Christian
Scholars Review 17 (1987) 52-66
Copyright © 1987 by Christian
Scholar’s Review; cited with permission.
Qoheleth and the Problem
of Alienation
By
N. Karl Haden
52 Paul Tillich begins "Part One: The
Human Predicament" of The Eternal Now
with
these words:
[Aloneness] is more true of man than of any
other creature. He is not only alone; he also
knows that he is alone. Aware of what he is, he
asks the question of his aloneness. He asks
why he is alone, and how he can triumph over his
being alone. For this aloneness he
cannot endure. Neither can he escape it. It is
his destiny to be alone and to be aware of it.
Not even God can take this destiny away from
him. ...This is the greatness and this is
the burden of man.1
As
man questions his existence2 he appears only as a momentary and
flickering
flame
in a remote corner of the universe--a flame that wishes to ignite the
cosmos,
but is all too quickly snuffed out. And no one seems to care--the
universe
is impersonal and indifferent; the gods or God, if they exist, have
abandoned
man as an unwanted child. Thus, the existence of humankind seems
transitory
and purposeless. Rational man's struggle with aloneness is manifest
all
the way from his microcosmic need for individual significance to his mac-
rocosmic
aspirations projecting man as the measure of all things.
Within the wisdom movement of ancient Israel
Qoheleth, the most radical
of
the wisdom writers, wrestles with the problem of man's aloneness and man's
search
to attain meaningful existence. Qoheleth confronts this problem both
with
philosophical dexterity, and, of particular importance, with his own feel-
ings
of estrangement. This sage of yesterday has much to say to modem man
regarding
the experience which has become known as "alienation."3
Alienation
The
word "alienation" conveys the dilemma of a modern experience, yet
the
term is muddled by its various connotations. In its multi-dimensional im-
Alienation
as a characterization of human existence is generally thought of in connection
with modern society, and modern thought from
Feuerbach and Marx to existentialism.
N. Karl Haden finds the
essential characteristics of alienation in the ancient Hebrew sage
Qoheleth, and discovers in his writings a
perspective which is both sustaining and chal-
lenging to contemporary believers. Mr. Haden is
pursuing a doctorate in philosophy at the
Qoheleth
and the Problem of Alienation 53
plications,
alienation concerns both the individual and humanity; the nuances of
the
term are thus philosophical, psychological, political, economic, sociological,
religious
and ethical. Because of these various connotations, the first task at
hand
is to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of "alienation" as the
term will
be
used within the study.
G. W. F. Hegel was the first to use Entfremdung
(alienation) in a technical
and
philosophical sense. Hegel, Ludwig Feurbach, and Karl Marx are the three
thinkers
whose interpretations of alienation provide the basis for modem dis-
cussion.4
Alienation has also become a major concern of another school of
thinkers,
the existentialists. F. H. Heinemann, the continental philosopher who
coined
the term Existenzphilosophie in 1929, explains that the existentialists
wish
to
make man aware of the fact and problem of alienation; their aim is to liberate
him
from estrangement.5 In recent scholarship various themes of
existentialism
have
been assigned to Qoheleth: rebellion against a solely rational approach to
problems
of existence, an emphasis on the individual and the individual's expe-
rience,
and a lack of meaning in human existence.6 The purpose of this study is
to
consider Qoheleth's struggle with alienation and to discern his conclusions
about
life within the framework of his world view.
Toward
An Understanding of Alienation
When man questions the significance of life he
begins on the basis of his
own
existence; as he works his way into the macrocosm he can find only an
indifferent
and impersonal universe. But this estrangement from nature is only
the
beginning of the problem. Alienation is connected with human society, for
1Paul Tillich, The
Eternal Now (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), pp. 15, 17.
2"existence,"
i.e., man's state of being.
3As far as I know, very
little has been written on the theme of alienation in Qoheleth. One of the best
essays
I have encountered which treats this theme to some extent is James Williams,
"The Wisdom of
Koheleth
(What Does It Profit a Man?)" in Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom,
selected, with a Pro-
legomenon,
by James L. Crenshaw (New York: Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1976), pp.
375-389.
4This paper is not
intended to be an analysis of the historical development of the term
"alienation." For
those
interested in the ideology surrounding "alienation," particularly in
relation to Hegel, Feurbach,
and
Marx, see the following: "Alienation" in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (
Publishing
Company 1972), pp. 76 77; George A. Kendall, "Alienation and the Struggle
for Existence:
Biblical
and Ideological Views in Contrast," Thomist 47 (1983): 66-76; Lutz
Musner, "Ein Versuch Die
Hegelkritik
in Marxel1s Fruhschriften Als Entstehung Eines Sozialwissenschaftlichen
Forschungsprogrammes
zu
Deuten" Conceptus 15 (1981): 193-206; Mark C. Taylor, Journeys
to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard
(Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980): John Torrance, Estrangement, Alienation,
and Exploitation:
A Sociological Approach to Historical
Materialism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
5Fredrick Heinemam, Existentialism
and the Modern Predicament (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 9.
6Some recent works
dealing with existentialism, or existentialists, and Qoheleth are: Kenneth
James,
"Ecclesiastes:
Precursor of Existentialists," The Bible Today 22 (1984): 85-90;
Francis W. Nichols,
"Samuel
Beckett and Ecclesiastes on the Borders of Belief," Encounter 45.1 (1984):
11-22; C- B.
Peter,
"In Defense of Existence: A Comparison Between Ecclesiastes and Albert
Camus,"
TheologicalForum 12 (1980): 26-13. Robert
Gordis gives a very perceptive comparison between
modern
existentialism and Qoheleth in "Koheleth and Modem Existentialism," Koheleth-The
Man and
His
World, A Study of Ecclesiastes (New York: Schocken, 1968).
Christian
Scholar's Review 54
with
the movement of the masses to the swelling urban centers of the world,
man's
estrangement from the natural realm becomes more acute. Since the
Industrial
Revolution man has spent an increasing amount of time working with
machines.
The estrangement brought on by technology has only intensified with
the
modern computer age as individuals spend less time in reflecting and relat-
ing
to other individuals, choosing instead a kinship with automata.
The depersonalization of man in society leads
toward the apogee of aliena-
tion:
self-alienation. William Barrett describes this condition as resulting from a
society
that only requires man to perform his particular social function, identify-
ing
the individual with the function and neglecting the other vital components
of
humanness.7 Self-alienation characterizes the cleavage which
separates the
individual
as a dispensible component of the marketplace from the individual as
a
human being with deep personal needs.
Heinemann offers an excellent definition of
alienation which coincides with
our
present concern:
The facts to which the
term 'alienation' refers are, objectively, different kinds of dissocia-
tion, break or rupture
between human beings and their objects, whether the latter be other
persons, or the
natural world, or their own creations in art, science, and society; subjec-
tively, the
corresponding states of disequilibrium, disturbance, strangeness and anxiety.8
Morton
A. Kaplan conveys the same understanding in a different manner: alien-
ation
occurs as the individual perceives that his status, his identifications, his
relationships,
his style of life, and his work are not meaningfully correlated.9
Thus,
alienation in our study is the individual's detachment from the universe at
large,
from society, and from one's own self.10
There have been various solutions proposed to
remedy man's alienation.
One
school, believing that external changes have no effect, contends that indi-
vidual
effort can enable mankind to overcome alienation. Psychoanalytical treat-
ment
is seen as a viable means to the inward reform of the estranged person. A
second
school, basing its solutions on the economic determinism of Marxism,
contends
that the individual is the passive product of social organization and
that
social organization is the product of economic organization, which in many
societies
is determined by private property. Thus, the cure is thought to consist
in
social transformation through the abolition of private property.11
In
contrast to those who maintain that alienation has a certain remedy, many
existentialists
have argued that the condition is permanent, that man cannot rid
7William Barrett, Irrational
Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (
Anchor
Books, 1962), p. 36.
8Heinemann, Existentialism,
p. 9.
9Morton A. Kaplan, Alienation
and Identification (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 119.
10The reader should note
that here I am concerned primarily with the modem experience of alienation
as
opposed to a "biblical alienation" due, for example, to man's
depravity. A link between the modern
experience
and the theological explanation will be discussed later in the paper.
11The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy,
s.v. "Alienation," by G. Petrovic (
Company,
1972), p. 80. The reader may also want to note G.A. Kendall's article, "Alienation
and the,
Struggle
for Existence."
and
negates existence, p. 76.
Qoheleth
and the Problem of Alienation 55
himself
by any means of this inherent quality. Man is necessarily self-alienated; it
is
illusive to believe that he is capable of finding consistent personal meaning
in an
impersonal.world.12 As a "precursor of existentialists"
Qoheleth's conclusion on
this
matter is of particular interest.
Because man is alienated, life's occurrences
often seem paradoxical.
dox
results from the projection of human insights, interpretations, values, and
actions
into the universe. Existence becomes absurd. C. B. Peter explains:
Absurdity is the
failure of the world to satisfy the human demand. There is a paradox and
contradiction between
man's longing for clarity and the failure of logic to provide it, his
longing for eternal
joy and his experience of agony, his longing for immortality and his
ending in death.13
Perhaps
the greatest paradox is the concept of God. Good health and fortune
attest
to the absolute goodness of God; evil and suffering call God's goodness
into
question. Traditional theism, embodied in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam,
seems
unable to reconcile its concept of God with the experience of man: if God
is
immutable, how can he relate to individuals who constantly change? Why
should
he even want to relate to man? If he is omnipotent and loving, why is
there
pain and suffering? If he is omnipresent, why does he so often appear to
be
deaf to the voices of his children?
Perhaps traditional theism has a fallacious
view
of God, shackled by the proclivities of man; or perhaps traditional theism,
once
divorced from dogmatic systematization, is right after all in its concept of
God,
but man simply refuses to accept the consequences of this view.
Alienation
in Qoheleth
I will now turn to consider Qoheleth in view of
my premise that he grapples
for
meaning which has been lost through alienation. Although the historical
context
is different, the problems causing alienation as faced by Qoheleth are
universally
human and timeless.
When Qoheleth considers the universe in which
man finds himself, he
concludes
that in the natural cycles of this world man has no significance. The
wind
blows in the patterns it has always followed; the rivers flow to the sea, but
the
sea is never full; "a generation goes and a generation comes, but the
earth
remains
forever" (1:4). Thus in the passing from generation to generation, man
is
an isolated and minute fragment, quite dispensable to nature. Qoheleth con-
cludes
that "all things are wearisome; man is not able to tell it" (1:8a). I
suggest
that
the dillema Qoheleth recognizes here, man's alienation from nature, is
because
man can find no reference point in nature to give his life meaning.
Qoheleth experiences first hand the
utter bankruptcy of the attempt to
understand
life rationally: ". . . in much wisdom is much grief, and increasing
knowledge
results in increasing pain" (
12Ibid., p. 79.
13C.B. Peter, "In
Defense of Existence," p. 37.
14The reference to man's
reason has peculiar implications within the wisdom tradition. These implica-
tions,
which concern practical wisdom for the ordering of life, will be noted later.
Christian
Scholar's Review 56
work
of God, his divine plans and thoughts, then life could be patterned mean-
ingfully
in accordance with God's ordained purpose. But God's work escapes
rational
scrutiny:
When I gave my heart
to know wisdom and to see the task which has been done on the
earth (even though one
should never sleep day or night), and I saw every work of God, I
concluded that man
cannot discover the work which has been done under the sun. Even
though man should seek
laboriously he will not discover; and though the wise man should
say, 'I know,' he
cannot discover (8:16, 17; cf. also
Not
knowing the plans of God leaves all men subject to fate and the "chanci-
ness"
of existence (cf.
The most severe confrontation with fate and
chance comes in the form of
death.
Death becomes the ultimate boundary situation in which one's desires
and
choices conclusively elude him. Working within the mindset of Old Testa-
ment
Judaism, Qoheleth asks if the end of human beings is any different than
the
end of the beast. His conclusion: we cannot know (cf.
maintains,
". ..this also is a grievous evil-exactly as a man is born, thus will
he
die" (5:16a). He concludes that there is "no advantage to him who
toils after
the
wind" (5:16b). Poignantly, man is better off never to have been born (cf.
4:3;
6:3).
The same fate awaits both the wise and the foolish: death is the great
equalizer
(cf.
Just as modem experience is filled with paradox,
so Qoheleth observes
paradox
in his context. Prosperity was not guaranteed by right living; many
wicked
were found to be prosperous while the righteous were in poverty (cf.
chance:
...the race is not to
the swift, and the battle is not to the warriors, and neither is bread to
the wise, nor wealth
to the discerning, nor favor to men of ability; for time and chance
overtake them all (
Qoheleth
observes that folly is set in many high places while rich men are in
humble
places. He has seen slaves riding horses as if they were princes, and
princes
walking as if they were slaves (cf. 10:5-7). In summation, life is not
always
governed by the dictates of logic; rather, life is paradoxical.
Vanity
Perhaps
the greatest and most significant affinity between the modern di-
lemma
of alienation and Qoheleth's experience is to be found in the word
"vanity"
(hebel). The term is used no less than 37 times, and it conveys to the
15Walther Zimmerli notes
that one of the major concerns of the wisdom tradition was the
avoidance
of premature death via proper conduct. At one point Qoheleth seems to favor
this
project
(cf.
Qoheleth's
completely radical consideration of death." In 2:15, 16 Qoheleth maintains
that the
same
fate awaits both the foolish and, the wise. Zimmerli suggests that the older
sages are
concerned
only with the "when" of death and" willfully ignore the
"what." Contrary to the
tradition,
Qoheleth focuses on the inevitability (the "what") of death. See
Walther Zimmerli,
"Concerning
the Structure of Old Testament Wisdom, in
Studies
in Ancient Israelite Wisdom, pp. 191-193.
Qoheleth
and the Problem of Alienation 57
reader
the feeling of meaninglessness, or—to use the modem term-absurdity.
The
introduction, " 'vanity of vanities,' says Qoheleth, 'vanity of vanities!
All is
vanity'"
(1:2), which is repeated in the conclusion (12:8), provides the overall
inclusion
of the work.16 James Williams notes that Qoheleth's constant use of
hebel is a rhetorical
feature: Qoheleth questions the profit (yitron) of this life,
which
evokes the response that there is no profit, and he concludes with "all is
hebel."17
George Castellino makes a similar suggestion about the literary pro-
cedure
in Qoheleth:
...generally a
theoretical statement in the form of a thesis about some point.is offered the
reader, then the
statement is validated or illustrated through expenence (at times in terms
of a proverb or a
saying), and finally, a judgment is passed on the 'non-value,' 'vanity,' of
the experience in
question.18
In
the recent literary approach to Qoheleth, hebel, as a Leitmotiv,
has played a
fundamental
part in the analysis of the book.19
The basic definition of hebel is
"wind" or "breath." Figuratively, hebel con-
veys
the connotation of being unsubstantial and worthless, making the thing in
question
unprofitable. Vanity parallels the conclusions evoked by alienation:
first,
there is an inability to find fulfillment in toil, and thus man experiences the
failure
to exercise freedom in relation to his own possessions (cf.
4:4,
8; 6:2); secondly, the relationship between sin and judgment, and right-
eousness
and blessing is absent, and such anomalies of life are vanity; thirdly,
the
brevity of life is vanity.20 C. B. Peter states that vanity includes
four aspects
of
existence: first, the changeless monotony which characterizes the affairs of
men
and the course of nature; secondly, there is no profit or advantage (yitron)
in
wisdom (cf. 116-18), pleasure (cf. 2:1-10), nor in toil (cf.
death
ends all (cf
man
cannot understand the universe rationally (cf.
The contrast between hebel and yitron
is significant for the two concepts
represent
an antithesis. K. Seybold suggests that hebel serves an evaluative pur-
pose
with a "critico-polemic" intention. Qoheleth's observation that all
human
16That 1:2 and 12:8
provide the overall inclusion is a generally accepted view. Addison Wright,
"The
Riddle
of the Sphinx: The Structure of the Book of Qoheleth," The Catholic
Biblical Quarterly 30
(1968):
314-320, considers the larger context of 1:2-11 and 11:7-12:8 to be poems which
stand outside
of
the main structure of the book. Wright gives a helpful survey of other views on
the structure of
Qoheleth,
including the new literary methods, and then makes his own analysis (see n. 19
below), p. 333.
17James Williams,
"The Wisdom of Koheleth" p. 375. Williams notes that Walther Zimmerli
suggested
this
rhetorical feature in Die Weisheit des Predigers Salomo (
18George R. Castellino,
"Qohelet and His Wisdom," The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 30
(1968): 18f.
19For recent discussions
on the structure of Qoheleth, especially to his use of hebel, see
Castellino, J.A.
Loader,
Polar Structures in the Book of Quohelet, BZAW 152 (Berlin: Walter de
Gryuter, 1979), and
Addison
G. Wright's three related articles: "The Riddle of the Sphinx: The
Structure of the Book of
Qoheleth,"
The Cathollic Biblical Quarterly 30 (1968): 314-320; 'The Riddle of the
Sphinx Revisited:
Numerical
Patterns in the Book of Qoheleth," The Catholic Biblical Quarterly
42 (1980): 38-51;
"Additional
Numerical Patterns in Qoheleth," The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 45
(1983): 32-43.
20Theological Wordbook of
the Old Testament,
edited by Laird R. Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr.,
and
Bruce K. Walkte, s. v. "hebel," by Victor P. Hamilton
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), p. 205.
21Peter, "In Defense
of Existence," pp. 29-31.
Christian
Scholar's Review 58
activity
is vanity stands in opposition to the wisdom tradition's quest for yitron
in
life.22 Seybold concludes:
...thus hebhel
serves as 'destructive judgement,' a devaluation of the system of norms
established by
traditional wisdom, a polemic against its sensible value regulations, a
defamation of the
wisdom ideal of life.23
I maintain that Qoheleth's observations and
experiences are testimonies to
what
has become known as alienation. He is unable to find significance in
nature,
in his achievements, with reason, or even in seeking out the plans of
God.
But the study is yet incomplete, for Qoheleth's response must be exam-
ined.
In order to comprehend his response properly, we must establish his
context
as a sage and ascertain the roots of alienation for Qoheleth. Perhaps the
crux
of alienation for Qoheleth is estrangement from God.24
The
Goal of the Wisdom Tradition
James Crenshaw argues that, in his view, the
"fundamental link" between
the
quest of
suggest
that failure in this enterprise is the major contributor to the dilemma of
alienation.
The primary difference between Qoheleth and the other sages is
Qoheleth's
recognition of how romantic and fanciful the venture to insure God's,
favor,
and thereby guarantee the good life, had become. To arrive at Qoheleth's
concept
of God -his conclusion on the divine presence--we will establish first
the
goal or purpose of the tradition; then we will probe Qoheleth's conclusions
in
contrast to the tradition.
Walther Zimmerli proposes that the basic
question of the wise may be
expressed
as: "'How do I as man secure my existence?'"26 The school
of
wisdom
represented in Proverbs held the belief that a divine moral order exist-
ed,
an order which rewarded the wise and the good and punished the foolish
and
the wicked (cf. Prov 3:3: 10:3;
apparent
in the book of Job. Although it was championed by Job's friends, Job
himself
severely questioned the doctrine of retribution. Job was a righteous
man,
yet he suffered excruciating physical pain and untold emotional distress.
22 Theological Dictionary of the Old
Testament," edited by G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren,
vol. 3: gillulim-haras,
trans. by John T. Willis and Geoffery W. Bromiley, s. v. "hebhel,"
by K. Seybold
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), p. 319.
Williams draws a similar conclusion: for Qoheleth there is no
profit
(yitron) in this life, but there is a portion (heleq). Experiencing this
portion brings joy to life. See
pp. 384-389.
23 Ibid., p. 320.
24 In "The Riddle of the Sphinx,"
Wright concludes that the idea of the impossibility of discovering
God's work is
the theme of the book, and it is built on the vanity motif, p. 266.
25 James L. Crenshaw, "In Search of
Divine Presence," Review and Expositor 74 (1977): 366.
26Zimmerli, "Concerning the Structure
of Old Testament Wisdom," p. 190.
27 R. B. Y. Scott, The Way of Wisdom in
the Old Testament (
1971), p. 10.
Qoheleth
and the Problem of Alienation 59
Crenshaw
maintains that the three friends had a rational and predictable deity;
one
who was enslaved by a greater principle-justice.28
What
then is the basis for this trust in an order that insures retribution? Von
Rad
explains that the basis of trust may be seen not in terms of trusting in God,
...but to something
apparently quite different, namely the reality and the evidence of
the order which
controls the whole of life, much as this appears in the act-consequence
relationship....In it
however, Yahweh himself was at work in so far as he defended
goodness and resisted
evil.29
How
does this affect the concept of God? Von Rad continues:
If this experiential
reality could only be approached, from the point of view of acquiring
knowledge of it, from
the direction of knowledge of God, then knowledge of the world
could, in turn, also
consolidate knowledge of God. The statement that the fear of God is
the beginning of
wisdom could even be turned around, to the effect that knowledge and
experience lead to the
fear of God.30
For
the sages the discovery of this fundamental order meant the ability to coordi-
nate
life in the most advantageous manner. What then is the goal of the wisdom
tradition?
Crenshaw states this goal in one word-life.31 The sages sought to
master
life in order to attain the best that life could offer: health, honour, longev-
ity,
prosperity--all leading to a sense of security. This sense of security is anti-
thetical
to alienation; this desire to master life, which can be achieved only at the
expense
of enslaving the deity to a greater principle, causes Qoheleth to become
a
revolutionary within the wisdom movement. Experience does not affirm any
such
law of the universe; in fact, life often seems subject to the arbitrariness of
circumstances.
Are there parallels to the experience of modern
man as he desires to master
life?
The passion for affluence and personal security characterizes contemporary
Western
society. It is apparent all the way from the beer commercial panning the
"yuppies"
in a bar and espousing the philosophy that "you are in charge"--
conveying
to the viewer or listener the message of autonomous bliss--to the
trend
of many religious organizations, pray "this way. .." and God will
grant
your
requests. Presumably, God does not want his people to suffer--or be poor
(thus,
enslaving God to formulas designed to meet the whims of man). Man
longs
to be more than man, but existentially he is unable to shed his bonds of
mortality.
In his failure to escape his own finitude, modem man, like the sage of
old,
experiences alienation.
‘Olam
in Man's Heart
For Qoheleth the venture for the mastery of life
failed because of a false
premise
about God. That God exists and rules the world is a major assumption
28Crenshaw,
"In Search of Divine Presence," p. 360.
29Gerhard von
Rad, Wisdom in Israel (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), pp. 191, 192.
30Ibid., p. 194.
31James L.
Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, An Introduction (Atlanta: John Knox
Press, 1981), p. 62.
Christian
Scholar's Review 60
of
Qoheleth, as with the older teachers; but Qoheleth introduces a new dilem-
ma:
the activity of the divine is beyond man's comprehension, and therefore
man
cannot adapt himself to any fundamental order ordained by God. Should
man
despair? Is there absolute alienation from God? In response to these ques-
tions
our first concern will be Qoheleth's theology, which is unorthodox in
comparison
with the tradition, and secondly his theological conclusions and
their
practical applications.
Recent scholarship has been quick to point out
agnosticism, skepticism,
nihilism
and various other negative themes within the book of Qoheleth.
Crenshaw
has described Qoheleth's God as "stingy," and as one who concealed
all
important knowledge that would enable the sages to act in accordance with
his
plan and timing.32 Von Rad states that for Qoheleth man cannot
discern
what
has been decreed by God in any given set of circumstances. The dilemma is
not
the adversities of life but rather the insurmountable barrier blocking man's
attainment
of knowledge.33 Scott considers the philosophy of Qoheleth agnostic
and
fatalistic.34 Thus, some conclude that Qoheleth conceives of God as
a re-
mote
and indifferent being; God is omnipotent to be sure, but He is also arbi-
trary.
Man is left without recourse with such a God; man can only submit (cf.
Much of the scholarship deducing Qoheleth as a
philosopher chasing after
meaning
in life, and not finding significant meaning, can be traced to the ex-
egesis
of
He has made everything appropriate in its time.
He has also set ‘olam in their heart,
yet so
that man will not find out the work which God
has done from the beginning even to the end.
Chapter
3, verse 11 proves to be the most pivotal and perhaps the most debated
verse
in the book of Qoheleth. ‘Olam has
various renderings: forever, ever,
everlasting,
evermore, perpetual, old, ancient, world. The Septuagint translates
the
word as aion. Allan Macrae suggests that ‘olam is derived from ‘alam,
meaning
"to hide" and pointing to the distant future or to the distant past.35
Scott
translates ‘olam in 3:11 as "an
enigma," thereby signifying the root
meaning
as "that which is hidden."36 Gordis proposes that
"love of the world" is Qoheleth's
intention
in using the term.37 Within the context of Chapter 3, there is
nearly
unanimous
agreement that the contrast is between fixed time (‘et) and ‘olam. In
3:1
Qoheleth states: "There is an appointed time (‘et) for everything. And there is
a
time (‘et) for every event under
heaven." He then delineates such appointed
32Crenshaw,
"In Search of Divine Presence," p. 36.
33von Rad, Wisdom
in
34Scott, The
Way of Wisdom, p. 170.
35Theological
Wordbook of the Old Testament, s. v. "'olam," by Allan A.
Macrae, pp. 672-673.
36R.B.Y. Scott, The
Anchor Bible: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, edited by William Foxwell Albright
and David
Noel
Freeman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 221.
37Gordis, Koheleth,
pp. 231, 232.
Qoheleth
and the Problem of Alienation 61
times
(again, ‘et) in verses 2-8. God has
ordained a proper time (‘et) for every-
thing,
but as Roland Murphy comments,
God runs things off at his own time, and man is
not geared to this scheme because of the
timeless <’olam>
in his heart. Hence, he cannot discover 'the work God has done'--a
limitation that earlier sages failed to
appreciate.38
I
agree with James Williams, that however the word is translated, the im-
plication
is that ‘olam lies at the center of
existence. ‘Olam is the component
which
makes the human species distinctive; ‘olam
provides a link with God, yet
God's
work remains mysterious.39 Williams suggests that ‘olam is the reason
for
the "unhealable alienation of man from his world."40 It is
at least the source of
man's
deepest yearning for meaning.
Williams contrasts two recent responses to the
function of ‘olam as the
primary
cause of alienation.41 The position credited to H. Gese is that
alienation
is
overcome in the world-context through the fear of God; thus, alienation is
replaced
by openness to the world as man thankfully receives the good times in
life
as a gift from God. The individual will accept the bad times in accord with
God's
purposes, and he will recognize "that it is only his inability to
understand
the
‘olam that brings him to his
existential impasse."42 Williams disagrees with
this
position, and he deduces a contrary view from H.H. Schmid: the gifts of
God
are arbitrary; fear of God and accepting his gifts in life do not provide a
sufficient
explanation to man's estrangement.43
Williams identifies ‘olam as the antithesis of hebel (vanity), and he
also
con-tends that ‘olam is the basic
cause of human striving. He argues:
God puts the ‘olam in men's hearts, he wills that they fear him-and they could
not fear
him if they were unaware of the ‘olam, which is the 'divine' dimension.
Yet justice and
righteousness cannot be observed in the world,
and oppression cannot be rectified by final
judgement or a release of the spirit to a
heavenly reaIm.44
In
accord with the position he attributes to Schmid, Williams maintains that
Qoheleth's
fear of God is due to his discontent over the hebel of life, and his
yearning
for knowledge of the ‘olam which
would make the course of life appar-
38Roland E.
Murphy, "Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth)," in Jerome Biblical Commentary,
edited by Raymond E.
.Brown,
S.S., Joesph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., and Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm., (Englewood
Cliffs, New
39Williams,
"The Wisdom of Koheleth," p. 378.
40Ibid., pp.
378-379.
41H. Gese,
"Die Krise der Weisheit bei Koheleth," in Les Sagesses des
Proche-Orient Ancien (
and
H.H. Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit, BZAW 101, G. Fohrer, ed.
(
42Williams,
"The Wisdom of Koheleth," p. 377.
43Ibid., pp. 378,
380. H. L. Ginsberg suggests the same: "For Koheleth regards God as the
absolute and
arbitrary [his emphasis] master of destiny." Human
merit does not matter, for God's actions toward
man
are unpredictable. See H. L. Ginsberg, "The Structure and Contents of the
Book of Koheleth,"
Vetus Testamentum Supplement 3 (1955): 147. As will
soon be apparent, I do not think that the emphasis
falls
on the arbitrariness of God, but rather on man's interpretation of God and His
actions.
44Ibid., p. 380.
Christian
Scholar's Review 62
ent
to him and allow true wisdom. Williams concedes that the wise and the
foolish
are "in the same boat."45 In what follows, I tend to side
with the oppos-
ing
conclusion, that is, Qoheleth's response to God in fear and submission is a
life-affirming
alternative to estrangement.
I believe that Francis Nichols' explanation
provides insight into man's di-
lemma
over 'olam, God, and alienation: in
significance
in the historical or world context. Empirically, man cannot verify
God's
control over history, yet faith says that God is directing man's drama. In
spite
of the conclusion of experience -vanity of vanities- man continues to
strive.46
Although man seemingly has no reference point for meaning in his
experience
of nature, society, or within himself, he yearns for significance.
Why?
As Kenneth James explains, there is a level of meaning known only to
God,
but God has placed an element of this meaning, ‘olam, in man's heart. This
component
within man's being draws him to profound contact with life.47
Qoheleth's
Concept of God
which
their
wisdom on the experience of Yahweh, but Qoheleth chooses the more
common
name "Elohim" to relate his theistic perspective. Within the Old
Testa-
ment,
Elohim signifies God as: creator (cf. Isa 45:18; Jonah 1:9); savior (cf. Gen
17:8;
Exod 3:6; Isa 45:21); the sovereign (cf. Ps 57:2; Isa 54:5; Jer 32:27); the
God
of heaven (cf. Gen 24:7); and the supreme God above all gods (cf. Deut
136:2).
Often the name "Yahweh" occurs in the same context with
"Elohim,"
but
such is not the case in Qoheleth.48
There can be no doubt that Qoheleth was familiar
with the various concepts
surrounding
the name "Elohim"; I suggest that Qoheleth adopts the less per-
sonal
name to convey his thinking more precisely. Helmer Ringgren points out
that
"Elohim" is often used instead of "Yahweh" with the intent of
exalting
Yahweh
as God absolutely-the transcendent God.49 Along with transcendence
comes
a measure of abstractness; God as Elohim transcends the rationality of
humankind.
As a Hebrew, and thus a monotheist, Qoheleth knows Yahweh to
be
the one true God, but perhaps Qoheleth's experience fails to affirm the
45Ibid. Despite
this conclusion, Williams deduces a positive message from Qoheleth, see n. 22.
46Nichols,
"Samuel Beckett and Ecclesiastes," p. 16. .
47Kenneth W.
James, "Ecclesiastes: Precursor of Existentialists," p. 89. By now
the question has possi-
bly
arisen: is ‘olam the imago dei?
Perhaps, for there seem to be parallels. But to assert ‘olam as the imago
dei seems unwise in the face of the ambiguity
surrounding ‘olam and its use in 3:11.
48My purposes
within the confines of this paper do not entail an examination of source
criticism
regarding
Old Testament names of God. If the reader is interested in source criticism,
Ringgren offers a
good
starting point in vol. 1 of the Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament,
s. v. "'elohim." Also see
James
L. Crenshaw, "Qoheleth in Current Research," Hebrew Annual Review
7 (1983): 44, for a recent
bibliography
on the question: "Was Qoheleth the guardian of authentic Yahwism or did he
circle
around
biblical faith, remaining on the outermost fringes?"
49Theological
Dictionary of the Old Testament, s. v. "'elohim" by Helmer
Riggren, p. 284.
Qoheleth
and the Problem of Alienation 63
intimate
personal involvement claimed by
Qoheleth,
Elohim is God, but Elohim is girded with mystery.
Compared to other Old Testament writings, the
motif of God's hiddenness
is
intensified by Qoheleth; some have even referred to it as skepticism.50
Qoheleth
recognizes that discerning God's activity in life cannot be accom-
plished
through the normal process of the wisdom tradition, that is, by means of
observation;
thus, the failure to obtain satisfying answers is not because God is
increasingly
inaccessable, but because man's methods are suspect. Qoheleth
concludes
that the sage, by reason and wisdom, cannot discover the work of
God,
no matter how diligent he may be (cf.
discover
the activity of God "who makes all things" (11:5). And experientially
man
does not know his future or what awaits him (cf. 9:1). Perhaps Qoheleth is
focusing
attention on what John Hick has called "epistemic distance," that is,
man
exists in a world in which God is not "immediately and overwhelmingly"
apparent.51
The question yet to be answered is whether Qoheleth perceives man
as
ultimately and totally alienated from God.
Crenshaw points out a major consideration at
this point:
The
careful reader will have noted that Qoheleth seems to know far more about God
than
his
theology of divine mystery allows. In truth, he frequently makes assertations
about
God's
will and activity despite the protestations about God's hiddenness.52
I
suggest that apparent inconsistencies in Qoheleth' s concept of God are instead
components
of a viable theocentric world view. God is concealed and conceals,
but
this enigma is not absolute-God is not an unknown variable. Qoheleth
knows
that his God is the Creator of the cosmos and sovereign over his creation:
Who
can change God's work? (cf.
and
adversity (cf.
"everything
that God does will remain forever" and is perfect (
accept
the element of mystery that separates him from God, but man cannot
discount
what can be known about Elohim.
For Qoheleth God grows more personal as the
sovereign Lord becomes the
judge
of every man: "God will judge both the righteous man and the wicked
man,
for a time for every matter and for every deed is there" (
11:9;
12:14). As a Jew, Qoheleth had been taught from the rich tradition of the
Torah
and the Prophets; judgment implies a standard. Final execution of justice
50 Cf. Samuel
Koheleth, pp. 128-132; R. H. Pfeiffer, "The
Peculiar Scepticism of Ecclesiastes," Journal of Biblical Liter-
ature 53 (1954):
100-,109; Klopfenstein, M. A., "Die Skepsis des Qohelet," Theologische
Zeitschrift 28
(1972):
97-109; James L. Crenshaw, "The Birth of Skepticism in Ancient
edited
by James L. Crenshaw and S. Sandmel (New York, 1980), pp. 1-19. Balentine notes
the follow-
ing
differences between the "psalms of lament" and Qoheleth: first, in
Qoheleth the issue is not so
much
God's hiddenness, as in the psalms, but rather the hiddenness "of the
interpretation of events";
and
secondly, while in the psalms God bears the burden of responsibility, Qoheleth
believes the
problem
to be man's failure and thus man's responsibility, p. 169.
5l John Hick, Evil
and the God of Love (Cleveland: Collins World, 1968), p. 373.
52Crenshaw, Old
Testament Wisdom, p. 139.
Christian
Scholar's Review 64
is
in the hand of God (cf. 9:1; 11:9); and perhaps, even for Qoheleth, the acts of
men
will be measured against God's commandments (cf.
understand,
however, that this standard cannot be used to manipulate God.
God
can be known as sovereign creator and as judge, but the dominant
theme
regarding the person of God is found in Qoheleth's continuous reference
to
God as the source of joy. Qoheleth has identified alienation from nature, from
society,
from human achievements, and to a degree, from God. But in the face of
this
estrangement, he asserts that man should be happy! As the individual
approaches
the common occurrences of daily life, he is to enjoy them. For
Qoheleth,
God is the source of this enjoyment; he is the rewarder of man.
In
the mundane toil of life, the very toil that can lead to alienation, man is to
enjoy
his labor as a gift from God (cf.
is to eat and drink and enjoy the few years of
life, "for he will not often consider
the
years of his life, because God keeps him occupied with the gladness of his
heart"
(
often
shrouded with ambiguity, Qoheleth recognizes one sure "lot" in life
di-
rected
toward good. Von Rad adds, "Here for the first time, Qoheleth is aware
that
he is in accord with a divine purpose; here he sees himself face to face with a
beneficient
God. . ." (cf.
In
knowledge
and joy; thus, Qoheleth does not totally discount the value of
wisdom
and knowledge, only the direction the pursuit for understanding had
taken
(cf.
wisdom,
but in seeing its merits, he is mindful that the source is God.55
There-
fore,
God is the origin of experiential significance and of all theoretical under-
standing
leading to meaningful existence.
53Today most
scholars agree that the epilogue is the product of a redactor, perhaps one of
Qoheleth's
students.
In all three of Wright's articles (see n. 19), he argues that the main
structure of the book is
independent
of the epilogue. Cf. also Williams, "The Wisdom of Koheleth,” pp. 382,
389; Gerald T.
Sheppard,
"The Epilogue to Qoheleth As Theological Commentary,” The Catholic
Biblical Quarterly 39
(1977):
182-189; Gerald H. Wilson, "'The Words of the Wise': The Intent and
Significance of Qohelet
12:9-14,"
Journal of Biblical Literature 103.2 (1984): 175-192. Michael V. Fox in
"Frame-Narrative and
Composition
in the Book of Qohelet,” Hebrew Union College Annual 48 (1977): 83-106
proposes that the
entire
book is product of an epilogist. As a frame-narrative, the book takes on a
whole new concept of
unity;
the "frame-narrator" relates the story and teachings of Qoheleth the
sage, p. 91. The epilogue is
a
type of epic situation, i.e., it is didactic as in the father-son instruction,
p. 99. Fox contends that the
epilogue
reinforces Qoheleth's teachings: Qoheleth advises fear of God (5:6;
divine
judgment (
Qoheleth
does not mention explicitly obedience to God's commandments, "that
requirement could be
inferred
from 5:3-5:” p. 103. I admit, in accord with Fox, that the epilogue does
admonish in a more
dogmatic
fashion than the rest of the book; nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose
the epilogue
contradicts
Qoheleth's main teaching.
54 von Rad, Wisdom
in Israel, p. 231.
55 In Koheleth
Gordis states:"Koheleth, a son of
and
the Sages, could notdoubt the reality of God for an instant. For him, the
existence of the world was
tantamount to the existence of God....It was
on the question of God's relation to men that Koheleth parted
company
with the conventional teachers of his time. ...There was not a shred of proof
that God wished
to
reveal the true Hokmah, the secret of life, to men," p. 122.
Qoheleth
and the Problem of Alienation 65
The
Divine Mandate
Time and time again Qoheleth identifies man's
proper response to Elohim
as
fear: the sovereign God has worked in his perfect ways so that men should
fear
him (ct.
making
vows, be respectful and serious-minded, not lighthearted (cf. 5:1-7).
Wisdom
and righteousness are the results of fearing God (cf.
the
wicked may seem to prosper and lengthen their days, still, Qoheleth main-
tains,
it will be better for those who fear God-and fear God openly (cf.
The
epilogue, which concurs with the main body of the book, admonishes the
reader
to "fear God and keep his commandments, because this applies to every
person”
(
What
exactly is this divine imperative of fear? Is it an attitude of terror?
Commenting
on the occurrence in
Fear of God means walking under a heaven that is
mysteriously closed, walking without
the assurance that lightning might not suddenly
shoot out and strike you as you go-
every step relying upon the free gift of God,
but with every step also summoned to suffer
the riddle and oppression that God can inflict.57
But
for Qoheleth fear of God is much more than dread evoked by uncertainty.
Fear
of God is willful submission to the Divine and to his plans. Such fear
implies
a trust in God in spite of multiplied perplexities; it includes not only an
emotional
state, but conduct that is pleasing to God. Thus, amid the vanity of
life
there is a proper ethical code, there can be wisdom and knowledge, and
there
can be significant existence. Fear of God is the disposition that combines
the
components of mystery, vanity, and limited knowledge to result in mean-
ingful
existence.
Conclusion
Common experience seems to invite skepticism,
agnosticism, and even
Atheism. Qoheleth recognizes the proneness toward
doubt and abdication;
man's
limitations are the innate qualities that pilot him toward alienation. The
self-appointed
station as the measure of all things continually eludes man; thus,
he
is destined to this insatiable desire for something more. Why? As Gordis
explains,
Man is a creature whose reach is always greater
than his grasp, with a boundless imagina-
tion weaving hopes and desires far beyond the
capacity of his brief earth-bound existence
to fulfill.58
56Sheppard,
"The Epilogue to Qoheleth,"argues that the admonition "fear God
and keep his com-
mandments"
has no parallel in the body of Qoheleth, p.187. In view of
to n. 53 above, I find Sheppard's position
implausible. In contrast, Wilson, "The Words of the Wise,"
suggests
that the epilogist selected the phrase because it does reflect the content of
Qoheleth, p. 178.
He
states furthermore that there is "sufficient evidence" to support the
thesis that the epilogue is
meant
to link Qoheleth together with Proverbs. The epilogue could therefore serve as
a "canonical
key
to the interpretation or both,” pp. 179, 191, 192.
57Murphy, Jerome Biblical Commentary, p. 536.
58Gordis, Koheleth, pp. 130-131.
Christian
Scholar's Review 66
Qoheleth
offers hope in teaching that although limitations are inescapable, they
do
not necessitate a renunciation of meaningful existence. The rupture between
most
modern existentialists and Qoheleth occurs precisely at the recognition of a
higher
level of meaning: for the existentialist, meaning escapes man because there
is
no reference point outside of humanity to give life meaning; for Qoheleth,
meaning
may be elusive and cause the feeling of hebel, but nevertheless, meaning
exists
because God exists.59
Qoheleth's conclusions are relevant for the
modern religious experience,
but
the meaning of Qoheleth's unconventional words is often muddled by the
attempt
to interpret him solely from a New Testament perspective. Harvey Cox
argues
that "the biblical doctrine of God's hiddenness stands at the center of
the;
doctrine
of God."60 God's
hiddenness does not mean absolute alienation from
the
"wholly other"; instead the inscrutability of God entails that God is
revealed
only
in the way, and to the degree, that he desires. Qoheleth is fully aware of the
divine
dimension which remains beyond the mind of man; his awareness of this
higher
level is far more acute than the understanding of the older sages. The
failure
to accept this exalted view of the Divine results in deeper alienation, for
when
God is not responsive to the theist's dogmatism and doctrinaire formulas,
the
theist feels cut off from the source of meaningful existence.
The proper rejoinder to alienation for modern
theism is found within the
problem
itself: theology must elucidate the difference between the Creator and
the
creature. George Kendall, commenting on the biblical account of the Fall,
makes
the perspicacious observation that the effort of man to abolish his crea-
tureliness
is the source of the schism between creature and Creator.61 I agree
with
limitations
as a creature which leads him toward deeper alienation and struggle
in
life.62 Qoheleth's
affirmation of creaturehood is apparent in his exhortation to
enjoy
life as the gift of God. Underlying the affirmative approach to life must be
a
trust in God's divine plan, despite the daily uncertainties of life. Hence,
mod-
ern
theology must reckon man as man, and be reconciled to God as the majestic,
self-existent,
self-revealing, and often mysterious Absolute of the universe. Dog-
ma
must not be defended to the exclusion of the truth-the truth that the
unequivocal
meaning of this existence rests beyond mortal man.
59There
is a higher level of meaning, that is, there is a level of meaning known only
to God.
When God serves as the reference point-or the
hub of existence for the individual-one finds
equanimity in the belief that although he does
not have all the answers, God does. It is this
abandonment, faith, that allows joy to radiate
from the higher level into the mundane life of mortal man.
60Harvey
Cox, The Secular City (New York,
1965), quoted in Gordis, Koheleth,
pp. 120-121.
61
62
Ibid., p. 69.
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