained pro-
gressively:3
When a scoffer is punished, the simple becomes wise;
when a wise man is instructed, he gains knowledge.
21:11
Throughout the B composition, there are repeated refer-
ences to the mind or heart, with the word lb appearing
some twenty-three times.4 Wisdom has the quality of depth,
hence the analogy of the fountain or flowing waters,5
"Wisdom is a fountain of life to him who has it":6
The words of a man's mouth are deep waters;
the fountain of wisdom is a gushing stream. 18:4
To have this quality, wisdom must even be more than
knowledge-how, though it may also enable one to deal
1Cf. 18:15, quoted above.
2See Appendix, Table 15, Part C.
319:20; 18:15
4Not counting 15:28, 30, 32. See Appendix, Table
17.
5See Appendix, Table 16, Part D.
616:22a; cf. 20:5.
330
competently with demanding situations in life.1 Wisdom,
then, is a quality of mind or heart. It is insight, per-
ceptiveness and depth of spirit which is only reflected in
the way that one acts and interacts with others.
The wise of heart [lhikm-lb] is called a man of dis-
cernment,
and pleasant speech increases persuasiveness. 16:21
The parallelism is synthetic; the rhetoric is conse-
quence.2 Wisdom is valuable in and of itself, not for the
sake of some more distant goal; hence, "virtue is its own
reward” in 16:22 and in
A man of understanding sets his face toward wisdom,
but the eyes of a fool are on the ends of the
earth. 17:24
One does not pursue wisdom for some objective to which wis-
dom is the means, though having attained wisdom, one may
gain consequent things as well:3
To get wisdom is better than gold;
to get understanding is to be chosen
rather than silver. 16:16
This saying is a variant on the tiwb-mn, lacking the dis-
tributive negative middle term which customarily produces
116:14, 21, 23.
2 I.e, the second stichos gives an implication of
the general principle stated in the first stichos; 17:20;
20:18; 15:33; cf. 16:23 (climactic parallelism without
consequence);. 19:8(!).
3Cf. 19:20 b’hirytk.
331
a comparative dilemma or conflict of value. Here, tiwb
appears internally, and inversion of the form produces a
synonymous intensification.1
Wisdom is achieved through a discipline of in-
struction, and this discipline continues to characterize
the life of the wise individual through an ethic of re-
straint and self-control:2
Even a fool who keeps silent is considered wise;
when he closes his lips, he is deemed intelligent.
17:28
Wine is a mocker, strong drink is a brawler;
and whoever is led astray by it is not wise. 20:1;
Part of this discipline is the ability to verbalize in-
sight3 economically, effectively and persuasively.4 Two
references to wisdom appear in the context of king-sayings.
In 20:26, the king's wisdom is that of wise governance,
not necessarily the insight and perspicacity we associate
with wisdom tout court. At 16:14, the wise person is
threatened by the king's passion; wisdom provides the pos-
sibility of dealing with that inevitable characteristic of
power. The reference to the emissary of death suggests the
1See Appendix, Tables 11 and 12.
221:11; 15:31, 33; 17:28; 16:14(?).
3An essential presupposition of wisdom, e.g. 19:27.
416:21, 23; 18:4.
332
relationship of wisdom, sound governance and the ethic of
restraint to the purposes of Yahweh.1 The power of wisdom
is such that might alone does not avail against it, which
implies wise governance in the plans of battle or con-
flict.2
Ultimately, however, whatever wisdom one may
acquire through the discipline of instruction, that dis-
cernment is bounded by the power of Yahweh to pursue and
establish whatever purposes he will. Thus, while wisdom
is acquired as a process, by implication one never fully
attains it. The limit on the one hand is demesne--wis-
dom's value on self-control, restraint, (self-)governance
--and on the other is Yahweh and his wisdom:
No wisdom, no understanding, no counsel,
can avail against the Lord. 21:30
The word dct appears nine times, twice in 18:15.3
The latter emphasizes the cumulative acquisition of wisdom
through hearing; it is the pursuit of the intelligent
mind.4 The association of knowledge with hearing, with
the verbal and transmissable character of wisdom, appears
in 19:27, an admonition and the B collection's only use
1Cf. 17:11 cruel emissary; 16:4 evil day; 16:25
ways of death.
221:22; 20:18.
3See Appendix, Table 15, Part C.
4Lb nbwn (cf. 15:14a).
333
of the vocative bny:1
Cease, my son, to hear instruction
only to stray from the words of knowledge. 19:27
This verse and 21:11, when compared with 17:16, already
point up the distinction between ignorance and folly.2
While the ignorant (typically represented by the stock
figure of the callow youth) person can err and act fool-
ishly, that folly is not a fundamental part of his dis-
position, i.e. his character. Through instruction, it may
be driven from him; hence, cf.
Folly is bound up in the heart of a child,
but the rod of discipline drives it far from him.
22:15
The fool, however, acts foolishly out of his basic charac-
ter; his mind lacks the capacity to acquire the discipline
of wisdom.3 Thus, wisdom, ignorance and folly represent
three distinct human dispositions. The ignorant can learn
through-mwsr;4 the wise person can benefit from counsel
and reproof; the fool stands beyond wisdom's reach. In
these sayings which refer to knowledge, we find the same
themes that emerged earlier with respect to wisdom. It is
1Cf. 27:11 in C.
2See Appendix, Tables 18 and 19.
3See Appendix, Table 20.
4See Appendix, Table 21.
334
valuable in itself, more than any precious possession.1
Passion is rejected2 in favor of restraint:
He who restrains his words has knowledge,
and he who has a cool spirit is a man of
understanding. 17:27
Knowledge implies control and economy of speech.3 Finally,
the demesne of an individual's wisdom is described and
delimited by that of Yahweh:
The eyes of the Lord keep watch over knowledge,
but he overthrows the words of the faithless. 22:12
Note again the verbal basis of knowledge, and thus wisdom.
The word tbwnh occurs five tithes; byn or bynh six.4
These sayings also emphasize the deep association of wisdom
and mind, drawing out implications in that notion:
Whoever acquires insight loves his basic nature
[qnh lb ‘hb npšw!]
he who keeps understanding will prosper. 19:8 BK
The purpose in a man's mind [csih blb] is like deep water,
but a man of understanding will draw it out. 20:5
They continue the emphasis on the wise person's capacity to
learn, discipline for the ignorant, and the life of re-
straint.5 The fool's disposition bars him from wisdom:
120:15; 19:2a.
219:2b.
320:15b.
4See Appendix, Table 15, Parts B and D.
517:10, 24; 19:25; 21:29.,
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A fool takes no pleasure in understanding,
but only in expressing his opinion. 18:2
Here, too, is the demesne of human wisdom:
A man's steps are ordered by the Lord;
how then can a man understand his way? 20:24
Among other terms, mwsr appears four times, all
among passages dealt with above;1 nbwn, four; csh, five.2
*Śkl occurs ten times, though at least one use seems to
play on its alternative meanings of pondering and prosper-
ing.3 Verse 16:20 emphasizes the precondition of reliance
on Yahweh. In 19:14, a "prudent" wife comes from Yahweh,
though "house and wealth are inherited from fathers." At
21:16, the word drk appears ("way of understanding") as it
frequently does in relation to adhering to wisdom, a point
we shall investigate further below. Finally, the term ap-
pears in reference to what we shall argue is another dis-
position, righteousness, in the sense of reflecting on or
pondering the experience of others, to learn from it:
The righteous observes the house of the wicked;
the wicked are cast down to ruin. 21:12
The saying in 17:2 points up the precedence dispositional
state takes over social conventions, in what amounts to a
1Plus 15:32, 33.
219:21 of Yahweh parallel to mhišbwt of man in the
sense of demesne.
317:8 the bribe!
336
rather iconoclastic re-assessment of social as against wis-
dom values:
A slave who deals wisely will rule over a son who acts
shamefully,
and will share the inheritance as one of the brothers. 17:2
The word tm, integrity, appears twice, arguably in relation
to the disposition of the righteous rather than wisdom
per se.1 The former saying is a regular tiwb-mn saying which
weighs poverty and integrity against perversity of speech
and folly. Twšyh for "sound judgment" appears in 18:1,
whose interpretation is obscured by the exact rendering
which should be given to (1) t'wh (own desire? pretexts?).
The word crm does not appear to mean wisdom or knowledge
so much as wit, cunning or prudence in its two occurrences.
Once, ysr appears in an admonition to instruct the callow
youth:
Discipline your son while there is hope;
do not set your heart on his destruction. 19:18
In 18:11, mśkyt may mean "imagination," though its applica-
tion here would be tangential in any event, confirming in-
sight as something more than a specificable body of actions
or information. Admonition, twkhit, appears in 15:31, 32
and as the verb at 19:25. Yr't-yhwh, the fear of the lord
which is a pre-condition for wisdom is associated with hisd
119:1; 20:7.
337
w'mt, hiyym, swr mrc, cnwt, kbwd.1 There are certainly a
number of other words which appear in these contexts, but
an exhaustive analysis of the vocabulary of this passage
lies outside our purposes. The implications of many of
these terms--drk, lb, rwhi, šmc , nr, tiwb, ksyl, pty and
others--will become clear as they fit into the course of
our discussion.
The B composition seems to delimit a clear realm
of wisdom. It is associated with the mind. The principal
emphasis lies on its inherent value, not any specific con-
sequences which might follow. To be wise involves the
capacity to heed instruction, restrain and control one's
passions in the disposition of a cool spirit, ponder and
learn from experience and from verbal instruction. Wisdom
is attained through discipline, but it seems to supercede
any particular act or teaching. Since wisdom is cumulative,
and since some dispositions bar one from attaining it, by
implication the wise sustain and expand their wisdom
through mutual recognition and instruction as well as by
the disciplined instruction of youth. While there are no
clear references to a group of wise, the nature of that
wisdom virtually demands that those of like disposition
interact, while excluding these (fools) who simply cannot
116:6; 19:23.
338
hope for wisdom. Wisdom is the highest intrinsic good,
but it is bounded by the power, dominion and (presumably)
wisdom of Yahweh who at once sustains and limits the ef-
fective power of knowledge. The wise person's command of
life is qualified, not absolute, hence the folly of pur-
suing wisdom instrumentally (as if that were possible).
The life-world: power and position
Given this description of wisdom, how does the
life-world manifest itself to the writers of the B composi-
tion? We begin by looking at the conduct and activities of
the wise person himself, which to some extent we shall have
to infer from stated values.
We have already remarked that apt speech figures
prominently in their thought. Wisdom leads to parsimonious
but effective speech.1 While wisdom is communicated in
part through verbal instruction, silence is-often prefer-
able to speaking:
He who keeps his mouth and his tongue
keeps himself out of trouble. 21:23
To speak is to expose oneself to the consequences of having
spoken.2
First, one should attend to instruction: these
116:21, 23; 17:27.
218:20-21. See Appendix, Table 22.
339
sayings place a premium on listening, the attentive ear,
and heeding admonition:1
The hearing ear and the seeing eye,
the Lord has made them both. 20:12
In addition, restraining the tongue gives one time to con-
eider what should be said and present it cogently and ef-
fectively.2 In speech, one conveys the depth of his mind--
that is how instruction is possible—and reveals himself to
those with the insight to perceive.3 Thus, the gravest
failing in speech may be haste:4
If one gives answer before he hears,
it is his folly and shame. 18:13
Consider the consequences:
From the fruit of his mouth a man is satisfied;
he is satisfied by the yield of his lips.
Death and life are in the power of the tongue,
and those who love it will eat its fruits.
18:20-21
The latter saying is not without a certain sense of irony.5
Certainly, the expression of knowledge leads to life, so
that speech is not per se evil. In fact,
118:15; 19:20, 27; 15:31.
215:28; 17:27.
318:4.
415:28; 20:9, 22, 25; 17:27.
5Cf. Appendix, Table 23.
340
Pleasant words are like a honeycomb,
sweetness to the soul and health to the body.
16:24
Compare 15:30, and
There is gold, and abundance of costly stones;
but the lips of knowledge are a precious jewel.
20:15
The menace in speech is that it exposes one to the
power and control of others; words go out beyond the demesne
that one can control. Thus, speech is the vehicle for
gossip, quarreling, strife and conflict;1 whoever gossips
cannot exercise control or discretion, therefore no secrets
are safe when one associates with him. Further, attractive
and effective speech is more than idle flattery or the
puffery of a facade. It requires a measure of insight and
perspicacity in the audience to appreciate.2 One who is
not wise will find the speech of the foolish or wicked en-
ticing; it has its own attraction, and its own reward:3
An evildoer listens to wicked lips;
and a liar gives heed to a mischievous tongue.
17:4
The words of a whisperer are like delicious morsels;
they go down into the inner parts of the body.
18:8
116:28; 17:9; 18:8; 20:19.
2Perhaps this explains the emphasis on corporal forms
of discipline with the ignorant (19:20, 25, 29; 22:15).
3Cf. 18:7.
341
Thus, speech, too, is tied to disposition. To each
type of character, a certain speech becomes appropriate.
From that kind of speaking flow consequences appropriate to
the disposition, not just the speech itself. This distinc-
tion applies to social station and to disposition as
measured against the wisdom scale of values.2 Signifi-
cantly, these sayings assume the capacity of the king to
appreciate and reward speech that is both righteous and
eloquent:3
He who laves purity of heart
and whose speech is gracious,
will have the king as his friend. 22:11
Reception by the king as friend has special significance in
these sayings. Verse 16:10 seems to attribute divination,
the Revised Standard Version has "inspired decisions," to
the king, which would affirm both his close association to
insight and wisdom through speech and its appropriate dis-
position and his favor with Yahweh who limits but sustains
wisdom.4
The B collection's concern for the courts,
1A source of some ironic observations by the
authors (17:7; 18:23; 19:7(?))
216:27; 17:20; 19:1.
316:13; 17:7(?).
4See Appendix, Tables 10 and 24.
342
especially truthful testimony and just administration,
closely follows this problem of speech.1 The parallel
sayings in 19:5 and 9 affirm consequences of false testi-
mony:
A false witness will not go unpunished,
and he who utters lies will not escape
[v. 9: will perish].
Such sayings seem to confirm a doctrine of retribution,2
although its nature is remarkably unspecific.3 Yet,
other sayings recognize the fragility of justice when it is
perverted, either by lies or by bribery.4
It is not good to be partial to a wicked man,
or to deprive a righteous man of justice. 18:5
This saying and 19:28 can be interpreted to reflect the in-
herent difference in character between righteous and wicked
which results in a radically different relationship to the
judicial and administrative system.5 In that light, jus-
tice becomes the product of perspicacity and just procedure,
the difficulty of which is keenly presented in 18:17:
1See Appendix, Table 25; cf. Tables 22 and 26,
Parts E and R.
221:28; cf. 21:6; 20:17.
3See Appendix, Tables 8, Part E, and 27.
4See Appendix, Table 26, Parts N and. R; cf. Table
16, Part F.
5Cf. 21:15.
343
He who states his case first seems right
until the other [rchw!] comes and examines him.
righteous are not assured deliverance from all in-
justice:
To impose a fine on a righteous man is not good;
to flog noble men is wrong. 17:26
The saying confirms the proprieties that attend differen-
tial social status,1 but it would be irrelevant were not
such injustice both possible and an actual fact.2 Simi-
larly, if simple retribution could be taken for granted,
there would be no need to affirm it. Thus, sayings like
19:5, 9; 21:28 need to be viewed circumspectly. While they
may well confirm a doctrine of retribution, though we shall
argue they do not, they may also deny such a doctrine by
confirming the need to uphold and defend the value system
of this group.3 In that light, the general statement of
consequences becomes important: compare the statements
which make each dispositional state its own reward.4
The courts and administration generally receive a
relatively large amount of attention in this composition.
1See Appendix, Table 14.
2However infrequent, compare 17:23.
3See Appendix, Table 27.
4See Appendix, Table 28.
344
We find reference to cases,1 testimony,2 examination,3
decision,4 and punishment.5 We include administration be-
cause several sayings extend the references to lying and
deceit beyond the situation of the law court. Sayings
20:17 and 21:6 are general, but imply favorable economic
transactions for the liar while affirming that such deceit
will not bring enduring gain. Verse 19:22 presents a con-
flict of values, esteeming fidelity, even with poverty,
over false speech.6 The sayings on bribery, however, pro-
vide a much clearer focus.7 They apply to law and adminis-
tration alike. It would be too much to say that the wise
advocate the use of bribes--though such an interpretation
has at times been given such sayings in arguing for the
worldly orientation of this wisdom. Rather, these sayings seem
to condone them, though with some ambivalence and a
sense of irony. As we shall see, the wise here favor
118:27.
219:5, 9, 28; 21:28.
318:17.
417:26; 18:5; 20:8; 21:15.
517:26, 23; 21:15; 19:29(?).
6See Appendix, Table 29.
7See Appendix, Tables 16, Part F, and 26, Part N.
345
generosity in those of means.1 They recognize the influence
wealth has over the actions of others.2 Verse 19:6 may well
play on this theme by equating wealth, power, social status
and generous inclination all through the ambiguity of ndyb:
Many seek the favor of a generous man ["noble"?],
and everyone is a friend [!] to a man who gives gifts.
19:6
In a world where one must deal with those who have power,
this kind of "generosity" can be quite helpful:3
A man's gift (mtn 'dm) makes room for him
and brings before great men. 18:16
Still, 17:23 voices disapproval toward accepting a bribe
for the sake of influencing the dispensing of justice.
What is wrong is not just the acceptance per se, since 17:8
places acceptance in a far more ambiguous light. Perhaps
one could argue that perversion of the judicial process is
what is at stake,4 but 20:17 and 21:6 clearly have broad
application in denouncing false speech. There may be some
clue for us in 17:8,
A bribe is like a magic stone
in the eyes of him who receives it;
wherever he turns he prospers.
1See Appendix, Tables 30 and 31.
2See Appendix, Table 32.
3Compare 21:14.
4’rhiwt mšpt 17:23b.
346
"Prospers" renders yśkl which may play on its technical
sense. That would suggest a less favorable and more ironic
stance toward the bribe. Resolution of this conflict must
await the elaboration of more evidence. For now, the bribe
sayings indicate clear concern for relations with legal and
administrative power. Their focus seems to be at least as
much on the use of gifts to manipulate influential people
as on the taking of bribes by those who have power. This
emphasis again suggests that these wise must deal with
powerful institutions and influential people whose favor has
a material effect on their life situations.1
The saying at 16:14, mentioned earlier intimates a
gift as a possible means for diverting the anger of the
king. Verse 20:8 explicitly relates the royal court to
justice, in distinguishing the righteous and the wicked.
King-sayings recur throughout the B collection, as they do
in the mashal literature generally.2 We find a block of
royal king-sayings at 16:10-15. The king's throne is
founded in righteousness and fidelity (sidqh, hisd):
Loyalty and faithfulness preserve the king,
and his throne is upheld by righteousness. 20:28
1Note how 17:16 suggests that wisdom instruction
requires the payment of a fee or price.
2See Appendix, Table 10.
347
The institution of the monarchy has a special relationship
to Yahweh that must be respected and preserved, certainly
by the king himself. Thus, "It is an abomination to kings
to do evil."1 When the king issues a pronouncement, it has
the status of an oracle and is synonymous with justice.2
The righteousness of the royal institution, if not of the
king himself, is divine, giving royal authority a divine
warrant. Still, the king's power devolves from Yahweh,
and Yahweh may do with it according to his own purposes.3
Even the authority of the king has a demesne that is bounded
by the power of Yahweh:
The king's heart is a stream of water
in the hand of the Lord;
he turns it wherever he will. 21:1
Here the appearance of the water metaphor with the reference
to heart suggests a quality of insight that goes beyond
competent governance.4 Royal insight is virtually wisdom
by definition. Several sayings seem to confirm this inter-
pretation. The king seems to recognize and prefer righteous-
ness, to esteem true speaking,5 to perceive and focus upon
116:12a.
216:10.
3See Appendix, Table 8, Parts A and G.
4See Appendix, Table 8, Part L.
516:13.
348
evil in his midst,1 and to separate righteousness from
wickedness while calling the latter to judgment:2
A wise king winnows the wicked,
and drives the wheel over them. 20:26
This divine favor may help explain the reference to the
emissary of death in 16:143 along with the choice of kpr
for "appease" there and the use of ."purity" (tihwr),
"fidelity," "righteousness," "faithfulness" all in connec-
tion with the king. Certainly, since the king possesses
great power, we probably should not read over much into
statements about his wrath. The B composition suggests by
its concern with royal favor and the hazards of dealing with
royal power that such matters were an important concern for
these wise. More, the special status afforded the king in
relation to Yahweh, to the extent that it manifests itself
as wisdom or insight, suggests a social condition in which
the wise group would support and defend the royal establish-
ment in spite of its hazards.4 To evoke the wrath of the
120:8.
2"Winnows" (20:8, 26).
3Cf. 17:11.
416:14; 19:12; 20:2 (the first stichoi of the latter
two sayings differ by one word).
349
king is to court death;1 his favor brings (forth) life.2
There also appear references to princes or nobles.
Except for 19:6, which involves a possible play on words
already noted, sayings dealing with the nobility are
propriety sayings.3 That is, they set forth separate
standards of conduct and treatment, depending on one's
social class (as here) or disposition. It is not appro-
priate for princes to be impoverished, subject to social
inferiors, dealt rough justice.4 One expects cultivated
discourse but also veracity of a noble. If 19:6 should
apply to the prince, then he should also be generous,
while dispensing powerful favors, not unlike the king him-
self. Again, such statements suggest an environment where
the privilege of the nobility is taken for granted by the
wise group underlying this composition. The latter seem
to observe and cultivate the social proprieties.
The B composition gives considerable attention to
the influence of the powerful, particularly when that
120:2.
219:12; 16:15; cf. 22:11.
3See Appendix, Table 14.
417:26; 19:10.
5By implication, the fool is a social inferior, as
would be appropriate if royalty have a special relationship
to Yanweh founded in righteousness (17:7).
350
influence results from wealth.1 Power as such is am-
biguous. While the wise here seem to respect it, they
often deem competing values to be superior to it. For
example, in wisdom resides the potential to overthrow self-
confident might:
A wise man scales the city of the mighty
and brings down the stronghold in which they trust.
21:22
Presumably, the saying is metonymous or synechdochic--"by
wise guidance wage war"2 --and the setting is political and
military. Where powerful forces are in conflict, the wise
concern for restraint comes into play:3
The lot puts an end to disputes
and decides between powerful contenders. 18:18.
Security is implicit in wealth, which fact makes riches
most desirable. With wealth comes entree to other rich
and powerful people.4 It brings new company.5 One
propriety saying reflects the new freedom of the well-to-
do:
The poor use entreaties,
but the rich answer roughly. 18:23
1See Appendix, Tables 32 and 33.
220:18b.
3Cf. 16:33.
418:16.
519:4, cf. 7
351
Still, the wise view skeptically the loss of restraint and
self-control that can come with power.1 They vehemently
contemn the vice of arrogance and overweaning pride which
surely invites ruin.2 When wealth or, one assumes, other
sources of power lose their distinctive value as security
from the manipulation or control of others and become the
basis of one's own obtrusive or coercive activity, then
this wise group rejects them because they entice one to
overreach his demesne into (potential) destruction.3
In addition, wealth can induce sloth,4 hedonism,5 greed6
and perhaps even a measure of folly in the unwary.7
Power, especially wealth, is valuable not in and of it-
self, but instrumentally. Its ethical valuation by the
wise depends on setting, the context within which it is
used. For that reason, the extensive references to
generosity, direct and implied, suggest at least one way
121:24
216:18; 18:12.
316:18-19; 15:33; 16:5, 8; 17:19.
420:13.
521:17.
621:6; 22:16
721:20.
352
in which riches are to be used wisely:1
All day long the wicked covets,
but the righteous gives and does not hold back.
21:26
He who has a bountiful eye (tiwb-cyn) will be blessed,
for he shares his bread with the poor. 22:9
While economic inequity is clearly a major concern
in the B collection, the wise here are not so close to
either pole of the issue that they become strident and
humorless. Their sense of ironic distance remains,2
implying that they do not identify themselves completely
with rich or poor. Distance, irony, ambivalence, ethical
concern, all suggest that this composition issues from a
group that has not become accustomed to inherited wealth
or privilege even if they have it,3 is subject to the
vagaries of power, but is sufficiently confident in its
station that it may at least subtly "lecture" itself and
others on their moral obligations. Further, poverty is
more than a theoretical possibility for them,4 the ad-
versity sayings seem to confirm this,5 without becoming a
1See Appendix, Table 30.
218:23, 18; 20:14(?); 19:7, 4.
319:14.
4See Appendix, Table 29.
522:1-2; 19:22, 1; 17:5; 16:19.
353
fixation. Wealth and poverty are both "existential"
realities in the B composition.
As we shall shortly see, privilege brings obliga-
tion, "noblesse oblige":1
He who oppresses the poor to increase his own wealth,
or gives to the rich, will only come to want. 22:16
The poor become a special moral concern of those who have.
Restraint remains a feasible strategy for those who are
comfortable, but not well-to-do. With the attainment of
wealth and influence, one can no longer be self-contained.
Riches and power affect others simply because one has them.
To some extent, they breach demesne in rather the same way
that situations which demand that one speak, and do so
effectively, serve to breach the confines of demesne.
Benevolent use of this influence restores balance, there-
fore quiet confidence in one's position.2
He who closes his ear to the cry of the poor
will himself cry out and not be heard. 21:13
If wealth and generosity are a concern in B, so is
poverty along with its implications.3 Two themes recur
in these sayings. First, the poor are subject to the
1See Appendix, Table 31.
219:17; 21:13; 22:2, 9; 18:11; 21:26.
3See Appendix, Table 34.
354
control of the wealthy.1 Second, to be poor is to be
friendless: those continually in need exhaust the gen-
erosity of both family and friends. Pleas for relief of
their plight serve only to alienate further those on whom
they might formerly have relied:2 "a poor man is deserted
by his friend."3 Disposition is more important than
poverty. Thus, in two tiwb-mn sayings, personal integrity
supercedes wealth, particularly when riches lead to con-
ceit, over-confidence and folly:
Better is a poor man who walks in his integrity [btmw]
than a man who is perverse in speech, and is a fool.
19:14
It is better to be of a lowly spirit with the poor
than to divide the spoil with the proud. 16:19
Saying 19:22 is a variant comparative which stresses in-
tegrity as hisd:5
What is desired in a man is loyalty,
and a poor man is better than a liar.
For these sayings to carry weight, clearly poverty
must be viewed by the wise group at this time as being a
considerable misfortune. Yet, for poverty to form the
122:16; 22:7; 18:23.
219:7 (v. 7c is difficult).
319:4b.
4Cf. 28:6a.
5See Appendix, Table 35.
355
focal point of sayings concerning power, altruism and the
dilemmas of the wise' ethics, these alternatives should
likely have been more than purely theoretical. Both wealth
and poverty, gain and loss of social station, seem to have
represented real and plausible possibilities in the lives
of this wise group. Thus, the B composer considers the
relationship of ethics and its intrinsic system of values
to social position. While 17:6 equates want or low
station (rš, cf. dl elsewhere) with personal calamity ('yk),
it also reflects an "iconoclastic" trend in these sayings:
He who mocks the poor insults his Maker;1
he who is glad at calamity will not go unpunished.
17:5
The B composer evidences a special concern for the
poor that goes beyond what we call noblesse oblige. Rather,
it seems to reflect a concern for the possibilities of
virtuous life irrespective of social station. The wise
assess position by a standard which departs from that of
their society2--disposition, personal integrity within
one's appropriate social role, is what is ethically rele-
vant, to the extent that social fortunes may be overturned
by one with proper character.3 They aspire to such social
1Cf. 14:31a.
2See Appendix, Tables 36 and 37.
322:4; 21:13; 17:2.
356
transformations, knowing that they may not come about.1
Ultimately, virtue is its own reward.2 Note that poverty
itself is not ennobling; it is a social calamity. Disposi-
tion, not station, counts. The virtues of upright character
realized in conduct supercede the positive, or negative,
benefits of social position. Allegiance to Yahweh, humility,
integrity, reputation, esteem, diligence and good marriage
all mean far more than an one's station in life.3 In sum,
The rich and the poor meet together,
the Lord is the maker of them all. 22:2
The B composer seems to reflect a wise group who are not
mere custodians of the social status quo.4 They are suf-
ficiently close to wealth and want, socially and intel-
lectually, to perceive the ethical ambiguities inherent in
each and to chart their own course through them independent
of their society's values as such.
While the B composition treats the pledge or surety
relationship, it does not consider it as an independent
status.5 One saying6 points up the influence inherent in
116:19; 19:1, 22.
217:5, 16:16; 22:1, 4.
316:19; 19:1, 14, 22; 21:5; 22:1, 4.
4See Appendix, Tables 36 and 37.
5See Appendix, Table 26, Part L.
622:7.
357
wealth and money. It and two others1 focus on the loss of
control (demesne) that comes with borrowing or surety, thus
reflecting more on the discipline of restraint than on a
particular social relationship. The wise person avoids be-
coming thus dependent on others--through borrowing or be-
coming surety--while continuing to exert control over his
own property when others are foolish enough to enter such a
relationship.
The slave is mentioned only three times, one of
which is metaphorical.2 A second treats the proprieties of
power and position, relating slave to prince.3 The third
places the slave within the context of family rather than
social relationships.4 Thus, though its extent may be un-
clear, there is a material familial dimension to the slave's
position evidenced in this material, even though the status as
such seems rather removed from the "existential possi-
ilities" of the B composer. Slavery is tangential to his
thought.5 It is relevant insofar as it continues to af-
firm the distinction between the social value of one's
position and the value of one's integrity and faithful
117:18; 20:16.
222:7 (in connection with borrowing).
319:10.
417:2.
5See Appendix, Table 38.
358
conduct. Propriety means one has an ethical responsibility
to act in terms of one's social role, but one's disposition
is not determined by his social position.1
The foreigner appears equally tangential.2 He
figures into one saying concerning surety and pledge:
Take a man's garment when he has given surety
for a stranger and hold him in pledge when
he gives surety for foreigners [nkrym, Q nkryh!]
20:163
The saying concerns demesne, leaving the place of the
foreigner obscure. The Qere of this saying and 22:14 sug-
gest the image of the "foreign woman" or ‘yšh zrh4 to a
reader sensitized by the image in other wisdom. Only at
29:3 do we find any other reference to the foreign woman or
prostitute within the four major collections.5 In addition,
the image appears in the shorter intermediary collections
at 23:27-28, at the conclusion of a series of hortatory dis-
courses with the vocative reminiscent of the setting of the
parallel sayings in chs. 1-9. Verse 29:3 uses zwnwt,
limiting the parallel. Saying 22:14 could conceivably be an
addition, since it is the third saying from the end of
1See Appendix, Tables 14, 35, and 39.
2See Appendix, Table 40, Part H.
327:13 (except qhi for lqhi).
4V. 14 zrwt.
5There, D.
359
the B collection, which breaks off with the Amenemope
material. On the other hand, nothing about the saying it-
self compels symbolic, let alone mythic, interpretation,
and any relationship with the foreign woman image may be
extraneous, purely inferential or even, contra Bauer-Kayatz,1
anachronistic. In the context of the B composition, the
sense of the saying could adequately be given by pointing
up once again Yahweh's power, especially over those who act
without restraint or self-control. Yahweh may (not, must)
use such lack of discipline as an occasion to work his own
purposes.
In this connection, the rhetorical style of B be-
comes important. The composer(s?) makes no use of mythic
or highly symbolic language. When he turns to metaphor, he
appropriates stock symbols and figures from what seems to
be a technical vocabulary having relatively narrow and well-
defined meanings. This vocabulary appears from an examina-
tion of B's own usages: by and large, one need not refer
elsewhere to discover that B is using stock terminology.
Our first obligation obviously is to see what B means by
his language, irrespective of other applications. B's
metaphors are conventional and relatively closed: concrete
and narrow in scope. The foreign woman symbol is (almost)
1 Bauer-Kayatz, Proverbien 1-9; Bauer-Kayatz,
Einführung, pp. 36-=38, esp. 37, n.3.
360
mythic, broad in its polyvalence, highly abstract--symbol
rather than metaphor, to the extent that we may make a dis-
tinction between the two. On the other hand, the prostitute
as a metaphor is quite within the rhetorical reach of B.
Significantly, the mashal literature, the proverb collec-
tions, turns to abstraction rather than symbol in making
general, potentially multi-valent statements. Indeed, it
is that propensity for using abstract technical vocabulary
which makes the proverb literature so difficult to read or
interpret. We cannot exclude the image of the prostitute
prefiguring or even subtly suggesting other usage, but the
thrust here seems straightforward and concrete. Taken this
way, the saying tells us little if anything at all, about
“foreignness.”
Whether the product of one or several writers, the
B collection, as we have argued, seems to call for the
existence of a group whose accumulated and collective counsel
was superior to that of any one member. Moreover the group
acted as custodians of this learning, instructing the
educable in this heritage. While the sayings here give no
certain evidence of the work or social location of the wise,
inferences can be drawn. B shows ambivalence and value-
conflict when social situations are close to the writer
(and, presumably, his group). This group experiences wealth
and poverty, high and low station, as real possibilities in
361
life, irrespective of personal virtues. They do not in-
herit wealth or position so secure that it can neither be
lost nor materially enhanced. Rather, they live by what
they do, not who they are. Thus, the capacity to project
an effective image in dealing with the powerful becomes a
vital group value—hence, their focus on effective speech.
They seem to work in administrative milieu of information,
judgment and decisions: false statements threaten the
viability of their working positions. Close to those who
have power, they esteem it, but perceive its fickleness.
The king and the nobility are more remote than the wealthy
and powerful; their power and its rightness are taken for
granted. The king is remote; his power, quasi-divine. One
would expect a more complex humanized view, cognizant of
arbitrariness born of politics, intrigue and aristocratic
conflicts, from a group close to the king or high aris-
tocracy. Such ambivalence appears toward wealth and poverty,
suggesting a more modest and intermediate position for this
group. They have enough not to be forever subject to the
control of others; little enough so that they project their
concern about the loss of control inherent in wealth onto
those with more than themselves. These characteristics
suggest middle-rank career officials in the employ of the
state and others, dependent on their work or wits for ad-
vancement but with some confidence (but not certitude) that
362
integrity, fidelity and diligence will be rewarded. While
loss of position is a real calamity, it is not a fixation.
There is far more to life of value than one's position.
In this respect, the wise here reformulate the social order.
They have sufficient stake in the present order that they
value it and seek a measure of fulfillment within its
proprieties. Yet, wisdom is not equivalent to social posi-
tion; status is not presumptive evidence of wisdom. Neither
is wisdom a radical inversion of the social order, whether
this-worldly or other-worldly. The wise perceive their
demesne, their limits of personal control, and seek to act
within it. Overreaching is the cardinal sin. Social posi-
tion is not good, it is given; it is part of demesne. Any
realization of wisdom must be accomplished within that given,
though it maybe an intrinsic value that does not lead to
social preference or advancement. The social order, then,
is affirmed to the extent that it is given. Wisdom values,
however, are relatively, if not entirely, independent of
that system. Though wisdom is possible for every status,
and no one station is free of folly, each class has its
special virtues and vices. The king's virtue is righteous-
ness; his vice, evil deeds and judgments. The nobility,
one suspects, might be characterized by, respectively, grace
and perhaps boorish insipidity. The wealthy may be generous
or grasping. The educated are wise or foolish. The poor
363
are uprightly faithful or dependently servile. Slaves may
be trustworthy or, one might guess, self-aggrandizing.
Wisdom and folly are the special virtue and vice of this
“middle-class” officialdom. Each class may realize wisdom,
or folly, but they appear in forms appropriate to that
position in society. Each vice is not ignorance but failure
to observe the bounds of demesne, overreaching the discipline
of restraint, pride, hence hubris. Recognition of demesne
is faithfulness and integrity; competent action and self-
control within its bounds is wisdom, realized as the special
characteristics of each position. We have to make in-
ferences to reach such a list, but, to the extent that it
be accepted, it suggests the relative independence of wis-
dom versus class which can masquerade as class itself only
because it takes the social order as a given, seeking ac-
complishment within it. The adversity sayings (infra)
strongly suggest that the wise value wisdom over their
social position. Finally, one might even infer that Yahweh's
righteousness, for this group, reflects Yahweh's kingly
role: it is Yahweh's wisdom seen in ruling and governing,
casting righteousness in a slightly different light.
Though important elements of our depiction of the wise have
yet to be sketched, we can already begin to see difficulties
with arguments from retribution and order that seek to
represent or depict the wise, at least with respect to the
364
B composition. The wise’ interpretation of their world
shows notable affinities with what Weber called "inner-
worldly asceticism" (innerweltliche Askese), though such a
characterization would be far too broad and general to be
entirely satisfactory for this
literature.1
The life-world: social institutions
The family and familistic language recur within
these sayings.2 We find references to father, mother, wife,
son, child (ncr), youth (bhiwr), grandchild, the aged,
brother and friend/neighbor--not to mention the outsider or
foreigner already discussed. As one might expect with re-
lational language, several different familistic terms tend
to occur within any particular saying and several relation-
ships may be implied. Occasionally, these terms take on a
symbolic or metaphorical sense, especially the term
“brother.” Generally, however, the terms seem to refer to
the institution of the family, though often in an abstract
or generalizing way. With the exception of the vocative
bny in the admonition 19:27, there is no evidence that the
terms should be taken as an indirect reference to some other
institution or social relationship. There is, for example,
no implication that “father” or "son" have any sort of
1Weber, Protestant Ethic, pp. 79-92.
2See Appendix, Table 41.
365
school or apprenticeship setting.1
Fathers are mentioned seven times.2 In each case,
other familistic terms appear: son,3 mother,4 wife,5 and
grandchildren and the elderly.6 Where sons are juxtaposed
to fathers, the grief of a son's folly for his parents ap-
pears in three sayings,7 violence toward parents is de-
plored once8 and his cursing of his parents is once decried.9
Only 17:6 casts this relationship in a more favorable light,
and it emphasizes the glory of grandchildren for one who is
old, while sons are honored by their fathers:
Grandchildren are the crown of the aged,
and the glory of sons is their fathers.
Against this left-handed compliment are arrayed sayings like:
A stupid [ksy!] son is a grief to his father;
and the father of a fool has no joy. 17:2110
1McKay, pp. 426-35. See Appendix, Table 41, Parts
A, D and H.
217:6, 21, 25; 19:13, 14, 26; 20:20.
317:6, 21, 25; 19:13, 26; and implied in 20:20.
419:26; 20:20; and implied in 17:25.
519:13, 14.
617:6.
717:21, 25; 19:13.
819:26.
920:20.
10Cf. v. 25, 19:13a.
366
Whoever does violence to his father and chases away
his mother
is a son who causes shame and brings repproach. 19:26
The relationship between youth and age, however,
represents a counterpoise to the father sayings at least
insofar that they are silent about the grief youth may
cause. Saying 17:6 involves an ironic inversion of time;
it is tied by catch words (ctirt, tp’rt) to 16:31 preceding:
A hoary head is a crown of glory;
it is found in the way of righteousness: (BK)
In 20:29, one finds an appreciation of youth that otherwise
seems to be lacking in these sayings:
The glory of young men is their strength,
but the beauty of old men is their gray hair.
Clearly, youth militates against wisdom; it is a stage of
life in which the way of wisdom may be lost and is there-
fore perilous to the youth and stressful to the parent.
Youth is not, however, to be devalued or evil ipso facto.
Wisdom comes with age. The implication seems to be that
those who are wise expect and desire that their sons (pre-
sumably) succeed them in wisdom. They look to their chil-
dren, not generally to surrogate children,1 to follow their
example. The role of family-based in-group recruitment
among these wise, therefore, should probably not be under-
stated.
1Cf. 17:2.
367
Train up a child in the way he should go,
and when he is old he will not depart from it.
22:6
Right conduct cannot be assumed; it is something that must
be attained in the child through disciplined development
structured by the parent.
Wives are mentioned four times;1 mothers, three,
each time parallel to father (!).2 Two of the wife sayings
follow the tiwb-mn form;3 each is a saying of adversity.4
In each case, the wise man faces a dilemma. He has to de-
cide between undesirable alternatives. The obvious impli-
cation is that such relationships which place the wise
person in an untenable position occur; such choices have to
be made, electing the lesser of two evils. Here, a mar-
riage of contention and conflict represents one of the most
unhappy and disruptive situations in which one who is seek-
ing the wisdom can find himself. Better loneliness and isola-
tion than such disruption. These sayings place a high
value upon a sound and supportive marriage; a good wife
facilitates the way of wisdom for her spouse. Both the
choice of a wife and the wife's own conduct are fundamental
118:22; 19:13; 21:9, 19.
217:25; 19:26; 20:20.
321:9, 19.
4Cf. Appendix, Tables 41, Part C, and 29.
368
to the development of right conduct, a good relationship
with Yahweh and successful pursuit of wisdom:
It is better to live in a desert land
than with a contentious and fretful woman. 21:19
He who finds a wife finds a good thing,
and obtains favor from the Lord. 18:22
As the ultimate good, the way of wisdom supercedes even
the marital relationship. Still, the family is pivotal
to the development, maintenance and communication of the
character and discipline of wisdom. Thus, the character
of one's wife critically affects one's ability to develop
that disposition which is wisdom. This material seems to
presuppose a male perspective. The role of father pre-
dominates over the (almost totally implicit) role of hus-
band. The father's role in discipline receives heavy
emphasis; the mother's, mostly implicit stress, though it
is by no means beyond inference.1 The value of the wise
disposition as of righteous character redounds through
and is expressed in terms of the father-son relationship:
A righteous man who walks in his integrity--
blessed are his sons after him! 20:7
While women or daughters are not explicitly credited with
wisdom, and that relationship attains no symbolic status
in this work, there is something to the disposition of a
woman that one must assume can be developed and which must
1See Appendix, Table 41, Parts, A, B, C and D.
369
be sought for her husband and children (sons) to hold to
the way of wisdom. Interestingly, the vices of the bad
wife presented in the adversity sayings are those of
passion and heat: quarreling, contention, fretting.
They also imply abuse of speech! The good wife, by im-
plication, practices that same restraint which typifies
one who pursues wisdom.
All of the references to the mother role occur in
the context of sayings which deal with the foolish or dis-
respectful son: violence to parents,1 cursing parents2
or general folly.3 The first two stress, albeit by a
rhetorical inversion of extremity, filial respect and
responsibility, perhaps at least in part because wisdom
can only come with mature age, though obviously these
sayings also deal with surrender of the self to vicious
passions. The third is consistent with the view that the
fool's folly has contagious consequences. Those who are
closest to him and whose lives are most inextricably
bound up with him will be most affected by the conse-
quences of his disposition and conduct.4
119:26.
220:20.
317:25.
4See Appendix, Tables 42 and 43.
370
Several sayings refer rather generally to children,
though the child would seem to be male (ncr) so that these
sayings might be included with son sayings. Two sayings
stress discipline.1 The former has become a cliche, at
least in English, but it stresses the gradually and sys-
tematic acquisition of disposition. The way, disposition
and conduct, is and must be acquired while growing up, as
a process of development.2 The latter almost equates
folly with ignorance, but that equation is rhetorical
(effect and cause made equivalent).3 Wise disposition is
not natural or inherent. Ignorance in a child becomes
folly in an adult. The discipline is begun while one is
a callow youth or not at all. Youth is the gateway to
wisdom as to folly.
Folly is bound up in the heart of a child,
but the rod of discipline drives it far from him.
22:15
Verse 20:11 is what we might call an observation:
it is a pithy insight into human nature, a keen recognition
and summary of how people actually behave, seemingly with-
out a judgment as to that behavior.4 The recurrence of
122:6, 15.
2Cf. Appendix, Tables 20, 39, and 44.
3See Appendix, Tables 26 and 28.
4See Appendix, Tables 45 and 46.
371
observations among these sayings may account in part for
the alleged pragmatism, not to mention secularity, of this
material.1 Something about human conduct and nature is
seen which is simply given as an 'observation' for what
it may be worth, apparently non-judgmentally. If this
saying is an observation, then it expresses the universal
experience of adults dealing with children: children have
keen insight into what is expected of them, yet may behave
in ways sharply at variance with what they know to be right.
Just the way a child goes about doing something
shows clearly whether what he is doing is proper.
Even a child makes himself known by his acts,
whether what he does is pure and right. 20:11
Even a child is not an a-moral being. Yet the saying lends
itself to other, non-observational, interpretations as well.
First, righteousness (unlike folly?!) forms part of an
inherent moral sense which even children have. That in-
trinsic sense forms the basis for the development of what
we are calling "character" or "disposition." The act is
the unveiling of something that is not practical or prag-
matic, that is prior to conduct: it is the revealing of
the character out of which that act inevitably springs
(ytnkr-ncr). Second, the saying represents a counter-
poise to 22:15. The child is capable of right action.
1See Appendix, Table 47.
372
Folly is potentially present in youth, but it is not in-
herent. The child can elect or act out that righteousness
which is the sine qua non of the way of wisdom or the child
can choose evil or folly. Youth does not equal folly,
therefore ignorance also is not the same as folly.1 Un-
derneath the observation lie some understandings of human
nature that are fundamental to the distinctive position
of this (wisdom) material.
Eight sayings deal explicitly with the role of
son;2 at least two others are implicit.3 Eight are ex-
plicit or implicit father-sayings, with which we have al-
ready dealt. One deals with the faithful slave.4 The
last presents the stock figure of the callow youth whose
ignorance can and must be overcome through discipline:
Discipline your son while there is hope;
do not set your heart on his destruction. 19:18
Ironically, while these sayings portray the vulnerability
of parents, particularly the father, to the ignorance and
potential folly of their offspring, no saying states that
parents might somehow gain glory and honor through the
conduct or disposition of their children. In fact, 17:6
1See Appendix,. Tables 20 and 48.
217:2, 6, 21, 25; 19:13, 18, 26; 20:7.
320:20, 29.
417:2.
373
inverts that theme. It would be too much to take this
curious balance, particularly on the basis of silence, as
evidence that these wise strongly disvalue youth. If that
were so, the concern with the institution of the family,
to the exclusion of many other social institutions, that
is expressed here would be inexplicable. The clear im-
plication is that these wise desire that their sons
(children?) eventually follow them on the path of wisdom:
like many elites, this group would seem to sponsor its own
children for its successors. Rather, we might infer that,
while a youth, one's capacity for wisdom and maturity of
disposition is by definition low, while one's vulnerability
to folly is high. The contagion of folly exposes those
close to one to its consequences.1 Hence, these parents
have little to gain from their youth qua youth, but stand
to lose much if their children go astray. The sayings
reflect that disparity.1
Six sayings deal with brothers;2 none with sisters.
One is a slave saying,3 previously dealt with. Three are
friend-sayings that juxtapose brother and friend as re-
lationships of faithfulness and intimacy. Verse 18:9
1See Appendix, Table 42.
217:2, 17; 18:9, 19, 24; 19:7.
317:2.
374
treats "brother" metaphorically. In 28:24b, the same
basic phrase appears using hibr for 'hi, thus indirectly
linking this verse as well to the comparison between
brother and friend. Only 18:19 may deal with the brother
as a straightforward kinship relationship, but unfor-
tunately the saying is quite corrupt. It seems to stress
fraternal loyalty and mutual reliance.
There are eleven sayings which explicitly portray
the stock figure of friend or neighbor.1 Two others might
be considered implicit.2 Nine use the term rch or a re-
lated form; one, 'wlp;3 one, 'yš-'mwnym.4 The figure sym-
bolizes steadfastness, loyalty, fidelity, faithfulness
and integrity. By poetically juxtaposing friend and
brother, the kinship relationship becomes a thematic
bridge whereby the figure of the friend is brought into
the closest circles of intimacy for these wise: the
friend is like a close member of the family.5
There are friends who pretend to be friends,
but there is a friend who sticks closer than a brother.
18:24
116:29; 17:9, 17, 18; 18:24; 19:4, 6, 7; 20:6;
21:10; 22:11.
220:16 and 19.
317:9.
420:6.
5See Appendix, Table 24.
375
‘yš rcym lhtrwcc
wyš ‘hb dbq m’h. 18:24
First, the friend sayings stress the character of
the friend:
A friend loves at all times,
and a brother is born for adversity. 17:17
Many a man proclaims his loyalty,
But a faithful man who can find? 20:6
Character is important in assessing the conduct of the
friend; there is a propriety of conduct toward one another.
Friendship is a value that transcends particular acts.1
Judgment is called for in determining how to act toward
the other, for if the other be a friend, special obliga-
tion is due. Being a friend and friendship seem to be
part of the character or disposition of wisdom: to become
is, in part, to be and behave as a friend. Thus, the
character of the friend qua friend raises a special pro-
priety or obligation, one which impinges upon them both:
He who forgives an offense seeks love,
but he who repeats an offense alienates a friend.
17:9
Note that this saying, 17:17, and perhaps 22:11, all de-
nominate the intimacy of the friendship relationship as
love, 'hbh. Those who share friendship, founded in
righteousness and ultimately wisdom, have a relationship
1Implicit adversity: better friendship than
alienation over some misconduct.
376
that goes beyond intellect or conduct to 'way,' character,
disposition. If love be a passion, which is probably too
much to say, then it seems at least in this respect to
be affirmed in friendship and a fortiori in kinship.
Second, and seemingly at some variance with the
foregoing, these sayings relate friendship to wealth and
material generosity. If one has means, one can have
ready friendship. To some extent, we can subsume these
sayings under our rubric of 'observation.' They are the
wry recognition that where there is generous treatment of
material wealth, the sycophants gather. Yet, the language
of the sayings in no way suggests any distancing from
wealth or means that would suggest irony or perspectival
objectivity. At best, one might infer a certain ambivalent
admiration: that friendship is easy and rewarding where
there is material abundance but burdensome and fragile.
where it is lacking:
Many seek the favor of a generous man,
and every one is a friend to a man who gives gifts.
19:6
Wealth brings many new friends,
but a poor man is deserted by his friend. 19:4
We might better explain this admiration as a recognition
of the vulnerability and contagion of poverty. The poor
person cannot readily control what happens to him and
cannot easily influence others. The necessities of
life come hard. One is vulnerable to minor exigencies
377
that one of more means could easily ignore. One is
vulnerable to chance and circumstance.1 Further, one must
spend the capital of one's friendships and kin relation-
ships in a constant succession of minor but irksome re-
quests for basic needs. The poor are forever needing and
asking for something. One is tempted to add that they do
not even have to ask. To those who have some means, the
mere fact of the poverty of kin and close friends is a
burden borne with guilt that is rekindled every time one
has to see them. Their very existence creates guilt.
Verse 19:7 expresses this dimension, though its third
stichos is difficult:
All a poor man's brothers hate him;
how much more do his friends go far from him!
He pursues them with words, but does not have them.
Warnings against becoming surety or giving pledge are the
logical extension of such vulnerability: one objectively
surrenders control of his life into the hands of others.2
One is no longer able to rely on his own character or dis-
position. To be wise is to limit, not expand, one's
vulnerability. Consider,
A man without sense gives a pledge,
and becomes surety in the presence of his neighbor.
17:18
1See Appendix, Tables 34 and 43.
2See Appendix, Table 26, Part L.
378
Thus, we may infer that wealth provides a measure of pro-
tection against vulnerability. It is a means to an end,
viz. relatively greater invulnerability which is part of
the restraint which wisdom seeks. It may not be an end
in itself.1
Two sayings treat the corruption of friendship.
The relationship opens one to influence by another, an
influence, vulnerability, which the wise would seem to
wish to avoid otherwise. Friends are not by definition
either wise or righteous. Hence, one may be harmed by one
with bad character or evil disposition.
The soul of the wicked [npš ršh] desires evil;
his neighbor finds no mercy in his eyes. 21:10
A man of violence entices his neighbor
and leads him in a way that is not good, 16:29
One last friend saying sums up many of these points. Dis-
cipline, integrity and restraint are means to a life of
quality that will be rewarding. The king becomes friend
and intimate:
He who loves [‘hb] purity of heart,
and whose speech is gracious, will have the king
as his friend. 22:11
Within the life-world of these savings, the family
figures prominently. Few social institutions or relation-
1See Appendix, Tables 32, 33, 34, 42, and 43.
379
ships receive the emphasis that family does. While argu-
ments from silence are perilous, one looks vainly for
sayings dealing with most occupations, vocations, classes
or social groups. Certain of the elite appear, as do
and court. Most others are missing. Thus, the
prominence accorded family and the friend loom large.
There is a privacy, intimacy and relationalism to the way
of wisdom that is otherwise often missed. Objectively, it
means the group is more closed and higher in-internality
than often seems the case. We infer most recruitment by
sponsorship from within.
Only one other social institution receives the
stress accorded the royal court and the family in the B
collection: the law court.1 The sayings revolve around
testimony and judgment. Mashal 18:17 offers the observa-
tion that
He who states his case first seems right,
until the other comes and examines him.
There is a hint of propriety in this saying. The persua-
sive power of speech relates to the circumstances of its
use. The eloquent litigant and the well-spoken adversary
each use speech to present their approach to the case in
the most convincing light. It is a good as a tool, in
1See Appendix, Table 25.
380
relation to the propriety of its use, not as a value or
end in itself.
Four sayings dea1 with false testimony; two dif-
fer only by replacement of the last word or two by an
equivalent of the opposite valence (negative for positive
expression--19:5, 9). They affirm the integrity and
durability of true testimony. They assert the surety of
judgment against a false witness.
A false witness will perish,
but the word of a man who hears will endure.
[or:--but an .attentive/obedient man will speak
in an enduring way. (BK)] 21:28
In 19:28, we find a saying of deceptive simplicity. It
seems true by definition, almost an observation. Yet, it
appears to assert that vice like virtue is its own reward,
that evil corrupts established social institutions, that
the defect in the evil person lies in the character from
which the conduct flows, and that unreliable or false
testimony amounts to an active rejection of or rebellion
against the law court system. Like many other of these
sayings, much is communicated by implication.
A worthless witness mocks at justice,
and the mouth of the wicked devours iniquity.
19:28
The saying in 18:5 can be taken as a direct affirmation
of the judicial system as well as a rejection of partiality.
In that sense, however, the saying is trivial and it
belabors the obvious. It affirms the accepted with seeming
381
artlessness. Perhaps we should see this as another pro-
priety saying revolving around the characters or disposi-
tions of the litigants. The character as well as the act
must be considered part of the litigation. The court
cannot be blind as to who appears before it. Acts do not
supercede the personalities, characters, of the agents.1
To affirm the acts of the wicked or to hold against the
conduct of one who otherwise is righteous represents a
perversion of justice. The upright expect their conduct
to be affirmed as the wicked must expect to meet rejection
in the courts.
It is not good to be partial to a wicked man,
or to deprive a righteous man of justice. 18:5
With this saying, compare,
He who justifies the wicked and he who condemns the
righteous
are both alike an abomination unto the Lord. 17:15
Other sayings affirm the judgment of the courts and its
appropriateness.2 Hence, in what may be another propriety
statement,
When justice is done, it is a joy to the righteous,
but dismay to evildoers. 21:15
The association of courts with propriety is reinforced by
the sayings concerning lots discussed above: the lot
1See Appendix, Table 14.
217:26; 19:29.
382
decides between powerful adversaries, implying that power,
like character, is a relevant and appropriate considera-
tion in the deliberations of those in the law courts.1
Aside from the rite of lot-casting, if indeed it
should be taken as a reference at all, the cult is in-
frequently mentioned and then in fairly general terms.2
Verse 15:29, which we may include with B material, asserts
that Yahweh hears the prayer of the righteous while re-
maining remote from the wicked. The saying is more in-
teresting for the equation of righteousness with prayer,
hence (cultic?) ritual, than for the possible allusion to
formal worship or religious expression. In other words,
we shall argue below that such sayings clarify the com-
parative semantic fields of "righteous" and "wise"--the
two are related but not equivalent.3
In 21:27, the disposition of the worshipper af-
fects the quality and validity of the worship and worship-
ful conduct. What the wicked does is ipso facto offen-
sive; the character of the individual is in and of itself
an abomination that by contagion sullies whatever he or
she may seek to do. Above and beyond that, the worship
116:33; 18:18.
2See Appendix, Tables 8, Part H; 26, Parts R, S
and U; and 40, Parts D, F, and J.
3See Appendix, Tables 26, 49 and 50.
383
is doubly abominable if it forms part of an evil design
zmh:
The sacrifice of the wicked is abomination;
how much more when he brings it with evil intent
[Better: intentions, plans, designs]. 21:27
Saying 21:3 clearly places some distance between the author
and the cult. Sacrifice is not in and of itself a good.
This saying can be taken as evidence that these wise have
secular values or that they downplay the role of the cult
in their life. The saying fits in with the widespread
secular-pragmatic interpretation of wisdom. Three issues
impinge on this saying. First, the semantic field of
"righteousness" (sidqh) needs to be considered. Second,
if conduct is the outgrowth of a disposition, then the
quality or nature of the disposition of the person deter-
mines the nature or quality of the act. Third, each dis-
position implies a propriety. Thus, one who is righteous
has, we shall argue, a right relationship with Yahweh.
It is a type or quality of relationship (not the only one
possible); it is not an act. Thus, doing righteousness
amounts to the expression of a certain quality of relation-
ship and of the personality who has it. Valid cultic
worship of any kind is possible if and only if the indi-
vidual already stands in the proper kind of relationship
with Yahweh--otherwise, the worship is actually a pro-
fanation, by virtue of the disposition of the agent alone
384
(propriety). Thus, sacrifice is not in and of itself
valuable, but valuable only as the act and expression of
one who already expresses the proper disposition, viz.
right relationship with Yahweh. Thus, Yahweh clearly
favors the disposition and its expression over the cultic
act, except and unless it is the expression of such a
personality.
To do righteousness and justice
is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice.
21:3
This interpretation receives some reinforcement,
not only from intentionality sayings, but from a saying
concerning vows and one's perceptions of the holy. Here,
the act of vowing or of religious affirmation (better:
commitment, dedication in the cultic sense) represents a
genuine vulnerability. The author(s) asserts that such
an act binds. Therefore, it must be undertaken with
caution and reflection. The sacred and the cult repre-
sent significant powers that are not to be trifled with
or taken lightly. Such commitments represent irrevocable
surrenders of autonomy. The power of the sacred, perhaps
even over disposition, is affirmed.1 The saying suggests
a highly serious attitude toward cultic acts:
It is a snare for a man to say rashly, "It is holy,"
And to reflect only after having made his vows.
20:25
1Cf. 19:16.
385
One other saying may reflect some understanding
of the cult, though it is obscure at best.
The wicked is a ransom [kpr] for the righteous,
and the faithless for [thit] the upright. 21:18
The saying clearly deals with disposition and propriety
following the interpretation we are developing, but the
word "ransom" or atonement/redemption gives it a cultic
cast. We infer that the disposition of the wicked vastly
increases their vulnerability. Righteousness and wisdom
represent attempts to limit one's vulnerability. There-
fore, under the principle of propriety, those who have
evil or rebellious dispositions are due evil and ultimate
destruction. Whatever acts of evil the righteous person
does, whatever acts of folly the wise person may commit,
all pale to insignificance by propriety combined with a
due consideration of the dispositions of those who have
not followed that way. The vulnerability of the wicked
to the consequences of his or her own disposition de-
creases the vulnerability of the righteous or wise to
deviations from their ways.1 This view would represent
a modification of, and perhaps an explicit response to,
the doctrine of retribution.2 Retributive justice is not
tied purely to act. The intentionality forms the basis
1See Appendix, Table 43.
2See Appendix, Tables 8, Part E, and 27; cf.
Tables 12, 29, 36 and 39.
386
of moral consequence: it is so governed by propriety that
the consequences which accrue to those who are evil work
to free from potential harm those who are upright.1 The
doctrine may be cultic as well as moral-ethical.
Trade is mentioned occasionally, though principally
through sayings on weights and measures.2 Three sayings
associate "diverse" measures and weights with abomination
to Yahweh:3
Diverse weights and diverse measures
are both alike an abomination to the Lord. 20:10
Sayings like these could represent a serious ethical con-
cern on the part of the wise of the B collection, especially
because of the parallels to prophetic ethical concern.
We shall shortly argue, however, that these sayings belong
to a class we shall call 'noblesse oblige' in which the
elite assert and justify their privileged station (here,
in the way of wisdom and in righteousness) through-certain
highly conventionalized ethical statements.4 The concern
is formalistic rather than substantive. But, we anticipate
ourselves. Suffice to say that, if so, these sayings also
shed little light on these wise' relationships to trade,
1See Appendix, Tables 42 and 43.
2See Appendix, Table 51.
316:11; 20:10, 23. See Appendix, Table 52.
4See Appendix, Table 31.
387
merchants or measures. Otherwise, there remains only the
penetrating 'observation':
"It is bad, it is bad," says the buyer;
but when he goes away, then he boasts. 20:14
A variety of sayings deal with agricultural
settings, practices or products.1 For Skladny, this
language anticipates a gradual movement of this wisdom
away from an urban elitist setting onto the land. Wisdom
becomes both democratized and decentralized as part of its
reaction to the breakdown of retributionism.2 What is
striking about these sayings, however, is not the depth
and power of their insight, their familiarity with and use
of the vocabulary and experience of agriculture, but
rather their formality and superficiality. We find no
hapax legomena, no odd technical terms, no difficult or
obscure practices. We find metaphors that are virtually
cliche and rather banal naturalistic language ("bread,"
'honeycomb," "grass," "rain" and the like). In what way
is rural life essential to these sayings? Rather, an
urban tyro could as easily appropriate this language (and
it might therefore be more excusable artistically, if we
dare make such judgment). To be convincingly naturalistic
this language ought to seem out of place anywhere but on
1See Appendix, Table 53.
2Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp. 76-79.
388
the land. It does not. Why? We would argue that it
represents a common reaction of urban elites to their re-
fined lifestyle: the neo-naturalistic urge to recapture
lost intimacy with others and self and to be free of
alienating and objectifying as well as anxiety-producing
social structures by fantasizing a return to the land.
The fantasy serves as a compensation and affirmation. Neo-
naturalism affirms one's own value and significance. It
affirms another dimension to one's life and sense of self.
It idealizes and captures the value of personal intimacy
that being a part of an urban elite often denies one.
The language, therefore, is imagistic only to the extent
that it is symbolic. It asserts the well-rounded in-
terests and life of its author and preserver. The de-
tails and arcana of rural life are irrelevant, for one
does not seek that life literally (and modern neo-
naturalists would probably hate to live the life they so
symbolically reverence), but figuratively. The banality
and triviality of the images suggest the symbolic rather
than experiential value of these sayings. Similarly, a
few sayings mention wild animals--she-bear, lion,
horse(?)--but not in ways that would suggest, let alone
require, direct experience.1
1See Appendix, Table 54.
389
A king's wrath is like the growling of a lion,
but his favor is like dew upon grass. 19:12
Let a man meet a she-bear robbed of her cubs,
rather than a fool in his folly. 17:12
He who sows injustice will reap calamity,
and the rod of his fury will fail. 22:8
Such sayings offer little direct interpretation of the
life-world of these wise. If neonaturalistic, the life-
world is expressed through them by a kind of indirect,
almost inverse, symbolism.
There are several sayings that deal with war or
battle.1 The predominate theme is the stronghold or
fortress-city, which may be besieged. Thus,
A wise man scales the city of the mighty
and brings down the stronghold in which they trust.
21:22
A rich man's wealth is like a strong city2
and like a high wall protecting him. 18:11
Restraint offers security,3 as does one's brother helped.4
Wisdom and counsel prepare the way for battle,5 intimating
the cumulative nature of wisdom. Wisdom also makes the
stronghold vulnerable.6 There is also the deus disponit
1See Appendix, Table 55.
2Cf. 10:15a; 18:10.
316:32.
418:19.
520:18.
621:22.
390
saying:
The horse is made ready for the day of battle,
but the victory belongs to the Lord. 21:31
Here, too, the imagery is stereotypical. There is
nothing about it that suggests by vividness of imagery or
use of special terminology that the wise of collection B
have more than an abstract familiarity with war. Rather,
war seems to express conveniently vulnerability and in-
vulnerability in symbolic terms. Indeed, one saying
suggests this conceptual and emotional distance by assert-
ing the wisdom standard of valuation:
He who is slow to anger is better than the mighty,
and he who rules his spirit than he who takes a city.
16:32
Though various sayings deal with corporal punish-
ment as a means of discipline,1 none specifically locates
that within a formal didactic institution, though several
do in terms of the law court's judgment. Only one saying
seems to reflect a formal system of instruction as part
of the Lebenswelt:
Why should a fool have a price in his hand to buy
wisdom,
when he has no mind [lb]? 17:16
Several technical wisdom terms appear in this rhetorical
question.2 Behind it, one would like to find some sort
119:18; 22:15.
2See Appendix, Tables 15 and 56.
391
of formal system of instruction for which fees were
charged. One is tempted by the Greek model of paideia,
though the notion is both anachronistic and culturally
untenable. Still, the saying cannot be dismissed.
While one can make no useful statement about the form of
instruction or its social organization, the saying would
make no sense if it were not possible to think, however
wrongly (irony!), that wisdom could be bought. In other
words, the fool's error could be not merely that he lacks
the essential disposition to acquire wisdom but also that
he thinks wisdom is purchasable. Still, where would he
get the idea unless there were some formal instruction,
if only for those who had amenable dispositions and who
could acquire the discipline to which the instruction
would be at best the means? One cannot buy a disposition
or character, but that character must be put on the way,
trained, through a discipline imposed by those who have
advanced toward wisdom.1 Some formal system seems im-
plicit.
This discussion of the Lebenswelt seems to show
a focus in this material around the issue of socio-
economic status and the institution of the family. The
1See Appendix, Tables 20 and 39.
392
wise of the B collection seem to be an elite, built on
administrative authority and a specialized discipline
which they attributed to the character of the learner.
They seem to form an in-group, hence their concern for
their immediate circle of family and "friends." That
intimacy shades into wisdom. They therefore probably
sponsor their own young to succeed themselves, failure
at which is deemed a great personal tragedy. They seem
to be urban and privileged, though subject to those with
great power. They live in an administrative world of
court and courts, where language and reliability are
vital. When they look outside that realm, their language
and imagery become stereotypical, symbolic, and sometimes
banal. Their attention seems to be focussed on a fairly
restricted sphere. While arguments from silence are
tenuous, an argument from a pattern of silence may not
be: much of the social life of that society is missing,
because it did not occupy the attention of these wise.
It could be taken for granted as certain specialized areas
could not. The life of the lower classes and the world
outside the city (if our argument concerning neonaturalism
be valid) scarcely appears. They explain and defend the
world which they must interpret because of its immediacy
and their potential vulnerability to it: the world of
administrative and political power. It requires
393
interpretation only because they live within it and are
immediately affected by it. I submit we may largely as-
sume that what is missing did not require explanation.
Demesne
Third, tinder the rubric of space, we shall examine
the demesne these wise perceive, or better the system of
demesnes which they perceive themselves to inhabit and
in terms of which they feel they have to act. We use the
somewhat archaic term 'demesne' to refer to the range of
personal and social space over which a particular person,
being, institution or effect would have influence or
power. One's demesne is what one can control. That the
wise perceived themselves to deal with the world of ex-
perience in terms of demesnes meant that they understood
the world in terms of gradients of power or authority,
control. This view should not be surprising if our loca-
tion of this literature among the administrative elite
be correct. The bureaucracy is a world of semi-feudal
demesnes. Little wonder that this experience should be-
come normative for their understanding of life. The
gradients experienced in work are seen as one manifesta-
tion of a pervasive natural and religious phenomenon. The
world is organized and structured by power. Its range is
demesne. The wise person lives within his own demesne,
limiting his or her exposure to the demesnes of others and
394
thereby reducing vulnerability and contagion. Part of
wisdom is one's recognition of the boundaries of demesnes
beyond which one becomes especially vulnerable. The
fourth section, following, deals with these boundaries.
Demesne is not an act or action, nor is it expressed
directly as or through activity. Demesne is the gradient
structure of a power whose range diminishes at some bound-
ary.
Obviously, 'demesne' represents an inference. We
propose this concept as a means of interpreting the seem-
ing inconsistencies of this literature. The much vaunted
pragmatism of these wise stands over against admonitions
and judgments which flagrantly ignore self-interest or
expediency. Concern with conduct stands in opposition to
the abstraction and generality of too many sayings. The
term 'demesne' should be sufficiently neutral that we
can avoid most extra-cultural inferences and use it to
structure and interpret what seems to be an implicit and
sometimes explicit consistency with these sayings.
Demesne begins with disposition, intentionality.
intentionality, rather than disposition, is the more
rigorous term.1 By intentionality, we mean the way in
which the individual as a whole being, having and giving
1See Appendix, Table 39.
395
meaning to the world of experience, comes to (= is dis-
posed toward, hence disposition) action. “Disposition,”
"personality," "character," all are more conventional
terms which we substitute for the Phenomenologically-
based 'intentionality.' Intentionality is hermeneutic
because it presupposes a meaningful and meaning-giving
orientation toward life. It is not "intent" or "inten-
tion" but the whole of a person's character which colors
and interprets what that person then does. Intentionality
cannot be reduced to conduct.1
We have already suggested that the B material
bases its evaluation of people and their conduct on dis-
position, intentionality, not on the conduct alone. The
first clue to the approach from intentionality comes from
the 'attitude' sayings.2 They stress the state of mind
(lb, heart) of the individual as something significant and
valuable, entirely apart from behavior. Thus:
A cheerful heart is a good medicine,
but a downcast spirit dries up the bones. 17:22
A man's spirit will endure sickness;
but a broken spirit who can bear? l8:14
The purpose in a man's mind is like deep water,
but a man of understanding will draw it out. 20:5
All the ways of a man are pure in his own eyes,
but the Lord weighs the spirit. 16:2
1Kovacs, "Intentionality."
2See Appendix, Table 57.
396
Within the mind/heart resides a disposition or character
that may not readily appear in overt behavior. People do
not reveal their basic natures by what they do. Impor-
tant dimensions of personality, that are essential for
interpreting the meaning and quality of their conduct,
lie beyond immediate observation. Only through perspicacity
and insight in the context of a proximous even intimate re-
lationship can the deepest but most fundamental elements
of the other be known.1 Part of wisdom is being able to
go beyond superficial evaluation of conduct and perceive
the basic character that underlies it. Yahweh possesses
this ultimate quality, so that he assesses or judges
("weighs'!) action on the basis of what is fundamental to
that person, the essential disposition.2 In that, Yahweh
differs from people, especially those who do not pursue
wisdom. They judge conduct after their own lights, i.e.
in and of itself, apart from the intentionality from which
it springs.
The spirit of man is the lamp of the Lord,
searching all his innermost parts. 20:27
The “lamp”3 symbolically represents that essential
1See Appendix, Table 16, Part O.
2See Appendix, Table 8, Parts H and L.
3See Appendix, Table 58.
397
character.1 Note the equation here with spirit,2 which
is also terminus technicus for disposition or essential
being.3 Another term is "bones" or grm in 17:22 which
Brown-Driver-Briggs suggests can mean "self" as it may
in the difficult text II Kings 9:13; Proverbs 25:15 also
gains considerable poignance when interpreted in this
light. The wise are sensible of the quality of depth in
human experience and express it in imagistic and meta-
phorical language. Thus, too, they use the images of
fountain,4 deep waters,5 rain and clouds,6 stream7 and
the like. To understand a person, one must look within
to his character; one must look behind actions to their
underlying meaning. This quality of insight is quintes-
sentially Yahweh's. This language also casts the term
'way' (drk) in another light.8 A person's way is not
what he does but what he or she is essentially. We might
120:20; 21:4; cf. 15:30.
2rwhi; see Appendix, Table 59.
3Saying 13:9 in.the A collection parallels lamp
to light, cf. 15:30 in B, "light of the eyes."
416:22; 18:4.
518:4; 20:4.
616:15.
721:1.
8See Appendix, Table 44.
398
say that it is the pattern rather than specific instances of
conduct. The recurrence of the term suggests its
importance; it is more than a metaphor. Though it cer-
tainly implies the discipline whereby wisdom develops
and grows, the way is more than a discipline. It repre-
ents the intentional patterns of which particular
disciplines are in turn expressions.
When a man's ways please the Lord,
he makes even his enemies to be at peace with him.
16:7
The highway of the upright turns aside from evil;
whoever guards his way preserves his life. 16:17
A wicked man puts on a bold face,
but an upright man establishes his ways. 21:29
Character is a value in its own right. It gives pleasure.
It is the basis for intimacy with others, hence friend-
ship. Ultimately, it is the basis of a sound relation-
ship with Yahweh. The attitude sayings show that the
B author, and presumably his audience, distinguish the
importance of disposition, stressing the significance
of good character, even as its own reward.
What is desired in a man is loyalty [hisd!]
and a poor man is better than a liar. 19:22
Many a man proclaims his own loyalty,
but a faithful man who can find?
A righteous man who walks in his integrity--
blessed are his sons after him! 20:6-7
A fool takes no pleasure in understanding,
but only in expressing his opinion. 18:2
399
The wise have a distinct standard of values which are
organized around the quality of person that is character,
attitude, intentionality.1
In the B material, we find delineated various ways
of living, various kinds of character or intentionality.
The most important of these are wisdom, righteousness,
ignorance, folly and wickedness, though one could probably
argue for others as well, the ‘friend’ for example. The
righteous, whom we have not yet really discussed, put the
others in perspective.2 Like wisdom, righteousness is
an intentionality, it is character.3 Certain aspects of
righteousness make it difficult to separate from wisdom,
so that the two may seem to be equated or equatable.
Thus, two sayings associate the righteous person with
reflective, thoughtful, accurate speech.4 Another relates
righteousness to generosity.5 An adversity saying in tiwb-
mn form prefers righteousness to wealth; reminiscent of
the valuation placed on wisdom in such meshalim.6 Two
1See Appendix, Table 36.
2See Appendix, Table 49.
317:26; 18:5; 20:7!, 28; 21:18.
415:28; 16:13.
521:26.
616:8.
400
assert that righteousness leads to life and wickedness to
destruction, a la wisdom versus folly.1
Since we have no saying which explicitly compares
or contrasts wisdom and righteousness, any distinction we
draw between the two must be based on inferred semantic
fields. There seems to be some difference. Righteous-
ness is associated with a relationship to Yahweh. The
righteous person finds Yahweh a refuge; Yahweh hears his
or her prayers; Yahweh orders the system of justice in
favor of the righteous (not right acts!).2 Righteous-
ness appears in the context of integrity (tm) and
loyalty/hisd3 and faithfulness ('mwnh).4 Several of the
sayings have a cultic cast;5 others use the term abomina-
tion (twcbh) in the same context;6 some refer to an act
of judgment;7 others associate righteousness with wise
governance and the king.8 I would propose that what
116:31; 21:12; cf. 20:7; 21:18.
215:29; 17:15; 17:26; 18:10; 21:3.
3See Appendix, Table 35.
420:6-8, a thematic sayings sequence; cf. 20:28!
515:29; 17:15?; 21:3, 18.
6See Appendix, Table 52.
717:15, 26.
816:12, 13; 20:28.
401
underlies these sayings is a disposition of one in a
proper/valid/sound relationship with Yahweh. Righteous-
ness is right relationship to god. That relationship
then forms the basis of cult, court and kingship. Each
can be well founded and function properly if and only if
there be first a right or proper relationship to Yahweh.
Otherwise, the structure is perverted and results in
(contagious) evil. Righteousness is a way that is es-
sential for Hebrew society and for each person within it.
Righteousness is attainable: there is no suggestion that
a person cannot aspire to being righteous, that some
group or class of people are a fortiori excluded from the
ranks of the righteous except insofar that they exclude
themselves (as and through wickedness). Right character
is self-justifying;1 it is its own reward. We would
infer that righteousness is the sine qua non of wisdom.
Unless one establishes right relationship with Yahweh,
one cannot begin to pursue wisdom, hence the unclarity.
Everyone who is wise is and must be righteous and just.
To be wise, one must have integrity. But all who are
righteous are not wise. Wisdom is something that is
not as readily accessible. Some, as fools, cannot attain
wisdom; they cannot aspire to it. Even a child, we have
120:7.
402
seen, possesses a certain moral sensitivity1 that is the
basis of righteousness. The callow youth, however, does
not possess a certain intellectual or better charactero-
logical sensitivity that predisposes him or her to wisdom.
Indeed, the grief of bringing one's children to wisdom
obsesses these wise. The fool, therefore, lacks wisdom,
either by rejecting it or being unable to attain it. The
ignorant, however, are educable. The fool is no longer
educable. The wicked reject righteousness; what they do
is evil. It leads, by contagion and vulnerability to
destruction. Folly has the same outcome. Both can af-
fect others who become bound up in them. In a sense,
folly and wickedness are more closely related than wisdom
and righteousness. If wisdom presupposes righteousness,
then wickedness presupposes folly. But, to reject wisdom
is virtually to reject the righteousness upon which it
is based: hence, the probable convergence of folly and
evil/wickedness.
There is no saying that neatly clarifies this
vocabulary. We suggest, however, that the cultic and
righteousness sayings, in the light of those on disposi-
tion and attitude, suggest a kind of increasingly restric-
tive hierarchy of dispositions: wicked, foolish,
120:11,
403
ignorant, righteous, wise. The ambiguity of the relation-
ship between righteousness and wisdom derives from the
fact that righteousness is taken for granted; it is that
without which one cannot be wise, the sine qua non.1 To
be wise, one must first be righteous. One must first be
in right relation with Yahweh, implying a recognition
and presupposition of the cult. Again, it is the sine
qua non. Of course one must have "piety," but that is
not enough. Other values are higher still--which does not
mean a rejection of or normative faith. But, dis-
position supercedes practice; wisdom is more demanding
than righteousness.
Better is a poor man who walks in his integrity
than a man who is perverse in speech and is a fool.
It is not good for a man to be without knowledge,
and whoever makes haste with his feet misses the way.
When a man's folly brings his way to ruin,
his heart rages against the Lord. 19:1-3
Each “way” is a disposition. To each way belong
appropriate behaviors and responses. The ‘propriety say-
ags’ are an outgrowth of these distinctions.2 Behavior
is interpreted on the basis of intentionality: it acquires
meaning on the basis of who undertakes the action. Right
interpretation and response is to the character of the
“agent” not to the abstract ethical status of the act.
115:33; 16:6.
2See Appendix, Table 14.
404
In this sense, we see the Hebrew wise of this collection
as personal, individualistic and concrete. Acts are an
abstraction. What one is concerned with is the conduct
of personalities. To understand an act, I must under-
stand who did it. Thus, what may be fitting in one
setting is out of place in another. What is right for
one is wrong for another, even though the objective act
be the same. The act alone is not at stake; one must
consider the character of the person who acted. Perhaps
this is the meaning of 21:18 as we have suggested.1
The Lord has made everything for its purpose [lmcnhw],
even the wicked for the day of trouble [lywm-rch].
16:4
The poor use entreaties,
but the rich answer roughly. 18:23
The latter may be an observation, or even bon mot; how-
ler, it also may reflect a sense of propriety as well.
What is proper, even admirable, in the well-to-do, is
appropriate or unsuitable for the poor. Each way, each
character, has its own appropriate conduct and style. A
number of other propriety sayings have already been noted,
though the clearest deal with social class, wealth or
judgments in court. In a way, retribution is the working
of propriety. Each "way" has intrinsic consequences.
Each attains what is inherent and appropriate to the
1See Appendix, Tables 39 and 57.
405
character of the individual. Thus, many seemingly
retributive sayings can readily take on a proprietary
cast when seen in this light.1
As one moves up the hierarchy of dispositions,
one becomes less and less vulnerable. Wickedness and
folly not only lead to appropriately unfortunate conse-
quences, but they expose one to danger and disaster.
While no one can totally avoid misfortune, righteousness
and wisdom reduce the risk of it.2 First, Yahweh searches
out a person's character.3 One may be mistaken about his
way, and from that mistake incur disaster or mischance.4
What Yahweh intends, not man, will take precedence.5
Intentions bow to god's will:6
Many are the plans in the mind of a man,
but it is the purpose of the Lord that will be
established. 19:21
Moreover,
Who can say, "I have made my heart clean;
I am pure from my sin?" 20:9
Wisdom is cumulative and limited. It is a demesne. When
117:10-11; 17:5, 13, 20, 22; inter alia.
2See Appendix, Tables 16, 39, 49 and 57.
320:27.
416:2; 21:2.
5See Appendix, Table 8, Parts A and C.
621:30-31.
406
one steps beyond that demesne into Yahweh's, then one
risks misfortune in the face of Yahweh's will, especially
if that overstepping be borne of arrogance:
Pride goes before destruction,
and a haughty spirit before a fall.
It is better to be of a lowly spirit with the poor
than to divide the spoil with the proud. 16:18-19
Adversity occurs, even to the wise, as the ad-
versity sayings clearly show.1 But, one can reduce the
likelihood of misfortune by pursuing a way, a disposi-
tion, that will find favor with Yahweh and by restricting
his behavior insofar as possible to what is within one's
own demesne.2 What vulnerability means is that a person
who is foolish or wicked will experience disaster or
misfortune in ways far out of proportion to their ob-
jective behavior. The response (propriety) is to their
character, not their conduct. Even the objectively
"good" or "right" derives from a personality that is
neither, thus they gain no benefit from such acts. In-
deed, a right act done by the wrong person may be doubly
offensive, as is the case with cult sacrifice by one who
is wicked.3 Conversely, the righteous and wise avert
many disasters that might befall them on the basis of
1See Appendix, Table 29.
2E.g., 16:5-7.
321:27.
407
the consequences objectively due certain deeds, because
Yahweh searches out their "heart" or "spirit" and
evaluates their conduct in that light. They are rela-
tively less vulnerable to consequences.1
By loyalty and faithfulness iniquity is atoned for,
and by the fear of the Lord a man avoids evil
16:62
It is even possible that the increased vulnerability of
the wicked or foolish can be thought to balance the de-
creased vulnerability of the wise and righteous,3 though
we should not stress the point.
Along with vulnerability goes contagion. In
other words, character is not purely a matter of indi-
idual personality. It affects those with whom one has
relationships. The closer the relationship, the more
one is affected. Good and evil alike are contagious, as
are wisdom and folly. In a sense, then, relationships
make one vulnerable to contagion.4
Let a man meet a she-bear robbed of her cubs,
rather than a fool in his folly. 17:12
A king's wrath is like the growling of a lion,
but his favor is like dew upon the grass. 19:12
1See Appendix, Table 8, Part H.
2Cf. vv. 1-9.
321:18.
4See Appendix, Tables 42 and 43.
408
Drive out a scoffer, and strife will go out,
and quarreling and abuse will cease. 22:10
The second saying indicates that contagion may be
facilitated by demesnes of power. 'Contagion' is a
rather sinister way of saying that for these wise, dis-
positions develop and change. They are not fixed and
immutable. Wisdom derives from discipline and learning.1
Wickedness may be rebellion; folly can be arrogance or
militant ignorance.2 In a world where personalities can
be changed, but where the "quality" of the personality
has ultimate religious and ethical significance, people
can be affected through their relationships with others.
The consequences of disposition, good and ill, are not
and cannot be confined to the particular individual:
they affect those he is close to and whom he influences.
Consequences are distributed through structures of rela-
tionship and influence. The doctrine of vulnerability
merely enhances this process. Contagion also means that
the individualism of these wise can be rather overstated.
While contagion is not community, it does depend on re-
lationships and ultimately intimacy.
When a scoffer is punished, the simple becomes wise;
when a wise man is instructed, he gains knowledge.
21:11
1See Appendix, Tables 20 and 60.
2See Appendix, Table 26.
409
One is most vulnerable to contagion in family and friend-
ship, hence the poignance of a shrewish wife, feckless
child, impecunious and importuning brother or faithless
friend.
The result of vulnerability and contagion is a
sharpening of social divisions. One should seek to live
his or her life among those with righteous dispositions
and who are pursuing the way of wisdom. One should
limit contacts with those whose dispositions are likely
to draw one into their predisposition to misfortune and
disaster. What counts is the character of the person
with whom one deals.1 Thus, we infer social demesnes.
From this perspective, the wise constitute an elite in-
group. They identify themselves on the basis of charac-
ter, which they see as going beyond membership in a
particular social subclass, a certain kind of training
or discipline, or a certain parentage.2 Doubtless,
though, these objective characteristics constituted im-
portant signs for prospective membership among this
group of "wise." Yet, "ideologically," they wish to
maintain, probably with some justice, that the ultimate
test is a character which one who is wise can generally
1See Appendix, Table 39.
2See Appendix, Tables 16, 20, 21, 48 and 60.
410
perceive in another that goes beyond any specific objec-
tive criteria.1 Indeed, from the adversity sayings, lack
of certain of these characteristics does not necessarily
bar one from wisdom, if one has the disposition/inten-
tionality, though such lack makes the way more arduous
and treacherous.2 This proposal would account for our
difficulty in specifying what wisdom is, for it lies be-
yond objective conduct in the quality of a person's
character. Wisdom would then have a strong intuitive
dimensiom. Wisdom is what one is, not what one does.
Noetic words thereby take on another cast; they are in-
tuitive recognitions, not sums of rote learning and ap-
plication. This view, obviously, stands against the
postulated pragmatic interest of the wise soi-disant.
What is prudential is that one seek to fulfill a 'good'
disposition, act within and in terms of it, and live
within and in terms of a compatible social demesne.
Within this group, the beneficial contagion and cumula-
tion of wisdom redounds to the benefit of each member and
of the group as a whole. Maleficence in turn is basically
confined to its proprietary groups as a contagion.3 One
1See Appendix, Table 16, Part O.
2See Appendix, Part 29.
3E.g., 16:27-32; 20:1-3; 21:4-12.
411
gains not only the beneficent fruits of one's own dis-
position as wise or righteous but shares in their poten-
tiation through participation with like-disposed others.
Thus, the ethic of restraint which expresses these
demesnes constitutes a kind of Standesethik to the extent
that it serves to identify, organize and maintain an
identifiable social group that, at least by inference,
constitutes a social demesne or in-group.
The most encompassing of all demesnes is Yahweh's.
His power supervenes over all others.1 No insight, no
wisdom can prevail against the stronghold of Yahweh's
power:2 Whatever Yahweh disposes occurs. Human ends,
from whatever disposition they may derive, must submit to
those of Yahweh. While those who are righteous and wise
are most likely to be in accord with those purposes and
therefore most likely to experience beneficent outcomes,
no human judgment, no concatenation of human judgments
however disposed can equal those of Yahweh. Yahweh has
the (absolute) capacity to bring his ends to fruition.
Even when human purposes and the disposition of which
they are born are in accord with Yahweh's, it is Yahweh's
power that brings them to fulfillment. The outcome,
1See Appendix, Table 8, Parts A and D.
2See Appendix, Table 8, Part B.
412
beneficent or maleficent, good or bad, always proceeds
from Yahweh's power.1 The demesne of Yahweh supervenes
over all others.
Further, Yahweh is disposed (!) in terms of
standards and values which are distinctly his (i.e.,
appropriate to his disposition as Yahweh and god).2
Whatever human judgment may be, even born of wisdom and
righteousness, its values are secondary to Yahweh's
Yahweh has a distinct system of valuation.
All the ways of a man are pure in his own eyes,
but the Lord weighs the spirit. 16:2
No wisdom, no understanding, no counsel,
can avail against the Lord. 21:30
People develop a variety of plans, in accord with their
dispositions. Yahweh's supercede that diversity.3
Humility is, therefore, a virtue, because it is a recog-
nition that no knowledge or insight, no disposition, can
assure that one's intentions are consistent with Yahweh's.4
Wisdom is not absolute; it must submit to the superior
demesne. At the same time, Yahweh's values, purposes and
power are not maleficent but righteous--they are intrinsic
116:1-9, 33; 20:24; 21:1-2, 30 (!), 31; 22:5, 12.
2See Appendix, Table 8, Part C.
319:21; 22:2, 16 (JB).
4See Appendix, Table 16, Part I.
413
to and follow from Yahweh's own disposition as god.1 The
superiority of the divine demesne does not place people
in an intolerable no-win situation. While Yahweh's dis-
position is not fully knowable as such, its foundation
in righteousness is knowable. Further, relationship with
him, which is the foundation of human righteous as hisd,
is not only possible but essential. It is the sine qua
non of any knowing and any sound disposition whatsoever.
Thus, the relationship, as a kind of intimacy, supercedes
any particular intent, purpose, end or action.2 The
relationship provides a basis for trust:3
Commit your work to the Lord,
and your plans will be established. 16:3
What one can do is walk in his integrity, which
is the ultimate solution to the theodical question.4
Moreover, the relationship, upon which both wise and
righteous dispositions are founded, is an intrinsic value;
it requires no justification or legitimation in terms of
some other value or system of value. It is good in itself.
1See Appendix, Table 8, Parts D, G, H and I.
216:3, 20; 18:10; 20:22, 21:1, 31; 22:4 (?), 12;
cf. 22:16 (JB).
316:3, 6.
416:6; 19:1, 22; 20:6-7; 21:3.
414
It is its own reward.1 Yahweh's power and values are
accompanied by insight. In a sense, relationship with
Yahweh is possible because he has ultimate insight into
a person's character.2 As a part of Yahweh's standards,
he assesses a person on the basis of that integrity,
faithfulness or hisd which is instrinsic to one's dis-
position. Deeds and purposes and knowledges are all
subsidiary to the structure of character from which they
derive. The standard by which Yahweh judges a person is
character. Yahweh weighs hearts;3 he judges the spirit.4
Since character is an intrinsic good, nothing else is
necessary as the basis of a relationship with Yahweh.
For
Who can say,”I have made my heart clean;
I am pure from my sin"? 20:9
Wisdom is the quest for that character which Yahweh
values, even though it can only be partially attained.
It is also a search for that form of relationship and
valuation in one's dealings with others--to deal with
them dispositionally (hence, demesnes). Yr't-yhwh is the
115:29-32; 16:22; 18:2, 14; 19:2-3, 8.
2See Appendix,, Table 8, Part L.
3See Appendix, Table 8, Part H.
416:2; 17:3; 20:27; 21:2.
415
sine qua non of wisdom.1
Set below Yahweh is the demesne of the king,
practically in terms of the monarch's power and ideally
in terms of his perspicacity.2 Thus, we might infer a
distinction between office and person. The king's
authority to govern is derived from Yahweh as righteous-
ness.3 Thus, with the office goes the right to determine
ends and realize purposes irrespective of the wills of
particular people. In that respect, the power of the
king resembles that of god and is second only to Yahweh.
Whatever a person's disposition, he is vulnerable to the
power and judgment of the king, though one who is righteous
or wise is proportionately less vulnerable and more likely
to be in accord with the king's will than one who is
foolish or wicked.4 Wisdom is beneficial for one who
deals with the king because it enables one to reduce his
vulnerability and enhance the likelihood that his purposes
and actions will conform to the desires of the king.5
115:33; 16:6; 18:10; 19:23; 22:4.
2See Appendix, Table 10.
3See Appendix, Table 8, Part G.
4See Appendix, Table 26, Parts B and C.
5See Appendix, Table 16, Parts E, M, P, Q, R and S.
416
Still, the purposes of the king are different from those
of other people. And the disposition that inheres in
kingship, irrespective whether the king be good or
wicked, wise or foolish, means that the king's values
and goals are not precisely those of his subjects, what-
ever their dispositions. In other words, the kingship
implies a distinctive dispositional and valuational
system.1 For that reason, the actions of the king are
not fully intelligible or comprehensible--no insight is
sufficient to anticipate the actions of the king. Rather,
one can conform one's disposition to that which the king
ought to seek, since with kingship goes the potential for
special insight into a person's character. The king,
especially the good and wise king, penetrates beyond the
superficial acts and appearances of people to judge them
by their dispositions.2 Against the king's power, wis-
dom avails as it does not against Yahweh, so that one
may deflect royal wrath and channel the apparently
whimsical purposes of the king.3 The wise person has
power to act even within the demesne of the king, although
116:10, 12-15; 17:7; 19:10, 12; 20:2, 8, 26, 28;
21:1; 22:11.
2 20:8, 26.
316:14; 20:2.
417
that power is subsidiary to that of the king. Apparently
the qualities of disposition and insight go to some de-
gree with the office of king, so that the throne per se
is founded in righteousness; obviously, the power is in-
herent in the office. The king, however, is capable of
goodness or wickedness, wisdom or folly.1 By pursuing
goodness and wisdom, the king enhances his power, in-
sight and capacity to rule. Wisdom and righteousness
strengthen the effective demesne of the king. The king's
problem is not to circumscribe his power, though against
Yahweh's demesne that would be necessary, but to occupy
and make use of the demesne effectively and potently.2
Wickedness or folly, not to mention ignorance, make the
king vulnerable. The stronghold of city and kingdom are
vulnerable to human wisdom, as the way sayings seem to
suggest.3 Only when the king occupies his demesne wisely
are he and his people secure: by implication, wise
governance is a fortress.4 From our study of the life-
world of the wise, we might infer that through the royal
court, certain high officials and members of the
1See Appendix, Table 26, Part B (!).
216:12; 20:28.
320:18; 21:22, 31 (!).
416:12, 32 (?); 20:28.
418
aristocracy share in or rank immediately below the power
and disposition of the king. If that be so, however, the
only saying which even hints of such a thesis would be
20:18 in light of the cumulative nature of wisdom.
Below the king's demesne ranks the wise' demesnes.
We say "demesnes," plural, because, while the wise form
a group to preserve and enhance what they have in wisdom,
each person can govern only himself or herself and to a
lesser extent can influence others based on kinship,
intimacy, authority or persuasiveness. Life-world does
not equal demesne. The exigencies of life force one to
live among and act in terms of people, institutions and
forces that one cannot control and over which one may
have little if any influence (Yahweh, the king, the
aristocracy, the powerful or wealthy, the contagion of
the foolish or wicked). With the development of wisdom's
disposition, one develops, through discipline, an ethic
of restraint that leads one to limit his or her exposure
to the influence or control of these forces. While one
cannot constrict one's life-world, one can so live within
it that one's exposure is limited. One can seek fulfill-
ment within the demesne of what one can reasonably,
though never assuredly, control. Thus, there is a
parallel between governance and this sort of wisdom, for
living within one's dispositional demesne is self-
419
governance.1
A prudent man sees danger and hides himself;
but the simple go on and suffer for it. 22:3
Thorns and snares are in the way of the perverse;
whoever guards himself [šwmr npšw!] will keep far
from them. 22:5
It is an honor for a man to keep aloof from strife;
but every fool will be quarreling. 20:3
The beginning of strife is like letting out water;
so quit before the quarrel breaks out. 17:14
The minute one invests himself outside the demesne he can
govern, he becomes progressively enslaved to forces he
cannot control:
The rich rules over the poor,
and the borrower is the slave of the lender. 22:7
The man of discernment has wisdom there before him,
but the eyes of the fool range to the ends of the earth.
17:24 (JB)
He who is slow to anger is better than the mighty,
and he who rules his spirit than he who takes a city.
16:32
Wisdom implies a discipline we shall discuss in a moment.
It also implies insight into the characters of others. In
order to be self-governing and to limit one's exposure,
one must be able to judge the situation and the person.
In that respect, wisdom leads to insight. One who has
wisdom perceives what is intrinsic to people and situations,
and therefore governs his actions more effectively and
117:27; 19:11; 21:23; 16:17-9.
420
gives sounder counsel.1
On the basis of our analysis of their life-world,
we have located the author(s) and audience of the B
material at or near the social center, in positions of
authority and responsibility. Not surprisingly, then,
we would not only expect them to have an investment in
traditon2 and in the status quo,3 except in fact where
these are in conflict with their highest values, but we
might expect their interpretation of life to sound rather
conventional and conservative.4 Thus, the concept of
demesne can be seen not as limitation but as the basis for
freedom and autonomy. To overreach oneself is to submit
to the control of others. Pride, arrogance, passion,
volubility, and political-social-economic manipulation,
all are not liberating but exposing; they subject one to
other powers in other demesnes.5 Only by restraint born
of the increasingly wise disposition can one assume con-
trol of one's own life, govern it, act freely within it,
120:5, 27; 18:4; 22:1, 11; 21:22.
215:31, 32; 16:16; 17:16, 24; 18:15; 19:8, 27;
22:6, 12.
316:10; 17:7; 18:5; 21:15; not to mention sayings
concerning royalty and power and wealth.
4See Appendix, Tables 37 and 61.
5See Appendix, Table 26, Parts A, E, F, P and Q.
421
live autonomously. With that freedom comes responsibility:
an affirming of the status quo, upholding the proprieties
of social class, liberality, counsel, cult, pedagogy.
These follow from what is intrinsically good in life. The
universe of the wise is ordered (!) into demesnes of power,
competence and disposition. In that respect, the world
makes sense. The authority of wisdom is the authority of
an intrinsic good which also provides the means of its
own realization. Wisdom is not instrumental; it need
not be legitimated in terms of something else. Motiva-
tions are secondary, not primary, to wisdom. Wisdom is
self-justifying; it is its own authority.1 We should
probably not over-intellectualize wisdom. The world is
intelligible, not in the sense that wisdom leads to de-
tailed understanding of it, but in the sense that one
knows where and how one can act and can therefore act
confidently and with integrity. Wise disposition leads
to (self-) governance which is action, not contemplation.
The pursuit of wisdom is discipline and restraint, but it
is not by any means the contemplative life. It is the
life of autonomous and value-able action:
qnh-lb 'hb npšw
šmr tbwnh lmsi'-tiwb. 19:8
115:32, 33; 16:4, 16, 22; 19:1-3; 18:14-15; 21:
20-22.
422
Wisdom is an elite demesne. Not everyone may
aspire to it. One must be so pre–disposed that the dis-
cipline and ethic of restraint can produce the mature
disposition of wisdom. In order to free oneself from the
power of others' demesnes, wealth, authority, position
(status) and familial descent (class affiliation) seem
to be important, perhaps even a certain relationship to
Yahweh (through the cult?). Those who lack these condi-
tions are seriously inhibited in seeking wisdom and may
be barred. They certainly are, if as youth they did not
have the opportunity to undertake the discipline which
only can lead to wisdom. Wisdom is a total commitment of
one's life begun early. Everyone, however, would seem
to be able to pursue righteousness. While not offering
the insight into character that wisdom does, righteous-
ness, as we have seen, does offer an intrinsically valu-
able way of life built on a relationship with god. One
is more vulnerable; but the fundamental character lies
entirely within one's power to develop and sustain.
Righteousness is also a dimension of governance,1 so that
the righteous person also has a measure of personal
autonomy. What one lacks is the know-how to restrain
oneself within the boundaries of one's demesne (though
120:28.
423
the demesne here is more broadly and loosely drawn). The
redeeming quality is faithfulness based in a relationship
to Yahweh.1 By founding one's disposition in that rela-
tionship, one's character is grounded for self-governance
in the same way that the king's power is grounded. As an
intrinsic good, righteousness is self-justifying, though
it also is sustained through its grounding in relation-
ship to Yahweh.
Ignorance is a tenuous demesne.2 It cannot en-
dure. The wise symbolize this through a stock figure of
the callow youth, whose impress we can see among these
sayings. Ignorance is a stage of life out of which be-
gins the development of some character that will endure
throughout life. The youth lacks both insight and power.
Ignorance is powerlessness. While one may have some
basic moral sense that could issue in righteousness, one
lacks the relationship, pattern of living and of action,
and discipline out of which an autonomous, self-governing
and perhaps insightful character may develop. To be
ignorant is to be subject to any other power--it is in
a sense the ultimate vulnerability because it is so con-
sequential for life. Even if one lacks the pre-conditions
1See Appendix, Tables 35 and 16, Part Q.
2See Appendix, Tables 18 and 41, Part D.
424
for becoming wise, however, righteousness is accessible
to anyone. One's basic moral sense offers the possibility
of such a line of growth and maturity, if one does not
turn aside. In that respect, one is not hopelessly
vulnerable. In youth resides the potential for some
measure of self-governance and autonomy.1
While the ignorant have some rudimentary sensi-
tivity to the existence of demesne, the foolish syste-
matically ignore the boundaries of autonomy and self-
governance.2 They seek power, freedom and fulfillment
outside the sphere of demesne and consistently meet with
misfortune and disaster.3 In a sense, their 'sin' is
classic: hubris.4 They seek to control that which is
beyond their proper bound, that which properly belongs
to the dispositions of others. Thus, they not only bring
such outcomes upon themselves, by reaching beyond their
bounds, they impose upon the demesnes of others and in-
volve them (contagion) in that misfortune.
Every one who is arrogant is an abomination to the Lord;
be assured, he will not go unpunished. 16:5
1See Appendix, Tables 20, 29, 44, 62, and 63.
2See Appendix, Table 19.
3See Appendix, Tables 26, Parts D and P, and 50.
4See Appendix, Table 26, Part A.
425
. . . he who makes his door high seeks destruction.
17:19b
While a 'cool spirit' carefully weighs consequences,1 the
heated and passionate person substitutes action for re-
flection. Passion is a violation of the bounds of demesne.
Strong emotions issue in actions that inherently and in-
evitably carry one beyond the bounds of his or her own
autonomy--at times which such boundary violation
is unnecessary.2 Perhaps part of the difficulty in lack-
ing the predispositions that will lead one, under proper
tutelage, to wisdom is that one is frequently placed in
vulnerable situations where the path of the cool spirit
soi-disant is closed to one. One is compelled by the
circumstances of life, poverty for example, to act in
im-passioned ways that a birth of wealth, higher birth
or social station could readily avoid.3 The fool, how-
ever, is not merely one who is reduced by circumstance
to being impassionate. The fool is ineducably ignorant
of the boundaries of demesne.4 Poverty does not make one
a fool. Militant ignorance certainly does. In part,
1See Appendix, Table 26, Part K.
218:13; 19:2; 20:1, 21, 25; cf. 17:27.
318:25; 19:1, 4, 7.
417:16.
426
folly seems to be a mistake. The fool conceives that
what is required of a person, and what is essential for
personal freedom and autonomy, is some sort of action.
To be a person of a certain quality or kind, one must act.
Therefore, the fool is forever acting, ignorant of the
fact that righteousness and wisdom alike consist in
what one is (in terms of a relationship grounded in
Yahweh), not what one does. The fool substitutes action
for character. The pride of the fool has a classic, even
archetypal, overt manifestation: impetuosity.2 In his
haste (to act), the fool takes no time to reflect. Speak-
ing is more important than having something substantial
to say.
A fool's lips bring strife,
and his mouth invites a flogging.
A fool's mouth is his ruin,
and his lips are a snare to himself. 18:6-7
If one gives answer before he hears,
it is his folly and shame. 18:13
But,
Even a fool who keeps silent us considered wise;
when he closes his lips, he is deemed intelligent.
17:28
It is the disposition, not the silence, that separates fool
from one who is wise. Alas, the fool cannot keep his
117:24, 28 (!); 18:2; 19:22; 21:20, 25; 16:22, 26.
2See Appendix, Table 26, Part P.
427
mouth shut. He must expose himself to the affects of
powerful demesnes he cannot control and intrude himself
upon the demesnes of others.1 Thus, he cannot govern
himself and makes himself and others vulnerable.
The wicked, too, is arrogant and prideful, though
in a somewhat different way. The wicked person is a
perverter. He destroys. His sin is more than just un-
bounded passion. In some respects, "sin" is the right
word here, for, more than any other disposition, it is
possible to specify in some detail the vices of the
wicked. The wicked person violates the demesnes of others
in order deliberately to aggrandize himself at the cost
of others and their autonomy. The wicked spreads violence,
oppresses and scorns the poor, corrupts justice, speaks
perversion and lies, spreads strife and contention,
schemes and plots evil, misuses authority and suborns
governance, takes pleasure in calamity, violates the
principle of propriety by returning evil for righteousness,
perjures, bribes, quarrels, and is merciless.2 On the
basis of what is said in the B collection about righteous-
ness, one is attracted to the inference that wickedness is
a violation of the grounding relationship with Yahweh.
1See Appendix, Table 26, Parts E, G, M, P, Q, R
and S.
2See Appendix, Table 26.
428
While folly is a violation of insight and boundaries,
wickedness is a violation of relationship with god.
Rather than being an assault on the integrity of others,
it is a violation of personal integrity because the wicked
person explicitly rejects what is necessary to have in-
tegrity. Wickedness, if this be true, is a contravention
of hisd. It is an assault ultimately upon Yahweh, the
extreme case of hubris, rather than upon other people.
For that reason, it is due absolute condemnation. While
there may be a sense in which folly is its own punish-
ment,1 the wicked are due something more as the fruit of
their explicit rejection and revolt.2 This line of argu-
ment would clarify the special vulnerability and contagion
that seems to attach to wickedness: what is at stake is
not merely a particular kind of disposition. It is not
merely the absence of insight or judgment or the capacity
for self-governance. It is not delusion. It is not mis-
calculation of one's interests nor surrender of the self
to one's passions. It is not mere overreaching. What is
at stake is conflict with Yahweh, a rebellion against the
grounding relationship upon which civil order, justice,
the state, social relationships and the entire social
116:22; 18:21.
2See Appendix, Tables 40, Parts A, B and C; and 50.
429
system is based.1 One can do without the insight of the
wise, though at some cost. One cannot do without the
grounding relationship in Yahweh, let alone do so by
calculation. Thus, punishment must fall disproportion-
ately upon the rebel.2
At the same time, one cannot help noticing, after
reviewing the vices of the wicked, that there is a kind
of inversion of the taken-for-granted world of the wise
being projected upon the wicked. The wicked violate all
the constraints to which the wise feel bound. Further,
they represent a kind of symbolic assault upon tradition
and the status quo.3 Though the wise have been accused
of pragmatism and self-interest, in this material it
would seem to be the wicked who are accused of this.4
Such self-interested action undercuts the foundation upon
which the social system is based, grounding in Yahweh,
and must therefore be condemned. The wise, one might
speculate, fear disruption of the social order, religious
or theological dissonance (non-conformity, impiety?) and
conflict, breach of the proprieties, violation of tradition.
1See Appendix, Table 8, Parts C, D and G.
215:29; 16:4; 21:18; cf. 19:3.
3See Appendix, Tables 37 and 61.
4Cf. Appendix, Table 46.
430
As conservatives, the wise fear conflict and social up-
heaval; it is the cardinal social sin. Those who propose
or symbolically represent significant social changes
threaten the established position of this elite. The
circle of wise have considerable to lose from signifi-
cant social changes. What they value is not necessarily
stasis but continuity. The pattern of future develop-
ments should be as clear as possible. Similarly, who-
ever opposes them and their position of privilege is
likely to be tarred with the symbolic image of the rebel
and have attributed to them the cardinal vices of these
wise. Thus, the wicked person may well be a symbolic
representation for this literature: a symbolic inversion
of their taken-for-granted world, depicting what they
regard as the greatest threat to their position and their
world.
If the sketch we are developing has any validity or
plausibility, the obvious upshot of this analysis is
that the wise, as they appear through the B collection,
are very far from being anthropocentric or secular
minded. Religion, piety, is the sine qua non. The
cardinal sin is rejection of the religious taken-for-
granted, disruption of the grounding relationship, as
hisd, with Yahweh. The analysis of dispositions and
demesnes leads me to propose a hypothesis which the
431
B collection neither enables me to prove nor acceptably
disconfirms. Therefore, I must offer it for further re-
search.1 The unquestioning and unequivocal Yahwism of
the mashal literature, especially the B collection, is
curious, given what we know of the social, political and
religious circumstances when they most likely were
written. Why does none of the conflict with folk re-
ligion or royal (i.e., political) religious practice ap-
pear in the sayings? Allegiance to Yahweh is the obses-
sion of the prophetic movement throughout this period.
Where the wise concern themselves with allegiance, it is
only to the extent that they attribute symbolic sins to
a rhetorical figure, the wicked person, whom they accuse,
albeit by implication, of breach of relationship with
Yahweh but not defection to some other deity. Why? I
would suggest that we consider whether Yahwism serve, for
this elite, as a point of elite symbolic unity. In other
words, their adherence to a particular religious party
(better: ideology) identifies them as members of the
elite. Their religion is a symbol of their social status,
particularly in that they are members of a religiously
exclusive party when others of seeming high rank are
eclecticists. Yahwism is a badge of in-group
1Kovacs, 'Social Considerations"; Gottwald, "Re-
sponse."
432
identification. Thus, they do not seek to expand Yah-
wism--that would undercut their exclusive religious
position. Nor do they regard their religious commitment
as a problem: their social position, as a class, is
secure. They are much less vulnerable than high officials
to the winds of political favor. Whoever is in power must
turn to the educated and experienced bureaucrats to make
the political and social system work effectively. Indi-
viduals may suffer; the class will not. Therefore,
neither their religion nor their social position is or can
be threatened easily. Their Yahwism, according to this
hypothesis, is symbolic, unquestioned, unproblematic. Of
course it is special, restricted/ive and elitist. That
is the basis of its ideological appeal and function. I
must state again that this literature offers no means of
testing this hypothesis to my satisfaction. It remains,
therefore, to be studied. It has the virtue, however, of
explaining the Yahweh sayings in a way that seems to me
to be consistent with what else we know, according to the
most conservative renderings, about this social class.
It is also a counterpoise to the recent resurgence of
evolutionary hypotheses in biblical study.
Restraint
The concept of 'demesne' implies on the one hand
a system of values and an ethic whereby the demesne is
433
occupied--i.e., one makes oneself "at home in it"--and on
the other hand boundaries beyond which one cannot be
autonomous but becomes subject to other forces--one is not
at home there. We shall take each of these in turn.
From the B collection sayings, we have inferred
two values that are fundamental. Both are intrinsic.
One must have righteousness, a disposition grounded in
a relationship to Yahweh. From that grounding, one may
then seek wisdom, a refinement of disposition that leads
to insight into character and intentional self-governance.
Both values are intrinsic; they are not means to something
else, even the good. Self-mastery, as mastery of one's
demesne of existence, is ultimate, when properly grounded
(the sine qua non). To lose either of these values is to
lose the only things worth having in life. In fact, to
lose either is tantamount to losing one's life, it is
the ultimate disaster.l One cannot entirely control
even one's own demesne, for there are powerful forces in
the world. One has, however, entire control over one's
own character--one cannot be compelled to lose that.
Thus, any adversity is bearable, so long as one retains
righteous and wise disposition:2 character, rather than
1See Appendix, Tables 64 and 65.
215:33; 16:8, 19; 17:1, 17; 18:1 (?); 19:1; 21:1,
19.
434
the social world, is the ultimate demesne. Thus, develop-
ment of that character represents a responsibility and
high value. The discipline of wisdom is an essential part
of its successful transmission, as we have seen. The
author(s) and audience for this material are clear that
life presents dilemmas where one is forced to choose be-
ween extrinsic and intrinsic values.1 Adherence to
wisdom or righteousness can force one to accept adversity,
loss of things of considerable extrinsic value, in order
to maintain those things which are ultimate. This valua-
tion and this insight may underlie the evolution of the
tiwb-mn form.2 The saying reflects the dilemmas of choice
that one who has ultimate commitments has to make in a
world of demesnes:
Better a little with righteousness
than great revenues with injustice. 16:8
It is better to be of a lowly spirit with the poor
than to divide the spoil with the proud. 16:19
Better an equable man than a hero,
A man master of himself than one who takes a city.
l6:32 (JB)
The word tiwb, especially in variant or implicit tiwb-mn
sayings, expresses this comparative valuation process.
Thus, these people are far from being masters of expediency.
1See Appendix, Tables 29 and 36.
2See Appendix, Table 11; cf. Table 12.
435
They have ultimate commitments, and recognize the potential
costs of holding to what is of intrinsic value in life.
Wisdom, righteousness, are not inherently pragmatic values;
they are not instrumental.
The conservatism and conventionalism of this group
confounds our understanding of them, because at the same
time they generate sayings about adversity and the dilemmas
of holding to such character, they also produce sayings
which support the status quo and express admiration for
what enables one to manipulate others.1 While the
hierarchy of characters, and their demesnes, is not a
simple reflection of the social class system of ancient
Hebrew society, it should be clear that there are signifi-
cant parallels, nonetheless. The propriety sayings can
be understood as support and admiration of the social
status quo, an affirmation of the class system in the
society to the extent that class status and character are
equivalent (as they by all rights ought to be?).2 Thus,
we would see the support offered for the existing social
situation as subsidiary to other, higher values. It is
subject to the condition that the status quo reflect the
hierarchy of dispositions, as it in fact does not always
1See Appendix, Table 37.
2See Appendix, Table 14.
436
do. The elitism of these people is not built upon power.
Power belongs to king and presumably to the aristocracy
and court officials.1 Rather, the elitism of this group
as wise is built upon character and its consequent in-
sight. They place intentionality and understanding ahead
of conventional social values when there must be a con-
flict, which gives some of their sayings an iconoclastic
flavor if so interpreted.2
Nevertheless, the social system is built upon
grounded power, i.e., authority. This system generally
assures these people a measure of status, stability and
influence. They seem to be in a position where they can
appropriate and make use of the authority of others.
They have means and a measure of freedom and leisure.
They have the time, education, and freedom to develop an
elaborate and highly sophisticated, not to mention
rhetorically technical, aesthetic that is expressed both
in literature and as a discipline in life. Therefore,
they respect, admire, support and affirm that social sys-
tem insofar that it offers them such position. The view
is evinced in sayings which, as we have seen, confirm the
proprieties, uphold tradition and confirm the status quo.
1See Appendix, Table 33.
216:19; 17:2, 28; 18:17, 18; 20:9; 21:1, 20; 22:1,
2, 16.
437
Support of the status quo, in this view, would be in-
strumental and therefore conditional. The existing social
system provides the opportunity to pursue wisdom and at-
tain the highest and most demanding intrinsic value. The
system is good and valuable in that light and to that ex-
tent. It is not good in itself.
Another series of sayings can best be described
as pragmatic.1 They are not an affirmation of the formal
social order. They express approval or grudging admira-
tion for manipulation of that order and its functionaries
in pursuit of one's own end or goals. Curiously, the
wise seem to admire expediency. Why?
A bribe is like a magic stand in the eyes of him who
gives it;
wherever he turns he prospers. 17:8
. . . everyone is a friend to one who gives gifts.
19:6b
Take a man's garment when he has given surety for a
stranger. . . 20:16a
Death and life are in the power of the tongue,
and those who love it will eat its fruits. 18:21
Wealth brings many new friends. . . 19:4
But,
Under cover of the cloak a venal man takes the gift
to pervert the course of justice. 17:23 (JB)
How do we square such sayings with the sayings' concern for
1See Appendix, Table 46.
438
wisdom and righteousness above any apparent expediency?
Here again, we may appeal to demesne. Wealth and speech
in particular are qualities which can free an individual
from vulnerability to others.1 Used with restraint,
caution and calculation, they offer some extension of
one's own demesne, or relative freedom from others',
without the entanglements that inevitably follow from
passion. In other words, there are certain things, and
certain personal attributes, that can be used consistent
with discipline and the ethic of restraint. While these
wise may be ambivalent about such things, as they con-
spicuously are about bribery, they admire the extent to
which a disciplined person can use them to maintain and
secure autonomy. Their instrumental value cannot be
ignored. Still, these values are quite subsidiary and
extrinsic. They are subject to circumstance and condi-
tion. When used with passion, they menace. When used to
pervert righteousness or in pursuit of folly, they are
desperately inappropriate. Used in the context of a dis-
ciplined intentionality, they are an extension of
propriety and an effective use of demesne, therefore to
be valued, albeit cautiously. Actions are secondary to
character. Actions done out of and consonant with right
1See Appendix, Tables 22 and 32.
439
and faithful and insightful (wise) disposition are good.
The same actions done out of another disposition, or not
in consonance, are not.
The ethic of restraint, as we call it, is the ex-
pression of this system of values. The producers of this
material seem to want to limit their vulnerability to
others and to gain autonomy and self-governance. There
are powers in society which one cannot avoid nor success-
fully contest. What one can do is limit his or her ex-
posure to them. One can reduce his vulnerability.1
Wisdom is expressed as a way of life; it appears as a
holding back or self-restraint. What these people fear
most, it would seem, is the loss of their power to govern
their own demesne--loss of self-determination or of what
we have called autonomy. Self-control, then, becomes the
basis for an ethic. It means living fully within one's
demesne and circumspectly outside of it.
Restraint is emotional control. Passions and
strong emotions are held back. One is to behave reflec-
tively and thoughtfully. Speech is a public act, there-
fore one is vulnerable whenever he speaks. Thus, each
word must be weighed and considered for the effect it may
have upon one's autonomy. One who is wise uses speech in
1See Appendix, Table 43.
440
rare bursts of eloquence. These are most valuable in
influencing the decisions of powerful others who could
invade one's demesne. It becomes a defensive weapon.
Restraint means one's associations with others
are controlled. Relationship means intimacy; that in
turn means vulnerability through contagion. One uses the
insights of wisdom to assess the character of others,
though that instrument is not infallible. Associations
are, so far as possible, limited to those who are worthy,
by their character, of association. One invests only so
much of oneself in most social relationships as is abso-
lutely necessary: the minimum exigencies of the life-
world are met through association, but more investment
of self than that would be perilous.
Restraint means discipline. It means subjecting
oneself to the control and guidance of parents and worthy
elders. We should see in this relationship a measure of
trust, though no saying evinces it. In other words, the
callow youth cannot readily determine the character of
his mentor(s), and so must accept discipline in trust
that what is being done to and for him is worthy of his
commitment. There is a theological significance to that
relationship, between student and mentor, that resides
far behind the sayings themselves. That perception
should also be cautionary: there is much about the
441
taken-for-granted and implicit world of these sayings
that we cannot readily know nor infer. Yet it may be
precisely those dimensions which are socio-historically
and religiously the most profound.
Restraint means humility. The cardinal sin, for
fool and wicked alike, is presuming more control over
one's own life than one has. When carried to extreme, the
sin becomes an assault upon the authority of Yahweh. The
concept of demesne implies that one does well to err on
the side of underestimation.1 Governance is a funda-
mental virtue, but only of the self (unless one happens
to be king or a high official). That authority does not
need to be asserted, merely to be exercised. Reputation,
a high value, is made by others, not by oneself.2
Restraint ultimately means a style of life in
which one has perspective and a measure of emotional
distance. One is not without commitments; rather, one
knows what his or her commitments are, which are funda-
mental, and what is at stake. The wise are neither
idealists nor pessimists. They follow what might better
be termed a minimalist approach to life: to invest of
self only what one needs to invest, assume only what one
1See Appendix, Table 16, Part I.
2See Appendix, Table 16, Part M.
442
needs to assume. While they value other things, that
valuation is secondary and conditional. Their basic com-
mitments and presuppositions are minimal.
It is this minimalism that they share with con-
servative, conventionalist, upper middle class movements
in a wide variety of cultures--not necessarily the sub-
stantive elements of their thought or ethics. Their
minimalism extends to their symbolic world, so that they
come across to some readers as pragmatic realists. The
nature of their commitment—to character, theologically
grounded--belies that interpretation. What they have are
few symbols and illusions, but by no means none. Socially,
the consequence of this restraint is probably an in-group
ethic (Standesethik). In other words, they value their
own group and the facilitation it gives their governance
of their awn demesnes. The proprieties mean that they
owe a different kind of ethical obligation to those out-
side the group than they owe each other. Their ethics
may well have had, as many sayings suggest, a strong class
character, even though no vocational or strict profes-
sional statement comes through. Commitment to their
group and a differential ethic are nonetheless clear.
Boundaries
Demesne implies boundary. There are limits to
one's sphere of control and self-governance. There are
443
other demesnes, just as there are other intentionalities.
People experience boundary conditions because each per-
son's demesne is limited. Those limits are appropriate
to that person's character, life-world affiliations, and
location within the Yahweh-grounded social world. Since
wisdom is not what one knows but what one is, human wis-
dom is limited in extent and reliability.1 Wisdom by no
means implies absolute verbal understanding, or even
savoir-vivre. It implies commitment, and the disposition
to make the commitment, to certain, ultimate values,
properly grounded.2 In those terms and under those condi-
tions, it is rewarding in and of itself: each disposition
gets what it deserves by virtue of what it is. Thus,
there is a sense in which retribution is true by defini-
tion, since the outcome is its own reward. The con-
formity of objective rewards, though expected, cannot be
assured because it lies outside one's own demesne. In a
way, the concept of demesne lends itself to the notion of
a distribution of power(s) and its/their gradients. While
there is a “harmony” to these powers, an 'aesthesis,'
that interaction or mutual fit can only be partially un-
derstood and therefore deliberately participated in by
1See Appendix, Tables 8, Parts A, B and G; 16,
Parts H and I; 39 and 57.
2See Appendix, Table 36.
444
any person. 'Understanding,' as an expression of wise
intentionality, is less a comprehensive verbal interpre-
tation of experience's underlying orderly structure than
an aesthetic sense of the propriety of things and an in-
tention to harmonize with them well. There seems to be
a strong aesthetic dimension to wisdom, at least here,
to which we shall return below under the rubric of
'rhetoric.'
If our understanding of wisdom as demesne and in-
tentionality represents the implicit presuppositions of
this literature with any fairness, then limiting situa-
tions and boundary experiences constantly recur. They
are far more diverse than they are depicted among these
B collection sayings. Certain, presumably important,
themes recur, suggesting that they are symbolic foci for
this group, representing important aspects of that ex-
perience. Concern with these experiences becomes a
thematic hallmark for the B collection, especially in
the context of Yahweh's grounding and limiting self-
governance and conduct. The significance of this fact
rests in part on arguments and evidence which lie beyond
the scope of this inquiry. If one presupposes an evolu-
tionary view of society in general and theological under-
standing in particular--a view that has held considerable
sway in biblical studies since von Harnack and nineteenth-
445
century liberalism, then it is possible to locate this concern
for boundaries within the context of a breakdown in the
credibility of the retribution dogma.1 Thus, wisdom
loses its innocence, draws back and changes its character
as a result of an ethical and theodical frustration.
Earlier wisdom would be focussed on ethics and conduct.
The emphasis on boundaries becomes symbolic of a growing
pessimism within this literature and among its authors.
What does the recognition of boundaries mean?
We see four major lines of argument, in some way salient
to this analysis, which impinge on this argument.
First, there is the evolutionary presupposition
itself. We quickly embark upon a chicken-and-egg con-
troversy. Does the evidence compel the thesis or the
thesis compel the evidence? Which leads to recognition
of the other? Obviously, the notion of presupposition-
less research is a philosophical monstrosity. Still,
what compels us to assume the process? In part, the as-
sumption develops out of theses concerning changes in
social organization and theological reflection that have
a long base-line. They occur over many centuries, even
1Cf. Appendix, Table 6; Schmid, Wesen and Geschichte
der Weisheit, pp. 173-201; Skladny, Spruchsammlungen, pp.
76-79. Cf. the methodology developed in Paul D. Hanson,
The Dawn of Apocalyptic (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1975).
446
millenia. How is modern society different from ancient
society? It has evolved socially and intellectually.
Therefore, the microcosm recapitulates the macrocosm (an
assumption, of course, but scale-invariance is a highly-
desired criterion of good philosophy of history and
elegant social science). The doctrine, however, presumes
unilinear or at least continuous and generally linear
social change. We cannot assess the argument on that
scale here. What we can ask is a more restricted ques-
tion. Is there anything about the B collection which
compels us to see behind a process of intellectual or
social change that is leading to a re-theologizing of
wisdom? Absent such evidence, the assumption of scale-
invariance in the application of evolutionary theory be-
comes quite tenuous. Our line of argument to this point
has been in quite the contrary direction. We have argued
that the sayings belie a period of social stability in
which these people have a measure of confidence in their
social position. They form an elite which does not seem
to be agonizing over its status; certainly there is no
(tortured) self-justification among these sayings. On
the contrary, they seem to take the legitimacy of the
position of this group for granted: its foundation takes
some inferential reasoning to locate in fact. Restraint
is not withdrawal. These sayings are far from jaded,
447
disappointed, sad, wistful or pessimistic. Rather, they
are energized,1 optimistic2 and strongly supportive of the
social status quo. While the sayings clearly do not as-
sume social rigidity, they do not treat social change as
caprice or chance. They are confident of their ability,
within the bounds of discipline and restraint, to cope
with it. Even the possibility of royal whim, and the
menace inherent in it, is seen in perspective, with the
assurance that wisdom can cope; indeed, even the king
must give way to the power and purposes of Yahweh.3
What these people fear is the vulnerability and contagion
of the wrong disposition, not the failure of their ethic.
It is hard to see the force of any argument that the B
material, taken in isolation from other works and other
sayings, leads one to the conclusion that forces of social
change or socio-political instability are at work either
organizationally or theologically. It is extremely diffi-
cult to point to the absence of something and prove one's
case. However, these sayings, by themselves, do not
evince a theology in trouble. Rather, the theology seems
too be clear, stable and untroubled. The boundary
1Sayings on work and sloth.
217:22; 18:14; 21:21; 22:11.
321:1, 31.
448
material is quite compatible with such stability in terms
of such concepts as demesne and intentionality.
These last points lead us to our second line of
argument. From the B material we have projected an
upper-middle-class elite whose authority and its legiti-
macy are both derived from others whom they closely serve
--Yahweh, king, aristocratic officialdom. Thus, they
are aware of their vulnerability to power, and the
caprice with which it is sometimes exercised. On the
other hand, they possess an expertise and station which
significantly reduces their vulnerability despite their
proximity. The concept of demesne is a natural evolution
from bureaucratic and governmental experience. Deriva-
tive authority and proximity to power lead fairly straight-
forwardly to the recognition of boundaries. Moreover,
one's privileged social position cannot be explained in
terms of the ultimate legitimations of the authority one
is entitled to dispose--those legitimations belong to
others, basically to king and court.1 One can find one's
legitimation, however, in the way one exercises derived
authority: in the style or personality of the individual
rather than in the overt conduct. In fact, this situation
explains a subtle iconoclasm that may seep in. While the
116:12b; 21:1; 22:11 (?).
449
truly powerful are elite in what they do and in their en-
titlement to do it, these people ("the wise") are elite
in who they are. The latter then is an even higher form
of elite status than the former; it becomes an ultimate
value. Moreover, not only is character or style not
derivative from others, it is secure and stable because
it cannot readily be taken away. Unlike formal authority,
which comes from others, character inheres in the self.
One acquires character by some arduous process--here,
discipline--it is not given to one by another. Litera-
ture becomes an expression of that refinement of charac-
ter and that style. It reflects a superior aesthesis
that those who have ultimate power never develop. Again,
their position is actually higher. The highest classes,
those who have power, notoriously abjure discipline and
intellectual reflection; they reject arduous and abstract
aesthetics. They are free to use power which resides
within themselves; they do not have to worry about it.
Vulnerability is not a problem. The highest classes are
not intellectuals. The existence of such a literature
implies a measure of vulnerability for that reason alone.
More, it reflects the search for a means of justifying
elite position; it is an ideological defense cast in
aesthetic form. Demesne, therefore, did not evolve in
response to ethical conflict. Boundaries are the
450
inevitable experience of those who use the authority of
others--who have to justify and interpret their privilege.
The characteristic of their demesne then becomes an ulti-
mate value in a subtle inversion of the social structure:
one would expect such a touch of ressentiment among those
in such a position. They compensate for their functionary
role by appealing to what they are as an ultimate value
and the final superiority, while still affirming the
social system and its status quo. They do this in an
aesthetic form that is most accessible to those who are
already members of the class, or who are aspiring to and
sponsored for admission to that group (such ideological
materials become didactic in use even when they are not
so in origin). Significantly, ideological material is
notorious for its lack of specificity. The language used
is highly emotive, symbolic and expressive. It rehearses
common feelings and sentiments. It is symbolic, not
semantic. The fact that many words in this literature
are difficult to define may be a clue to the nature of
the mashal collections, i.e., ideological and legitima-
tional rather than “ethico-philosophical.” The basic
issue is not ethical. The concept of demesne does not
evolve under ethical or theodical pressure. In sum,
this literature seems to be located in a setting where
boundaries were a basic life experience and where retri-
butionism would not be what is at stake socially,
451
religiously or ideologically. Hence, we have spoken of
restraint and minimalism, rather than retribution.
Third, we argue that this literature is much
more highly structured than the 'collection' terminology
or hypothesis suggests. While more study is necessary,
we have suggested, in the previous chapter, some evi-
dences that the material has a tight and rigorous poetic
structure. We shall argue that there is also a refined
rhetorical style. These points weigh strongly for
through-composition rather than collection. In the event
of such composition, we have to raise the question of
structure and theme. There are evidences of an archi-
tecture to the B collection as well as for thematic unity
and consistency.1 If the works be through-composed, then
we must discount thematic differences among them as the
basis for organizing them historically. To be more ex-
act, in such a case, thematic differences are the result
of compositional intent. Differences in theme are not
prima facie evidence of differences in date or social
setting, though they may be. Any such socio-historical
differences would have to be established on some other
ground than theme, or one's argument becomes hopelessly
circular. In Table 9, we see that there is a general
1See Appendix, Table 9.
452
thematic sequence to sayings. There is also some evi-
dence of inclusion, as the opening and closing display
some parallels, a few of which are striking. Given the
predilection of wisdom literature soi-disant for
inclusio, this pattern is the more interesting. The
theme of the passage recurs at thematically and poetically
crucial points, which we have called 'cadences' following
the role of such architecture in music. These postulated
cadences would make boundary experiences and Yahweh's
role in establishing limits the central theme of the work.
Yahweh-theology becomes fundamental to such wisdom as
does the experience of limits to wisdom and personal
demesne. The paronomastic architecture which also un-
derlies this material is far too complex to discuss here,
though some limited work has been done on it.1 We shall
have to content ourselves to asserting, without proof
here, that initial examination of this structure suggests
that it is highly intricate, beyond what the coincidences
that thematically, onomatopoetically or paronomastically
similar sayings might have. Again, through-composition,
a possibility which undermines the concept of 'collection,'
makes assertion of evolution in the material more
1Boström, Paronomasi; Casanowicz, "Paronomasia";
J. J. Glück, "Paronomasia in Biblical Literature,"
Semitics: Annual of the Department of Semitics, Uni-
versity of South Africa 1 (1970): 50-78.
453
difficult because the themes become intrinsic to the
structure of the saying rather than extrinsic and there-
fore a manifestation of the social and theological milieu.
That the theme is tied to setting remains clear in any
event, but the question becomes how. Artistic intent
and expression force thematic, if not stylistic, diversity.
That the themes can be ordered in a logical way does not
compel they should be absent other evidence. In sum, if
theme is a part of poetic architecture, then differences
in theme among various compositions reflect various as-
pects of their self-interpretation which may or may not
have any coincident historical sequence. Nothing in this
material seems to compel such sequence, though that argu-
ment in detailed examination lies beyond us. Nothing
from the life-world material compels a definable social
milieu, except in the most general terms, independent of
the theme. We have to have evidence, beyond assumption,
for attributing theme to social milieu as opposed to
other possible causations (i.e., artistic intent above
all else).
Fourth, And finally, we raise the question of
thesis. The concept of 'demesne' threatens to con-
jure up a Donnean vision of islands, separated from and
independent of one another--or of Leibnitzian monads com-
municating with one another perhaps only through the mind
454
of god. Demesne can suggest isolation. The B collection,
however, is not a work of isolation. Rather, it leads,
through rhetoric, paronomasia, poetic architecture,
thematic development, discipline and the interactions of
the life-world to a relationalism we might best call
'aesthesis.' People who derive their position and in-
fluence from others tend to be more concerned with form
than with substance, particularly if they are accorded
comparatively lofty station in the order of things. They
produce an 'etiquette.' They develop, an understanding
of the fitness and harmony of things that becomes taste,
for which they provide the leadership and sensibility.
Etiquette and taste are not concerned so much with what
specifically is done as with how it is done. Thus, we
argue for a possible noblesse oblige interpretation of
some of their conventional sayings about ethics as well
as for a neo-naturalism in their imagery. In the poetry
of the proverb collections, we run the risk of importing
our own class and culture understandings into the litera-
ture. We are accustomed to using language for the con-
veyance of information or understandings. We look to it
for meaning, signification, semantic significance. Yet,
paronomasia and various rhetorical devices may appeal to
another way of using the literature, for sound or har-
mony. If it be poetry in this form, then we risk placing
455
too much emphasis on any particular saying and its apparent
meaning. The value of the saying is, one might argue, its
structure and sonorous relationship, its harmony, with
its context. It is not merely, or even principally, what
is said so much as how it is said. Again, this view is
consistent with what we have said of intentionalities and
demesnes. We can perceive of wisdom as an aesthetic
Gestalt, a comprehensive and harmonious patterning of
life. Such harmony does not demand control, nor is its
principal conceptual category 'justice.' Rather, one is
concerned with fitting in, doing what is appropriate,
elegance and style. For harmony, it is enough that one
be able to perceive a pattern--not a rigid and inflexible
structure, as the term 'order' seems to imply--or co-
herence in terms of which one can arrange one's life
aesthetically. Aesthesis deals with values, not deeds.
Thus, it is significant that this literature returns so
often to the proprieties--to what is suitable, right or
appropriate for particular kinds of people in particular
settings. Propriety may reflect aesthesis, the har-
monious suitability of things. It is hard for harmony
to be disconfirmed. Harmony is not rigidity. Judgment
is required to harmonize, and not all attempts will be
successful. Those who have Gestalt insight--sensitivity
--will be more successful at recognizing what situations
456
require and fitting in. The attainment of aesthetic value
is hardly an extrinsic act: it is its own reward. The
reward for doing something well, as opposed to just doing
it, is doing it well. Aestheses certainly change and
develop, but whether boundaries could be taken as evi-
dence for change is most doubtful; they and the Yahweh
theology are entirely compatible with an elitist and
upper-middle-class functionaries' aesthesis or harmony,
especially as a harmony of powers.
Boundary experiences are essential to wisdom,
to living within and attempting to harmonize with a uni-
verse of graduated powers. Understanding is finite and
fluid: there is a propriety of times as well as of place
and person, as in knowing when to speak and when to be
generous. There is always that which one does not un-
derstand; there is always that which one cannot control.
One cannot entirely protect oneself from adversity, no
matter how virtuous one may be. One cannot substitute
one's judgment, insight, plans or purposes for those of
Yahweh. For one who is wise, the world still contains
non-manipulables. It is still filled with mystery. We
are accustomed to think of knowledge in terms of content.
We interpret it as a transitive relationship: under-
standing amounts to knowledge-of. For this literature,
it is possible that we should orient ourselves more
457
intransitively: to think of knowledge as a state of
being. At the risk of sounding existential, the known is
bounded by the unknown (which is in principle vastly
greater). The wise are sensible of hubris--one cannot
arrogate to oneself the position of Yahweh.1 Yahweh truly
understands what goes on within a person and acts in ac-
cord with that fundamental disposition. Yahweh truly
understands the pattern and direction of the world, and it
is that direction which he purposes which will be estab-
lished irrespective of our desires and understandings.
My knowledge, as wisdom, is limited to a distinct demesne
over which I can exercise it. Beyond that lies a world
which I cannot control, though which I may harmonize my-
self with and which I cannot fully understand. Much of
the world is ineffable. If I look to wisdom to give me
an understanding of what lies thus beyond my demesne, I
am asking for what it cannot give. In fact, what wisdom
brings is a clarification of the ineffability of much of
the world. I know that I cannot know it. The funda-
mental premise of this wisdom is not that the world is
fundamentally intelligible and therefore communicable,
but, ironically, that it is not. Yahweh, a la Otto, is
1See Appendix, Table 8, Parts A, B, C and L.
458
the mysterium tremendum; his autonomy is absolute.1 Even
the demesne of the king supercedes that of the wise, so
that his purposes can appear as caprice. To be wise
not so much to make-sense-of, again a transitive rela-
tionship, but to be in a certain (aesthetic) way. It is
from the latter that the world becomes reliable for me.
I may still experience adversity and dilemmas; death
remains a reality (and a fixation of these people).2
Still, I have hold of what is valuable in itself. What
is significant in the proverbs is the pattern which lies
beyond them. Conceiving of wisdom aesthetically alters
what we expect wisdom to be and do. Again, ironically,
freedom or autonomy is found in circumscription and
limitation, recognition of demesne.
When we start detailing specific boundary situa-
tions, we risk repeating our depiction of the hierarchy
of intentionalities, for the hierarchy is a reflection
of the boundary phenomenon. What we can do briefly here,
however, is discuss the basis for its more important
characteristics. The pivotal issue involves grounding.
1Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry
into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine
and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey,
Galaxy Books (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958),
pp. 5-59.
2See Appendix, Tables 64 and 65.
459
What is the source of the confidence and value that I
find in the way of wisdom? To argue that wisdom is en-
tirely self-grounding would amount to hubris. I cannot
ground my own existence; intentionality is not self-
grounding.1 I rely upon Yahweh. My own judgment, intro-
spection ("in one's own eyes"), provides no basis for a
claim upon Yahweh.2 Yahweh's power and authority lie
beyond any individual's claim. Human intentions and
insight are valueless in sensibly interpreting god.
Yahweh is ineffable, for to know is to bind.3 The re-
liability and dependability that I find in the world is
neither noetic nor ethical. It is aesthetic. From
within my own demesne and in terms of it, I can perceive
an aesthetic pattern (i.e., through artistic or symbolic
or poetic rather than intellectual or moral sensitivity)
with which I can harmonize myself. By so dis-posing
myself, I participate in the wisdom of Yahweh which
grounds that harmony. I do not claim it; I relate my-
self to it. (In a sense, it claims me; or in classic
theology one has grace.) I can rely on the harmony of my
being, but not on my judgment of the harmony of my being,
1See Appendix, Tables 8, Parts D and G, and 39.
2See Appendix, Table 8, Parts A and H.
321:30.
460
for god weighs hearts. Still, Yahweh's harmony is open
and subject to innovation and surprise--improvisation as
it were. The world does not lose harmony, or value, nor
do I. Yet, I may not be prepared for that possibility and
it may not work to my benefit. The aesthesis is open, not
closed, and it depends literally on the direction of Yah-
weh. If my harmony be qualitatively poor, it is a reflec-
tion upon me and not Yahewh. Yahweh is the master of the
harmony. If I do not conform to the harmony, I create a
dissonance that affects me and those nearby, irrespective
of my purpose in so projecting myself. It is not my
harmony but the master harmony that will be established.1
Dissonance can be created inadvertently. Still, if I
develop aesthetic sensitivity, if I grow in skill in the
harmony, then I am less likely than others to err and
more likely to create a larger harmony with others of
like sensitivity and disciplined skill. The development
of an aesthesis is not a guarantee but it does not con-
ceive of the universe rigidly. Rather, it is the asser-
tion of a pattern that tends to recur and which can be
enhanced by participation which is rewarding in and of
itself, therefore grounded.
In saying this much, we obviously move far beyond
1See Appendix, Table 66.
461
the text, drawing the aesthetic metaphor from the style
of the mashal literature and the etiquette of the pro-
prieties. Yet, aesthesis makes sociological sense.
Ethical retributionism or a firm (order-based) noesis are
both highly fragile doctrines for a group in the position
suggested by the life-world of this literature. They act
in terms of derivative authority. They cannot claim
legitimacy for themselves and lack power to assert their
position against those more powerful in a show-down.
They have no claim on the most powerful people and insti-
tutions of the nation. Noetic or ethical wisdom invite
isconfirming experiences. Their position is curious:
individually vulnerable and collectively secure. Fur-
ther, there is no obvious stake in a noesis or ethic to
initiate cognitive dissonance, preventing a rapid theo-
dical breakdown in the world-view.1 As aesthesis, how-
ever, the world-view expresses the mix of vulnerability
and security much more closely while also providing a
1 For a recent application of Cognitive Dissonance
Theory to biblical study (here, New Testament) and a dis-
cussion of some methodological issues, see John G. Gager,
Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Chris-
tianity, Prentice-Hall Studies in Religion Series, eds.
John P. Reeder, Jr. and John F. Wilson (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1975), pp. 37-49; cf. also my "Response"
to his work presented to the Consultation on the Social
World of Early Christianity, Society of Biblical Litera-
ture Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 28-31 December 1977.
462
basis for asserting the inherent class superiority of the
group, in terms of its character or aesthetic discipline
end sensitivity. The task of the high bureaucrat is pre-
cisely to harmonize him- or herself to the wishes of those
who delegate their authority and legitimacy through them,
to give form rather than create substance, to pattern
rather than create. An aesthetic of wisdom is impervious
to disconfirmation in ways that other interpretations of
wisdom thinking are not. It is more resilient and dur-
able; it more effectively interprets their life-situation.
And, it has the virtue of providing a means of in-group
expression and solidarity through a medium denied to
outsiders on the basis of its difficulty, sophistication
and technical proficiency--not to mention the intangible
trump-card of "taste."
Rhetoric: The Word
With the introduction of our concept of 'aesthesis,'
the significance of rhetoric to understanding and inter-
preting the perspective(s) underlying this literature
should become clearer. The style of the saying is as im-
portant as its apparent content. Poesis is the verbal
expression of the integrating and interpreting aesthetic
of this group of people. The aesthetic of the poetry
is part of its hermeneutic. The poetic interrelationship
of the sayings is integral to understanding how they
463
comprise a world-view. Atomization, combined with an
orientation directed purely to content, ignores what is
essential: the poetic integrity and expression of the
work. Obviously, this line of argument is considerably
heightened if one accept the possibility of through-
composition for the B material. At the very least, each
saying does not exist in a vacuum, either for its author
or its audience. It exists in the context of a wide
variety of sayings being honed and preserved and trans-
mitted for their value in maintaining and conveying this
people's interpretation(s) of experience, whether large
numbers of sayings were composed by the same author as
part of a continuous literary context or whether the
composition/redaction was a social-group process. Each
saying, by the very fact of its existence, presupposes
the existence of other sayings. The preservation of a
mashal literature makes this point beyond dispute. The
audience for any saying, whether presented as part of a
composition or as a separate saying, knew and used, and
would necessarily be assumed to know and use, many and
diverse sayings as part of the poetic interpretation of
their lives--aesthetic interpretation of wisdom or not.
These are a mashal-using people. Thus, any particular
saying plays and must play off against a background of
sayings with which the audience would be familiar, both
464
in particular and in general. Any given saying's mean-
ing and form of expression in conveying that meaning
would take that context for granted. This fact rein-
forces the aesthetic interpretation, for that taken-for-
granted perspective is poetic and symbolic: each saying
plays poetically off others in both form and content.
To convey meaning through mashal, the meaning must be in-
corporated into understood poetic forms and their variants.
The rhetoric of mashal-poesis is fundamental to the grammar
of the sayings. Meaning arises through in-forming and in-
stylizing a verbal interpretation of experience (von Rad!)
which communicates according to understood and elegant
expressive patterns (grammar and style). In order to
make sense of these sayings, ultimately we have to de-
velop, or better reconstruct, the rhetoric which informed
them: the understood conventions of expression which
gave the verbal interpretation of an understanding/
experience an appropriateness to the experience of the
audience once and an elegance of expression (aesthesis) that
made it worthy of communication and preservation. What
was the poetic context whereby these words became a
poesis and were so retained and transmitted? What is
their poetic-contextual significance in light of that
poetizing? In what way are sayings modified by their
larger poetic context, especially if that context be
systematic and integral?
465
Adequate answers to such questions hardly exist.
The 'collection hypothesis' has probably worked to dampen
the search far such a larger rhetorical context, particu-
larly when combined with a thesis that places the origins
of some sayings or of the sayings-composition process
within the folk or folk-tribal milieu. The significance
of such an aesthetic, if it could even exist non-trivially,
becomes down-played. The presence of a coherence of world-
view and expression suggests the opposite tack: that we
assume aesthetic integration and begin to search for the
manner of its expression within this literature. In
fairness, that assumption has underlain our analysis and
interpretation of these sayings to this point, though the
assumption has not been made explicit in this form. As-
signment of sayings to various categories takes into
account, insofar as possible at this stage of inquiry,
our interpretation of the in-forming rhetoric.
Rhetoric is significant in another way as well.
It constitutes a bridge from the 'spatial' to the 'temporal'
dimensions of the projected world of the B composition as
of this literature generally. The aesthesis is a Gestalt
recognition. In that sense, it is as such ineffable; it
lies beyond the particular interpretation it may be given
in any verbal statement. The statement, the words, con-
stitute a means whereby one comes to that understanding,
466
but they are not the understanding itself. Instruction,
discipline, are a way of living, i.e. in self-governing
but grounded autonomy, not a collection of statements or
rules of conduct. Still, poesis is a way of expressing
that understanding and provides a means for people who
are so disposed to intuit the integrative understanding,
aesthesis. To use Otto's language, it supplies the stand-
point or perspective from which the aesthesis may be
recognized and internalized if one will.1 For a properly
disposed person, the sayings lead to the unveiling of ex-
perience. It gains "integrity" and harmony. It coheres.
Each demesne of the universe unveils itself, to the ex-
tent that it will in ways appropriate to itself. Poetic
expression is part, but only part of that unveiling pro-
cess. Aesthetically and rhetorically, the word is more
a symbol than a sign. It harmonizes, rhetorically, with
what is.
The word, here as saying, thus appears as a sym-
bol in social space and social time. It is not only a
means whereby the world coheres for one receptive to and
disciplined for that cohesion. It is a means for in-
corporating, sharing, maintaining and communicating that
harmony, as poesis and poetry. It delineates, but as a
1Otto, pp. 5-59.
467
transmission event. The word has the power to locate an
experience. It is a hermeneutic of space and time because
it gives social spatio-temporal meaning to event. By
publishing, i.e, making public, it locates what is other-
wise precognitive and transient. For those reasons, one
could arguably treat word or language, here our rubric is
'rhetoric,' as prior to either social space or time and
therefore a distinct inclusive category. Alternatively,
one could recognize the bridging dimension of rhetoric
and treat it as a category between. While we see rhetoric
as central to this literature, aesthesis extends beyond
rhetoric. Clearly, though, rhetoric leads our discussion
into social time.1
We have already mentioned assonance, paronomasia,
use of key-words and -phrases, topical linking, themes
and poetic architecture as rhetorical expressions of the
B composition's aesthesis. To these we need to add a
list of stylistic tendencies and devices which recur and
which significantly affect the meanings to be attributed
to particular sayings. In addition, they may help explain
some of the inconsistency, exaggeration and tendentious-
ness of the material. These include:
(1) Absolutism: representing qualities or
1Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifesta-
tion, 385 ff.
468
characteristics that have a great deal of (internal)
variability in terms of non-dimensional, invariant
qualities or characteristics; treating variable qualities
as constants. Only by the concatenation of such sayings
or by combining them with instance-sayings that present
specific counter-examples does the variability of the
quality appear. In other words, the absolute saying
assumes a background of sayings to introduce the attri-
bute's variability.1
(2) Concretion: representing qualities or char-
acteristics by means of a class of behaviors, a type of
person, or a specific characteristic in which that quality
is deemed to appear. The tangible replaces the intangible,
recognizing that what is involved is not the type of per-
son or conduct represented but the general quality which
is symbolically represented. Concretion does not present
a specific case of the quality, but it takes an abstract
or complex attribute or concept and presents it in terms
of more comprehensible and ordinary concepts.2
(3) Instance: a specific instance--person, cir-
cumstance or behavior--is depicted to symbolize an ab-
stract concept or quality. When instance involves a
1E.g., l5:28, 31; 18:3; 19:4; rich versus poor,
wise versus foolish, righteous versus wicked.
2E.g., 16:11, 24; 17:22; 20:14, 20.
469
class of cases rather than a specific one, it begins to
shade into concretion; the former, however, tends to deal
with a case or cases while the latter deals with a quality
or qualities.1
(4) Abstraction: a set of concepts are related
to one another predominantly or exclusively as abstract
concepts rather than concrete qualities or instances.
The interrelation is stated as a generality or abstrac-
tion, without regard for the complexity of the concepts
being related.2
(5) Universality: a quality of attribute is
presented as applicable without exception, even when there
are well-known or obvious exceptions to the generalization.
The saying asserts the pervasiveness or value of a quality
or attribute by treating it as if it were universal or
unexceptioned. It thereby assumes that the audience will
interpret it against the background of sayings which
clarify the quality's true extent or which deal with the
exceptional or difficult cases.3
(6) Personalization: presentation of a charac-
teristic, quality, attribute or concept in the form of a
1E. g., 16:26; 17:8, 17; 20:1.
2E.g., 16:12, 22; 20:18; 15:32.
3E.g., 16:3; 20:21; 22:6, 9.
470
person having that quality or an aspect of that quality.
An abstraction is made concrete by expressing it through
typical or stylized personal behavior. Unlike instance
or concretion, here the emphasis is on the person or
class of people who represent this concept. The persona-
lization, however, is highly one-dimensional and imper-
sonal. The only relevant dimension of the character is
the concept being presented through it.1
(7) Stock figure: use of a stereotypical person
or thing, often an ironic caricature, to present a series
of related attributes, qualities, characteristics or
concepts, the elemental structure of their interrelation-
ships and the pattern of their interaction with other
qualities and circumstances beyond the figure. The stock
figure is not one-dimensional. It depicts a complex
series of internal and external relationships. The figure
also tends to be poetically and symbolically open to new
situations and interpretations, unlike the personaliza-
tion, which tends to offer only a rather closed set of
applications or interpretations. The stock figure is
sufficiently complex that it implies a wide series of
attributes and behaviors beyond what is straightforwardly
presented in the saying, offering the opportunity for
1E.g., 16:27, 28; 19:25; 21:22.
471
ironic usage and divers layers of meaning.1
(8) Extremity: the use of extreme or exaggerated
occurrences of a quality, attribute, characteristic or
concept even when the extreme rarely occurs in the course
of the quality's widely variable forms of appearance.
These sayings tend to treat extreme cases; they avoid
the mean in favor of drawing worst- or best-case analyses,
especially when combined with absolutism, where the ex-
treme is treated as the representative occurrence of the
quality or concept. Extremity anticipates a background
of sayings which qualify, clarify or modify the extreme
and often absolutistic presentation; other sayings pro-
vide the lacking perspective.2
(9) Antithesis: the juxtaposition of extremi-
ties or absolutistic extremities, often as if they were
opposites or exhaustive alternatives. Antithesis re-
duces extremity to duality. Generally, this rhetorical
device is used to draw fundamental lineaments of inten-
tional demesnes and to stress boundary conditions, even
where there may be more than two options and where the
over-all valuing system may not see them as true opposites.
Antithesis treats the system of values as uni-hierarchical,
1E.g., the king, the callow youth, the fool, the
sluggard, the false witness, the faithful wife.
2E.g., 17:2; 18:9; 19:3, 29.
472
even when a more complex system may be held. Again,
the complex background of sayings would create the neces-
sary depth, variability of quality, and valuational com-
plexity that a specific individual saying lacks for
stylistic effect.1
(10) Dilemma: presentation of inconsistent or
mutually exclusive qualities or values of identical
valence (positive or negative), often in an extremitized
form. This device is a stylistic inversion of antithesis.
It generally serves to delineate boundary situations by
depicting them in (extremitized) situations of exclusive
alternative choice, with one value-system understood as
favored. Adversity sayings frequently use dilemma. Dilem-
ma sayings in particular serve to counterbalance and pro-
vide perspective for antitheses, extremities and ab-
solutisms.2
(11) Cadence: a saying or group of sayings which
the basic theme or themes of a composition (col-
tion?) in terms of basic rhetorical motifs. Cadences
form an inclusion structure and may punctuate the com-
position as well. The structure of cadences provides
1See Appendix, Table 7.
2See Appendix, Tables 11 and 29.
473
closure or completeness.1
(12) Observation: a superficially non-judgmental
presentation, often with irony, of a relationship, quality
or pattern of action that typically unveils the inten-
tionality or characteristic conduct of the person or
figure. An observation may therefore present neutrally
or with admiration what is elsewhere highly disvalued;
the value of the observation lies in the insight.2
(13) Bon mot: an observation which displays
striking imagery. The observation tends to function ex-
plicitly while the bon mot functions implicitly and with
multiple layers of meaning, beyond the aesthetic-qualita-
tive difference.3
(14) Irony: the use of multiple layers of mean-
ing, especially when the apparent explicit meaning stands
in some tension with or dissonance to one or more of the
implicit meanings; inconsistency of meaning, especially
when it is used to emphasize the propriety of demesne.4
(15) Neo-naturalism: the symbolic use of stereo-
typical naturalistic language as a compensation for
1See Appendix, Table. 9.
2See Appendix, Table 45; cf. Table 47.
3See Appendix, Table 45.
4See Appendix, Table 23.
474
qualities, concepts or values which are in conflict with
those symbolically represented by the "natural world."
Typically, neo-naturalism is compensation for urbanism,
formalistic social relationship, and increased social
distances.1
(16) Intellectualization: substitution of
verbalized interpretations of experience for pre- or
extra-verbal interpretations; representation of the
extra-verbal by means of the symbolic-poetic use of the
verbal.2
(17) Individualism: statement of group or class
values in terms of the qualities, attributes and conduct of
stereotypical individuals; substitution of the typical
individual for the values of the group of which he or she
deemed to be a member, often by poetic attribution.3
To these, one might add thematic devices typical
of this literature, such as hierarchy, demesne, mystery,
noblesse oblige, topos, propriety, gradience, hubris
grounding legitimacy/authority, and the like. If there
be a wisdom aesthesis, then what is said--and meant--is
inextricably tied up with how it is said. The 'how' re-
mains in many ways too poorly understood.
1See Appendix, Table 53; cf. Table 54.
2E.g., 15:30; 16:17; 17:12, 22; 19:14; 20:14.
3E.g., 19:6, 7; 20:5-7, 9.
475
Time
Excepting the somewhat doubtful middle case of
'word,' 'time' comprises the second of the fundamental
phenomenological dimensions of social existence. People
make themselves "at home" in a when as well as a where.
This time is a hermeneutic, just like social space. It
is an interpretation of experience as meaningful, valuable,
and significant. Social time is a social reality, a
construction and therefore a kind of convention. It is
another way of relating disparate events to one another
so that one may deal effectively with experience. Behind
this literature lies an interpretive temporality which we
also want to elicit. Time is not a prominent, explicit
and consistent concern of this literature as it is of
other types, such as prophecy or apocalyptic. The spatial
characteristics of the social world are clearly more ex-
plicit and detailed in the B collection. In part, though,
this may be a function of the rhetorical devices, such
as absolutism, abstraction and extremity, which downplay
or omit temporal conditions. Some of our understanding
of temporality has to be derived from the juxtaposition
of sayings with one another, especially as a socially
interpretive background among a mashal-using people.
Also, important temporal concepts are analogues or con-
sequents of spatial concepts already developed.
476
In our discussion of space, it has been a prac-
tical impossibility to defer all consideration of tem-
porality. We have already sketched many of its linea-
ments and developed some of its basic concepts. We shall
not repeat those lines of argument again in detail here.
Rather, we shall seek to summarize coherently the tem-
poral concepts or implications of concepts already de-
veloped and explore the other, often-implicit, dimensions
of temporality. Three central issues will form the basis
for our discussion. First, what is the stance of the
individual with respect to time? How does a person con-
front temporality as it applies to one's own life-
situation? This question is at once ethical and existen-
tial: in what way can or do I act with regard to events
as sequence, how do I choose? Second, in what way is
temporality related to life as a whole? In what way is
a person's life an expression of (their) temporality?
Third, in what way does the world express a temporality
that extends beyond one's own life and yet impinges upon
it? How do I relate to time as the process of history?
The disparity of attention paid to spatiality as
opposed to temporality constitutes an important clue
both to the world-view of this literature and to the
social milieu from which it comes. Spatial issues are
problematic. The gradient power, its legitimacy,
477
autonomous action within one's essential social milieu,
all have become significant problems requiring both inter-
pretation and defense of that interpretation among the
sayings. It is axiomatic in sociological analysis that
people only talk about that which is not taken-for-
granted. They discuss, assert and defend something be-
cause it has in some way become a problem for them. De-
fenses of world-views appear when those world-views are
beginning to crumble. The world-view of this literature
is not beginning to crumble, because it has not evoked
that kind of elaborate spirited defense. Still, certain
situations provoke questions that have to be dealt, with
and those issues appear as social spatiality. The re-
stricted autonomy, individual vulnerability and collective
security of this bureaucratic elite require explanation
and interpretation. They are ineluctable issues.
By contrast, temporality is largely-taken-for-
granted. Few problems require social temporal explana-
tions. This lack of emphasis does not mean that time
has no meaning or significance for these people. It
means that whatever experience they have of time, it is
unproblematic, at least for the most part. In fact, we
shall argue that time is an important part of their
hermeneutic. They exist in a time that has a great deal
of meaning for them. But, that time is reliable and
478
consistent. It is relatively free from surprises or
rapid and unpredictable changes of direction. Indeed,
the reality of time is pivotal to their ethic and their
world-view: meaningful action is possible in the world.
Problems of sociality arise precisely because the ex-
perience of temporality is fundamental, but relatively
untroubled.1
This taken-for-granted character of social
temporality in this literature also has important impli-
cations for our understanding of its social evolution.
Whatever experiences its authors and audiences may have
been having, they did not raise significant issues of
temporality in any of the three forms we shall consider.
The social milieu raised spatial but not temporal kinds
of questions. No event or constellation of events, no
social process, no intellectual or theological develop-
ment led to the posing of significant temporal problems.
Their view of time persisted and could continue to be
taken-for-granted, with few and specific expectations.
Only the second question, the process of personal de-
velopment, raises issues in connection with the commit-
ment to and disciplined development of an intentionality.
One would expect ethical or theodical problems to raise
1See Appendix, Tables 37 and 61.
479
temporal questions. Choice--action and consequence--in-
volves one's being toward the future.1 To have choice at
all, there must be some freedom and openness toward the
not-yet. Yet, the future is not an overweaning issue,
even in the dilemmas and adversity sayings. Similarly,
the absence of Heilsgeschichte, even in the thematically
theological B collection, is notorious. Whatever is
happening "historically" to their social world, these
people are not experiencing it as a problem in terms of
their interpretation of history. Since we shall argue
a temporality of continuity here, that entails that they
have not experienced events that call that thesis of
social and national continuity in time into question.
Time may not be rigid and inflexible, else their ethic
would be purely formalistic instead of substantive, but
it is also not discontinuous and inconsistent. Their
temporal world, on all three levels, is basically stable,
consistent, reliable and predictable to a sufficient
degree. They know how to cope with temporality and are
coping with it. Their social world and ideology display
no temporally-based evidence of being in trouble. Their
being in time can be taken for granted.
1See Appendix, Table 67.
480
Stance
The first dimension of temporality is stance,
the "presentness" of the individual in his or her being
toward the future. This dimension is both preceptual
and ethical. To choose is to operate out of a stance
toward a meaningful future. The temporal characteristics
which emerge from the perspective of stance are:
(1) Time is an arena within which meaningful
action is possible. The ultimacy and mystery of Yahweh,
the boundedness of demesne, and the sharp delineation of
intentionalities could together serve to deprive indi-
vidual choices and actions of any real significance, but
that does not happen.1 Actions are not overwhelmed.
Even allowing for a noblesse oblige interpretation of
some sayings, the cumulation of wisdom, adversity sayings
and dilemmas, correction and instruction, discipline and
growth in an intentionality, all suggest that one faces
ethically genuine choices at any stage in one's develop-
ment.2
Each action has meaning; it is not automatic or
derivative. Some choices lead to growth; others, to
harm or even destruction. No particular stage of growth
1See Appendix, Tables 8, Parts A, B and C; 39
and 57.
2See Appendix, Tables 13, 20, 21, 44, 48, 60;
cf. Tables 16 and 26.
481
or intentional structure deprives one of the reality of
choice. Thus, what one does and how one chooses to do it
is a constantly meaningful occurrence. One's stance out
of the present toward the immediate future offers por-
tentous alternatives.1 The future and the present are
not equivalent. There is a genuine passage of and in
time. The future is potential and it is different from
the present. It is not fixed or given; it is not
chimaerical. The 'way' involves constant decision-making
to maintain and develop the discipline.2 Thus, the in-
dividual is a functioning agent in time.
(2) Meaningful change occurs. One cannot rely on
one's own judgment of a state of affairs or of one's own
wisdom to detect a pattern or structure to events that
will continue indefinitely into the future and upon which
one can rely beyond that of the harmony or aesthesis of
wisdom within one's demesne of autonomy. In other words,
hubris or self-righteousness assert an understanding be-
yond one's demesne one cannot have, even one who is
otherwise pursuing wisdom.3 Yahweh's pattern, his purposes,
1See Appendix, Tables 8, Part A; 16, Part P; 26,
Part D; and 67.
2See Appendix, Table 44.
3See Appendix, Tables 8, Part A; 16, Part P; and
26, Part A.
482
remain in principle beyond human ken.1 Hence, genuine
dilemmas and genuine adversity are possible, though un-
likely, even for one who is quite wise.2 The future
differs from the present. Real change occurs, because
the unexpected is an inherent part of futurity. Indeed,
that fact about time is a fundamental motive for the de-
velopment of the doctribe of demesne, limiting oneself to
that upon which one can rely. Haste and impetuosity are
cardinal vices.3 Choice is disciplined and bounded.4
(3) Change is evolutionary, not revolutionary.
Excessive or excessively rapid change is as subversive
of the possibility of choice as stasis.5 In a revolu-
tionary society or world, change is so rapid that there
is no intelligible basis for making decisions; experience
is not a reliable or consistent guide. Old principles
do not necessarily have validity in the new order. Clearly,
wisdom is cumulative; growth is expected; the discipline
is the facilitative means to wisdom.6 The past is a
1See Appendix, Table 8, Part B.
2See Appendix, Tables 11, 12, 29, 65, 66 and 68.
3See Appendix, Table 26, Parts H, P and Q.
4See Appendix, Table 20.
5See Appendix, Tables 31, 37 and 61.
6See Appendix, Tables 13, 48, 60.
483
reliable guide to choice and conduct in the present and
the future, though it may not be perfectly predictive.
The pursuit of wisdom aesthesis and the harmony which
flows from it are reasonable and worthy goals. The
propriety of intentionalities is consistent and one can
expect a general harmony or consonance of circumstance/
outcome and intentionality.1 The possibility inherent
in futurity does not undercut the general harmony of
character and station, though it means that the relation-
ship is not mechanical. The freedom of the powerful to
exercise their power according to their will and the un-
knowability of Yahweh's specific intentions tend to be
more ideal than actual in that in practice both tend to
act in ways that are consonant with the aesthesis of wis-
dom. Specific inconsistencies do not undermine the larger
consistency and therefore the appropriateness of wisdom
disposition. Specific freedom is compatible with the
evolution of possibility on the larger scale.
(4) Dispositions evolve, grow. Characters appear
in this literature in absolute, one-dimensional form. In
fact, each disposition is widely variable, a necessary
concommitant of the reality and significance of choice.2
1See Appendix, Tables 39, 57; cf. Tables 8, Parts
E and G, and 27,
2See Appendix, Tables 20, 39 and 57.
484
Wisdom, for example, is acquired through a life-long dis-
cipline. One's wisdom at any particular moment may or
may not be adequate to the situational demands made upon
it. It is possible to have insufficient maturity in
wisdom and therefore to be unequal to a circumstance or
decision.1 Similarly, there are degrees of folly, so
that instruction even of the fool makes sense.2 Judgment
and correction do make a difference even for those for
whom wisdom—and conceivably, though not likely, even
righteousness--is not an intentional possibility.3
Though within limits, character can change and be molded.
Again, ethical decisions have meaning; they are real, for
each intentionality. To face genuine options, one's
character must have a range of development. That range,
however, seems to grow consistently narrower with time.
The dispositional range--potential--of the callow youth
is virtually total, from wicked to wise, at least in
principle.4 The dispositional range of one mature in his
or her intentionality is basically within that particular
intentionality alone. The wicked do not become wise; but
1See Appendix, Tables 11, 12 and 29.
2See Appendix, Table 19.
3See Appendix, Table 60.
4See Appendix, Table 18.
485
it seems that they may well become less wicked.1
(5) What is relevant in relation to the conse-
quential future is attitude or character, not the specific
act. All action is character-based. This interpreta-
tion follows directly from the proprieties and from in-
tentionality.2 It exerts a stabilizing influence on the
process of change. Harmonizing occurs with respect to
character, therefore isolated acts, especially if out of
character, do not disrupt the continuity of time. Changes
in disposition development or deterioration of charac-
ter, do appear to affect consequences. The process of
harmonization is not restricted to the intentional agent.
Others within the life-world, the powerful, the natural
world and Yahweh also constitute active harmonizing
forces that tend toward consonance, or 'aesthesic har-
mony.'3 Since the pursuit of harmony is intentional, the
response of these extra-demesne forces is to harmonize
with intentionality. This harmony, however, is not act-
based, nor is it retributive. The world is not mechani-
cal; these forces are individually active. Harmony above
all in the domain of specific acts does not mean utter
1See Appendix, Table 39.
2See Appendix, Tables 14 and 39.
3See Appendix, Tables 8, Part A, 10, 32 and 33.
486
predictability or rigidity: the world has its surprises,
and not all are benevolent from the perspective of a par-
ticular individual ("in his own eyes"). Dilemmas exist
which no harmony or structure or stability or order can
avert, hence the recognition of demesne.
(6) Temporal processes which are relevant to the
individual tend toward harmony with intentionality. In a
way, the B material seems to make the claim that the world
makes sense but that that sense is not intelligible as
such even to one who is mature in wisdom. One can discern
some of that pattern. One can have a Gestalt insight
into the meaning of the pattern without knowing the de-
tails or substance of it. That the world makes sense does
not mean that it is knowable or even that it has to be
knowable. Rather, wise or tight intentionality are part
of the way in which the world makes sense. Thus, the
disparate forces and dimensions of activity in the world,
including the actions of Yahweh, tend to fit appropriately
with well-disposed actions. The psychological term
'closure' might apply here. The sense underlying the world
appears as harmony, but only over time and in respect of
intentionality. Moreover, harmony is a fitness or appro-
priateness, not a mechanistic relationship. The exact
form of the harmony is not predictable--that is the part
of the sense of the world that lies beyond human ken. What
487
one can be sure of is that wise or right intentionality
fit; they harmonize. For that reason, they facilitate the
sense of the world and are intrinsically good and right
in turn. One's participation in this aspect of temporal
propriety is not passive but dispositionally active.
While Yahweh sets the ultimate sense, the proper disposi-
tion (but not one's own interpretation of what the proper
disposition might be, which is a fortiori dubious) does
make a difference, facilitative or destructive (temporal
dimension of contagion).1
(7) For one of right or wise disposition, the
world is ultimately worthy of trust. The B material is
not cynical, despondent, melancholy or pessimistic. Less
is it paranoid. People are depicted as active and par-
ticipating in the life-world: one cannot successfully
restrict oneself only to one's autonomous demesne. One
must risk--disciplined--involvement in the life-world.
Withdrawal is not a viable option, except perhaps as a
rhetorical response to the choices posed in adversity
(through the dilemma). Wealth, position, authority,
influence, eloquence, insight, all are tools for use in
manipulating and disposing one's life-world.2 Consonance
1See Appendix, Tables 8, Parts A, B, C, D, E, G,
H and I; 28 and 42.
2See Appendix, Table 16.
488
can and should be sought actively, not passively. Dis-
cipline and restraint mean minimalism, not withdrawal.
This literature reflects a wary people, who recognize the
limits to intelligibility and knowing, but who believe
that action in accord with the proper disposition is
right, necessary and productive, though not always sure.
There are ethical imperatives of action. With the appro-
priate character, such involvement facilitates harmony and
tends to be rewarding. On balance, the oft-times pre-
carious and uncertain world is benevolent to those rightly
disposed. That benevolence-on-balance, however, is predi-
cated on involvement within the life-world. To hope to
harmonize, one must involve oneself in the world beyond
the narrowest and best-governed portions of the demesne,
into the life-world. On the other hand, that involvement
does not mean arrogance or passionate commitment; it means
discipline in accord with disposition. Restraint and
discipline mean walking the path ("the way") between
under- and over-commitment, both of which are inharmonious.
(8) The world within which one acts is reliable.
Irrespective of one's disposition, the world, as an ex-
pression of the purposes of Yahweh, can be expected to
make sense. Harmony persists. While the particular form
and content of that harmony cannot be predicted, one can
be sure that the harmony will be maintained. The world
489
will not become dissonant and inharmonious; Yahweh will
not act without meaning or purpose.1 One can rely on the
preservation of harmony and meaning by and through the
aesthesis even when one cannot predict specific events
or acts. One can also rely on the relationship which
persists between harmony and intentionality. Right and
wise dispositions facilitate, while evil and foolish
harm or destroy.
(9) The world within which one acts is consistent.
The pattern underlying the world is such that the strate-
gies divined by the wise for dealing with it retain their
validity even when certain prudential patterns of conduct
may change. The basic lineaments of that strategy appear
in demesne, intention, propriety. These strategic inter-
pretations have persistent validity. While specific
moral imperatives and admonitions may change, the inter-
pretation upon which they are based persists, the ethic
remains. In other words, one can count on the fundamental
nature of the world remaining constant. One may count on
the fundamental nature of Yahweh remaining constant, even
if they cannot be fully known nor understood, let alone
their effects predicted. Thus, ways of coping with such
a world, if effective, retain their effectiveness to the
1See Appendix, Table 8.
490
extent that they are based on valid and accurate interpre-
tations of those natures. While first-order judgments may
change, second-order do not. The interpretations are
consistent and reliable, even when the specific judgments
and actions they lead to may vary.
This is a difficult and somewhat obscure inter-
pretive point, but basic to clarifying how this litera-
ture functions. We propose that the consistency and co-
herence of the world perceived by the author(s) and users
of the B composition lies at a higher level than has often
been supposed. The "order" does not lie in some automatic
or mechanical relationship of act and consequence. The
world is not rigid and inflexible. Such an order under-
mines the meaning of ethical choice: the appearance of
choice is a sham. Ultimately, the effect is to deprive
Yahweh of any freedom, which seems a curious doctrine to
impute to either this literature or these people, though
it cannot be ruled invalid for that reason. Such doc-
trines as retribution, however, do not square with ad-
versity, dilemma, iconoclasm or the role of power in this
material. The appearance of retributive language can be
understood rhetorically. If reward and punishment are
not mechanical, however, what motivates the wise to
pursue an arduous and potentially unrewarding discipline?
Why risk a foolish son, contentious wife, autocratic king
491
and willful deity? What justifies wisdom? The argument
that wisdom could not be justified in the face of these
experiences--theodicy--that it broke down, ultimately begs
the question. Where did the notion come from in the first
place? How did a people whose everyday experience exposed
them to the caprice of power arrive at the conclusion that
righteousness and wisdom are objectively rewarded? How
could they claim to understand what they later must ap-
parently admit they did not, when their experience with
the caprice of king and official must have been immediate?
A doctrine of consistency, however, does not raise direct
theodical questions, is resilient and far more immune
from attack. We cannot know the ultimate pattern. We
can know that it exists. We do not know what Yahweh in-
tends. We know that he intends purposefully. We do not
know that what we do will always lead to reward and happi-
ness. We know that no other strategy leads to more suc-
cess and happiness than ours. Further, we know that the
ultimate intentional realization of our way of life is
fully in harmony with the ultimate pattern of the universe,
helping to preserve, extend and perpetuate it insofar
that human action can. What we do makes sense, though it
may not always work. Our knowledge is limited and our
judgment of our knowledge self-centered. But, it is the
best strategy and the strategy is in basic accord with
492
the over-arching meaning of the world. When taken as the
collective product of a group of people who persist over
time, wisdom presents a strategy/interpretation whose
fundamental structure is so in accord with the funda-
mental pattern of the universe that it persists. Wisdom,
however, can grow and develop. The strategy and under-
standing are forever incomplete. Interpretations of it
by individuals are subject to fault, folly and hubris.
The persistence of wisdom as a harmonizing strategy re-
flects both the reliability and the basic consistency
that underlie a world that appears open and changing.
(10) From the perspective of a particular indi-
vidual, the temporal aspect of the world is fluid. Things
change, but slowly. Short-term variability does not
conceal long-term stability. The world is not erratic,
neither is it rigid. In order to function in particular
life-situations, one has to make judgments appropriate to
the circumstance, context and character(s) involved.
Decisions, choices, are not inalterable, but they are not
random. There is a basis for choice, but specific choices
gradually change. The world is not bound, brittle, or
broken.
(11) The future is open. No specific course of
action is ever a foregone conclusion. The role of Yahweh
provides for intervention, however much one may think
493
one understands a particular situation and how-
ever righteous or wise one may think one's course. The
course of events provides real alternatives which lead
in genuinely different directions. The over-all pattern
or sense of the world, the purposes of Yahweh, do not
produce a rigid structure to the world that closes or
confines courses of action to the extent that inexorable
processes are at work. The world is not governed by fate
or necessity, certain rhetorical usages to the contrary
notwithstanding.1 The pattern does not produce an im-
mutable sequence of events in which the individual or even
Yahweh is impotent or must function mechanically. The
options we face are real. The pattern exists at the
second-order. We might say that it is the pattern of the
pattern of events that is fixed.
(12) The orientation toward time in the situation
of choice is individualistic. While it is clear that
wisdom is both cumulative and collective, the situation
of ethically-relevant choice is individualistic. Demesne,
for example, is an intensely individual concept. The
rhetorical use of stock figures is revealing. While they
may present classes of individuals in the form of collec-
tive representations, the choices they face, the situations
1See Appendix, Tables 8, Parts A, B and C; 36
and 66.
494
they are in, are appropriate to particular separate
people, not to groups. Choice is not a group, class or
national process. Intentionality must be pursued through
individual discipline, not collective. Speech is the act
of one person (at a time). The issues that concern people
in this literature revolve around situations in which
particular persons are presented with choices that they
as individuals have to make. That fact does not make
wisdom purely individual, but it certainly reflects a
stance toward temporality that is individualistic.1 The
reality and openness of time is experienced at the point
of the individual's decision for a particular way of
being or course of action. Even contagion suggests that
involvement begins with the spread of effects from a
particular person's intentionality. It is the individ-
ual, not the group, class or nation, that is the focal
point for the life-world. The model stance is a person
open to decision.
(13) That stance assumes freedom and autonomy.
Individuals can make meaningful choices apart from groups.
In fact, the nature of group decision-making over against
that of the individual is never addressed: is it dif-
ferent in kind or nature or degree? While self-governance
1See Appendix, Table 16, Parts E, F, H, I, K, L,
M, O, P, Q, R and S.
495
may not be competent, it is understood and assumed as the
point of departure. Choices are real. No previous
pattern of action so binds one that choices only have the
appearance of meaning. Intentionality does not assure
that one will act purely in terms of that intentionality.
It structures and orients conduct, but it does not de-
termine choice, hence we cannot totally predict the ac-
tions of others on the basis of their intentionalities.1
However mature in wisdom one may have become, he must
still make decisions that continue to be consonant with
that wisdom and it is still possible that he will not.
Yahweh's involvement is determinative of events, not
acts. Yahweh assures harmony. Yahweh assures sense. But
the divine in no way takes away the reality of choice,
even from the ignorant, foolish or wicked.2 Instruction,
free choice to alter one's conduct though not necessarily
to an unlimited extent, remains possible.3 People can
learn to some degree, however formed their dispositions.
One is therefore responsible for one's choices. Yahweh
may intervene between the formulated purpose (decision)
and its outcome, but he does not intervene in making the
1See Appendix, Tables 39 and 57.
2See Appendix, Tables 18, 19, 20, 28 and 60.
3See Appendix, Tables 21, 48 and 60.
496
decision itself. There is no structure, mechanism, neces-
sity or fate that deprives a person of meaningful choice.
(14) Spatiality and temporality are both inner-
worldly. We have seen that the life-world of the B ma-
terial is disposed in a fairly-well-defined social milieu.
The questions posed and answers given deal essentially
with matters of immediate personal concern. One confines
one's attention to that one can effectively deal with,
one's demesne and one's life-world. Beyond that lie the
demesnes of others. The supra-mundane does not occupy
these people. They are not other-worldly. They look
for no supernatural compensation for their lot. Indeed,
their situation is, if not always assured and stable, more
often agreeable than not. The same situation obtains
with respect to time. The relevant temporal consideration
at the point of choice is immediate and personal future.
Outcomes are this-worldly and individual. They are not
and are fundamentally inconsistent with the other-worldly,
supra-temporal or supra-individual. At most, the focus
of this literature extends beyond the temporality of one's
own experiential world to that of intimates and progeny.
The closest one comes to the other-worldly is the ref-
erence to Rephaim in 21:16, a, saying which is still con-
cern with the fate of a particular individual as the con-
sequence of this-worldly conduct; the lineaments of any
497
other-worldly place or time are lacking.l
(15) Temporality appears as stance, presentness.
Inner-worldly and individualistic temporality means that
the focus is on the situation of choice, one's stance
toward the immediate personal future. The past exists
largely for one through intentionality developed to that
point; indeed, the constitutive elements of that past,
such as childhood, appear in and through that inten-
tionality. The past appears as an influence upon the
present rather than an independent and detailed reality
with its own structure and concerns. Similarly, the
openness of the future appears over against the present-
ness of one's stance: that the future is as-it-were un-
formed possibility without (first-order) structure. The
literature is concerned with the specious present oriented
to the immediate future.
(16) Personal past appears as developed/ing in-
tentionality brought to bear upon the moment of choice.
The past is individualistic, not collective. One is the
product of one's choices; one ultimately is responsible
for molding one's own life. Groups appear in forming
and disciplining a person. Parents, for example, have
1See Appendix, Table 40, esp. Part J.
2See Appendix, Tables 39 and 57.
498
great, though not absolute, influence over a child's de-
velopment.1 Yet, people have autonomy and genuine choice.
Their actions are not subsumed to a group or structure of
reality, present or past. The past, internalized, in-
forms but does not determine their actions. The past ap-
pears within these sayings as what affects one's stance,
rather than an independent and valuable reality to be
preserved and cherished in its own right.2 The past ap-
pears in light of one's stance in the present, and is
subordinate to it (which rather rules out the last possi-
bility as an unexpressed taken-for-granted lying far be-
hind this literature). The past, therefore, can be seen
under the rubric of experience, intentionally understood.
The past appears less as the interpretive cumulation of
past events than as the development and maturation of a
personality/character through a process of learning and
growth. (Thus, we need to be careful of the treacherous
multi-vocality of 'experience.')
(17) Temporality is an arena of non-symbolic
action. This point follows rather directly from much
that we have already said. Choice does not stand for
forces or structures that are larger than life or supra-
1See Appendix, Table 41.
2See Appendix, Table 61.
499
mundane. Nor are they supra-personal. Actions certainly
reflect structures of intentionality, with which time
harmonizes, but that intentionality is individual and
personal, however typical or representative it may be.
One is not compelled or fated to act in a typical way.
Acts carry their ordinary social and contextual meanings.
These sayings are certainly not devoid of symbolism, but
the use of symbols is consistent with their minimalism;
time is immediate and mundane. It seldom has symbolic
value except as the arena of decision and action.1
(18) Temporality appears as demesne, in terms of
the life of the individual. The sayings' concern with
time is often expressed in terms of the language of life
and death.2 As would be expected, longevity and right or
wise intentionality are related. One's demesne, however,
is ones life. While actions, may redound to some extent
to family and kin, while contagion implies a measure of
temporality, the consequences of action, like the action
themselves, occur within and are directly related to one's
own life. The temporal stance of presentness is oriented
within one's own life demesne. The working out of in-
tentionality, the realization of harmony, is a process
1See Appendix, Table 16.
2See Appendix, Tables 64 and 65.
500
of the individual life, above all. An individual life-
time is the demesne within which wisdom comes to its proper
realization. This demesne is not obvious given the trans-
missibility of wisdom combined with cumulativity. One
could imagine a supra-personal wisdom realized in his-
torical process whose symbolic benchmarks were divorced
from the individual human life. If such a conception of
wisdom existed among these people at this time, it does
not appear clearly among these sayings. One can only
realize wisdom within and in terms of one's own life and
life-world, one's spatio-temporal action sphere.
(19) Wisdom has temporal authority. The develop-
ment of wise disposition leads to facilitative harmony
with one's world. In that respect it is continuous with
the grounded aesthetic which is the (second-order) pat-
tern of the world and of its governance. The trans-
missible authority of wisdom is its grounded aesthesis:
it produces a valuable harmonizing of individual, group
and world that is compatible with the aesthetic under-
lying the purposes of Yahweh. No other disposition is
similarly consonant; only righteous character is similarly
grounded. Wisdom and righteousness are transmissible
realizations of intrinsic value. The aesthetic in which
wisdom may be said to "participate" is good in and of
itself. Wisdom's authority is its relationship to this
501
Yahweh-grounded and -legitimated value. The authority of
those who have wisdom to act to preserve and transmit the
wisdom aesthesis expressed through a person's inten-
tionality (i.e., their authority to act, to seek and
discipline students, to communicate their ethic) is their
relationship to the value, the aesthesis and the ground
of both in Yahweh.1
(20) Wisdom cumulates through time. Wisdom is
not an absolute or ideal quality. It appears concretely
as intentionality, in and through specific-individuals.
As discipline and aesthesis, wisdom can grow, develop, be
refined. Its basis in mature and righteous intentionality,
its history, its grounding, all mean that the basic pat-
tern endures, as we have argued. Still, the last word
remains to be said. Time forms an arena in which wisdom
develops through the group which possesses it.2
(21) Wisdom is collective. Wisdom grows through
the participation of people in a group. Thus, there is
a sense in which wisdom is also tied to the life of the
group of people who possess it. Wisdom cumulates with
respect to the group as well as the individual. The
1See Appendix, Tables 8, 16, 20, 21, 48 and 60.
2See Appendix, Tables 11, 12, 29, 36, 66 and 67.
3See Appendix, Tables 21, 48 and 60.
502
group assures, to the extent possible, wisdom's preserva-
tion and transmission. The aesthesis of wisdom, the
"second-order pattern," is supra-personal in space and
time to the extent that the aesthesis is the harmonizing
pattern of world and god. This dimension of wisdom, how-
ever, is not discussed in detail within the sayings.
Further, the group is not itself treated supra-personally.
The temporality of wisdom, despite cumulation and col-
lectivity, appears in and through individual demesne,
one's life.
(22) There is a propriety to time. This pro-
priety of individual temporality does not seem to appear
as a doctrine of kairos, the general propriety of times,
though such a doctrine would be quite plausible given the
analysis thus far. Rather, it appears in the range of
choices and alternatives arising within the sphere of im-
mediate action at each stage of life. Each stage in
intentional development has its appropriate relationship
to action. The range of action--freedom, autonomy, open-
ness of time—varies with intentional stage of individual
development and growth.
In addition to these points, several others have
either appeared within the discussion or are obvious
analogues to spatial concepts. In either case, it is
sufficient merely to mention the following:
503
(23) Aesthesis appears in the individual stance
toward time as a strategic conservatism.
(24) Aesthesis appears in the individual stance
toward time as a strategic minimalism.
(25) The openness of immediate futurity entails
individual vulnerability, irrespective of intentionality.1
(26) Contagion appears within immediate tem-
porality.2
(27) Wisdom as intentionally realized aesthesis
is transmitted through discipline, ethic and language
(poetry) within the context of a group of wise.
These characteristics reinforce the artistic
metaphor we are using in discussing wisdom. There is an
art to applying wisdom to life situations. The openness
and change one confronts when one deals with temporality
out of the stance of one's presentness mean that wisdom
as aesthesis cannot be a formula for conduct. When wis-
dom is converted, or better translated, from the abstract
level of aesthesis to specific ethical considerations,
the proprieties and demesnes of the immediate situation
have to be taken into account. The suitability of the
context is ethically relevant. Right is an appropriateness
1See Appendix, Table 43.
2See Appendix, Table 42.
504
or fitness to character as well as the groundedness of
the action; it is not a formula of conduct. The pattern
derived from discipline and learned in the growing ex-
perience of the past requires harmonizing and application.
An act is not objectively wise. It is aesthetically wise,
doing well rather than doing good.
Stages of Life
The second temporal dimension of wisdom follows
from the propriety of time. One's life is composed of
stages, to each of which there is an appropriateness of
both space and time. We have already discussed the
hierarchy of intentionalities at length. Clearly, though,
they have some temporal relationship. Even in childhood,
an apparent sensibility of righteousness appears. The
child is amenable to discipline, though incapable of in-
tentional choice.1 The child has not yet the capability
of selecting an intentional direction to his or her life.
The parent has both the capacity and the responsibility
to begin the process of directing the child's growth so
that proper choices will be made and the child will pur-
sue the discipline of wisdom when he or she can.2 This
instruction, though pivotal, does not control inalterably
1See Appendix, Table 41.
2See Appendix, Tables 20, 48 and 60.
505
the child's development as several sayings might seem to
suggest. Else how can we explain the persistant theme of
the foolish child. Clearly, parents who pursue wisdom
nevertheless find their hopes for their children, the
perpetuation of their wisdom-based values and class
identity, disappointed. If all that were required for
the child to elude this fate in later life were adequate
parental guidance and discipline, this recurrent theme
would be difficult to explain. Rather, the child's life
seems to be patterned rather than determined. He or she
must still decide the direction of his or her intention-
ality in youth, and face real ethical choices as adults.
No childhood instruction in and of itself produces wis-
dom. This argument is also consonant with wisdom's ap-
parent cumulation and collectivity, not to mention one's
demesne.
The (callow) youth has reached the age where-in-
tentional choice becomes possible. Indeed, only in youth
can one's direction for life be set. In youth, one has
the potential for the fundamental ethically-meaningful
choice, what sort of character do I commit myself to de-
veloping? If the youth be so equipped, he or she may
pursue the way of wisdom. Certainly, the way of righteous-
ness lies open. On the other hand, folly and wickedness
may also begin from wrong decisions and commitments made
506
in youth. In a sense, youth is a period of total inten-
tional freedom. One may go virtually any direction.1
Once this period in life is past, there seems to be much
less freedom. The sayings offer no clear indication that
one can change from one type of intentionality to another
after the passage of youth.2 To pursue wisdom, one must
find teachers, perhaps one's parents, who can subject one
to the course of discipline that is essential for mature
wisdom to appear later in life.3 In youth, what begins
as a result of one's decision is a process of growth
within the way one has chosen. Whatever character one
selects begins to grow and develop, both as a process of
personal growth and development and as a process of social
interaction. The youth who seeks wisdom becomes a
protegé of the wisdom-seeking class. He becomes a part
of their collective and its facilitation. The dis-
cipline, as we have consistently argued, is not rote
learning. The "instruction" which occurs is a vehicle
for developing a character.
With adulthood, the realistic possibility of com-
mitting oneself to a particular course of personal
1See Appendix, Tables 18 and 41.
2See Appendix, Table 28.
3See Appendix, Table 48.
507
development fades. One's intentionality is increasingly
fixed. One's actions, however, still have a measure of
freedom, so that one may exacerbate a wrong choice or
facilitate a good one--or vice versa. The process of
growth and development does not come to an end with the
passing of youth. The maturation of intentionality is
ultimately a process that goes on for an entire lifetime.
It is never complete or finished. The rhetorical device
of extremity tends to conceal the variability within each
intentionality. It is in the course of adulthood that
one makes decisions and acts in ways that affect one's
position within that variability. Wisdom in particular
does not come to full maturation in the early years of
adult life. Wisdom requires some age to possess with
assurance and confidence.1 Thus, we should distinguish
the young man (young adult) from the mature adult. Only
the latter functions as one who is consistently wise and
fully autonomous (self-disciplining?). In that middle
age, one's discipline has at last acquired a maturity
that stable character exists and one becomes one who acts
consistently out of wisdom intentionality and may properly
be said to do so. Before that time, one's handle on that
wisdom remains too shakey. Even now, one who is wise,
1See Appendix, Table 41, Part G; cf. Table 16.
508
acting alone, may err grievously or do what is inappro-
priate or wrong. The group is some protection against
such deviation.
Age brings the final maturity in wisdom. It is
the full fruition of an intentionality developed through
life's discipline. At that point it becomes one's point
of honor and integrity. One may take satisfaction and
act confidently with comparatively little fear of self-
delusion or hubris. Honor, however, may begin to take
the place of action and specific conduct as duties in-
volving regular decision-making pass to others. In other
words, it is possible that the old may revel and take
honor in their professed wisdom in that they have ever
fewer opportunities to use it, and therefore to risk
error or misconduct. They have the privilege of being
rather than doing.
There is nothing within this literature that en-
ables us to locate the B collection clearly within any
of these stages of life. Nevertheless, this analysis
allows us to infer some probabilities which are sugges-
tive. One may begin by asking in which life stage such
a work could be composed or, alternatively, compiled.
In theory, mature age is possible, since then one can
function with confident authority. Still, action weighs
against reflection. Moreover, the composition or
509
collection of such material even at that age would seem
to border on arrogance or hubris. By what right does one
engage in attempting to delineate, codify or organize
wisdom material. What entitles one to undertake the
poetic act without its becoming merely the expression of
what is wise in one's own eyes. Old age, however, is al-
lowed honor. Age, after all, is the harmonious concom-
mitant of righteousness and wisdom. Moreover, the old
are allowed their glory and honor in wisdom as no other
life stage is. Further, a summing up is psycho. Socially
appropriate in age. The preparation of a wisdom compo-
sition is the culmination of a disciplined and wise life.
It is the verbal and poetic expression of what one has
become. It offers a measure of psychological closure.
The completion of the work parallels the completion of a
wise and aesthetically sound life. Intentional aesthesis
finds counterpart in literary aesthesis. Further, the
failure of the old to record their experience threatens
the loss of some of the wisdom collective. Certainly,
wisdom is not a saying or collection of sayings. But,
the aesthetic of wisdom is pointed to and symbolized by
the composition. Some measure of retention and endurance
is assured. Otherwise, the group is impoverished by the
loss of its old. Clearly, the group believes that wis-
dom is transmissible. Indeed, it must be transmitted.
510
Poetic preservation is an appropriate and fitting part of
that process. It is the more when it comes from the ap-
propriate members of the community, among a group for
whom the notion of fittingness or propriety is quite
fundamental. Further, the group values eloquent speech.
Speech is an important means of maintaining autonomy and
manipulating the life-world. Among the old, such elo-
quence ought to have come to its fruition. The notion of
cumulation points strongly to age as the life stage for
mashal composition. It is the symbolic rite of a stage
of life.
The notion of symbolic rite also offers a possible
application for the literature. Stages of life in any
society mandate a rite of passage between each pair of
stages. All societies rehearse the formal and informal
social transitions of their members. If these wise so
regarded and recognized stages of life, then rites of
passage of some sort had to exist, at least for members
of the group and their families. An exhortation of some
sort, based in the mashal form, is an appropriate means
of recognizing certain passages, perhaps best that from
youth to young adulthood. When a youth has irrevocably
committed himself to the wisdom discipline and has so
demonstrated aptitude and proficiency that the attainment
of wisdom in full adulthood may be anticipated, then it
511
is time to recognize the passage from 'postulant' to
'member.' One has become a member of the group and has
committed oneself to it. The sayings would make a cer-
tain sense in the context of recognizing this membership
and one's adult capacity to decide not subject to the
strict and searching discipline laid by elders upon the
callow youth. One becomes responsible for one's own con-
duct in accord to that intentionality to which one has
committed himself. In this, the old become sponsors of
the young. They symbolically, rather than literally,
instruct eloquently those who are entering the group,
ultimately to take their place. Those most advanced in
wisdom communicate their aesthesis to those least ad-
vanced. There is a symbolic recognition that the preser-
vation and transmission of wisdom rests increasingly with
those who have sought out wisdom and become members of
such a circle. The communication of the mashal makes far
less sense to either callow youth or mature adult: one
cannot yet make use of the exhortation and the other
really does not require it. The young adult adherent also
most needs ideological affirmation and confirmation. Such
exhortation is far more symbolic than literal; it is af-
firming, and in a language deemed valuable and powerful
by virtue of the commitment since made (cognitive dis-
sonance?). If the communication of sayings, not to
512
mention their composition, formed part of some rite of
passage, then the circle of the wise would have been even
more tightly-knit and -organized a group than we have
thus far argued. The existence of a theory of life-
stages does fit appropriately with such a passage rite.
The aged wise sponsor the committed young. They sym-
bolically recognize their adulthood and thereby take
leave of them.
Life and death are important dimensions in the
sayings of the B collection, but the actual use of these
terms does not display a discernible pattern beyond the
obvious association with the antithesis between righteous-
ness and wisdom versus folly and wickedness.1 In a way,
the terms seem rhetorical; they are ambiguous and vague
in their context. They seem to be used symbolically more
than literally. The Rephaim are once mentioned.2 Death
is associated with a messenger twice,3 perhaps consonant
with Yahweh's role in grounding intentionality. The use
of life and death language suggests that the course of a
person's life, and its length, are of great significance
in these sayings. That emphasis fits in with our
1See Appendix, Tables 64 and 65.
221:16.
316:14; 17:11.
513
contention that the primary frame of reference is the
individual human life: that is what is at stake in these
sayings for their author(s) and audience. If intention-
ality properly developed is an intrinsic good, then it is
not hard to infer that death is a fundamental evil. It
represents the termination of any possibility of realizing
that good. Moreover, if wisdom be cumulative, collective,
and developmental (i.e., part of the human process of
growth), then premature death denies one the opportunity
to achieve mature wisdom. Wisdom in its fullest, in its
aesthetic wholeness, comes only with the maturity of age.
Thus, old age is required for closure, especially if
mashal-composition is an old man's activity as part of
that culmination.
History
Finally, we come to the question of history be-
yond the individual. What we can infer here differs
little conceptually from what we have already said. One
or two concepts, however, should be stressed. First,
the material suggests that time is continuous rather than
discontinuous. That means that each moment of time fol-
lows coherently and consistently, though not necessarily
predictively, from the moment before. There are no
drastic, erratic or random changes in the course of his-
tory. The past is applicable to the present; the present
514
has an intelligible relationship to the future. The
consistency of change follows a pattern (of the second
degree). What this means is that there are no points in
history when sudden breaches occur which disrupt the con-
nection of moment to moment. There is no point where
what follows bears no readily discernible relationship to
what preceded. There is no apparent dualism or poly-
morphism of time. Time is one continuous and uninterrupted
process of development, growth and change.
This conception of time places this literature
at some remove from those works which postulate drastic
discontinuities in time. The wise have not had experience
that causes them thus to distrust history or to place its
meaning and unveiling outside the "natural" process. It
is difficult to see how this material could readily be
the precursor of literatures which postulate historical
dualism. This view poses a basic difficulty for the
von Rad hypothesis. The traditional affinity between law
and wisdom is based on their compatible spatio-temporal
realities: based in demesnes, displaying proprieties,
this-worldly and temporally continuous. Prophecy coheres
with apocalyptic on the grounds of the same kind of com-
patibility: here a dualistic approach to history that is
radically discontinuous in a world without demesnes or
proprieties in which ethical activity/sensitivity is
515
leveled by a radical divalent ethical and temporal system.
The divalence of wisdom, we have argued, is largely
specious; the doctrine is far more complex and multi-
valent, but temporally continuous.
The other features of historical temporality
amount to a repetition of our earlier list: stable, re-
liable, evolutionary, coherent and consistent, arena of
meaning, fluid, open, field of change, non-symbolic, in-
telligible through aesthesis and as aesthesis, indi-
vidualistic, a field of authority and power according to
the proprieties, subject to the harmonizing aesthesis of
Yahweh as ground. The ultimate values of this material,
however, are individual rather than supra-individual, so
we look in vain for discussions of history qua history.
At best, we perceive the longer term by inference: that
history is the field within which these people may
cumulate, rehearse, celebrate and transmit their inter-
pretation through a literature which symbolizes poetically
a quality of being they intrinsically value. In that
they become a group and acquire identity, that wisdom
grows out of common search and common life. Perhaps this
literature is a reflection of the ritual forms and sharing
that bound that life and group together.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The themes of atomism and evolutionary develop-
ment recur in the scholarly interpretation of the Hebrew
Bible's proverb literature. The sayings are terse, em-
blematic and often abstract. Their literary structure
derives from formal rather than substantive coherence.
Thus, the works may appear to be collections of sayings
brought together from a wide variety of social, cultural,
and theological milieux to serve their present, pre-
sumably didactic, purpose. Within or between these
collections, one can discern the lineaments of the his-
torical processes whereby the literature evolved. Ele-
ments of large-scale social processes already appear,
perhaps in miniature. With their implicit hermeneutics
and historiagraphies, such theories cut to the heart of
the phenomenon of wisdom. The proverb literature is
pivotal, both historically and form-critically, since it
seems to derive from settings which, and to present what,
one must call 'wisdom' if the term is to have any viable
analytic application.
Examination of the definitions which predominate
516
517
in wisdom research makes clear the multi-vocality of
'wisdom,' raising the question whether any historical
phenomenon as such lies behind it. The attempt to de-
velop a wisdom typology derived from the text makes clear
that wisdom is not a single historical entity.
If 'wisdom' is not to be either vacuous or os-
tensive and therefore derivative, then some minimum
criterion for its application must be developed. This
criterion is sociological: some identifiable social
group must stand behind the literature. Theses concern-
ing wisdom influence or development become theses con-
cerning the relationships and continuity of that group
with others within that socio-historical milieu.
Certain projective approaches derived from sys-
tematic, methodologically-rigorous Phenomenology elicit
a coherent world-view from one accepted body of proverb
material. Delineation of this Weltanschauung helps
clarify the setting within which this literature de-
veloped and was preserved. The result argues for com-
positional rather than redactoral unity in this proverb
work; it imposes distinct limitations on viable evolu-
tionary theories.
The work examined, Proverbs 15:28-22:16, evi-
dences a hierarchy of "demesnes." Demesnes are spheres
of power, influence or autonomy. They are ordered in
518
terms of intentionalities. Character stratifies demesne:
Yahweh, king, aristocrat, wise, righteous, ignorant,
foolish, wicked. Passion or pride, violating the boun-
daries of demesne, makes one vulnerable to the contagious
effects of other demesnes; one loses autonomy. Such
structures are both spatial and temporal. Wisdom is
the character acquired through a discipline begun early
in life. Demesne is not absolute. Wisdom's discipline
is an intrinsic good which supercedes other values, even
autonomy.
Such a world-view demands a cohesive social group
which preserves and transmits the discipline, shares the
potentiation of collective wisdom, reduces vulnerability,
and produces and preserves an ideological literature.
Though they have authority, the wise are subordinate to
other powers and demesnes, especially Yahweh's. Wisdom
has a theological orientation which clarifies the re-
ligious self-understanding of this group and explains
the authority of their wisdom.
Sociological-structural analysis thus validated
offers further prospect for clarifying and evaluating
theories concerning the origins, nature and development
of wisdom and related groups. The methodology has pa-
tential value in interpreting any social group whose
world-view is coherently expressed in literary form.
TABLE 1
TERMS FOR "WISDOM," "UNDERSTANDING,"
"KNOWLEDGE"
hikmh byn nbwn bynh tbwnh dct *ydc
tcm mzmh mwsr csih ycsi twšyh *śkl
Also: sidq crmh |
wisdom; often used with lb, insight comprehend (distinguish), understand (action) insightful, understanding, apt understanding understanding knowledge, insight, understanding knowledge, experience (i.e., ability), experienced, adroitness, aptness understanding, comprehending plan, thought., lucidity discipline, instruction., "paideia" counsel, advice i advise, counsel i effective wisdom, success insight, comprehension, think, ponder
right, righteous, in harmony with order (maat?) i craftiness, prudence |
Perhaps: yšr, hisd, kbwd, tiwb, ‘šr
520
521
TABLE 2
TERMS RELATING TO FOLLY OR IGNORANCE
'wyl foolish, stupid
'wly useless, worthless
'wlt stupidity, impious stupidity
ksyl foolish, stupid (practical matters), shameless
(religion)
lsi scorner, gossiper
nbl worthless, foolish, uncomprehending
nblh folly, blasphemy
*skl foolish action
*pth inexperienced, misguided
pty young and inexperienced, eatily, misled, ignorant
bcr dull, brutish, stupid
hll boastful
hllh, hllt madness
Also: kcs, pšh, cwn, šmh, *hiti'
522
TABLE 3
ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL WISDOM TERMS
tkhit
ysr
mcgl
drk
'rhi
ntbh
hisd
hn
msiwh
cqš
nptl
cwt
hit'
SOURCE: Crawford H. Toy, A Critical and E;:egetioal
Ccrnrentary of the Book of Proverbs, International Critical
Commentary, vol. 16 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1899), pp. xxiv-xxv.
523
TABLE 4
ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL WISDOM TERMS PECULIAR
TO PROVERBS 10 ff
mqwr hiyym fountain of life
mhith destruction
bn mbyš son who causes shame
slf perverseness, subvert ruin
yd lyd hand to hand [surely--BDB]
'k lmhiswr only to want
mpry py ‘yš from the fruit of a man's mouth
htglc show the teeth, rail, quarrel
twcbt-yhwh abomination of Yahweh
yš formula for introducing a proverb
thibwlwt wise guidance, steersmanship
esi hiyym tree of life
1' ynqh shall not go unpunished
mrp' healing (with various applications)
ypyhi kzbym breathes forth lies
yphi 'mwnh breathes forth faithfulness
mrdp pursuer of . . .
hpyq rsiwn draw favor from Yahweh
myhwh
ygrh mdwn stir up strife
nrgn whisperer, tail-bearer
r’š, rš poverty
bny my son
Also:
twšyh, lqhi ‘mrym, "void of heart," "sluggard “
mcglwt, thpwt
SOURCE: S. R. Driver, An Introduction to the Litera-
ture of the Old Testament, Meridian Books (Cleveland: World
Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 403-4.
524
TABLE 5
THE SEMANTIC FIELD OF WISDOM
(ADAPTED FROM FOHRER'S ANALYSIS)
A. Sorcery, witchcraft, knowledge of sacred powers.
This sense is closely parallel to the predominate Mesopotamian
usage. "Hikm ist eine Bezeichnung desjenigen, der um die
Hintergründe des Weltgeschehens und die künftigen Ereignisse
zu wissen vorgibt,"a including not only priests and oracle-
sayers but animals. The wise are those who understand the
times; thus, there is a connection with astralism.
B. Aptitude, ability, experience, adroitness. Here
we understand by 'wise' the skill of the artisan at his
craft as wel1 as the administrative capacity of the ruler or
official whatever his rank:
C. Cleverness, craft, cunning. The word is applied
to the wiles of animals, so "dass hikm ein nicht von Moral
bestimmtes Klug- und Kundigsein ausdrücken kann, das man
braucht, um im Leben bestehen zu können."b In Job, such
cunning takes on a distinctly negative hue.
D. "Lebensklunheit," worldly wisdom, practical
understanding. Wisdom is “die Kunst, das Leben in jeder
Beziehung und in allen Lagen meisterlich zu führen."c It is
steersmanship (tahibûlōt), which may include the understand-
ing that Yahweh directs the world, knows everything that
occurs in the world, and distinguishes good and evil.
E. Learning, knowledge. To this sense of 'wisdom'
belong the onomastica, the lists of plants, creatures,
deities, and other entities which were common to Egypt and
Mesopotamia and are suggested in I Kings 4:33 with reference
to Solomon.
He spoke of trees, from the cedar that is in Lebanon to
the hyssop that grows out of the wall; he spoke also of
beasts, and of birds, and of reptiles, and of fish.
Here, the observer is attempted to define and objectify the
world as it appears to him, to give it an intelligible order
so that he may master it.
525
TABLE 5--Continued
F. Right conduct, rules of conduct, admonitions of
behavior. Just as the torah is administered by the priest,
and the prophet mediates the divine word, so the wise gives
counsel. The speeches of the wise about behavior are flow-
ing fountains not deep cisterns--the wise are not merely
accurate authorities on right conduct, but their ideas and
counsels are artfully arranged to be of use and beauty.
G. Ethical behavior, moral determination. The out-
come of right rules of conduct is ethical behavior, which is
governed by understanding. Indeed, it requires understand-
ing to know enough to seek such rules in order to attain to
ethical action.
H. Piety, right religious behavior. Ethical be-
havior is often tinged with religious implications; moral
maxims, by religious thoughts. Wisdom is often equated with
the fear of Yahweh, in the sense that theologically-deter-
mined wisdom will lead one to an understanding of and re-
spect for Yahweh. By 'understanding' we do not suggest
"pious aptitude."
Immer bezeichnet der in der Weisheitslehre beliebte
Ausdruck Jahwe- oder Gottesfurcht das fromme Verhalten.
Er meint nicht die Angst vor Gott, sondern die
religiöse Verehrung, wie sie sie jedem Gott von seinen
Verehrern entgegengebracht wird. Sie äussert sich
nicht im Kultus, der in diesem Zusammenhang nur eine
ganz geringe Rolle spielt, sondern ist praktische
Religion im täglichen Tun and Lassen, d.h. im rechten
ethischen Verhalten.d
I. Academic wisdom teachings. This sense applies
to the general understanding of the world developed in later
wisdom. It formed a complete unity of teaching that was
theologically finished.
J. Eschatological reward or treasure, apocalyptic
gift. As gift, wisdom is the more-than-human wisdom to
uncover the secrets of the future. As "grace," wisdom is
bestowed by the Spirit of God upon the ruler of the end
time. There, it amounts to insight, counsel, knowledge,
fear of Yahweh, and power, all of which exceed in strength
and extent any human skill.
526
TABLE 5--Continued
K. Possession of Yahweh, creation of Yahweh.
Finally, wisdom represents the sagacity of Yahweh which en-
compasses all his divine secrets, his retributive justice,
his knowledge of the future, and his basic determination of
good and evil conduct and their codification. In this mean-
ing, wisdom represents a comparatively late borrowing from
similar Canaanite, Mesopotamian and Egyptian notions. We
also have the almost mythic characterisation of wisdom from
Job 28. Yahweh searched out and won Wisdom, then used her to
order and govern creation. Wisdom here is less personal and
hypostatic than simply objective. It/she is divine, pre-
existent, and an independent potency that only gradually
becomes located in Yahweh's divinity. In any case, this kind
of wisdom includes the secrets of creation and the immensity
of creative knowledge.
SOURCE: Adapted from Georg Fohrer, "Die Weisheit im
Alten Testament," in Studien zur Attestamentlichen Theologie
und Geschichte (1949-1966), Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die
Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, vol. 115 (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter Company, 1969), pp. 243-74.
NOTE: Interestingly, while the Egyptian macat can at
least arguably be related to Hebrew 'wisdom' and 'righteous-
ness,' in Akkadian the terms for 'wisdom' convey almost ex-
clusively the sense of cultic or magical knowledge. So, "In
dem Text 'Ich will preisen den Herrn der Weisheit' ist der
Gott Marduk gemeint, dessen 'Weisheit' darin besteht, dass
er der Riten des Exorzismus kundig ist."e This lack of an
equivalent term, however, does not mean any lack of wisdom
literature comparable to Hebrew and Egyptian. It is interest-
ing, though, that the two Akkadian termini technici "to com-
prehend something" and "to learn" (hakâmu and lamâdu) are
both West-Semitic loan words.
aP. 254. bP. 255.
cP. 256. dP. 260.
eP. 245.
527
TABLE 6
CHARACTERISTICS OF WISDOM, LATE WISDOM AND MYTH
(ADAPTED FROM H. H. SCHMID)
A. Genuine wisdom.
1) In-the-world: person acts in terms of the demands
and alternatives presented within his everyday life.
2) In history: there is only one time--duration--in
which one lives wisely. His life is not ordered
according to some objectivizing time nor accord-
ing to "real time" from which the experiential
is derived (cf. Jolles). Significant events are
individuated as experience.
3) In space one lives in van der Leeuw's "extension"
from which significant places are individuated as
positions (i.e., of experience).
4) Duration and extension exist with respect to and
for the acting individual: cosmos is created in
unity with the world through individual, not
collective, action.
5) Unity postulate: the world of life (-experience)
and the cosmos (beyond experience) are one.
6) The same structure, order, fully interpenetrates
world and cosmos.
7) "Man is the measure of all things"--the ethical
value of an act (vis-a-vis the world order) is
solely a function of its propriety in terms of
that situation, that moment of time and that
particular position in space. There is no ethical
judgment apart from individual experience.
8) There is no sacred realm that exists in opposition
to the space or time (or word) of this world.
[Perhaps one may regard the situation of right
action as somehow sacred in Schmid's system, the
word being sacred only with respect to that event.]
9) The wise man lives in the continuous present (not
in Jolles' past). Wisdom is only viable for that
present.
10) Wisdom is contingent on experience. Wisdom deals
with an instant as experience, in terms of its
particularity (parallel to Jones).
11) Change through time is continuous but not pre-
dictable. Therefore, knowledge can be transmitted
but must be re-tested in every new context.
528
TABLE 6—Continued
A. Genuine wisdom--Continued
12) Wisdom creates structure. Cosmogony is con-
tinuous and co-extensive with right action in
the world. Cosmic structure is a function of
human behavior in concrete situations.
13) Deed and consequence are perceived as a unity--
the outcome is an integral part of the act. Any
displacement between the two in space or time is
immaterial to their synthesis.
14) Correlative with the unity of experience is a
tendency to perceive the divine in "monotheistic"
terms, i.e., as a functional unity which validates,
justifies and upholds the ethical stability of
the act-conseqence synthesis.
15) Distillation of experience into maxims of wisdom
is limited by social convention to certain indi-
viduals (Sippenweisheit, patriarchalism) or a
class of individuals, on whose authority this
contingent wisdom is transmitted. Descriptively
speaking, wisdom sayings tend to center on the
significant experiences in the lives of these
people.
16) Wisdom validation out-selects transient phenomena.
B. Formalized ("late" or "systematic") wisdom.
1) Objectivized: a person acts in terms of the
structured pattern of behavior and its descrip-
tions of reality set out within an authoritative
system (strictly speaking, an authoritative set
of instructional sayings and discourses).
2) Systematic time is static--duree is immaterial to
the system's validity or function and the system
stands outside temporal categories, with respect
to experience.
3) Systematic space stands outside extension which
is equally immaterial. Experiential position is
not relevant to the theory.
4) Time and space are perceived in terms of the system
objectively. The theory rejects a relativism of
space and time which emphasizes the individual,
his experience, and appropriateness. Rather,
situational duration and extension vary unpre-
dictably and inconsistently from the objective
norm, but the pattern of these deviations appears
in the formalized space and time of the system.
529
TABLE 6—Continued
B. Formalized ("late" or "systematic") wisdom--Continued
4) Time and space are perceived in terms of the
system objectively--Continued
Therefore, the wise person norms all his ex-
perience to the system in the expectation that
variations will cancel themselves out. This
forming involves an act of faith.
5) The pattern of the cosmos cannot be adequately
discerned by the mind of man. One can know
authoritatively only enough to get along reason-
ably well in life. The divine remains distant;
it is Wholly Other, whose purposes can at best
be matters of belief where they are intelligible
or discernible at all. In principle, the aims
of the divine may be at variance with human
well-being--at least they may seem to be.
6) Wisdom tends to personify and anthropologize in
compensation for the implicit alienation from the
cosmos and the unpredictability of experience.
Man becomes man's center, restoring epistemic
unity. Somehow, depending on the culture, the
cosmos is mediated to man in a personal way.
7) The world's structure is not adequately and en-
tirely discernible to man--hence, not intelligible.
Wisdom, as theory, conforms this structure to
objective criteria which are intelligible. The
structure of the world continues subordinate to
the cosmos and the divine, but the cosmos stands
above and at some remove from the world. Late
wisdom, as a result, essentially drops the unity
hypothesis.
8) The system is the measure of all things; man
constitutes the fundamental unifying center which
validates the structure of theory.
9) The "school"—including in this term all formal
and approved occasions for the systematic communi-
cation of wisdom--functions as a (quasi-) sacred
position, or sanctuary. The school has its sacred
word with power (whose order and form is fixed
without regard for meaning (cf. Jolles on the
maxim), its degrees, its rites. While the calendar
of the school, the paternal-maturational structure
of its time, are fixed, they seem not to have been
so encompassing as to constitute truly sacred
530
TABLE 6—Continued
B. Formalized ("late" or "systematic") wisdom—Continued
9) The "school"—Continued
time. [Here we have to make considerable in-
ference from Schnid's comparison between myth
and genuine wisdom: a sacred calender would
seem to recapitulate life far more than does
the "school."]
10) Wisdom's authority derives from the past, an in-
creasingly remote past of great wise men. Its
faith in the proleptic justification of the system
means a reliance on future vindication for what is
undertaken in the present. The unintelligible
contingency of the present stands in stark relief
to the certitude of the past and hope for the
future. The time to come, in other words, struc-
tures and explains and justifies the present
world of action, events.
11) Wisdom is absolute.
12) Change is discontinuous. Wisdom stands above
change, though there is a strong element of belief
in its anticipation that cosmic structures beyond
its ken will work to validate it.
13) Formal wisdom perceives patterns of action; dis-
position, not some particular deed, is ethically
significant. The realm of wisdom differs from
the realm (space) of non-wisdom; no act can bridge
the gap. Positions relate to disposition, patterns of action.
14) Deed and consequence are displaced. In a single
event, there is no guarantee of synthesis. Con-
sequences (in the future) are believed to com-
pensate for imbalances in the present, when in-
terpreted in terms of patterns.
15) Wisdom persists through a stable authoritarian
system of oral communication, rote learning, and
learned formal interpretive schemes.
16) The tone of formal wisdom is ambiguous, because
of the contingency of experience, and pessimistic,
because of the alienation from everyday experience
(objectification) and orientation to times other
than the present. The pessimism is latent, in
the form of a crisis potential between historical
and a-historical wisdom. Overtly, the pessimism
appears of a kind of distance (almost proto-stoic)
in which one avoids unnecessarily exposing himself
to the unpredictable vagaries of nature and power.
531
TABLE 6—Continued
C. Myth
1) Apart from the world: a person acts ritual
in a formalized and world-excluding setting
which may recapitulate fundamental and essen-
tial cycles or experiences in life but in a
guise that established a separate and distinct reality.
2) Outside of history: mythic structure (mythos)
does not define a present, past and future. All
time, and therefore in a sense no time, is en-
compassed. The a-temporality of myth often
appears in terms of an indefinite future (end-
time) or past, but its continuity with the
present is not that of history. It is synchronic;
there is sacred time.
3) Sacred space also exists to delimit the sphere
of holy power. Positions acquire mythic sig-
nificance in reference to groups: family,
community, sect, tribe. Gradations of space
protect and define types or degrees of power.
Different functions demand different space.
4) Sacred ritual encompasses. It celebrates
unities, not distinctions. It recapitulates.
On the other hand, some kind of negation is im-
plicit in space and time distinctions which keep
the sacred from the profane or the expressly
contaminating. [We submit that three categories
at least are needed; beyond sacred and profane
there is the demonic/wicked/contaminating.]
Rite and sanctuary are superior to the indi-
vidual devotee.
5) Mediation Postulate: ritual brings together the
cosmic and world of ordinary experience. The
cult typifies so that separate events acquire
reality in terns of sacred mythos. Super-
natural reality impinges on phenomenal reality
through and in terms of cultic mythos.
6) The structure of mythos is received from cosmic
structure. Myth defines, therefore, a hierarchy
of reality. One cannot speak of interpenetration
since the devotee is drawn by the cult toward the
original cosmic reality from which cult and world
structure derive at increasing remove. Cosmic
structure is primordial.
532
TABLE 6—Continued
C. Myth—Continued
7) Cosmic structure (not necessarily order in the way
that genuine wisdom creates cosmic order) is the
measure of all things. Ritual and magic bring it
to bear in intelligible form upon events to re-
veal their structure. Hence, they manipulate the
cosmic, within definite constraints, in the
service of the present.
8) There is a primordial sacred realm outside dura-
tion and extension.
9) The devotee, when in the sacred precincts and in
the presence of or participating in ritual, lives
outside time. Past and future are only metaphors
for this is a-temporality of mythos.
10) Mythos is not contingent, but absolute because
founded on a prior (ontologically, if we may say)
reality.
11) Within mythos there is no change. Mythos defines
a static, predictable cycle of events that re-
capitulate fundamental types of experiences.
Its standard "time" is therefore cyclical. Since
it points to the same cycles in the life-world,
change there must be immaterial. Deep structures
of the world do not change; the eternal cycles
recur however appearances may differ.
12) Cycles suggest synthesis, that there is some kind
of deed-consequence retribution, but the power
which stands behind and above the deed (or, less
likely, disposition) is prior to the deed itself.
Right action rests upon external criteria not
entirely consistent with retribution in the
strictest sense. [Here again, we have had to go
rather far in our inferences to complete a some-
times sketchy paradigm.]
13) Synthesis appears, but includes a prior element
of the power of structure from which the deriva-
tive reality of experience acquires its structure.
14) Mythos tends to cosmologies which rehearse cosmic
structures excluding (i.e., vanquishing) chaos.
The tendency to cosmologize places mythos in
primordial times, increasing the alienation be-
tween cosmos (in cult) and experience.
15) Mythos is authoritative, ritualized in word and
deed, restricted in space and time, a collective
rather than individual product. [Mythos is
533
TABLE 6—Continued
C. Myth—Continued
15) Mythos is authoritative . . . —Continued
received from tradition (by the ritualizers); it
is not written nor revised by any determinable
individual.] It therefore centers on the re-
curring collective experiences of some relevant
group.
16) Mythos deals in terms of the Wholly Other whose
power must be duly protected and confined.
17) While genuine wisdom expressly affirms life in a
certain sense, so does mythos in terms of the
cyclical, basic, collective and cosmic. The tone
of both is affirmative-optimistic. Wisdom is
dynamic, while cult and mythos are static.
SOURCE: Adapted from Hans Heinrich Schmid, Wesen
und Geschichte der Weisheit: eine Untersuchung zur
Altorientalischen und Israelitischen Weisheitsliteratur,
Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentlice Wissen-
schaft, vol. 101 (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1966).
534
TABLE 7
ANTITHESIS
15:29, 32
16:1, 2, 9, 22, 21, 33
17:9, 22, 24
18:2, 12, 14, 19, 23, 24
19:4, 12, 21
20:3, 5, 6, 14, 15, 17, 29
21:5, 8, 15, 20, 26, 28, 29, 31
22:3, 15
535
TABLE 8
SAYINGS DEALING WITH YAHWEH
A. Yahweh disposes
16:1, 4, 7, 9, 33
19:21
20:24
21:1, 2, 30 (!), 31
22:5, 12
B. Mystery
16:(25?), 33
19:21
20:24, 25, 27
21:2, 30
Cf.: 18:17
C. Yahweh's standards
16:2, 4(?)
17:3
19;21
20:22, 25 (?)
21:1, 2, 30
22:5, 12, 14, 16 (JB)
D. Trust in Yahweh's power
16:3, 20
18:10
20:22
21:1, 31
22:4 (?), 12, 16 (JB)
536
TABLE 8—Continued
E. Simple retribution: direct harmony
16:4, 5, 7
17:5, 15
19:3, 17, 23
21:12(?)
22:4, 5,12(?), 14(?), 16
Cf.: 15:29
F. Atonement
16:6
(20:9)
(21:18)
G. Guarantor of justice
16:4, 5, 6, 7, 11
18:10
20:10, 12, 20(?), 22, 23
21:12(?)
22:4, 12, 16
Cf.: 18:18
H. "Weighs hearts"
16:2
17:3
(20:27)
21:2
I. Yahweh as maker
17:5
22:2
537
TABLE 8—Continued
J. Yahweh's name
18:10
K. Wife as Yahweh's favor
18:22
19:14
Cf.: 22:14
L. Yahweh as origin of insight
20:12, 27
Cf.: 20:30
M. Cult/Sacrifice
15:29
19:16
20:25
21:3, 18(?), 27
538
TABLE 9
ARCHITECTURE OF PROVERBS 15:29-22:16
15:28-16:9 Thematic Statement
15:28 parallel 22:12
15:29 parallel 22:11(?)
15:30 parallel 22:9 ("eye")
15:33 parallel 22:4 (yr’t-yhwh)
16:1-7 parallel 21:30-1; 22:1-4
15:28-9 wicked
31-3 instruction
16:1-9 Yahweh sayings
10-5 royal sayings (mlk)
18-9 pride and humility
20-30 speech or words
26-32 attitude types
16:32-17:3 wisdom standards
4-5 evildoers
6-16 proprieties
17-8 friend
19-25 attitude or character
27-8 speech
18:2-3 character (wisdom standard)
4 wisdom
6-8 fool's speech
10-1 security
12-4 attitude
16-8 pragmatic judgments
539
TABLE 9—Continued
18:2-3 character--Continued
(19 parallel to verses 10-1?)
20-3 speech
19:3-4 observations
5-9 false witness
6-7 friend
11-2 anger/wrath
13-4 fathers
213 thematic recapitulation Cadence
19:29-20:3 passion
5-11 Character or attitude
20 parallel 27 lamp
20-1 filial relations parallel 29
20:22-21:3 Yahweh and king sayings Cadence
4-12 wicked versus righteous
16-29 intentionalities
21:30-22:4 Yahweh (wisdom standard) Cadence
7-11 intentionalities or character
12 thematic summary Cadence
12-16 additions?
540
TABLE 10
ROYAL SAYINGS
16:10, 12, 13, 14, 15
17:7(?)
19:10(?), 12
20:2, 8, 26, 28
21:1
22:11
Cf.: 18:18
TABLE 11
TiWB-MN SAYINGS
16:8, 16(?), 19, 32(?)
17:1, (10?), 12
19:1, 22(?)
21:9, 19
22:1(?)
541
TABLE 12
TiWB-SAYINGS
(WORD "TiWB” APPEARS, IRRESPECTIVE OF FORM)
15:30
16:8, 16, 19Q, 20, 29, 32
17:1, 13, 20, 26
18:5, 22
19:1, 2, 8, 22
20:23
21:9, 19
22:1, 9
TABLE 13
ADMONITION OR VETITIVE
19:18, 27
20:16, 18, 19(?), 22
Jussive: 17:12
Motivated Form: 16:3
19:19, 20
20:13
22:10(?)
542
TABLE 14
PROPRIETY SAYINGS
16:4, 25, 26(?)
17:7, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 26
18:5, 17, 23, 24(?)
19:1, 4, 7, 10(!)
20:20
22:7
Cf.: 19:14, 26 .
But: 17:2
22:2
543
TABLE 15
WISDOM TERMS
A. *hikm
15:31, 33
16:14, 16, 21, 23
17:16, 24, 28
18:4, 15
19:20
20:1, 26
21:11, 20, 22, 30
B. byn
16:16
17:10, 24
19:25
20:24
21:29
C. dct
17:27
18:15
19:2, 25, 27
20:15
21:11
22:12
D. tbwnh
17:27K
18:2
19:8
544
TABLE 15—Continued
D. tbwnh—Continued
20:5
21:30
E. nbwn
16:21
17:28
18:15
19:25
F. csih
19:20, 21
20:5, 18
21:30
G. mwsr
15:32, 33
16:22
19:20, 27
22:15
H. crwm
19:25
22:3
I. thiblwt
20:18
J. śkl
16:21, 22, 23
17:2, 8
545
TABLE 15—Continued
J. śk1—Continued
19:11, 14
21:11, 12, 16
K. tm
19:1
20:7
L. twšyh
18:1
M. ysr
19:18
N. mśkyt
18:11
O. ykhi
15:31, 32
19:25
P. 'mwnh
20:6
Q. thiwr
20:9
22:11
546
TABLE 16
ELEMENTS OF WISDOM
Cf.: 20:9
A. Comparison to gold or silver
16:16
17:3
20:15
22:1
B. Power
21:22
C. Heart
16:21
17:22
18:15
19:8(!)
22:11
D. Fountain
16:22
17:14
18:4
20:5
21:1
E. Speech
15:30(?)
16:23
18:20, 21
547
TABLE 16—Continued
F. Bribery
17:8
18:16
19:6
21:14
G. Forgiveness
17:9
19:11
But: 19:19
H. Silence
17:27, 28(!)
21:23
I. Humility
15:33
18:12(?)
J. Prosperity
19:8
21:26
K. Slow to anger
19:11
L. Without vengeance
20:22
M. Reputation
22:1
548
TABLE 16--Continued
N. Dew/grass
19:12
Cf.: 20:4
O. Insight
18:4
20:5, 27
P. Plans
20:18
21:16(?)
22:3
Q. Loyalty
20:28
R. Action
21:3
S. Diligence
21:5, 21, 29
549
TABLE 17
LB SAYINGS
15:30, 32
16:1, 5, 9, 21, 23
17:3, 16, 18, 20, 22
18:2, 12, 15
19:3, 8, 21
20:5, 9
21:1, 2, 4
22:11Q, 15
TABLE 18
IGNORANCE
15:31, 32
16:20 (?)
18:13
19:2, 7, 20, 25, 27
21:11
22:6, 14
Cf.: 17:16, 28
20:5, 24
21:2
550
TABLE 19
FOLLY
16:22
17:7, 10, 12, 16, 21, 24, 28
18:2, 6, 7, 13
19:1, 3, 10, 13, 29
20:1(?), 3, 19
21:11, 20
22:5, 14
TABLE 20
DISCIPLINE
15:31, 32, 33
16:22
17:10
18:6
19:11, 18, 20, 25, 27
22:6, 15
551
TABLE 21
'INSTRUCTION' SAYINGS: MWSR
15:32, 33
16:22
19:20, 27
22:15
TABLE 22
SPEECH
15:28
16:13, 21, 23, 24, 27(!)
17:4, 7, 20, 27(!), 28
18:2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 20, 21
19:1, 7, 16(?)
20:15, 19
21:23
22:11
552
TABLE 23
IRONY
16:26, 30
17:2, 8, 10, 16, 24, 28
18:17, 23
19:13, 24
20:14, 28
21:3, 13, 17, 25
22:13
Cf.: 19:27 (JB)
20:11, 17
TABLE 24
FRIEND/NEIGHBOR SAYINGS
16:29
17:9, 17, 18
18:24
19:4, 6, 7
20:6
21:10
22:11(!)
Cf.: 20:16, 19
553
TABLE 25
LAW COURTS
17:15, 26
18:5, 17
19:5, 9, 28, 29
21:15, 28
554
TABLE 26
ELEMENTS OF EVIL AND FOLLY
A. Arrogance or pride
16:5, 18
17:19
18:12
20:6, 9
21:4, 24
B. Errant kings
16:12
C. King's Wrath
16:14
19:12
20:2, 8, 26
D. Plotting/Scheming
15:28
16:27, 30
17:11, 20
18:3
E. Speech
15:28
16:27
17:4, 7, 20
18:21
19:1, 28
Cf.: 20:19
555
TABLE 26—Continued
F. Strife
16:28
17:14, 19
20:3
22:10
G. Gossip or Rumor
16:28
17:9
18:8
20:19
H. Violence
16:29
21:7
I. Mocking poor
17:5
J. Rejoicing at calamity
17:5
K. Evil returned for good
17:13, 15
L. Pledge, surety
17:18
20:16
Cf.: 19:17
22:7
556
TABLE 26—Continued
M. Attitude
17:22
18:1
21:7
N. Bribery
17:23
O. Laziness, sloth
18:9
19:15, 24
20:4, 13
21:25
P. Impetuosity
18:13
19:2
20:21
21:5
Q. Quarreling
18:19
20:3
R. Lies, perjury
19:5, 9, 22, 28
20:17
21:6
557
TABLE 26—Continued
S. Despise word
19:15, 25, 29
21:24
22:10
T. Unfilial
19:26
U. Vows
20:25
V. Wine
20:1
W. Mercilessness
22:10
558
TABLE 27
SIMPLE RETRIBUTION: WITHOUT YAHWEH'S AGENCY
16:17, 31
17:11, 13
18:5, 7, 20(?), 21
19:5, 8, 15, 16(!), 19
20:7(?), 13, 16, 18(?), 21, 30(?)
21:5, 7, 8, 11, 12(!), 13, 15, 20, 21, 28, 29(?)
22:2, 4, 5, 8, 10(?)
Cf.: 15:29(?!)
21:17
22:7
TABLE 28
GULF BETWEEN WISDOM AND FOLLY
15:32
16:22(?)
17:7(?), 10, 16, 21(?), 24
18:2, 19(?)
19:2, 10, 22
21:11, 15, 18, 20, 22, 26, 27(!), 29
22:3, 5
But: 17:28
22:2
559
TABLE 29
ADVERSITY SAYINGS
15:33(?)
16:8, 19
17:1, 17
18:1(?)
19:1
21:9, 19
TABLE 30
ALTRUISM
17:5
19:6, 17
21:13, 26
22:9, 16(?)
Cf.: 18:23
21:5, 20
560
TABLE 31
NOBLESSE OBLIGE
16:11, 19
17:5
19:17
21:13(?), 26
22:9, 16
NOTE: Sayings involving "Weights-Measures-Scales,"
"Altruism;" and "Law Courts” (viz. testimony) may be given
this interpretation (Tables, 51, 30, and 25).
TABLE 32
WEALTH
18:11, 16(?), 23
19:4, 6, 10, 14
20:14
21:6, 20, 26
22:1, 2, 4, 7, 16
561
TABLE 33
THE POWERFUL
18:16, 18
21:22, 24
TABLE 34
POVERTY
16:19
17:5
18:23
19:1, 4, 7, 17, 22
20:13
21:13, 17, 19, 26
22:2, 7, 9
TABLE 35
HiSD SAYINGS
16 :6
19:22
20:6, 8
21:21
562
TABLE 36
WISDOM STANDARD OF VALUES: IMPLIED
“HIGHER STANDARD”
15:33
16:25, 32
17:2
20:9(!), 14, 24
21:16(?)
22:16
Cf.: 20:29
TABLE 37
STATUS QUO
16:10, 31(?)
17:7, 14(?), 26
18:5
20:8(?), 28
21:3(?), 8, 15
563
TABLE 38
SLAVE SAYINGS
17:2
19:10
22:7
Cf.: 20:16
TABLE 39
INTENTIONALITY
15:28, 32
16:6, 7, 23, 25, 27, 28
17:9, 10, 11, 16, 22, 24, 26
18:1, 3, 6, 14
19:2, 11, 19, 22, 28
20:5, 7, 9, 11, 14(?), 27(Q)
21:2, 8, 10(1), 15, 17, 25(!), 27(!)
22:11, 12
564
TABLE 40
MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL CONCEPTS
A. Day of trouble 16:4
B. Messenger 16:14; 17:11
C. Way of Death 16:25
D. Commandment (miswh) 19:16
E. Wine 20:1
F. Lots 16:33; 18:18
G. Vocative "My son" 19:27
H. Foreigners 20:16, 18
I. Loose woman (zrwt) 22:14
J. Rephaim 21:16
K. Cool spirit (qr-rwhi) 17:27
565
TABLE 41
FAMILISTIC SAYINGS
A. Father
17:6, 21, 25
19:13, 14, 26
20:20
B. Mother (all with 'b)
17:25
19:26
20:20
C. Wife
18:22
19:13
21:9, 19
D. Son/Child
17:2, 6, 21, 25
19:13, 18, 26, 27
20:7, 11
22:6, 14
E. Grandchild
17:6
F. Brother
17:2, 17
18:9, 19, 24
19:7
566
TABLE 41—Continued
G. The Aged
16:31
17:6
20:29
22:6(?)
H. Vocative "my son"
19:27
567
TABLE 42
CONTAGION
16:19, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30
17:2, 4, 8, 9, 12(!), 14(!), 17, 21, 25
18:9, 22(?)
19:12, 13, 19(?)
20:7, 19, 28(?)
21:10, 11, 18, 22(?)
22:9, 10, 11, 14
TABLE 43
VULERNABILITY
16:4, 5, 7(!), 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22
17:5, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22(?)
18:3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14(?), 16, 19, 21, 23
19:2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(?), 9, 16, 23
20:2(!), 3, 8, 16, 23
21:5(?), 6, 7, 14(?), 16, 18, 22, 23, 26(?), 27
22:3, 6(?), 7, 14
568
TABLE 44
'WAY' SAYINGS: DRK
16:2, 7, 9, 17, 25, 29, 31
19:3, 16Q
20:24
21:2, 8, 16, 29Q
22:5, 6
TABLE 45
OBSERVATION (FORM)
16:24, 26a, 30a(?)
17:12, 14, 17, 28
18:8, 17, 18(?), 23
19:3, 4, 6, 7
20:6, 11, 14a
21:17
22:7, 13a
aBon mot.
569
TABLE 46
DESCRIPTIONS
16:15, 26
17:12
18:8, 17
19:7, 24
20:4, 11, 14, 28(?), 29(?)
21:8, 15, 17
22:7, 13
TABLE 47
PRAGMATIC SAYINGS
17:8, 9, 14
18:16, 18, 20
19:6, 11, (18?), (19?), 20
20:6, 9, 13, 16, 25
21:14, 22(!)
22:3, 6, 15, 16(?)
570
TABLE 48
TEACHING
17:16
19:18, 27
22:6, 15
TABLE 49
THE RIGHTEOUS
15:28, 29
16:8, 12, 13, 31
17:15, 26
18:5, 10, (11?)
20:7, 28
21:3, 12, 15, 18(!), 21, 26, 29
571
TABLE 50
PURPOSE/END OF THE WICKED
16:4, 18, 25
17:11
18:3, 21, 24
19:16
20:20, 21, 22
21:7, 13, 25, 28(?)
22:8, 14
Cf.: 21:18
TABLE 51
WEIGHTS-MEASURES-SCALES
16:11
20:10, 14, 23
572
TABLE 52
‘ABOMINATION’ SAYINGS: TWcBH
16:5, 12
17:15
20:10, 23
21:27
TABLE 53
NATURALISTIC SAYINGS
[OR, NEO-NATURALISTIC]
16:24, 26
18:8, 20, 21
19:12, 1:3, 15, 24(?)
20:4, 13, 17, 26
21:17
22:8
573
TABLE 54
ANIMALS
17:12 She-bear
19:12 Lion
20:2 Lion
21:31 Horse
22:13 Lion
TABLE 55
WAR SAYINGS
16:32(?)
18:10, 11, 19
20:18
21:22, 31
TABLE 56
(RHETORICAL) QUESTIONS
17:16
18:14
20:6, 9, 24
574
TABLE 57
ATTITUDE
15:30, 33
16:2, 6, 7, 26-32
17:5, 9, 20-22
18:2, 12, 14
19:1-3, 16(?), 22
20:5-7, 27
21:2, 3, 24,27
22:10
TABLE 58
LIGHT/LAMP SAYINGS
15:30
16:15
20:20Q, 27
21:4
575
TABLE 59
'SPIRIT' SAYINGS: RWHi
16:2, 18, 19Q, 32
17:27K, 22
18:14
TABLE 60
CORRECTION, ADMONITION
15:31, 32
17:10, 15, 26
18:5, 6, 17
19:5, 9, 18, 20(?), 25, 28, 29
20:8, 30
21:11, 15, 28
22:6(?), 14
576
TABLE 61
TRADITION
15:31, 32
16:16
17:16, 24
18:15
19:8, 16, 27
21:11
22:6, 12
TABLE 62
NPŠ SAYINGS
15:32
16:17, 24, 26
18:7
19:2, 8, 15, 16, 18
20:2
21:10, 23
22:5
577
TABLE 63
YR’T-YHWH SAYINGS
15:33
16:6
19:23
22:4
TABLE 64
LIFE SAYINGS
16:7, 15, 22
18:7, 21
19:1, 23
20:2
22:5
578
TABLE 65
DEATH SAYINGS
16:14, 25
17:11
18:21
19:16, (18)
20:2, 20(?)
21:6, 12(?), 16(!)
TABLE 66
SAYINGS INVOLVING 'FATE"
16:4, 7, 25
18:18
19:9 (?)
20:22(?), 24, 25
22:2(?), 3
But: 16:33
579
TABLE 67
FUTURE
19:20
20:20
21:28
TABLE 68
SICKNESS
17:22
18:14
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