CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Theology in
Grace Theological Seminary
May 1981

Title: CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT
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Date: May 1981
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Increasing interest in the grammar of the Greek New Testament has focused attention upon aspects of the language that have, for the most part, been passed over by past grammarians. Among these topics is that of conditional sentences. A superficial survey of the literature indicates that most writers seem to have the data confidently in tow, but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Modern grammarians are, for the most part, content to follow the lead of A.T. Robertson and classify these clauses in terms of First, Second, Third, and Fourth Class conditions. Others, dissatisfied with Robertson's system and the extension of it by his followers, have returned to the terminology, if not the principles of Classical Greek. The situation is uncoordinated at best, for even in Classical Greek studies there is significant disagreement upon the classification of these sentences.

The historical background to the study of conditional sentences is presented from both the Classical and the Koine Greek standpoints. Suggested systems of classification include Time, Fulfillment, Form and Determination. The latter, championed by B.L. Gildersleeve, is the preferred system. Determination is indicated by the mood of the verbs employed in the protasis. Gildersleeve's system entered Koine studies primarily through the work of A.T. Robertson. He employes four classes into which he places these conditional sentences.

The Simple Condition, using the indicative mood, states the condition as an assumed reality. There is no necessary connection between actuality and the statement. This condition merely presents the conclusion as a necessary corollary of the condition.

The Contrary to Fact Condition also uses the indicative mood to present the condition as one that is assumed not true, i.e., contrary to fact. Again, there is no necessary connection between actuality and the conditional statement.

The Probable Condition presents the condition as one assumed probable, i.e., one that could easily be fulfilled. The hypothetical nature of this condition requires the use of the subjunctive mood.

The Possible condition states the condition as one that is assumed possible, i.e., little likelihood of fulfillment. This condition utilizes the optative mood, and there is no complete example of it in the New Testament.

Two basic concepts underlie all conditional sentences. First, the determining factor is the mood of the verb, not the particle employed. Second, all conditional sentences state their case as an assumption, never as a direct statement of reality.

Accepted by the Faculty of Grace Theological Seminary
in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree
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INTRODUCTION

God created man with the potential for abstract reasoning, and his many languages reflect this through their use of the subjunctive mood: the mood of contingency or possibility. Posing questions, exploring possibilities and analyzing logical connections are part of man's reasoning capabilities, and his languages reflect these skills. Among the syntactical tools which accomplish these are conditional sentences. These sentences, usually consisting of two clauses, state a hypothesis and give a conclusion. In English this corresponds to the "If . . . then" formula.

This type of sentence, while prevalent in English, is usually listed as one of several subordinate clause relationships.[1] By contrast, the Greek language presents a more fully developed system of conditional sentences by means of which a remarkable degree of precision may be obtained in expressing conditional thought. The Greek conditional sentence presents both the condition and certain specific implications about it in one sentence whereas English needs both the conditional statement and qualifying sentences to communicate the same concept. This compactness lends itself to greater precision

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[1] Porter Perrin and George H. Smith, *Handbook of Current English*, third edition, edited by Jim W. Corder (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1968), 48-56, 120-121.

in the statement of conditional concepts.

Since conditional sentences are basic to the material of the Greek New Testament, a detailed understanding of conditional sentences is vital for an accurate interpretation of its contents. This, then, is the goal of this study: to explore conditional sentences so that the message of the New Testament may be better understood.

Though all students of Greek, both Classical and Koine, agree on the importance of conditional sentences, few agree on the analysis of them. A. T. Robertson aptly describes the situation in Koine studies when he writes, "In truth the doctors have disagreed themselves and the rest have not known how to go."[1] The Classical scene is likewise muddled, as Blass-Debrunner notes, "The classical grammars are also hope-lessly at variance."[2]

Some of this confusion is due to the absence of a standard by which to classify conditional sentences. Time, degree of reality and construction have all been suggested by various grammarians as possible classification systems. Further, each grammarian seems to have developed his own terminology in discussing the subject, and each argues that his is best. Indeed, it is possible to trace the influence of major grammarians through succeeding generations by noting who adopts their terminology in dealing with conditional sentences.

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[1] A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 1004.

[2] Friedrich Blass and Alvert Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, translated and revised by Robert W. Funk (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 189.

Another reason for the lack of standardization may be the inherent flexibility of the language itself. Though Classical and Koine Greek may be considered fossilized ancestors of Modern Greek, they were living, functioning languages, complete with the internal syntactical elasticity found in living languages today. Greek, like English, developed through usage, and patterns so developed may refuse to be forced into a logically consistent mold. So, whether through lack of a standard, or lack of accepted terminology, or through syntactical flexibility, conditional sentences have provided grammarians with a fruitful area of contemplation, and students with a frustrating area of concentration.

This study seeks to offer help to those involved in the analysis of conditional sentences by summarizing the work of previous grammarians and giving a detailed analysis of each type of conditional sentence in the New Testament. The work of past and contemporary scholars will be surveyed to give an overview of their studies, agreements, and disagreements. Then the conditional sentences in the Greek New Testament will be identified and analyzed with the help of principles obtained from the grammatical survey. Finally, observations will be offered on the important matters of translation and interpretation. The result should be a small but positive step in gaining further insight into the meaning of conditional sentences in the Greek New Testament.

CHAPTER I

A HISTORICAL SURVEY

Since any study necessarily builds upon the work of others, a survey of previous studies of conditional sentences is basic to a thorough understanding of the topic. This study will include the work of both Classical and Koine scholars.

<u>Conditional Sentences in General</u>

A brief survey of the technical details of conditional sentences will set the scene for the succeeding discussion and evaluation.

The Definition of Conditional Sentences

A conditional sentence is a two-clause sentence in which the first clause states a supposition or hypothesis and the second clause states the results if that condition is met. The hypothetical clause which states the condition ("If this . . .") is termed the *protasis* and the conclusion clause is called the *apodosis* (". . . then this."). Herbert Weir Smyth explains it this way:

> A condition is a supposition on which a statement is based. A conditional sentence commonly consists of two clauses:
> The protasis: the conditional, or subordinate, clause, expressing a supposed or assumed case (if).
> The apodosis: the conclusion, or principal, clause, expressing what follows if the condition is realized. The truth or fulfillment of the conclusion depends on the truth or fulfillment of the conditional clause.[1]

[1] Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar for Colleges* (New York: American Book Company, 1920), p. 512.

The Construction of Conditional Sentences

The Protasis

As Smyth stated, the protasis stands as the subordinate or dependent clause, setting forth the condition. The term protasis comes from πρoστάσις, "lit. *stretching forward, that which is put forward (in logic, a premise).*[1] While the formal sequence is the standard "If . . . then," English, as well as Greek, varies the sequence in usage: "You will receive the reward if you do a good job."

The form of the protasis in Greek involves a conditional particle (εἰ or ἐάν) and a verb. The various combinations of particles and verbs will be discussed later. Though the mood of the verb is the key element in identifying the type of condition, certain constructions are fairly standard. Again, these will be presented later. This combination of particles and moods enables Greek to express conditional thought with a compact precision lacking in English. The thought of a few Greek words may take a few English sentences to be communicated.

The Apodosis

The main or independent clause in a conditional sentence is termed the apodosis. This term comes from "ἀποδόσις, lit. *giving back, return; i. e.* the *resuming* or *answering* clause."[2] The apodosis may employ verbs in any tense or mood, and frequently, in the Koine at

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[1] Smyth, *Grammar*, p. 512.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 512.

least, uses the particle ἄν with moods other than the indicative.[1] Taken together, then, the protasis and apodosis constitute a conditional sentence.

<div align="center">The Conditional Particles</div>

The origin of the Greek conditional particles is as obscure as their usage is important. Goodwin, one of the leading Classical Greek grammarians, succinctly states:

> It is impossible to discuss intelligently the origin of the conditional sentence until the etymology and original meaning of the particles εἰ, ἄν, and κέ are determined. On these questions we have as yet little or no real knowledge.[2]

He then gives a brief summary of what is known about these particles and concludes:

> But here we are on purely theoretical ground; and we must content ourselves practically with the fact, that in the earliest Greek known to us εɩ was fully established in its conditional sense, like our *if* and Latin *si*.[3]

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[1] H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey, *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 288.

[2] William Watson Goodwin, *Syntax of the Mood and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1893), p. 142.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 143.

εἰ

Liddell and Scott trace the origin of εἰ back to its use in Homer where it is sometimes replaced by the Doric αἰ.[1] It introduces either conditional clauses or questions and is regularly used with the indicative mood.[2] Its consistent translation in conditional clauses is "if." The relationship of this particle, the indicative mood and the assumed reality of the condition will be discussed later.

ἐάν

Εαν is a combination of ει and αν, according to Dana and Mantey.[3] Smyth remarks that "The etymology of ἐάν is uncertain: either from ἤ + ἄν or from εἰ + ἄν."[4] This particle introduces conditions in the subjunctive mood, though it is not limited to this mood:

> The difference between εἰ and ἐάν has been considerably lessened in Hellenistic as compared with earlier Greek. We have seen that ἐάν can even take the indicative; while (as rarely in classical Greek) εἰ can be found with the subjunctive.[5]

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[1] Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Vol. I, edited by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 480. See also William Watson Goodwin, *An Elementary Greek Grammar* (Boston: Ginn Brothers, 1872), p. 263.

[2] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 246.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 245.

[4] Smyth, *Grammar*, p. 512.

[5] J. H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, Volume I: Prolegomena, third edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 187.

This caution should guard against absolute rules, but the general principle is that ἐάν utilizes the subjunctive mood while εἰ employs the indicative. Again, the specific implications of this regarding the assumed reality of the condition will be discussed later.

These conditional particles are similar to particles of interjection in Homeric Greek and related languages. N. D. Coleman suggests that the conditional particles "appear to have been inter-jections in the first place."[1] J. B. Greenough tries to push the origin of the conditional sentence and its attendant particles back into the frontiers of the Indo-European linguistic heritage: "We are naturally led to conclude that this [conditional] construction was in use more or less in Indo-European times and was received by each of the languages as a part of the original inheritance."[2] Whatever the source of these particles, conditional sentences were a vital part of the language of both Classical and Koine Greek and play a vital role in the Greek New Testament.

<u>Conditional Sentences in Classical Greek</u>

Prior to the discovery of the papyri and the comprehension of their linguistic significance, Biblical Greek was considered to be

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[1] N. D. Coleman, "Some Noteworthy Uses of εἰ in Hellenistic Greek with a Note on St. Mark viii 12," *The Journal of Theological Studies*, 27:1 (April, 1976), p. 159.

[2] James B. Greenough, "On Some Forms of Conditional Sentences in Latin, Greek and Sanskrit," *Transactions of the American Philo-logical Association*, 2:2 (June, 1871), p. 164.

a unique species of that language, sometimes referred to as "Holy Ghost Greek."[1] This was, of course, a false position, for the Greek of the New Testament was simply the language of the common man as found in "the street and market place."[2] This was distinguished from Hellenistic Greek, a direct descendant of Attic or Classical Greek. While some New Testament writings show distinct Hellenistic influence, such as Luke, Acts and Hebrews, others are distinctly Koine. This is not because the writers, according to Moulton, used Greek "as foreigners, Aramaic thought underlying Greek expression."[3] Rather it is due to the individual writers using the language closest to them, each reflecting their own blend of Hebrew and Hellenistic cultures. As the result of pioneering efforts by men like Adolf Deismann in analyzing the papyri, "Biblical" Greek became identified as the language of the common man, the Koine Greek. To be sure, it still reflected the Hebrew idiom of the authors, but it was Koine none the less. A. T. Robertson sums up the current understanding of New Testament Greek:

> The Greek of the New Testament that was used with practical uniformity over most of the Roman world is called the Common Greek or κοινή. Not that it was not good Greek, but rather the Greek in common use. There was indeed a literary κοινή [Hellenistic Greek] and a vernacular κοινή. Plutarch is a good specimen of the, literary κοινή while the papyri are chiefly in the vernacular κοινή like most of the New Testament.[4]

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[1] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, pp. 9-15.

[2] W. White, Jr., "Greek Language," *The Zondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of the Bible*, 5 vols., Merrill C. Tenney, editor (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1977), II, pp. 827-828.

[3] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 3.

[4] A. T. Robertson, *A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: A. C. Armstrong E. Son, 1908), p. 6.

<u>The Importance of Classical Greek</u>

If the Koine of the New Testament is in the mainstream of linguistic development and expression, does it have any significant connection with the literary history of the language as a whole, and with Classical Greek specifically? Yes, answers Robertson:

> This κοινή was itself the heir of the past. The various Greek dialects blended on an Attic base. The κοινή was thus richer in expression as to words and forms than any of the older dialects. Compare the relation of modern English to the various tongues that have contributed to its power and expansion. Ionic, Doric, Aeolic, North West Greek and other dialects have made some contribution to the common result. The use of nominatives in the midst of accusatives in the Boeotian, for instance, is strangely like the Book of Revelation. So the absence of the future participle is like the N.T.[1]

This heritage, then, is sufficient justification for beginning the study of conditional sentences in Classical Greek, the language of the period from Homer to the Alexandrian conquests (c. 330 B.C.).[2] This language constituted the "chief basis of New Testament Greek,"[3] thus its handling of conditional sentences has important effects on the Koine Greek.

<u>Suggested Classification Systems</u>

How, then, did Classical Greek scholars classify conditional sentences? In general, they seemed to follow one of three systems. C. D. Chambers outlines them as follows:

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[1] A. T. Robertson, <u>A Short Grammar</u>, p. 6.
[2] Dana and Mantey, <u>Grammar</u>, p. 6.
[3] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 6.

> There are three possible ways of classifying conditional
> sentences, viz. (i) by time, (ii) by fulfillment, (iii) by form.
> The first is the system of Prof. Goodwin, the second is proposed by
> Mr. Donovan . . . and the third that of Mr. Sonnenschein.[1]

Though the situation is not as absolute as Chambers suggests, his

comments serve as a useful guide to the discussion of conditional

sentences in Classical Greek.

Classification According to Time

  The classification most familiar to American students of

Classical Greek is that of William Watson Goodwin. As Professor of

Greek Literature at Harvard University (1860-1901) he exerted signi-

ficant influence on Greek studies in the United States. His first major

book, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*, was published in

1860 when he was twenty-nine years of age. Ten years later he published

An Elementary Greek. Grammar.[2] The importance of these works may be

judged by the fact that both are still in print. His influence

extended into New Testament studies through the work of Ernest DeWitt

Burton.

  <u>The statement of the system</u>.--Goodwin sets forth his system in

terms of past, present and future conditions:

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[1] C. D. Chambers, "The Classification of Conditional Sentences,"
The Classical Review, 9:2 (May, 1895), pp. 293-294.
  [2] Chalmers G. Davidson, "Goodwin, William Watson," *Dictionary American Biography*, Vol. IV, edited by Allen Johnson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 411-413.

The most obvious natural distinction is that of (a) *present and past* conditions and (b) *future* conditions. Present and past conditions (a) are divided into two classes by distinguishing (1) those which imply nothing as to the fulfillment of the condition from (2) those which imply that the condition is not or was not fulfilled. Future conditions (b) have two classes (1, 2), distinguished by the manner in which the supposition is stated. Class 1 of present and past conditions is further distinguished on the ground of the *particular* or *general* character of the supposition . . . .[1]

Goodwin also includes the concepts of (a) fulfillment or non-fulfillment and (b) particular and general characteristics as other features by which conditional sentences may be classified. The first leads him to identify conditional clauses as (1) those which imply nothing as to the fulfillment of the condition, (2) those which imply fulfillment of the condition and (3) those which imply the nonfulfillment of the condition.

He explains the particular and general characteristics:

A particular supposition refers to a definite act or to several definite acts, supposed to occur at some definite time (or times) . . . .
A general supposition refers indefinitely to any act or acts of a given class which may be supposed to occur or to have occurred at any time . . . .[2]

The form of the conditional sentence may serve as a guide to its identification and classification under these headings. A later edition of his grammar summarizes this:

I. Present and past suppositions implying nothing as to fulfillment or condition:

(a) Chiefly particular:

(*protasis*) εἰ with indicative

(*apodosis*) any form of the verb

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[1] Goodwin, *Syntax of Moods*, p. 139.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

(b)   General:

1. (*protasis*) ἐάν with subjunctive
   (*apodosis*) present indicative

2. (*protasis*) εἰ with the optative
   (*apodosis*) imperfect indicative

II. Present and Past suppositions implying that the condition is not fulfilled:

(*protasis*) εἰ with past tense of indicative
(*apodosis*) past tense of indicative with ἄν

III. Future suppositions in more vivid form:

(*protasis*) εἰ with subjunctive (sometimes εἰ with future indicative

(*apodosis*) any future form

IV. Future suppositions in less vivid form:

(*protasis*) εἰ with optative
(*apodosis*) optative with ἄν[1]

Smyth also adopts this system of classification.[2]

The evaluation of the system.--The first point in evaluating Goodwin's system is that of time. He seems to make time a basis of classification when absolute time is of secondary importance in the Greek verb system. Goodwin himself notes that relative time is far more prominent in Greek verbs than in English: "It is a special distinction between the Greek and the English idioms, that the Greek uses its verbal

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[1] William Watson Goodwin, *Greek Grammar*, revised by Charles Burton Gulick (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), pp. 295-296.
[2] Smyth, *Grammar*, pp. 513-516.

forms much more freely to denote merely relative time."[1] A. T. Robertson, noting that absolute time is limited to the indicative mood, warns that "even in the indicative the time element is subordinate to the kind of action expressed."[2] While his reference to "kind" of action may be questioned, his observation on time is helpful.

But is Goodwin basing his classification on time as indicated by the verb itself, or on absolute time as indicated by the sentence as a whole? The examples he offers as illustrations seem to place the emphasis upon the verb rather than the syntax. Thus he presents: "Εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο, καλῶς ἔχει, *if he is doing this, it is well*; εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο, ἡμάρτηκέν, *if he is doing this, he has erred;* εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο, καλῶς ἕξει, *if he is doing this, it will be well*."[3] One may well argue that the syntax of a verb does assign it absolute time in any given context. But Goodwin does not stress the role of syntax in establishing the time of his verb. One must therefore question any system of classification which makes absolute time as found in the verb itself a foundation criterion.

Second, his distinction between particular and general conditions may be questioned as an objective standard of classification. Goodwin argues that

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[1] Goodwin, *Syntax of Moods*, p. 8.
[2] A. T. Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 825.
[3] Goodwin, *Syntax of Moods*, p. 139.

When the apodosis has a verb of present time expressing a customary or repeated action, the protasis may refer (in a general way) to any act or acts of a given class which may be supposed to occur at any time within the period represented in English as present. Thus we may say:--

Ἐάν τίς κλέπτη, κολάζεται, *if (ever) any one steals, he is (in all such cases) punished* . . . .[1]

Goodwin's concept of a present general condition seems to fit conditional sentences in the New Testament, such as I John 1:7: ἐάν δὲ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατῶμεν. . . , κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν - but if (whenever) we walk in the light . . . we have (in such cases) fellowship. But what about conditions such as Luke 5:12? Here the apodosis uses a present tense, but the condition must be considered a particular one, limited to the historical situation: κύριε, ἐάν θέλης, δύνασαί με καθαρίσαι - Lord, if you are willing you are able to cleanse me.

What is the difference between these two sentences? Simply that the apodosis of I John 1:7 contains a present tense verb which expresses a "customary or repeated action," while that of Luke 5:12 does not. There can be no question that the condition in I John 1:7 states a general situation that is presently true for all believers, but such identification depends upon the interpretation of the action represented by the verb. Could it be possible for interpreters to disagree over the interpretation of a given verb? Yes, it could. Should the basis of classification be a point that is interpretative in nature? It seems reasonable to answer in the negative. Since, then, there is no objective way of determining if a verb is referring to a

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[1] Goodwin, *Syntax Mood's*, p. 141.

general or a particular act, the final determination becomes one of interpretation rather than form. The concept of general versus particular may serve as an interpretative guideline, but it is not distinguished by form. "That point [of present or general conditions]," writes A. T. Robertson ,"has no bearing on the quality of the condition."[1] Though several modern New Testament grammarians continue this terminology, it must be questioned as a criterion to the objective analysis of conditional sentences.

Another point to consider in evaluating Goodwin's classification system is his concept of fulfillment or non-fulfillment as found in the condition. Robertson has particular problems with Goodwin's concept that conditions employing the indicative mood in the protasis imply nothing as to the fulfillment of the condition. This, as Robertson sees it, violates the very nature of the indicative mood:

> The words to which I object, besides "particular," are "implying nothing as to the fulfillment of the condition." This condition *pointedly* implies the fulfillment of the condition. It is the condition of actuality, reality, *Wirklichkeit*, and not mere "possibility" as Farrar has it . . . *a la* Goodwin.[2]

Robertson claims that Goodwin "confuses the 'fact' with the 'statement' of the fact."[3] This seems a bit harsh, for Goodwin himself writes: "The Greek has no form implying that a condition is or *was fulfilled*, and it is hardly conceivable that any language should find such a form

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1006.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 1006.
[3] *Ibid*.,p. 1006.

necessary or useful."[1] This would amount to a direct statement, for
if the condition is fulfilled, then the results are realized. Such a
statement would not be a conditional statement at all, but a statement
of actuality. While the specific topic of reality in conditional
sentences will be examined in detail later, the important point is that
Robertson had serious doubts about the validity of Goodwin's classifica-
tion scheme.

Another minor point of criticism leveled against Goodwin is
that of terminology. J. W. Roberts notes that "Others have attacked
Goodwin's terms 'more' and 'less vivid' as describing the significance
of his third and fourth class conditional sentences," but gives no
supporting references.[2] Robertson did not use this terminology, and
those who followed have also set it aside. Some contemporary grammarians,
though, are returning to it. Both Robert W. Funk and William S.
La Sor speak of "vivid" and "less vivid" concepts when discussing
conditional sentences in their grammars. This point is not foundational
to the analysis of Goodwin's system, and will be discussed later.

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[1] Goodwin, *Syntax of Moods*, p. 140.

[2] J. W. Roberts, "The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Hellenistic
Uses," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Texas,
1955, p. 20.

[3] Robert W. Funk, *A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of Hellenistic
Gree*k (Missoula, Montana: The Society of Biblical Literature, 1973),
p. 684; and William Sanford La Sor, *Handbook of New Testament Greek*,
vol. II (Grand. Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973),
pp. 221-225.

In summary, then, Goodwin is the main proponent of Chamber's first suggested criterion for classifying conditional sentences: Time. The main point of Goodwin's system is the classification of these sentences into past, present and future conditions. Some of these categories are further divided into "particular" and "general" conditions, and some of these are subdivided by "vividness."

Criticism of his system has focused on (1) his use of time as a main dividing point, (2) the characteristics of particular and general, (3) the implication of fulfillment and (4) his terminology. The majority of Koine grammarians today, operating under the influence of A. T. Robertson, do not follow Goodwin's system, though some show signs of returning to it.

Classification According to Fulfillment

The second criterion suggested by Chambers for classifying conditional sentences is that of fulfillment, i.e. cataloging them according to the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the condition.

The statement of the system.--Herbert Wier Smyth follows this system, noting that conditional sentences may be classified according to form and function. Among the functions he lists is "fulfillment or non-fulfillment."[1] J. Donovan also champions this method of classification, and his argument is worth pursuing. He uses a book review essay as an opportunity to argue his case in *The Classical Review*. The grammar

[1] Smyth, *Grammar*, p. 514.

he is reviewing argues for the position of classification by form, and Donovan rejects this approach. He argues that different meanings may have the same form. He concludes by writing: "What is wanted is not that there should be a search for 'would be' or 'should be' or 'might be' or other variations; but recourse should at once be had to the universal canon of fulfillment or non-fulfillment."[1]

Further, recognizing that his position had already been challenged, he adds a note of defense:

> After the campaign recently conducted in the pages of this *Review* against the very principle of fulfillment as a basis of classification, one point is now clear, if it was not so already, namely, that to be regarded as unfulfilled, a condition need not necessarily be so *actually*, but that it is enough that it should be *assumed* to be such.[2]

Thus Donovan elevates the concept of fulfillment or non-fulfillment to the status of a "universal canon" for the classification of conditional sentences.

The evaluation of the system.--Donovan's review brought a rapid response from Chambers who defended the position in question. His rebuttal begins with a summary of Donovan's principle:

> Therefore the universal canon resolves itself into this: Conditions are to be divided into (i) those which imply or assume without implying that the condition is not fulfilled, and (ii) those which do not assume or imply that the condition is not fulfilled.[3]

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[1] J. Donovan, "Sonnenschein's Greek Grammar," *The Classical Review*, 9:1 (January, 1895), p. 64.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 64.

[3] Chambers, "Classification," pp. 293-294.

He then offers three serious objections to Donovan's position. First, Chambers observes that this produces an imbalance in grammar. Conditions implying non-fulfillment are relatively rare in the language and should not be the basis of classification. Second, the terminology is awkward at best and hardly fits the need of the beginning composition. Since Chambers is speaking of English to Greek composition, his comment has little reference to this study. Third, and more to the point, Donovan's scheme does not fit all cases. The majority of grammarians have not followed his suggestions. The concept of fulfillment does, as Goodwin notes, play a role in our understanding of conditional sentences, but it does not provide a sufficiently applicable standard upon which to classify them.[1]

Classification by Form

The third criterion Chambers suggests is classification by the form of the conditional sentence. Among the classical grammarians who have followed this approach is E. A. Sonnenschein, professor of Greek and Latin at Birmingham University.[2]

The statement of the system.--Sonnenschein writes:

To me the ordinary forms of Conditional Sentences, whether in Latin, Greek or a modern language, present themselves in two great

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[1] Goodwin, *Syntax of Moods*, p. 139.
[2] S. B. Sedwick, "Sonnenschein, Edward Adolf," *Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930,* edited by J. R. H. Weaver (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 796.

classes, the distinction between which is marked by certain well-defined differences both of meaning and of linguistic form.[1]

Form, for him, helps determine the meaning, for in his classification "there is a *coincidence* between distinctions of form and distinctions of meaning."[2] Chambers supports this principle, noting that "It is axiomatic that the division by form, and not by sense, is the truly scientific one, because like forms must (originally at least) have like meanings, but like meanings need not have like forms."[3]

Smyth notes that several possibilities exist with regard to classification according to form:

> Classified according to form, all conditional sentences may be arranged with regard to the form of the protasis or of the apodosis.
> Protasis: εἰ with the indicative.
>   ἐάν (rarely εἰ) with the subjunctive.
>   εἰ with the optative.
> Apodosis: with ἄν, denoting what *would (should) be* or *have been*.
>   without ἄν, not denoting what *would (should) be* or *have been*.[4]

Which of these possibilities should be followed if conditional sentences are to be classified by form? "Ought we to classify according to the Protasis (Subordinate Clause) or according to the Apodosis

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[1] E. A. Sonnenschein, "Horton-Smith's *Conditional Sentences*," *The Classical. Review*, 9:2 (April, 1895), p. 221.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 221, italics added .

[3] Chambers, "Classification," p. 294.

[4] Smyth, *Grammar*, p. 513.

(Principal Clause), or according to both at once?"[1] Sonnenschein opts

for the Apodosis as the standard. Roberts outlines his system so:

> I. Type One: Sentences without ἄν in the apodosis: the protasis
>   expressing no implication of fulfillment.
> εἰ with a Past Indicative expressing *what was*
> εἰ with a Present Indicative expressing *what is*
> ἐάν with a Subjunctive expressing *what is* or *what will be*
> Also ἐάν ἦ – ἔσται "If A is B," followed by a command or wish.
> II. Type Two: Sentences with ay in the apodosis: the protasis
>   expressing some sort of implication as to fact or fulfill-
>   ment.
> εἰ with the Optative--Optative with ἄν expressing *what would be*
> εἰ with a Past Indicative--Past Indicative with ἄν expressing
>   *what would be*
> III.   Type Three: εἰ εἴη . . . ἔσται (or ἔστι) expressing in the
>   protasis some sort of mental reservation.[2]

Evaluation of the system.--Donovan, as indicated above, claims

that this system leads to more problems than solutions in application.

Even Chambers wonders "whether this was the original principle of

division, or only its accidental final result."[3] The basic problem is

the occasional divergence between form and meaning. Although the use of

form does offer an objective standard of classification, is it reasonable

to pursue it when it does not coincide with the real world? As will be shown

Sonnenschein is on the right track, but the emphasis requires a slight

[1] Sonnenschein, "Horton-Smith," p. 220.
[2] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 12.
[3] Charmers, "Classification," p. 294.

shift in order to be workable.

Classification by Determination

   Chambers omitted a fourth basis of classification of conditional sentences, that of determination. This approach, popularized by B. L. Gildersleeve and followed by many other grammarians, was first published in 1876 and again in 1882.[1] It seems strange that Chambers, writing in 1895, was unaware of it.

   The statement of the system.--Gildersleeve states his case so:

   In common with most grammarians, I divide the conditional
   sentences into four classes, for which I have been in the habit of
   using the designations "Logical," "Anticipatory," "Ideal,"
   "Unreal." If nothing more can be said in behalf of this nomenclature
   than that it saves time, something at least has been said; and I am
   glad to learn that a part of this nomenclature, as applied to the
   Latin language, has found favor among teachers. Logical, Ideal, and
   Unreal conditions occur in Latin also. The Anticipatory is
   peculiar to Greek.[2]

   He describes the Logical Condition as one that

   . . . states the elements in question. It is used of that which
   can be brought to the standard of fact; but that standard may be
   for or against the truth of the postulate. All that the logical
   condition asserts is the inexorable connexion [*sic*] of the two
   members of the sentence.[3]

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   [1] B. L. Gildersleeve, "On εἰ with the Future Indicative and εαν with the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 7:1 (January, 1876), pp. 2-23; and "Pindaric Syntax," pp. 434-445.
   [2] Gildersleeve, "On εἰ," pp. 5-6.
.   [3] Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 435.

This type of condition corresponds to Robertson's First Class condition.[1]

The Anticipatory Condition involves ἐάν in the protasis, and thus corresponds to Robertson's Third Class condition. Interestingly enough, Gildersleeve agrees with Goodwin in his concept of particular and general ("generic"), noting that "The anticipatory condition is particular or generic according to the character of the apodosis . . ., just as any other conditional sentence."[2] The key element is the use of the present indicative in the apodosis. Such a condition "is regularly generic."[3]

Gildersleeve's Ideal Condition employs the optative mood and "seems to have been developed out of the wish, just as the anticipatory was developed out of demand."[4] This corresponds to Robertson's Fourth Class condition. Since the New Testament has no complete sentence of this type, his comments on it are beside the point of this study.

His fourth type of condition is termed the Unreal Condition, corresponding to Robertson's Second Class condition. Rather than use the term non-fulfillment as does Goodwin, he speaks of it as "futureless."

> The Unreal. Condition, 'the hypothesis contrary to fact,' seems to be related to the hopeless wish, as the ideal condition to the wish pure and simple . . . . A wish may be madly impossible, but

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1007.
[2] Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 436.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 435.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 436.

if it belongs to the domain of the future it is optative. Now the hopeless wish is hopeless because it is futureless . . . .[1]

In simple language, this condition states a condition as though there is no hope whatsoever of its being fulfilled. It implies its non-fulfillment.

Thus Gildersleeve divides conditional sentences into two broad catagories: the first containing those which imply something about the determination of the condition, and the second containing those which imply nothing about its determination. The first catagory is subdivided into two classes: those which imply positive fulfillment of the condition and those which imply negative or non-fulfillment of the condition. The second catagory also is subdivided into two classes: those conditions with a greater degree of probability and those with a lesser degree of probability.

Roberts summarizes this in outline form:

I.   Condition determined

    A.   As fulfilled - the Simple or Logical Condition

                              past

        Protasis: εἰ with an indicative present

                              future

        Apodosis: Any form of verb

    B.   As unfulfilled - the Unreal Condition

        Protasis: εἰ with a past indicative

        Apodosis: Past indicative with ἄν

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[1] Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 437.

II. Condition undetermined

    A. With greater prospect of fulfillment - The Anticipatory Condition

        Protasis: ἐάν with the subjunctive

        Apodosis: Usually future, except for the general, which has the present indicative

    B. With less prospect of fulfillment - The Ideal Condition

        Protasis: εἰ with the optative

        Apodosis: Optative with ἄν[1]

    <u>The comparison of the system</u>.--A comparison of this outline with that of Goodwin's system on pages 12-13 or with the chart in Smyth's grammar will indicate Gildersleeve's points of departure.[2] These may be listed as:

    1. No attempt is made to utilize the time of the condition as a guide to the classification of the sentence.

    2. No attempt has been made to divide them into particular or general on the basis of the protasis. Each of these may, in Gildersleeve's opinion, be particular or general, depending on the apodosis, but that is not a basis of classification.[3]

    3. Mood, rather than tense is emphasized as one of the important features of the protasis.

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[1] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 22.
[2] Smyth, *Gammar*, p. 516.
[3] He does approve of such a distinction as a guide to interpretation. See "On εἰ," p. 7.

4. No attempt is made to distinguish general and particular conditions by form, though he does recognize that the Anticipatory condition (ἐάν with the subjunctive in the protasis) is more often than not a general condition.

5. The Future Condition (called by Smyth the "Future Emotional"[1]) is identified as a simple or logical condition on the basis of the indicative mood.

This system has been followed by a significant number of Koine grammarians, including men such as Winer,[2] Buttman,[3] Robertson,[4] and Blass-Debrunner.[5]

The evaluation of the system.--There are three points which need to be considered in evaluating his system. First, the above-mentioned

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[1] Smyth, *Grammar*, p. 516.

[2] G[eorge] Benedict] Winer, *A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament*, seventh edition, revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated and edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover, Massachusetts: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 291.

[3] Alexander Buttmann, *A Grammar of the New Testament Greek*, translated and edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1873), p. 220.

[4] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1004.

[5] F[riedrich] Blass and Albert] Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, translated and revised by Robert W. Funk (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 188-189.

point regarding present and general conditions needs to be summarized. Gildersleeve maintains that any conditional sentence may be particular or general "according to the character of the apodosis."[1] The particular character he looks for is the use of the present tense. This is true, according to him, of all conditions, including the Logical and Anticipatory conditions:

> Hence when [the logical condition] has its apodosis in the present, it has a double meaning, which adapts it admirably to personal argument. So especially when the form εἰ τις is used, which may point either to a definite or to an indefinite person, the Logical condition is a two-edged sword, often wielded in the keen encounter of Attic wit. But as the ἐάν conditional with a present indicative apodosis is regularly generic, it is not without reason that this form should be preferred, when distinctly generic action is to be expressed.[2]

New Testament examples which illustrate his point include Matthew 19:10 (εἰ οὕτως ἐστίν ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μετὰ τῆς γυναικός, οὐ συμφέρει γαμῆσαι - if this is the case of the man with his wife, it is better not to marry), a logical condition which is obviously a general one, and John 11:9 (ἐάν τις περιπατῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, οὐ προσκόπτει - if anyone walks in the day he does not stumble), an anticipatory condition which is also general. Whether this holds as a uniform rule (present tense in apodosis = a general condition) deserve detailed treatment and will receive it at a later point in this study. For now, it is sufficient to note that Gildersleeve's suggestion does fit some passages in the Koine of the New Testament.

[1] Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 435.
[2] Gildersleeve, "On ει," p. 6.

The second point of evaluation also relates to a distinction between Gildersleeve and Goodwin. Gildersleeve's system relegates the present general condition of Goodwin to the anticipatory class because of its subjunctive mood. Conditions employing future indicative verbs are classed as simple or logical conditions. But what is the difference between these two? Does not the future indicative convey the same concept as the present subjunctive, for all practical purposes?

Gildersleeve answers that there is a distinction between the two, one which he feels has been overlooked by many grammarians. First, he notes, the normal pattern for future conditions is ἐάν with the subjunctive: "The fact then is patent enough to every one who will be at pains to count, that for model Greek prose ἐάν with the subjunctive is preferred to εἰ with the future indicative."[1] The reason for this, he writes,

> . . . seems to be to a considerable extent the greater temporal exactness, the same greater temporal exactness which has wholly displaced the future indicative with the temporal particles, the same greater temporal exactness which has given so wide a sweep to the optative with ἄν as a sharper form of the future.[2]

If ἐάν with the subjunctive is the normal form in Attic prose, what is the role of εἰ with the future indicative? It shows

> . . . a certain coldness, a certain indifference; and this added to the general rigor of the logical condition, which faces fact in all its grimness, gives a stern, minatory, prophetic tone to the future

[1] Gildersleeve, "On εἰ," p. 9.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 9.

indicative, which commentators and grammarians have noticed, but noticed only in passing.[1]

Though Gildersleeve is speaking of conditions in Attic Greek, his observations give an added dimension to the force of such conditions in the New Testament, such as Matthew 6:23 (ἐάν δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου πονηρὸς ᾖ, ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου σκοτεινὸν ἔσται - but if your eye is evil, your whole body will be darkness) and Luke 13:3 (ἀλλά ἐάν μὴ μετανοῆτε, πάντες ὁμοίως ἀπολεῖσθε - but unless you repent, you will all likewise be destroyed).

Thus Gildersleeve uses the mood of the verb as the guiding principle of his classification. The present general conditions as identified by Goodwin simply follow the pattern of Attic prose and should be considered as a type of anticipatory or future conditions. Further, the use of the future indicative not only classes the condition as a logical condition, but stresses the inescapable nature of the apodosis.

A third point arises over the distinction between the indicative and subjunctive moods. Contrary to Gildersleeve, Goodwin maintains that there is no distinction between these two moods in conditional sentences except that of time. He devotes an entire paper to the defense of his position and offers the following observation:

> The idea of "possibility" or something of the kind being attached to the subjunctive, it was naturally supposed that the simple indicative in protasis must have a corresponding idea at its foundation, and that of "certainty" or "reality" has generally been assigned to it.[2]

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[1] Gildersleeve, "On εἰ," p. 9.

[2] "William Watson Goodwin, "On the Classification of Conditional Sentences in Greek Syntax," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 6:1 (March, 1873), pp. 61-62.

He then gives several reasons for questioning that this distinction holds up in conditional sentences. In concluding his argument he writes:

> After the most careful study that I have been able to give to the subject, and especially after a comparison of several thousand classic examples, I am convinced that no such principle [of distinction] can be found. Every example that I have met with has only confirmed the opinion, which I can now express with the greatest confidence, that there is no inherent distinction between the present indicative and the present subjunctive in protasis (between εἰ βουλέται and ἐάν βουλῆται) except that of *time*.[1]

Robertson, writing some years later, defends Gildersleeve's position against Goodwin by pointedly hinging the meaning of the logical condition (εἰ with the indicative in the protasis) on the significance of the indicative mood.[2] This mood, according to him, is characterized as:

> . . . the "modus rectus." It does express "l'affirmation pure et simple." The indicative does *state* a thing as true, but does not guarantee the *reality* of the thing. In the nature of the case only the *statement* is under discussion. A clear grip on this point will help one all along. The indicative has nothing to do with reality ("on sich"). The speaker *presents* something as true. Actuality is implied, to be sure, but nothing more. Whether it is true or no is another matter.[2]

Concerning the subjunctive mood, Robertson notes two things. First, it is probably impossible to identify a single root-idea for this mood. He accepts Brugmann's identification of "three uses of the subjunctive (the *volitive*, the *deliberative*, the *futuristic*."[3] Thus

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[1] Goodwin, "Classification," pp. 64-65.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 915.
[3] *Ibid*., pp. 926-927.

the subjunctive does not necessarily imply a specific time.

Second, there is a close connection between the aorist sub-juctive and the future indicative:

> These [the aorist subjunctive and the future indicative] are closely allied in form and sense. It is quite probable that the future indicative is just a variation of the aorist subjunctive . . . . The subjunctive is always future, in subordinate clauses relatively future. Hence the two forms continued side by side in the language. There is a possible distinction. "The subjunctive differs from the future indicative in stating what is thought likely to occur, not positively what will occur." [quoting Thompson, *A Syntax of Attic Greek*, p. 133].[1]

Thus Robertson offers support for Gildersleeve's position by holding, first, to a uniform distinction between indicative and sub-junctive moods, and, second, to a non-chronological significance for the subjunctive mood itself. The particular case of the future indicative and the aorist subjunctive may show a blurring of this otherwise sharp distinction, but Robertson will not concede confusion in the essential modal significance, even in conditional sentences.

It would seem, then, that the major objections against Gildersleeve's system raised by Goodwin can be answered. Indeed, some of the answers are directly related to the objections raised against Goodwin's own approach. Most Koine grammarians have been convinced of the superiority of Gildersleeve's approach and have adopted it, via Robertson, with some notable exceptions.

[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, pp. 924-925.

Summary of Classical Greek Classification Systems

This somewhat detailed review of the work of Classical grammarians has shown that there is, in truth, significant disagreement among them. Goodwin classifies according to time, Donovan according to fulfillment or, non-fulfillment, Sonnenschein and Chambers according to form, and Gildersleeve according to determination. In terms of a majority vote, classical grammarians usually follow Goodwin and Koine grammarians generally follow Gildersleeve (or Robertson who follows Gildersleeve).

<u>Conditional Sentences in Koine Greek</u>

It is impossible to separate the advances in Koine grammar from those of Classical Greek, for they have moved hand-in-hand. At times, Koine grammarians took the work of the Classical scholars and brought it directly into New Testament studies, as Burton did with Goodwin's classification of conditional sentences. Robertson is representative of those Koine scholars who were conversant with Classical studies, but saw fit to reject some of them and sharpen the focus of others, as he did with Gildersleeve's work on these sentences.

Nigel Turner has done the historian of grammatical studies a great favor by publishing a chronological bibliography of all major Greek works, beginning with the first New Testament grammar published in 1655 and ending with the latest edition of Bauer's *Worterbuch* in 1958.[1]

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[1] Nigel Turner, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume III: Syntax* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), pp. vii-x.

This discussion will limit itself to the major Koine grammarians appearing on his list, including those who have published since he compiled his catalog. For organizational purposes they will be divided into "Early" and "Late" grammarians, with A. T. Robertson being the dividing point. Just as the survey of Classical grammarians illustrated the wide range of opinion on conditional sentences in the classic writings, so this survey will demonstrate that Koine studies are in a similar state of flux.

Early Grammarians

George Benedict Winer

George Benedict Winer is identified by Dana and Mantey as the first grammarian to operate with the concept that the Greek of the New Testament is the Greek of the common people, not a special, Holy Ghost language.[1] In the preface to the Sixth Edition of his grammar Winer writes:

> The fundamental error--the πρῶτον ψεῦδος--of the Biblical philology and exegesis to which we refer, consisted ultimately in this, that neither the Hebrew nor the language of the N.T. was regarded as a living idiom . . . designed to be used by men as the medium of intercourse.[2]

From this basis he develops his analysis of the Koine grammar, including that of conditional sentences.

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[1] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 9.
[2] Winer, *Grammar*, p. v.

Statement of His Position

Winer applies the results of the "enlightened philology" of his day to New Testament Greek and offers this analysis of conditional or hypothetical sentences:

> In HYPOTHETICAL sentences four kinds of construction occur:
> a. Pure condition: *If thy friend come, give him my regards* (the case is put as real). Here the Indicative is used with εἰ. . . .
> b. Condition with assumption of *objective* possibility (where experience will decide whether or not it is real): *If thy friend should come* (I do not know whether he will come, but the result will show). Here ἐάν . . . with the Subjunctive is used.
> c. Condition with assumption of *subjective* possibility, the condition existing merely in thought: *If thy friend come* (the case being conceivable and credible) I should be pleased to present my respects to him. Here εἰ with the Optative is used.
> d. Condition believed to be contrary to the fact: *were there a God, he would govern* (but there is not). *Had God existed from eternity, he would have prevented evil* (but he has not existed). Here εἰ with the Indicative is used,--the Imperf. in the first case, the Aor. or (much more rarely) the Plup. in the second . . .; in the conclusion likewise one of these two tenses.[1]

Summary of His Position

Winer's optimistic statement that "the diction of the N.T. will be found entirely in accordance with the preceding rules" indicates his confidence in these four basic divisions.[2] Though this has not been fulfilled to the degree he predicted, Winer has anticipated the major system used by Koine grammarians today. It is apparent that he is following Gildersleeve's system, though using slightly different termin-ology. He makes no reference to Gildersleeve, but it is possible that he

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[1] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 291.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 292

was familiar with Gildersleeve's work. Like him, Winer distinguishes between εἰ and the future indicative verb in the protasis and ἐάν with the subjunctive, though he acknowledges that "such construction with the Fut. would approximate most nearly to that with ἐάν . . . ."[1] He illustrates the difference between the two in this way:

> . . . but *if all shall be offended in thee* is a more decided statement than *if all should be offended*. In the latter, it is still altogether uncertain whether they will be offended; in the former, this is assumed as a future fact . . . .[2]

Winer notes that "the exceptions to these rules in the N.T. text are but very few, and occur for the most part only in particular Codd."[3] He discusses two types of exceptions: the use of εἰ with the subjunctive and ἐάν with the indicative. He does not discuss mixed conditions, concessive particles or elliptical conditions.

Evaluation of His Position

It is difficult at best to read many last-century grammarians with any degree of comprehension. They wrote "for another eye, another mind and another time." He further complicates the issue by trying to illustrate Greek concepts from English. The difference between "If thy friend come" and "If thy friend should come" hardly conveys the difference between the indicative and subjunctive moods. His explanatory comments are far more helpful than his examples, which tend to confuse the points he tries to make.

[1] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 293.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 294.

Winer did, however, establish a significant precedent by considering the Koine Greek to be just that, the language of the common man. By bringing the concept of simple observation and induction to bear upon the New Testament he advanced the understanding of its structure and pointed the way for others to follow.

<u>Alexander Buttmann</u>

Alexander Buttmann followed the general rules of Winer in his treatment of conditional sentences. Rather than expanding the rules at length, Buttmann concentrated on the deviations found in the New Testament. By this time it was fairly evident that Winer's confident assertion that all New Testament forms were covered by his four rules was overstated. Buttmann's work, though, shows that Winer's four classifications are generally true and accurately describe the majority of conditional sentences in the New Testament.

Statement of His Position

Buttmann observed that the first two forms of conditional sentences (εἰ with the indicative and ἐάν with the subjunctive) are by far the most frequent forms in the New Testament.[1] He also stressed the importance of mood as the determining factor in evaluating the kind of condition:

> The difference between them [the two types of conditional sentences] . . . is plainly to be recognized in sentences where both are used in close proximity; as Gal. i. 8,9, where the

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[1] Buttmann, *Grammar*, p. 220.

hypothesis expressed in the 8th verse by ἐάν with the Subjunctive is resumed or repeated in the 9th verse with greater energy and definiteness by εἰ with the Indicative. So in Acts v. 38, 39.[1]

Comparison of His Position

Buttmann's analysis of the exceptions to Winer's rules centers on two areas: the use of εἰ and ἐάν with the indicative and subjunctive moods respectively, and the use of ἄν in conditions contrary to fact.

Particles and moods.--His analysis of the particles and their corresponding moods is one of the first treatments of the topic that discusses the problem of variant readings.

Of the first case, the use of εἰ with the Subjunctive, we find, to be sure, accidentally . . . no example which is quite certain; for in some of them the readings vary, some are set aside by the MSS. (as Rev. xi. 5 [but cod. Sin. θελῆσῃ the second time]), some are capable of a special interpretation.[2]

He also lists I Corinthians 9:11 and Luke 9:13 as possible examples of this exception.

Regarding the use of ἐάν with the indicative he notes that this "is given so frequently, that it is to be eliminated as little from the writings of the N.T. as of the Old."[3] Buttmann does concede that most of these examples may be questioned upon textual evidence, but argues that the variants were introduced when the copyists altered the original and more difficult indicative.

[1] Buttmann, *Grammar*, p. 220.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 221.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 222.

It is, indeed, not to be denied that the instances in question almost disappear amid the multitude of those that are grammatically regular, and suspicion may also be raised by the circumstance that hardly a single passage with the Indicative is completely beyond question critically. Yet when we consider that in countless passages with the Subjunctive not the smallest variation is found (which would not be the case if the Indicative were chargeable solely to the copyists), it is far more probable that, where a diversity of readings occurs in such a number of instances, this fact results from the circumstance that the copyists, commentators, etc., early altered the Indicative which gave them offence.[1]

Specific examples will be considered in a later section of this study, but Buttmann's consideration of variant readings marks a significant advance in the detailed study of conditional sentences.

Conditions contrary to fact.--The second area of deviation Buttmann examined was the use of ἄν in the fourth class of conditions: conditions contrary to fact. He noted that the apodosis regularly included ἄν, but recognized that this was not an absolute principle. He listed four rules to explain the disappearance of ἄν from these apodoses:

a) When ἄν has already been expressed previously in the same connection with another predicate. This instance, which often occurs in the classics and is found in the nature of the case, is acci-dentally not to be met with in the text of the N. T. . . .

b) When the predicate (or the copula) to which it belongs is also dropped, as I Cor. xii. 19 . . . .

c) Where the apodosis contains such a predicative term as ἐδεὶ, καλόν ἦν, ἠδύνατο, etc. This omission . . . is so necessary according to Greek habits of thought, that it is only by way of concession to our usage that we can speak of supplying ἄν.

d) Lastly, ἄν is dropped for rhetorical reasons: where, though the fact itself is impossible or improbable, the orator in the vivacity of his thought desires to represent it as actually

[1] Buttmann, *Grammar*, p. 222.

having occurred, or at least as almost taken place.[1]

Most modern grammarians dispense with these rules, simply noting that ἄν usage is at best unpredictable. Robertson, for example, simply states that "There is no principle involved in ἄν, simply custom."[2] Buttmann was willing to recognize that the particle may be absent from a condition without upsetting the force of that sentence, and this is the emphasis of modern grammars.

Evaluation of His Position

Buttmann gets credit for a more thorough study of the conditional sentence than that of Winer. He accepted Winer's four categories, but noted several major exceptions to them, especially in the variant readings. Buttmann and Winer both placed emphasis upon mood as the determining factor in classifying conditional sentences rather than the particles or tense. It remained for other grammarians to state this principle in more formal terms.

Samuel G. Green

Published around 1887, Samuel G. Green's *Handbook of the Greek Testament* presents an analysis of conditional sentences that follows the patterns of Winer and Buttmann.[3]

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[1] Buttmann, *Grammar*, pp. 225-226.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*. p. 1007.
[3] Samuel G. Green, *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament* (London: The Religious Tract Society, 11886]), pp. 317-320.

Statement of His Position

Briefly, Green identifies four kinds of conditions or hypotheses:

α. The supposition of a fact.
β. "   "   of a possibility.
γ. "   "   of uncertainty.
δ. "   "   of something unfulfilled.[1]

These four types of conditions are indicated by four distinct

forms:

α. The conditional particle εἰ, *if*, with the Indicative in the
protasis, assumes the hypothesis as a fact. The apodosis may have
the Indicative or Imperative.
β. Possibility or uncertainty with the prospect of decision, is
expressed by ἐάν = εἰ ἄν (very rarely by εἰ alone [He lists I Cor. 14:5,
Phil. 3:12, and a few various readings, such as in Rev. 11:5, as
examples.] with the Subjunctive in the conditional clause, and the
Indicative or Imperative in the apodosis.
γ. The Optative in a conditional sentence expresses entire
uncertainty--a supposed case. Here the particle εἰ is always used.
δ. When the condition is spoken of as unfulfilled, the
Indicative is used in both clauses, with the particle εἰ in the
protasis, and ἄν in the apodosis.[2]

Evaluation of His Position

As is evident, Green's system of analysis is the same as those

already discussed: four types of condition, each identified by a

particular combination of particles and moods, and each conveying a

different concept. Winer, Buttmann and Green all seek to analyze

conditional sentences in terms of form, especially that of mood. They

differ little from the popular scheme of Robertson.

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[1] Green, *Grammar*, p. 317.
[2] *Ibid*., pp. 317-319.

Ernest DeWitt Burton

     Ernest DeWitt Burton was both a scholar and an administrator, having served as the chairman of the Department of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and later as the president of the University of Chicago.[1] In his major Greek work, *Moods and Tenses of New Testament Greek*, he adopts Goodwin's analysis of conditional sentences and applies it to the New Testament.[2]

Statement of His Position

     His specific position, following Goodwin, is:

     A. Simple Present or Past Particular Supposition. The protasis *simply states* a supposition which refers to a particular case in the present or past, implying nothing as to its fulfillment. The protasis is expressed by εἰ with a present or past tense of the Indicative; any form of the finite verb may stand in the apodosis.

John 15:20; εἰ ἐμὲ ἐδίωξαν, καὶ ὑμᾶς διώξουσιν, *if they have persecuted me, they,will also persecute you*.

Gal. 5:18; εἰ δὲ πνεύματι ἄγεσθε, οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον, *but if ye are led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law*. See also Matt. 4:3; Luke 16:11; Acts 5:39; Rom. 4:2; 8:10; Gal. 2:17; Rev. 20:15.

     B. Supposition Contrary to Fact. The protasis states a supposition which refers to the present or past, implying that it is not or was not fulfilled.

     The protasis is expressed by εἰ with a past tense of the Indicative; the apodosis by a past tense of the Indicative with αν.

John 11:21; Κύριε, εἰ ἦς ὧδε οὐκ ἄν ἀπέθανεν ὁ ἀδελφός μου, *Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother would not have died*.

Gal. 1:10; εἰ ἔτι ἀνθρώποις ἤρεσκον, Χριστοῦ δοῦλος οὐκ ἄν ἤμην, *if I were still pleasing men, I should not be a servant of Christ*. See also John 14:28; Acts 18:14; Heb. 4:8; 11:15.

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[1] Charles Thwing, "Burton, Ernest DeWitt," in Vol. II of *Dictionary of American Biography*, ed. by Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 341-342.

[2] Ernest DeWitt Burton, *Syntax of Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 101.

C. Future Supposition with More Probability. The protasis states a supposition which refers to the future, suggesting some probability of its fulfillment.

The protasis is usually expressed by ἐάν (or ἄν) with the Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future Indicative or by some other form referring to future time.

Matt. 9:21; ἐὰν μόνον ἅψωμαι τοῦ ἱματίου ἀτοῦ σωθήσομαι, *if I shall but touch his garments, I shall be made whole.*

John 12:26; ἐάν τις ἐμοὶ διακονῇ τιμήσει αὐτὸν ὁ πατήρ, *if any man serve me, him will the Father honor.*

John 14:15; ἐὰν ἀγαπᾶτέ με, τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς ἐμὰς τηρήσετε, *if ye love me, ye will keep my commandments.* See also Matt. 5:20; I Cor. 4:19; Gal. 5:2; Jas. 2:15,16.

D. Future Supposition with Less Probability. The protasis states a supposition which refers to the future, suggesting less probability of its fulfillment than is suggested by ἐάν with the Subjunctive. There is no perfect example of this form in the New Testament.

The protasis is expressed by εἰ with the Optative; the apodosis by the Optative with ἄν.

I Pet. 3:17; κρεῖττον γὰρ ἀγαθοποιοῦντας, εἰ θέλοι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, πάσχειν ἤ κακοποιοῦντας, *for it is better, if the will of God should so will, that ye suffer for well doing than for evil doing.* See also I Cor. 14:10; 15:37; I Pet. 3:14.

E. Present General Supposition. The supposition refers to any occurrence of an act of a certain class in the (general) present, and the apodosis states what is wont to take place in any instance of an act of the class referred to in the protasis.

The protasis is expressed by ἐάν with the Subjunctive, the apodosis by the Present Indicative.

John 11:9; εάν τις περιπατῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, οὐ προσκόπτει, *if a man walk in the day, he stumbleth not.*

2 Tim. 2:5; ἐὰν δὲ καί ἀθλῇ τις, οὐ στεφανοῦται ἐάν μὴ νομίμως ἀθλήσῃ, *and if also a man contend in the games, he is not crowned, unless he contend lawfully.* See also Mark 3:24; John 7:51; 12:24; I Cor. 7:39, 40.

F. Past General Supposition. The supposition refers to any past occurrence of an act of a certain class, and the apodosis states what was wont to take place in any instance of an act of the class referred to in the protasis.

The protasis is expressed by εἰ with the Optative, the apodosis by the Imperfect Indicative.

There is apparently no instance of this form in the New Testament.[1]

In addition to these general classifications, Burton makes some interesting observations regarding the specific classes. He notes that in the first type

> . . . the Future Indicative may stand in the protasis of a conditional sentence of the first class when reference is had to a present necessity or intention, or when the writer desires to state not what will take place on the fulfillment of a future possibility, but merely to affirm a necessary logical consequence of a future event.[2]

This differs from Goodwin's position that the future indicative and the subjunctive may have the same significance in conditional sentences.

The third class of conditional sentences may also have these constructions in the protasis: (a) εἰ with the Subjunctive, (b) εἰ or ἐάν with the Future Indicative, and (c) εἰ with the Present Indicative.[3] Conditions of this last form are apparently first class conditions, but "are distinguished by evident reference of the protasis to the future."[4]

Concerning the fifth class, the Present General Supposition, he notes that some conditions using εἰ with the indicative "apparently express a present general supposition," which does not fit his rule that such conditions use ἐάν with the subjunctive.[5] He explains that it is

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[1] Burton, *Syntax,* pp. 102-106.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 103.
[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 104-105.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 105.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 107.

difficult to distinguish between this form of a present general condition and that of a simple condition:

> Yet in most New Testament passages of this kind, it is possible that a particular imagined instance in the present or future is before the mind as an illustration of the general class of cases . . . . It is scarcely possible to decide in each case whether the supposition was conceived of as general or particular

> Luke 14:26; εἴ τις ἔρχεται πρός με καὶ οὐ μισεῖ . . . τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ, οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής, *if any man cometh unto me, and hateth not . . . his own life, he cannot be my disciple.* Cf. John 1:51; 12:26; where in protases of apparently similar force ἐάν with the Subjunctive occurs, and the apodosis refers to the future.

> Rom. 8:25; εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ βλέπομεν ἐλπίζομεν, δι᾿ ὑπομονῆς ἀπεκδεχόμεθα, b*ut if we hope for that which we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.* See also Jas. 1:26.[1]

According to form, such conditions are simple conditions, but according to interpretation, they may be considered a variety of present general conditions. The distinction, it must be stressed, is one of interpretation, not form. Classification should be on an objective basis, such as form, not upon a subjective one, such as interpretation.

Summary of His Position

In addition to these details, Burton also considers many various peculiarities of conditional sentences. He lists nine of these, including (1) mixed forms, (2) multiple protases, each with its unique emphasis, (3) the use of a participle, an imperative or other form of expression "suggesting a supposition" to supply the protasis, and (4) the observation that sometimes either the protasis or the apodosis may be omitted.[2]

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[1] Burton, *Syntax*, pp. 107-108.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 109-112.

One final comment: Burton correctly identifies the assumption of "reality" or "unreality" in these conditions as that of the speaker or his hearers, not in the external situation:

> It should be observed that the titles of the several classes of conditional sentences describe the supposition not from the point of view of fact, but from that of the representation of the case to the speaker's own mind or to that of his hearers.[1]

Conditional sentences do speak of many things that are objectively true, but the demonstration of their factuality lies in the external world, not in the internal world of the conditional statement.

James Hope Moulton

The *Prolegomena* to James Hope Moulton's *A Grammar of the New Testament* was the first major grammar to utilize the newly discovered evidence from the papyri.[2] This work was followed by his *Introduction to the Study of New Testament Greek*, a formal grammar.[3] Moulton had originally conceived of his major work, *A Grammar of the New Testament*, in terms of three volumes. He published *Volume I: Prolegomena* in 1906, and it quickly went through three editions in two years. He produced the rough draft for parts I and II of the second volume, but was not permitted to finish it. While at sea he died "in the Mediterranean,

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[1] Burton, *Syntax*, p. 101.

[2] James Hope Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I: Prolegomena*, third edition (Edinburgh: T. S T. Clark, 1908), p. 4.

[3] James Hope Moulton, *An Introduction to the Study of New Testament Greek* (London: Charles H. Kelly, n.d.).

in April, 1917, a victim of the ruthless submarine campaign."[1] Nigel Turner
continues the interesting story:

> His pupil, Dr. W. F. Howard, saw that volume through the press in
> parts, from 1919 to 1929, but before he had opportunity to lay many
> plans for Volume III he himself died in 1952; and then, on condition
> that he had the assistance of someone who would collect the necessary
> material, Dr. H. G. Meecham assumed responsibility for the syntax.
> It was on Dr. G. D. Kilpatrick's suggestion that I was permitted to
> help at this point, and we had done no more than compile a provisional
> bibliography when Dr. Meecham died in 1955. By the kind invitation of
> the publishers I then worked alone and broke the spell by living to
> complete Volume III.[2]

Since he was anticipating two more volumes, Dr. Moulton did little
more than mention a few aspects of conditional sentences in the *Prolegomena*.
Fortunately, his *Introduction to the Study of New Testament Greek* gives
a relatively complete presentation of his views on the classification of
these clauses.

Statement of His Position

First, the general comments from his *Prolegomena* will be
presented. To begin with, he notes that the distinction between εἰ and ἐάν

> . . . has been considerably lessened in Hellenistic as compared with
> earlier Greek. We have seen that ἐάν can take the indicative; while
> (as rarely in classical Greek) εἰ can be found with the subjunctive.[3]

Regarding the constructional distinctions of conditional sentences,
Moulton makes the following observations:

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[1] James Hope Moulton and W. F. Howard, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume II: Accidence and Word Formation* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1929), p. v.

[2] Nigel Turner, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*. Volume III: Syntax (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), p. v.

[3] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 187.

The differentation of construction remains at present stereotyped: εἰ goes with indicative, is used exclusively when past tenses come in (e.g. Mk 3²⁶), and uses οὐ as its negative; while ἐάν, retaining μή exclusively, takes the subjunctive almost invariably, unless the practically synonymous future indicative is used. Ἐάν and εἰ are both used, however, to express future conditions . . . The immense majority of conditional sentences in the NT belong to these heads.[1]

Moulton opts for Blass's principle as opposed to Goodwin's to explain the use of the optative mood in these sentences:

Meanwhile we may observe that Blass's dictum (p. 213) that εἰ c. opt. form is used "if I wish to represent anything as generally possible, without regard to the general or actual situation at the moment," suits the NT exx. well; and it seems to fit the general facts better than Goodwin's doctrine of a "less vivid future" condition (Goodwin, *Greek Grammar*, 301).[2]

He specifically identifies Acts 8:31 as an example of a conditional sentence employing ἄν with the optative to which Goodwin's "less vivid" form does not apply.[3]

However, he does follow Goodwin's general system for the overall classification of conditional sentences. Three general classes are recognized:

Simple Conditions in present or past time.

Protasis, εἰ with indicative; *Apodosis*, generally indicative, always *without* ἄν.

These sentences merely join together a condition and a result without any indication as to the probability or improbability of the condition.

[1] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 187.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 196, note.
[3] *Ibid*., pp. 198-199.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 199.

Unfulfilled Conditions in present and past time.

Protasis, εἰ with indicative, imperfect for present time, aorist for past.
Apodosis, indicative *with* ἄν, imperfect for present time, aorist for past.

Future Conditions.

Protasis, ἐάν with subjunctive (rarely indicative, or εἰ with subjunctive).
Apodosis, future indicative, sometimes the imperative.[1]

He classifies the optative condition, Robertson's Fourth Class Condition, as a special form of the Future Condition, noting that its full expression has vanished in the Koine and only parts of such conditions appear in the New Testament.

Modern Grammarians

Archibald Thomas Robertson

Of all modern Koine grammarians, none has exerted the influence or achieved the status of Archibald Thomas Robertson. As professor of New Testament at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary from 1890 to 1934 he helped form modern opinion about Koine Greek. With few exceptions contemporary grammarians have adopted his terminology and viewpoint, especially on conditional sentences. Thus his position requires detailed study in order to fully comprehend the current majority view of conditional sentences in the New Testament.

Statement of His Position

His system of analysis basically follows that of Gildersleeve in Classical Greek by identifying four types of conditions, each

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[1] Moulton, *Introduction to New Testament Greek*, pp. 210-213.

determined by the mood of the protasis.

His summary.--Robertson first summarizes the importance of mood in conditions:

> The indicative mode in the condition always makes a *clear-cut assertion* one way or the other [fulfilled or unfulfilled]. If the subjunctive or the optative is used in the condition (protasis) *a doubtful statement* is made whatever may be the actual fact or truth in the case. By these modes of doubtful statement the condition puts it *as doubtful or undetermined* (not put in a clear--cut way). If the subjunctive is used, there is less doubt than if the optative is used, precisely the difference between these two modes of doubtful statement.[1]

This distinction in mood (indicative = fulfilled or unfulfilled, subjunctive = doubt, optative = more doubt) leads to the natural conclusion that there are four types of conditional sentences:

> (a) First Class: Determined as Fulfilled (εἰ, sometimes ἐάν, with any tense of the indicative in condition. Any tense of the indicative in the conclusion).
> (b) Second Class: Determined as Unfulfilled (εἰ and only past tenses of the indicative in condition. Only past tenses in the conclusion, usually with ἄν to make clear the kind of condition used).
> (c) Third Class: Undetermined with Prospect of Determination (ἐάν or εἰ with the subjunctive in the condition, usually future or present indicative or imperative in the conclusion, much variety in the form of the conclusion).
> (d) Fourth Class: Undetermined with Remote Prospect Determination (εἰ with the optative in the condition, ἄν and the optative in the conclusion).[2]

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[1] A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis, *A New Short Grammar of the Greek Testament* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 349.
[2] *Ibid*., pp. 349-350.

His Defence.--In defending this analysis, Robertson speaks against the popular forms of classification, especially that of Goodwin. First he rejects the concept of particular and general as a basic principle of classification. Actually the concept of time was the key principle of Goodwin, but the particular-general division was important. In any event, Robertson points to the work of Gildersleeve and says of Goodwin's distinction: "This is a false step in itself."[1] He accepts Gildersleeve's position that any condition may be particular or general, depending upon the type of verb used in the protasis.

Robertson then raises his next and most serious objection to Goodwin and those following him: they refuse to recognize the basic significance of the mood in conditions. Goodwin's first class of conditions utilizes the indicative mood and, he says, "simply states a present or past particular supposition, implying nothing as to the fulfillment of the condition . . . .[2] Robertson strongly objects to this interpretation, claiming that "This condition *pointedly* implies the fulfillment of the condition."[3] Robertson hinges his argument on the basic significance of the indicative mood which, he claims, has its usual meaning in conditions as well as normal clauses. This is, as he says, "the crux of the whole matter."[4] Goodwin's classification seems to

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1005.
[2] Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 145.
[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1006.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 1006.

place emphasis on things other than mood, relegating it to a position of lesser importance. For Robertson, mood is all-important. He pursues his analysis on this assumption.

One specific detail of his system needs further comment: the first class condition labeled as "*Determined as Fulfilled*." Robertson quotes Gildersleeve as identifying this condition as "the favorite condition," though he is talking about classical poets, especially Pindar.[1] The question already raised by Robertson relates to the degree of determination implied by the condition. Is the speaker presenting the condition as something that is objectively true (εἴ τις θέλει ὀπίσω μου ἔρχεσθαι, ἀρνησάσθω ἑαυτόν - Since someone does wish to come after me, let him deny himself. Luke 9:23)? Or is the speaker assuming the truth of the condition without committing himself to a position one way or the other, such as might be done "for the sake of the argument" (εἰ δὲ ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ Χριστὸς ἐγήγερται - But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not raised. I Cor. 15:13)? This point will receive a more detailed treatment later, but it is important to note that some commentators have understood Robertson to say that the first class condition actually affirms the objective reality of the condition. Perhaps his statements could have been more precise, but common sense will suffice to show that this cannot be the case in all situations. If it were, then Christ would have been operating in the power of the Devil (Matt. 12:27)

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1007.

and would not be resurrected (I Cor. 15:13). Yet writers continue to to read objective reality into the first class condition. An extreme example is the statement of Jerome Moore:

> The first class condition implies truth or reality. If . . . *and it is true*. Colossians 1:23 . . . is an example of this. The idea there is, "If ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, *and ye shall*!" There is no doubt implied here. This is a condition of reality. No need to doubt the security of your salvation or any-one else's, for *if* here in the Greek does not imply doubt.[1]

Were the situation not so serious, it would be funny. No one can guarantee the salvation of anyone else. Certainly Paul challenged the Corinthians to test and examine themselves (2 Cor. 13:5). Obviously some contexts permit the English "since" with its implication of objective reality, but many, indeed, a majority, do not. To make such claims is to ignore common sense, the teaching of Robertson and the clear statements of Scripture.

In his doctoral dissertation John Battle describes Robertson as "difficult to read."[2] Perhaps the wordiness of his *Historical Grammar* led to some contradictory statements in the minds of some, but in the first edition of his *Shorter Grammar*, he clearly states:

> This condition does *assume* the reality of the condition. Take Matt. 12:27. Christ did not cast out demons by Beelzebub, but in argument he assumes it. The indicative mode determines the condition as fulfilled, so far as the statement is concerned.[3]

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[1] Jerome Moore, "Four Ways to Say 'If,'" *The Baptist Bulletin* 45:1 (June, 1979), p. 11.

[2] John A. Battle, Jr., "The Present Indicative in New Testament Exegesis," unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace Theological Seminary, 1975, D. 170.

[3] A. T. Robertson, *A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1908), p. 151.

At times this assumption is parallel with the objective reality of the statement, as in I Thessalonians 4:14 – εἰ γὰρ πιστεύομεν ὅτι Ἰησους ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἀνέστη . . . ; for if we believe that Jesus died and rose again. In other contexts the assumption is counter to the objective reality, as in Matthew 12:27 – καὶ εἰ ἐγὼ ἐν Βεεζεβοὺλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμόνια . . . ; and if I by the power of Beelzebub cast out the demons. In still other situations (probably the majority of those in the New Testament) the assumption is neither parallel nor counter to objective reality, for the reality cannot be determined from the information at hand. This is the situation in Colossians 1:23 – εἴ γε ἐπιμένετε τῇ πίστει . . .; if you continue in the faith. The best English word to use in all three situations is "if," and all major English translations of the New Testament uniformly translate the first class condition this way.

Evaluation of His Position

A. T. Robertson's analysis of conditional sentences has blazed a trail that many have followed in New Testament studies. His terminology has become almost universal, and his rejection of Goodwin's system has been accepted by almost all who have followed him. Unfortunately, some have taken Robertson too simply and have read verification (or non-verification) of external or objective reality into his First and Second Class conditions. One could wish that he had been more precise in his statements, but such difficulties are no excuse for the misuse of his concepts one finds in the literature.

<u>William Douglas Chamberlain</u>

As a professor at Louisville Presbyterian Seminary, William Douglas Chamberlain first published his Greek grammar in 1941: His analysis is a concise summary of Robertson's work. Only a few remarks need be made to indicate additional information he provides.

Statement of His Position

Accepting Robertson's terminology, he affirms that in first class conditions "The protasis has to do with the way the statement is made, and not with the truth or falsity of it."[1] Untrue conditions may be assumed to be true for the sake of the argument. Matthew 12:27 is presented as an example of this situation.

In second class conditions he, like Robertson, identifies the tenses used as past tenses: imperfect, aorist or pluperfect. It is possible to have different tenses in the protasis and the apodosis, as in John 14:28. While "the viewpoint is changed between the protasis and the apodosis," the entire sentence is still a second class condition: "These are not 'mixed conditions.'"[2]

He identifies the third class conditions as those which are "stated as a matter of doubt, with some prospect of fulfillment."[3] The fourth class is "even more doubtful than the third class."[4] While

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[1] William Douglas Chamberlain, *An Exegetical Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 195.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 197.
3 *Ibid*., p. 198.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 199.

he finds no complete example of this condition in the New Testament, he does identify fragments in I Peter 3:14, I Corinthians 15:37, Acts 17:27, and Acts 27:39.[1]

Chamberlain discusses two other aspects of conditional sentences which are also mentioned in Robertson, though not in so succinct a manner: Mixed Conditions and Elliptical Conditions. The first involves a change in class of condition between the protasis and the apodosis, for the "writer changes his viewpoint between the protasis and the apodosis."[2] Luke 17:6 is listed as an example.

The second topic, elliptical conditions, involves conditional sentences in which the apodosis is expressed and the protasis is simply implied. He lists four ways this is accomplished:

1. By the participle: Rom. 2:27.

2. By a verb in the imperative mode: Mark 1:17.

3. The protasis may be abbreviated to the vanishing point as with εἰ μὴ in the case of 'except': Mt. 11:27.

4. The apodosis may be omitted: Luke 19:42.[3]

Chamberlain also notes that the Hebraistic use of εἰ in oaths (Mark 8:12), and its use to introduce direct questions (Acts 1:6) are not conditional sentences.[4]

Evaluation of His Position

Chamberlain's little grammar provides a very readable synthesis of Robertson's position without going into the fine details of historical

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[1] Chamberlain, *Grammar*, p. 199.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 199.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 199
[4] *Ibid*., p. 200.

analysis. Mood is the key factor in determining the type of conditional sentence, and the indicative mood identifies sentences which present the condition as true.

Charles Francis Digby Moule

The English scholar C. F. D. Moule, publishing in 1953, follows neither Robertson nor Goodwin in his analysis of conditional sentences. He presents a unique system of both construction and application, setting aside many of the chief dicta of other grammarians.

Statement of His Position

He summarizes the various conditions under three headings:

1. Past or present conditions, possible or actual.

2. Recurrent or future conditions, whether real or hypothetical.

3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.[1]

In outline form his system looks like this:

1. Past or present conditions, possible or actual.
   Protasis: εἰ with the indicative in the appropriate tense.
   Apodosis: another indicative or its equivalent [an imperative, as in Col. 4:10, or conceivably a participle] in the appropriate tense.

2. Recurrent or future conditions, whether real or hypothetical.
   Protasis: εἰ (or ὅτε) with ἄν (making ἐάν, ὁτάν) with the subjunctive in the appropriate tense.
   Apodosis: Indicative or its equivalent [imperative or participle] in the appropriate tense.

3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.

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[1] C[harles] F[rancis] D[igby] Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p. 148.

Protasis: εἰ with a past tense of the indicative.
Apodosis: a past (but not necessarily the same) tense of the indicative, usually with ἄν.[1]

He sums up his concept of conditional sentences by stating:

Thus the form of a conditional sentence is largely determined by two main factors—time (past, present, future) or Aktionsart (instantaneous, protracted, recurrent, etc.) and the degree of reality (impossible, improbable, possible, probable, actual).[2]

Specific factors which help determine the mood of conditional sentences include:

(a) Any *past* condition introduced by *if* must, in the nature of the case, be hypothetical, if not definitely unreal: otherwise there would be nothing *conditional* about the sentence. Therefore there appears to be no need to vary the mood, and it is regularly Indicative.
(b) But *present, future, or recurrent* conditions may vary widely in their degree of actuality: hence (perhaps) the variation in moods. In general, the Indic. represents certainty, while the Subj. represents something more hypothetical or uncertain.[3]

Moule thus recognizes the basic significance of these moods, but he employs them in a unique system of analysis.

Evaluation of His Position

Two observations may be made about this analysis. First, Moule maintains that the apodosis is always in the indicative mood regardless of the mood of the protasis. The specific examples will be discussed in the next chapter, but this is an over-simplification, as Galatians 5:25 demonstrates. Second and more important, this approach

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[1] Moule, *Idiom Book*, pp. 148-149.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 150.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 149.

seems to produce sentences that are one class by form and another by meaning. Moule thinks that this is a problem:

> The difficulty of classifying is illustrated by sentences which belong by meaning in one class, but by form in another; e.g.: (1) in form, (2) in meaning: II Tim. ii:12 εἰ ὑπομένομεν, καὶ συνβασιλεύσομεν; II John 10 εἴ τις ἔρχεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ ταύτην τὴν διδαχὴν οὐ φέρει, μὴ λαμβάνετε αὐτόν. Both these might well have had εαν with Subj. in the protasis. (1), in meaning, (2) in form: I Cor. ix. 16 ἐὰν γὰρ εὐαγγελίζωμαι, οὐκ ἔστιν μοι καύχημα . . . .[1]

But is this really a problem? The two examples listed as being class 1 (possible or actual) by form and class 2 (recurrent or future conditons) by meaning, 2 Tim. 2:12 and 2 John 10, are straight-forward first class conditions in both form and meaning. It is futile to suggest what "might well" have been written, for the text has been set down as God wanted it given. One might feel that an exegetical problem could be solved by treating 2 Tim. 2:12 as a hypothetical condition, but such is not the case. It is a first class and needs to be interpreted as such. So with 1 Cor. 9:16; it is presented as a hypothetical condition, even though facts outside the condition establish that it is an actual situation. There is no need to rewrite the statement.

It seems reasonable to ask, If one's analysis produces such apparent contradictions as Moule felt his did, should the analysis be pursued? It seems-unlikely that such diverse situations would arise in the normal development of a language. Significant also is the fact that no other grammarian has followed Moule in this approach. All seem to

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[1] Moule, *Idiom Book*, p. 149.

have recognized the weakness in his system.

Friedrich Blass - Albert Debrunner

In 1911 Friedrich Blass published his *Grammar of New Testament Greek*. It passed through several editions and translations and was continued after his death by Albert Debrunner, a professor of Indo-European and classical Philology at the University of Bern.   Robert W. Funk of the University of Montana prepared a new translation and revision of this work as a companion grammar to Arnt and Gingrich's *Lexicon*. Funk's revision is the one under consideration.

Statement of His Position

Blass-Debrunner recognizes five forms of conditional sentences in Classical Greek, four of which are present in the New Testament:

(1) **Εἰ** with the indicative of all tenses denotes a simple conditional assumption with emphasis on the reality of the assumption (not of what is being assumed): the condition is considered 'a real case.'

(2) **Εἰ** with the optative presents something as thought of, without regard for reality or unreality, and emphasizes the hypothetical character of the assumption: 'a potential case.'

(3) **Εἰ** with an augmented tense of the indicative marks the assumption as contrary to fact: 'an unreal case.'

(4) **Ἐάν** with the subjunctive denotes that which under certain circumstances is expected from an existing general or concrete standpoint in the present: 'case of expectation.'

(5) **Εἰ** with the optative also specifies repetition in past time.[1]

Of these five forms, (2) has almost disappeared from the New Testament and (5) has completely disappeared. Blass-Debrunner thus comes close to Robertson's (and Gildersleeve's) four conditions. Indeed, Funk

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[1] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 188.

speaks of Robertson's organization as "especially lucid."[1] Unfortunately,

neither Blass-Debrunner's nor Funk's comments have the same quality, so

some explanatory comments are necessary.

The first group, the "real case," speaks of

> . . . a present reality = 'if . . . really' (as you say, as is
> believed, as you see, etc.) or = 'if therefore' (resulting from
> what has been said), often closely bordering on causal
> 'since' . . . .[2]

Were one to change the adverb "often" to "infrequently," he would be

closer to the truth of the New Testament. He comes closer in his

first statement that this condition places emphasis on "the reality of

the assumption (not of what is being assumed)." This distinction between

the statement of a situation and the actual situation itself must be

maintained. In Matthew 12:27, for example, Jesus speaks of His

exorcism in a way that is directly counter to the reality of the situa-

tion. This fits Blass-Debrunner's statement.

The third group, $\epsilon \acute{\iota}$ with an augmented indicative verb,

indicates a condition that is contrary to fact. Unlike Classical Greek,

the "addition of $\overset{\text{˝}}{\alpha} \nu$ to the apodosis is no longer obligatory."[3] These

conditions are "remarkably scarce in Paul."[4]

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[1] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 189.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 189.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 182.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 182.

The fourth group, ἐάν with the subjunctive, refers to future situations. These situations may be of a general or specific nature ("general or concrete standpoint"), corresponding to the often-mentioned present general condition. The use of ἐάν with the subjunctive to refer to future time is normal. "There is," he notes, "no certain example of ἐάν with the future indicative in the NT."[1] This is not unexpected, for there has always been a close affinity between the future indicative and the subjunctive. Indeed, the origin of the future indicative may well have been a mixture of "the Indo-European future, which denoted future time, and the subjunctive of the sigmatic aorist."[2] This close relationship has been noted before.

Evaluation of His Position

Blass-Debrunner agrees with Robertson in his stress upon the limitation of the reality of the first class condition to the statement, not the situation. Although Funk respects Robertson's analysis, he retains the original terminology of Blass's work. While there may not be general agreement between this grammar and that of Robertson on titles, there is on the forms and their significance.

Nigel Turner

Nigel Turner's role in finishing the grammar started by Moulton has already been set forth. His volume on syntax represents conditional

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[1] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 190.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 166.

sentences under their respective parts: moods, tenses, etc. Only towards the end does he summarize his conclusions.

Statement of His Position

In outline form his analysis is:

(i)   εἰ with indic., representing the simple assumption . . .

(ii)   εἰ with opt., representing the "potential" conception . . . .

(iii)   εἰ with aor. or impf. indic., representing an assumption as not corresponding with reality . . . .

(iv)   ἐάν with subj., indicating an expected result based on the present general or particular circumstance . . . .[1]

Turner presents a system of analysis that combines features of Moulton along with some of Goodwin. It is instructive to see what new insights this gives for each of these conditions.

Details of His Position

Turner does not give a detailed discussion of the first type of condition except to note that εἰ with the future indicative, unlike ἐάν with the present subjunctive, calls attention to "The feeling of definiteness and actual realization [that] accompanies it. It is almost causal."[2] He recognizes the problem posed by 2 Timothy 2:12, but offers no suggested answer: "The difficulty about this view is 2 Ti 2^{12} εἰ ἀπαρνησόμεθα, where the condition was surely conceived as no more than hypothetical."[3]

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[1] Turner, *Syntax*, p. 319.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 115.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 115.

Turner notes that in the third group of conditional sentences, the "unreal" conditions, the past tenses are used and retain their proper *Aktionsart*. Thus the imperfect stands for "what *should* be now" and the aorist for "what *should have been*."[1] In both cases, reality is not found in what the speaker wants it to be or to have been.

His discussion of the fourth group of conditions (protasis = ἐάν with the subjunctive) includes the concept of particular and general as defined by the *Aktionsart* (as he understands it) of the verbs employed:

> (1) *Present*: very common in Koine. In a general and iterative sense, as "condicio universalis" . . . , the pres. subj. denotes a hypothesis which can occur over and over again (present *Aktionsart*). The most common example of this condition in the Ptol. Pap. is stereotyped phrases in decrees and punishments, having a continual validity.
> (2) Aorist: This represents a definite event as occurring only once in the future, and conceived as taking place before the time of the action of the main verb. It is expectation, but not fulfillment as yet.[2]

Here he evidences the common, though erroneous, view of the significance of the aorist tense. Further, he does not make the concept of particular and general a basis of classification, only of interpretation.

Not all conditional sentences fit neatly into this four-group package, and Turner speaks of "a liberal mixing in the various categories of conditional sentences."[3] The specifics remain to be explored, but

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[1] Turner, *Syntax*, p. 91.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 114.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 319.

it would seem, as with Moule, that any system that produces such results needs to be reexamined.

H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey

The appearance of Dana and Mantey's *Manual Grammar* probably accounted for the disappearance of Robertson's *Shorter Grammar of the Greek New Testament* as a standard intermediate text.[1] In their book these authors summarize Robertson's analysis and add some interesting terminology and explanations of their own.

Statement of Their Position

The basis upon which they classify conditional sentences is "the attitude that they express with reference to reality."[2] This is expressed through the mood of the protasis. The indicative points to a condition from the viewpoint of reality. The subjunctive and optative moods point to a condition from the viewpoint of probability.[3] Those conditions which use the indicative mood are divided into two sub-classes. The first, termed the "simple condition," presents "one fact as conditioning another." In this form "nothing is implied as to whether or not this fact actually exists."[4] The second sub-class

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[1] Now available as a reprint: A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis, *A New Short Grammar of the Greek Testament*, 10th edition (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1977).

[2] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 287.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 287.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 287.

implies that "this fact has not been realized, and therefore does not exist. This we call the *contrary to fact condition*."[1] These two types, then,

> . . . assume that the premise is either true or untrue. The speaker takes for granted that which he assumes is true, as in the simple condition; or that it is known not to be true, as is the case in the contrary to fact condition. The indicative, being the mood for reality, is regularly used in this type of sentence.[2]

Using Matthew 12:27 as a test case, it is clear that their first statement (The condition implies nothing about the actual facts of the case.) is more accurate than the second one. Jesus did take His assumed link with Beelzebub for granted, but only for the sake of the argument.

Conditions utilizing the subjunctive mood are termed the "more probable future conditions," and those with the optative are the "less probable future conditions."[3] All of these conditions utilize the particle ἄν whether by itself or in combination with εἰ (εἰ + ἄν = ἐάν).[4]

Evaluation of Their Position

Their observations on the construction of the four types of conditional sentences are identical to Robertson's. They identify three types of irregular forms of conditional sentences: (1) mixed conditions,

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[1] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 287.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 288.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 287.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 288.

(2) implied conditions "in which the apodosis is expressed and the protasis implied in a participle (I Tim. 4:4), imperative (Mk. 1:17), or question (Mt. 26:15)," and elliptical conditions.[1]

Although their terminology is somewhat different than that of Robertson, the closeness of their position to his places them under the same evaluation.

Robert W. Funk

As Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Montana, Robert W. Funk has not only translated and enlarged the standard grammar of Blass-Debrunner, but has produced one of his own. His discussion of conditional sentences reflects the basic system of Robertson, but with significant comparisons to Classical grammars, especially the work of Smyth.

Statement of His Position

The first class condition presents "a simple conditional assumption with emphasis on the reality of the assumption (but not on the reality of what is being assumed)."[2] This is the same statement he used in his revision of Blass-Debrunner, and the same clarification is necessary. By "assumption" he means the statement of the situation, and by "what is being assumed" he means the situation itself. The use of the future tense in both the protasis and apodosis is the equivalent

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[1] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 291.
[2] Funk, *Grammar*, II, p. 680.

of Smyth's "future most vivid" condition, but Funk recognizes it as a special form of the first class condition.[1]

His analysis of the second class is the same as Robertson. The third class of conditions utilizes the subjunctive mood in the protasis and is called "a probable case."[2] The use of the present tense in the apodosis "often gives the condition a generalizing force (indicated by event in the translation)."[3] This is what Smyth termed the "future more vivid" condition.

Evaluation of His Position

Funk demonstrates the advantages of classification by reality as expressed in the mood of the protasis. He is able to present a simple, easily comprehended, system and account for the many subspecies recognized by other grammarians. His improvement upon Robertson's system is more in terms of organization than content.

William Sanford La Sor

William Sanford La Sor is more familiar to scholars for his work in Hebrew rather than Greek, for he is Professor of Old Testament at Fuller Theological Seminary. He has, however, published a two-volume handbook of Greek grammar based on an inductive study of Acts. In this work he follows a system unique to modern Koine grammarians: that of

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[1] Funk, *Grammar*, II, p. 684.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 683.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 683.

Goodwin.

Statement of His Position

The outline of his position is almost identical to that of
Goodwin:

Simple Condition,
  Protasis = εἰ + indicative
  Apodosis = indicative or equivalent
Unreal Condition
  Protasis = εἰ + past indicative
  Apodosis = (ἄν) + past indicative
Present General Condition
  Protasis = ἐάν + subjunctive
  Apodosis = present indicative
More Vivid Future Condition
  Protasis = ἐάν + subjunctive/other
  Apodosis = future indicative
Less Vivid Future Condition
  Protasis = εἰ + optative
  Apodosis = ἄν + optative[1]

This classification is based upon time and reality, as was
that of Goodwin. La Sor states that:

Present conditions can be only noncommittal or general . .
Past conditions can be noncommittal or contrary to fact . . . .
Future conditions can be only probable. But the degree of probability
in the speaker's mind is variable. There is a more probable (or
"more vivid") future condition. . . and a less probable (or "less
vivid") future condition . . . .[2]

He offers some interesting comments on the various types of
conditions. For example, he says that the simple condition [obviously]

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[1] William Sanford La Sor, *Handbook of New Testament Greek*, 2
volumes (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973), II,
p.. 225.
  [2] *Ibid.*, p. 222.

may refer to past time by using a past tense in the protasis. This form is very similar to that of the unreal condition, which also uses a past (augmented) tense in the protasis. Further, he notes that the regular negative particle for the protases of past simple conditions is μή, even with the indicative tense: "Where οὐ is used, it probably negates a word in the protasis and not the entire protasis."[1] He also identifies μή as the negative particle of unreal conditions, "even though it [the verb] is indicative."[2]

Evaluation of His Position

La Sor evidences the same problem that Goodwin does in his analysis: classification more by interpretation than by form. He notes, for example, that the present general condition, which uses ἐάν and the subjunctive mood, is often "close to, if not identical with the simple condition . . . except for the use of ἐάν + sbjtv. [sic]"[3]

The more vivid future condition "is expressed by using say in the protasis, generally with the subjunctive, and a future indicative or equivalent in the apodosis."[4] La Sor then remarks that "there is considerable variation in the protasis of this type of condition: and offers these examples:

[1] La Sor, *Grammar*, II, p. 223.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 224.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 224.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 224.

With εἰ + subjtv: Lk. 9:13; I Cor. 14:5.
With εἰ or ἐάν + fut. ind.: Ac. 8:31; 2 Tim. 2:12.
With εἰ + pres. ind.: Matt. 8:31; I Cor. 10:27.[1]

Again, it would seem that interpretation more than form is the guiding principle of classification. The specific verses will be analyzed in the following sections of this study. La Sor's position will have to be carefully evaluated, for he represents a unique position among modern Koine grammarians.

<center>Summary of Koine Grammarians</center>

The twelve Koine grammarians discussed in this section may be classified into two groups: (1) those who do not follow Robertson: Moule and La Sor, and (2) those who do: all the rest. The first group pursues either their own approach, such as Moule, or follow most Classical grammarians, as La Sor does. They are a decided minority among Koine grammarians, both early and modern.

The second group follows the system presented by Robertson in Koine studies and Gildersleeve in Classical grammar. These classify conditional sentences according to the reality of the condition as expressed by the mood of the protasis. The first group basically follows the time of the condition as the principle of classification.

The relation of the condition to reality is either actual or potential. The moods utilized in the protasis indicate these relation-ships: indicative = actual, subjunctive or optative = potential. The

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[1] La Sor, *Grammar*, II, p. 224.

first group of conditions, those using the indicative mood, may be real or unreal. The speaker may assume that the condition is a real condition, or he may assume that it is not. In either case the indicative mood is used, and in both cases the reality is limited to the statement, not the situation. The second group, those conditions presented as potential, involve two degrees of potentiality. Here the grammarians struggle with terminology. Dana and Mantey are the least ambiguous with their terms "more probable" and "less probable." The degrees of probability are indicated by the subjunctive and optative moods, respectively.

CHAPTER II

THE SIMPLE CONDITION

A survey of the various grammarians and their attempts to classify conditional sentences is helpful, but not determinative. Only an inductive analysis of the New Testament examples can offer definitive evidence for one system over another. Such an inductive study is the goal of the next four chapters.

Introduction

The following steps were taken to achieve this goal: (1) All conditional sentences were identified and entered on index cards. This was accomplished by looking at every reference containing a conditional particle as listed in *Englishman's Greek Concordance*. Each card showed the protasis, apodosis and verb parsings of every condition. Supplied verbs were entered based upon context and reference to the *New American Standard Bible*.

(2) This information was then entered on punch cards for ease in mechanical sorting. The cards were then sorted into the various groups as indicated in the following chapters. This arrangement also facilitated rapid cross-checking of the various types of conditions.

(3) The information on each punch card was again verified from the Greek New Testament and the lists were prepared. There are no complete listings of all conditional sentences in the New Testament.

Robertson offers a full, albeit incomplete listing in the Appendix of his grammar,[1] and J. W. Roberts has even more extensive lists in his dissertation.[2] After the author had completed his lists, he compared them to Robertson and Roberts and made the necessary adjustments. Since Roberts' were more complete, they were usually consulted. Careful study showed that while they were extensive, they were not perfect. The results, it is hoped, will be even more extensive.

It is readily acknowledged that these lists are not perfect. Many apodosis verbs have to be supplied from the context, and honest differences of opinion exist as to what tense and mood is to be inserted. Also, in a study of this magnitude, omissions and errors are possible, although every effort has been made to keep such to a minimum. Individual questions about specific conditions, though, will not affect the general picture that emerges from the data, and this is the desired goal.

In order to avoid problems with certain incorrect implications drawn from A. T. Robertson's terminology and its inadequacies, the "neutral" terminology of Dana and Mantey will be employed. Again, their definition of a simple condition:

[1] A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1934), pp. 1416-1419.

[2] J. W. Roberts, "The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek New Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Helenistic Uses," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Texas, 1955.

This condition was used when one wished to assume or to seem to assume the reality of his premise. **Εἰ** occurs regularly in the protasis, with any tense of the indicative. There is no fixed form for the apodosis--any mood or tense may occur.[1]

Appendix I lists the occurrences of the simple condition, and verifies their observation: most moods and tenses do appear. The summary of these occurrences is:

Protasis using εἰ with the present indicative . .   221 examples

Protasis using εἰ with the aorist indicative. . .   56 examples

Protasis using εἰ with the future indicative. . .   22 examples

Protasis using εἰ with the perfect indicative . .   <u>12 examples</u>

311 examples

The Conditional Particle **Εἰ**

The discussion of the simple condition begins with a brief analysis of its components. Taking them in order of appearance, the first subject is the condition particle εἰ.

The Significance of **Εἰ**

When used by itself, εἰ may be several things, including (1) a conditional particle, (2) a type of aposiopesis (a sudden breaking off of what is stated), especially as a replacement for the Hebrew אִם and (3) an interrogative particle.[2]

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[1] H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey, *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 289.

[2] William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 219-220.

As a Conditional Particle

Εἰ regularly appears with the indicative mood to indicate the simple condition. It also occurs with the subjunctive mood in Luke 9:13; Romans 11:14; I Corinthians 9:11 (T.R.), 14:15; Philippians 3:11,12; I Thessalonians 5:10; and Revelation 11:5. Since the mood of the verb determines the type of condition, not the particle employed, these specific passages are discussed in the next chapter. **Εἰ** also appears with the optative in the less probable future conditions.

As an Interrogative Particle

Not all occurrences of εἰ mark conditional sentences, for it is used to indicate questions, especially indirect ones. Robertson notes that its use with direct questions is close to an elliptical condition and suggests Mark 15:44 and Luke 23:6 as examples.[1] This is parallel with its use in marking out direct quotes, frequently serving as quote marks in English (e.g. Matthew 12:10). Robertson further suggests that this use may be due to the fact that the Septuagint utilizes εἰ at times to translate the ה-interrogative, as here in Matthew 12:10.[2] This usage is a change from the usual Classical use of εἰ. One cannot automatically think "conditional sentence" whenever he observes this particle in the text.

[1] A. T. Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 916.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 916.

In Aposiopesis

A third important use of εἰ is in aposiopesis,

> . . . the sudden breaking off of what is being said (or written),
> so that the mind may be more impressed by what is too wonderful,
> or solemn, or awful for words: or when a thing may be, as we some-
> times say, "better imagined than described."[1]

In this construction, the protasis is stated and the writer drops the

sentence, letting the reader draw his conclusion, as in Luke 19:42.

A related use is to translate the Hebrew particle אִם. This is a

recognized Hebraism and is not a conditional sentence.

Εἰ does have a number of uses, but the most important one is

that of the conditional particle. Before pursuing its most common

use, brief mention should be made of its appearances in combination with

other particles.

<h3 style="text-align:center">The Significance of Εἰ with Other Particles</h3>

Εἰ ἀρά

There are only two New Testament examples of εἰ ἄρα: Mark 11:13

and Acts 8:22. This combination emphasizes the assumption: "When placed

after pronouns and interrogative particles, it refers to a preceding

assertion or fact, or even to something existing only in the

mind . . . ."[2] Acts 8:22 (δεήθητι τοῦ κυρίου εἰ ἄρα ἀφεθήσεταί σοι)

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[1] E. W. Bullinger, *Figures of Speech Used in the Bible* (Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1968 reprint of 1898 edition), p. 154.

[2] Joseph Henry Thayer, *Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the New
Testament*, reprint of Corrected Edition (Marshallton, Delaware: The
National Foundation for Christian Education, n.d.), p. 71.

is translated by Thayer as "If, since thy sin is so grievous, perhaps the thought etc."[1] This usage is similar to εἰ πῶς, as will be seen below.

Εἰπέρ

Six undisputed examples of εἰπέρ are found in the New Testament: Romans 8:9,17; I Corinthians 8:5, 15:15; 2 Thessalonians 1:6 and I Peter 2:3. I 2 Corinthians 5:3 B, D. E. and G support εἰπέρ. **Εἰ γέ** is the accepted reading, supported by ℵ, C, K, L and P.[2] This combination emphasizes the concept under discussion: the particle περ means "to do a thing to the limit (beyond), thoroughly."[3] Suggested translations of εἰπέρ include "if indeed, if after all, since."[4] Use of this particle combination emphasizes the veracity of the condition being discussed. Interestingly, only Paul employs this construction.

Εἰ γέ

The combination of εἰ γέ is represented by five New Testament examples: 2 Corinthians 5:3; Galatians 3:4; Ephesians 3:2, 4:21; and Colossians 1:23. This combination emphasizes the conditional nature of

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[1] Thayer, *Lexicon*, p. 71.
[2] W. Robertson Nicoll, editor, *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, 5 volumes (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), II, p. 66.
[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1154.
[4] Arndt and Gingrich, *Lexicon*, p. 219.

the thought. Commenting on εἰ γέ καὶ εἰκῆ in Galatians 3:4 Lightfoot remarks:

> Εἴ γέ leaves a loophole for doubt, and καί widens this, implying an unwillingness to believe on the part of the speaker. Hermann's distinction . . . that εἴ γέ assumes the truth of a proposition while εἴπερ leaves it doubtful, requires modifying before it is applied to the New Testament, where εἴπερ is, if anything, more directly affirmative than εἰ γέ.[1]

Arndt and Gingrich suggest "if indeed, inasmuch as" as possible translations of this combination and render Galatians 3:4 as "have you experienced so many things in vain? If it really was in vain . . . ."[2] The particle γέ performs its usual emphatic function, strengthening the word to which it is attached, and stresses the conditional nature of the concept.

Εἰ καί

The combination εἰ καί is used to introduce concessive clauses, and is usually translated "even if." Robertson represents the majority opinion when he writes that concessive clauses "are really just conditional clauses with the addition of καί."[3] Blass-Debrunner agrees with this evaluation.[4] Burton, as Robertson noted, draws a major distinction between conditional and concessive clauses:

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[1] J. B. Lightfoot, *The Epistle of St. Paul to the Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1966 reprint of 1866 edition), pp. 135-136.
[2] Arndt and Gingrich, *Lexicon*, p. 152.
[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1026.
[4] Friedrich Blass and Albert Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature,* translated and revised by Robert W. Funk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 190.

The force of a concessive sentence is thus very different from that of a conditional sentence. The latter represents the fulfillment of the apodosis as conditioned on the fulfillment of the protasis; the former represents the apodosis as fulfilled in spite of the fulfillment of the protasis.[1]

He does recognize, though, that there are times when the two clauses become almost identical:

Yet there are cases in which by the weakening of the characteristic force of each construction, or by the complexity of the elements expressed by the protasis, the two usages approach so near to each other as to make distinction between them difficult.[2]

Few Koine grammarians follow Burton in this distinction. For purposes of classification, concessive clauses were omitted from the lists of conditional sentences in the appendices. Including them would, of course, alter the total number of examples, but would not affect the general conclusions.

Εἰ πῶς

The last particle combination is εἰ πῶς. This occurs three times with the indicative mood (Romans 1:10, 11:14 and Philippians 3:11), twice with the subjunctive (Romans 11:14 and Philippians 3:11), and once with the optative mood (Acts 27:12). This combination, like εἰ ἄρα, serves to heighten the question involved. It is uniformly translated in the Authorized Version as "if by any means."

While each of these particle combinations has its special point of emphasis, it is the conditional use of εἰ that is the center of attention. The next area of discussion will be that of the negative

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[1] Ernest DeWitt Burton, *Syntax of Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 112.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

particles employed in the simple condition.

Negative Particles in Simple Conditions

The topic of negative particles in conditional sentences shows how far Koine Greek has moved from Classical Greek, for the divergence in form and style is marked.

The Classical Pattern

W. W. Goodwin will serve as the standard for presenting the classical pattern of negative particles in conditional sentences:

The negative particle of the protasis is regularly **μή,** that of the apodosis is **οὐ**.
When **οὐ** is found in a protasis, it is generally closely connected with a particular word (especially the verb), with which it forms a single negative expression; so that its negative force does not (like that of **μή**) affect the protasis *as a whole*.[1]

Though there are, of course, exceptions, Goodwin's rule states the general case for the Classical literature. The Koine situation is quite different.

The Koine Pattern

Statement.--Alexander Buttmann, an early Koine grammarian, recognized the distinction between Koine and Classical Greek on this point:

The use of **οὐ** in the protasis of a conditional sentence occurs in the N.T. relatively very often; so that we are

[1] W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (Boxton: Ginn and Company, 1893), p. 138.

justified in inferring a difference in usage, since in classical writers this use is only exceptional.[1]

A later writer, J. H. Moulton, approvingly quotes Blass's rule for the negative particles in Koine: "'All instances,' he says, 'may practially he brought under the single rule, that οὐ negatives the indicative, μή the other moods, including the infinitive and participle."[2]

Robertson agrees, noting that "The negative of the protasis in the first class condition is practically always οὐ in the N.T. We have εἰ οὐ as a rule, not εἰ μή."[3] This rule is not absolute, and he identifies five exceptions, listed in the next section. Both he and Moulton see the simple absolute rule of οὐ with the indicative and μη with the other moods as a goal "not yet reached in the N.T." but almost completely met in Modern Greek.[4]

Specific examples.--The authorities list different totals for the various combinations. Moulton finds thirty-one examples of εἰ οὐ in simple condition protases,[5] Robertson thirty-four,[6] and Roberts

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[1] Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek, translated and edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1873), pp. 344-345.

[2] J. H. Moulton, *Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I: Prolegomena*, third edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 170.

[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1101.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 1101, Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 170.

[5] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 171.

[6] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1111.

thirty-five.[1] Whatever the discrepancies, the preponderance of this form
is clear when compared to only five examples of εἰ μή: Mark 6:5,
I Corinthians 15:2, 2 Corinthians 13:5, Galatians 1:7 and I Timothy 6:3.
Of these five, only Mark 6:5 and I Timothy 6:3 have unanimous acceptance
as examples of the classical pattern.

      Godet considers I Corinthians 15:2 "a pleonasm arising from the
mixing of the two following constructions: *excepting if* (ἐκτός εἰ)
and: *if not* (εἰ μή).[2] Lenski agrees with this identification.[3]

      Lightfoot explains Galatians 1:7 so:

> **Εἰ μή** seems always to retain, at least in this stage of the
> language, its proper exceptive sense, and is not simply *oppositive,*
> though it frequently approaches nearly to ἀλλά . . . .[4]

This construction "may either state an exception to the preceding
negative clause (= *except, save*) or merely qualify it (= *but only*),
as it does in Luke iv. 26 . . . and in Gal. 1. 7 . . . ."[5] The same
basic construction is found in 2 Corinthians 13:5 – εἰ μήτι ἀδόκιμοι ἔστε.

      The ratio of five to thirty-five examples gives credence to
Buttmann's claim that the Koine shows a wide divergence from the
Classical usage in the negative particles in the simple condition. The
presence of a relatively few examples of μή show that the Classical
heritage has not been completely lost in the New Testament.

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[1] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 153.
[2] Frederick Louis Godet, *Corinthians*, II, p. 269.
[3] Lenski, *Corinthians*, p. 629.
[4] Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 77.
[5] Nicoll, *Testament*, III, p. 156.

Ἐάν with the Indicative Mood

Although, the general principle of simple conditions is that the protasis consists of εἰ with the indicative mood, there are exceptions. A few such conditions employ εαν with the indicative in an apparent contradiction to this principle: Mark 8:3; Luke 19:40; John 8:54, 21:22,23; Acts 8:31; I Thessalonians 3:8; I John 5:15 and Revelation 2:22.

Explanation of the Form

While these nine exceptions are a small percentage of the total, they are a phenomenon that needs explanation. Several explanations may be offered.

Development of the Language

First of all, Koine Greek represents a stage in the historical development of the language. As the language progressed from Classical through Koine to Modern, the distinction between εἰ and ἐάν faded, especially in respect to their respective moods. In the later Koine "the use of ἐάν with the ind. is rather more frequent . . . Finally εἰ came to be 'a mere literary alternative.'"[1] Blass-Debrunner also recognizes this consequence of linguistic development.[2] The New Testament, therefore, represents a period in which the general principle is operative, but a transition is evident. Robertson summarizes: "In general, the difference between εἰ and ἐάν is considerably lessened

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1009.
[2] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 190.

in the κοινή, though it must be remembered that ἐάν was never confined to the subj. nor εἰ to the ind. and opt."[1]

Textual Emendations

While the development of the language may be one consideration in explaining these apparent exceptions, textual emendations are another. Buttmann raises this observation and caution:

It is, indeed, not to be denied that the instances in question almost disappear amid the multitude of those that are grammatically regular, and suspicion may also be raised by the circumstances that hardly a single passage with the Indicative is completely beyond question critically. Yet when we consider that in countless passages with the Subjunctive not the smallest variation is found (which would not be the case if the Indicative were chargeable solely to the copyists), it is far more probable that, where a diversity of readings occurs in such a number of instances, this fact results from the circumstance that the copyists, commentators, etc., early altered the Indicative which gave them offence.[2]

Winer also notes the significance of textual variations in his comments on the subject.[3] Both grammarians, however, recognize the legitimate identification of ἐάν with the indicative in the New Testament in spite of the fact that most of the examples show textual variants.

How wide-spread is this textual difficulty? A review of the available evidence supports the claim of Buttmann: such constructions

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, pp. 1009-1010.
[2] Buttmann, *Grammar*, p. 222.
[3] G. B. Winer, *A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament*, seventh edition, revised by Gottfried Lunemann, translated by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 294.

are part of the original text. Robertson discusses several passages which have been challenged,[1] and Roberts lists the textual evidence for some of them and adds a few examples of his own.[2]

Thus two things seem to be born out: (1) there has been some alteration of the text in apparent attempts to bring specific passages into conformity with the general rule and (2) ἐάν was used with the indicative mood in some passages of the original text of the New Testament.[3]

<center>Significance of the Form</center>

If the use of ἐάν with the indicative is part of the original text, then what is its significance? Specific answers vary: Robertson, of course, sees no special significance. The key for him is the mood, not the particle. Therefore he sees no basic difference between the two types of protases, for each uses the indicative mood.[4] Both represent simple conditions. Burton agrees, though he speaks less dogmatically:

> In a few instances say is used with the Present Indicative in the protasis of a conditional sentence, apparently to express a simple present supposition. I Thess. 3:8, I John 5:15.[5]

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1010.
[2] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," pp. 146-149.
[3] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 168.
[4] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1007.
[5] Burton, *Syntax*, p. 103.

Blass-Debrunner offer no comment either way.[1]

Roberts approaches the subject from the historical side and discusses the use of ἐάν in conditional sentences in the Septuagint. In this section of his dissertation he relies upon the work of James Sterenberg who wrote a dissertation for the University of Munich in 1908 entitled "The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Alexandrian Version of the Pentateuch." This work was not available to the author, so Roberts' conclusions will have to be accepted at face value:

> It will be remembered that Sterenberg noted that the construction is used in the LXX (where it occurs with the perfect, present, imperfect, and the aorist indicatives) mostly in laws in the protases of which transgressions and the like are minutely defined and that it is used to render the original thought more exactly to avoid ambiguity; e.g., where the verb in the protasis is thought to precede in time the event or the immediately preceding verb, or in one verb when the event may be supposed as a possible event, requiring the indicative, but where both verbs are governed by ἐάν.[2]

This, though, is the sense of the construction in the Septuagint. New Testament examples are not, as Roberts notes, "so related to laws."[3] It would seem that the observations based upon the Septuagint do not fit the New Testament examples.

Neither do the commentators offer much help. Lenski identifies the εαν of I Thessalonians 3:8 as "looking to the future."[4] Lightfoot,

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[1] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 190.

[2] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 149.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 149.

[4] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to Philemon* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 291.

after defending the indicative in the same verse, equates doubt with the particle:

> St. Paul speaks with some hesitation here 'if so be ye stand fast.' Their faith was not complete (ver. 10). There was enough in the fact that they had been so recently converted, enough in the turn which their thoughts had recently taken, absorbed so entirely in the contemplation of the future state, to make the Apostle alarmed lest their faith should prove only impulsive and transitory.[1]

The Expositor's Greek Testament notes that the future indicative in Revelation 2:22 "expresses rather more probability than the subj. with ἐάν μή."[2]

What, then, can be said about a distinction in meaning between ἐάν with the indicative and εἰ with the indicative? Nothing, really. There are too few examples upon which to build rules, and the distinction, if any, is nebulous at best. Roberts accurately states the case: "This writer is able to discover no distinction which can be put in a rule."[3] Neither is this one.

Significance of Moods and Tenses

Since the deciding factor in identifying a simple condition is the indicative mood in the protasis and not the conditional particle, the next step in discussing the simple condition is to evaluate the significance of the various moods and tenses in the protasis and apodosis.

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[1] J. B. Lightfoot, *Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1957 reprint of 1895 edition), p. 46.

[2] Nicoll, *Testament*, V, p. 361.

[3] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 150.

Moods and Tenses in the Protasis

General Observations

The simple condition is, by definition, limited to the indicative mood, for it assumes the reality of the condition. The particle ἐάν does occur, but the key is the mood. A few examples of εἰ with the subjunctive mood are found in the New Testament, but these are identified as more probable conditions and discussed under that heading. The simple condition is limited to the indicative mood in the protasis.

This mood may be used with any tense. The specific data for New Testament tense usage is listed below:

Present tense	= 69.0%
Aorist tense	= 17.5%
Future tense	= 6.9%
Perfect tense	= 3.8%

Each of these tenses brings with it the usual verbal significance as described in the grammars. Which one is used in a given condition depends upon the action involved in the protasis.

While there is no rule governing the type of tense used in any given protasis except the desire of the author, it is clear that the present tense is used far more than all others combined.

Future Indicative

One particular combination calls for specific discussion: εἰ with the future indicative. Two things should be noted. First is its

use in Classical Greek, especially by the poets, in threatening or
warning (minatory or monitory) statements. Second is its use in
emphatic assertions or oaths.

Minatory or Monitory Use

Gildersleeve has called attention to this special use of the
simple condition. Working within the framework of a comparison between
εἰ and the future indicative and ἐάν with the subjunctive, he first
notes that the latter is by far more frequent. The distinction between
the two is seen

> . . . whenever it is important to distinguish continued from
> concentrated action, whenever it is important to distinguish over-
> lapping from priority, ἐάν with the subjunctive is preferred.

He continues,

> Now the neglect of this distinction in εἰ with the future
> indicative shows a certain coldness, a certain indifference; and
> this added to the general rigor of the logical condition, which
> faces fact in all its grimness, gives a stern, minatory, prophetic
> tone to the future indicative, which commentators and grammarians
> have noticed, but noticed only in passing . . . .[2]

Gildersleeve then proceeds to illustrate this from the tragic
poets, showing that the device is frequently employed by them in such
settings.

The New Testament, though, stands in contrast to the tragic
poets of Classical Greek, for there is only one example of this

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[1] B. L. Gildersleeve, "On εἰ with the Future Indicative and εαν
with the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," *Transactions of the American
Philological Association*, 7:1 (January, 1876), p. 9.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 9.

construction in its pages.

Of the New Testament instances of εἰ followed by a Future (about twenty in number), one, 2 Tim. 2:12, illustrates the *minatory* or *monitory* force attributed to such clauses by [Gildersleeve].[1]

The phrase under discussion, εἰ ἀρνησόμεθα, κἀκεῖνος ἀρνήσεται, is the third line of what may be four lines of an early Christian hymn.[2] The fact is stated "in all its grimness" that "If we shall deny Him, He also will deny us." Certainly this must be understood as a stern warning, for eternity seems to hang in the balance. But, it should be asked, a warning of what to whom?

Commentators are, as usual, divided on the passage. Some seem to imply loss of salvation resulting from a believer's turning against his Lord and denying Him. Hendriksen's words seem to allow for this:

When a person, because of unwillingness to suffer hardship for the sake of Christ and his cause, *disowns* the Lord ("I do not know the man!"), then, unless he repents, *he will be disowned* by the Lord in the great day of judgment ("I do not know you.").[3]

Kent understands Paul to be speaking of professed believers in general and, assuming that some may prove their true colors by denying Him, warns them of their fate.[4] Hiebert agrees with Kent, rejecting the idea that this denial refers to "a temporary weakness of faith," but

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[1] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 105.
[2] Homer A. Kent, Jr., *The Pastoral Epistles* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1958), p. 271.
[3] William Hendriksen, *1 - II Timothy and Titus* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1965), p. 259.
[4] Kent, *Pastoral Epistles*, p. 272.

as the conclusion shows, to deny Him "as a permanent fact."[1]

Certainly, though, Gildersleeve's identification of this construction as one presenting grim fact in a coldly logical way aptly describes Paul's words.

Emphatic Assertions

The second and more common use of εἰ with the future indicative is in emphatic assertions or oaths. This is especially true in quotes from the Old Testament where εἰ translates the Hebrew particle אִם. The four examples of this are Mark 8:12, Hebrews 3:11, 4:3 and 4:5. Mark 8:12, εἰ δοθήσεται τῇ γενεᾷ ταύτῃ σημεῖον, is not an "official" oath like the examples in Hebrews, but it fits the same pattern: "No sign shall be given to this generation." As already indicated, Robertson identifies this as an elliptical condition lacking the apodosis. Further, he says that this is "really aposiopesis in imitation of the Hebrew use of *im*."[2] Other grammarians recognize this construction, including Winer,[3] Buttmann,[4] and Blass-Debrunner.[5]

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[1] D. Edmund Hiebert, *Second Timothy* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1958), pp. 63-64.
[2] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, IV, p. 331.
[3] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 500.
[4] Buttmann, *Grammar*, pp. 358-359.
[5] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 189.

The references in Hebrews (3:11, 4:3 and 4:5) are all quotations from the Septuagint version of Psalm 95:11 – εἰ εἰσελεύσονται εἰς τὴν κατάπαυσίν μου. The Hebrew version introduces this with the particle אִם, whose use in oaths is a normal structure of the language.[1] The Septuagint regularly uses εἰ in these situations. The Authorized Version correctly renders 3:11 as "They shall not enter into my rest," while 4:3 and 4:5 are translated, "If they shall enter into my rest." Modern versions correctly translate all of them the same way: a statement of warning, "They shall not enter into my rest."

Thus εἰ with the indicative is used in sentences of emphatic negation, though few of them are found in the New Testament. The conditional particle is a straight-forward translation of the Hebrew and is a proper Hebraism.

Moods and Tenses in the Apodosis

There is no specific relationship between the moods and tenses of the protasis and the apodosis in simple conditions. Robertson summarizes this point well when he states:

> The apodosis varies very greatly. It all depends upon what one is after, whether mere statement, prediction, command, prohibition, suggestion, question. Hence the apodosis may be in the indicative (any tense) or the subjunctive or the imperative. There is no necessary correspondence in tense between protasis and apodosis. The variation in the mode of the apodosis has no essential bearing on the force of the condition.[2]

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[1] E. Kautzsch, ed., *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar*, revised by A. E. Cowley (London: Oxford University Press, 1910), pp. 471-472.

[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1008.

While there is no essential correspondence between the protasis and the apodosis, there is a preference for the indicative mood in the apodosis. The tables in Appendix I yield the following data:

Apodoses with indicative mood   = 205 or 67.3% of the total.

Apodoses with imperative mood   = 84 or 28.4% of the total.

Apodoses with subjunctive mood = 7 or 2.4% of the total.

Again, no rule may be fixed, but the distribution is most reasonable. Protases which speak in real terms would normally imply apodoses which also speak in real terms. But language is flexible, and all moods are possible and do occur.

Meaning of the Simple Condition

Now that the details of amount and construction have been considered, the way is cleared for a consideration of the basic meaning of the simple condition. This will cover two areas: (1) particular and general conditions, and (2) the degree of reality implied by the protasis.

Particular and General Conditions

The terminology if not the concept of particular and general conditions has entered Koine studies through the work of Goodwin, hence his definitions will be the starting point.

The Position of Goodwin

Goodwin defines particular and general thusly:

A particular supposition refers to a definite act or to several definite acts, supposed to occur at some definite time (or times) . . . .

A general supposition refers indefinitely to any act or acts
of a given class which may be supposed to occur or to have occurred
at any time . . .[1]

This particular distinction is seen "in all classes of conditions,"

but in some of them it may be distinguished by construction:

When the apodosis has a verb of present time expressing a
customary or repeated action, the protasis may refer (in a general
way) to any act or acts of a given class which may be supposed to
occur at any time within the period represented in English as
present.
When the apodosis has a verb of past time expressing a customary
or repeated action, the protasis may refer (in a general way) to any
act or acts of a given class which may be supposed to have occurred
at any time in the past.[2]

The key point in the construction of the conditional sentence

is the tense of the apodosis, not the protasis. Goodwin is simply

attributing to the present and imperfect tenses their continual or

repetitive significance.

The Evaluation of Goodwin

As mentioned earlier, Funk has also noted that "The present

tense in the apodosis often gives the condition a generalizing force

(indicated by *ever* in the translation)."[3] Funk, though, simply notes it

as an observation without making it a rule of classification. In this

he follows Gildersleeve, who notes that all classes of conditional

sentences may be either general or particular, "according to the

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[1] W. W. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 141.
[2] *Ibid*., pp. 141-142.
[3] Robert W. Funk, *A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of Hellenistic Greek*, 3 volumes (Missoula, Montana: The Society of Biblical Literature, 1973), II, p. 683.

character of the apodosis."[1]

Robertson rejects Goodwin's use of this concept as a means of classification:

> This theory calls for "particular" and "general" suppositions as a fundamental element. This is a false step in itself. As Gildersleeve shows, each of the four classes of conditions may be particular or general. That point has no bearing on the quality of the condition.[2]

Does this agree with the facts of the case? Can simple conditional sentences be particular or general, depending upon the context as Gildersleeve and Robertson maintain? The answer, of course, is Yes. A few examples will suffice.

Romans 4:14 uses two perfect tenses in the apodosis of its condition and speaks of one past historical event: the giving of the law – εἰ γὰρ οἱ ἐκ νόμου κληρονόμοι, κεκένωται ἡ πίστις.- "for if those who are of law are heirs, then faith has no value." This fits the pattern of Goodwin as a particular condition.

I Corinthians 15:2, however, uses a present tense in the apodosis and speaks of the specific situation of the Corinthian believers and their relationship to the gospel – δι' οὗ καὶ σώζεσθε, τίνι λόγω εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμίν εἰ κατέχετε - "By this (gospel) you are saved, if you hold fast to the word I preached to you." This does not agree with Goodwin, for the present tense (σώζεσθε) should make this condition a general one.

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[1] B. L. Gildersleeve, "Studies in Pindaric Syntax," *The American Journal Philology*, 3:4 (December, 1882), p. 435.

[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, pp. 1005-1006.

Matthew 12:26 – καὶ εἰ ὁ στανᾶς τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει, ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτόν ἐμερίσθη - "And if Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself" - may be taken as a general condition, referring to any time Satan works against himself. Yet the apodosis uses the aorist ἐμερισθη, contrary to what Goodwin would predict.

Thus the simple condition may be either particular or general with no special significance attached to the tense of the apodosis. Funk's point should not be overlooked, though, for the concepts of particular and general are a legitimate part of interpretation and translation.

<div align="center">Degree of Reality</div>

One of the most important questions about simple conditions is: What do they imply about the condition they state? The indicative mood communicates objective reality, but how is that communicated and wherein does the reality lie?

Review of the Grammarians

The various grammarians approach this question in various ways, but most have arrived at a similar position.

Classical Grammarians

Goodwin stated his opinion that simple conditions are those which imply nothing as to the fulfillment [reality] of the condition . .,"[1] He rejects the idea that language should even have a form which implied

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[1] Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 139.

the objective reality of a condition: "The Greek has no form implying that a condition *is* or *was fulfilled*, and it is hardly conceivable that any language should find such a form necessary or useful."[1]

Gildersleeve agrees with Goodwin:

The Logical Condition [simple condition] states the elements in question. It is used of that which can be brought to the standard of fact; but that standard may be for or against the truth of the postulate. All that the logical condition asserts is the inexorable connection of the two members of the sentence.[2]

His point is that the factuality of the postulate is limited to its statement, for it is presented as something that can be considered as fact but not necessarily is fact. The Classical grammarians are in agreement on this point.

Koine Grammarians

Early Koine grammarians followed this approach. Green states, "The conditional particle εἰ, *if* with the Indicative in the protasis, assumes the hypothesis as a fact."[3] Winer reflects Gildersleeve's view by identifying the simple condition as the "Pure Condition."[4] Even Turner, a more recent scholar, uses the general language of "simple assumption."[5]

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[1] Goodwin, *Mood's and Tenses*, p. 140.
[2] Gildersleeve, "Pinder," p. 435.
[3] Samuel G. Green, *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament* (London: The Religious Tract Society, [1886]), p. 317.
[4] Winer, *Grammar*, p . 291.
[5] Turner, *Syntax*, p. 319.

More recent grammarians continue this same general approach. Blass-Debrunner states, somewhat confusingly, "Εἰ with the indicative of all tenses denotes a simple conditional assumption with emphasis on the reality of the assumption (not of what is being assumed): the condition is considered 'a real case.'"[1] The confusion results from the distinction between the assumption and "what is being assumed." The assumption corresponds to the statement, "What is being assumed" corresponds to the situation. In Matthew 12:27, Jesus offers the statement with an assumption that it is a real case. He assumes it to be true. He is not, however, stating the situation as true. The distinction Blass-Debrunner draws is between these two: the statement and the situation.

Dana and Mantey are clearer when they identify the simple condition as the one that "was used when one wished to assume or to seem to assume the reality of his premise."[2] Funk expands this description:

> In a first class condition the protasis is a simple conditional assumption with emphasis on the reality of the assumption (but not on the reality of what is being assumed) [reality of statement, but not the situation]. It is therefore taken to be a real case though it may, in fact, be an unreal case [as in Matthew 12:27].

Robertson's position is basic to this discussion, since he is most often quoted in support of one position or another. To show the development of his thought two statements will be given, one from the

[1] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 188.
[2] Dana and. Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 289.
[3] Funk, *Grammar*, II, p. 680.

first and one from the tenth edition of his *Short Grammar*:

> The indicative *states* the condition as a fact. It may or may not
> be true in fact. The *condition* has nothing to do with that, but
> only with the *statement*. . . . This condition does *assume* the
> reality of the condition.[1]

Then, from the tenth edition:

> This condition *assumes* the reality of the condition. The indicative
> mode *states* it as a fact. The *condition* has nothing whatever to do
> with the actual fact or truth. It is just here that some of the
> grammars have erred in failure to distinguish clearly between the
> *statement* and the *reality*. It is the condition taken at its face
> value without any insinuations or implications. The context, of
> course, must determine the actual situation. The indicative mode
> determines only the statement.[2]

It is evident in the latter statement that he is trying to avoid
the impression that he considers the simple condition one that affirms
the reality (or actuality) of the situation as an objective fact. It
does affirm the reality of the speaker's assumption or statement, *i.e.*,
the speaker really assumes (though he may believe otherwise) that the
condition (statement) is true. The statements in his *Historical
Grammar*, offered in response to Goodwin, are not as clear:

> This condition *pointedly* implies the fulfilment of the condition.
> It is the condition of actuality, reality, *Wirklichkeit*, and not
> mere "possibility" as Farrar has it . . . *a la* Goodwin. This is
> the *crux* of the whole matter. Once see [*sic*] that the first class
> condition with the ind. implies the reality of the premise, all
> else follows naturally.[3]

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[1] A. T. Robertson, *A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament*
(New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1908), p. 161.
[2] A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis, *A New Short Grammar of
the Greek Testament* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 350.
[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1006.

It seems, then, that the grammars present a unified view concerning the degree of reality in the simple condition: It presents the statement of the condition as true, but without affirming anything about the reality of the actual situation.

Review of the Problem

The unanimous opinion of the grammarians is not reflected by some writers and speakers who claim that the simple condition guarantees the reality of the situation. They suggest the translation "since," rather than "if." In English this presents the situation as true, both in the speaker's statement and in objective fact. An extreme, but by no means isolated example of this has already been given: "The first class condition implies truth or reality. If . . . *and it is true*."[1] Sometimes Kenneth Wuest is implicated in this view on the strength of translation such as Romans 6:5 -

> The Word "if" in the Greek is not the conditional particle of an unfulfilled condition. It is a fulfilled condition here, its meaning being, "in view of the fact."[2]

He did not adopt this as a uniform principle of translation, though, and limited such renderings to places where the context justified them. This, of course, is at the heart of the situation. There are several passages where the reality of the statement is in keeping with the reality of the situation. But many times it is not, e.g. Matthew 12:27.

[1] Jerome Moore, "Four Ways to 'Say 'If,'" *The Baptist Bulletin*, 45:1 (June, 1979), p. 11.
[2] Kenneth S. Wuest, *Treasures From the Greek New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957), p. 89.

One cannot generalize from a context where this is true to all uses of the simple condition.

Objections to this view.--Several objections may be raised to this position. First, a little mature reflection will cause one to be cautious about agreeing with Moore and others. In his example he claims, on the basis of a simple condition in Colossians 1:23, that there is no need to doubt the security of anyone's salvation. This is not supported from Scripture, for certainly the false teachers of Acts 20:30 looked and acted like believers before their true colors were flown. Those in I John 2:19 must have looked like believers before they went out and demonstrated that they were not. Would Paul have been so quick to affirm the absolute salvation of all those in the church where he had not visited (Colossians 1:4, 9)? Probably not.

Second, and more significant, the pattern of translating εἰ by "since" does not hold in all cases. James Boyer shows that Wuest changes his translation between John 10:35 ("since") and 10:37, 38 ("assuming that"), as required by context.[1] John Battle has listed all simple conditions which, in his opinion, present data in the protasis that are contrary to fact and known to be so by the speaker.[2] It is impossible to use "since" in such verses as I Corinthians 15:13 and

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[1] James L. Boyer, "Semantics in Biblical Interpretation," *Grace Journal,* 3:2 (Spring, 1962), p. 33.

[2] John A. Battle, Jr., "The Present Indicative in New Testament Exegesis," unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace Theological Seminary, 1975, pp. 166-168.

still maintain orthodoxy. Battle's list is impressive, and all one has
to do is insert "since" in place of "if" in the verses to realize the
error of this concept. J. Harold Greenlee shows the variety of
situations one encounters in the simple condition:

> Moreover, 2) the speaker may believe that the condition is true:
> "if they have persecuted me (and they have done so) [John 15:20a];
> or 3) he may believe that the condition is not true: "if they have
> kept my word" (but they have not done so) [John 15:20b]; or 4) he
> may be uncertain as to whether it is true: "sir, if you have
> carried him away" (she does not know whether he had or not) [John
> 20:15]; or 5) the speaker may even be mistaken in his assumption:
> "if he is sleeping" (but he was in fact dead) [John 11:12].[1]

Justification for the translation of εἰ by "since," must come
from the context, not the condition. This is an interpretation,
not a translation.

The correct view.--The simple condition, through the indicative
mood, offers a conditional statement presented as real. It makes no
attempt to speak to the actual situation. If the exegete will maintain
this distinction between statement and situation, then he will not err
in handling this condition. A good summary of this point of view is
found in *The Bible Translator*:

> When εἰ with the indicative is used, it implies that the truth or
> otherwise of the condition is regarded as in principle "determined,"
> i.e. is represented as a fact (although the speaker does not commit
> himself as to whether he believes the condition is true or not.[2]

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[1] J. Harold Greenlee, "'If' in the New Testament," *The Bible
Translation*, 13:1 (January, 1962), p. 40.
  2 John Kinje, Jr., "Greek Conditional Sentences," *The Bible
Translator*, 13:4 (October, 1962), p. 223.

Translation of the Simple Condition

How, then, should the simple condition be translated? The uniform rule of all grammarians surveyed is to use the English conditional construction, "if." All major English versions so translate this condition. Should one want to paraphrase the concept, then the phrase, "If, as I am assuming . . ." might be employed. The statement of the simple condition may be in accord with the reality of the situation, it may be contrary to it, or it may be unknown. All that can be said is that the speaker is presenting the condition as true in his statement.

CHAPTER III

THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION

<u>Introduction</u>

The Concept

The simple condition states the matter directly by assuming it
to be true. This, as has been discussed, is an assumption of reality.
But the assumption can also work the opposite way. The speaker can
present the situation and assume it to be false or contrary to fact.
Such a condition is termed the Contrary to Fact condition and is the
subject of this chapter.

The Construction

These conditions follow a standardized construction: εἰ with
a past (augmented) tense in the indicative mood in the protasis, and
another past (augmented) verb in the apodosis, usually with ἄν. This is
as would be expected, for both the simple condition and the contrary to
fact condition are making definite statements; the former assumes them
to be true, the latter false. Robert W. Funk describes them so:

> The assumption is taken to be untrue in the protasis of a second
> class condition [contrary to fact]; it is considered an unreal case
> (whether it is, in fact, is another matter). The conclusion
> follows from the premise.
> The protasis consists of εἰ plus a past (augmented) tense of
> the indicative; the apodosis also has a past tense of the indicative,
> usually with ἄν.[1]

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[1] Robert W. Funk, *A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of Hellenistic
Greek*, 3 vols. (Missoula, Montana: The Society of Biblical Literature,
1973), II, p. 681.

In this format the use of the imperfect tense in both clauses refers to present or past time, and that of the aorist to past time only. This basic scheme is the same as that of Robertson,[1] Winer,[2] and Goodwin.[3] Blass-Debrunner recognizes these general principles, but does not relate the condition to time: "The tense (imperfect, aorist, pluperfect . . .) retains its *Aktionsart*; the imperfect is temporally ambiguous."[4]

List of Contrary to Fact Conditions

Appendix II gives a Listing of the contrary to fact conditions in the New Testament. There are some apparent exceptions. Buttmann lists four which he feels should be classed as contrary to fact conditions even though they use present tenses: John 8:39, 14:28; Luke 17:6 and Hebrews 11:15. He calls them exceptions to the rule.[5]

John 8:39.—εἰ τέκνα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ἐστε, τὰ ἔργα τοῦ Ἀβθαάμ ποιεῖτε (if you were Abraham's children, then you would do the works

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[1] A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 1013.

[2] G. B. Winer, *A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament*, 7th edition, revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated by J. H. Thayer (Andover, Massachusetts: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 291.

[3] W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of Moods and Tenses* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1893), p. 147.

[4] Friedrich Blass and Albert Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, translated and revised by Robert W. Funk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 182.

[5] Alexander Buttmann, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, translated and edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1873), pp. 224-225.

of Abraham). Buttmann observes that

> Most of the interpreters and editors, indeed, have taken offence
> at this reading [ἔστε in John 8:39], and have adopted into the
> text instead the very weakly-attested ἦτε (and thus restored the
> construction to the ordinary form), explaining to themselves the
> origin of εστε in various ways . . . .[1]

Εστε is supported by ℵ, B, D, and L. Ἐποιεῖτε is supported by

B, D, E, F, and G.[2] Westcott and Hort have present tenses in

both the protasis and apodosis,[3] and the United Bible Societies' text

has the imperfect in the apodosis.[4] The question, then, is not

ἔστε versus ἦτε, but ἐποιεῖτε instead of ποιεῖτε.

There seems to be little or no support for Buttmann's claim

that this represents a contrary to fact condition, for the present

tense in the protasis affirms Christ's assumption that His listeners

were Abraham's children . The imperfect indicates that He expresses

doubt as to their ability to prove it. This is the view of Godet.[5]

Such an interperetation makes this a mixed condition. The protasis

is that of a simple condition, and the apodosis that of a contrary to

fact condition.

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[1] Buttmann, *Grammar*., p. 225.
[2] W. Robertson Nicoll, ed., *The Expoisiton'is Greek Testament*
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), I, p. 778.
[3] Brooke Foss Westcott and Fenton John Anthony Hort, *The New
Testament in the Original Greek* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941),
p. 208.
[4] Kurt Aland, et. at., eds., The Greek New Testament (London:
United Bible Societies, 1966), p. 359.
[5] Frederick Louis Godet, *Commentary on the Gospel of John,* 2 vols.
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, n.d., reprint of 1893 edition),
II, p. 112.

John 14:28.—εἰ ἠγαπᾶτε με, ἐχάρητε ἄν (if you loved me, you would have rejoiced). Although Buttmann claims that there is manuscript evidence for a present tense in this condition, neither he nor anyone else gives the data for it.

Luke 17:6.—εἰ ἔχετε πίστιν ὡς κόκον σινάπεως, ἐλέγετε ἄν (if you had faith as small as a mustard seed, you could say). Here the present ἔχετε is supported by ℵ, A, B, L, X and others, while the imperfect εἴχετε shows up in D and the rest of the Byzantine manuscript tradition.[1] This, like John 8:39, is in reality a mixed condition.[2]

Hebrews 11:15.—καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐκείνης ἐμνημόνευον ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἐξέβησαν εἶχον ἄν καιρὸν ἀνακάμψαι (if they had been remembering the country they had left, they would have had opportunity to return). The only significant problem is the presence of μνημονεῦουσιν in the apodosis instead of ἐμνημόνευον. The evidence for this present tense is so slight, though, that it is only mentioned in a footnote in *Lange's Commentary*.[3] Thus this is taken as a regular contrary to fact condition. Buttmann's apparent exceptions, then, are either non-existent or are to be considered mixed conditions.

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[1] Nicoll, *Testament*, I, p. 592.
[2] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1964), p. 867.
[3] John Peter Lange, editor, *Commentary on the Holy Scriptures*, 24 volumes reprinted in 12 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1960), XI, p. 187.

<u>Significance of the Tense</u>

The mood employed in the contrary to fact conditions is the indicative. The only variety comes in the tenses used, and these are limited to the augmented ones: imperfect, aorist and pluperfect.

The Imperfect Tense

The basic significance of the imperfect tense is to designate durative or repeated action in past time.[1] This tense may appear in both parts of the conditional sentence, or in either part in combination with the other augmented tenses.

<u>Imperfect in Protasis and Apodosis</u>

When the imperfect is used in both the protasis and apodosis, it implies that the condition and conclusion both involve durative acts. The time of the actions, though, is present, rather than past. Robertson states this as a general rule of these conditions: "An unfulfilled condition about the present time was expressed in terms of the imperfect ind."[2] Burton rejects this as an absolute rule, claiming that the time involved must be determined from the context: "The Imperfect denotes continued action; the Aorist a simple fact; the Pluperfect completed action. The time is implied in the context, not expressed by the verb."[3] This

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[1] H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey, *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 186.

[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1013.

[3] Ernest DeWitt Burton, *Syntax Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 103.

is the more applicable view, for even Robertson notes that in Hebrews 11:15 the imperfect is used of continual action, but in past, not present time.[1] The equation of present time with the imperfect tense, while not an absolute rule, does fit most of the examples in Appendix II. Westcott summarizes:

> In this case the hypothetic unfulfilled [contrary to fact] condition and the consequence of its non-fulfillment are both regarded (a) generally as present or (b), if not as present, as continuous and not definitely complete in a specific incident.[2]

This combination is the most frequent (17 examples) type of contrary to fact conditions, and a glance at those listed will confirm Westcott's generalization. The actions viewed are considered continual acts, and in the present time in most cases. The list of examples could be expanded at the expense of the pluperfect, for this tense can be treated as a real imperfect. Both Westcott[3] and Robertson[4] recognize this. The examples in Appendix II conform to verb structure, not usage, so such conditions are listed as pluperfects.

Imperfect in the Protasis Only

Since the aorist tense is more frequent in the apodosis than the pluperfect (22 examples as opposed to 9), the examples considered will

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[1] A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis, *A New Short Grammar of the Greek Testament* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 352.
[2] Brooke Foss Westcott, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1889), p. 112.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[4] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1015.

be the imperfect-aorist combination. Again, Westcott: "The hypothetic unfulfilled [contrary to fact] condition is regarded as continuous and not definitely complete in the past, while the consequence of its non-fulfillment is specific and past."[1] The imperfect in the protasis emphasizes continual or durative action while the aorist in the apodosis indicates a specific action.

The New Testament has four examples of this imperfect-aorist combination, all of them in John's Gospel: 11:21, 11:32, 14:28 and 18:30. In 11:21 (εἰ ἦν ὧδε οὐκ ἄν ἀπέθανεν ὁ ἀδελφός μου) Martha's sorrowful statement illustrates these two ideas. The presence of Jesus, considered in a durative way, would have prevented the specific act of Lazarus' death. In 14:28 (εἰ ἠγαπᾶτέ με ἐχάρητε ἄν) the imperfect protasis implies failure on the part of the disciples to be loving Jesus as they ought to at that time ("If you loved me"). The aorist in the apodosis points to the expected but lacking joy at His statement of return to the Father. Robertson explains this in some detail.[2] 18:30 (εἰ μὴ ἦν οὗτος κακὸν ποιῶν, οὐκ ἄν σοι παρεδώκαμεν αὐτόν) follows the same pattern, for the imperfect ἦν in the protasis refers to the continual character of Jesus as perceived by His accusers, and the aorist παρεδώκαμεν refers to the specific, and historically past act of delivering Him to Pilate.

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[1] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 117.
[2] A. T. Robertson, *Word Pictures in the New Testament*, 6 vols. (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1930), VI, p. 256.

<u>Imperfect in the Apodosis Only</u>

The combination of aorist in the protasis and imperfect in the apodosis is one where "The hypothetic unfulfilled [contrary to fact] condition is placed as a definite incident in the past, while the result of the non-fulfillment is regarded as continuous in the present."[1] Westcott translates Hebrews 4:8 (εἰ κατέπαυσεν . . . οὐκ ἄν ἐλάλει) as "if rest had been given at the entrance into Canaan, God would not have continued to speak as He does now."[2] John 15:22—εἰ μὴ ἦλθον καὶ ἐλέλησα αὐτοῖς, ἀμαθίαν οὐκ εἴχοσαν--("if I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have had sin") combines an aorist in the protasis with an imperfect apodosis, placing the protasis in the past and the apodosis in the present, as Lenski explains.[3]

<div align="center">The Aorist Tense</div>

The basic significance of the aorist tense is to denote "an action simply as an event, without in any sense defining the manner of its occurrence."[4] Robertson terms this the basic tense of the language and says "A statement in the indicative would naturally be in the aorist unless there is reason to put it in some other tense, and so of the other modes."[5]

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[1] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 113.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 113.
[3] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. John's Gospel* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 1060.
[4] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 194.
[5] Robertson and Davis, *Shorter Grammar*, p. 137.

Aorist in the Protasis and Apodosis

The general concept of the aorist tense continues in the contrary to fact conditions. When used in both the protasis and apodosis it speaks of "a past and completed result which would have ensued if the unfulfilled condition had been realized."[1] Westcott further emphasizes the past time concept by describing the aorist-aorist form of this condition as one where "The hypothetic unfulfilled [contrary to fact] condition and the result of the non-fulfillment are regarded as definite incidents wholly within the past."[2] In Classical Greek conditions the aorist could refer to events in present time, but this has not carried over into the Koine.[3]

The New Testament contains nine examples of this construction. There are two sets of parallel passages (Matthew 24:22 - Mark 13:20 and Matthew 11:21 - Luke 10:13). Romans 9:29 is a quote from the Septuagint. Westcott illustrates his position by translating I Corinthians 2:8 (εἰ ἔγνωσαν . . . οὐκ ἄν ἐσταύρωσαν) as "if at the crisis of their trial they had known . . . they would not have crucified."[4] The phrase "crisis of their trial" is reading too much into the aorist, for

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[1] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 111.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[3] Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 151
[4] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 113.

it simply denotes an event without specifying anything about the action, especially durative or punctiliar characteristics. But the actions are both restricted to past time by this tense in the protasis and apodosis of this condition.

Of the examples listed in Appendix II, all are referring to past events with the possible exception of Matthew 24:22. But here the aorist indicative is used with its normal force, for the point of view is that prophetic judgments are past. This is in keeping with "the genius of prophecy."[1]

Aorist in Either the Protasis or the Apodosis

The specific references and discussion given above regarding the aorist-imperfect combinations may be repeated here. Each of these examples follows the general rule already stated: The aorist, whether in the protasis or apodosis, considers the event simply as an act in past time without indicating anything about how that act was carried out. This contrasts with the imperfect which states continual action in the present time (usually).

The Pluperfect Tense

Robertson calls the pluperfect or past perfect a "luxury in Greek," noting that its use in the New Testament is "current, but not common."[2] As a tense it emphasizes a blend of aorist and imperfect

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[1] Nicoll, *Testament*, I, p. 293.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 903.

concepts:

> As the present perfect is a blending in idea of the aoristic (punctiliar) and the durative present (a sort of durative aoristic present combined), so the past perfect is a blend of the aorist and the imperfect in idea. It is continuance of the completed state in past time up to a prescribed limit in the past.[1]

Though the usual form of the contrary to fact condition utilizes the aorist, the pluperfect sometimes appears. Eight examples of this tense in either the protasis or apodosis or both are given in Appendix II. Again, these examples are listed by form, not use.

I John 2:19 may serve to illustrate the distinction between the aorist and the pluperfect (εἰ ἦσαν . . . μεμενήκεισαν ἄν), "if they were . . . they would have remained." Westcott identifies this verse as one "where the pluperfect suggests a continuous state limited at a point in the past."[2] This certainly fits the context of this verse. Since the important detail involves the time element, and the pluperfect as well as the aorist both indicate actions in the past, no further discussion of the pluperfect will be given.

The Use of ἄν in Contrary to Fact Conditions

One of the key characteristics of the contrary to fact condition is its use of ἄν in the apodosis. This particle usually appears, but there are a significant number of exceptions. Robertson, in fact,

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 903.
[2] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 112.

rejects ἄν as an essential part of any conditional sentence.[1] What, then, is the situation of this particle?

The Classical Usage

Since Buttmann notes that the "N.T. writers have in the main adhered strictly to the grammatical model" for this condition, it seems reasonable to begin with that usage.[2] Goodwin states the form: " . . . the past tenses of the indicative are used in both protasis and apodosis, and the apodosis contains the adverb ἄν.[3] Only certain, specific exceptions are permitted:

> A peculiar form of potential indicative without ἄν consists of an infinitive depending on the imperfect of a verb of propriety, or possibility, like ἔδει, χρνή or ἐχρήν, εἰκὸς ἦν, or προσηκέν.[4]

All other forms of this condition use ἄν in the apodosis.

The Koine Usage

As with other points of grammar and syntax, the Koine has moved from the Classical usage in the case of ἄν. Although the sampling represented in the New Testament is small compared to all of Koine literature, most of which has been lost, enough representation is given to offer some detailed observations.

[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1007.
[2] Buttmann, *Grammar*, p. 224.
[3] Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 147.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 151-152.

<u>Verses Omitting ἄν</u>

Where does ἄν occur and where does it not? Moulton states that there are forty-two occurrences of ἄν with imperfect, aorist and pluperfect indicatives in the apodoses of contrary to fact conditions.[1] Since he only states the number and gives no specific references, cross-checking is impossible. Of the forty-nine contrary to fact conditions listed in Appendix II, only ten do not have ἄν in the apodosis: Matthew 26:24; Mark 14:21; John 9:33, 15:22, 15:24, 18:36, 19:11; Acts 26:32; Romans 7:7 and Revelation 20:15. This is not an impressively long list, but sufficient to show that such absence is more than an accidental phenomenon. Roberts adds to the list by listing the following verses which omit ἄν in some manuscripts: John 8:19, 9:41; Acts 18:14; Hebrews 4:8 and 11:15.[2] Unfortunately, he does not give any indication of the manuscript evidence, and this author was unable to identify the variants.

<u>Grammatical Observations</u>

The grammars recognize that Koine Greek exhibits the absence of ἄν far more frequently than does Classical Greek. Burton simply notes this fact in passing,[3] while Buttmann states:

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[1] J. H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I: Prolegomena*, third edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 166.
[2] J. W. Roberts, "The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek New Testament as compared with Homeric, Classical and Helenistic Uses," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas, 1955, p. 184.
[3] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 104.

. . . such an omission is allowable only in fixed cases, which are observed also in the N.T., and may be reduced to the four classes that follow.

That is to say, the omission of αν occurs:
a) When ἄν has already been expressed previously in the same connection with another predicate. This instance, which often occurs in the classics and is founded in the nature of the case, is accidentally not to be met with in the text of the N.T.; but it occurs once only as a various reading of cod. A in Luke xvii. 6.
b) When the predicate (or the copula) to which it belongs is also dropped, as I Cor. xii. 19 . . . .
c) Where the apodosis contains such a predicative term as ἔδει, καλόν ἦν, ἠδύνατο etc
d) Lastly, ἄν is dropped for rhetorical reasons: where, though the fact itself is impossible or improbable, the orator in the vivacity of his thought desires to represent it as actually having occurred, or at least, as almost taken place.[1]

Blass-Debrunner notes that "the addition of ἄν to the apodosis is no longer obligatory."[2] Robertson summarizes the discussion:

Sometimes, again, ἄν was not employed because the context made it plain that it is the second-class condition, as in Jo. 15:22 . .   . So also as to verse 24. In the same way the absence of ἄν with οὐκ εἶχες in Jo. 19:11 still leaves it clear by the following clause that we have a second class condition. So again verbs of fitness or propriety like καλόν ἦν (Matt. 26:24) and οὐ καθήκεν (Acts 26:32), and obligation like ἔδει (Matt. 23:23).[3]

Where does this leave the question? First of all, the omission of ἄν is admitted by all grammarians. The particle is not essential for the formation of the contrary to fact condition. Second, there are suggested rules regarding its absence. Buttmann lists four, Robertson two. Do the observed examples fit these rules? Matthew 26:24, Mark

[1] Buttmann, *Grammar*, pp. 225-226.
[2] Blass-Dehrunner, *Grammar*, p. 182.
[3] Robertson, *Shorter Grammar*, p. 352.

14:21, John 9:33 and Acts 26:32 agree with the rules of both Buttmann and Robertson. John 15:22 and 24 surrender to Robertson's rule that context makes clear what condition is intended. This leaves John 19:11, Romans 7:7 and Revelation 20:15. Buttmann explains Romans 7:7 as an omission for rhetorical reasons, but does not explain the other two.[1]

Rather than pursue an explanatory rule for all cases, it seems more reasonable to admit that there is no universal principle accounting for the omission of ἄν. Though stated in another context, Robertson's observation that "There is no principle involved in ἄν, simply custom" may well describe the situation in the New Testament.[2]

The Significance of ἄν

Since most of the contrary to fact conditions use ἄν in the apodosis, it is necessary to consider the significance of this particle. Moulton puts it this way:

> The addition of ἄν to an indicative apodosis produced much the same effect as we can express in writing by italicising "if":
> *if* he had anything, he gave it. Or "if he had anything, in that case (ἄν) he gave it," alike suggest by their emphasis that the condition was not realized.[3]

Robertson finds the New Testament in agreement with this observation.[4] Ἄν, then, strengthens the "if" aspect of the apodosis,

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[1] Buttmann, *Grammar*, p. 226.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1007.
[3] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 200.
[4] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1014.

and would naturally be superfluous when the apodosis verb contained that significance within itself. This, then, is the basis for the grammarians identifying certain types of verbs as ones which are used without ἄν.

The Meaning of the Contrary to Fact Condition

General Observations

The contrary to fact condition has been given many different titles as grammarians have tried to encapsulate its significance: "Condition Determined as Unfulfilled,"[1] "Condition with Supposition Contrary to Fact,"[2] "Condition Contrary to the Fact,"[3] and "Second Class Condition."[4] Dana and Mantey give the basic meaning of this condition as

The premise is assumed to be contrary to fact in this class, and only the past tenses of the indicative are used. As suggested above, this condition states a thing as if it were untrue or unreal, although in actual fact it may be true, as the first example below [Matthew 26:24] shows.[5]

Goodwin presents his view:

When the protasis states a present or past supposition, implying that the condition *is not* or *was not* fulfilled, and the apodosis expresses what *would be* (or *would have been*) the result if that condition were (or had been) fulfilled, the past tenses of the indicative are used in both protasis and apodosis, and the apodosis contains the adverb ἄν.[6]

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[1] Robertson, *Shorter Grammar*, p. 162.
[2] Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 147.
[3] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 291.
[4] Robertson, *Shorter Grammar*, p. 351
[5] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 289.
[6] Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 147.

Robertson elaborates:

> The premise is assumed to be contrary to fact. The thing in itself may be true, but it is *treated* as untrue. Here again the condition has only to do with the *statement*, not with the actual fact . . . . Surely the ind. is the mode for positive and negative statements, for directness of statement and clarity of expression. But one must emphasize the words "statement" and "expression." The ind. does not go behind the face value of the record.[1]

The actual facts of the case, whether the supposition is true or not, "is a more difficult matter. This idea has to be conveyed by suggestion."[2]

Specific Examples

Some examples may suffice to illustrate these concepts in action. First, Jesus' statement to His detractors in John 5:46 represents a contrary to fact condition in present time: εἰ γὰρ ἐπιστεύετε Μωϋσεῖ, ἐπιστεύετε ἄν ἐμοί. The statement refers to the current state of affairs concerning the belief of the Jews, and the imperfect tense shows. Jesus' statement assumes that they were not believing Moses, hence they were not believing Him. It may be paraphrased, If you were believing Moses, which you are not, then you would be believing Me, which you are not."

Galatians 4:15 uses aorist indicatives in both parts of the condition, and omits ἄν in the apodosis: εἰ δυνατὸν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑμῶν ἐξορύξαντες ἐδώκατε μοι. Paul is reflecting upon the Galatians' previous attitude toward him. The contextual time is past, and the

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1013.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 1014.

suggested action clearly impossible. "If it were possible, which it wasn't, you would have given my your eyes after you took them out, which you didn't."

Luke 7:39 is presented by Robertson as an example where the assumption goes contrary to the actual facts: οὗτος εἰ ἦν ὁ προφήτη, ἐγίνωσκεν ἄν. He points out that the Pharisee was assuming that Jesus was not the prophet and thus ignorant of the moral nature of the woman.[1] In point of fact, Jesus was the prophet and did know about the woman. He was not ignorant, the Pharisee was. This illustrates Robertson's observation that the actual situation must be determined by data outside the condition. The condition only presents the statement, not the situation.

The Translation of the Contrary to Fact Condition
General Observations

Robertson termed the contrary to fact condition a "somewhat difficult condition."[2] The difficulty to which he referred was not the construction, which is quite regular, but the translation. It is hard to communicate both the force of the condition (the assumption that the condition is contrary to fact) and the tense of the verb (imperfect, aorist or pluperfect). One of the most concise attempts at defining the meaning and translation of this category of conditions is found in

[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1013.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 1012.

Westcott's commentary on Hebrews. First, he explains the meaning of the condition:

> Two main cases arise. In one (1) the protasis expressed by εἰ with the indicative is followed by the imperfect indicative with ἄν. The thought here is of a present or continuous result which would have been seen now if the unfulfilled supposition had been realized. In the other (II), the protasis expressed by εἰ with the indicative is followed by the aorist indicative with ἄν. The thought here is of a past and completed result which would have ensued if the unfulfilled condition had been realized.[1]

Westcott obviously is dealing with the apodoses rather than the protases, but this is where the results are stated. The key problem in rendering the entire sentence into English is the precise statement, not only of the supposition, but of the anticipated results. He continues, noting some serious problems confronting the translator:

> No uniform rendering in English is able to give the exact force of these two different forms of expression. It has become common to translate (1) by *if (he) had . . . (he) would . . .*; and (II) by *if (he) had . . . (he) would have . . . .* But if this rendering is adopted, the definite negation of the fact in the apodosis of (I) is commonly lost or obscured, and the statement appears to be simply hypothetical and to suggest a possible fulfilment in the future. On the other hand if (I) and (II) are translated in the same manner, the suggestion of the present or continuous fact in (I) is obliterated.[4]

Is Westcott's observation correct? Is it impossible to accurately convey both aspects of the contrary to fact condition? If one is looking for a simple translation formula into which the various parts of the condition are inserted to find the correct English equivalent,

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[1] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 111.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

then he will be frustrated. Such a translation formula does not exist in this case, nor in any other situation. In some cases, the translator may have to sacrifice either the concept of assumed negation or the *Aktionsart* of the verb. But in others, each may be preserved through a judicious choice of English phrasiology.

Four such examples are given in Westcott's commentary on Hebrews: Hebrews 8:4 (both protasis and apodosis = imperfect), Hebrews 4:8 (protasis = aorist, apodosis,= imperfect), John 14:28 (protasis = imperfect, apodosis = aorist) and I Corinthians 2:8 (protasis and apodosis = aorist). The major versions used for comparison of his translations are the, *Authorized Version*, the *New American Standard Bible,* the *New International Version*, and the *Berkeley Version*.

Hebrews 8:4

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν ἐπὶ γῆς, οὐδ' ἂν ἦν ἱερεύς

Westcott.--"if he had been now invested with such an office . . he would not be as he now is . . ."[1]

Authorized Version.--For if he were on earth, he should not be a priest.

New American Standard Version.--Now if He were on earth, He would not be a priest at all.

New International Version.--If he were on earth, he would not be

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[1] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 112.

a priest.

Berkeley Version.--If, then, He were still on earth, He would not be a priest at all.

Hebrews 4:8

εἰ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾽Ιησοῦς κατέπαυσεν, οὐκ ἄν περὶ ἄλλας ἐλάλει μετὰ ταῦτα ἡμέρας

Westcott.--"if rest had been given at the entrance into Canaan, God would not have continued to speak as He does now . . ."[1]

Authorized Version.--For if Jesus had given them rest, then would he not afterward have spoken of another day.

New American Standard: Bible.--For if Joshua had given them rest, He would not have spoken of another day after that.

New International Version.--For if Joshua had given them rest, God would not have spoken later about another day.

Berkeley Version.--Now, if Joshua had given them rest, God would not have spoken of another day later on.

John 14:28

εἰ ἠγηπᾶτέ με, ἐχάρητε ἂν ὅτι πορεύομαι πρὸς τόν πατέρα

Westcott.--"if ye had now been loving me . . . ye would at the

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[1] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 113.

moment of my saying . . ."[1]

       <u>Authorized Version</u>.--If ye loved me, ye would rejoice.

       <u>New American Standard Bible</u>.--If you loved Me, you would have rejoiced.

       <u>New International Version</u>.--If you loved me, you would be glad that I am going to the Father.

       <u>Berkeley Version</u>.--If you loved me, you would be glad that I go to the Father.

<u>I Corinthians 2:8</u>

       εἰ γὰρ ἔγνωσαν, οὐκ ἂν τὸν κύριον τῆς δόξης ἐσταύρωσαν

       <u>Westcott</u>.--"if at the crisis of their trial they had known . . . they would not have crucified. . . "[2]

       <u>Authorized Version</u>.--for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.

       <u>New American Standard Bible</u>.--for if they had understood it, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory.

       <u>New International Version</u>.--for if they had [understood it], they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.

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[1] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 113.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 113.

Berkeley Version.--for had they understood, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.

Conclusion

What does this comparison demonstrate? Several things; first, the problems raised by Westcott need not interfer with an accurate translation. English communicates a significant amount of information by context, and that fact helps translators handle both aspects of the contrary to fact condition. The clear implication of the context of I Corinthians 2:8 underscores the negative assumption of the condition. Further, the use of the English pluperfect assists this idea, as well as reflecting the aorist verbs. Other English tenses adequately reflect the imperfect tense, as the examples show. Westcott's general observation accurately sums up the situation: "Each case therefore must be considered by itself in order that the translator may convey the truest impression of the original with regard to the context."[1]

[1] Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 112.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBABLE CONDITION

Introduction

The next two types of conditional sentences represent the second half of the entire collection: the undetermined conditions. These present their conditions as undetermined or doubtful, but with a varying degree of possible fulfillment. The previous conditions, the simple condition and the contrary to fact condition, enable the speaker to communicate a definite assumption in his conditional statement. Either he assumed it was true, or he assumed that it was not true.

In the undetermined conditions he states it as a possibility, not an actuality or an impossibility. This distinction is accomplished by using the moods of possibility: the subjunctive and the optative. "Naturally the indicative is not allowed here."[1]

This large group, the undetermined conditions, may be sub-divided into two classes which differ from each other in the degree of possibility each expresses. This difference is found in the moods employed in them, and it is as large as the semantical gap between them:

> The difference therefore between the third and fourth class conditions is just that between the subj. and the opt. They are both modes of doubtful, hesitating affirmation, but the optative is more

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[1] A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 1004.

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remote than the subj. In this type the premise is not assumed to be either true or untrue. The point is in the air and the cloud gathers round it. But there is less mist over the subj. than the opt.[1]

This chapter will focus on the third group in Robertson's classification: those conditions employing the subjunctive mood in the protasis.

The terminology involved in the analysis of this group of conditional sentences has not been standardized. Robertson quotes from different grammars, illustrating the variety found in the literature:

La Roche prefers "objektive Molichkeit" for the third class and "subjecktive Molichkeit" for the fourth class (εἰ and the opt.). This is also the language of Winer, "objective possibility" and "subjective possibility." Farrar prefers the words Possibility, Impossibility, Slight Probability, Uncertainty. Radermacher . . . calls εἰ with ind. "objektiv," εαν with subj. "an sich objektiv," εἰ with past tense of ind. "Irrealitat." So it goes.[2]

The list could be expanded by including the terminology suggested by modern grammarians. Dana and Mantey provide the best descriptive title when the call it "the more probable future condition."[3] Rather than their cumbersome terms "more probable" and "less probable," it seems better to this author to use "probable" and "possible," the latter being reserved for εἰ with the optative. If a sentence is either probable or possible it is obviously future. Thus the title suggested is "The Probable Condition."

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, pp. 1004-1005.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 1005.
[3] H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey, *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 290.

<u>Analysis of the Probable Condition</u>

The probable condition is the second most frequent conditional sentence in the New Testament and certainly the most debated. While grammarians generally agree on its basic form, they continue to debate its meaning in terms of implication (degree of probability or vividness), application (particular or general) and extent (should it include εἰ with the future indicative). These and other matters will be considered below. The specific analysis of this condition will involve the particles and verb forms employed in both the protasis and apodosis.

<div align="center">The Protasis</div>

The general rule regarding the formation of this condition is well recognized: "The protasis is usually expressed by ἐάν (or ἄν) with the Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future Indicative or by some other form referring to future time."[1] In a few examples εἰ, rather than ἐάν, is used with the subjunctive.[2] The discussion of the protasis, then, begins with the particles.

<u>Ἄν in the Protasis</u>

As indicated in Appendix III, ἄν in the protasis is limited to the Gospel of John--5:19, 13:20, 16:23 and 20:23 (2 examples). In addition to these verses, Moulton and Geden list John 12:32; Acts 2:45,

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[1] Ernest DeWitt Burton, *Syntax of Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 104.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1017.

4:35 and 9:2 as other examples of this construction.[1] However, John 13:32 and Acts 9:2 read ἐάν in current critical texts, while Acts 2:45 and 4:35 are identified by Robertson as the "Regular Greek idiom for comparative clauses with ἄν and imperfect indicative corresponding precisely with the three proceeding imperfects (Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 967)."[2]

The use of ἄν then, in these conditions is limited to the Gospel of John. While interesting, this observation does not interfere with the basic meaning of the condition. Indeed, ἄν is technically part of all the others, for ἐάν is simply εἰ and ἄν.[3]

Εἰ in the Protasis

Εἰ does occur in the protasis of the probable condition with verbs in the subjunctive mood. While unusual, it is not unexpected, for Koine Greek represents a stage in the development of the language in which the absolute distinctions between εἰ and ἐάν were beginning to weaken. "Indeed, as we sometimes have ἐάν and the fut. ind, in the first class condition, so we occasionally meet εἰ and the subj. in the third class [probable] condition."[4] As might be expected, the examples are few; only eight are listed in Appendix III. Most of these passages may be questioned on textual grounds.

[1] W. F. Moulton and A. S. Geden, eds., *A Concordance to the Greek Testament* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1967), p. 55.

[2] A. T. Robertson, *Word Pictures in the New Testament*, 6 volumes (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1930), III, p. 39.

[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1007.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 1017.

Moulton finds only one absolute example:

> The latter [εἰ with the subjunctive] occurs only in I Co 14⁵, where the peculiar phrase accounts for it . . . . We should hardly care to build much on Rev 11⁵. In Lk 9¹³ and Phil 3¹¹ we probably have deliberative subjunctives, "unless we are to go and buy," and "if after all I am to attain . . . to apprehend."[1]

Burton offers his opinion:

> For the few New Testament instances there is possibly in each case a special reason. Thus in Luke 9:13 there is probably a mixture of a conditional clause and a deliberative question: *unless indeed—are we to go?* i.e., *unless indeed we are to go*. In I Cor. 14:5 and I Thess. 5:10 a preference for the more common εἰ μή and ἐάντε . . . ἐάντε over the somewhat unusual ἐάν μή and ἐάντε . . . ἐάντε may have led to the use of the former in spite of the fact that the meaning called for a Subjunctive . . . . It is doubtful, however, whether the discovery of any difference in force between εἰ with the Subjunctive and say with the Subjunctive in these latter passages is not an over-refinement.[2]

Perhaps Burton was thinking of Winer when he wrote the last sentence, for Winer does find a distinction between the two constructions:

> The distinction between εἰ with the Subjunctive and εαν or αν is thus defined . . .: εἰ puts the condition simply, but when used , with the Subjunctive represents it as depending on the result; ἐάν also does the latter, but less decisively, inasmuch as the ἄν represents the condition as dependent on accidental circumstances, *if anyhow* or *perhaps*.[3]

Winer seeks to apply this to several statements taken from Classical Greek. He notes that in the latter, i.e. Byzantine authors, "a fixed distinction between εἰ with the Subj. and the same particle with the Ind., cannot be traced . . . ."[4] His conclusion: ". . . it is uncertain

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[1] J. H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume 1: Prolegomena*, third edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 187.
[2] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 105.
[3] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 295.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 295.

whether Paul had in view the nice discrimination specified above."[1]
Winer and Burton thus come to the same conclusion as Robertson: "The
true explanation is only possible by approach from the Greek standpoint.
And that is by the *mode,* not by εἰ or ἐάν."[2] This, then, is where the
matter rests.

The Tenses Used in the Protasis

Introductory Concepts

Before discussing the specific examples of the New Testament
it will be advantageous to survey the significance of the various tenses
in the subjunctive mood.

The Relationship of Tense to Time.--The concept of tense
deals with the action of the verb under two headings: aspect and time.
Aspect refers to the way the action is stated, which may be undefined
(aorist), continual (present, imperfect) or completed (perfect). It is
this characteristic which is dominant, for "*time is but a minor
consideration in the Greek tenses*."[3] Others agree: "One must dismiss
all notion of time if he wishes to understand the Greek verb."[4] "Even
in the indicative the time element is subordinate to the kind of action

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[1] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 295.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1007.
[3] Dana and. Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 171. Italics theirs.
[4] A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis, *A New Short Grammar
the Greek Testament* (Baker Book House, 1977 reprint of 1933 edition),
p. 293.

expressed."[1]

Greek verb tenses are employed to describe the action involved in terms of aspect rather than time. All aspects of action may occur at any time.

The Relationship of Tense to Mood.--Mood is the term used to describe the relationship of the action of the verb to reality. The indicative mood affirms the reality of the action described. The subjunctive, optative and imperative moods present the action as "objectively possible," "subjectively possible," and "volitionally possible," respectively.[2] The subjunctive mood, of course, is the important one in light of this study. "if [the action] is viewed as contingent upon certain existing and known conditions--being objectively possible--the subjunctive is used."[3] This is the situation with the probable condition. It is stated as a possibility or probability without any implication about its actuality or impossibility.

How does the tense relate to the mood of a verb? The main concept of tense is aspect of the action described, and each mood may express each aspect without regard to time. Potential moods must, by definition, refer to an action yet unrealized, i.e. future. And that concept is uniquely common to all the moods.[4]

[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 825.
[2] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 166.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 166.
[4] Robertson, *Shorter Grammar,* p. 293.

The Relationship of Tense to Time.--Absolute time can only be assigned to an action if it is a real entity. Only then may it be spoken of as past, present or future. Absolute time, then, may be applied to those actions described by the indicative mood only. Potential moods describe actions not yet realized, hence no absolute time references may be assigned to them. "The time element is entirely absent from the potential moods."[1] Any concept of time connected with a subjunctive verb will be relative, implied by the context. There is no time in the subjunctive.

These concepts are recognized by all grammarians. Burton, for example, discusses them in terms of the three main tenses:

The Present of the Dependent Moods is used to represent an action in progress or as repeated. It may be altogether timeless, the action being thought of without reference to the time of its occurrence; or its time, as past, present, or future, may be involved in the function of the mood, or may be indicated by the context.

The Aorist of the Dependent Moods represents the action expressed by the verb as a simple event or fact, with reference either to its progress [or lack thereof] or to the existence of its result . . . .
The time of the action, if indicated at all, is shown, not by the tense, but by some fact outside of it.

The Perfect of the Dependent Moods is used of completed action. As in the Indicative, the thought may be directed both to the action and its result, or only to the result. The time of the action is indicated, as in the Present and Aorist, not by the tense but by the context or by the function of the mood.[2]

The statistics indicate that the New Testament prefers the three protasis tenses in this order: Aorist Subjunctive = 177 examples,

[1] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 167.
[2] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, pp. 46-48.

Present Subjunctive = 105 examples, and Perfect Subjunctive = 7 examples. This is what one would expect from this "aorist-loving language."[1] The aorist is preferred by almost two to one over the present, with the perfect almost disappearing from sight.

Tenses Employed in the Protasis

The Present Tense.--The present tense describes the action of the verb in terms of continual or linear action. The use of this tense in the protasis of a probable condition states the condition or hypothesis as a linear or progressive action. The examples in the New Testament should be seen in this light. Matthew 8:2, for example, presents the leper as conditioning his healing upon the continual attitude of Jesus toward him, perhaps speaking to his abiding character rather than a changeable aspect of His will: ἐάν θέλης, δύνασαι με καθαρίσαι ("if you are willing, you are able to cleanse me"). Jesus was referring to His continual ministry and Messianic claims when He stated in John 5:31: ἐάν ἐγὼ μαρτυρῶ περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, ἡ μαρτυρία μου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής. Paul speaks of the regular actions of the church when members have legal problems with other believers in the same tense: βιωτικὰ μὲν οὖν κριήρια ἐάν ἔχητε . . . τούτους καθίζετε (I Corinthians 6:4). Consideration of the mood of the protasis throws a significant amount of light upon the nature of the statement, light which the English often fails to reflect.

[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 831.

The Aorist Tense.--The aorist tense is used to present the fact of an action without defining anything about it either in terms of aspect or time. "Action may be regarded as simple, undefined (aoristic, α-ὁρίστος, from ἀορίζω, 'I do not define') action. The common term for this is punctiliar action."[1] Chamberlain's statement introduces a misconception, for the term "punctiliar" does define the action. It would be better to state it as undefined and leave it at that. "The aorist denotes an action simply as an event, without in any sense defining the manner of its occurrence."[2] It communicates neither a specific aspect (punticiliar or continual) nor a specific time (past, present or future). It merely states the action.

This distinction is maintained in the probable condition. Matthew 5:46, for example, simply presents the act of love on the part of Jesus' listeners without specifying anything about that act: ἐάν γὰρ ἀγαπήσητε τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας ὑμᾶς, τίνα μισθοὺ ἔχετε; ("For if you love those who are loving you, what reward do you have?").

A better way of seeing the present contrasted with the aorist is to consider several verses which utilize both types of verbs. First, Matthew 21:21 uses a present and an aorist subjunctive in the protasis, both with a single particle ἐάν: ἐάν ἔχητε πίστιν καὶ μὴ διακριθήτε ("if you have faith and do not doubt"). Lenski compares these two verbs so:

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[1] Wiiam Douglas Chamberlain, *An Exegetical Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 67.
[2] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 194.

> The first verb is a present subjunctive, for to have faith is a continuous activity, the second verb is an aorist subjunctive, for the doubt deals with the single act regarding which hesitation occurs. For the moment the doubt blocks the faith and prevents the act faith should accomplish.[1]

Here Lenski, like others, misses the point of the non-specific meaning of the aorist and attributes the concept of singularlity to it. Perhaps Broadus comes closer to the concept with his rendering of "undoubting faith."[2] Jesus does speak of their faith as a continual thing and states their doubt as an action, nothing more.

I Corinthians 14:24 uses the same combination of tenses: ἐάν δὲ πάντες προφητεύωσιν, εἰσέλθη δέ τις ἄπιστος ἢ ἰδιώτης, ἐλέγχεται. ("but if all prophesy and an unbeliever or an uninstructed person comes it, he is convicted"). Here the two actions are presented, the first as a regular, continual one, the second as an undefined one. The context obviously assigns an individual, particular meaning to εἰσέλθη, but the aorist merely presents the action. Robertson and Plummer translate the protasis as "Whereas, if all should be prophesying, and there should come in some unbeliever or ungifted person."[3] Lenski is

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[1] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Matthew's Gospel* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 824.

[2] John A. Broadus, *Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew*, volume I of *An American Commentary on the New Testament*, Alvah Hovey, ed. (Philadelphia: The American Baptist Publication Society, 1886), p. 435.

[3] Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians*, volume 32 of *The International Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments*, edited by Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles Augustus Briggs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), p. 318.

closer when he writes

> The present subjunctive προφητεύωσιν, like λαλῶσι in v. 23,
> pictures the action in progress: "suppose all are engaged in
> propheysing." . . . . The aorist εἰσέλθη, like εἰσέλθωσι in
> v. 34, merely marks the fact of the entrance.[1]

2 Timothy 2:5 combines the present and aorist subjunctive forms
of the same verb in the same protasis: ἐάν δὲ καὶ ἀθλῇ τις, οὐ
στεφανοῦται ἐὰν μὴ νομίμως ἀλθήσῃ ("And if anyone competes as an
athlete, he is not crowned unless he competes lawfully."). Robertson
and Lenski offer different interpretations of this passage. First
Robertson:

> Note the sharp distinction between *athlei* (present subjunctive,
> engage in a contest in general) and *athlesei* (first aorist active
> subjunctive, engage in a particular contest). Not "except he have
> contended," but simply "unless he contend" . . . . [2]

Lenski sees the emphasis this way:

> . . . but we cannot agree with [Robertson] when he has the latter
> mean "engage in a particular contest." Both verbs refer to a
> particular contest. The present subjunctive = "if one engages in an
> athletic event;" this does not assure him the wreath or garland
> "unless (now effective aorist subjunctive) he lawfully (as the law
> of that event prescribes) completes the event.[3]

Neither one is clear in their statement, and both miss the point
of the undefined aorist. The present tense sets the context and the
aorist follows naturally within that setting. There is no need to use
a second present; the naturally employed aorist fits perfectly. No

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[1] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation I and II Corinthians*
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1963), p. 603.

[2] Robertson, *World Pictures*, IV, p. 617.

[3] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Paul's Epistles to
the Colossians, to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to Philemon*
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 781.

special significance is attached to the aorist.

The Apodosis

General Observations

The apodosis of the probable condition is, according to Burton, formed by "the Future Indicative or by some other form referring to future time."[1] One would expect, then, that the most common form of the apodosis would involve future indicative verbs. Such, however, is not the case. The examples listed in Appendix III indicate that the present indicative is preferred to the future indicative one hundred eleven to ninty-nine. Thus the present, rather than the future, is the dominant tense, but not by much. Is Burton then in error? No, he is not, as the following considerations show.

The Time of the Apodosis

First, there is no Question that the probable condition is, in fact, restricted to the future time.[2] It presents a conclusion that is conditioned on a hypothetical situation which is "up in the air" as the speaker presents it. Were it referring to an objective reality or an impossibility, as assumed by the speaker, then it would refer to a real time event: past, present or future, and employ the indicative mood.

The Tenses of the Apodosis

Actually all tenses, present, aorist, future and perfect, are represented in the apodosis of these conditions. The major tenses,

[1] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 104.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1018.

though, are the present and future. Statistically, the tables show 133 present tenses, 53 aorists, 99 futures and 5 perfects. These verbs represent all moods: indicative, subjunctive and imperative. In terms of indicative verbs there are 111 present indicatives, 8 aorist indicatives, 99 future indicatives and 5 perfect indicatives. Obviously there is no general principle for choosing the apodosis verb except the action being described.

Do these facts create a problem in terms of the future time of the condition? Not at all, when one remembers that the primary function of tense is to describe the aspect of the action, not the time. One may present the contingent act as one that is simply stated without any defined aspect (aorist), a progressive act (present and sometimes future) or, rarely, an act in a state of completion (perfect). The same observations may be offered regarding the mood of the verbs. The contingent act may be presented by the speaker as one that will be actualized upon realization of the stated condition (indicative), one that may be realized (subjunctive) or one that must be realized (imperative). Each of these moods makes its unique contribution to the sense of the whole conditional statement.

Tenses Employed in the Apodosis

Several examples of tense and mood combinations found in the apodoses of these conditions will be examined to show how they communi-cate the actions involved.

The Present Indicative

Although the future indicative seems like the obvious choice for these apodoses, it is second to the present indicative. In light of this fact it is interesting that Winer should write:

> Hence the consequent clause usually, contains a Fut. . . . or, what is equivalent, an Aor, with **οὐ μή** . . . or an Imperat. . . , more rarely a Pres., and then either in the sense of a Fut. . . or denoting something permanent . . . or a general truth . . . .[1]

The wide use of the present, however, is not surprising, for it is frequently used with a future implication. This "futuristic present" is discussed by Robertson who correctly notes that time is not the key issue: "Since the pres. ind. occurs for past, present and future time it is clear that 'time' is secondary even in the ind."[2] This use of the present tense projects a progressive or durative aspect into the future. "As examples of the durative present in this [futuristic] sense take παραδίδοται (Mt. 26:45), ἀναβαίνομεν (Mk 10:33), ὑπάγω ἀλιεύειν and ἐρχόμεθα (Jo. 21:3), διέρχομαι (I Cor. 16:5), ἔχομεν (2 Cor. 5:1)."[3] Dana and Mantey read more into this use of the present tense then is justified when they identify it as one that "denotes an event which has not yet occurred, but which is regarded as so certain that in thought it may be contemplated as already coming to pass."[4]

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[1] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 293.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, pp. 881-882.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 882.
[4] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 185.

The futuristic present, properly understood, gives the probable condition a progressive aspect when used in the apodosis. Sometimes this is spoken of as a point of emphasis upon the speaker's present confidence, but such statements do not reflect the proper function of the present tense. Robertson follows this erroneous concept:

> But ofttimes the conclusion [of the Probable condition] is stated in terms of the present either as a present hope or a vivid projection into the future (futuristic present). So in 2 Cor. 5:1, ἐάν καταλυθῇ, ἔχομεν. The condition is future in conception, but the conclusion is a present reality, so confident is Paul of the bliss of heaven.[1]

Additionally, general rules or maxims often use the present indicative in the apodosis. Robertson quotes Mark 3:27 (οὐ δύναται οὐδεὶς . . . ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον δήσῃ) as an example.[2] This fits the continual aspect of the present tense.

Burton identifies the use of the present indicative in the apodosis as the mark of the Present General Supposition.[3] He makes this a separate class of conditions, but previous discussion has shown that any condition may be particular or general as the situation demands. Two examples may be offered. Mark 3:27 has already been identified as a passage Burton identifies as a present general supposition. It is a statement of a general truth and does employ the present tense.

But in contrast, consider Matthew 21:26 – ἐὰν δὲ εἴπωμεν. ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, φοβούμεθα τὸν ὄχλον ("but if we say, 'of men,' we fear the

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1019.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1019.
[3] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 107.

the crowd"). The context marks this conclusion as a definite conclusion, limited to a historical situation. Other examples could be offered to illustrate the same point. The suggestion of a special catagory of probable conditions termed "present general conditions" as a grammatical point should be rejected. It is valid, though, as a contextual consideration.

The Aorist Indicative

The above discussion on the relationship of time and moods explains the appearance of the aorist subjunctive verbs in these conditions, but what of the aorist indicative? What sense does this type of verb give the conclusion of a probable condition?

Robertson offers two explanations. First, he notes that the aorist may be considered timeless in all the moods, including the indicative. "The aor. ind. is sometimes timeless as is always true of the other modes . . . That may be the explanation here."[1] His second explanation is to accept the normal meaning of the aorist indicative and see a dramatic rhetorical shift in the sense of the condition:

> It is possible also to explain it as a change of standpoint. The protasis looks to the future, while the apodosis turns back to the past. Such vivid changes in language are due to the swift revolution in thought. See Mt. 18:15 . . . .[2]

The text of Matthew 18:15 is ἐάν σου ἀκούσῃ, ἐκέρδησας τὸν ἀδελφόν σου ("if he listens to you, you have gained your brother").

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1020.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1020.

The aorist indicative may, according to Robertson, be considering the desired act so intently as to see it completed at some future time in the mind of the speaker. Elsewhere, though, he backs off from this position and identifies it as "a sort of timeless aorist, a blessed achievement already made."[1] Hendriksen's translation "you have (meaning *will have*) won your brother" reflects this emphasis.[2] Lenski stumbles over technical terms, trying to place the aorist in the future, but after another future act:

> Here we have a case in which the condition looks to the future while the conclusion turns to the past, which R[obertson] 1020 attributes to the swift leap of thought. But this past is a past only to that future: "thou didst gain" if thy brother "shall hear." Moreover, the Greek uses the aorist to express this past, whereas the English would prefer the perfect "hast gained"; yet we do not regard this as a gnomic aorist (R[obertson] 842).[3]

It seems best to the author to take the aorist indicative in the normal sense of undefined aspect rather than time, as Lenski does. It wraps up the result of the hypothetical ἀκούσῃ in a real, albeit undefined act.

The Future Indicative

The subjunctive mood of the protasis places the probable condition into future time, and one would expect the apodosis to follow. This is exactly what happens, regardless of the tense employed in the apodosis. The second most common verb form is the future indicative.

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[1] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, I, p. 148.

[2] William Hendriksen, *The Gospel of Matthew* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1973), p. 699.

[3] Lenski, *Matthew*, p. 700.

Like the other tenses, the future states the apodosis as a future act, contingent upon the protasis. No special significance should be read into this combination other than an emphasis upon the future time which is already present in the condition.

The Perfect Indicative

Verbs in the perfect tense describe an action in the state of completion. They combine the sense of punctiliar (it is completed) with that of continual (it remains completed).[1] These verbs are used in the apodosis of the probable condition to emphasize the state of completion, that is, the continual aspect. Winer terms the perfects "equivalent to Presents,"[2] and Robertson agrees, especially in the precept or maxim form of the condition, as in Romans 14:23 – ὁ διακρινόμενος ἐὰν φάγη κατακέκριται ("the one who doubts is condemned if he eats").[3] The four examples of the perfect tense apodosis fit these observations.

Verbs in the Imperative Mood

The imperative mood appears forty times in the probable condition apodoses: ninteen present imperatives and twenty-one aorist imperatives. The imperative mood, of course, places an action in the future. This fits the sense of the condition as a whole, for the protasis has already placed the entire thought in the future through the subjunctive mood.

[1] Robertson, *Shorter Grammar*, p. 302.
[2] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 293.
[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1019.

Imperative verbs are a natural occurrence in these conditions

Meaning of the Probable Condition

The study has proceeded to the point where the meaning of the probable condition may be discussed. There has been much dissension among the grammarians on this subject, so the procedure will be to review the opinions of various scholars, evaluate their position, and explore the meaning of this condition as contrasted with that of the simple condition.

Review of the Grammarians

This review will follow the pattern of the second chapter: first the Classical scholars and then the Koine scholars.

W. W. Goodwin

Writing from the Classical viewpoint, W. W. Goodwin describes these conditions as the "Future suppositions in more vivid form" which he explains so:

> When a supposed future case is stated *distinctly* and *vividly* (as in English, *if I shall go*, or *if I go*), the protasis has the Subjunctive with ἐάν (epic ει κέ), and the apodosis has the future indicative or some other form of future time.[1]

By adding the English "shall" or "will" Goodwin hopes to add more emphasis to the condition. Whether it comes across in the English translation or not, the Greek, in his opinion, places emphasis upon the intensity of the statement.

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[1] W. W. Goodwin, *Greek Grammar*, revised by Charles Burton Gulick (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), p. 300.

The speaker, according to Goodwin, makes no implication about the degree of probability assigned to the condition. The speaker's emphasis is upon the vividness or intensity of the statement. As will be seen later, Goodwin terms conditions which employ the optative mood "less vivid conditions."

The basis for his view lies in the futuristic use of the subjunctive mood:

> In the Homeric language the subjunctive (generally the aorist) may be used in independent sentences, with the force of a future indicative. The negative is οὐ . . . .
> This Homeric subjunctive, like the future indicative, is sometimes joined with κέ or ἄν in a potential sense. This enabled the earlier language to express an apodosis with a sense between that of the optative with ἄν and that of the simple future indicative, which the Attic was unable to do.[1]

The subjunctive mood, then, would be making a simple statement about the future in a way that would be less emphatic (or vivid) than the future indicative, but more so than the optative.

G. B. Winer

Winer, a Koine grammarian, simply states the case of this type of condition as one of probability without any other alternative being considered:

> Condition with assumption of *objective* possibility (where experience will decide whether or not it is real): *if thy friend should come* (I do not know whether he will come, but the result will show). Here ἐάν . . . with the Subjunctive is used.[2]

Later he writes that this condition is used "if an objective

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[1] W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax Moods and Tenses* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1893), p. 97.
    [2] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 291.

possibility with the expectation of a decision is to be expressed."[1] The sense of the probable condition as Winer sees it, then, is one of a degree of expected (or implied) fulfillment, rather than one of vividness of statement.

E. Burton

Normally Burton follows Goodwin in his treatment of conditional sentences, but here he departs from Goodwin's scheme by identifying the probable condition as the "Future Supposition with More Probability." His explanation is:

> The protasis states a supposition which refers to the future, suggesting some probability of its fulfillment.
> The protasis is usually expressed by ἐάν (or ἄν) with the Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future Indicative or by some other form referring to future time.[2]

Burton's terminology is more accurate than Winer's, and his understanding of the sense of this condition is the same. The words "more probability," if understood from the speaker's point of view, better describe the probable condition than "objective probability."

Blass-Debrunner

Blass-Debrunner also supports the concept of anticipated fulfillment as the basic significance of this condition:

> (4) Ἐάν with the subjunctive denotes that which under certain circumstances is expected from an existing general or concrete standpoint in the present: 'case of expectation' and 'iterative case in present time.'[3]

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[1] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 293.
[2] Burton, *Syntax of Moods and Tenses*, p. 104.
[3] Blass-DeBrunner, *Grammar*, p. 188.

Here again the basic concept is anticipation or expectation of fulfill-

ment, not vividness of statement.

A. T. Robertson

In his *Shorter Grammar* Robertson identifies this condition in

this manner:

> This condition *states* the condition as a matter of doubt, but with
> some expectation of realization. Hence the subjunctive is the mode
> of doubt used, not the optative, the mode of still greater doubt.
> It is undetermined and so does not use the indicative mode, but
> there is more hope and that marks it off from the optative.[1]

Concerning the subjunctive mood in particular he writes:

> The chief difference between the subjunctive and the optative can
> be conveyed by our words *probablity* [*subjunctive*] and *possibility*
> [*optative*]. Both are modes of doubtful assertion, but the optative
> is more doubtful.[2]

His term "doubtful" communicates a concept of negative

thought that the terms "probable" or "possible" do not. They are to

be preferred. His overall concept of the sense of the condition is

correct.

Evaluation of the Grammarians

Vividness versus Probability

The first question involves the basic emphasis of this condition.

Does it stress the vividness of the condition as seen by the speaker, or

does it speak of an idea of anticipated fulfillment? The underlying

concept, of course, is one's view of the force of the subjunctive mood.

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[1] Robertson, *Shorter Grammar*, p. 353.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 309.

Goodwin lays stress upon the vividness of the statement, locating the subjunctive between the indicative and the optative. This evaluation comes from his analysis of Classical Greek syntax.

Koine grammarians, in general, support the concept that the subjunctive reflects probability or anticipation rather than vividness. This, for example, is how Robertson speaks of the basic meaning of this mood. Thus his terminology "undetermined, but with prospect of determination" is applied to this condition.[1] Others have followed him: Dana and Mantey--"More Probable Future Condition,"[2] Roberts (following Gildersleeve)--"Anticipatory Condition,"[3] and Burton-- "Future Supposition with More Probability."[4] La Sor represents a unique position among Koine grammarians with his acceptance of Goodwin's concept of vividness as the basic meaning of this condition. Though he seems to equate probability with vividness in his discussion, he prefers the former terminology in classification:

> Future conditions can only be probable. But the degree of probability in the speaker's mind is variable. There is a more probable (or "more vivid") future condition ("If you [will] take me, I shall go"), and a less probable (or "less vivid") future condition ("If you would take me, I would go"). Because the degree of probability exists only in the speaker's mind, many grammarians prefer the terms "more vivid" and "less vivid," and avoid reference to probability.[5]

[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1016.
[2] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 290.
[3] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 24.
[4] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 104.
[5] William Sanford La Sor, *Handbook of New Testament Greek*, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973), II, p. 222.

Of course, the degree of vividness is also a product of the speaker's mind, hence the argument could be reversed, for the condition can and usually does have contact with external facts. More to the point, though, is the fact that La Sor seems to miss the significance of the two terms. "Vividness" does not avoid a logical or semantic difficulty, for it is not interchangeable with the concept of probability. As commonly used, the term refers to the drama, the intensity behind a statement. "Probability," on the other hand, has reference to a more hopeful, anticipatory concept. It brings fulfillment closer in terms of objective reality, not dramatic impact. Among Koine grammarians La Sor's "many grammarians" are limited to a class of one: himself. It seems best to this author to keep it that way.

New Testament Examples

The deciding factor, though, is the text of the New Testament. What does it indicate? Three examples will be evaluated: Matthew 18:15, Luke 4:7 and I Thessalonians 3:8.

Matthew 18:15

The text reads ἐάν σου ἀκούσῃ, ἐκέρδησας τὸν ἀδελφόν σου ("if he hears you, you have gained your brother"). Is this presenting a situation in a "more vivid" manner, or is there a degree of expectation or antici-pation in the statement? Although the question is beyond the grammar of the sentence, the context and direct implication seem clear: there is a real hope, a definite prospect of gaining the sinning brother. The speaker does not give the condition a sense of sureness, for he uses the subjunctive mood. But he expresses optimistic probability of restoring

fellowship with the sinning brother. Willoughby Allen so interprets the

passage,[1] as do Broadus,[2] and Lenski.[3] Again, the point in question is

the force of the condition. It is emphasising, not the dramatic aspect

of the situation, but the hopeful anticipation of realizing the condition.

Thus the term "probable condition" better describes the condition.

Luke 4:7

The text reads σὺ οὖν ἐὰν προσκυνήσῃς ἐνώπιον ἐμοῦ, ἔσται σοῦ

πᾶσα ("therefore, if you will worship before me, all this will be yours").

Is the Devil making a vivid statement, or is he speaking so as to

anticipate the probability of Jesus' positive response? In the context

of the temptation one would choose the latter alternative. As both

Nicoll[4] and Hendriksen[5] note, the emphasis is upon the anticipated

fulfillment of the condition rather than the vividness of it. This,

too, is a probable condition.

I Thessalonians 3:8

Paul writes ὅτι νῦν ζῶμεν ἐὰν ὑμεῖς στήκετε ἐν κυρίῳ ("now we

live if you stand fast in the Lord"). The historical context of this

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[1] Willoughby Allen, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to S. Matthew*, vol. 26 of The International Critical Commentary, edited by Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles Augustus Briggs (Edinburgh: T. 6 T. Clark, 1907), p. 197.

[2] Broadus, *Matthew*, p. 387.

[3] Lenski, *Matthew*, pp. 699-700.

[4] Nicoll, *Testament*, I, p. 486.

[5] William Hendriksen, *The Good of Luke* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1978), pp. 236-237.

passage argues for the concept of anticipated, probable fulfillment. Paul had received confirmation that the Thessalonian believers were standing firm in Christ, and he drew significant encouragement from their faithfulness. His statement anticipates continued standing on their part. The present indicative in the apodosis reenforces this idea, considering his future encouragement in a dramatic form. Commentators favoring this view include Ellicott[1] and Hendriksen.[2]

While some examples may be understood as vivid, dramatic statements, it is clear that some, if not the greater portion, imply a probable degree of fulfillment. Robertson's concept of the subjunctive mood as one of expectation or anticipation describes the text of the New Testament better than Goodwin's concept of vividness.

Since the basic sense of this condition is future, and the mood employed presents an anticipated or probable fulfillment, this author has selected the title "probable condition." Probable in this sense is contrasted with possible, as will be seen when the optative mood is discussed. "Probable" also communicates some degree or amount of expectation, which this condition contains. All in all, this term is the best one for a one-word description of the significance of this type of condition.

[1] Charles J. Ellicott, *Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessalonians* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1957 reprint of 1861 edition), pp. 42-43.

[2] William Hendriksen, *I and II Thessalonians* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1964), p. 88.

Relationship with the Simple Condition

A final step in the discussion of the probable condition is
to evaluate its relationship with the simple condition.

Opinions of the Grammarians

Goodwin and those following him, it will be remembered,
classify conditional sentences with respect to the time involved in
them: "The most obvious natural distinction is that of (a) *present and
past* conditions and (b) *future* conditions."[1] Gildersleeve, Robertson
and others classify them in terms of their relationship to reality:
those presented by the speaker as real, and those presented as potential.
Each of these two groups may be divided into two. The first divides
into those presented as actual and those presented as impossible. The
second group divides into those stated as more likely to be fulfilled
and those presented as less likely. The suggested terms for these two
concepts are "probable" and "possible."

Observations of the New Testament

Enough has been said to suggest that this distinction is main-
tained in the New Testament. But does the text itself support such a
conclusion? The answer is Yes, and a brief consideration of several
passages which use both conditions will support this conclusion.

John 13:17.--Both a simple and a probable condition are used
in conjunction with a single apodosis in John 13:17—εἰ ταῦτα οἴδατε
μακάριοί ἐστε ἐὰν ποιῆτε αὐτά ("if you know these things, you will be

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[1] Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 139.

blessed if you do them"). The simple condition states the matter with
an assumption of reality, hence Jesus is saying, "If you know these
things, and I am assuming that you do . . . ." The last member of the
verse is the protasis of a probable condition. The two protases are
both connected to the one apodosis μακαριοι εστε.

What, then, can be made of this situation? Godet's terminology
is ambiguous: "Εἰ, *if*, 'if truly.' as is really the case; it is the
general supposition; ἐάν, *in case that*; it is the more particular
condition."[1] He seems to be using the term "particular" in the sense
of anticipation or probability, as his interpretation indicates. But
the specific term is misleading at best.

Nicoll recognizes the difference: "εἰ οἴδατε, 'if ye know,' as
you do know; ἐάν ποιῆτε, a supposition." "The knowing is objectively
granted, the doing subjectively conditioned."[2] This, of course, is the
same as Godet. Lenski argues at length for this distinction:

> The first is a condition of reality: "If you know these things,"
> for Jesus rightly assumes that they do know them . . . .
> But, of course, only "if you keep doing them." Doing is
> emphatic over against mere knowing. The condition is now one of
> expectancy, "if you shall be doing them." Jesus expects it of them,
> yet it is possible that they may disappoint him--will they? the
> condition asks.[3]

Robertson continues this line of reasoning: "Here we have the
first and third class conditions happily combined with a clear distinc-

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[1] Godet, *John*, II, p. 252.

[2] Nicoll, *Testament*, I, pp. 187-188.

[3] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. John's Gospel*
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 929.

tion. Jesus assumes the knowledge as a fact, but the performance is-doubtful."[1] Roberts accepts this reasoning,[2] but Battle comes at it another way. Setting aside Robertson's comment on "doubtful," he explains the verse so: "Jesus regards their present knowledge as either existing or not--that matter is settled. But he regards their performance as possible or probable in the future."[3] Actually, both Battle and Robertson are saying the same thing. The term "doubtful" is used by Robertson as a contrast to the factuality assumed in the first statement. "Doubtful" does mean "possible or probable."

The comparison of the two conditions illustrates the way each of them presents its concept. The simple condition assumes that the disciples know the facts under discussion. The probable condition anticipates their performance, their application of these facts. But the speaker does not assume that such actions will happen.

Acts 5:38-39.--Another interesting combination of conditions is found in Acts 5:38-39—ὅτι ἐὰν ᾖ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἡ βουλή αὕτη ἢ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο, καταλυθήσεται· εἰ δὲ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐστιν, οὐ δυνήσεσθε καταλῦσαι αὐτούς ("for if this purpose or work is of men, it will be destroyed; but if it is of God, you will not be able to destroy these men"). Is Gamaliel stating the first condition as a vivid future condition and

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1019, also *Word Pictures*, V, p. 241.
[2] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 226.
[3] Battle, "Present Indicative," p. 170.

the second as a simple condition, or is he communicating certain assumptions about the infant Church?

The fact that Gamaliel, a leader of the Pharisees, offers this advice and employs a simple condition in so doing has caused some commentators to view him a sympathetic toward Christianity. Alexander even refers to an "old opinion" that Gamaliel was a secret believer on this basis, but he himself does not hold to that view) Nicoll puts the case cautiously:

> . . . it has sometimes been thought that the change of mood from subjunctive to indicative, "but if it is of God," as if indicating that the second supposition were the more probable (c4. Gal. i. 8, 9), indicates sympathy on the part of Gamaliel.[2]

Robertson identifies Gamaliel's motive for changing conditions in the politics of the situation:

> Gamaliel gives the benefit of the doubt to Christianity. He assumes that Christianity is of God and puts the alternative that it is of men in the third class. This does not, of course, show that Gamaliel was a Christian or an inquirer. He was merely willing to score a point against the Sadducees.[3]

Battle follows this reasoning in general, though he stresses the "aspect" emphasis of the conditions in terms of their relationship to reality:

> It seems better, rather, to view Gamaliel's speech from the standpoint of aspect. Whether the new sect and its miraculous power were from God, is a settled fact which nothing can change. If, on the other hand, it is of men, then future events will show it to be so-- an alternative Gamaliel could have considered probable, even though he used εἰ with the indicative.[4]

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[1] J. A. Alexander, *Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1956 reprint of 1875 edition), pp. 237-238.

[2] Nicoll, *Testament*, II, p. 161.

[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1018.

[4] Battle, "Present Indicative," p. 171,

Battle's emphasis on aspect points to the significance of the
two conditional clauses. The first one, the probable condition, sets the
tone of the entire statement. The whole statement is put into future
time. The first condition is a probable condition; Gamaliel stated the
case so as to imply an anticipated, probable fulfillment. It will
probably prove to be of men. The second condition, a simple one,
considers the connection between Christianity and God. The time is
still future, and the indicative mood presents the situation in an
aspect of reality. All things are known to God, and He certainly knows
the truth about this new sect. Gamaliel does shift to the indicative
mood in his second condition, not so much to give Christianity the
benefit of the doubt, but to acknowledge that God certainly knows the
true situation. The simple condition provides the means to express this
assumption.

I Corinthians 10:27-28.--The general topic of Christian conduct
in the Corinthian culture led Paul to discuss the proper response of a
believer if he was invited to an unbeliever's home and then confronted
with a difficult situation. These two hypothetical cases are discussed
in two conditional sentences, the first a simple condition, the second
a probable condition-- (verse 27) εἴ τις καλεῖ ὑμᾶς τῶν ἀπίστων καὶ
θέλετε πορεύεσθαι, πᾶν τὸ παρατιθέμενον ὑμῖν ἐσθίετε . . . . (verse 28)
ἐάν δέ τις ὑμῖν εἴπη· τοῦτο ἱερόθξτόν ἐστιν, μὴ ἐστίετε. Again the two
conditions are set side by side, and again an opportunity is given to
evaluate the relative meanings of the two. The difference is more than
just time. The first, the simple condition, presents the invitation as

an assumed reality. Paul states the case, at least for the sake of argument, that believers will be invited over to unbeliever's homes for dinner. But in this social setting a second situation might arise. The believer might be confronted with the fact that his dinner had been offered to an idol. This situation, Paul assumes, would be less likely to confront a Christian than the invitation. Not every host will raise the idol question.

The conditions employed reflect these two assumptions. The first, the simple condition, has already been discussed. The second, the probable condition, presents its condition, as Ellicott says, as "a case of distinctly objective possibility."[1] Nicoll refers to it as "a probable contingency," as contrasted with the first, "an assumed fact."[2] Lenski describes the first as "a condition that expresses reality," and the second as "a condition that expresses expectancy."[3] Robertson and Plummer explain the two conditions as: "'If any one invites you,' a thing which is very possible and may have happened. 'If any one should say to you,' a pure hypothesis and not so very probable."[4]

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[1] Charles J. Ellicott, *A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians* (Andover: W. F. Draper, Publisher, 1889), p. 203.

[2] Nicoll, *Testament*, II, p. 868.

[3] Lenski, *I and II Corinthians*, p. 421.

[4] Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians*, vol. 32 of *The International Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments,* edited by Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles Augustus Briggs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), p. 221.

The context itself points to the fact that the reception of a dinner invitation would be a normal course of social affairs, offering insight into the expected relationship between an individual Christian and his neighbors. The confrontation with the dinner's past history would not be as probable, but certainly not outside the realm of normal experience. Thus the two conditions: the first assumes the invitation to be real, the second presents the confrontation as a definite possibility.

Galatians 1:8-9.--His warnings against false teachers and gospels bring Paul to speak against such in the strongest of terms in Galatians 1:8-9, again employing the simple and the probable conditions: (verse 8) ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἡμεῖς ἢ ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ εὐαγγελίσηται ... ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. (verse 9) ὡς προειοήκαμεν καὶ ἄρτι πάλιν λέγω, εἴ τις ὑμᾶς εὐαγγελίζεται παρ᾽ ὅ παθελάβετε, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. Here the sequence of conditions is opposite to that of I Corinthians 10:27-28. Paul begins with the subjunctive and moves to the indicative. Buttmann identifies this as an example where

> The difference between [them] is plainly to be recognized in sentences where both are used in close proximity; as Gal. i. 8,9, where the hypothesis expressed in the 8th verse by ἐάν with the Subjunctive is resumed or repeated in the 9th with greater energy and definiteness by εἰ with the Indicative. So in Acts v. 38-39.[1]

Burton agrees, expanding upon the thought:

> This sentence [verse 9] differs from that of v. 8 in two respects which affect the thought: (1) the element of concession and impro-bability disappears in the omission of ἡμεῖς ἢ ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐθανοῦ;

[1] Alexander Buttmann, *A Grammar of the New Testament Greek*, translated and edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1873), p. 220.

(2) the form of the condition that suggests future possibility is displaced by that which expresses simple present supposition, and which is often used when the condition is known to be actually fulfilled. The result is to bring the supposition closer home to the actual case, and since it was known both to Paul and his readers that the condition εἴ τις . . . παρελάβετε was at that very time in process of fulfillment, to apply the ἀνάθεμα ἔστω directly to those who were then preaching in Galatia.[1]

The shift from the probable condition to the simple condition serves to place emphasis upon Paul's assumption that there were those at that present time who were preaching a false gospel in Galatia. The emphasis moves from the probable condition with its lack of assumption as to the reality of the case to the simple condition which states such an assumption.

Lenski uses inconsistent terminology when he writes: "Note the difference in the conditional clauses: καὶ ἐάν vividly supposes a case; εἰ in v. 9 takes up the real case that is now occurring in Galatia."[2] Is the first condition being stated vividly or being stated as a possibility? Robertson argues for possibility, even including Paul himself.[3] The better term would be "probability."

Summary

Battle identifies Kinge's statement as "the clearest exposition of conditional present exegesis which this author has found:"[4]

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[1] Ernest DeWitt Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, vol. 35 of *The International Commentary*, edited by Samuel Rolfes Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles Augustus Briggs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921), p. 30.
[2] Lenski, *Galatians*, p. 38.
[3] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, IV, p. 277
[4] Battle, "Present Tense," p. 170.

When εἰ. with the indicative is used, it implies that the truth or otherwise of the condition is regarded as in principle "determined," i.e. is represented as a fact (although the speaker does not commit himself as to whether he believes the condition is true or not).

When can with the subjunctive is used, it implies that the truth or otherwise of the condition is regarded as in principle "undetermined," i.e. is represented as uncertain, either because the condition is conceived as a future occurrence, which may or may not ever take place, or because the condition is a general one which may be realized at any time.[1]

This author agrees with Battle that Kinje provides a succinct summary of the distinction between simple and probable conditions.

A test case may be made of Acts 5:38-39. The first condition, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἡ βουλὴ αὕτα ἢ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο, καταλυθήσεται, regards the source of the Christian sect as "in principle" undetermined and open to future evaluation. This could be paraphrased: "If this counsel or this work is of men (as the future may well demonstrate) . . . ." The second condition, εἰ δὲ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐστιν, οὐ δυνήσεσθε καταλῦσαι αὐτους, represents the situation "as a fact," one that is presently, in theory at least, determined. This may be paraphrased as "but if it is of God (as may be assumed in light of the facts) . . . ." The distinctions fit the case well, and do not put Gamaliel on either side of the debate, for neither condition of necessity conveys the speaker's true convictions.

By examining these examples it may be seen that a distinction is to be drawn between the simple condition and the probable condition in terms of probability or anticipation rather than vividness. The former states the condition as an assumed reality, while the latter presents it as a potential future reality. This is the basic meaning of this condition.

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[1] John Kinje, Jr., "Greek Conditional Sentences," *The Bible Translator*, 13:4 (October, 1962), p. 223.

Translation of the Probable Condition

Are there any general principles which can be derived from this study to guide translators in their handling of the probable condition? In order to answer this question consideration will be given to the opinion of the grammars, then some observations will be made from the New Testament.

The Grammarians' Opinions

A few grammarians have ventured opinions on the translation of at least some types of probable conditions. Chief among them is Moulton who writes:

> The verbs are all futuristic, and the ἄν ties them up to particular occurrences. The present accordingly is conative or continuous or iterative: Mt 6[2] ὅταν ποιῆς ἐλεημοσύνην "whenever thou art for doing alms," 6[16] ὅταν νησεύητε "Whenever ye are fasting, " Jo 2[5] ὅτι ἄν λέγη "whatever he *says* (from time to time)." The aorist, being future by virtue of its mood, punctiliar by its tense, and consequently describing complete action, gets a future-perfect sense in this class of sentence; and it will be found most important to, note this, before we admit the less rigid translation. Thus Mt 5[21] ὅς ἂν φονεύσῃ "the man who has committed murder," 5[47] ἐάν ἀσπάσησθε "if you *have* only saluted him," Mk 9[18] ὅπου ἐάν αὐτὸν καταθάβῃ "wherever it has seized him;" the cast of the sentence allows us to abbreviate the future-perfect in these cases.[1]

He obviously misses the point about the aorist. Such verbs are neither punctiliar because of their tense, nor are they assigned to the future by their subjunctive mood. Were these true, then his suggested translation might be reasonable. Moulton does not discuss any exceptions to this, though he does raise Matthew 5:21 as an apparent problem. He answers this by noting that ἀπολύσῃ "denotes not so much the carrying

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[1] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 186.

into effect as the determination."[1]

Thayer agrees with Moulton, noting that ἐάν with the aorist subjunctive corresponds to the Latin future perfect. He translates Matthew 4:9. ἐὰν προσκυνήσῃς μοι, as "if thou shall have worshipped me."[2] Interestingly enough, none of the versions checked adopted this form of translation, including the Douay-Rheims, Darby's translation, Phillip's paraphrase, the *New English Bible*, *The Revised Standard Version*, and the *New American Standard Bible*. All of them translate these verses (Matthew 4:9, 5:21, 5:47 and Mark 9:18) as English future tenses. This lends support to the objections raised by some against Moulton's position.

The objections come from Robertson mainly and are directed against Moulton's rule of using a future-perfect English verb to translate the aorist subjunctive in these conditions:

> I doubt the propriety, however, of reading a future perfect sense *a la* Latin into this aorist subj. as Moulton does. He cites Mt. 5:47, ἐὰν ἀσπάσησθε, but surely the simple aorist conception is sufficient.[3]

Though he does not discuss this particular verse in *Word Pictures*, he doubtless would have followed all major versions by using the English future and considering the act as one simply stated by the aorist and assigned by context to the future time.

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[1] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 186.
[2] Joseph Henry Thayer, *Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, reprint of the Corrected Edition (Marshallton, Delaware: The National Foundation for Christian Education, n.d.), p. 162.
[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1019.

Burton also objects to the establishment of a uniform rule and offers the best suggestion:

> An Aorist Subjunctive after εαν, οταν, εως, etc. is sometimes properly translated by a Perfect or Future Perfect., but only because the Context shows that the action is to precede that of the principal verb. In the great majority of cases a Present Subjunctive or a Future is the best translation.[1]

His emphasis upon context as the deciding factor is the key consideration, for there are some probable conditions where the context argues against a future perfect translation. As in all cases, the context is the deciding factor.

New Testament Observations

The examples in which the context does not fit a future perfect translation include John 14:3, where the emphasis is upon the future departure of Christ; John 19:2 where the releasing of Jesus was contemplated as a future act; and Romans 15:24 where the filling of Paul by the Roman believers is best understood as a simple, i.e. undefined, future act.

The emphasis of the New Testament is that the context should decide the specific translation. The English should represent as far as possible the sense of the specific tenses. The translator, though, has to remember that the tenses communicate aspect rather than time of action, hence, any tense, especially in the subjunctive mood, may be considered a future act. There is no uniform rule that will govern the specific English verb form selected in each case.

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[1] Burton, *Mood and Tenses*, p. 47.

Summary

The best rule for translation is that of context: each condition must be handled on its own merits and situation. The English should reflect two things. First, the aspect of the verb used in the condition. The undefined aspect of the aorist tense is to be directly translated into English. The continual aspect of the present usually comes into English in the form of a participle. The time considerations of the probable condition are by definition future. Thus the best English combination will be a verb with its helping verbs to communicate both ideas.

CHAPTER V

THE POSSIBLE CONDITION

Introduction

The final category of conditional sentences is noticable for its

relative absence in Koine Greek literature, especially the New Testament.

In fact, this condition is technically outside the scope of this study,

for no complete sentence of this type exists in the New Testament. This

condition is included here, however, for the sake of completeness, though

it is better thought of as a special use of the optative mood.

Technically this condition "is expressed by εἰ with the optative in the

protasis and ἄν with the optative in the apodosis."[1]

Moulton recognizes its absence when he writes that "Neither in

LXX nor in NT is there an ex. of εἰ c. opt. answered with opt. c. ἄν, nor

has one been quoted from the papyri."[2] Consequently it is difficult to

establish firm conclusions about its use in the New Testament. A general

survey of the few partial examples will establish the general signifi-

cance of this condition. First, though, a brief review of the optative

mood will be given.

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[1] H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey, *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 290.

[2] J. H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume 1: Prolegomena*, third edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 196.

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<u>The Optative Mood in General</u>

General Observations

All grammarians agree that the optative mood has been the least used of all the Greek moods. Indeed, it has all but disappeared in Modern Greek, save for the stock phrase μὴ γένοιτο.[1] Robertson observes that Greek was the only language to preserve both the subjunctive and optative moods, but that the former was by far the dominant mood in conversation and writing.[2] Moulton states that the "optative mood was doomed from the very birth of the κοινή . . . ."[3] Obviously it was well on its way to its final demise during the time of the New Testament.

The total number of optatives in the New Testament is not very great. Robertson claims sixty-seven,[4] and this is accepted by Heinz.[5] Although this is a statistically small quantity, the optative mood does make a significant contribution to the comprehension of the New Testament. Since some of that contribution is in the conditional sense, the details of the optative mood will be explored.

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[1] A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 325.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 325-326.

[3] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 240.

[4] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 939.

[5] Vincent Heinz, "The Optative Mood in the Greek New Testament," unpublished Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1962, p. 23.

Specific Classifications

Robertson and others identify three basic uses of the optative mood: Futuristic (or Potential), Volitive and Deliberative.[1] These will be examined below.

The Futuristic (or Potential) Optative

Grammarians who address the subject of the optative mood in detail agree on the significance of the potential optative. Moulton expresses it best: "It was used to express a future in milder form, and to express a request in deferential style."[2] Robertson[3] and Heinz agree with this statement. This particular form of the optative may or may not employ the particle ἄν. New Testament examples of this type of optative may be found in Luke 9:46—τὸ τίς ἂν εἴη μέζων αὐτῶν ("which of them might be the greatest") and Acts 17:18—τί ἂν θέλοι ὁ σπερμολόγος οὗτος λέγειν; ("What might this babbler wish to say?").

Usually the potential optative occurs with the particle αν. This is its usual form which, as Robertson notes, is limited to Luke's writings and is "an evident literary touch."[5] The combination implies a conditional concept, making "one think of the unexpressed protasis of

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[1] A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis, *A New Short Grammar of The Greek Testament* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 311.

[2] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 197.

[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 937.

[4] Heinz, "Optative Mood," p. 31.

[5] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 938.

the fourth-class condition."[1] Burton is more detailed:

> The Optative with $\alpha\nu$ is used to express what would happen on the fulfillment of some supposed condition. It is thus an apodosis correlative to a protasis expressed or implied. It is usually translated by the English Potential.[2]

He lists Acts 8:31—πῶς γὰρ ἂν δυναίμην ἐὰν μή τις ὁδηγήσει με ("How can I unless someone should guide me?") and Acts 17:18 (already quoted) as examples. The specific details of the optative and its conditional use will be discussed below, but this observation illustrates the close link between the two.

The Volitive Optative

The most frequent use of the optative is that of an expression of volition or a wish, hence the term "volitive" and the name "optative."[3] Blass--Debrunner notes that "The optative proper used to denote an attainable wish is still in use in the NT as it is in the the LXX and Papyri (negative μή)."[4] This is the most frequent use of this mood.

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 937.

[2] Ernest DeWitt Burton, *Syntax of Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), pp. 79-80.

[3] Alexander Buttmann, *A Grammar of the New Testament Greek*, translated and edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1873), p. 214.

[4] Friedrich Blass and Albert Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, translated and revised by Rovert W. Funk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 194.

Burton identifies thirty-five such examples in the New Testament,[1] which Moulton corrects to thirty-eight: ". . . which come down to 23 when we drop μὴ γένοιτο. Of these Paul claims 15 . . ., while Mk, Lk, Ac, Heb, I Pet and 2 Pet have one apiece, and Jude two."[2]

Heinz identifies three types of volitive optatives: (a) Optative of Depreciation, (b) Optative of Wishing and (c) Optative of Command. It is also his opinion that the volitive optative "is rare in the New Testament in dependent [including conditional] clauses."[3] Robertson, on the other hand, claims that "The use of the opt. in the protasis of [the possible] condition is probably volitive . . ."[4] This relatively minor problem will be discussed later.

The Deliberative Optative

The optative mood is used in indirect discourse, and Robertson terms this usage the "Deliberative Optative."[5] Blass-Debrunner use the term "oblique optative."[6] Dana and Mantey describe this use as one in which "indirect rhetorical questions are expressed by the optative. In this construction an unusually doubtful attitude of mind is implied."[7]

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[1] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 79.
[2] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, pp. 194-195.
[3] Heinz, "Optative Mood," pp. 24-28, 42.
[4] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1020.
[5] *Ibid*., p. 940.
[6] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 195.
[7] Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, p. 174.

There are few examples of this use in the New Testament, not only because of the scarcity of the optative mood in general, but "simply because of the very strong overall preference for direct discourse" shown in the New Testament.[1]

Heinz questions Robertson's identification of the deliberative optative as a separate use. His thesis argues that the volitive and potential optatives may be used in either dependent or independent clauses. In this he is supported by Moulton, who also speaks of only two uses of the optative.[2] Further, Heinz identifies a separate category which is limited to dependent clauses and "which cannot be satisfactorily categorized as either volitative or potential."[3] This use is termed the oblique optative, in parallel with Blass-Debrunner's terminology. The ultimate resolution of the deliberative or oblique optative question has no effect on the subject of conditional sentences, but it does illustrate the difficulty of precise analysis of relatively few examples.

The Optative Mood in Conditional Sentences

Having given the optative mood a brief overview, its use in conditional sentences will be considered. The form of these sentences as well as their significance will be discussed.

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[1] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*., p. 195.
[2] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, pp. 194-199.
[3] Heinz, "Optative Mood," p. 54.

The Construction

The Format Used

Burton concisely states the form of the probable condition:

> The protasis states a supposition which refers to the future, suggesting less probability of its fulfillment than is suggested by ἐάν with the Subjunctive.
> The protasis is expressed by εἰ with the Optative; the apodosis by the Optative with ἄν.[1]

He then speaks of the absence of this condition in the New Testament:

> There is no perfect example of this form in the New Testament. Protases occur in I Cor. and I Pet., but never with a regular and fully expressed apodosis. Apodoses occur in Luke and Acts, but never with a regular protasis.[2]

Moulton accepts this description and adds that the combination of εἰ with the optative by itself is exceedingly rare:

> We only note here that H[atch] and R[edpath] give no more than 13 exx. from LXX of εἰ c. opt. (apart from 4 Mac and one passage omitted in uncials): about 2 of these are wishes, and 5 are cases of ὥσ(περ) εἰ τις while 2 seem to be direct or indirect questions.[3]

In spite of the absence of any complete example, grammarians agree on the form of this condition.

The Optatives Used

Since there are three types of optatives in the New Testament, it would be useful to inquire as to which one or ones are employed in conditional sentences. The question, of course, is limited to the

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[1] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 106.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 107.
[3] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 196.

protasis, for the use of ἄν with the optative in the apodosis marks it as potential. The optatives in the protasis are not so easily identified.

The Volitive Optative

Moulton identifies the optative in the protasis as a volitive optative, or an optative of wish:

> In hypotasis the optative of wish appears in clauses with εἰ, as is shown by the negative's being μή, as well as by the fact that we can add εἰ, *si, if,* to a wish, or express a hypothesis without a conjunction, by a clause of jussive or optative character.[1]

Robertson agrees: "The use of the opt. in the protasis of this condition is probably volitive, since the negative is μή,"[2]

But does the occurrence of μή automatically indicate a volitive optative? Heinz challenges Robertson and Moulton on this point, for he questions whether the presence of this particle should be so interpreted. His conclusion is that it should not. He examines the eleven examples of εἰ with the optative and concludes that "The optative in the protasis of a fourth class condition is normally potential rather than volitional."[3] He grants that five times the protasis of these conditions has "a slightly volitive" character, but affirms that this "is determined by the element of purpose involved rather than by any demands of grammatical structure."[4] It seems that his reasoning could

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[1] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 196.
[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1020.
[3] Heinz, "Optative Moods," pp. 41-42.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 42.

be reversed and a case made for the volitive over against the potential. The final answer, though, in no way affects the character of the protasis in which it is found; only the semantical "fine tuning" is involved. The meaning stays the same.

The Potential Optative

The potential optative, usually marked by ἄν,[1] is identified by Heinz as the "usual apodosis to the fourth class condition."[2] This agrees with Robertson.[3] The use of the potential optative in the protasis, though, is a subject of disagreement. Moulton identifies the usual type as the volitive optative, since it appears with the particle εἰ and employs μή as its negative.[4] Robertson accepts this, and adds the observation that the potential optative (with ἄν) may appear in the protasis of such sentences.[5] Again, the specific identification of the type of optative is not essential to the meaning of the sentence. The basic significance is the same, regardless of how one identifies the optative involved. The basic constructional pattern will remain the same.

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[1] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 937.
[2] Heinz, "Optative Mood," p. 45.
[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1020.
[4] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 196.
[5] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1020.

The Significance

Exactly what is the significance of the possible condition? Two avenues will be explored in answering this question. First, the opinions of leading Koine grammarians will be investigated. Then, the specific examples of this condition, or rather the fragments of it, will be discussed.

The Grammarians

Burton

Burton supports the idea of probability as opposed to the "less vivid" concept of Classical Greek grammarians. He writes

The protasis states a supposition which refers to the future, suggesting less probability of its fulfillment than is suggested by ἐαν with the Subjunctive.
The protasis is expressed by εἰ with the Optative; the apodosis by the Optative with ἄν.[1]

Moulton agrees with Burton's position, acceptably quoting Blass who also holds to it:

Meanwhile we may observe that Blass's dictum that the εἰ c. opt. form is used "if I wish to represent anything as generally possible, without regard to the general or actual situation at the moment," suits the NT exx. well; and it seems to fit the general facts better than Goodwin's doctrine of a "less vivid future" condition.[2]

This concept might be paraphrased by the English term "possibility" as contrasted with the term "probability," which this author reserves for the subjunctive mood. The latter implies a greater chance of fulfillment than does the former.

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[1] Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 106.
[2] Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 196, note.

Blass-Debrunner

This grammar states: "**Εἰ** with the optative presents something as thought of, without regard for reality or unreality, and emphasizes the hypothetical character of the assumption: 'a potential case.'"[1] Funk, the American editor, repeats this terminology in his own grammar.[2] Again, as with Burton, the emphasis is on the potentiality or possibility of the condition, not its vividness.

Robertson

The fullest description of the significance of this condition comes from Robertson:

> This fourth class condition is undetermined with less likelihood of determination than is true of the third class with the subj. The difference between the third and fourth classes is well illustrated in I Pet. 3:13f. So Jesus draws a distinction in Lu. 22:67. The use of the opt. in both apodosis and protasis accents the remotness of the hypothesis. And yet it is not in the category of unreality as in the second class. It floats in a mirage, but does not slip quite away. It is thus suitable not merely for real doubt, but it also fits well the polite temper of courteous address.[3]

In general, then, the grammarians offer agreement on the significance of this condition. They identify it as one which emphasizes the possibility of the supposition, rather than its probability; its

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[1] Blass-Debrunner, *Grammar*, p. 188.
[2] Robert. W. Funk, *A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of Hellenistic Greek*, 3 volumes (Missoula, Montana: The Society of Biblical Literature, 1973), II, p. 685.
[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1020.

distant potentiality, rather than its closer anticipation. Robertson uses the term "remote" to describe this concept. It was an unfortunate choice, since "possibility" better fits the case. The next step in this discussion is to take a close look at a few New Testament examples of this condition and see what may be learned from each one.

The Specific Examples

Those with the Protasis Implied

Roberts identifies six potential optatives as ones which imply a protasis of the possible type.[1] Each of these will be considered in order.

Luke 1:62.--The first suggested conditional use of the potential optative is Luke 1:62—τί ἂν θέλοι καλεῖσθαι αὐτό ("what he would like to call him"). The stated apodosis (ἂν θέλοι καλεῖσθαι) is thought to imply the protasis "if he could speak." Lenski follows this view:

> The indirect question retains the optative of the direct: "what he would wish him to be called," i.e. if he could speak, a condition of potentiality (εἰ with the optative) in the protasis and the optative with ἄν in the apodosis.[1]

Robertson also supplies the words "if he could speak" and calls this "a conclusion of the fourth-class condition."[2]

The conditional element may not be as obvious as these suggest, though. The English versions do not translate this phrase as a condition.

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[1] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 96.
[2] A. T. Robertson, *Word Pictures in the New Testament*, 6 volumes (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1930), II, p. 17.

The *New International Version*, for example, translates it as "what he would like to name the child." The use of such terms as "would," "might," etc. can communicate the concept of potential choice, and that is what is in view here. The implied protasis is not "if he could speak," but "if he had a choice." Culture, not silence, limited his selection of a name for his son as verses 61 and 63 indicate. It does seem fair to list this passage as an example of an implied condition, but to recognize the condition as referring to a choice. Even in English questions are asked which imply a potential or possible choice, but in point of fact, no choice is possible.

Luke 6:11.--The statement in Luke 6:11—τί ἂν ποιήσαιεν τό Ἰησοῦ ("what they might do to Jesus")--is identified by some as implying the protasis "if they could do something." The remoteness of any opportunity at this point to inflict injury on Him points to the possible condition using the optative. Plummer identifies this as an optative used with an indirect question, though, setting aside the conditional concept.[1] Lenski argues for the conditional idea and expands the statement: "If we had him in our power, what could we do to him."[2] Hendriksen follows Plummer, noting that "the deliberative optative of the direct question is retained in the indirect question."[3]

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[1] Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gosspel According to S. Luke*, volume 28 of *The International Critical Commentary*, edited by Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles Augustus Briggs (Edinburgh: T. g T. Clark, 1896), p. 170.

[2] Lenski, *Luke*, p. 335.

[3] William Hendriksen, *Luke*, p. 325.

So which is it? Does this optative represent an indirect question without conditional overtones, or does it represent a fragment of a possible condition? The answer lies in the context: they talked to one another. This question is one stated in indirect discourse. Thus the optative ποιήσαιεν is not to be understood as a conditional statement, but one of a simple question.

Luke 9:46.--This passage—τὸ τίς ἂν εἴη μέζων αὐτῶν ("which of them would be the greatest")--is very similar to the one above. Again the statement could be understood to be a condition, implying the protasis "if they could be." But it is also a statement of the words of the apostles which is presented in indirect discourse. Lenski tries to have it both ways, noting that the indirect question serves as "the apodosis of a potential condition and the optative with ἀν is left unchanged in the indirect question."[1] The conditional interpretation seems rather forced, since the theoretical direct question of the apostles would not have been put as a condition. It is simpler and more direct to interpret this optative as one of indirect discourse rather than a conditional one.

Luke 15:26.--Here there is less question about the lack of a condition than with the other passages. The statement—τί ἂν εἴη ταῦτα ("what these things might be")--implies no condition. It is just the potential optative with no conditional overtones at all. Roberts

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[1] Lenski, *Luke*, p. 544.

identifies the optative as a conditional and supplies the protasis
"If the fact should be told."[1] This is an unnecessary concept.

Acts 5:24, --τί ἂν γένοιτο τοῦτο ("what might come of this") is
at first glance similar to Luke 15:26 and appears to be a simple potential
optative. But, as Alexander notes, there is a future dimension to the
question here: "The question here was not what it was that they beheld
[as in Luke 15:26], but what it would be, if they failed to use preven-
tive measures."[2] Also, unlike Luke 9:46, the original direct question
could have been stated, in theory at least, as a condition. Here
Robertson's explanation finds more support than the others:

> Second aorist middle optative of *ginomai* with ἄν, the conclusion
> of a condition of the fourth class (undetermined with less likelihood
> of determination), the unexpressed condition being "if the thing
> should be allowed to go on."[3]

Since the question has a future concept to it and since the original
question may well have been put as a condition, this will be accepted as
an example of the conditional use of the optative mood.

Acts 10:17.--Here the optative phrase—τί ἂν εἴη τὸ ὅραμα ("what
the vision might mean")--has no conditional overtones. This verse is
parallel to Luke 9:46, for it asks a question of a present reality. In
spite of the fact that both Robertson[4] and Lenski[5] identify this as an

[1] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 237.
[2] Alexander, *Acts*, pp. 223-224.
[3] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, III, p. 64.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 138.
[5] Lenski, *Acts*, p. 405.

example of an indirect question implying a condition.

Summary.--These six passages which Roberts identifies as being conditional uses of the optative mood need to be reconsidered. One of them (Luke 1:62) is such a passage, one of them (Acts 5:24) might well be one, and the rest are not conditional statements. Examples of this type of conditional statement with the protasis implied are even more elusive than is popularly thought.

Those with the Protasis Stated

In some verses the condition is stated and the conclusion is either implied or stated in the form of another type of conditional sentence. There are no complete examples of conditional sentences using optative moods in both the apodosis and the protasis.

Acts 8:31.--This sentence takes the form of a mixed condition wherein the apodosis used the optative mood and the protasis the indicative—πῶς γὰρ ἂν δυναίμην ἐὰν μή τις ὁδηγήσει με; ("How can I unless someone guides me?"). The protasis is that of a simple condition, though ἐάν is used with the indicative ὁδηγήσει instead of the usual εἰ. The apodosis is that of a possible condition, employing ἄν with the optative δυναίμην. This phenomenon of mixed conditions is something that Robertson calls a "common enough phenomenon in the *Koine*."[1] Alexander's comments are in keeping with Moulton's observations on the optative as an expression of doubt and self-depreciation:

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[1] Robertson, *Word Picture*, III, p. 110.

[This form] expresses in a high degree the speaker's doubt, if not as to the absolute intrinsic possibility, at least as to the actual and present practicability of the thing in question . . . . Besides the modest self-depreciation of this answer, it implies a suspicion, if no more, that the stranger who thus suddenly accosted him was just such a guide and helper as he needed.[1]

The indicative mood in the protasis indicates the real need the Eunuch felt for a guide, and the optative in the apodosis shows how improbably he regarded his comprehension. Doubtless Alexander goes too far when he reads into the indicative the man's recognition of Peter and his role.

Acts 20:16.—ἔσπευδεν γάρ, εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη αὐτῷ, τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς πεντηκοστῆς γενέσθαι εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα ("For he was in a hurry to be in Jerusalem, if it were possible, before the day of Pentecost"). Roberts writes that the phrase εἰ δυνατόν implies "doubt or worry lest the sea voyage should delay his arrival by that time, thus the less probable [possible] condition."[2] But if this is the protasis, what is the apodosis? Both Lenski[3] and Robertson[4] identify this as a possible condition, but neither identifies the implied apodosis. The best answer is that there is none. The statement is simply one expressing doubt in light of the many problems confronting such a voyage.[5]

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[1] Alexander, *Acts*, p. 345.
[2] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 244.
[3] Lenski, *Acts*, p. 835.
[4] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, III, p. 347.
[5] Lenski, *Acts*, p. 835.

The optative mood fits such a context as this, and such an author as Luke.

Acts 24:19.--This verse presents another mixed condition which uses an optative mood in the protasis: οὕς ἔδει ἐπὶ σοῦ παρεῖναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν εἴ τι ἔχοιεν πρὸς ἐμέ ("who ought to be before you and accuse me, if they should have anything against me."). The doubt of the protasis, emphasized by εχοιεν, is reenforced by the contrary to fact apodosis. There was no charge against Paul that was valid in a Roman court, nor were the eye-witnesses present to state such charges as could be presented. Paul employed the optative mood to underline the doubtful nature of the whole proceedings. Lenski objects to the identification of the sentence as a mixed condition, noting that ἔδει may be either "an apodosis of present unreality" or "the imperfect in an obligation that has not been met."[1] The only change this brings about is to identify the apodosis as one that is implied rather than stated. In either case, the protasis implies doubt as to the validity of the charge against Paul.

Acts 27:12.--The clause οἱ πλείονες ἔθεντο βουλὴν ἀναχθῆναι ἐκεῖθεν, εἴ πως δύναιντο καταντήσαντες εἰς φοίνικα παραχειμάσαι ("the majority decided to sail from there, if somehow they might reach Phoenix and winter there") is identified by Robertson as one containing the protasis of a doubtful condition involving the optative δύναιντο.[2] This combination "is a condition of the fourth class with the notion of purpose

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[1] Lenski, *Acts*, p. 974.
[2] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, III, p. 462.

implied and indirect discourse . . . .."[1] Lenski challenges this identifica-
tion, quoting from Robertson's *Grammar* to show that the shift to optative
is accounted for by the indirect discourse of the statement. He argues
that the optative represents either indirect discourse or a conditional
statement, but not both: "Εἴπως with the optative is not a condition of
potentiality . . ., because it occurs in indirect discourse."[2] Heinz does
not commit himself, noting that this optative expresses "aim or purpose,"
but that it also contains "an element of condition."[3] Elsewhere he
speaks of this verb as one that might be introducing indirect discourse,
but which leans "more to the conditional use of the potential optative."[4]
It seems that Lenski's observations about the optative being either
conditional or involved in indirect discourse are valid, but it also
seems that this particular example is hard to classify. In either case,
the general study is not affected, for if this verb is considered
conditional, then its use is typical: expressing mere probability about
the future outcome of a situation.

Acts 27:39.--As Paul and his shipwrecked party survey the
forbidding shoreline of Malta through the mist and spray, they make out
a small bay, a break in the rocky coast, εἰς ὃν ἐβουλεύοντο εἰ δύναιντο
ἐξῶσαι τὸ πλοῖον ("into which, if it were possible, they decided to run

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[1] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, III, p. 462.
[2] Lenski, *Acts*, p. 1072.
[3] Heinz, "Optative Mood," p. 42.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

the ship"). Luke uses the optative δύναιντο either to express an indirect question on the part of the sailors, "as if the sailors had said amongst themselves ἐξῶσομεν εἰ δύναμεθα,"[1] or a condition of vague probability, i.e. possibility. As mentioned above, Robertson implies that both may be true of a given optative verb, but others question the dual function in such cases. Which one is found here is debatable. Moule notes that "In Acts xxvii.39 it is not absolutely clear in which sense εἰ is used: does εἰ βουλεύοντο εἰ δύναιντο ἐξῶσαι mean *they were planning* whether *they could. . ., or they were planning* (if *they could), to* . . . ?"[2] He does distinguish between the conditional and indirect discourse usages, but cannot classify this verse.

Were one to take the optative as that of a condition, then the verse represents the sailors as viewing the possibility of their reaching the safety of the bay as theoretically possible at best. The apodosis, in this case, is not expressed. Certainly the situation was not one to offer much encouragement to the exhausted crew and weakened passengers. Granting the conditional nature of this optative, it fits the general nature of this condition: possibility as opposed to probability.

1 Corinthians 14:10 and 15:37.--Both passages employ the phrase εἰ τύχοι which is identifies by Arndt and Gingrich as "a formula *if it*

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[1] Nicoll, *Greek Testament*, II, p. 534.
[2] C. F. D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p. 151.

should turn out that way, perhaps."[1] This formula is used throughout the Church Fathers, as this lexicon indicates. Robertson observes that these two examples are the only ones in Paul's writing: "Paul has only the stereotyped phrase εἰ τύχοι . . . which is a true example of this protasis, 'if it should happen.'"[2] The only other optative formula found frequently in Pauline writings is the familiar μὴ γένοιτο ("may it not be"), but this one lacks conditional force. Robertson and Plummer explain the phrase in terms of indefiniteness. In 14:10 εἰ τύχοι "implies that the number is large, but that the exact number does not matter."[3] In 15:37 it "indicates an indefiniteness which is unimportant."[4]

I Peter 3:14.—ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ πάσχοιτε διὰ δικαιοσύην ("but even if you should suffer") offers one of the fullest statements of this type of condition in the New Testament, and even this lacks a complete apodosis. Here μακαριοι ("you are blessed") is the closest one comes. The optative mood of πάσχοιτε implies "the slight possibility that God wills such suffering for Christians," according to Roberts.[5] The context, especially

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[1] William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, second edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 829.

[2] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1021.

[3] Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, p. 310.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 370.

[5] Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p. 245.

verse 13 (καὶ τίς ὁ κακώσων ὑμᾶς ἐὰν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζηλωταὶ γένηστε—

"and who is going to harm you if you are zealous for the good?") provides a note

of victory, hence the suffering of verse 14 is viewed as a possible

cloud on the horizon. It may come about, but it is not guaranteed. This

is the emphasis of the optative. Lenski expresses this idea well when he

writes:

> Peter states it thus in the hope that the readers may, after all,
> despite the threatening clouds that are arising in Rome, escape
> special suffering. To say that he indicates an improbability is not
> exact. What he has in mind is not a balancing of probability and
> improbability. When he looks at the future he expresses his own
> desire that the readers may be spared; yet, if this should not be
> the case, it is really of no moment since any suffering that might
> come would be only blessedness. One always speaks subjunctively
> when using conditional clauses. In this connection Peter wants his
> readers to think of suffering only as something that might come.[1]

Winer charts a singular course when he uses this verse to prove

that εἰ with the optative is used to denote subjective possibility "when

a condition is regarded as frequently recurring . . . as I Pet. iii.14 . . ."[2]

Most grammarians, though, limit the sense of the optative to the basic

concept of possibility rather than a repeated situation.

I Peter 3:17.--The other conditional statement which comes the

closest to a complete statement of the possible condition is also found in

I Peter—κρεῖττον γὰρ ἀγαθοροιοῦντας, εἰ θέλοι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ,

πάσχειν ἢ κακοποιοῦντας ("It is better, if the will of God should be so, to

suffer for doing good than for doing evil."). Here again the optative θέλοι

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[1] Lenski, *I Peter*, p. 148.
[2] Winer, *Grammar*, p. 293.

communicates the same basic concept as in 3:14--a potentiality, a possibility of suffering. These two passages, I Peter 3:14 and 17, are considered to be the fullest expressions of this type of conditional sentence, yet both are incomplete.

Translation of the Possible Condition

The possible condition uses the optative mood to communicate the sense of possibility rather than probability. The English language approaches this by the use of such adverbs as "should," "might," "maybe," etc. The use of such terms in the common "if . . . then" formula of conditions can communicate the improbability, the possibility of the condition.

Conclusion

The possible condition expresses a situation about which the speaker has significant doubt. The degree of doubt is sufficient to place the concept in the realm of the less probable, but insufficient to classify it as impossible. This is accomplished by placing the thought in the optative mood. Though rare in the New Testament, this mood expresses the verbal idea as one which is stated as potential. Though the specific type of optatives in the New Testament are classified differently by different grammarians, the basic concept is the same.

The possible condition is as removed from the probable condition as the optative mood is from the subjunctive. Although the optative mood and its possible condition were on their way out of Greek when the New Testament was written, they are still a part, albeit a small part, of

its pages. An understanding of the significance of this mood and its condition helps the interpreted in those passages where the existing fragments occur.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The historical survey of Classical Greek grammarians shows that
the majority of them recognize nine types of conditional sentences. As
the language developed into the Hellenistic phase and then the Koine
of the New Testament, the number of conditional sentences decreased.
Today most Koine grammarians recognize four types of conditions. Of
these, one type is represented only by fragments, for no complete
example of it exists in the New Testament. Thus there are only three
complete types of conditional sentences to deal with in the Greek New
Testament.

Various systems of classification have been suggested for analyzing
conditional sentences. Among Classical grammarians four such systems have
been used. Goodwin argues for time as the basic principle of classifica-
tion. Smyth arranges them according to their fulfillment. Sonnenschein
argues that their form should be the basis of classification. Gilder-
sleeve puts forth the concept of determination as identified by the mood
of the protasis verb as the guiding principle. Gildersleeve's system,
through Robertson, has been accepted by most Koine grammarians.

As applied to the New Testament, Gildersleeve's system identifies
four types of conditional sentences. These are classified according to
the determination implied by each sentence. This implication is based

upon the mood of the verbs employed in the protasis. The four types of determination are (1) determined as real, (2) determined as unreal, (3) determined as probable, and (4) determined as possible.

<div align="center">Simple Conditions</div>

Conditions determined as real are called Simple Conditions. They consist of a protasis which contains the particle εἰ and any tense of the indicative mood. The apodosis may contain any form of the verb. By using the indicative mood the speaker is presenting the condition from the viewpoint of assumed reality. There is no guarantee, absolute or implied, as to the objective reality of the condition. It is merely stated as though it were true. Its conclusion naturally follows and is as valid as the condition upon which it is based.

One common fallacy of students is to read the concept of objective reality into this condition. There is no warrant for such an interpretive step, for any proof of such objective reality must come from the context of the statement and not the statement itself. Although some grammarians have made statements which could be interpreted as supporting this view, no one accepts it.

This condition is called the Simple Condition because it presents the condition-conclusion relationship in its simplest form. The condition is stated as an assumed reality, and the conclusion naturally follows. The latter is as true, and only as true, as is the former.

Unreal Conditions

Conditional sentences which are determined as unreal or unfulfilled are those which state the condition with an implication of unreality. Rather than implying that the condition is true, these imply that it is not true. Such conditions use an augmented form of indicative verbs in the protasus and the apodosis. They usually employ the particles εἰ in the protasis and ἄν in the apodosis. The indicative mood is the correct mood, for the assumption is that the statement is actually unreal. There is no probability or possibility about it.

As with the simple condition, this condition presents only an implication, an assumption, not a direct statement about the condition and its reality or lack of it. The speaker presents his case as one that he assumes to be unreal. There is no guarantee in the statement of its actual or objective unreality. Such objectivity has to come from the context, not from the sentence. This condition is thus termed the Unreal Condition, since it presents the condition as one with an assumption of unreality.

Probable Conditions

Conditional sentences which are determined as probable consist of a protasis containing any form of the subjunctive mood, usually with ἐάν, in the protasis and any form of verb in the apodosis. The subjunctive mood is one which presents an action as potential, rather than actual, and probable, rather than possible. A subjunctive verb is one which could well take place in the future, but about which no guarantee or even

implication of reality can be made. It cannot be stated as having happened, or as one that should not happen, but as one that could happen. An alternative title might be "conceivable," though it seems that the term "probable" is sufficient to describe the concept.

The subjunctive mood enables the speaker to present the condition as one with a significant degree of probability. This act could well take place, but there is a chance that it might not. The most concise title for this concept is Probable as contrasted with Possible. Thus this condition is termed the Probable Condition.

Possible Conditions

The fourth type of conditional sentence exists only in fragments. Its complete form is a protasis consisting of εἰ with an optative mood and an apodosis with ἄν and an optative mood. The use of the optative mood presents the condition in the realm of potentiality, but a realm that is less probable than the subjunctive mood. The speaker does not present the condition as one that cannot happen, but as one that he does not expect to happen. The English term employed for this concept is "possible," as contrasted with the "probable" of the subjunctive mood. Hence this condition is termed the Possible Condition.

Summary

In summary, then, the New Testament presents three complete types of conditional sentences and fragments of a fourth. This author has termed these (1) the Simple Condition, (2) the Unreal Condition, (3) the Probable Condition, and (4) the Possible Condition. In more

expanded form these conditions are:

1. Stated as though assumed real--the Simple Condition

2. Stated as though assumed unreal--the Unreal Condition

3. Stated as though assumed probable--the Probable Condition

4. Stated as though assumed possible--the Possible Condition

If one wished to consider the Possible Condition as a special use of the optative mood rather than a type of conditional sentence, then Moulton's classification becomes eminently usable: Simple Conditions, Unreal Conditions and Future Conditions with the optative being a special case of the third catagory. In either case, the optative condition exists as fragments in the New Testament, reflecting the changing pattern of Koine as opposed to Classical Greek.

Anyone who hopes to give an accurate presentation of the content of the New Testament must take care to handle these conditional sentences properly. He must not read too much into them, nor fail to recognize the fulness of their content.

APPENDIX I

OCCURRENCES OF THE SIMPLE CONDITION

In the following lists, * indicates that the verb has been
supplied and # indicates a textual problem. Unless otherwise noted,
the United Bible Societies' text has been followed.

Protasis Using εἰ with Present Indicative

(221 examples)

Apodosis Using Present Indicative (91 examples)

Matthew	6:23*
	6:30*
	11:14
	12:27
	19:10
	22:45
Mark	9:42
Luke	6:32
	11:19
	12:26
	14:26
	17:2
John	1:25
	3:12
	7:23
	8:46
	13:17
	15:18

Acts	19:38
	25:11
	26:8*[1]
Romans	2:17-19*[2]
	7:16
	7:20
	8:9
	8:10*
	8:13
	8:17*
	8:25
	8:31*
	11:6*
	11:16*
	11:18
	12:18*
	13:9
	14:15
I Corinthians	6:2
	9:2
	9:12*
	9:17
	10:30
	11:16
	14:38#
	15:2
	15:29
	15:44
2 Corinthians	2:2*
	4:3
	4:16
	5:17*
	8:12*

[1] A. T. Robertson, *Word Pictunes in the New Testament*, 6 vols. (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1930), III, p. 445; W. Robertson Nicoll, editor, *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, 5 vols. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), II, p. 503; and R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of the Acts of the Apostles* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 1030, all identify this as a simple condition.

[2] Nicoll, *Testament*, II, p. 599 indicates a textual problem.

2 Corinthians	11:4
	11:6*
	11:15*
	11:20
	12:15#
Galatians	2:14
	3:18*
	3:29*
	4:7*
	5:11
	5:18
	6:3
Philippians	1:22[1]
	2:17
	3:4*
Colossians	2:5
I Timothy	1:10
	3:1
	5:8
2 Timothy	2:13
Hebrews	7:15
	12:8
James	1:26*
	2:8
	2:9
	3:2*
	3:3#
	4:11
I Peter	1:6*
	2:19*
	3:17*
	4:4*
2 Peter	2:6

[1] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Paul's Epistles to Galatians, Ephesians and Philippians* Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 744 identifies this as a simple condition. Robertson, Grammar, p. 1023 identifies it as anacoluthon and in his *Word Pictures*, IV, p. 440 as a condition.

I John   5:9
Revelation   11:5
                13:10
                14:11*

Apodosis Using Present Subjunctive (1 example)
        Galatians   5:25

Apodosis Using Present Imperative (40 examples)
        Matthew   16:24
                        19:17[1]
                        19:21
        Mark   4:23
                        7:16#
                        8:34#[2]
                        11:25
        Luke   9:23
        John   10:24#
                        10:37
                        10:38
        Acts   4:9
                        13:15
                        19:38
                        25:5
        I Corinthians   7:12
                        7:15
                        7:36
                        10:27
                        11:6*
                        11:34
                        14:35
                        14:37
                        16:22

[1] Nicoll, *Testament*, I, p. 249 notes minor evidence [B,D] for the present tense τήρει in the apodosis. Nestle's and the United Bible Societies' texts give no discussion of the problem.

[2] *Ibid*., I, p. 398 indicates that εἴ τις is found in ℵ,B,C,D, L and Δ.

2 Corinthians 13:5
Galatians   1:19
             5:15
Ephesians   4:29*
Philippians 4:8*
2 Thessalonians 3:10
             3:14
I Timothy   5:4
             5:16
Philemon   18
James   1:5
             3:14
I Peter   4:11*
             4:16
I John   3:13
2 John   10

Apodosis Using Imperfect Indicative (2 examples)
     Luke   17:61
     John   8:39#

Apodosis Using Aorist Indicative (6 examples)
     Matthew   12:26
                 12:28
     Luke   11:20
     I Corinthians 8:2

[1] Nicoll, *Testament*, I, p. 592 identifies this as a first class condition; R. C. H. Lenski *The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel* Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 592 calls this three types of conditions; and Robertson, *Word Pictures*, II, p. 226 calls it a mixed condition.

Galatians   2:21*
Colossians   1:21

Apodosis Using Aorist Subjunctive (6 examples)
    Mark   14:35[1]
                  15:36[2]
    Luke   23:31
    I Corinthians 8:13
                  15:32
    2 Corinthians 2:9

Apodosis Using Aorist Imperative (36 examples)
    Matthew   4:3
                  4:6
                  5:29
                  5:30
                  8:31
                  14:28
                  16:24
                  18:8
                  18:9
                  18:28#[3]
                  19:17
                  19:21
                  26:39
                  26:42
                  27:40
                  27:43

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[1] R. C. H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Mark's Gospel* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 636 identifies this as a first class condition.

[2] Nicoll, *Testament*, I, p. 450 identifies this as a future supposition.

[3] *Ibid*., I, p. 243 shows some evidence for ὅ τι as found in T.R. instead of εἴ τι in the modern texts.

Mark	8:34
	9:22
Luke	4:3
	4:9
	9:23
	22:42
	22:67
	23:35
	23:37
John	7:4
	13:7
	18:8
1 Corinthians	3:18
	7:9
	7:21
	11:6
Philippians	2:1*
Philemon	17
I Peter	1:17
Revelation	13:9

Apodosis Using Future Indicative (29 examples)

Matthew	17:4
	17:11
	19:21
Mark	9:35
Luke	11:13
	11:36*
	12: 28*
	16:31
John	3:12
	5:47
Acts	5:39
	18:15
	19:39

Romans   3:5
              8:11
              11:12*
              11:15*
I Corinthians 3:12
              3:14
              3:17
2 Corinthians 11:30
Philippians   3:15
I Thessalonians 4:14
I Timothy   3:5
2 Timothy   2:12
Hebrews   9:14
I Peter   4:17*
              4:18
Revelation   14:9

Apodosis Using Perfect Indicative (10 examples)
Romans   4:14*
I Corinthians 8:3
              9:17*
              15:13
              15:16
I Timothy   5:8
              6:3
James   1:23
              2:11
2 Peter   2:20

Protasis Using εἰ with Aorist Indicative

(56 examples)

Apodosis Using Present Indicative (17 examples)

Mark	3:26
Luke	19:9
John	10:35
	13:14
	18:23*
Romans	3:7
	4:2
	6:8
	15:27
I Corinthians	4:7
	9:11*
	15:32*
2 Corinthians	3:9*
	3:11
Galatians	2:17*
Colossians	2:20
I John	4:11

Apodosis Using Present Imperative (3 examples)

Colossians	3:1
1 Timothy	5:10
Philemon	18

Apodosis Using Imperfect Indicative (6 examples)

Matthew	26:24
Mark	14:21*
John	15:24

Acts　　　　11:17
Galatians　　3:21
Hebrews　　　4:8

Apodosis Using Aorist Indicative (8 examples)

Matthew　　11:21
　　　　　　 11:23
Luke　　　　10:13
Romans　　　5:15
　　　　　　 11:17
I Corinthians 2:8
2 Corinthians 7:12
Revelation　20:15

Apodosis Using Aorist Imperative (3 examples)

John　　　　18:23
　　　　　　 20:15
I Peter　　　2:3

Apodosis Using Future Indicative (16 examples)

Matthew　　10:25*
Luke　　　　11:18
　　　　　　 16:11
　　　　　　 16:12
John　　　　3:12
　　　　　　 13:32#
　　　　　　 15:20 (contains two examples)
Romans　　　3:3
　　　　　　 5:10
　　　　　　 5:17
　　　　　　 11:21
　　　　　　 11:24
2 Corinthians 3:7*

Hebrews   2:2
                 12:25*

<u>Apodosis Omitted</u> (3 examples)

Luke   19:42[1]

Acts   17:27[2]
                 23:9[3]

Protasis Using εἰ with Future Indicative

(22 examples)

<u>Apodosis Using Present Indicative</u> (5 examples)

      I Corinthians 9:11*

      2 Corinthians 5:3

      I Peter   2:20* (contains two examples)

      Revelation   13:10

<u>Apodosis Using Imperfect Indicative</u> (1 example)

      Mark   3:2

<u>Apodosis Using Future Indicative</u> (4 examples)

      Matthew   26:33

      I Corinthians 3:14

                 3:15

      2 Timothy   2:12

[1] Lenski, *Luke*, p. 967.

[2] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, III, p. 288.

[3] E. W. Bullinger, *Figures of Speech Used in the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1968 reprint of 1898 edition), p. 154.

Apodosis Using an Infinitive (2 examples)
        Matthew   24:24
        Mark   13:22
Apodosis in an Elliptical Condition (5 examples)
        Mark   11:13[1]
        Acts   8:22[2]
        Romans   1:10[3]
                       11:14
        Philippians   3:11

Apodosis Omitted Due to Hebraisms (5 examples)
        Mark   8:12[4]
        Hebrews   3:11
                       4:3
                       4:5
                       6:14

Protasis Using εἰ with Perfect Indicative
(12 examples)

Apodosis Using Present Indicative (5 examples)
        Mark   9:42
        Luke   17:2

[1] Robertson, *Word Pictures,* p. 359.
[2] *Ibid*., I, p. 359; also Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 218.
[3] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, IV, p. 325.
[4] *Ibid*., I, p. 331; also Nicoll, *Testament*, I, p. 394.

Acts   25:11
I Corinthians 15:14
                 15:17

Apodosis Using Present Imperative (2 examples)
Acts   16:15
2 Corinthians 10:7

Apodosis Using Aorist Indicative (1 example)
2 Corinthians 10:7

Apodosis Using Future Indicative (3 examples)
John   11:12
                14:7#
Romans   6:5

Apodosis Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
2 Corinthians 2:5

APPENDIX II

OCCURRENCES OF THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION

In the following lists, * indicates that the verb has been supplied, # indicates a textual problem and + indicates that αν is omitted in the apodosis. Unless otherwise noted, the United Bible Societies' text has been followed.

Protasis with εἰ and Imperfect Indicative

(21 examples)

Apodosis using Imperfect (15 examples)

Matthew	23:30
Luke	7:39
John	5:46
	8:42
	9:33+
	9:41
	15:19
	18:36#
	19:11+
Acts	18:14
I Corinthians	11:31
Galatians	1:10
Hebrews	8:4
	8:7
	11:15

Apodosis using Aorist (4 examples)

John	11:21
	11:32
	14:28
	18:30

Apodosis using Pluperfect (2 examples)

Romans	7:7+
I John	2:19

Protasis with εἰ and Aorist Indicative
(16 examples)

Apodosis using Imperfect (7 examples)

Matthew	6:5+
	26:24+
Mark	14:21*+
John	15:22+
	15:24+
Galatians	3:21
Hebrews	4:8

Apodosis Using Aorist (9 examples)

Matthew	11:21
	11:23
	24:22
Mark	13:20
Luke	10:13
Romans	9:29
I Corinthians	2:8
Galatians	4:15+

Revelation   20:15+[1]

Protasis with εἰ and Pluperfect Indicative
(6 examples)

Apodosis Using Imperfect (1 example)
      Acts   26:32+

Apodosis using Aorist (4 examples)
      Matthew   12:7
                      24:43
      Luke   12:39
      John   4:10

Apodosis using Pluperfect (1 example)
      John   8:19

Other Forms
      Matthew   25:27 - protasis implied[2]
      Luke   17:6 - mixed condition[3]
                      19:23 - protasis implied[4]
                      19:42 – aposiopesis[5]
      John   14:2 - protasis implied[6]

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[1] A. T. Robertson, *Word Pictures in the New Testament*, 6 vols. (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1930), V, pp. 464-465 identifies this as a first class or simple condition.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, p. 200.

[3] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1022.

[4] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, II, p. 243.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, p. 246.

[6] *Ibid.*, VI, p. 248.

I Corinthians 12:19 - protasis = εἰ + imperfect, apodosis =
question

Hebrews 7:11 - protasis = εἰ + imperfect, apodosis =
question

APPENDIX III

OCCURRENCES OF THE PROBABLE CONDITION

In this list of the occurrences of the probable condition, all verbs were classified in terms of their form, rather than function. In periphrastic constructions classification was made on the basis of the main verb, and the participle was regarded as a "supplimentary" participle. * means the verb has been supplied, and # indicates a textual variant.

Protasis with ἐάν and Present Subjunctive
(105 examples)

<u>Apodosis Using Present Indicative</u> (53 examples)

Matthew	8:2
Mark	1:40
Luke	5:12
	6:23
John	3:2
	3:27
	5:31
	6:65
	8:16
	9:31
	11:9
	11:10
	13:17
	13:35
	15:4
	15:6
	15:14
	21: 22*
	21:23*
	21:25

Acts   26:5
Romans   2:25
                14:8 (contains 4 examples)
I Corinthians 4:15
                5:11
                6:4
                9:16
                11:14
                11:15
                13:2
                13:3
                14:14
                14:24
I Thessalonians 3:8
I Timothy   1:8*
                3:25
2 Timothy   2:5
James   2:14*
                2:15
                2:17
I Peter   3:13*
I John   1:7
                1:9
                2:1
                2:3
                2:15
                3:20
                3:21
                4:12
                5:14

Apodosis Using Present Imperative (8 examples)
        Matthew   5:23
        John   7:37
                    10:38
                    12:26
        Romans   12:20
                    13:4

I Corinthians 7:36
           14:28

Apodosis Using Aorist Indicative (4 examples)
    John   15:6
    I Corinthians 7:28 (contains 2 examples)
    I Thessalonians 2:7

Apodosis Using Aorist Subjunctive (3 examples)
    Matthew   26:35
    Luke   20:28
    Acts   13:41

Apodosis Using Aorist Imperative (8 examples)
    Matthew   5:23
                10:13 (contains 2 examples)
    Mark   9:45
                9:47
    John   10:38
                15:7
    Colossians   3:13

Apodosis Using Future Indicative (26 examples)
    Matthew   6:22
                6:23
                15:14
                17:20
                21:21
                24:48 (contains 2 examples)
    Luke   10:6
                13:3
                19:31

John	6:62*
	7:17
	12:26
	13:35
	14:15#
	14:23
Acts	5:38
Romans	2:26
	9:27
I Corinthians	14:16
	14:23
	14:24
	16:4
Galatians	5:2
Hebrews	13:23
James	4:15

Apodosis Using Perfect Indicative (2 examples)
      Romans   2:25
      I Corinthians 13:1

Apodosis Using a Participle (1 example)
      Colossians   3:13

Protasis with ἐάν and Aorist Subjunctive
(177 examples)

Apodosis Using Present Indicative (52 examples)
      Matthew   5:46
                     5:47
                     12:29
                     18:12
                     18:13
                     21:26

Mark	3:24
	3:27
	7:3
	7:4
	7:11
	10:12
Luke	6:34*
	12:38
	15:8
John	3:3
	3:5
	6:44
	7:51
	8:31
	8:54
	12:24
	12:47
	13:8
	14:3
	19:12
Acts	15:1
	27:31
Romans	7:3
	11:22
	15:24
I Corinthians	7:8*
	7:39
	7:40
	8:8 (contains 2 examples)
	12:15
	12:16
	13:3
	15:36
	16:7
2 Corinthians	5:1
Hebrews	3:6
	10:38
James	2:15*
I Peter	3:13*

I John   1:6
                    1:8
                    1:10
                    2:1
                    2:29
                    4:20

<u>Apodosis Using Present Subjunctive</u> (3 examples)
     Hebrews   3:7
                    3:15
                    4:7

<u>Apodosis Using Present Imperative</u> (11 examples)
     Matthew   5:23
                    18:15
                    18:17
     Mark   13:21
     I Corinthians 7:11
                    10:28
                    14:30
                    15:10
     Galatians   1:8
                    6:1
     James   5:19

<u>Apodosis Using Aorist Indicative</u> (4 examples)
     Matthew   18:15
     I Corinthians 7:28 (contains 2 examples)
     James   2:2

<u>Apodosis Using Aorist Subjunctive</u> (20 examples)
     Matthew   5:20
                    16:26
                    18:3
                    24:23
                    24:26

Mark	12::19
	16::18#
Luke	20:28
	22:67
	22:68
John	4:48
	8:51
	8:52
	9:22
	11:57
	16:7
	20:25
Acts	9:2
Romans	10:15
2 Corinthians	9:4

Apodosis Using Aorist Imperative (13 examples)

Matthew	5:23
	18:15
	18:16
	18:17
	26:42
Mark	9:43
	11:3
Luke	17:3 (contains 2 examples)
	22:68
John	15:7
I Corinthians	7:11
Colossians	4:10

Apodosis Using Future Indicative (72 examples)

Matthew	4:9
	5:13
	6:14
	6:15
	9:21
	12:11

Matthew	18:2
	18:19
	18:35
	21:3
	21:21 (contains 2 examples)
	21:24
	21:25
	22:24
	24:48
	28:14
Mark	3:35
	5:28
	6:23
	9:50
	11:31
Luke	4:7
	12:45
	13:5
	14:34
	16:30
	16:31
	17:4
	20:5
	20:6
John	3:12
	5:43
	6:51
	8:24
	8:55
	10:9
	11:25
	11:40
	11:48
	12:32
	14:3
	14:14
	15:7
	15:10
	16:7
Romans	7:3
	10:9
	11:23

I Corinthians 4:19
                8:10
                14:6
                14:7
                14:8
                14:9
                14:23
                14:24
2 Corinthians 10:8
                12:6
                13:2
I Timothy   2:15
2 Timothy   2:21
Hebrews   12:20
James   4:15
I John   2:24
                3:2
                5:16
3 John   10
Revelation   3:3
                3:20
                22:18
                22:19

<u>Apodosis Using Perfect Indicative</u> (2 examples)
    Romans   7:2
                14:23

Protasis with ἐάν and Perfect Subjunctive
(7 examples)

<u>Apodosis Using Present Indicative</u> (3 examples)
    I Corinthians 13:2
                14:11
    I John   2:29

Apodosis Using Future Indicative (1 examples)
      I Corinthians 14:11

Apodosis to be Supplied (2 examples)
      2 Corinthians 11:16
      2 Thessalonians 2:3

Apodosis in Aposiopesis (1 example)
      Luke   13:9[1]

Protasis with ἄν and Present Subjunctive
(4 examples)

Apodosis Using Present Indicative (3 examples)
      John   5:19
                    13:20[2]
                    16:23[3]

Apodosis Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
      John   20:23b

Protasis with ἄν and Aorist Subjunctive
(1 example)

Apodosis Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
      John   20:23a

[1] A. T. Robertson, *Word Pictures in the New Testament*, 6 volumes (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1930), II, p. 187.

[2] *Ibid.*, V, p. 242.

[3] *Ibid.*, V, p. 271 discusses the condition and Frederick Louis Godet, *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, 2 volumes, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, n.d., reprint of 1893 edition), II, p. 317 discusses a minor textual variant.

Protasis with εἰ and Aorist Subjunctive
(8 examples)

Luke   9:131
Romans   11:142
I Corinthians 9:11#3
               14:5
Philippians   3:114
               3:125
I Thessalonians 5:106
Revelation   11:5#7

[1] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, II, p. 126.

[2] *Ibid*., IV, p. 395.

[3] W. Robertson Nicoll, ed., *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, 5 volumes (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman's Publishing Co., 1967), II, p. 849 and John Peter Lange, ed., *Commentary on the Holy Scriptures*, 24 volumes reprinted in 12 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1960), X, p. 180.

[4] Robertson, *Word Pictures*, IV, p. 455.

[5] *Ibid*., IV, p. 455.

[6] Robertson, *Grammar*, p. 1017.

[7] Lange, *Commentary*, XII, p. 215.

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