Grace Theological Journal 10.1 (1989) 29-49.
[Copyright ©
1989 Grace Theological Seminary; cited with permission;
digitally prepared for use at
A CLASSIFICATION OF
CONDITIONAL
SENTENCES
BASED ON SPEECH ACT THEORY
RICHARD
A. YOUNG
The assumption that the meaning of conditional sentences
can be
determined solely by surface structure features, such as tense, mood,
and particles, severely restricts the exegetical task. The
meaning of
any utterance cannot be understood apart from the speaker's
intent,
the situational and linguistic context, as well as the
linguistic form.
Speech act theory
provides objective criteria to help the exegete
integrate these elements. When applied to conditional sentences,
speech act theory yields more meaningful results than traditional
approaches.
*
* *
INTRODUCTION
THE
approach one takes to understand an utterance rests on
underlying assumptions concerning how thoughts are communi-
cated through language. Traditional
approaches to Greek grammar
have not yielded satisfactory results in classifying
the meanings of
conditional sentences. Greek rhetoricians debated
the meaning of
Greek
conditional sentences.1 In reference to conditional sentences,
Robertson
remarked, "In truth the doctors have disagreed themselves
and the rest have not known how to go.”2
Blass and Debrunner
observe, "The classical grammars are also
hopelessly at variance.”3
Recent
work, however, in linguistics and philosophy offer potential
for a fresh understanding of Greek conditional
sentences.
l
Callimachus (Epigrammatum Fragmenta 393) remarks, "Even the crows on the
rooftops are discussing the question as to which
conditionals are true." Cf. Sextus
Empiricus, Adversus Grammaticos 309. For the debate see Sextus
Empiricus, Adversus
Dogmaticos 2.112-23.
2 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of
Historical Research (Nashville: Broadman, 1934) 1004.
3 F. Blass and A. Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament and Other
Early Christian
Literature
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1961) 189.
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TRADITIONAL
UNDERSTANDING OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES
Most modern grammarians of NT Greek follow
Robertson's
classification of conditional
sentences.4 Robertson essentially follows
the system of Gildersleeve
and Winer in identifying four classes of
conditionals based on the surface
structure phenomena of mood and
tense.5 Meanings are then
assigned to each class.
The first class condition is identified by ei] with an indicative verb
in the protasis and a
verb of any tense and mood in the apodosis.6
Because
the first class uses the indicative mood (the mood of reality)
in the protasis, it is
commonly said to mean that the protasis is
"determined as fulfilled." Robertson claims that the
speaker assumes
the reality of his premise. The premise may or may
not be actually
true. If the premise is objectively true, it may be
rendered with
"since." Otherwise the speaker is either falsely
assuming the reality of
the premise or assuming its reality for the sake of
argument.
The second class condition is identified by an ei] with a secondary
tense indicative mood verb in the protasis
and the particle a@n (usually)
with a secondary tense verb in the apodosis.7
The second class condi-
tion is said to mean that
the premise is determined as unfulfilled. The
indicative is used because the speaker is of the
persuasion that the
premise (protasis)
which he sets forth is contrary to fact. The premise
may actually be contrary to fact (John
what the speaker believes to be the facts (Luke
The third class condition is identified by e]a<n with a subjunctive
mood verb in the protasis
and a verb with any tense and mood in the
apodosis (usually present or future tense and
indicative mood).8 Ac-
cording to Robertson this construction means
that the premise is
undetermined but has a prospect of
determination. Since the subjunc-
4 Notable among modern grammarians who do
not follow Robertson are C. F. D.
Moule (An
Idiom-Book of New Testament Greek [
1968]
148-52),
[
ment Greek [
5 Robertson, Grammar, 1004-27.
6 There are about 300 examples of this
surface structure phenomenon in the NT.
J.
L. Boyer ("First Class Conditions: What Do They Mean?" GTJ 2 [1981] 75-114)
counts 308 using GRAMCORD. It may be questionable
whether all the examples that
Boyer
cites represent conditional sentences. J. W. Roberts ("Some Aspects of
Condi-
tional Sentences in the Greek New Testament," Restoration Quarterly 4 [1960] 72)
counts 339.
7 There are about 50 examples of this
surface structure form in the NT. J. L. Boyer
("Second
Class Conditions in New Testament Greek," GTJ 3 [1982] 81.) counts 47.
J.
W. Roberts ("Some Aspects of Conditional Sentences," 72) counts 51.
8 There are about 300 examples of this
structure in the NT. J. L. Boyer ("Third
[and Fourth] Class Conditions," GTJ 3 [1982] 163) counts 277. J.
W. Roberts ("Some
Aspects of Conditional Sentences," 72)
counts 332.
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 31
tive is a mood of unreality
or uncertainty, its use indicates that the
premise has not yet become a reality. The third
class is essentially a
future condition. The speaker regards the premise as
having a greater
probability of becoming a reality than would have
been true if he had
used a fourth class condition, which uses the optative mood. The
speaker does not assume the premise to be true
or untrue.
The fourth class condition is identified by ei] with an optative
mood verb in the protasis
and the particle a@n with an optative mood
verb in the apodosis. No example of this
construction exists in the
NT
having both the protasis and apodosis.9 It
is said that the premise
of the fourth class condition is undetermined with
remote prospect of
determination. The fourth class
condition is understood to indicate a
future (undetermined) condition with a less probable
chance of ful-
fillment than is true with a
third class condition.
INADEQUACY
OF THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING
The traditional approach to Greek conditionals
is adequate for
classifying the surface structure phenomena. It is
inadequate, how-
ever, for describing the semantic range of
conditional sentences. For
example, in Luke
are willing, take this cup from me" (NIV). The premise is not true; it
was the Father's will for Jesus to suffer. It
cannot be said that Jesus
assumes the truth of the premise for the sake of
argument, for that
understanding of the statement would
result in a serious theological
problem, namely, disunity in the Godhead. The
other option, that
Jesus
falsely assumed the truth of the premise, is highly questionable.
It
could be said with Boyer10 that first class conditions merely repre-
sent a simple if/then relation. Grammatically this
is correct, but
semantically it barely scratches the
surface. What did Jesus mean by
the utterance? Why did he say it?
In Gal
done so, you would have torn out your eyes and given
them to me"
(NIV). The traditional
interpretation (contrary-to-fact condition)
would yield the following understanding: "If you
could have done so
(which for some reason you could not do), you would have torn
out
your eyes and given them to me (which of course you
did not do
because the premise was never realized)."11
This is nothing more than
9 Roberts ("Some Aspects of
Conditional Sentences," 72) counts 12 examples of
the partial construction in the NT, but Boyer
("Third [and Fourth] Class Conditions,"
170)
denies that any exist.
10 Boyer, "First Class
Conditions: What Do They Mean?" 81-82.
11 Boyer ("Second Class Conditions in
New Testament Greek," 83) explains the
meaning of second class conditions by means of a
similar expanded paraphrase. He
remarks, "It states a condition which as a
matter of fact has not been met and follows
with a statement of what would have been true if it
had."
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a truism that does not say anything at all. The
exegete must realize
that the situation was emotionally charged and that
Paul is express-
ing something more than
meaningless double-talk.
The main cause for exegetical problems with the
traditional
approach stems from a simplistic view of
semantics.12 There is an
overemphasis on a one-to-one
correspondence between form and
meaning, which does not fully recognize the
semantic range of ei] or
that one type of condition may be represented by
various surface
structure forms. As observed in the above survey,
conditional sen-
tences are classified
according to surface structure phenomena (mood
and tense) and then a meaning is attached to each
class.13 The
assumption that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between form
and meaning is often violated in actual usage.
Lexical forms usually
have many meanings (e.g., the word "run");
likewise, grammatical
constructions often have multiple
meanings (e.g., the Greek genitive
case). Any attempt to uncover the meaning of
conditionals must be
based on a more productive theory of semantics.
Furthermore, the traditional approach fails to
recognize the role
of the situational context in the communication
act.14 To interpret the
meaning of language purely on the basis of its
linguistic features is a
12 "Semantics" as used here
refers to the study of total meaning rather than the
meaning of language structure. This includes the
meaning of the propositional content
of the linguistic structure, the propositional
content of inferential material, and the
intent of the speaker. Since these elements are
necessary for understanding an utter-
ance, they must be part of the
study of total meaning. Semantics then will be used in its
broadest sense and closely associated with the
concept of understanding. For an
extensive bibliography on semantics, see
Bibliography,"
Notes on Linguistics 37 (1987) 5-43.
13 Some have rightly observed a semantic
overlap between the four classes of
conditions. For the similarity between a first
class form in which the protasis is
obviously false and a second class form see M.
Winger ("Unreal Conditions in the
Letters of Paul," JBL 105 [1986] 110-12). Winger (p. 111) states, "Grammarians
generally agree that writers of ancient Greek--classical
or Hellenistic--sometimes
stated conditions they regarded as unreal without
using secondary tenses or a@n. Thus,
the unreal form is only an option; any past or
present condition may be unfulfilled, but
the unreal condition is explicitly, and therefore
emphatically, unfulfilled." Boyer ("First
Class
Conditions: What Do They Mean?" 76) isolated 36
first class examples from the
NT in which the protasis
was obviously false. Boyer correctly concluded that every
sentence with a first class form will not fit the
meaning attached to it by Robertson. Yet
what Boyer does is simply to replace Robertson's
meaning with another, retaining the
one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning.
104-5)
argues that ei] with the future tense
conveys the same idea as e]a<n with the
subjunctive. There are 22 examples of ei] with the future tense in
the NT.
14 The context includes such things as the
shared experience of the speaker and
audience, the shared knowledge about the culture,
the immediate situational setting,
the prior statements of the same and related
discussions, the relationship between
speaker and audience, the formality of the
situation, and the social register of the
speaker and hearer.
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 33
basic fallacy that grammarians are prone to make.
Situational con-
text influences the meaning of an utterance in two
ways. (1) Speakers
often allow the context to communicate part of their
message for
them. Why say something that is obvious and insult
your audience's
intelligence? As in most forms of
human behavior, there is a principle
of least effort. People say just enough to be
understood in light of the
situation. They allow the audience to compare what
was said with
the context and to draw the proper inference,
thereby arriving at the
intended meaning. The speaker may leave part of
his propositional
content or his intent to be inferred by his
audience. (2) The speaker
may be influenced by pragmatic concerns and modify
how he says
something. Sometimes a conditional construction is
used as a polite-
ness marker when requesting a superior to do something:
"If you
wouldn't mind. . . ," or "If you would
be willing. . . ." This interac-
tion between linguistic form
and situational context implies that the
linguistic form cannot be adequately explained
apart from consider-
ing the communication
situation. How much is actually said and how
it is said will depend on various pragmatic
factors, such as formality
and social register.
Little attention has been given to indirect
utterances and the
distinction between propositional meaning and use. A
speaker may be
influenced by pragmatic concerns to the extent that
he will use a
surface structure phenomenon in a way that is
alien to its literal
meaning.15 If a wife makes the
statement, "The car is dirty," and her
husband replies, "You're right," and
then continues to read the sports
page, he is likely to exasperate his poor wife. Her
utterance was not
really a statement, it was a request. Indirect speech
acts still retain
their literal meaning. The car is indeed dirty. The
wife, however,
meant not only what she said, but something else in
addition. The
questions that concern the semanticist are,
"What were the pragmatic
influences that caused her to express her desires
in the form of a
statement?" "Is it possible to develop
criteria or rules to define such
use of language and to recover the speaker's
intent?”16
15 Common examples of disjunction between
meaning and use would be idioms,
figures of speech, and one part of speech used
for another. More relevant to our study
of conditional sentences is where one type of
sentence is used for another. Questions
are often equivalent to statements. For example,
"What shall it profit a man. . . ?"
(Matt
emphatic negative assertion, "It will surely
not profit a man. ..." Questions can be
used for commands or request, "Will you please
close the door?" or "Can you pass the
salt?" In the latter, the ability of the person
addressed is hardly the issue. Statements
may be used for commands, "It's rather drafty
in here" could mean "Please close the
window."
16 R. A. Jacob and P.
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There needs to be more attention given to a
speaker's intent
when interpreting what any utterance means. Both the
propositional
content of what is said and how the speaker uses
the words have
direct bearing on the proper understanding of an
utterance. If a
hearer simply decodes the propositional content in the
question "Can
you pass the salt?" he might respond with an
affirmative answer
rather than the desired action. He would not have
understood what
was said because he did not consider the intent of
the speaker. The
goal of biblical exegesis is to understand what the
writers of Scripture
said; this cannot be done by viewing the text (on
any level) apart
from the intent of the author/speaker.
Semantics is perhaps the least precise and most
difficult sub-
division of language study. The reason for this
is that there are a
great number of factors involved in the meaning of
human communi-
cation, such as the intent of
the author, the situational context,
shared knowledge, the words used, the arrangement of
the words, the
inflection of the voice, discourse features such as
prominence and
structure, the attitude of the speaker, and the
relation of the speaker
to the audience. There is much more involved in
meaning than simply
linguistic phenomena. The questions are how do all these factors
interact and is it possible to devise a theory of
meaning that takes
everything into account?
A
NEW APPROACH: IMPLICATURE AND SPEECH ACT THEORY17
The theory of "implicature"
was proposed by Grice in a series of
lectures at Harvard in 1967.18 Grice
recognized that the meaning of
communication is dependent not simply
on what is said, but also on
what is implicated (implied). He distinguished
between the inferences
that one could possibly draw from an utterance and
the inferences
between form and meaning. . . . One of the major
goals of linguistics, perhaps the
major one, is to make this relationship
explicit."
17 The theory of implicature
and speech act theory are subdivisions of the study of
pragmatics. Pragmatics is broadly defined as the
study of language usage. It is con-
cerned with the relation
between context and language and how language usage affects
language structure; cf. S. C. Levinson, Pragmatics (
1983)
5-35.
18 His work has only been partially published;
see H. P. Grice, "Logic and Conver-
sation," in P. Cole and
J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics,
vol. 3, Speech Acts
(New
York: Academic Press, 1975) 41-58. A recent development of Grice's theory is
relevance theory; cf. D. Sperber
and D. Wilson, Relevance: Communication
and
Cognition (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986); D. Sperber and D.
Relevance
Theory," Notes on Linguistics 39 (1987) 5-24; Ernst-August Gutt, "Un-
ravelling Meaning: An
Introduction to Relevance Theory," Notes
on Translation 112
(April
1986) 10-20; and Ernst-August Gutt, "What is the
Meaning We Translate,"
Occasional Papers in
Translation and Textlinguistics 1 (1987) 31-58.
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 35
that the speaker intended. The latter he called
implicatures.19 This
concept arose out of five principles (or rules)
that he formulated by
which efficient, rational, and cooperative use of
language is achieved.20
Since
meaning is conveyed through both the linguistic activity and
the situational context, it follows that there is
more communicated
than what is said. "The words and sentences on
the page are reliable
clues, but they cannot be the total picture. The more
pressing ques-
tion is how the texts
function in human interaction.”21
Two pioneers of speech act theory are J. L.
Austin22 and John R.
Searle.23
Their basic thesis is that people actually perform
acts by
using speech patterns.
ber of utterances that are
not reports about reality and therefore not
subject to being true or false. Instead, these
utterances are actions
(e.g.,
"I name this ship Queen Elizabeth," or "I bet you a dollar it
will
rain tomorrow"). By making the utterance the
speaker is actually
performing the action. Such use of language is
termed "performa-
tive." Thus,
something about reality (constative
utterance) or to do something
(performative utterance ).24
Often the performative
will be marked in the surface structure by
a definite formula: the first person singular
pronoun, the present
tense, and a performative
verb, such as promise, warn, thank, com-
mand, congratulate, or
apologize.25 Other times it will not be overtly
19 Distinction should also be made between Grice's
concept of conversational
implicature and logical
implication, which is based solely on semantic content.
20 These principles are as follows: (1) The
Cooperative Principle: the participants'
contributions are in keeping with the
common purpose or direction of the exchange;
(2)
The Principle of Quality: the participants do not normally say things they know
to
be false; (3) The Principle of Quantity: the
participants' contribution is only as
informative as required by the purposes of the
exchange; (4) The Principle of Rele-
vance: the participants'
contributions are relevant to the discussion; and (5) The
Principle
of Manner: the participants normally attempt to be brief and orderly,
avoiding obscurity and ambiguity. See Grice,
"Logic and Conversation," 45-47.
21 R. de Beaugrande
and W. Dressler, Introduction
to Text Linguistics (
Longman, 1981) 3. They go on to say (p.
35) that a text is the result of an unconscious
process of decision and selection which cannot
be interpreted in isolation from those
factors that were involved in its formation.
"We must constantly seek to discover and
systemize the motivations and strategies according
to which the creation and utilization
of texts are kept in operation."
22 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (
1962).
23 John R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (New
24 Austin himself came to reject this
distinction since even statements about reality
can be expressed using a performative
verb, "I hereby state that X." Thus all utterances
are performatives.
25 Austin (How to Do Things with Words, 149) claimed that there are over a
thousand such words in English. If a verb could
collocate with the word "hereby" ("I
36
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THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL
marked in the surface structure. For example,
"Can you pass the
salt?" would be the implicit form of "I
request that you pass me the
salt.”26 Thus, there are two categories
of performatives: explicit per-
formatives (marked in surface structure by standard
formula) and
implicit performatives
(not marked in surface structure by standard
formula).27
Performatives can carry a certain
force (rebuke, warning, etc.) or
can achieve a certain effect (conviction,
persuasion, etc.). The first is
called an illocutionary act (e.g., "He urged me
to shoot her") and the
second is called a perlocutionary
act (e.g., "He persuaded me to shoot
her"). If an illocutionary act fulfills all
its necessary conditions, it will
produce in the hearer a recognition of the
intent of the utterance.
In order for communication to be effective, the
speaker must get
the hearer to recognize the intent of his
utterance. This may be
accomplished in several ways--which
one the speaker chooses de-
pends on situational factors.
He may indicate his intent in a conven-
tional manner by (1) the
standard formula, (2) a recognized device in
the surface structure other than the standard
formula,28 (3) a sentence-
type that represents a certain illocutionary force,29
or in a nonconven-
hereby promise that X"), it was deemed a performative verb.
collection of verbs as the basis for classifying
speech act types into five groups.
However,
it is Searle's classification of speech act types which is more commonly
accepted today, but even his scheme is not
without opponents. According to Searle
(Expression and Meaning [New York:
Cambridge University, 1979] 1-29) there are five
types of utterances: (1) assertives,
which commit the speaker to the truth of the
expressed proposition (e.g., assert, conclude,
affirm); (2) directives by which the speaker
attempts to get the hearer to do something (e.g.,
request, question); (3) commissives,
which commit the speaker to some future course of
action (e.g., promise, offer);
(4)
expressives, which express a
psychological state (e.g., thanking, apologizing); and
(5)
declarations, which affect immediate changes in the
state of affairs (e.g., declaring
war, christening, excommunicating). B. Fraser
("Hedged Performatives" in Cole and Morgan,
Speech Acts, 187-210) groups speech
acts into eight categories based on speaker's intent.
26 Some suggest that implicit performatives are merely idioms. Levinson (Prag-
matics, 268-70) argues to the
contrary. Among his reasons are: (1) indirect speech acts
may be responded to literally, indicating that they
retain their literal meaning (e.g,
"Can
you pass the salt?" "Yes I can, here it is"); and (2) many
indirect speech acts can
be transferred literally into another language
since the principles of their formation are
not language specific.
27 All implicit performatives
can be expressed explicitly with the formula "I
(hereby) V p (you) (that) S," where V p is a performative verb and S is an embedded
sentence.
28 Levinson (Pragmatics, 233) observes that the force of implicit performatives
could be indicated by mood ("Shut the door"
rather than "I order you to shut the
door"), particles ("Therefore, X"
rather than "I conclude that X"), adverbs ("I'll be
there without fail" rather than "I promise
that I will be there"), and even intonation of
voice ("It's going to change" rather than
"I state [or question] that it's going to
change").
29 The interrogative sentence is normally
associated with the act of questioning, an
imperative with commanding, and a declarative with
stating. Yet this correspondence is
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 37
TABLE I
Necessary
Conditions for Requests and Assertionsa
Conditions Requests
Assertions
Propositional
Content Future act of hearer Any proposition
Preparatory
Speaker
believes hearer can Speaker has
evidence for the
do act truth of proposition
It is not obvious that
hearer It is not obvious to speaker
would do act
without being that hearer knows
asked proposition
Sincerity
Speaker
wants hearer to do Speaker believes
proposition
act
Essential
Counts
as an attempt to get Counts as an
undertaking to
hearer to do act the effect that proposition
represents an
actual state of
affairs
a Adapted from Searle,
Speech Acts, 66-67.
tional manner by (4) framing
his words in such a way (without any
commonly recognized surface structure marker) so
that the audience
can make the proper inferences. The first would be
a direct speech
act; the other three would be indirect speech acts.
By avoiding the standard illocutionary force
marker a speaker
can soften an otherwise harsh performative
("Can you pass the salt?"
instead of "I request you to pass me the
salt"). It is probable that
speakers of Koine Greek
used conditional sentences to tone down the
force of certain acts such as rebuke or request. When
Martha rebuked
the Lord for not being there to prevent Lazarus
from dying, she used
the form of a conditional sentence: "If you
had been here, my brother
would not have died" (John
according to the traditional understanding of
second class conditions,
her intention will not be understood.
If some performatives
are not marked in the surface structure by
the standard formula, there needs to be some
criteria for exegetes to
determine what type is taking place. Searle argues
that speech acts
"are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use
of linguis-
tic elements.”30 He devised a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions
for speech acts to be successfully performed in a
given utterance (see
Table).
not strictly observed. For example, the explicit performative "I request that you close
the door" could be communicated with an
interrogative ("Can you close the door?"),
an imperative ("Close the door"), or a
declarative ("I would be very happy if you'd
close the door"). Some would classify sentence
types that are recognized as expressing
a certain performative
act as explicit rather than implicit performatives
(e.g., impera-
tives for expressing a
command).
30 Searle, Speech Acts, 16.
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From
his conditions, Searle derived a set of rules for the use of
the illocutionary force indicator.31 He
has since modified his theory to
accommodate Grice's theory of implicature
by adding criteria to help
determine the illocutionary force of indirect
speech acts, e.g., to
determine when the speaker is asking the hearer to
pass him the salt
and when he is merely concerned with the hearer's
ability to do so.
After
analyzing various indirect requests, Searle proposed the follow-
ing generalizations: (I) a
speaker can make an indirect request by
either stating that or asking if the propositional
content condition
concerning the future act of the hearer is in
effect (e.g., "Do you have
change for a dollar?"). (2) A speaker can make an
indirect request by
either stating that or asking if the preparatory
condition concerning
the hearer's ability to do an act has efficacy
(e.g., "Can you pass the
salt?"). (3) A speaker can make an indirect
request by stating that
(not asking if) the sincerity condition concerning his desire
to the
hearer to do an act is true (e.g., "I wish you
wouldn't do that"). (4) A
speaker can make an indirect request by either
stating that or asking
if there are sufficient reasons for doing an act
(e.g., "You had better
go now"). (5) A speaker can make an indirect
request by asking if
the hearer wants to do an act (e.g., "Would
you like to go to the
store?”).32
Indirect speech acts which are constructed by
questioning or
stating one of the necessary conditions are
called conventional. Some,
however, do not follow this pattern; e.g.,
"Boy, I'm starving" can be
used for a request. Such nonconventional
indirect speech acts seem-
ingly violate Grice's
principles of communication and place the bur-
den on the hearer to make the proper inference.
The hearer can usually discern that an utterance
is a certain type
of performative by
inference from what was said in light of the
context.33 For example, the
utterance "There is a bull in the field"
could either be a simple remark or a warning. It all
depends on which
31 Rules for the illocutionary force
indicating device of a request are as follows.
(I)
The Propositional Content Rule: the request is to be uttered only in the
context of a
sentence or longer stretch of discourse. The
utterance predicates a future act of the
hearer. (2) The First Preparatory Rule: the request is
to be uttered only if the speaker
believes the hearer can do the act. (3) The
Second Preparatory Rule: the request is to
be uttered only if it is not obvious that the
hearer would do the act without being
asked. (4) The Sincerity Rule: the request is to be
uttered only if the speaker wants the
hearer to do the act. (5) The Essential Rule: the
utterance of the request counts as an
attempt to get the hearer to do the act. See
Searle, Speech Acts, 62-63.
32 John R. Searle,
"Indirect Speech Acts," in Cole and Morgan, Speech Acts, 59-
82.
The essay was reprinted in Searle, Expression
and Meaning, 30-57.
33 Searle (Expression and Meaning, 32) states, "In indirect speech acts
the speaker
communicates to the hearer more than
he actually says by way of relying on their
mutually shared background information, both
linguistic and nonlinguistic, together
with the general powers of rationality and inference
on the part of the hearer."
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 39
side of the fence the person being addressed is
standing! In the same
way one can infer from the context and what was
said that Martha's
utterance (John
Basically there are two elements involved in
understanding an
utterance: (I) the propositional meaning, or what
was said, and (2)
the intent of the speaker, or why it was said (the
illocutionary force).34
In
some cases the two elements are not detachable; the propositional
content includes the force indicating device. If
the fellow picking
daisies on the other side of the fence
recognized only the proposi-
tional meaning of "There
is a bull in the field," he would probably
end up being gored. He may have been able to parse
every word and
to look up the meanings in a lexicon, but he would
have failed to
understand because he missed the intent. Both
elements should be
recognized as an interconnected unit. Illocutionary
force then is an
aspect of meaning that can be described in terms of
conditions or
rules. Propositional content conveys what is being
said, and the
illocutionary force conveys how it is
to be taken. To understand
the statements in Scripture, exegetes must be
sensitive not only to the
propositional meaning but also to
devices that mark illocutionary
force.
ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONAL
SENTENCES
Speech act theory categorizes utterances
according to function
rather than form. There is greater exegetical and homiletical value in
classifying conditionals in this way, for it brings
the interpreter closer
to the speaker's intent. When viewed through the
speech act model,
all conditionals are seen as implicit performatives which are used to
do something in addition to stating a condition;
i.e., to persuade the
listener, to make a strong assertion, to
manipulate the listener, to give
an exhortation, to express a respectful rebuke, to
ask something in a
polite way, to justify one's self, to mock someone, or
to convey a
lament. Pragmatic reasons cause a speaker to use a
conditional in-
stead of a more direct expression. The following is a
partial classifica-
tion of conditionals on the
basis of function.
Rebuke
To soften a rebuke and make it more respectful,
it may be
cloaked in a conditional sentence or some other
rhetorical device.
Shakespeare
has said, "Your 'if' is the only peacemaker; much virtue
34 Searle (Intentionality [New York: Cambridge University, 1983] 27), in
discussing
the relation between illocutionary force and
intentionality, states, "To characterize
them [utterances] as beliefs, fears, hopes, and
desires is already to ascribe intentionality
to them."
40 GRACE THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL
in 'if,.”35 The necessary conditions
(in terms of Searle's theory) for a
rebuke are that the hearer performed an act in the
past (propositional
condition), the speaker does not believe that the
act was in his best
interest (preparatory condition), the act angered
the speaker (sincerity
condition), and the speaker intends his expression
as a reprimand
(essential condition). Indirect rebukes may be made by
questioning or
stating anyone of the above conditions. For
example, a speaker may
question why the hearer did an act ("Why
didn't you get the car
fixed?"), or he may state that an act was not in
his best interest ("You
sure got us in a jam this time"). A speaker may
combine the proposi-
tional content with what would
have been in his best interest ("If you
had gotten the car fixed, we wouldn't be stranded
out in the middle of
nowhere").
An example of a conditional sentence used as a
rebuke is found
in John 11:21, "If you had been here, my
brother would not have
died.”36 A number of factors
were involved in the formation of
Martha's utterance. Her brother had just
died. She was in deep
sorrow and perhaps angered that Jesus had not been
there to heal
Lazarus's sickness. Martha was not in the
frame of mind to begin a
discourse in logic with her teacher. The sight of
Jesus only caused her
emotions to become more agitated. This charged
emotional state then
surfaced in a rebuke. The most important factor
involved in the
formation of Martha's utterance was the social
register between her
and Jesus. She was his devoted follower, having
great respect and
admiration for him as her teacher. The last thing
she would want to
do is to offend him. Because of this, she softened
her rebuke by
avoiding the illocutionary force marker and
framing it in the form of
a conditional sentence. The explicit form would
have been, "I hereby
rebuke you for not being here and preventing my
brother from
dying. "
Lament
Consider the statement, "If my husband were
still alive, I would
be so happy." If it is not known that the
husband is dead, the speaker
is expressing hope; if it is known that the
husband is dead, the
speaker is expressing a lament. The protasis of a conditional used to
express a lament is contrary to fact. About
one-fourth of the so-called
second class conditionals in the NT express lament.
The necessary
35 As
You Like It, V.iv.108.
36 This was the initial statement that both
Mary and Martha made when they saw
Jesus (John
the necessary conditions for a rebuke and lament
are the same, many of their indirect
forms could be constructed in the same way. The
observation that Mary fell down at
Jesus'
feet and wept suggests that her utterance was a lament rather than a rebuke.
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 41
conditions for a lament are that an event happened
in the past
(propositional condition), the speaker does not believe that
the event
(which he believes to have occurred) was in the best interest
of
himself or the hearer (preparatory condition),
the speaker is grieved
because of the event (sincerity condition), and
the speaker counts his
utterance as expressing sorrow (necessary
condition). Indirect laments
may be conveyed by stating the event the speaker
would like to have
happened (e.g., "I wish that John had not
gotten aboard flight 256"
or "If John had taken another flight, he
would still be with us").
In Matt
unto thee, Chorazin! Woe
unto thee,
works, which were done in you, had been done in
they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and
ashes." The
explicit form of the lament is "I hereby
lament that you did not
repent as
saw."
Argue
The illocutionary act of arguing
(i.e., an attempt by a speaker to
persuade the hearer to accept his opinion) is
very common in condi-
tionals. Two rules of inference
are involved in the use of conditionals
for arguing (these rules will be illustrated by the
conditional state-
ment, "If I get my car
fixed, then I will come to see you"). Modus
ponens (method of affirming)
is used to argue that the consequent is
true by affirming the antecedent ("I fixed my
car. Therefore, I will
come to see you"). Modus tollens (method of denial) is used
to argue
that the antecedent is false by denying the
consequent ("I did not
come to see you. Therefore, I did not get my car
fixed"). No valid
conclusion can be drawn regarding the consequent by
denying the
antecedent ("I did not get my car fixed. I may
or may not come to see
you depending on whether I can get another ride
") or regarding the
antecedent by affirming the consequent ("I
came to see you. I may
or may not have fixed my car. Actually, someone
else gave me a
ride"). Thus, in order for a conditional to be
used to argue a point,
both parties must agree that the "if"
clause is true or the "then"
clause is false.37 The point of agreement
does not need to be asserted
in the text; it may be understood from the
context.
An example of a first class
conditional used for a modus tollens
argument is found in Matt
e]kba<llei,
e]f ] e[auto>n e]meri<sqh / 'And if Satan casts
out Satan, he is
37 Cf.
the ideas in this section have been adapted from J.
K. Baima, "Making Valid Con-
clusions from Greek Conditional
Sentences" (Th.M. Thesis, Grace Theological
Semi-
nary, 1986).
42
GRACE THEOLOGICAL
JOURNAL
divided against himself'. It is clear from the
following rhetorical
question ("How then will his kingdom
stand?") that the consequent is
false. Satan's kingdom does stand and he is not
divided against
himself. Since the consequent is false, then the
antecedent must also
be false. Jesus, then, is arguing that Satan does
not cast out Satan.
He
is not merely assuming the verity of the antecedent for the sake of
argument (in which case his own position would be
indeterminate); he
is arguing for its falsity. This then becomes the
basis for the rest of
the argument of the passage (Matt
A second class conditional using the
modus tollens
form of
argument
is found in Luke 7:39: Ou$toj
ei] h#n profh<thj, e]gi<nwsken
a}n
ti<j kai> potaph> h[ gunh> h!tij a!ptetai au]tou? /
'If this man were a
prophet he would know who is touching him and
what kind of
woman she is--that she is a sinner' (Luke
states, "The Pharisee here assumed that Jesus is
not a prophet be-
cause he allowed the sinful woman to wash his feet.”38
The pharisee,
however, was not merely assuming the case, he
was convinced that
Jesus
was not a prophet. By denying the consequent ("Jesus does
not know what kind of woman is touching him"),
the pharisee was
seeking to persuade the others that Jesus was
not a prophet.
Many first class conditions use modus ponens
to argue for the
truth of the consequent. The truth of the antecedent
is often clearly
the point of agreement and thus not explicitly
affirmed. In such cases,
ei] may be translated
"since." For example, in Rom
argues that the Jews do not have sole claim on God:
"Since God is
indeed one, then he is God of the Gentiles as
well." Paul used the
common agreement regarding the unity of God to argue
for the truth
of the consequence.
Request
Sometimes a speaker will frame a
request or command in the
form of a conditional sentence for the sake of being
polite. An
employee would not barge into his boss's office
and bluntly demand a
raise. Rather, he would soften his request with
"If you would con-
sider" or the like. The "if" clause is a mitigator
or politeness marker.
There is a polarity between being
direct (i.e., "I command you to
pass me the salt" or "Give me the
salt") and being polite (i.e., "Can
you pass the salt" or "If you wouldn't
mind, I would like some salt").
A
speaker would tend toward politeness if the situation is formal, the
social status of the hearer is above that of the
speaker, there are
others listening, the hearer is in close proximity to
the speaker, or if
the speaker desires the conversation to continue.
The demands for
politeness usually supersede the need for clarity.
38 Robertson, Grammar, 1012.
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 43
An example of a conditional used for a request
is found in Matt
17:4:
ei] qe<leij, poih<sw w$de trei?j skhna<j / 'If you wish, I will
put up
three shelters' (NIV).
The impetuous Peter might normally have
blurted, out, "Let me put up three
shelters." But the awe of the
situation--seeing Jesus in his radiant splendor conversing
with Moses
and Elijah--led Peter to frame his request in a
politer form using a
conditional.
Jesus' request in the
may this cup be taken from me" [Matt 26:39;
cf. Luke
Mark
clause introduces an indirect request asking whether
the preparatory
condition of the hearer's ability to do the
requested act has efficacy.
The
utterance would then be after the analogy of "Can you pass the
salt?" The sincerity of the request is
explained by saying that the
belief that the act was possible arose from the human
nature of Jesus,
which was not yet in perfect harmony with the desire
of the Father.
This
disharmony perhaps was due to a temptation to avoid the path
of suffering, but nevertheless, it is said, Jesus
recognizes the impossi-
bility of circumventing the
cross in his second prayer, "If (since) it is
not possible. . ." (Matt 26:42) and accepts
the will of his Father.
Such
a line of interpretation does not do justice to the hypostatic
union between the divine and human in Jesus. A second
line of
reasoning understands the "if" clause as
an expressive, not a directive.
That
is, the "if" clause expresses a condition necessary for the hearer
to perform the requested act, but both the hearer
and the speaker
realize that the "if" clause is
impossible (i.e., false). In such a situa-
tion, the conditional makes
no logical sense (see the discussion of
conditionals used to argue above),
but makes perfect sense if it is
understood as expressing the speaker's feelings or
needs. For ex-
ample, if a boy had a particular dislike for a
certain girl, he might say
to his friend, "If you give me a million
dollars, I'll ask her out for a
date." Both he and his friend realize that the
friend does not have a
million dollars; thus the speaker is not
questioning the hearer's ability
to meet a necessary condition (he already knows
that he cannot meet
the condition) but is using a conditional form to
express his aversion
to dating that particular girl. Thus, Matt 26:39
can be understood not
as a request that the immutable God reverse one of
his eternal
decrees, but as expressing the agony Jesus felt
as he faced the cross
event.
Assert
The necessary conditions for an assertion
are the same as for an
argument except that the assertion is not an
attempt to convince the
hearer of a proposition. Assertions are recognized in
conditionals
44 GRACE THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL
when the "then" clause does not follow
logically the "if" clause.39 For
example, in the sentence "If Hitler was a
military genius, then I'm a
monkey's uncle," the consequence is so
obviously false that the sen-
tence is in fact a strong
negative assertion-- "Hitler was in no way a
military genius." Most uses of conditionals
in the NT for assertion are
a form of Hebraic oath in which only the
"'if" clause is stated; the
"then" clause is omitted because the conclusion is
unthinkable or
abominable.
An example of a conditional used to
make an assertion is found
in Mark 8:12: ei]
doqh<setai t^? gene%? tau<t^ shmei?on. A literal trans-
lation would be, "'If a
sign will be given to this generation. . . ." An
idiomatic translation that captures the
illocutionary force of the
speaker would be, "A sign will not be given
to this generation."
Asseverations
marked by aposiopesis, such as Mark
reflect Semitic influence. Mark, however, made
no attempt to explain
the Semitism to his Roman audience as he does on
other occasions.
The
apparent acceptance of this Semitism into Greek supports the
contention that the formation of indirect speech
acts is not entirely
language specific, the syntax being understood
across language bound-
aries. Robertson remarked
that his construction is "'not un-Greek in
itself.”40 Other examples of this
construction are OT quotations (e.g.,
Heb
3: 11, 4:3, 4:5).41
39 K. Sorensen ("Asseverative IF and its Congeners," English Studies 59 [1978] 248)
remarks that these conditionals "are
assertions that operate under cover of logic."
40 Robertson, Grammar, 1024.
41 A milder form of
assertion employs a concession or contraexpectation
relation
between the two propositions (perhaps they could
be called acts of maintaining). The
speaker states a contrary thesis and then
maintains his position in spite of it. Even
though this relation may be conveyed by a first class
form (using ei], ei] kai<, or ei@per),
the subordinate clause does not stipulate a
condition (e.g, "Although all will be
offended in you, I will never be offended"
[Matt 26:33]).
112)
argues that such sentences should not be regarded as conditionals, saying
"The
force of a concessive sentence is thus very different
from that of a conditional sentence.
The
latter represents the fulfillment of the apodosis as conditioned on the fulfillment
of
the protasis; the former
represents the apodosis as fulfilled in spite of the fulfillment of
the protasis." J. H.
Greenlee ("IF in the New Testament," TBT 13 [1962] 42-43) agrees,
saying, "Whereas a conditional clause sets up a
condition favorable to the occurrence
of an event, a clause of concession sets up a
condition which is affirmed to be
inadequate to bring about the event." Nelson
Goodman (Fact, Fiction, & Forecast
[
do not assert a causal connection between the
antecedent and consequent; rather they
deny that such a relation exists. The idea of
connection is a basic element in real
conditions. J. Haiman
("Conditionals are Topics," Language
54 [1978] 579) observes
that some logicians and linguists "deny that semifactuals are conditionals at all-
regardless of their superficial morphological
similarity to true conditionals." The ques-
tion, however, is really one
of definition. Haiman (564) remarks, "Until a
satisfactory
definition for a category exists, the sole
criterion for identification of its supposed
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 45
Manipulate
A speaker may use a conditional to
manipulate the listener. A
manipulation is an attempt to get
someone to do something that he
normally would not do or thinks is wrong (e.g.,
"If you won't be a
good boy, Santa won't come"). The necessary
conditions for the
performance of a manipulation are that the hearer
perform a future
act (propositional condition), the hearer is able
to do the act, but it is
not obvious to the speaker that the hearer is
willing to perform the
act (preparatory condition), the speaker wants the
hearer to perform
the act (sincerity condition), and the speaker
counts his utterance as
an attempt to force the hearer to perform the act
(essential condition).
Indirect
manipulations may be performed by questioning the hearer's
ability to do an act ("You cannot do . . .")
or by questioning the
hearer's character ("If you're a man, you
would. . .").
An example of a conditional used for
manipulation is found in
Matt
4:3: Ei] ui[o>j
tou? qeou?, ei]pe> i!na oi[ ou$toi a@rtoi
ge<nwtai / 'If you are the Son
of God, tell these stones to become
loaves of bread'. If a command if found in the
consequent, then the
truth value of the antecedent is dependent upon the
response. If Jesus
obeyed, making the consequent true, nothing could be
said regarding
the truth value of the antecedent. If, however, he
did not obey,
making the consequent false, then by modus tollens
the antecedent is
also false-a denial of his own deity. To escape
Satan's trap, Jesus
responded by saying that obedience is due God
rather than to his
tempter. Satan is not merely assuming the
premise to be true, he
is using Jesus' character as a leverage to force
him to do some-
thing.42 Other examples of
manipulation are found in John
and Phlm 17.
Exhort
An exhortation is an attempt to urge
a hearer to do something
he recognizes is proper. It differs from a
manipulation in the prepara-
tory and necessary
conditions; it is not obvious to the speaker that
the hearer would do the act without being
encouraged, and it counts
as an attempt to urge the hearer to perform the
act. Exhortations
members is common superficial form: in the case
of conditional clauses, the presence,
in English, of a common conjunction if; in other languages, of a
corresponding
conjunction, word-order, verbal desinence,
or whatever." Exegetical precision calls for
a definition of conditionals based on the logical
relations between propositions and on
the speaker's usage, rather than solely on form.
42 It is obvious that
Satan was attempting to force Jesus to do something that he
would never otherwise do (obey him rather than the
Father). As such it is classified as a
manipulation rather than an
exhortation. However, the question remains whether ei]
46
GRACE THEOLOGICAL
JOURNAL
may be strengthened by stating the reason the act
should be done.
Among
the ways a causal relation can be formed in Greek is by using
the conjunction ei]. Such usage should not
be considered conditional.
An
example of an exhortation is found in 1 John 4:11: ]Aga-
pthtoi>,
ei] ou!twj o[ qeo>j h]ga<phsen h[ma?j, kai>
h[mei?j o]fei<lomen
a]llh<louj
a]gapa?n / 'Beloved, since God so loved us, we also
should
love one another'. Exhortations are also found in
John 13:14 and
3:1.
The matrix clause may contain an imperative, a
statement using
"ought," or a rhetorical question which can be
interpreted as an
imperative (e.g., Luke
Mock
Sometimes a person will boast about
being correct and mock or
deride another for being wrong. This ridicule is made
even more
pointed when it is constructed in the form of a
conditional sentence.
The
conditions necessary for the performance of a mockery are that
the hearer has performed a past act or made a
proposition (proposi-
tional condition), the hearer
believes the act was right or the pro-
position true (preparatory condition), but the
speaker believes the act
was wrong or the proposition false (sincerity
condition), and the
speaker counts his utterance as an attempt to
ridicule the hearer
(necessary condition).
An example of mockery is found in
Matt 27:40: Ei]
ui[o>j
ei# tou?
qeou?,
kata<bhqi a]po> tou? staurou? / 'If you are the Son of God, come
down from the cross'. The scorners were certainly
not trying to
manipulate Jesus to come down from the cross (they
did not believe
that he could). Instead, they were deriding Jesus
for his "false assess-
ment" of who he was and
asserting that they were right all along--the
fact that he was hanging helpless on the cross
proves for them that
they were correct; he cannot be the Son of God. For
other examples
of mockery see Matt 27:43; Luke 23:35, 37.
CONCLUSION
Speech act theory has called
attention to the function of an
utterance in human communication and to the
necessity of consider-
ing both the propositional
meaning and speaker's intent when inter-
preting what any given
communication means.43 The speaker's intent
should be rendered "since" or
"if". "Since" would indicate that Satan is manipulating
by flattery; "if" would indicate that
Satan is manipulating by modus tollens. Both types
of manipulation are performed by questioning the
hearer's character or ability. The
hearer is being forced to comply in order to vindicate
his reputation. The latter,
however, is much more forceful and is,
therefore, probably the force Satan intended.
43 Speech act theory
lends substantial weight to Hirsch's contention that the text is
not autonomous from the speaker's intent (E. D.
Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 47
can be detected from surface structure markings or
by the interaction
of the surface structure and situational context.
This latter observa-
tion forces the exegete to
integrate the total context (situational as
well as linguistic) into his grammatical and lexical
analysis at all
levels.
Analyzing conditionals in light of
speech act theory can be a
useful tool to bring the exegete nearer to the
intended meaning of the
speaker/author and to resolve
exegetical problems. The analysis of
conditionals in light of mood, tense,
and particles is not wrong, but it
only examines part of what contributes to meaning. Viewing
a prob-
lem from different angles
usually results in a clearer understanding. It
is like taking pictures of different sides of a
building. A picture of the
front of the building may be an accurate
representation, but it cannot
provide the viewer with an understanding of the
whole (How long is
the building? Is there a back porch?). Analyzing
conditionals in light
of speech act theory simply takes another picture
of the problem from
a different angle, augmenting the understanding
based on traditional
grammar.
One purpose of this paper has been
to question the prevailing
assumption that the linguistic form of a
conditional sentence (i.e.,
tense, mood, and particles) is the sole criteria to
ascertain meaning.
This
has been the approach of most previous work on conditionals.
Perhaps
the reason for the prevalence of this assumption is that
Greek
studies have traditionally been confined to linguistic features.
Those
who have passed through traditional instruction, therefore,
have a tendency to equate propositional meaning with
total meaning.
Further studies could be made in
several areas. First, more
precise categories and criteria will enhance the
accuracy of the results
and eliminate some subjectivity. For example, what
determines that
an utterance fits the criteria for a certain
illocutionary act when
exactly the same words are said (as in the case
of Mary and Martha
in John 11:21, 32)? To say that Martha's utterance
was a rebuke and
that Mary's was a lament when they say exactly the
same thing must
rest entirely on the exegete's analysis of the total
context, including
the actions of the speakers and hearers when the
utterances were
made. For example, a rebuke is rarely given when a
person is bowing
down before another and weeping (as Mary was).
Mary's posture
reflects her being deeply grieved rather than
resentful and angry.
The various aspects of the total
context must be evaluated in
terms of how they influence the necessary conditions
for a particular
speech act (the propositional, preparatory, sincerity,
and essential
conditions). A rebuke and lament differ mainly in
the sincerity and
[
intent is inseparably linked with both the surface
structure and the situational context.
48 GRACE THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL
essential conditions. The reason their indirect
forms can be expressed
with identical surface structure phenomena is
because the proposi-
tional (a past act of the
hearer or a past event) and preparatory (the
speaker believes the past act or event was not
in his best interest)
conditions are very similar. The sincerity
condition reflects an inner
disposition or emotion which often surfaces in
observable actions.
These
actions, for the most part, are not consciously performed, yet
they do convey a certain emotional state. The
sincerity condition for
a rebuke (the speaker is angered because of an
act) might be revealed
by voice inflection and increased volume, rapidity
of speech, short
choppy phrases, or tension and rigidness
of body. The sincerity
condition for a lament (the speaker feels grieved
because of an event)
could be discerned from weeping, solitude, bowing the
head, or a
quiet, broken voice. None of the behavior patterns
for a lament were
observed in connection with Martha's utterance,
but two accompanied
Mary's. It is only on such a basis that a
difference in meaning can be
determined when the propositional content is
identical.
The essential condition reflects an
attempt to communicate a
certain disposition or intent. The behavior
patterns associated with
the essential condition, therefore, are more
deliberate than those
associated with the sincerity condition.
Circumstances accompanying
a rebuke might include the speaker being in close
proximity to the
hearer, the speaker leaning forward, a characteristic
facial expres-
sion, or short quick
gestures with the lower arm and hand. A rebuke
is more confrontational than a lament. Actions in
the ancient Jewish
culture that help to convey a lament include
beating the breast,
rending one's garments, lifting one's hands,
fasting, dressing in black
garments, going barefoot, removing ornaments from
one's attire,
sitting among ashes or sprinkling ashes on
oneself, or public wailing.
The
expression of a rebuke involves retaliative behavior
against an
offender instead of outbursts of undirected
energy, as with a lament.
Martha's
meeting with Jesus was more confrontational, thereby sug-
gesting that she was rebuking
him.
The above represents suggestions for
integrating the situational
context with the propositional content to arrive
at the speaker's
meaning. All of the behavior patterns mentioned,
whether consciously
or unconsciously performed, are modes of
communication. Since they
contribute to the total meaning, they cannot be
ignored by the exe-
gete. Of course, some
behavior patterns cannot be discerned from a
literary text, but many can, especially in the
Scriptures. The Hebrew
people were honest with their feelings and when
something displeased
them, they would not hesitate to lift their voice to
God and cry out,
"Why
have you allowed this to happen?" Such outbursts were not
disrespectful, as might be construed
in a more reserved culture.
YOUNG:
A CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 49
A second area of further research
lies in applying speech act
theory to other categories of language study. For
example, a rhetori-
cal question is an indirect speech act that can be
formed when a
speaker questions the truth of a proposition.
The preparatory condi-
tion for an assertion is
that the speaker has evidence for the truth of a
proposition. By questioning the truth of a
proposition, a speaker is
actually making a strong negative assertion.
Thus, the rhetorical
question, "What shall it profit a man if he
gain the whole world and
lose his own soul?" (Mark
will surely not profit a man to gain the whole world
and lose his own
soul. "
A third area of further research
concerns the implications of
speech act theory for translation work. Speech act theory
indicates
that the illocutionary force of a sentence must be
retained if a sen-
tence is to be understood.
For instance, explicit performatives in a
source language may be best rendered implicitly in a
receptor lan-
guage. For example, Luke
14:18b reads, e]rwtw?
se, e@xe me par^th-
me<non. The NIV translation, "Please excuse
me," accurately renders
the illocutionary force of the sentence without
explicitly translating
every lexical item from the source language.
Traditional grammar does not
adequately explain the meaning of
certain passages of Scripture. This article has
demonstrated that
speech act theory can lead to a better understanding
of the biblical
text.
This
material is cited with gracious permission from:
Grace
Theological Seminary
www.grace.edu
Please
report any errors to Ted Hildebrandt at:
thildebrandt@gordon.edu