CONDITIONAL
SENTENCES IN THE
NEW TESTAMENT
by
William
E. Elliott
Submitted in partial
fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Theology in
Grace
Theological Seminary
May 1981
Digitized by Ted Hildebrandt, Gordon
College 2006
Title: CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE GREEK NEW
TESTAMENT
Author: William E. Elliott
Degree: Doctor of Theology
Date: May
1981
Committee:
Dr. Charles R. Smith, Dr. John A. Sproule, Dr. Homer A. Kent, Jr.
Increasing interest in the grammar
of the Greek New Testament
has
focused attention upon aspects of the language that have, for the
most
part, been passed over by past grammarians. Among these topics
is
that of conditional sentences. A superficial survey of the lit-
erature
indicates that most writers seem to have the data confidently
in
tow, but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Modern
grammarians
are, for the most part, content to follow the lead of A.T.
Robertson
and classify these clauses in terms of First, Second, Third,
and
Fourth Class conditions. Others, dissatisfied with Robertson's
system
and the extension of it by his followers, have returned to the
terminology,
if not the principles of Classical Greek. The situation
is
uncoordinated at best, for even in Classical Greek studies there
is
significant disagreement upon the classification of these sentences.
The historical background to the
study of conditional sentences
is
presented from both the Classical and the Koine Greek standpoints.
Suggested
systems of classification include Time, Fulfillment, Form
and
Determination. The latter, championed by B.L. Gildersleeve, is
the
preferred system. Determination is indicated by the mood of the
verbs
employed in the protasis. Gildersleeve's system entered Koine
studies
primarily through the work of A.T. Robertson. He employes
four
classes into which he places these conditional sentences.
The Simple Condition, using the
indicative mood, states the
condition
as an assumed reality. There is no necessary connection
between
actuality and the statement. This condition merely presents
the
conclusion as a necessary corollary of the condition.
The Contrary to Fact Condition also
uses the indicative mood
to
present the condition as one that is assumed not true, i.e., con-
trary
to fact. Again, there is no necessary connection between
actuality
and the conditional statement.
The Probable Condition presents the
condition as one assumed
probable,
i.e., one that could easily be fulfilled. The hypothetical
nature
of this condition requires the use of the subjunctive mood.
The Possible condition states the
condition as one that is
assumed
possible, i.e., little likelihood of fulfillment. This con-
dition
utilizes the optative mood, and there is no complete example
of
it in the New Testament.
Two basic concepts underlie all
conditional sentences. First,
the
determining factor is the mood of the verb, not the particle em-
ployed.
Second, all conditional sentences state their case as an
assumption,
never as a direct statement of reality.
Accepted by the Faculty of Grace
Theological Seminary
in partial fulfillment of
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Theology
Examining
Committee:
Charles R. Smith
Homer A. Kent Jr.
John A. Sproule
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER
I. A HISTORICAL SURVEY 4
Conditional Sentences in General 4
Conditional Sentences in Classical
Greek 8
The Importance of
Classical Greek 10
Suggested Classification
Systems 10
Classification
According to Time 11
Classification
According to Fulfillment 18
Classification
According to Form 20
Classification
According to Determination 23
Conditional Sentences in Koine Greek 33
Early Grammarians 34
George Benedict
Winer 34
Alexander
Buttmann 37
Samuel G.
Green 40
Ernest
DeWitt Burton 42
James Hope
Moulton 46
Modern Grammarians 49
Archibald
Thomas Robertson 49
William
Douglas Chamberlain 55
Charles
Francis Digby Moule 57
Friedrich
Blass - Albert Debrunner 60
Nigel Turner 62
H. E. Dana
and Julius R. Mantey 65
Robert W.
Funk 67
William
Sanford La Sor 65
Summary of Koine
Grammarians 71
II. THE SIMPLE CONDITION 73
Introduction 73
The Conditional Particle ei 75
The Significance of ei 75
The Significance of ei with other Particles 77
The Negative Particles in Simple
Conditions 81
Ean with the Indicative
Mood 84
Significance of Moods and Tenses 88
i
ii
Meaning of the Simple Condition 95
Particular and General
Conditions 95
Degree of Reality 98
Translation of the Simple Condition 105
III. THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION 106
Introduction 106
Significance of Tense 110
Imperfect Tense 110
Aorist Tense 113
Pluperfect Tense 115
The Use of An in Contrary to Fact Conditions
116
The Meaning of the Contrary to Fact
Condition 121
The Translation of the Contrary to
Fact Condition 123
IV. THE PROBABLE CONDITION 129
Introduction 129
Analysis of the Probable Condition 131
The Protasis 131
The Apodosis 141
Meaning of the Probable Condition 148
Review of the
Grammarians 148
Evaluation of the
Grammarians 151
Relationship with the
Simple Condition 156
Summary 163
Translation of the Probable
Condition 165
V. THE POSSIBLE CONDITION 169
Introduction 169
The Optative Mood in General 170
The Optative Mood in Conditional
Sentences 174
The Construction 175
The Significance 178
The Grammarians 178
The Specific Examples 180
Those with
the Protasis Implied 180
Those with
the Protasis Stated 184
Translation of the Possible
Condition 191
VI. CONCLUSION
193
Simple
Conditions 194
Unreal
Conditions 195
Probable Conditions 195
Possible Conditions 196
Summary 196
iii
APPENDICES 198
Appendix I: Occurrences of the
Simple Condition 198
Appendix II: Occurrences of the
Unreal Condition 211
Appendix III: Occurrences of the
Probable Condition 215
BIBLIOGRAPHY
226
INTRODUCTION
God created man with the potential for abstract
reasoning, and
his many languages reflect this
through their use of the subjunctive
mood: the mood of contingency
or possibility. Posing questions,
exploring possibilities and
analyzing logical connections are part of
man's reasoning capabilities,
and his languages reflect these skills.
Among the syntactical tools
which accomplish these are conditional
sentences. These sentences,
usually consisting of two clauses,
state a hypothesis and give a
conclusion. In English this corres-
ponds to the "If . . .
then" formula.
This type of sentence, while prevalent in English, is
usually
listed as one of several
subordinate clause relationships.1
By
contrast, the Greek language
presents a more fully developed system
of conditional sentences by
means of which a remarkable degree of
precision may be obtained in expressing
conditional thought. The
Greek conditional sentence
presents both the condition and certain
specific implications about it
in one sentence whereas English needs
both the conditional statement
and qualifying sentences to communicate
the same concept. This
compactness lends itself to greater precision
1 Porter Perrin and
George H. Smith, Handbook of Current
English, third edition, edited
by Jim W. Corder (
Scott, Foresman and Company,
1968), 48-56, 120-121.
2
in the statement of conditional
concepts.
Since conditional sentences are basic to the material of
the
Greek New Testament, a detailed
understanding of conditional sentences
is vital for an accurate
interpretation of its contents. This, then,
is the goal of this study: to
explore conditional sentences so that the
message of the New Testament
may be better understood.
Though all students of Greek, both Classical and Koine,
agree
on the importance of
conditional sentences, few agree on the analysis
of them. A. T. Robertson aptly
describes the situation in Koine studies
when he writes, "In truth
the doctors have disagreed themselves and the
rest have not known how to
go."1 The Classical scene is likewise
muddled, as Blass-Debrunner
notes, "The classical grammars are also hope-
lessly at variance."2
Some of this confusion is due to the absence of a
standard by
which to classify conditional
sentences. Time, degree of reality and
construction have all been
suggested by various grammarians as possible
classification systems.
Further, each grammarian seems to have developed
his own terminology in
discussing the subject, and each argues that his
is best. Indeed, it is possible
to trace the influence of major
grammarians through succeeding
generations by noting who adopts their
terminology in dealing with
conditional sentences.
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of Historical
Research
(
1934),
p. 1004.
2 Friedrich Blass and
Alvert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament and Other
Early Christian Literature, translated and
revised
by Robert W. Funk (
1961), p. 189.
3
Another reason for the lack of standardization may be the
inherent flexibility of the
language itself. Though Classical and Koine
Greek may be considered
fossilized ancestors of Modern Greek, they were
living, functioning languages,
complete with the internal syntactical
elasticity found in living
languages today. Greek, like English, developed
through usage, and patterns so
developed may refuse to be forced into a
logically consistent mold. So,
whether through lack of a standard, or
lack of accepted terminology,
or through syntactical flexibility,
conditional sentences have
provided grammarians with a fruitful area of
contemplation, and students
with a frustrating area of concentration.
This study seeks to offer help to those involved in the
analysis of conditional
sentences by summarizing the work of previous
grammarians and giving a
detailed analysis of each type of conditional
sentence in the New Testament.
The work of past and contemporary
scholars will be surveyed to
give an overview of their studies, agree-
ments, and disagreements. Then
the conditional sentences in the Greek
New Testament will be identified
and analyzed with the help of principles
obtained from the grammatical
survey. Finally, observations will be
offered on the important
matters of translation and interpretation.
The result should be a small
but positive step in gaining further insight
into the meaning of conditional
sentences in the Greek New Testament.
CHAPTER I
A HISTORICAL SURVEY
Since any study necessarily builds upon the work of
others, a
survey of previous studies of
conditional sentences is basic to a
thorough understanding of the
topic. This study will include the work
of both Classical and Koine
scholars.
Conditional
Sentences in General
A brief survey of the technical details of conditional
sentences
will set the scene for the
succeeding discussion and evaluation.
The Definition of
Conditional Sentences
A conditional sentence is a two-clause sentence in which
the
first clause states a
supposition or hypothesis and the second clause
states the results if that
condition is met. The hypothetical clause
which states the condition
("If this . . .") is termed the protasis
and the conclusion clause is
called the apodosis (". . . then
this.").
Herbert Weir Smyth explains it
this way:
A condition is a supposition on
which a statement is based.
A
conditional sentence commonly consists of two clauses:
The protasis: the conditional, or
subordinate, clause,
expressing
a supposed or assumed case (if).
The apodosis: the conclusion, or
principal, clause, expressing
what
follows if the condition is realized. The truth or fulfillment
of
the conclusion depends on the truth or fulfillment of the
conditional clause.1
1 Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar for Colleges (
American Book Company, 1920),
p. 512.
5
The Construction of Conditional
Sentences
The Protasis
As Smyth stated, the protasis stands as the subordinate
or
dependent clause, setting forth
the condition. The term protasis comes
from prosta<sij, "lit. stretching forward, that which is put
forward
(in logic, a premise).1 While the formal sequence is the standard
"If . . . then,"
English, as well as Greek, varies the sequence in
usage: "You will receive
the reward if you do a good job."
The form of the protasis in Greek involves a conditional
particle (ei] or e]a<n) and a
verb. The various combinations of particles
and verbs will be discussed
later. Though the mood of the verb is the
key element in identifying the
type of condition, certain constructions
are fairly standard. Again,
these will be presented later. This
combination of particles and
moods enables Greek to express conditional
thought with a compact
precision lacking in English. The thought of
a few Greek words may take a
few English sentences to be communicated.
The Apodosis
The main or independent clause in a conditional sentence
is
termed the apodosis. This term
comes from "a]podo<sij, lit. giving back,
return;
i. e.
the resuming or answering clause."2 The apodosis may
employ verbs in any tense or
mood, and frequently, in the Koine at
1 Smyth, Grammar, p. 512.
2 Ibid.,
p. 512.
6
least, uses the particle a@n with moods other than the indicative.1
Taken
together, then, the protasis
and apodosis constitute a conditional
sentence.
The Conditional
Particles
The origin of the Greek conditional particles is as
obscure as
their usage is important.
Goodwin, one of the leading Classical Greek
grammarians, succinctly states:
It is impossible to discuss
intelligently the origin of the
conditional sentence until the etymology
and original meaning of
the particles ei],
a@n, and ke< are determined. On
these questions
we have as yet little or no real
knowledge.2
He then gives a brief summary
of what is known about these particles
and concludes:
But here we are on purely theoretical
ground; and we must content
ourselves practically with the fact, that
in the earliest Greek
known
to us ei
was fully established in its conditional sense,
like our if and Latin si.3
1 H. E. Dana and Julius
R. Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the
Greek New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 288.
2 William Watson Goodwin,
Syntax of the Mood and Tenses of the
Greek Verb (Boston: Ginn &
Company, 1893), p. 142.
3 Ibid.,
p. 143.
7
ei]
Liddell and Scott trace the origin of ei] back to its use in
Homer where it is sometimes
replaced by the Doric ai].1 It introduces
either conditional clauses or
questions and is regularly used with the
indicative mood.2 Its consistent translation in conditional
clauses is
"if." The
relationship of this particle, the indicative mood and the
assumed reality of the condition
will be discussed later.
e]a<n
Ean is a
combination of ei and an, according to Dana and
Mantey.3 Smyth remarks that "The etymology of e]a<n is uncertain:
either from h] + a@n or
from ei] + a@n.”4 This particle introduces
conditions in the subjunctive
mood, though it is not limited to this
mood:
The difference between ei] and e]a<n has been considerably
lessened
in Hellenistic as compared with earlier
Greek. We have seen that
e]a<n can even take the
indicative; while (as rarely in classical
Greek) ei] can be
found with the subjunctive.5
1 Henry George Liddell
and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,
Vol.
I, edited by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie (
At
the Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 480. See also William Watson
Goodwin,
An Elementary Greek Grammar (Boston:
Ginn Brothers, 1872),
p.
263.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 246.
3 Ibid., p. 245.
4 Smyth, Grammar, p. 512.
5 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, Volume
I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 187.
8
This caution should guard
against absolute rules, but the general
principle is that e]a<n utilizes the subjunctive mood while ei] employs
the indicative. Again, the
specific implications of this regarding the
assumed reality of the
condition will be discussed later.
These conditional particles are similar to particles of
interjection in Homeric Greek
and related languages. N. D. Coleman
suggests that the conditional
particles "appear to have been inter-
jections in the first
place."1 J. B. Greenough
tries to push the
origin of the conditional
sentence and its attendant particles back into
the frontiers of the
Indo-European linguistic heritage: "We are
naturally led to conclude that
this [conditional] construction was in
use more or less in
Indo-European times and was received by each of the
languages as a part of the
original inheritance."2 Whatever
the source
of these particles, conditional
sentences were a vital part of the
language of both Classical and
Koine Greek and play a vital role in the
Greek New Testament.
Conditional Sentences
in Classical Greek
Prior to the discovery of the papyri and the
comprehension of
their linguistic significance,
Biblical Greek was considered to be
1 N. D. Coleman,
"Some Noteworthy Uses of ei] in Hellenistic
Greek
with a Note on St. Mark viii 12," The
Journal of Theological
Studies, 27:1 (April, 1976), p.
159.
2 James B. Greenough,
"On Some Forms of Conditional Sentences
in
Latin, Greek and Sanskrit," Transactions
of the American Philo-
logical
Association, 2:2 (June, 1871), p. 164.
9
a unique species of that
language, sometimes referred to as "Holy Ghost
Greek."1 This was, of course, a false position, for the
Greek of the
New Testament was simply the
language of the common man as found in
"the street and market
place."2 This was
distinguished from Hellenistic
Greek, a direct descendant of
Attic or Classical Greek. While some
New Testament writings show
distinct Hellenistic influence, such as
Luke, Acts and Hebrews, others
are distinctly Koine. This is not
because the writers, according
to Moulton, used Greek "as foreigners,
Aramaic thought underlying
Greek expression."3 Rather
it is due to
the individual writers using
the language closest to them, each reflecting
their own blend of Hebrew and
Hellenistic cultures. As the result of
pioneering efforts by men like
Adolf Deismann in analyzing the papyri,
"Biblical" Greek
became identified as the language of the common man,
the Koine Greek. To be sure, it
still reflected the Hebrew idiom of
the authors, but it was Koine
none the less. A. T. Robertson sums up
the current understanding of
New Testament Greek:
The Greek of the New Testament that
was used with practical
uniformity over most of the Roman world
is called the Common Greek
or koinh<. Not that it was not
good Greek, but rather the Greek
in common use. There was indeed a
literary koinh< [Hellenistic
Greek] and a vernacular koinh<. Plutarch is a good specimen of the,
literary koinh< while the papyri are
chiefly in the vernacular koinh<
like most of the New Testament.4
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, pp. 9-15.
2 W. White, Jr.,
"Greek Language," The Zondervan
Pictorial
Encyclopedia of the
Bible,
5 vols., Merrill C. Tenney, editor (Grand
Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1977), II, pp. 827-828.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 3.
4 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New York: A. C. Armstrong E.
Son, 1908), p. 6.
10
The Importance of Classical
Greek
If the Koine of the New Testament is in the mainstream of
linguistic development and
expression, does it have any significant
connection with the literary
history of the language as a whole, and
with Classical Greek
specifically? Yes, answers Robertson:
This
koinh< was itself the heir of the past. The various Greek
dialects blended on an Attic base. The koinh< was thus richer in
expression as to words and forms than
any of the older dialects.
Compare the relation of modern English to
the various tongues that
have contributed to its power and
expansion. Ionic, Doric, Aeolic,
North West Greek and other dialects have made
some contribution to
the common result. The use of nominatives
in the midst of accusa-
tives in the Boeotian, for instance, is
strangely like the Book of
Revelation. So the absence of the future
participle is like the N.T.1
This heritage, then, is sufficient justification for
beginning
the study of conditional
sentences in Classical Greek, the language
of the period from Homer to the
Alexandrian conquests (c. 330 B.C.).2
This language constituted the
"chief basis of New Testament Greek,"3
thus its handling of
conditional sentences has important effects on
the Koine Greek.
Suggested Classification
Systems
How, then, did Classical Greek scholars classify
conditional
sentences? In general, they
seemed to follow one of three systems.
C. D. Chambers outlines them as
follows:
1 A. T. Robertson, A
Short Grammar, p. 6.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar,
p. 6.
3 Ibid., p. 6.
11
There are three possible ways of
classifying conditional
sentences, viz. (i) by time, (ii) by
fulfillment, (iii) by form.
The first is the system of Prof. Goodwin,
the second is proposed by
Mr. Donovan . . . and the third that of
Mr. Sonnenschein.l
Though the situation is not as
absolute as Chambers suggests, his
comments serve as a useful
guide to the discussion of conditional
sentences in Classical Greek.
Classification According to
Time
The classification most familiar to American students of
Classical Greek is that of
William Watson Goodwin. As Professor of
Greek Literature at
ficant influence on Greek
studies in the
book, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, was published in
1860 when he was twenty-nine
years of age. Ten years later he published
An
Elementary Greek. Grammar.2 The importance of these works may be
judged by the fact that both
are still in print. His influence
extended into New Testament
studies through the work of Ernest DeWitt
The statement of the system.--Goodwin sets forth
his system in
terms of past, present and
future conditions:
1 C. D. Chambers,
"The Classification of Conditional Sentences,"
The Classical Review, 9:2 (May, 1895), pp.
293-294.
2 Chalmers G. Davidson,
"Goodwin, William Watson," Dictionary
American Biography, Vol. IV, edited by
Allen Johnson (
Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp.
411-413.
12
The most obvious natural distinction
is that of (a) present
and past conditions and (b) future conditions. Present and past
conditions (a) are divided into two
classes by distinguishing (1)
those which imply nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition
from (2) those which imply that the
condition is not or was not
fulfilled. Future conditions (b) have two
classes (1, 2), distin-
guished by the manner in which the
supposition is stated. Class 1
of present and past conditions is further
distinguished on the
ground of the particular or general
character of the supposi-
tion . . . .1
Goodwin also includes the concepts of (a) fulfillment or
non-
fulfillment and (b) particular
and general characteristics as other
features by which conditional
sentences may be classified. The first
leads him to identify
conditional clauses as (1) those which imply
nothing as to the fulfillment
of the condition, (2) those which imply
fulfillment of the condition
and (3) those which imply the nonfulfillment
of the condition.
He explains the particular and general characteristics:
A particular supposition refers to a
definite act or to several
definite acts, supposed to occur at some
definite time (or
times) . . . .
A general supposition refers
indefinitely to any act or acts
of a given class which may be supposed to
occur or to have
occurred at any time . . . .2
The form of the conditional sentence may serve as a guide
to
its identification and
classification under these headings. A later
edition of his grammar
summarizes this:
I. Present and past suppositions implying nothing as to
ful-
fillment or
condition:
(a) Chiefly particular:
(protasis) ei] with
indicative
(apodosis) any form of the verb
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 139.
2 Ibid.,
p. 141.
13
(b) General:
1. (protasis)
e]a<n with subjunctive
(apodosis) present indicative
2. (protasis)
ei] with
the optative
(apodosis) imperfect indicative
II. Present and Past suppositions implying that
the condition is
not fulfilled:
(protasis)
ei]
with past tense of indicative
(apodosis) past
tense of indicative with a@n
III. Future suppositions in
more vivid form:
(protasis)
ei]
with subjunctive (sometimes ei] with future
indicative
(apodosis) any
future form
IV. Future suppositions in less vivid form:
(protasis)
ei]
with optative
(apodosis)
optative with a@n1
Smyth also adopts this system
of classification.2
The evaluation of the system.--The first point in
evaluating
Goodwin's system is that of
time. He seems to make time a basis of
classification when absolute
time is of secondary importance in the
Greek verb system. Goodwin
himself notes that relative time is far more
prominent in Greek verbs than
in English: "It is a special distinction
between the Greek and the
English idioms, that the Greek uses its verbal
1 William Watson Goodwin,
Greek Grammar, revised by Charles
2 Smyth, Grammar,
pp. 513-516.
14
forms much more freely to
denote merely relative time."1 A. T. Robertson,
noting that absolute time is
limited to the indicative mood, warns that
"even in the indicative
the time element is subordinate to the kind of
action expressed."2
While his reference to "kind"
of action may be
questioned, his observation on
time is helpful.
But is Goodwin basing his classification on time as
indicated
by the verb itself, or on
absolute time as indicated by the sentence as
a whole? The examples he offers
as illustrations seem to place the
emphasis upon the verb rather
than the syntax. Thus he presents: "Ei]
pra<ssei
tou?to, kalw?j e@xei, if he is
doing this, it is well; ei] pra<ssei
tou?to,
h[marthke<n, if he is doing this,
he has erred; ei] pra<ssei
tou?to,
kalw?j
e@cei, if he is doing this, it
will be well."3 One may well argue
that the syntax of a verb does
assign it absolute time in any given
context. But Goodwin does not
stress the role of syntax in establishing
the time of his verb. One must
therefore question any system of
classification which makes absolute
time as found in the verb itself a
foundation criterion.
Second, his distinction between particular and general
conditions
may be questioned as an
objective standard of classification. Goodwin
argues that
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 8.
2 A. T. Robertson, Grammar, p. 825.
3 Goodwin, Syntax
of Moods, p. 139.
15
When the apodosis has a verb of
present time expressing a
customary or repeated action, the
protasis may refer (in a general
way) to any act or acts of a given class
which may be supposed to
occur at any time within the period
represented in English as
present. Thus we may say:--
Ea@n ti<j
kle<pth, kola<zetai, if
(ever) any one steals, he is
(in
all such cases) punished . . . .1
Goodwin's concept of a present general condition seems to
fit
conditional sentences in the
New Testament, such as I John 1:7: e]a<n de>
e]n
t&? fwti> peripatw?men. . . , koinwni<an e@xomen - but
if (whenever) we
walk in the light . . . we have
(in such cases) fellowship. But what
about conditions such as Luke
5:12? Here the apodosis uses a present
tense, but the condition must
be considered a particular one, limited
to the historical situation: ku<rie, e]a<n
qe<lhj, du<nasai< me kaqari<sai -
Lord, if you are willing you
are able to cleanse me.
What is the difference between these two sentences?
Simply
that the apodosis of I John 1:7
contains a present tense verb which
expresses a "customary or
repeated action," while that of Luke 5:12
does not. There can be no
question that the condition in I John 1:7
states a general situation that
is presently true for all believers,
but such identification depends
upon the interpretation of the action
represented by the verb. Could
it be possible for interpreters to
disagree over the
interpretation of a given verb? Yes, it could.
Should the basis of
classification be a point that is interpretative
in nature? It seems reasonable
to answer in the negative. Since, then,
there is no objective way of
determining if a verb is referring to a
1 Goodwin, Syntax
Mood's, p. 141.
16
general or a particular act,
the final determination becomes one of
interpretation rather than
form. The concept of general versus particular
may serve as an interpretative
guideline, but it is not distinguished by
form. "That point [of
present or general conditions]," writes A. T.
Robertson ,"has no bearing
on the quality of the condition."1 Though
several modern New Testament
grammarians continue this terminology,
it must be questioned as a criterion
to the objective analysis of
conditional sentences.
Another point to consider in evaluating Goodwin's
classifica-
tion system is his concept of
fulfillment or non-fulfillment as found
in the condition. Robertson has
particular problems with Goodwin's
concept that conditions
employing the indicative mood in the protasis
imply nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition. This, as
Robertson sees it, violates the
very nature of the indicative mood:
The words to which I object, besides
"particular," are "implying
nothing as to the fulfillment of the
condition." This condition
pointedly
implies the fulfillment of the condition. It is the
condition of actuality, reality, Wirklichkeit, and not mere
"possibility" as Farrar has it
. . . a la Goodwin.2
Robertson claims that Goodwin
"confuses the 'fact' with the 'statement'
of the fact."3
This seems a bit harsh, for Goodwin himself writes:
"The Greek has no form
implying that a condition is or was fulfilled,
and it is hardly conceivable
that any language should find such a form
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
2 Ibid., p. 1006.
3 Ibid.,p.
1006.
17
necessary or useful."1
This would amount to a direct statement,
for
if the condition is fulfilled,
then the results are realized. Such a
statement would not be a
conditional statement at all, but a statement
of actuality. While the
specific topic of reality in conditional
sentences will be examined in
detail later, the important point is that
Robertson had serious doubts
about the validity of Goodwin's classifica-
tion scheme.
Another minor point of criticism leveled against Goodwin
is
that of terminology. J. W.
Roberts notes that "Others have attacked
Goodwin's terms 'more' and
'less vivid' as describing the significance
of his third and fourth class
conditional sentences," but gives no
supporting references.2
Robertson did not use this terminology,
and
those who followed have also
set it aside. Some contemporary grammarians,
though, are returning to it.
Both Robert W. Funk and William S.
La Sor speak of
"vivid" and "less vivid" concepts when discussing
conditional sentences in their
grammars. This point is not foundational
to the analysis of Goodwin's
system, and will be discussed later.
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 140.
2 J. W. Roberts,
"The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Hellenistic
Uses,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the
1955,
p. 20.
3 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of Hellenistic
Greek (Missoula, Montana:
The Society of Biblical Literature, 1973),
p.
684; and William Sanford La Sor, Handbook
of New Testament Greek,
vol.
II (Grand. Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973),
pp. 221-225.
18
In summary, then, Goodwin is the main proponent of
Chamber's
first suggested criterion for
classifying conditional sentences: Time.
The main point of Goodwin's
system is the classification of these
sentences into past, present
and future conditions. Some of these
categories are further divided
into "particular" and "general" condi-
tions, and some of these are
subdivided by "vividness."
Criticism of his system has focused on (1) his use of
time as
a main dividing point, (2) the
characteristics of particular and
general, (3) the implication of
fulfillment and (4) his terminology.
The majority of Koine
grammarians today, operating under the influence
of A. T. Robertson, do not
follow Goodwin's system, though some show
signs of returning to it.
Classification According to
Fulfillment
The second criterion suggested by Chambers for
classifying
conditional sentences is that
of fulfillment, i.e. cataloging them
according to the fulfillment or
non-fulfillment of the condition.
The statement of the system.--Herbert Wier Smyth
follows this
system, noting that conditional
sentences may be classified according
to form and function. Among the
functions he lists is "fulfillment or
non-fulfillment."1
J. Donovan also champions this method of
classifica-
tion, and his argument is worth
pursuing. He uses a book review essay
as an opportunity to argue his
case in The Classical Review. The
grammar
1 Smyth, Grammar,
p. 514.
19
he is reviewing argues for the
position of classification by form, and
Donovan rejects this approach.
He argues that different meanings may
have the same form. He
concludes by writing: "What is wanted is not that
there should be a search for
'would be' or 'should be' or 'might be'
or other variations; but
recourse should at once be had to the universal
canon of fulfillment or
non-fulfillment."1
Further, recognizing that his position had already been
challenged, he adds a note of
defense:
After the campaign recently conducted in
the pages of this Review
against the very principle of fulfillment
as a basis of classifica-
tion, one point is now clear, if it was
not so already, namely,
that to be regarded as unfulfilled, a
condition need not necessarily
be so actually,
but that it is enough that it should be assumed
to be such.2
Thus Donovan elevates the
concept of fulfillment or non-fulfillment to
the status of a "universal
canon" for the classification of conditional
sentences.
The evaluation of the system.--Donovan's review
brought a rapid
response from Chambers who
defended the position in question. His
rebuttal begins with a summary
of Donovan's principle:
Therefore the universal canon resolves
itself into this: Conditions
are to be divided into (i) those which
imply or assume without
implying that the condition is not
fulfilled, and (ii) those which
do not assume or imply that the condition
is not fulfilled.3
1 J. Donovan,
"Sonnenschein's Greek Grammar," The
Classical
Review, 9:1 (January, 1895),
p. 64.
2 Ibid., p. 64.
3 Chambers, "Classification," pp.
293-294.
20
He then offers three serious
objections to Donovan's position. First,
Chambers observes that this
produces an imbalance in grammar. Condi-
tions implying non-fulfillment
are relatively rare in the language and
should not be the basis of
classification. Second, the terminology is
awkward at best and hardly fits
the need of the beginning composition.
Since Chambers is speaking of
English to Greek composition, his comment
has little reference to this
study. Third, and more to the point,
Donovan's scheme does not fit
all cases. The majority of grammarians
have not followed his
suggestions. The concept of fulfillment does, as
Goodwin notes, play a role in
our understanding of conditional sentences,
but it does not provide a
sufficiently applicable standard upon which to
classify them.1
Classification by Form
The third criterion Chambers suggests is classification
by the
form of the conditional
sentence. Among the classical grammarians who
have followed this approach is
E. A. Sonnenschein, professor of Greek
and Latin at
The statement of the system.--Sonnenschein writes:
To me the ordinary forms of
Conditional Sentences, whether in
Latin, Greek or a modern language,
present themselves in two great
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 139.
2 S. B. Sedwick,
"Sonnenschein, Edward Adolf," Dictionary
of
National Biography, 1922-1930, edited by J. R. H. Weaver (
21
classes, the distinction between which is
marked by certain well-
defined differences both of meaning and of
linguistic form.1
Form, for him, helps determine
the meaning, for in his classification
"there is a coincidence between distinctions of form
and distinctions of
meaning."2
Chambers supports this principle, noting that "It is
axiomatic that the division by
form, and not by sense, is the truly
scientific one, because like
forms must (originally at least) have like
meanings, but like meanings
need not have like forms."3
Smyth notes that several possibilities exist with regard
to
classification according to
form:
Classified according to form, all
conditional sentences may be
arranged with regard to the form of
the protasis or of the apodosis.
Protasis: ei] with the indicative.
e]a<n (rarely ei]) with the subjunctive.
ei] with the optative.
Apodosis: with a@n,
denoting
what would (should) be or have been.
without a@n, not denoting what would (should) be or
have
been.4
Which of these possibilities should be followed if
conditional
sentences are to be classified
by form? "Ought we to classify according
to the Protasis (Subordinate
Clause) or according to the Apodosis
1 E. A. Sonnenschein,
"Horton-Smith's Conditional
Sentences,"
The Classical. Review, 9:2 (April, 1895), p.
221.
2 Ibid., p. 221, italics added .
3 Chambers,
"Classification," p. 294.
4 Smyth, Grammar,
p. 513.
22
(Principal Clause), or
according to both at once?"1 Sonnenschein opts
for the Apodosis as the
standard. Roberts outlines his system so:
I.
Type One: Sentences without a@n in the apodosis: the
protasis
expressing no
implication of fulfillment.
ei] with a Past Indicative
expressing what was
ei] with a Present
Indicative expressing what is
e]a<n with a Subjunctive
expressing what is or what will be
Also e]a<n h] –
e@stai "If
A is B," followed by a command or wish.
II. Type Two: Sentences with ay in the apodosis:
the protasis
expressing some sort of implication
as to fact or fulfill-
ment.
ei] with the
Optative--Optative with a@n expressing what
would be
ei] with a Past
Indicative--Past Indicative with a@n expressing
what would be
III. Type Three: ei] ei@h . . .
e@stai (or e@sti) expressing in the
protasis some sort of mental reservation.2
Evaluation of the system.--Donovan, as indicated
above, claims
that this system leads to more
problems than solutions in application.
Even Chambers wonders
"whether this was the original principle of
division, or only its
accidental final result."3 The basic problem is
the occasional divergence
between form and meaning. Although the use of
form does offer an objective
standard of classification, is it reasonable
to pursue it when it does not
coincide with the real world? As will be shown
Sonnenschein is on the right
track, but the emphasis requires a slight
1 Sonnenschein,
"Horton-Smith," p. 220.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 12.
3 Charmers, "Classification," p.
294.
23
shift in order to be workable.
Classification by Determination
Chambers omitted a fourth basis of classification of
conditional
sentences, that of
determination. This approach, popularized by B. L.
Gildersleeve and followed by
many other grammarians, was first published
in 1876 and again in 1882.1
It seems strange that Chambers, writing
in
1895, was unaware of it.
The statement of the system.--Gildersleeve states
his case so:
In common with most grammarians, I
divide the conditional
sentences into four classes, for which I
have been in the habit of
using the designations
"Logical," "Anticipatory," "Ideal,"
"Unreal." If nothing more can be
said in behalf of this nomenclature
than that it saves time, something at
least has been said; and I am
glad to learn that a part of this
nomenclature, as applied to the
Latin language, has found favor among
teachers. Logical, Ideal, and
Unreal conditions occur in Latin also. The
Anticipatory is
peculiar to Greek.2
He describes the Logical Condition as one that
. . . states the elements in question. It
is used of that which
can be brought to the standard of fact; but
that standard may be
for or against the truth of the postulate.
All that the logical
condition asserts is the inexorable
connexion [sic] of the two
members of the sentence.3
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"On ei]
with the Future Indicative and ean
with
the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," Transactions
of the American
Philological Association, 7:1 (January, 1876),
pp. 2-23; and “Pindaric
Syntax,”
pp. 434-445.
2 Gildersleeve, "On ei]," pp. 5-6.
. 3 Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 435.
24
This type of condition
corresponds to Robertson's First Class condition.1
The Anticipatory Condition involves e]a<n in the protasis, and thus
corresponds to Robertson's
Third Class condition. Interestingly enough,
Gildersleeve agrees with
Goodwin in his concept of particular and
general ("generic"),
noting that "The anticipatory condition is
particular or generic according
to the character of the apodosis . . .,
just as any other conditional
sentence."2 The key
element is the
use of the present indicative
in the apodosis. Such a condition "is
regularly generic."3
Gildersleeve's Ideal Condition employs the optative mood
and
"seems to have been
developed out of the wish, just as the anticipatory
was developed out of
demand."4 This corresponds to Robertson's Fourth
Class condition. Since the New
Testament has no complete sentence of
this type, his comments on it
are beside the point of this study.
His fourth type of condition is termed the Unreal
Condition,
corresponding to Robertson's
Second Class condition. Rather than use
the term non-fulfillment as
does Goodwin, he speaks of it as
"futureless."
The Unreal. Condition, 'the hypothesis
contrary to fact,' seems
to be related to the hopeless wish, as
the ideal condition to the
wish pure and simple . . . . A wish may
be madly impossible, but
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
2 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 436.
3 Ibid., p. 435.
4 Ibid.,
p. 436.
25
if it belongs to the domain of the future
it is optative. Now the
hopeless wish is hopeless because it is
futureless . . . .1
In simple language, this
condition states a condition as though there
is no hope whatsoever of its
being fulfilled. It implies its non-
fulfillment.
Thus Gildersleeve divides conditional sentences into two
broad
catagories: the first
containing those which imply something about the
determination of the condition,
and the second containing those which
imply nothing about its
determination. The first catagory is subdivided
into two classes: those which
imply positive fulfillment of the condi-
tion and those which imply
negative or non-fulfillment of the condition.
The second catagory also is
subdivided into two classes: those
conditions with a greater
degree of probability and those with a
lesser degree of probability.
Roberts summarizes this in outline
form:
I. Condition determined
A. As
fulfilled - the Simple or Logical Condition
past
Protasis: ei] with an indicative
present
future
Apodosis: Any form of verb
B. As
unfulfilled - the Unreal Condition
Protasis: ei] with a
past indicative
Apodosis: Past indicative with a@n
1 Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 437.
26
II. Condition undetermined
A. With greater prospect of
fulfillment - The Anticipatory
Condition
Protasis: e]a<n with
the subjunctive
Apodosis:
Usually future, except for the general, which has
the present indicative
B. With less prospect of fulfillment - The Ideal
Condition
Protasis: ei] with
the optative
Apodosis: Optative with a@n1
The comparison of the system.--A comparison of
this outline with
that of Goodwin's system on
pages 12-13 or with the chart in Smyth's
grammar will indicate
Gildersleeve's points of departure.2
These may
be listed as:
1. No attempt is made to utilize the time of the
condition as a
guide to the classification of
the sentence.
2. No attempt has been made to divide them into
particular
or general on the basis of the
protasis. Each of these may, in
Gildersleeve's opinion, be
particular or general, depending on the
apodosis, but that is not a basis
of classification.3
3. Mood, rather than tense is emphasized as one of the
important
features of the protasis.
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 22.
2 Smyth, Gammar, p. 516.
3 He does approve of such
a distinction as a guide to interpre-
tation.
See "On ei]," p. 7.
27
4. No attempt is made to distinguish general and
particular
conditions by form, though he
does recognize that the Anticipatory
condition (e]a<n with the subjunctive in the protasis) is
more often than
not a general condition.
5. The Future Condition (called by Smyth the "Future
Emotional"1)
is identified as a simple or
logical condition on the basis of the
indicative mood.
This system has been followed by a significant number of
Koine
grammarians, including men such
as Winer,2 Buttman,3 Robertson,4 and
Blass-Debrunner.5
The evaluation of the system.--There are three
points which need
to be considered in evaluating
his system. First, the above-mentioned
1 Smyth, Grammar, p. 516.
2 G[eorge] Benedict] Winer,
A Grammar of the Idiom of the New
Testament, seventh edition,
revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated
and
edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher,
1893), p. 291.
3 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek,
translated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher,
1873), p. 220.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1004.
5 F[riedrich] Blass and
Albert] Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of
the New Testament and Other
Early Christian Literature, translated and
revised
by Robert W. Funk (
1961), pp. 188-189.
28
point regarding present and
general conditions needs to be summarized.
Gildersleeve maintains that any
conditional sentence may be particular
or general "according to
the character of the apodosis."1 The
particular character he looks
for is the use of the present tense. This
is true, according to him, of
all conditions, including the Logical and
Anticipatory conditions:
Hence when [the logical condition] has its
apodosis in the present,
it has a double meaning, which adapts it admirably
to personal
argument. So especially when the form ei]
tij is
used, which may
point either to a definite or to an
indefinite person, the Logical
condition is a two-edged sword, often
wielded in the keen encounter
of Attic wit. But as the e]a<n conditional with a
present indicative
apodosis is regularly generic, it is not
without reason that this
form should be preferred, when distinctly
generic action is to be
expressed.2
New Testament examples which illustrate his point include
Matthew 19:10 (ei] ou!twj e]sti<n h[ ai]ti<a tou? a]nqrw<pou
meta> th?j
gunaiko<j,
ou] sumfe<rei gamh?sai - if this is the case of the man with his wife,
it is better not to marry), a
logical condition which is obviously
a general one, and John 11:9 (e]a<n tij peripath? e]n t^? h[me<r%, ou]
prosko<ptei - if
anyone walks in the day he does not stumble), an
anticipatory condition which is
also general. Whether this holds as
a uniform rule (present tense
in apodosis = a general condition)
deserve detailed treatment and
will receive it at a later point in
this study. For now, it is
sufficient to note that Gildersleeve's
suggestion does fit some
passages in the Koine of the New Testament.
1 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 435.
2 Gildersleeve, "On ei," p. 6.
29
The second point of evaluation also relates to a
distinction
between Gildersleeve and
Goodwin. Gildersleeve's system relegates the
present general condition of
Goodwin to the anticipatory class because
of its subjunctive mood.
Conditions employing future indicative verbs
are classed as simple or
logical conditions. But what is the difference
between these two? Does not the
future indicative convey the same concept
as the present subjunctive, for
all practical purposes?
Gildersleeve answers that there is a distinction between
the
two, one which he feels has
been overlooked by many grammarians. First,
he notes, the normal pattern
for future conditions is e]a<n with
the
subjunctive: "The fact
then is patent enough to every one who will be
at pains to count, that for
model Greek prose e]a<n with
the subjunctive
is preferred to ei] with the future indicative."1
The reason for this,
he writes,
. . . seems to be to a considerable
extent the greater temporal
exactness, the same greater temporal
exactness which has wholly
displaced the future indicative with the
temporal particles, the same
greater temporal exactness which has given
so wide a sweep to the
optative with a@n as a sharper form of the future.2
If e]a<n with
the subjunctive is the normal form in Attic prose,
what is the role of ei] with the future indicative? It shows
. . . a certain coldness, a certain
indifference; and this added to
the general rigor of the logical
condition, which faces fact in all
its grimness, gives a stern, minatory,
prophetic tone to the future
1 Gildersleeve, "On ei]," p. 9.
2 Ibid.,
p. 9.
30
indicative, which commentators and
grammarians have noticed, but
noticed only in passing.1
Though Gildersleeve is speaking of conditions in Attic
Greek,
his observations give an added
dimension to the force of such conditions
in the New Testament, such as
Matthew 6:23 (e]a<n de> o[
o]fqalmo<j sou
ponhro>j
h#, o!lon to> sw?ma< sou skoteino>n e@stai - but
if your eye is evil,
your whole body will be
darkness) and Luke 13:3 (a]lla< e]a<n
mh> metanoh?te,
pa<ntej
o[moi<wj a]polei?sqe - but unless you repent, you will all likewise
be destroyed).
Thus Gildersleeve uses the mood of the verb as the
guiding
principle of his
classification. The present general conditions as
identified by Goodwin simply
follow the pattern of Attic prose and should
be considered as a type of
anticipatory or future conditions. Further,
the use of the future
indicative not only classes the condition as a
logical condition, but stresses
the inescapable nature of the apodosis.
A third point arises over the distinction between the
indicative
and subjunctive moods. Contrary
to Gildersleeve, Goodwin maintains that
there is no distinction between
these two moods in conditional sentences
except that of time. He devotes
an entire paper to the defense of his
position and offers the
following observation:
The idea of "possibility"
or something of the kind being attached
to the subjunctive, it was naturally
supposed that the simple
indicative in protasis must have a
corresponding idea at its
foundation, and that of
"certainty" or "reality" has generally been
assigned to it.2
1 Gildersleeve, "On ei]," p. 9.
2 "William Watson
Goodwin, "On the Classification of Conditional
Sentences
in Greek Syntax," Transactions of
the American Philological
Association, 6:1
(March, 1873), pp. 61-62.
31
He then gives several reasons for questioning that this
distinction holds up in
conditional sentences. In concluding his
argument he writes:
After the most careful study that I have
been able to give to the
subject, and especially after a comparison
of several thousand
classic examples, I am convinced that no
such principle [of
distinction] can be found. Every example
that I have met with has
only confirmed the opinion, which I can
now express with the
greatest confidence, that there is no
inherent distinction between
the present indicative and the present
subjunctive in protasis
(between ei]
boule<tai and e]a<n boulh?tai)
except that of time.1
Robertson, writing some years later, defends
Gildersleeve's
position against Goodwin by
pointedly hinging the meaning of the logical
condition (ei] with the indicative in the protasis) on the
significance
of the indicative mood.2 This mood, according to him, is characterized
as:
. . . the "modus rectus." It
does express "l'affirmation pure
et simple." The indicative does state a thing as true, but does not
guarantee the reality of the thing. In the nature of the case only
the statement
is under discussion. A clear grip on this point will
help one all along. The indicative has
nothing to do with reality
("on sich"). The speaker presents something as true. Actuality is
implied, to be sure, but nothing more.
Whether it is true or no is
another matter.2
Concerning the subjunctive mood, Robertson notes two
things.
First, it is probably
impossible to identify a single root-idea for
this mood. He accepts
Brugmann's identification of "three uses of the
subjunctive (the volitive, the deliberative, the futuristic."3
Thus
1 Goodwin,
"Classification," pp. 64-65.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 915.
3 Ibid.,
pp. 926-927.
32
the subjunctive does not
necessarily imply a specific time.
Second, there is a close connection between the aorist
sub-
juctive and the future
indicative:
These [the aorist subjunctive and the
future indicative] are closely
allied in form and sense. It is quite
probable that the future
indicative is just a variation of the
aorist subjunctive . . . .
The subjunctive is always future, in
subordinate clauses relatively
future. Hence the two forms continued
side by side in the language.
There is a possible distinction.
"The subjunctive differs from the
future
indicative in stating what is thought likely to occur, not
positively what will occur."
[quoting Thompson, A Syntax of Attic
Greek, p. 133].1
Thus Robertson offers support for Gildersleeve's position
by
holding, first, to a uniform
distinction between indicative and sub-
junctive moods, and, second, to
a non-chronological significance for
the subjunctive mood itself.
The particular case of the future
indicative and the aorist
subjunctive may show a blurring of this
otherwise sharp distinction,
but Robertson will not concede confusion
in the essential modal
significance, even in conditional sentences.
It would seem, then, that the major objections against
Gildersleeve's system raised by
Goodwin can be answered. Indeed, some
of the answers are directly
related to the objections raised against
Goodwin's own approach. Most
Koine grammarians have been convinced of
the superiority of
Gildersleeve's approach and have adopted it, via
Robertson, with some notable
exceptions.
1 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 924-925.
33
Summary of Classical Greek
Classification Systems
This somewhat detailed review of the work of Classical
gram-
marians has shown that there
is, in truth, significant disagreement
among them. Goodwin classifies
according to time, Donovan according to
fulfillment or,
non-fulfillment, Sonnenschein and Chambers according to
form, and Gildersleeve
according to determination. In terms of a
majority vote, classical
grammarians usually follow Goodwin and Koine
grammarians generally follow
Gildersleeve (or Robertson who follows
Gildersleeve).
Conditional
Sentences in Koine Greek
It is impossible to separate the advances in Koine
grammar
from those of Classical Greek,
for they have moved hand-in-hand. At
times, Koine grammarians took
the work of the Classical scholars and
brought it directly into New
Testament studies, as
Goodwin's classification of
conditional sentences. Robertson is
representative of those Koine
scholars who were conversant with Classical
studies, but saw fit to reject
some of them and sharpen the focus of
others, as he did with
Gildersleeve's work on these sentences.
Nigel Turner has done the historian of grammatical
studies a
great favor by publishing a
chronological bibliography of all major
Greek works, beginning with the
first New Testament grammar published
in 1655 and ending with the
latest edition of Bauer's Worterbuch
in
1958.1
1 Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume III:
Syntax
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), pp. vii-x.
34
This discussion will limit itself to the major Koine
grammarians
appearing on his list,
including those who have published since he
compiled his catalog. For
organizational purposes they will be divided
into "Early" and
"Late" grammarians, with A. T. Robertson being the
dividing point. Just as the
survey of Classical grammarians illustrated
the wide range of opinion on
conditional sentences in the classic
writings, so this survey will
demonstrate that Koine studies are in a
similar state of flux.
Early Grammarians
George Benedict Winer
George Benedict Winer is identified by Dana and Mantey as
the
first grammarian to operate
with the concept that the Greek of the New
Testament is the Greek of the
common people, not a special, Holy Ghost
language.1 In the preface to the Sixth Edition of his
grammar Winer
writes:
The fundamental error--the prw?ton
yeu?doj--of
the Biblical
philology and exegesis to which we refer,
consisted ultimately in
this, that neither the Hebrew nor the
language of the N.T. was
regarded as a living idiom . . . designed
to be used by men as the
medium of intercourse.2
From this basis he develops his
analysis of the Koine grammar, including
that of conditional sentences.
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 9.
2 Winer, Grammar,
p. v.
35
Statement of His Position
Winer applies the results of the "enlightened
philology" of his
day to New Testament Greek and
offers this analysis of conditional or
hypothetical sentences:
In HYPOTHETICAL sentences four kinds
of construction occur:
a. Pure condition: If thy friend come, give him my regards
(the case is put as real). Here the
Indicative is used with
ei]. . . .
b. Condition with assumption of objective possibility (where
experience will decide whether or not it
is real): If thy friend
should come (I do not know whether he will come, but the
result
will show). Here e]a<n . . . with the
Subjunctive is used.
c. Condition with assumption of subjective possibility, the
condition existing merely in thought: If thy
friend come (the case
being conceivable and credible) I should
be pleased to present my
respects to him. Here ei] with the Optative is
used.
d. Condition believed to be contrary
to the fact: were there a
God, he would govern (but there is not). Had God existed from
eternity, he would have prevented evil (but he has not
existed).
Here ei] with the Indicative is
used,--the Imperf. in the first case,
the Aor. or (much more rarely) the Plup.
in the second . . .; in the
conclusion likewise one of these two
tenses.1
Summary of His Position
Winer's optimistic statement that "the diction of
the N.T. will
be found entirely in accordance
with the preceding rules" indicates his
confidence in these four basic
divisions.2 Though this has not been
fulfilled to the degree he
predicted, Winer has anticipated the major
system used by Koine
grammarians today. It is apparent that he is
following Gildersleeve's
system, though using slightly different termin-
ology. He makes no reference to
Gildersleeve, but it is possible that he
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 291.
2 Ibid.,
p. 292
36
was familiar with
Gildersleeve's work. Like him, Winer distinguishes
between ei] and the future indicative verb in the protasis
and e]]a<n with
the subjunctive, though he
acknowledges that "such construction with the
Fut. would approximate most
nearly to that with e]a<n . . .
."1 He
illustrates the difference
between the two in this way:
. . . but if all shall be offended in thee is a more decided
statement than if all should be offended. In the latter, it is
still altogether uncertain whether they
will be offended; in the
former, this is assumed as a future fact .
. . .2
Winer notes that "the exceptions to these rules in
the N.T.
text are but very few, and
occur for the most part only in particular
Codd."3 He discusses two types of exceptions: the use
of ei] with the
subjunctive and e]a<n with the indicative. He does not discuss
mixed
conditions,
concessive particles or elliptical conditions.
Evaluation of His Position
It is difficult at best to read many last-century
grammarians
with any degree of
comprehension. They wrote "for another eye, another
mind and another time." He
further complicates the issue by trying to
illustrate Greek concepts from
English. The difference between "If thy
friend come" and "If
thy friend should come" hardly conveys the
difference between the
indicative and subjunctive moods. His
explanatory comments are far
more helpful than his examples, which tend
to confuse the points he tries
to make.
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 293.
2 Ibid., p. 294.
37
Winer did, however, establish a significant precedent by
considering the Koine Greek to
be just that, the language of the common
man. By bringing the concept of
simple observation and induction to
bear upon the New Testament he
advanced the understanding of its
structure and pointed the way
for others to follow.
Alexander Buttmann
Alexander Buttmann followed the general rules of Winer in
his
treatment of conditional
sentences. Rather than expanding the rules at
length, Buttmann concentrated
on the deviations found in the New Testa-
ment. By this time it was
fairly evident that Winer's confident asser-
tion that all New Testament
forms were covered by his four rules was
overstated. Buttmann's work,
though, shows that Winer's four classifica-
tions are generally true and
accurately describe the majority of
conditional sentences in the
New Testament.
Statement of His Position
Buttmann observed that the first two forms of conditional
sentences (ei] with the indicative and e]a<n with the subjunctive) are by
far the most frequent forms in
the New Testament.1 He also
stressed the
importance of mood as the
determining factor in evaluating the kind of
condition:
The difference between them [the two
types of conditional
sentences] . . . is plainly to be
recognized in sentences where
both are used in close proximity; as Gal.
i. 8,9, where the
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 220.
38
hypothesis expressed in the 8th verse by e]a<n with the Subjunctive
is resumed or repeated in the 9th verse
with greater energy and
definiteness by ei] with the Indicative. So in Acts v. 38, 39.1
Comparison of His Position
Buttmann's analysis of the exceptions to Winer's rules
centers
on two areas: the use of ei] and e][a<n with
the indicative and subjunctive
moods respectively, and the use
of a@n in conditions contrary to
fact.
Particles and moods.--His analysis of the
particles and their
corresponding moods is one of
the first treatments of the topic that
discusses the problem of variant
readings.
Of the first case, the use of ei] with the Subjunctive,
we find, to
be sure, accidentally . . . no example
which is quite certain; for
in some of them the readings vary, some
are set aside by the MSS.
(as Rev. xi. 5 [but cod. Sin. qelh?sh the second time]), some
are
capable of a special interpretation.2
He also lists I Corinthians
9:11 and Luke 9:13 as possible examples of
this exception.
Regarding the use of e]a<n with the indicative he notes
that this
"is given so frequently,
that it is to be eliminated as little from the
writings of the N.T. as of the
Old."3 Buttmann does
concede that most of
these examples may be
questioned upon textual evidence, but argues
that the variants were
introduced when the copyists altered the original
and more difficult indicative.
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 220.
2 Ibid., p. 221.
3 Ibid.,
p. 222.
39
It is, indeed, not to be denied that
the instances in question
almost disappear amid the multitude of
those that are grammatically
regular, and suspicion may also be raised
by the circumstance that
hardly a single passage with the
Indicative is completely beyond
question critically. Yet when we consider
that in countless
passages with the Subjunctive not the
smallest variation is found
(which would not be the case if the
Indicative were chargeable solely
to the copyists), it is far more probable
that, where a diversity of
readings occurs in such a number of
instances, this fact results
from the circumstance that the copyists,
commentators, etc., early
altered the Indicative which gave them
offence.1
Specific examples will be
considered in a later section of this study,
but Buttmann's consideration of
variant readings marks a significant
advance in the detailed study
of conditional sentences.
Conditions contrary to fact.--The second area of
deviation
Buttmann examined was the use
of a@n in the fourth class of
conditions:
conditions contrary to fact. He
noted that the apodosis regularly
included a@n, but recognized that this was not an absolute
principle.
He listed four rules to explain
the disappearance of a@n from
these
apodoses:
a) When a@n has already been
expressed previously in the same
connection with another predicate. This
instance, which often occurs
in the classics and is found in the
nature of the case, is acci-
dentally not to be met with in the text
of the N. T. . . .
b) When the predicate (or the
copula) to which it belongs is
also dropped, as I Cor. xii. 19 . . . .
c) Where the apodosis contains such
a predicative term as e]dei>,
kalo<n h#n, h]du<nato, etc. This omission . . . is
so necessary
according to Greek habits of thought, that
it is only by way of
concession to our usage that we can speak
of supplying a@n.
d) Lastly, a@n is dropped for
rhetorical reasons: where,
though the fact itself is impossible or
improbable, the orator in
the vivacity of his thought desires to
represent it as actually
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 222.
40
having occurred, or at least as
almost taken place.1
Most modern grammarians dispense with these rules, simply
noting that a@n usage is at best unpredictable. Robertson, for
example,
simply states that "There
is no principle involved in a@n,
simply custom."2
Buttmann was willing to
recognize that the particle may be absent from a
condition without upsetting the
force of that sentence, and this is the
emphasis of modern grammars.
Evaluation of His Position
Buttmann gets credit for a more thorough study of the
conditional
sentence than that of Winer. He
accepted Winer's four categories, but
noted several major exceptions
to them, especially in the variant
readings. Buttmann and Winer
both placed emphasis upon mood as the
determining factor in
classifying conditional sentences rather than the
particles or tense. It remained
for other grammarians to state this
principle in more formal terms.
Samuel G. Green
Published around 1887, Samuel G. Green's Handbook of the Greek
Testament
presents an analysis of conditional sentences that follows the
patterns of Winer and Buttmann.3
1 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 225-226.
2 Robertson, Grammar. p. 1007.
3 Samuel G. Green, Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament
(
41
Statement of His Position
Briefly, Green identifies four kinds of conditions or
hypotheses:
a. The supposition of a
fact.
b. “
“
of a possibility.
g. “ “ of uncertainty.
d. “ “ of something unfulfilled.1
These four types of conditions
are indicated by four distinct
forms:
a. The conditional
particle ei],
if, with the Indicative in the
protasis, assumes the hypothesis as a
fact. The apodosis may have
the Indicative or Imperative.
b. Possibility or
uncertainty with the prospect of decision, is
expressed by e]a<n = ei]
a@n (very
rarely by ei]
alone [He lists I Cor. 14:5,
Phil. 3:12, and a few various readings,
such as in Rev. 11:5, as
examples.] with the Subjunctive in the
conditional clause, and the
Indicative or Imperative in the apodosis.
g. The Optative in a
conditional sentence expresses entire
uncertainty--a supposed case. Here the
particle ei]
is always used.
d. When the condition is
spoken of as unfulfilled, the
Indicative is used in both clauses, with
the particle ei] in the
protasis, and a@n in the apodosis.2
Evaluation of His Position
As is evident, Green's system of analysis is the same as
those
already discussed: four types
of condition, each identified by a
particular combination of
particles and moods, and each conveying a
different concept. Winer, Buttmann
and Green all seek to analyze
conditional sentences in terms
of form, especially that of mood. They
differ little from the popular
scheme of Robertson.
1 Green, Grammar, p. 317.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 317-319.
42
Ernest DeWitt Burton
Ernest DeWitt Burton was both a scholar and an
administrator,
having served as the chairman
of the Department of New Testament and
Early Christian Literature and
later as the president of the University
of Chicago.1 In his major Greek work, Moods and Tenses of New Testament
Greek, he
adopts Goodwin's analysis of conditional sentences and applies
it to the New Testament.2
Statement of His Position
His specific position, following Goodwin, is:
A. Simple Present or Past Particular
Supposition. The protasis
simply states a supposition which refers
to a particular case in
the present or past, implying nothing as
to its fulfillment. The
protasis is expressed by ei] with a present or past
tense of the
Indicative; any form of the finite verb
may stand in the apodosis.
John 15:20; ei] e]me>
e]di<wcan, kai> u[ma?j diw<cousin, if they
have persecuted
me, they,will also persecute you.
Gal. 5:18; ei] de>
pneu<mati a@gesqe, ou]k e]ste> u[po> no<mon, but if ye are
led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law. See also Matt. 4:3;
Luke 16:11; Acts 5:39;
B. Supposition Contrary to Fact. The
protasis states a supposi-
tion which refers to the present or past,
implying that it is not or
was
not fulfilled.
The protasis is expressed by ei] with a past tense of
the
Indicative; the apodosis by a past tense
of the Indicative with an.
John 11:21; Ku<rie,
ei] h#j w$de ou]k a@n a]pe<qanen o[ a]delfo<j mou, Lord, if
thou
hadst been here, my brother would not have died.
Gal. 1:10;
ei] e@ti a]nqrw<poij h@reskon, Xristou? dou?loj ou]k a@n
h@mhn, if I
were still pleasing men, I should not be a servant of
Christ.
See also John 14:28; Acts 18:14; Heb. 4:8; 11:15.
1 Charles Thwing, "
Dictionary of American
Biography,
ed. by Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone
(New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 341-342.
2 Ernest DeWitt
Greek (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 101.
43
C. Future Supposition with More
Probability. The protasis
states a supposition which refers to the
future, suggesting some
probability of its fulfillment.
The protasis is usually expressed by
e]a<n (or a@n) with the
Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future
Indicative or by some other
form referring to future time.
Matt. 9:21; e]a<n
mo<non a!ywmai tou? i[mati<ou a]tou? swqh<somai, if I shall
but touch his garments, I shall be made whole.
John 12:26; e]a<n
tij e]moi> diakonh? timh<sei au]to>n o[ path<r, if any man
serve me, him will the Father honor.
John 14:15; e[a<n
a]gapa?te< me, ta>j e]ntola>j
ta>j e]ma>j thrh<sete, if ye
love me, ye will keep my commandments. See also Matt. 5:20;
I Cor. 4:19; Gal. 5:2; Jas. 2:15,16.
D. Future Supposition with Less
Probability. The protasis
states a supposition which refers to the
future, suggesting less
probability of its fulfillment than is suggested
by e]a<n with the
Subjunctive. There is no perfect example
of this form in the New
Testament.
The protasis is expressed by ei] with the Optative; the
apodosis by
the Optative with a@n.
I
Pet. 3:17; krei?tton ga>r a]gaqopoiou?ntaj, ei] qe<loi to>
qe<lhma tou?
qeou?,
pa<sxein h@ kakopoiou?ntaj, for it is better, if
the will of
God should so will, that ye suffer for well doing than
for evil
doing. See
also I Cor. 14:10; 15:37; I Pet. 3:14.
E. Present General Supposition. The
supposition refers to any
occurrence of an act of a certain class in
the (general) present,
and the apodosis states what is wont to
take place in any instance
of an act of the class referred to in the
protasis.
The protasis is expressed by e]a<n with the Subjunctive,
the
apodosis by the Present Indicative.
John 11:9; ea]<n tij
peripath? e]n t^? h[me<r%, ou] prosko<ptei, if
a man
walk in the day, he stumbleth not.
2 Tim. 2:5; e]a<n de> kai< a]qlh? tij, ou] stefanou?tai
e]a<n mh> nomi<mwj
a]qlh<sh, and if also a man contend in the games, he is not
crowned, unless he contend lawfully. See also Mark 3:24;
John
7:51; 12:24; I Cor. 7:39, 40.
F. Past General Supposition. The
supposition refers to any
past occurrence of an act of a certain
class, and the apodosis
states what was wont to take place in any
instance of an act of the
class referred to in the protasis.
The protasis is expressed by ei] with the Optative, the
apodosis
by the Imperfect Indicative.
44
There is apparently no instance of
this form in the New Testa-
ment.1
In addition to these general classifications,
interesting observations
regarding the specific classes. He notes that
in the first type
. . . the Future Indicative may stand in
the protasis of a conditional
sentence of the first class when reference
is had to a present
necessity or intention, or when the writer
desires to state not what
will take place on the fulfillment of a
future possibility, but merely
to affirm a necessary logical consequence
of a future event.2
This differs from Goodwin's
position that the future indicative and the
subjunctive may have the same
significance in conditional sentences.
The third class of conditional sentences may also have
these
constructions in the protasis:
(a) ei] with the Subjunctive, (b) ei] or
e]a<n with
the Future Indicative, and (c) ei] with
the Present Indicative.3
Conditions of this last form
are apparently first class conditions, but
"are distinguished by
evident reference of the protasis to the future."4
Concerning the fifth class, the Present General
Supposition, he
notes that some conditions
using ei] with the indicative
"apparently
express a present general supposition,"
which does not fit his rule that
such conditions use e]a<n with the subjunctive.5 He explains that it is
1 Burton, Syntax, pp. 102-106.
2
Ibid., p. 103.
3 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
4 Ibid., p. 105.
5 Ibid.,
p. 107.
45
difficult to distinguish
between this form of a present general condition
and that of a simple condition:
Yet in most New Testament passages of
this kind, it is possible that
a particular imagined instance in the
present or future is before the
mind
as an illustration of the general class of cases . . . . It is
scarcely possible to decide in each case
whether the supposition was
conceived of as general or particular
Luke 14:26; ei@
tij e@rxetai pro<j me kai> ou] misei? . . . th>n yuxh>n
e[autou?,
ou] du<natai ei#nai< mou maqhth<j, if any
man cometh unto
me,
and hateth not . . . his own life, he cannot be my disciple.
Cf. John 1:51; 12:26; where in
protases of apparently similar
force e]a<n with the Subjunctive
occurs, and the apodosis refers to
the future.
Rom. 8:25; ei] de> o! ou] ble<pomen e]lpi<zomen, di ]
u[pomonh?j a]pekdexo<meqa,
but if we hope for that which we see not, then do we with
patience wait for it. See
also Jas. 1:26.1
According to form, such
conditions are simple conditions, but according
to interpretation, they may be
considered a variety of present general
conditions. The distinction, it
must be stressed, is one of interpreta-
tion, not form. Classification
should be on an objective basis, such
as form, not upon a subjective
one, such as interpretation.
Summary of His Position
In addition to these details,
peculiarities of conditional
sentences. He lists nine of these, including
(1) mixed forms, (2) multiple
protases, each with its unique emphasis,
(3) the use of a participle, an
imperative or other form of expression
"suggesting a
supposition" to supply the protasis, and (4) the observation
that sometimes either the
protasis or the apodosis may be omitted.2
1 Burton, Syntax, pp. 107-108.
2 Ibid., pp. 109-112.
46
One final comment:
of "reality" or
"unreality" in these conditions as that of the speaker or
his hearers, not in the
external situation:
It should be observed that the
titles of the several classes
of conditional sentences describe the
supposition not from the
point of view of fact, but from that of
the representation of the
case to the speaker's own mind or to that
of his hearers.1
Conditional sentences do speak
of many things that are objectively true,
but the demonstration of their
factuality lies in the external world,
not in the internal world of
the conditional statement.
James Hope Moulton
The Prolegomena
to James Hope Moulton's A Grammar of the
New
Testament was
the first major grammar to utilize the newly discovered
evidence from the papyri.2
This work was followed by his Introduction to
the
Study of New Testament Greek, a formal grammar.3
Moulton had
originally conceived of his
major work, A Grammar of the New
Testament,
in terms of three volumes. He
published Volume I: Prolegomena in
1906,
and it quickly went through
three editions in two years. He produced
the rough draft for parts I and
II of the second volume, but was not
permitted to finish it. While
at sea he died "in the
1
2 James Hope Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. S T. Clark, 1908), p. 4.
3 James Hope Moulton, An Introduction to the Study of New Testa-
ment
Greek (
47
in April, 1917, a victim of the
ruthless submarine campaign."1 Nigel Turner
continues the interesting
story:
His pupil, Dr. W. F. Howard, saw that
volume through the press in
parts, from 1919 to 1929, but before he
had opportunity to lay many
plans for Volume III he himself died in
1952; and then, on condition
that he had the assistance of someone who
would collect the necessary
material, Dr. H. G. Meecham assumed
responsibility for the syntax.
It was on Dr. G. D. Kilpatrick's
suggestion that I was permitted to
help at this point, and we had done no
more than compile a provisional
bibliography when Dr. Meecham died in
1955. By the kind invitation of
the publishers I then worked alone and
broke the spell by living to
complete Volume III.2
Since he was anticipating two more volumes, Dr. Moulton
did little
more than mention a few aspects
of conditional sentences in the Prolegomena.
Fortunately, his Introduction to the Study of New Testament
Greek gives
a relatively complete
presentation of his views on the classification of
these clauses.
Statement of His Position
First, the general comments from his Prolegomena will be
presented. To begin with, he
notes that the distinction between ei] and e]a<n
. . . has been considerably lessened in
Hellenistic as compared with
earlier Greek. We have seen that e]a<n can take the
indicative; while
(as rarely in classical Greek) ei] can be found with the subjunctive.3
Regarding
the constructional distinctions of conditional sentences,
Moulton makes the following
observations:
1 James Hope Moulton and
W. F. Howard, A Grammar of New Testament
Greek. Volume II:
Accidence and Word Formation (
1929),
p. v.
2 Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume
III:
Syntax
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), p. v.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 187.
48
The differentation of construction remains
at present stereotyped:
ei] goes with indicative,
is used exclusively when past tenses come
in (e.g. Mk 326), and uses ou] as its negative; while e]a<n, retaining
mh< exclusively, takes the
subjunctive almost invariably, unless the
practically synonymous future indicative
is used. Ea@n and ei] are both
used, however, to express future
conditions . . . The immense
majority of conditional sentences in the NT
belong to these heads.1
Moulton opts for Blass's principle as opposed to
Goodwin's to
explain the use of the optative
mood in these sentences:
Meanwhile we may observe that
Blass's dictum (p. 213) that
ei] c. opt. form is used
"if I wish to represent anything as generally
possible, without regard to the general
or actual situation at the
moment," suits the NT exx. well; and
it seems to fit the general
facts better than Goodwin's doctrine of a
"less vivid future"
condition (Goodwin, Greek Grammar, 301).2
He specifically identifies Acts
8:31 as an example of a conditional
sentence employing a@n with the optative to which Goodwin's "less
vivid"
form does not apply. 3
However, he does follow Goodwin's general system for the
overall
classification of conditional
sentences. Three general classes are
recognized:
Simple Conditions in present or past
time.
Protasis,
ei] with
indicative; Apodosis, generally
indicative, always
without a]n.
These sentences merely join
together a condition and a result without
any indication as to the
probability or improbability of the condition.
1 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 187.
2 Ibid., p. 196, note.
3 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
4 Ibid.,
p. 199.
49
Unfulfilled Conditions in present and
past time.
Protasis,
ei]
with indicative, imperfect for present time, aorist for
past.
Apodosis,
indicative with a@n, imperfect for present
time, aorist for
past.
Future Conditions.
Protasis,
e]a<n with subjunctive (rarely indicative, or ei] with subjunc-
tive).
Apodosis,
future indicative, sometimes the imperative.1
He classifies the optative condition, Robertson's Fourth
Class
Condition, as a special form of
the Future Condition, noting that its
full expression has vanished in
the Koine and only parts of such conditions
appear in the New Testament.
Modern
Grammarians
Archibald Thomas Robertson
Of all modern Koine grammarians, none has exerted the
influence or
achieved the status of
Archibald Thomas Robertson. As professor of New
Testament at the Southern
Baptist Theological Seminary from 1890 to
1934 he helped form modern
opinion about Koine Greek. With few exceptions
contemporary grammarians have
adopted his terminology and viewpoint,
especially on conditional
sentences. Thus his position requires detailed
study in order to fully
comprehend the current majority view of
conditional sentences in the
New Testament.
Statement of His Position
His system of analysis basically follows that of
Gildersleeve
in Classical Greek by
identifying four types of conditions, each
1 Moulton, Introduction
to New Testament Greek, pp. 210-213.
50
determined by the mood of the
protasis.
His summary.--Robertson first summarizes the
importance of mood
in conditions:
The indicative mode in the condition
always makes a clear-cut
assertion one way or the other
[fulfilled or unfulfilled]. If the
subjunctive or the optative is used in the
condition (protasis) a
doubtful statement is made whatever may be
the actual fact or truth
in
the case. By these modes of doubtful statement the condition
puts it as doubtful or undetermined (not put in a clear--cut way).
If the subjunctive is used, there is less
doubt than if the optative
is used, precisely the difference between
these two modes of doubtful
statement.1
This distinction in mood (indicative = fulfilled or
unfulfilled,
subjunctive = doubt, optative =
more doubt) leads to the natural
conclusion that there are four
types of conditional sentences:
(a) First Class: Determined as Fulfilled
(ei],
sometimes e]a<n,
with any tense of the indicative in
condition. Any tense of the
indicative in the conclusion).
(b) Second Class: Determined as Unfulfilled
(ei]
and only past
tenses of the indicative in condition.
Only past tenses in the
conclusion, usually with a@n to make clear the kind
of condition
used).
(c) Third Class: Undetermined with Prospect
of Determination
(e]a<n or ei] with the subjunctive in
the condition, usually future
or present indicative or imperative in
the conclusion, much variety
in the form of the conclusion).
(d) Fourth Class: Undetermined with
Remote Prospect
Determination (ei]
with the
optative in the condition, a@n and the
optative in the conclusion).2
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
the Greek Testament (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1933), p. 349.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 349-350.
51
His Defence.--In defending this analysis,
Robertson speaks
against the popular forms of
classification, especially that of Goodwin.
First he rejects the concept of
particular and general as a basic
principle of classification.
Actually the concept of time was the key
principle of Goodwin, but the
particular-general division was important.
In any event, Robertson points
to the work of Gildersleeve and says of
Goodwin's distinction:
"This is a false step in itself."1 He accepts
Gildersleeve's position that
any condition may be particular or general,
depending upon the type of verb
used in the protasis.
Robertson then raises his next and most serious objection
to
Goodwin and those following
him: they refuse to recognize the basic
significance of the mood in
conditions. Goodwin's first class of
conditions utilizes the
indicative mood and, he says, "simply states a
present or past particular
supposition, implying nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition .
. . .2 Robertson strongly
objects to
this interpretation, claiming
that "This condition pointedly
implies the
fulfillment of the
condition."3 Robertson
hinges his argument on the
basic significance of the
indicative mood which, he claims, has its usual
meaning in conditions as well
as normal clauses. This is, as he says,
"the crux of the whole
matter."4 Goodwin's classification seems to
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1005.
2 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 145.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
4 Ibid.,
p. 1006.
51
place emphasis on things other
than mood, relegating it to a position
of lesser importance. For
Robertson, mood is all-important. He
pursues his analysis on this
assumption.
One specific detail of his system needs further comment:
the
first class condition labeled
as "Determined as Fulfilled."
Robertson
quotes Gildersleeve as
identifying this condition as "the favorite
condition," though he is
talking about classical poets, especially
Pindar.1 The question already raised by Robertson
relates to the
degree of determination implied
by the condition. Is the speaker
presenting the condition as
something that is objectively true
(ei@
tij qe<lei o]pi<sw mou e@rxesqai, a]rnhsa<sqw e[auto<n - Since
someone
does wish to come after me, let
him deny himself. Luke 9:23)? Or is the
speaker assuming the truth of
the condition without committing himself
to a position one way or the
other, such as might be done "for the
sake of the argument" (ei] de> a]na<stasij nekrw?n ou]k e@stin, ou]de> Xristo>j
e]gh>gertai
-
But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ
is not raised. I Cor. 15:13)?
This point will receive a more detailed
treatment later, but it is
important to note that some commentators
have understood Robertson to
say that the first class condition actually
affirms the objective reality
of the condition. Perhaps his statements
could have been more precise,
but common sense will suffice to show
that this cannot be the case in
all situations. If it were, then
Christ would have been
operating in the power of the Devil (Matt. 12:27)
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
53
and would not be resurrected (I
Cor. 15:13). Yet writers continue to
to read objective reality into
the first class condition. An extreme
example is the statement of
Jerome Moore:
The first class condition implies
truth or reality. If . . .
and it is true. Colossians 1:23 . . . is
an example of this. The
idea there is, "If ye continue in
the faith grounded and settled,
and
ye shall!" There is no doubt
implied here. This is a condition
of reality. No need to doubt the security
of your salvation or any-
one else's, for if here in the Greek does not imply doubt.1
Were the situation not so serious, it would be funny. No
one can guarantee the salvation
of anyone else. Certainly Paul
challenged the Corinthians to
test and examine themselves (2 Cor. 13:5).
Obviously some contexts permit
the English "since" with its implication
of objective reality, but many,
indeed, a majority, do not. To make
such claims is to ignore common
sense, the teaching of Robertson and
the clear statements of
Scripture.
In his doctoral dissertation John Battle describes
Robertson
as "difficult to
read."2 Perhaps the
wordiness of his Historical
Grammar led to
some contradictory statements in the minds of some, but
in the first edition of his Shorter Grammar, he clearly states:
This condition does assume the reality of the condition. Take
Matt. 12:27. Christ did not cast out
demons by Beelzebub, but
in argument he assumes it. The indicative
mode determines the
condition as fulfilled, so far as the
statement is concerned.3
1 Jerome Moore, "
45:1
(June, 1979), p. 11.
2 John A.
Exegesis,"
unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace Theological Seminary,
1975,
D. 170.
3 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New York: A. C. Armstrong
& Son, 1908), p. 151.
54
At times this assumption is
parallel with the objective reality of
the statement, as in I
Thessalonians 4:14 – ei] ga>r
pisteu<omen o!ti
]Ihsouj
a]pe<qanen kai> a]ne<sth . . . ; for if we believe that
Jesus died and
rose again. In other contexts
the assumption is counter to the
objective reality, as in
Matthew 12:27 – kai> ei]
e]gw> e]n Beezebou>l
e]kba<llw
ta> daimo<nia . . . ; and if I by the power of Beelzebub cast
out
the demons. In still other
situations (probably the majority of those
in the New Testament) the
assumption is neither parallel nor counter
to objective reality, for the
reality cannot be determined from the
information at hand. This is
the situation in Colossians 1:23 – ei@
ge
e]pime<nete
t^? pi<stei . . .; if you continue in the faith. The best
English word to use in all
three situations is "if," and all major
English translations of the New
Testament uniformly translate the
first class condition this way.
Evaluation of His Position
A. T. Robertson's analysis of conditional sentences has
blazed
a trail that many have followed
in New Testament studies. His
terminology has become almost
universal, and his rejection of Goodwin's
system has been accepted by
almost all who have followed him. Unfortun-
ately, some have taken
Robertson too simply and have read verification
(or non-verification) of
external or objective reality into his First
and Second Class conditions.
One could wish that he had been more
precise in his statements, but
such difficulties are no excuse for
the misuse of his concepts one
finds in the literature.
55
William Douglas Chamberlain
As a professor at Louisville Presbyterian Seminary,
William
Douglas Chamberlain first
published his Greek grammar in 1941: His
analysis is a concise summary
of Robertson's work. Only a few remarks
need be made to indicate
additional information he provides.
Statement of His Position
Accepting Robertson's terminology, he affirms that in
first class
conditions "The protasis
has to do with the way the statement is made, and
not with the truth or falsity
of it."1 Untrue
conditions may be assumed
to be true for the sake of the
argument. Matthew 12:27 is presented as
an example of this situation.
In second class conditions he, like Robertson, identifies
the
tenses used as past tenses:
imperfect, aorist or pluperfect. It is
possible to have different
tenses in the protasis and the apodosis, as
in John 14:28. While "the
viewpoint is changed between the protasis and
the apodosis," the entire
sentence is still a second class condition:
"These are not 'mixed
conditions."'2
He identifies the third class conditions as those which
are
"stated as a matter of
doubt, with some prospect of fulfillment."3
The fourth class is "even
more doubtful than the third class."4 While
1 William
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 195.
2 Ibid., p. 197.
3 Ibid., p. 198.
4 Ibid.,
p. 199.
56
he finds no complete example of
this condition in the New Testament, he
does identify fragments in I
Peter 3:14, I Corinthians 15:37, Acts 17:27,
and Acts 27:39.1
Chamberlain discusses two other aspects of conditional
sentences which are also
mentioned in Robertson, though not in so
succinct a manner: Mixed
Conditions and Elliptical Conditions. The
first involves a change in
class of condition between the protasis and
the apodosis, for the
"writer changes his viewpoint between the protasis
and the apodosis."2
Luke 17:6 is listed as an example.
The second topic, elliptical conditions, involves
conditional
sentences in which the apodosis
is expressed and the protasis is simply
implied. He lists four ways
this is accomplished:
1. By the participle: Rom. 2:27.
2. By a verb in the imperative mode: Mark 1:17.
3. The protasis may be abbreviated to the vanishing point
as with
ei]
mh>
in the case of 'except': Mt. 11:27.
4. The apodosis may be omitted: Luke 19:42.3
Chamberlain also notes that the
Hebraistic use of ei] in
oaths
(Mark 8:12), and its use to
introduce direct questions (Acts 1:6) are
not conditional sentences.4
Evaluation of His Position
Chamberlain's little grammar provides a very readable
synthesis
of Robertson's position without
going into the fine details of historical
1 Chamberlain, Grammar, p. 199.
2 Ibid., p. 199.
3 Ibid., p. 199
4 Ibid., p. 200.
57
analysis. Mood is the key
factor in determining the type of conditional
sentence, and the indicative
mood identifies sentences which present
the condition as true.
Charles Francis Digby Moule
The English scholar C. F. D. Moule, publishing in 1953,
follows neither Robertson nor
Goodwin in his analysis of conditional
sentences. He presents a unique
system of both construction and
application, setting aside many
of the chief dicta of other grammarians.
Statement of His Position
He summarizes the various conditions under three
headings:
1. Past or present conditions, possible or actual.
2. Recurrent or future conditions, whether real or hypothetical.
3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.1
In outline form his system
looks like this:
1. Past or present conditions,
possible or actual.
Protasis: ei] with the indicative in
the appropriate tense.
Apodosis: another indicative
or its equivalent [an imperative,
as in Col. 4:10, or conceivably a participle] in the appro-
priate tense.
2. Recurrent or future conditions,
whether real or hypothetical.
Protasis: ei]
(or o!te) with a@n (making e]a<n,
o[ta<n)
with the
subjunctive in the appropriate tense.
Apodosis: Indicative or its
equivalent [imperative or
participle] in
the appropriate tense.
3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.
1 C[harles] F[rancis]
D[igby] Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testa-
ment
Greek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p. 148.
58
Protasis:
ei]
with a past tense of the indicative.
Apodosis:
a past (but not necessarily the same) tense of the
indicative, usually with a@n.1
He sums up his concept of conditional sentences by
stating:
Thus the form of a conditional
sentence is largely determined
by two main factors—time (past, present,
future) or Aktionsart
(instantaneous, protracted, recurrent,
etc.) and the degree of
reality (impossible, improbable, possible,
probable, actual).2
Specific factors which help
determine the mood of conditional sentences
include:
(a) Any past condition introduced by if
must, in the nature of the
case, be hypothetical, if not definitely
unreal: otherwise there
would be nothing conditional about the sentence. Therefore there
appears to be no need to vary the mood,
and it is regularly
Indicative.
(b) But present, future, or recurrent conditions may vary widely
in their degree of actuality: hence
(perhaps) the variation in
moods. In general, the Indic. represents
certainty, while the
Subj. represents something more
hypothetical or uncertain.3
Moule thus recognizes the basic
significance of these moods, but he
employs them in a unique system
of analysis.
Evaluation of His Position
Two observations may be made about this analysis. First,
Moule maintains that the
apodosis is always in the indicative mood
regardless of the mood of the
protasis. The specific examples will
be discussed in the next
chapter, but this is an over-simplification, as
Galatians 5:25 demonstrates.
Second and more important, this approach
1 Moule, Idiom Book, pp. 148-149.
2 Ibid., p. 150.
3 Ibid.,
p. 149.
59
seems to produce sentences that
are one class by form and another by
meaning. Moule thinks that this
is a problem:
The difficulty of classifying is
illustrated by sentences which
belong by meaning in one class, but by form
in another; e.g.:
(1) in form, (2) in meaning: II Tim.
ii:12 ei] u[pome<nomen, kai>
sunbasileu<somen; II John 10 ei@ tij e@rxetai
pro>j u[ma?j kai> tau<thn
th>n didaxh>n ou] fe<rei, mh> lamba<nete au]to>n. Both these might well
have had ean with Subj. in the
protasis. (1), in meaning, (2) in
form: I Cor. ix. 16 e]a>n
ga>r eu]aggeli<zwmai, ou]k e@stin moi
kau<xhma . . . .1
But is this really a problem? The two examples listed as
being class 1 (possible or
actual) by form and class 2 (recurrent or
future conditons) by meaning, 2
Tim. 2:12 and 2 John 10, are straight-
forward first class conditions
in both form and meaning. It is futile
to suggest what "might
well" have been written, for the text has been
set down as God wanted it
given. One might feel that an exegetical
problem could be solved by
treating 2 Tim. 2:12 as a hypothetical
condition, but such is not the
case. It is a first class and needs
to be interpreted as such. So with 1 Cor. 9:16; it is presented as
a hypothetical condition, even
though facts outside the condition
establish that it is an actual
situation. There is no need to rewrite
the statement.
It seems reasonable to ask, If one's analysis produces
such
apparent contradictions as
Moule felt his did, should the analysis be
pursued? It seems-unlikely that
such diverse situations would arise in
the normal development of a
language. Significant also is the fact that
no other grammarian has
followed Moule in this approach. All seem to
1 Moule,
Idiom Book, p. 149.
60
have recognized the weakness in
his system.
Friedrich Blass - Albert
Debrunner
In 1911 Friedrich Blass published his Grammar of New Testament
Greek. It
passed through several editions and translations and was
continued after his death by Albert
Debrunner, a professor of Indo-
European and classical
Philology at the
W. Funk of the
revision of this work as a
companion grammar to Arnt and Gingrich's
Lexicon. Funk's
revision is the one under consideration.
Statement of His Position
Blass-Debrunner recognizes five forms of conditional
sentences
in Classical Greek, four of
which are present in the New Testament:
(1) Ei] with the indicative of
all tenses denotes a simple
conditional assumption with emphasis on
the reality of the assump-
tion (not of what is being assumed): the
condition is considered
'a real case.'
(2) Ei] with the optative
presents something as thought of,
without regard for reality or unreality,
and emphasizes the
hypothetical character of the assumption:
'a potential case.'
(3) Ei] with an augmented tense
of the indicative marks the
assumption as contrary to fact: 'an
unreal case.'
(4)
]Ea<n with the subjunctive
denotes that which under certain
circumstances is expected from an existing
general or concrete
standpoint in the present: 'case of
expectation.'
(5) Ei] with the optative also
specifies repetition in past
time.1
Of these five forms, (2) has almost disappeared from the
New Testament
and (5) has completely
disappeared. Blass-Debrunner thus comes close
to Robertson's (and
Gildersleeve's) four conditions. Indeed, Funk
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
61
speaks of Robertson's
organization as "especially lucid."1 Unfortunately,
neither Blass-Debrunner's nor
Funk's comments have the same quality, so
some explanatory comments are
necessary.
The first group, the "real case," speaks of
. . . a present reality = 'if . . .
really' (as you say, as is
believed, as you see, etc.) or = 'if
therefore' (resulting from
what has been said), often closely
bordering on causal
'since' . . . .2
Were one to change the adverb
"often" to "infrequently," he would be
closer to the truth of the New
Testament. He comes closer in his
first statement that this
condition places emphasis on "the reality of
the assumption (not of what is
being assumed)." This distinction between
the statement of a situation
and the actual situation itself must be
maintained. In Matthew 12:27,
for example, Jesus speaks of His
exorcism in a way that is
directly counter to the reality of the situa-
tion. This fits
Blass-Debrunner's statement.
The third group, ei] with
an augmented indicative verb,
indicates a condition that is
contrary to fact. Unlike Classical Greek,
the "addition of a@n to the apodosis is no longer obligatory."3
These
conditions are "remarkably
scarce in Paul."4
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 189.
2 Ibid., p. 189.
3 Ibid., p. 182.
4 Ibid.,
p. 182.
62
The fourth group, e]a<n with
the subjunctive, refers to future
situations. These situations
may be of a general or specific nature
("general or concrete
standpoint"), corresponding to the often-mentioned
present general condition. The
use of e]a<n with the subjunctive to
refer to future time is normal.
"There is," he notes, "no certain
example of e]a<n with the future indicative in the
NT."1 This is not
unexpected, for there has
always been a close affinity between the
future indicative and the
subjunctive. Indeed, the origin of the future
indicative may well have been a
mixture of "the Indo-European future,
which denoted future time, and
the subjunctive of the sigmatic aorist."2
This close relationship has
been noted before.
Evaluation of His Position
Blass-Debrunner agrees with Robertson in his stress upon
the
limitation of the reality of
the first class condition to the statement,
not the situation. Although
Funk respects Robertson's analysis, he
retains the original
terminology of Blass's work. While there may
not be general agreement
between this grammar and that of Robertson on
titles, there is on the forms
and their significance.
Nigel Turner
Nigel Turner's role in finishing the grammar started by
Moulton
has already been set forth. His
volume on syntax represents conditional
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
2 Ibid.,
p. 166.
63
sentences under their
respective parts: moods, tenses, etc. Only
towards the end does he
summarize his conclusions.
Statement of His Position
In outline form his analysis is:
(i) ei] with indic.,
representing the simple assumption . . .
(ii) ei] with opt., representing
the "potential" conception . . . .
(iii) ei] with aor. or impf.
indic., representing an assumption as
not corresponding with
reality . . . .
(iv) e]a<n with subj., indicating
an expected result based on the
present general or particular circumstance .
. . .1
Turner presents a system of analysis
that combines features of Moulton
along with some of Goodwin. It
is instructive to see what new insights
this gives for each of these
conditions.
Details of His Position
Turner does not give a detailed discussion of the first
type
of condition except to note
that ei] with the future indicative,
unlike e]a<n with the present subjunctive, calls
attention to "The
feeling of definiteness and
actual realization [that] accompanies it.
It is almost causal."2
He recognizes the problem posed by 2 Timothy
2:12, but offers no suggested
answer: "The difficulty about this view
is 2 Ti 212 ei] a]parnhso<meqa, where the condition was
surely conceived
as no more than
hypothetical."3
1 Turner, Syntax, p. 319.
2 Ibid., p. 115.
3 Ibid.,
p. 115.
64
Turner notes that in the third group of conditional
sentences,
the "unreal"
conditions, the past tenses are used and retain their
proper Aktionsart. Thus the imperfect stands for "what should be now"
and the aorist for "what should have been."1 In both cases, reality is
not found in what the speaker
wants it to be or to have been.
His discussion of the fourth group of conditions
(protasis =
e]a<n with
the subjunctive) includes the concept of particular and
general as defined by the Aktionsart (as he understands it) of the
verbs employed:
(1) Present: very common in Koine. In a general and iterative
sense, as "condicio universalis"
. . . , the pres. subj. denotes a
hypothesis which can occur over and over
again (present Aktionsart).
The most common example of this condition
in the Ptol. Pap. is
stereotyped phrases in decrees and
punishments, having a continual
validity.
(2)
Aorist: This represents a definite event as occurring
only once in the future, and conceived as
taking place before the
time of the action of the main verb. It
is expectation, but not
fulfillment as yet.2
Here he evidences the common,
though erroneous, view of the significance
of the aorist tense. Further,
he does not make the concept of particular
and general a basis of
classification, only of interpretation.
Not all conditional sentences fit neatly into this
four-group
package, and Turner speaks of
"a liberal mixing in the various categories
of conditional sentences."3
The specifics remain to be explored, but
1 Turner, Syntax, p. 91.
2 Ibid., p. 114.
3 Ibid.,
p. 319.
65
it would seem, as with Moule,
that any system that produces such
results needs to be reexamined.
H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey
The appearance of Dana and Mantey's Manual Grammar probably
accounted for the disappearance
of Robertson's Shorter Grammar of the
Greek
New Testament as a standard intermediate text.1 In their book
these authors summarize
Robertson's analysis and add some interesting
terminology and explanations of
their own.
Statement of Their Position
The basis upon which they classify conditional sentences
is
"the attitude that they
express with reference to reality."2 This is
expressed through the mood of
the protasis. The indicative points to
a condition from the viewpoint
of reality. The subjunctive and
optative moods point to a
condition from the viewpoint of probability.3
Those conditions which use the
indicative mood are divided into
two sub-classes. The first,
termed the "simple condition," presents
"one fact as conditioning
another." In this form "nothing is implied
as to whether or not this fact
actually exists."4 The second sub-class
1 Now available as a
reprint: A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis,
A New Short Grammar of
the Greek Testament,
10th edition (
Baker
Book House, 1977).
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 287.
3 Ibid., p. 287.
4 Ibid.,
p. 287.
66
implies that "this fact
has not been realized, and therefore does not
exist. This we call the contrary to fact condition."1
These two types,
then,
. . . assume that the premise is either
true or untrue. The speaker
takes for granted that which he assumes is
true, as in the simple
condition; or that it is known not to be
true, as is the case in the
contrary to fact condition. The
indicative, being the mood for
reality, is regularly used in this type of
sentence.2
Using Matthew 12:27 as a test
case, it is clear that their first state-
ment (The condition implies
nothing about the actual facts of the case.)
is more accurate than the
second one. Jesus did take His assumed link
with Beelzebub for granted, but
only for the sake of the argument.
Conditions utilizing the subjunctive mood are termed the
"more
probable future
conditions," and those with the optative are the "less
probable future
conditions."3 All of these conditions utilize the
particle a@n whether by itself or in combination with ei] (ei] + a@n =
e]a<n).4
Evaluation of Their Position
Their observations on the construction of the four types
of
conditional sentences are
identical to Robertson's. They identify three
types of irregular forms of
conditional sentences: (1) mixed conditions,
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 287.
2 Ibid., p. 288.
3 Ibid., p. 287.
4 Ibid.,
p. 288.
67
(2) implied conditions "in
which the apodosis is expressed and the protasis
implied in a participle (I Tim.
4:4), imperative (Mk. 1:17), or question
(Mt. 26:15)," and
elliptical conditions.1
Although their terminology is somewhat different than
that of
Robertson, the closeness of
their position to his places them under
the same evaluation.
Robert W. Funk
As Professor of Religious Studies at the
Robert W. Funk has not only
translated and enlarged the standard
grammar of Blass-Debrunner, but
has produced one of his own. His
discussion of conditional
sentences reflects the basic system of
Robertson, but with significant
comparisons to Classical grammars,
especially the work of Smyth.
Statement of His Position
The first class condition presents "a simple
conditional
assumption with emphasis on the
reality of the assumption (but not on
the reality of what is being
assumed)."2 This is the same statement he
used in his revision of
Blass-Debrunner, and the same clarification is
necessary. By
"assumption" he means the statement of the situation,
and by "what is being
assumed" he means the situation itself. The use
of the future tense in both the
protasis and apodosis is the equivalent
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 291.
2 Funk, Grammar,
II, p. 680.
68
of Smyth's "future most
vivid" condition, but Funk recognizes it as a
special form of the first class
condition.1
His analysis of the second class is the same as
Robertson. The
third class of conditions
utilizes the subjunctive mood in the protasis
and is called "a probable
case."2 The use of the
present tense in the
apodosis "often gives the
condition a generalizing force (indicated
by event in the
translation)."3 This is
what Smyth termed the "future
more vivid" condition.
Evaluation of His Position
Funk demonstrates the advantages of classification by
reality
as expressed in the mood of the
protasis. He is able to present a
simple, easily comprehended,
system and account for the many subspecies
recognized by other
grammarians. His improvement upon Robertson's
system is more in terms of
organization than content.
William Sanford La Sor
William Sanford La Sor is more familiar to scholars for
his work
in Hebrew rather than Greek,
for he is Professor of Old Testament at
Fuller Theological Seminary. He
has, however, published a two-volume
handbook of Greek grammar based
on an inductive study of Acts. In this
work he follows a system unique
to modern Koine grammarians: that of
1 Funk, Grammar, II, p. 684.
2 Ibid., p. 683.
3 Ibid.,
p. 683.
69
Goodwin.
Statement of His Position
The outline of his position is almost identical to that
of
Goodwin:
Simple Condition,
Protasis = ei] + indicative
Apodosis = indicative or equivalent
Unreal Condition
Protasis = ei] + past indicative
Apodosis = (a@n) + past indicative
Present General Condition
Protasis = e]a<n + subjunctive
Apodosis = present indicative
More
Vivid Future Condition
Protasis = e]a<n
+
subjunctive/other
Apodosis = future indicative
Less Vivid Future Condition
Protasis = ei]
+ optative
Apodosis = a@n +
optativel
This classification is based upon time and reality, as
was
that of Goodwin. La Sor states
that:
Present conditions can be only
noncommittal or general . .
Past conditions can be noncommittal or
contrary to fact . . . .
Future conditions can be only probable.
But the degree of probability
in the speaker's mind is variable. There
is a more probable (or
"more vivid") future condition.
. . and a less probable (or "less
vivid") future condition . . . .2
He offers some interesting comments on the various types
of
conditions. For example, he
says that the simple condition [obviously]
1 William Sanford La Sor,
Handbook of New Testament Greek, 2
volumes
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973), II,
p..
225.
2 Ibid.,
p. 222.
70
may refer to past time by using
a past tense in the protasis. This
form is very similar to that of
the unreal condition, which also uses
a past (augmented) tense in the
protasis. Further, he notes that the
regular negative particle for
the protases of past simple conditions
is mh<, even with the indicative tense: "Where ou] is used, it probably
negates a word in the protasis
and not the entire protasis."1 He also
identifies mh< as the negative particle of unreal conditions,
"even though
it [the verb] is
indicative."2
Evaluation of His Position
La Sor evidences the same problem that Goodwin does in
his
analysis: classification more
by interpretation than by form. He notes,
for example, that the present
general condition, which uses e]a<n and
the
subjunctive mood, is often
"close to, if not identical with the simple
condition . . . except for the
use of e]a<n +
sbjtv. [sic]"3
The more vivid future condition "is expressed by
using say in
the protasis, generally with
the subjunctive, and a future indicative or
equivalent in the apodosis."4
La Sor then remarks that "there is
considerable variation in the
protasis of this type of condition: and
offers these examples:
1 La Sor, Grammar, II, p. 223.
2 Ibid., p. 224.
3 Ibid., p. 224.
4 Ibid., p. 224.
71
With ei] + subjtv: Lk. 9:13; I
Cor. 14:5.
With ei] or e]a<n + fut. ind.: Ac. 8:31;
2 Tim. 2:12.
With ei] +
pres. ind.: Matt. 8:31; I Cor. 10:27.1
Again, it would seem that
interpretation more than form is the guiding
principle of classification.
The specific verses will be analyzed in
the following sections of this
study. La Sor's position will have to
be carefully evaluated, for he
represents a unique position among
modern Koine grammarians.
Summary of Koine
Grammarians
The twelve Koine grammarians discussed in this section
may be
classified into two groups: (1)
those who do not follow Robertson: Moule
and La Sor, and (2) those who
do: all the rest. The first group pursues
either their own approach, such
as Moule, or follow most Classical
grammarians, as La Sor does.
They are a decided minority among Koine
grammarians, both early and
modern.
The second group follows the system presented by
Robertson in
Koine studies and Gildersleeve
in Classical grammar. These classify
conditional sentences according
to the reality of the condition as
expressed by the mood of the
protasis. The first group basically follows
the time of the condition as
the principle of classification.
The relation of the condition to reality is either actual
or
potential. The moods utilized
in the protasis indicate these relation-
ships: indicative = actual,
subjunctive or optative = potential. The
1 La Sor, Grammar,
II, p. 224.
72
first group of conditions,
those using the indicative mood, may be real
or unreal. The speaker may
assume that the condition is a real condition,
or he may assume that it is
not. In either case the indicative mood is
used, and in both cases the
reality is limited to the statement, not
the situation. The second
group, those conditions presented as
potential, involve two degrees
of potentiality. Here the grammarians
struggle with terminology. Dana
and Mantey are the least ambiguous with
their terms "more
probable" and "less probable." The degrees of
probability are indicated by
the subjunctive and optative moods,
respectively.
CHAPTER
II
THE SIMPLE
CONDITION
A survey of the various grammarians and their attempts to
classify conditional sentences
is helpful, but not determinative. Only
an inductive analysis of the
New Testament examples can offer definitive
evidence for one system over
another. Such an inductive study is the
goal of the next four chapters.
Introduction
The following steps were taken to achieve this goal: (1)
All
conditional sentences were
identified and entered on index cards. This
was accomplished by looking at
every reference containing a conditional
particle as listed in Englishman’s Greek Concordance. Each
card showed
the protasis, apodosis and verb
parsings of every condition. Supplied
verbs were entered based upon
context and reference to the New American
Standard
Bible.
(2) This information was then entered on punch cards for
ease
in mechanical sorting. The
cards were then sorted into the various groups
as indicated in the following
chapters. This arrangement also facilitated
rapid cross-checking of the
various types of conditions.
(3) The information on each punch card was again verified
from
the Greek New Testament and the
lists were prepared. There are no
complete listings of all
conditional sentences in the New Testament.
73
74
Robertson offers a full, albeit
incomplete listing in the Appendix of his
grammar,1 and J. W.
Roberts has even more extensive lists in his disser-
tation.2 After the author had completed his lists, he
compared them
to Robertson and Roberts and
made the necessary adjustments. Since
Roberts' were more complete,
they were usually consulted. Careful
study showed that while they
were extensive, they were not perfect. The
results, it is hoped, will be
even more extensive.
It is readily acknowledged that these lists are not perfect.
Many apodosis verbs have to be
supplied from the context, and honest
differences of opinion exist as
to what tense and mood is to be
inserted. Also, in a study of
this magnitude, omissions and errors
are possible, although every
effort has been made to keep such to a
minimum. Individual questions
about specific conditions, though, will
not affect the general picture
that emerges from the data, and this is
the desired goal.
In order to avoid problems with certain incorrect
implications
drawn from A. T. Robertson's
terminology and its inadequacies, the
"neutral" terminology
of Dana and Mantey will be employed. Again, their
definition of a simple
condition:
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of Historical
Research
pp.
1416-1419.
2 J. W. Roberts,
"The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Helenistic Uses,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
the
75
This condition was used when one wished to
assume or to seem to
assume the reality of his premise. Ei] occurs regularly in the
protasis, with any tense of the
indicative. There is no fixed
form for the apodosis--any mood or tense
may occur.1
Appendix I lists the occurrences of the simple condition,
and
verifies their observation:
most moods and tenses do appear. The summary
of these occurrences is:
Protasis using ei] with
the present indicative . . 221 examples
Protasis using ei] with
the aorist indicative. . . 56
examples
Protasis using ei] with
the future indicative. . . 22
examples
Protasis using ei] with
the perfect indicative . . 12 examples
311
examples
The Conditional
Particle Ei]
The discussion of the simple condition begins with a
brief
analysis of its components.
Taking them in order of appearance, the
first subject is the condition
particle ei].
The
Significance of Ei]
When used by itself, ei] may be
several things, including
(1) a conditional particle, (2)
a type of aposiopesis (a sudden breaking
off of what is stated),
especially as a replacement for the Hebrew Mxi
and (3) an interrogative
particle.2
1 H. E. Dana and Julius
R. Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the Greek
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 289.
2 William F. Arndt and F.
Wilbur Gingrich, A Greek-English
Lexicon of the New
Testament and Other Early Christian Literature,
second
edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 219-
220.
76
As a Conditional Particle
Ei]
regularly appears with the indicative mood to indicate the
simple condition. It also
occurs with the subjunctive mood in Luke 9:13;
Romans 11:14; I Corinthians
9:11 (T.R.), 14:15; Philippians 3:11,12;
I Thessalonians 5:10; and
Revelation 11:5. Since the mood of the
verb determines the type of
condition, not the particle employed,
these specific passages are
discussed in the next chapter. Ei] also
appears with the optative in
the less probable future conditions.
As an Interrogative Particle
Not all occurrences of ei] mark
conditional sentences, for it is
used to indicate questions,
especially indirect ones. Robertson notes
that its use with direct
questions is close to an elliptical condition
and suggests Mark 15:44 and
Luke 23:6 as examples.1 This is parallel
with its use in marking out
direct quotes, frequently serving as
quote marks in English (e.g.
Matthew 12:10). Robertson further
suggests that this use may be
due to the fact that the Septuagint
utilizes ei] at times to translate the h-interrogative, as here in
Matthew 12:10.2 This usage is a change from the usual
Classical use of
ei]. One
cannot automatically think "conditional sentence" whenever
he observes this particle in
the text.
1 A. T. Robertson, Grammar, p. 916.
2 Ibid.,
p. 916.
77
In Aposiopesis
A third important use of ei] is in
aposiopesis,
. . . the sudden breaking off of what is
being said (or written),
so
that the mind may be more impressed by what is too wonderful,
or solemn, or awful for words: or when a
thing may be, as we some-
times say, "better imagined than
described."1
In this construction, the
protasis is stated and the writer drops the
sentence, letting the reader
draw his conclusion, as in Luke 19:42.
A related use is to translate
the Hebrew particle Mxi. This
is a
recognized Hebraism and is not
a conditional sentence.
Ei] does
have a number of uses, but the most important one is
that of the conditional
particle. Before pursuing its most common
use, brief mention should be
made of its appearances in combination with
other particles.
The Significance of Ei] with Other Particles
Ei]
a]ra<
There are only two New Testament examples of ei] a@ra: Mark 11:13
and Acts 8:22. This combination
emphasizes the assumption: "When placed
after pronouns and
interrogative particles, it refers to a preceding
assertion or fact, or even to
something existing only in the
mind . . . ."2 Acts 8:22 (deh<qhti
tou? kuri<ou ei] a@ra a]feqh<setai< soi)
1 E. W. Bullinger, Figures of Speech Used in the Bible
(Grand
Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1968 reprint of 1898 edition), p. 154.
2 Joseph Henry Thayer, Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the New
Testament, reprint of Corrected
Edition (
National Foundation for
Christian Education, n.d.), p. 71.
78
is translated by Thayer as
"If, since thy sin is so grievous, perhaps
the thought etc."1
This usage is similar to ei] pw?j, as will be seen
below.
Ei]pe<r
Six undisputed examples of ei]pe<r are
found in the New Testament:
Romans 8:9,17; I Corinthians
8:5, 15:15; 2 Thessalonians 1:6 and
I Peter 2:3. I 2 Corinthians 5:3 B, D. E. and G support ei]pe<r. Ei] ge< is
the accepted reading, supported
by x, C, K, L and P.2 This combination
emphasizes the concept under
discussion: the particle per means
"to do
a thing to the limit (beyond),
thoroughly."3 Suggested
translations of
ei]pe<r
include "if indeed, if after all, since."4 Use of this particle
combination emphasizes the
veracity of the condition being discussed.
Interestingly, only Paul
employs this construction.
Ei]
ge<
The combination of ei]
ge<
is represented by five New Testament
examples: 2 Corinthians 5:3;
Galatians 3:4; Ephesians 3:2, 4:21; and
Colossians 1:23. This
combination emphasizes the conditional nature of
1 Thayer, Lexicon, p. 71.
2 W. Robertson Nicoll,
editor, The Expositor’s Greek Testament,
5
volumes (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), II, p. 66.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1154.
4 Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, p. 219.
79
the thought. Commenting on ei] ge< kai> ei]kh? in Galatians 3:4 Lightfoot
remarks:
Ei@ ge< leaves a loophole for
doubt, and kai< widens this, implying
an unwillingness to believe on the part
of the speaker. Hermann's
distinction . . . that ei@
ge<
assumes the truth of a proposition
while ei@per leaves it doubtful,
requires modifying before it is
applied to the New Testament, where ei@per is, if anything, more
directly affirmative than ei] ge<.1
Arndt and Gingrich suggest "if indeed, inasmuch
as" as possible
translations of this
combination and render Galatians 3:4 as "have you
experienced so many things in
vain? If it really was in vain . . . .”2
The particle ge< performs its usual emphatic function,
strengthening the
word to which it is attached,
and stresses the conditional nature of
the concept.
Ei]
kai<
The combination ei]
kai<
is used to introduce concessive clauses,
and is usually translated
"even if." Robertson
represents the majority
opinion when he writes that
concessive clauses "are really just
conditional clauses with the addition of kai<."3 Blass-Debrunner agrees
with this evaluation.4
distinction between conditional
and concessive clauses:
1 J. B. Lightfoot, The Epistle of
(Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1966 reprint of 1866 edition),
pp.
135-136.
2 Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, p. 152.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1026.
4 Friedrich Blass and
Albert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament and Other
Early Christian Literature, translated and revised
by Robert W. Funk (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 190.
80
The force of a concessive sentence
is thus very different
from that of a conditional sentence. The
latter represents the
fulfillment of the apodosis as
conditioned on the fulfillment of
the protasis; the former represents the
apodosis as fulfilled in
spite of the fulfillment of the protasis.1
He does recognize, though, that there are times when the
two
clauses become almost
identical:
Yet there are cases in which by the
weakening of the character-
istic force of each construction, or by
the complexity of the
elements expressed by the protasis, the
two usages approach so
near to each other as to make distinction
between them difficult.2
Few Koine grammarians follow
purposes of classification,
concessive clauses were omitted from the
lists of conditional sentences
in the appendices. Including them would,
of course, alter the total
number of examples, but would not affect
the general conclusions.
Ei]
pw?j
The last particle combination is ei] pw?j. This occurs three
times with the indicative mood
(Romans 1:10, 11:14 and Philippians
3:11), twice with the
subjunctive (Romans 11:14 and Philippians 3:11),
and once with the optative mood
(Acts 27:12). This combination, like
ei]
a@ra,
serves to heighten the question involved. It is uniformly
translated in the Authorized
Version as "if by any means."
While each of these particle combinations has its special
point
of emphasis, it is the
conditional use of ei] that
is the center of
attention. The next area of
discussion will be that of the negative
1 Ernest DeWitt
Testament Greek (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1897), p. 112.
2 Ibid.,
p. 112.
81
particles employed in the
simple condition.
Negative Particles in
Simple Conditions
The topic of negative particles in conditional sentences
shows
how far Koine Greek has moved
from Classical Greek, for the divergence
in form and style is marked.
The Classical Pattern
W. W. Goodwin will serve as the standard for presenting
the
classical pattern of negative
particles in conditional sentences:
The negative particle of the
protasis is regularly mh<, that
of
the apodosis is ou].
When ou] is found in a protasis,
it is generally closely connected
with
a particular word (especially the verb), with which it forms a
single
negative expression; so that its negative force does not (like
that of mh<) affect the protasis as a whole.1
Though there are, of course,
exceptions, Goodwin's rule states the
general case for the Classical
literature. The Koine situation is
quite different.
The Koine Pattern
Statement.--Alexander Buttmann, an early Koine grammarian,
recognized the distinction
between Koine and Classical Greek on this
point:
The use of ou] in the protasis of a
conditional sentence occurs
in the N.T. relatively very often; so
that we are
1 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek
Verb
(Boxton: Ginn and Company, 1893), p. 138.
82
justified in inferring a difference in
usage, since in classical
writers this use is only exceptional.1
A later writer, J. H. Moulton, approvingly quotes Blass's
rule for
the negative particles in
Koine: "'All instances,' he says, 'may
practially he brought under the
single rule, that ou]
negatives the
indicative, mh< the other moods, including the infinitive and
participle."2
Robertson agrees, noting that "The negative of the
protasis in
the first class condition is
practically always ou] in the
N.T. We have
ei]
ou]
as a rule, not ei] mh<."3
This rule is not absolute, and he
identifies five exceptions,
listed in the next section. Both he and
Moulton see the simple absolute
rule of ou] with the indicative and mh
with the other moods as a goal
"not yet reached in the N.T." but almost
completely met in Modern Greek.4
Specific examples.--The authorities list different
totals for
the various combinations.
Moulton finds thirty-one examples of ei]
ou]
in simple condition protases,5
Robertson thirty-four,6 and Roberts
1 Alexander Buttmann, A
Grammar of the New Testament Greek, trans-
lated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
1873),
pp. 344-345.
2 J. H. Moulton, Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 170.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1101.
4 Ibid., p. 1101, Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 170.
5 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 171.
6 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1111.
83
thirty-five.1 Whatever the discrepancies, the preponderance
of this form
is clear when compared to only
five examples of ei] mh<: Mark 6:5,
I Corinthians 15:2, 2
Corinthians 13:5, Galatians 1:7 and I Timothy 6:3.
Of these five, only Mark 6:5
and I Timothy 6:3 have unanimous acceptance
as examples of the classical
pattern.
Godet considers I Corinthians 15:2 "a pleonasm
arising from the
mixing of the two following
constructions: excepting if (e]kto<j
ei])
and: if not (ei] mh<).2
Lenski agrees with this identification.3
Lightfoot explains Galatians 1:7 so:
Ei] mh< seems always to retain,
at least in this stage of the
language, its proper exceptive sense, and
is not simply oppositive,
though it frequently approaches nearly to a]lla< . . . .4
This construction "may
either state an exception to the preceding
negative clause (= except, save) or merely qualify it (= but only),
as it does in Luke iv. 26 . . .
and in Gal. 1. 7 . . . ."5 The same
basic construction is found in
2 Corinthians 13:5 – ei] mh<ti
a]doki<moi e@ste.
The ratio of five to thirty-five examples gives credence
to
Buttmann's claim that the Koine
shows a wide divergence from the
Classical usage in the negative
particles in the simple condition. The
presence of a relatively few
examples of mh< show
that the Classical
heritage has not been
completely lost in the New Testament.
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 153.
2
3 Lenski, Corinthians, p. 629.
4 Lightfoot, Galatians, p. 77.
5 Nicoll, Testament,
III, p. 156.
84
]Ea<n with the Indicative Mood
Although, the general principle of simple conditions is
that the
protasis consists of ei] with the indicative mood, there are exceptions.
A few such conditions employ ean with the indicative in an apparent
contradiction to this
principle: Mark 8:3; Luke 19:40; John 8:54,
21:22,23; Acts 8:31; I
Thessalonians 3:8; I John 5:15 and Revelation
2:22.
Explanation of the
Form
While these nine exceptions are a small percentage of the
total,
they are a phenomenon that
needs explanation. Several explanations may
be offered.
Development of the Language
First of all, Koine Greek represents a stage in the
historical
development of the language. As
the language progressed from Classical
through Koine to Modern, the
distinction between ei] and e]a<n faded,
especially in respect to their
respective moods. In the later Koine
"the use of e]a<n with the ind. is rather more frequent . . . Finally
ei]
came
to be 'a mere literary alternative.'"1 Blass-Debrunner also
recognizes this consequence of
linguistic development.2 The
New
Testament, therefore,
represents a period in which the general principle
is operative, but a transition
is evident. Robertson summarizes: "In
general, the difference between
ei] and e]a<n is considerably lessened
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1009.
2 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
85
in the koinh<, though it must be remembered that e]a<n was never confined
to the subj. nor ei] to the ind. and opt."1
Textual Emendations
While the development of the language may be one
consideration
in explaining these apparent
exceptions, textual emendations are
another. Buttmann raises this
observation and caution:
It is, indeed, not to be denied that
the instances in question
almost disappear amid the multitude of
those that are grammatically
regular, and suspicion may also be raised
by the circumstances
that hardly a single passage with the
Indicative is completely
beyond question critically. Yet when we
consider that in countless
passages with the Subjunctive not the
smallest variation is found
(which would not be the case if the
Indicative were chargeable solely
to the copyists), it is far more probable
that, where a diversity
of readings occurs in such a number of
instances, this fact results
from the circumstance that the copyists,
commentators, etc., early
altered the Indicative which gave them
offence.2
Winer also notes the significance of textual variations
in
his comments on the subject.3
Both grammarians, however, recognize the
legitimate identification of e]a<n with the indicative in the New Testa-
ment in spite of the fact that
most of the examples show textual
variants.
How wide-spread is this textual difficulty? A review of
the
available evidence supports the
claim of Buttmann: such constructions
1 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 1009-1010.
2 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 222.
3 G. B. Winer, A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament,
seventh
edition, revised by Gottfried Lunemann, translated by J. H.
Thayer (Andover: Warren F.
Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 294.
86
are part of the original text.
Robertson discusses several passages which
have been challenged,1
and Roberts lists the textual evidence for
some of them and adds a few
examples of his own.2
Thus two things seem to be born out: (1) there has been
some
alteration of the text in
apparent attempts to bring specific passages
into conformity with the
general rule and (2) e]a<n was
used with the
indicative mood in some
passages of the original text of the New
Testament.3
Significance
of the Form
If the use of e]a<n with
the indicative is part of the original
text, then what is its
significance? Specific answers vary: Robertson,
of course, sees no special
significance. The key for him is the mood,
not the particle. Therefore he
sees no basic difference between the
two types of protases, for each
uses the indicative mood.4 Both
represent simple conditions.
dogmatically:
In a few instances say is used with
the Present Indicative in
the protasis of a conditional sentence,
apparently to express a
simple present supposition. I Thess. 3:8,
I John 5:15.5
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1010.
2 Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," pp. 146-149.
3
Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 168.
4
Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
5 Burton, Syntax, p. 103.
87
Blass-Debrunner offer no comment either
way.1
Roberts approaches the subject from the historical side
and
discusses the use of e]a<n in conditional sentences in the
Septuagint.
In this section of his dissertation
he relies upon the work of James
Sterenberg who wrote a
dissertation for the
1908 entitled "The Use of
Conditional Sentences in the Alexandrian
Version of the
Pentateuch." This work was not
available to the author,
so Roberts' conclusions will
have to be accepted at face value:
It will be remembered that
Sterenberg noted that the construction
is used in the LXX (where it occurs with
the perfect, present,
imperfect, and the aorist indicatives)
mostly in laws in the protases
of which transgressions and the like are
minutely defined and that it
is used to render the original thought
more exactly to avoid
ambiguity; e.g., where the verb in the
protasis is thought to
precede in time the event or the
immediately preceding verb, or in
one verb when the event may be supposed as
a possible event,
requiring the indicative, but where both
verbs are governed by e]a<n.2
This, though, is the sense of the construction in the
Septuagint.
New Testament examples are not,
as Roberts notes, "so related to laws."3
It would seem that the
observations based upon the Septuagint do not
fit the New Testament examples.
Neither do the commentators offer much help. Lenski
identifies
the ean of I Thessalonians 3:8 as "looking to the
future."4 Lightfoot,
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 149.
3 Ibid., p. 149.
4 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
the Corinthians to the
Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to
Philemon
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 291.
88
after defending the indicative
in the same verse, equates doubt with
the particle:
fast.'
Their faith was not complete (ver. 10). There was enough
in the fact that they had been so
recently converted, enough in
the turn which their thoughts had
recently taken, absorbed so
entirely in the contemplation of the future
state, to make the
Apostle alarmed lest their faith should
prove only impulsive and
transitory.1
The
Expositor's Greek Testament notes that the future indicative in
Revelation 2:22 "expresses
rather more probability than the subj. with
e]a<n
mh<.”2
What, then, can be said about a distinction in meaning
between
e]a<n with
the indicative and ei] with
the indicative? Nothing, really.
There are too few examples upon
which to build rules, and the distinction,
if any, is nebulous at best. Roberts
accurately states the case: "This
writer is able to discover no
distinction which can be put in a rule."3
Neither is this one.
Significance of
Moods and Tenses
Since the deciding factor in identifying a simple condition
is the indicative mood in the
protasis and not the conditional particle,
the next step in discussing the
simple condition is to evaluate the
significance of the various
moods and tenses in the protasis and apodosis.
1 J. B. Lightfoot, Notes on the Epistles of
Zondervan
Publishing House, 1957 reprint of 1895 edition), p. 46.
2 Nicoll, Testament, V, p. 361.
3 Roberts, "Conditional Sentences,"
p. 150.
89
Moods and Tenses in
the Protasis
General Observations
The simple condition is, by definition, limited to the
indicative mood, for it assumes
the reality of the condition. The
particle e]a<n does occur, but the key is the mood. A few
examples of ei]
with the subjunctive mood are
found in the New Testament, but these are
identified as more probable
conditions and discussed under that
heading. The simple condition
is limited to the indicative mood in the
protasis.
This mood may be used with any tense. The specific data
for
New Testament tense usage is
listed below:
Present tense = 69.0%
Aorist tense =
17.5%
Future tense =
6.9%
Perfect tense = 3.8%
Each of these tenses brings
with it the usual verbal significance as
described in the grammars.
Which one is used in a given condition
depends upon the action
involved in the protasis.
While there is no rule governing the type of tense used
in any
given protasis except the
desire of the author, it is clear that the
present tense is used far more
than all others combined.
Future Indicative
One particular combination calls for specific discussion:
ei]
with the future indicative. Two
things should be noted. First is its
90
use in Classical Greek,
especially by the poets, in threatening or
warning (minatory or monitory)
statements. Second is its use in
emphatic assertions or oaths.
Minatory or Monitory Use
Gildersleeve has called attention to this special use of
the
simple condition. Working
within the framework of a comparison between
ei] and
the future indicative and e]a<n with
the subjunctive, he first
notes that the latter is by far
more frequent. The distinction between
the two is seen
. . . whenever it is important to
distinguish continued from
concentrated action, whenever it is
important to distinguish over-
lapping from priority, e]a<n with the subjunctive is preferred.
He continues,
Now the neglect of this distinction in ei] with the future
indicative shows a certain coldness, a
certain indifference; and
this added to the general rigor of the
logical condition, which
faces fact in all its grimness, gives a
stern, minatory, prophetic
tone to the future indicative, which
commentators and grammarians
have noticed, but noticed only in passing
. . . .2
Gildersleeve then proceeds to illustrate this from the
tragic
poets, showing that the device
is frequently employed by them in such
settings.
The New Testament, though, stands in contrast to the
tragic
poets of Classical Greek, for
there is only one example of this
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"On ei]
with the Future Indicative and ean
with
the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," Transactions
of the American
Philological Association, 7:1 (January, 1876),
p. 9.
2 Ibid.,
p. 9.
91
construction in its pages.
Of the New Testament instances of ei] followed by a Future
(about
twenty in number), one, 2 Tim. 2:12,
illustrates the minatory or
monitory
force attributed to such clauses by [Gildersleeve].1
The phrase under discussion, ei] a]rnhso<meqa, ka]kei?noj a]rnh<setai,
is the third line of what may
be four lines of an early Christian hymn.2
The fact is stated "in all
its grimness" that "If we shall deny Him,
He also will deny us."
Certainly this must be understood as a stern
warning, for eternity seems to
hang in the balance. But, it should be
asked, a warning of what to
whom?
Commentators are, as usual, divided on the passage. Some
seem
to imply loss of salvation
resulting from a believer's turning against
his Lord and denying Him.
Hendriksen's words seem to allow for this:
When a person, because of unwillingness to
suffer hardship for
the sake of Christ and his cause, disowns the Lord ("I do not know
the man!"), then, unless he repents, he will be disowned by the
Lord in the great day of judgment ("I
do not know you.").3
general and, assuming that some
may prove their true colors by denying
Him, warns them of their fate.4
Hiebert agrees with
the idea that this denial
refers to "a temporary weakness of faith," but
1
2 Homer A. Kent, Jr., The Pastoral Epistles (
1958),
p. 271.
3 William Hendriksen, 1 - II Timothy and Titus (
Baker
Book House, 1965), p. 259.
4 Kent, Pastoral
Epistles, p. 272.
92
as the conclusion shows, to
deny Him "as a permanent fact."1
Certainly, though, Gildersleeve's identification of this
construction as one presenting
grim fact in a coldly logical way aptly
describes Paul's words.
Emphatic Assertions
The second and more common use of ei] with the future indicative
is in emphatic assertions or
oaths. This is especially true in quotes
from the Old Testament where ei] translates the Hebrew particle Mxi. The
four examples of this are Mark
8:12, Hebrews 3:11, 4:3 and 4:5.
Mark 8:12, ei] doqh<setai th? genea? tau<th shmei?on, is
not an
"official" oath like
the examples in Hebrews, but it fits the same
pattern: "No sign shall be given to this
generation." As already
indicated, Robertson identifies
this as an elliptical condition lacking
the apodosis. Further, he says
that this is "really aposiopesis in
imitation of the Hebrew use of im."2 Other grammarians recognize this
construction, including Winer,3
Buttmann,4 and Blass-Debrunner.5
1 D. Edmund Hiebert, Second Timothy (Chicago: Moody Press,
1958),
pp.
63-64.
2 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 331.
3 Winer, Grammar, p. 500.
4 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 358-359.
5 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 189.
94
The references in Hebrews (3:11, 4:3 and 4:5) are all
quotations
from the Septuagint version of
Psalm 95:11 – ei] ei]seleu<sontai ei]j
th>n
kata<pausi<n
mou.
The Hebrew version introduces this with the particle
Mxi, whose
use in oaths is a normal structure of the language.1 The
Septuagint regularly uses ei] in these situations. The Authorized
Version correctly renders 3:11
as "They shall not enter into my rest,"
while 4:3 and 4:5 are translated,
"If they shall enter into my rest."
Modern versions correctly
translate all of them the same way: a statement
of warning, "They shall
not enter into my rest."
Thus ei] with the indicative is used in sentences of
emphatic
negation, though few of them
are found in the New Testament. The
conditional particle is a
straight-forward translation of the Hebrew
and is a proper Hebraism.
Moods and Tenses in
the Apodosis
There is no specific relationship between the moods and tenses
of the protasis and the
apodosis in simple conditions. Robertson
summarizes this point well when
he states:
The apodosis varies very greatly. It all
depends upon what one is
after, whether mere statement,
prediction, command, prohibition,
suggestion, question. Hence the apodosis
may be in the indicative
(any tense) or the subjunctive or the
imperative. There is no
necessary correspondence in tense between
protasis and apodosis.
The variation in the mode of the apodosis
has no essential bearing
on the force of the condition.2
1 E. Kautzsch, ed., Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, revised by A.
E.
Cowley
(London: Oxford University Press, 1910), pp. 471-472.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1008.
95
While there is no essential correspondence between the
protasis
and the apodosis, there is a
preference for the indicative mood in
the apodosis. The tables in
Appendix I yield the following data:
Apodoses with indicative mood = 205 or 67.3% of the total.
Apodoses with imperative mood = 84 or 28.4% of the total.
Apodoses with subjunctive mood = 7 or 2.4% of the total.
Again, no rule may be fixed,
but the distribution is most reasonable.
Protases which speak in real
terms would normally imply apodoses which
also speak in real terms. But
language is flexible, and all moods are
possible and do occur.
Meaning of the
Simple Condition
Now that the details of amount and construction have been
considered, the way is cleared
for a consideration of the basic meaning
of the simple condition. This
will cover two areas: (1) particular
and general conditions, and (2)
the degree of reality implied by the
protasis.
Particular and General
Conditions
The terminology if not the concept of particular and
general
conditions has entered Koine
studies through the work of Goodwin, hence
his definitions will be the
starting point.
The Position of Goodwin
Goodwin defines particular and general thusly:
A particular supposition refers to a
definite act or to several
definite acts, supposed to occur at some
definite time (or
times) . . . .
96
A general supposition refers
indefinitely to any act or acts
of a given class which may be supposed to
occur or to have occurred
at any time . . .1
This particular distinction is
seen "in all classes of conditions,"
but in some of them it may be
distinguished by construction:
When the apodosis has a verb of
present time expressing a
customary or repeated action, the
protasis may refer (in a general
way) to any act or acts of a given class
which may be supposed to
occur at any time within the period
represented in English as
present.
When the apodosis has a verb of past
time expressing a customary
or repeated action, the protasis may refer
(in a general way) to any
act or acts of a given class which may be
supposed to have occurred
at any time in the past.2
The key point in the construction of the conditional
sentence
is the tense of the apodosis,
not the protasis. Goodwin is simply
attributing to the present and
imperfect tenses their continual or
repetitive significance.
The Evaluation of Goodwin
As mentioned earlier, Funk has also noted that "The
present
tense in the apodosis often
gives the condition a generalizing force
(indicated by ever in the translation)."3
Funk, though, simply notes it
as an observation without
making it a rule of classification. In this
he follows Gildersleeve, who
notes that all classes of conditional
sentences may be either general
or particular, "according to the
1 W. W. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 141.
2 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
3 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of
Hellenistic
Greek, 3 volumes (
1973), II, p. 683.
97
character of the
apodosis."1
Robertson rejects Goodwin's use of this concept as a
means of
classification:
This theory calls for
"particular" and "general" suppositions as a
fundamental element. This is a false step
in itself. As Gilder-
sleeve shows, each of the four classes of
conditions may be parti-
cular or general. That point has no
bearing on the quality of the
condition.2
Does this agree with the facts of the case? Can simple
conditional sentences be
particular or general, depending upon the
context as Gildersleeve and
Robertson maintain? The answer, of course,
is Yes. A few examples will
suffice.
Romans 4:14 uses two perfect tenses in the apodosis of
its
condition and speaks of one
past historical event: the giving of the
law – ei] ga>r oi[ e]k no<mou klhrono<moi, keke<nwtai
h@ pi<stij.- "for if those
who are of law are heirs, then
faith has no value." This fits the
pattern of Goodwin as a
particular condition.
I Corinthians 15:2, however, uses a present tense in the
apodosis
and speaks of the specific
situation of the Corinthian believers and
their relationship to the
gospel – di ] ou$ kai> sw<zesqe,
ti<ni lo<gw
eu]hggelisa<mhn
u[mi<n ei] kate<xete - "By this (gospel) you are saved, if
you
hold fast to the word I
preached to you." This does not agree with
Goodwin, for the present tense
(sw<zesqe)
should make this condition
a general one.
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"Studies in Pindaric Syntax," The
American
Journal Philology, 3:4 (December, 1882),
p. 435.
2 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 1005-1006.
98
Matthew 12:26 – kai>
ei] o[ stana?j to>n satana?n e]kba<llei, e]f ]
e[auto<n
e]meri<sqh - "And if Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against
himself" - may be taken as
a general condition, referring to any time
Satan works against himself.
Yet the apodosis uses the aorist e]merisqh,
contrary to what Goodwin would
predict.
Thus the simple condition may be either particular or
general
with no special significance
attached to the tense of the apodosis.
Funk's point should not be
overlooked, though, for the concepts of
particular and general are a
legitimate part of interpretation and
translation.
Degree of Reality
One of the most important questions about simple
conditions is:
What do they imply about the
condition they state? The indicative mood
communicates objective reality,
but how is that communicated and
wherein does the reality lie?
Review of the Grammarians
The various grammarians approach this question in various
ways,
but most have arrived at a
similar position.
Classical Grammarians
Goodwin stated his opinion that simple conditions are
those which
imply nothing as to the
fulfillment [reality] of the condition . . ,”1
He rejects the idea that
language should even have a form which implied
1 Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses, p. 139.
99
the objective reality of a
condition: "The Greek has no form implying
that a condition is or was fulfilled, and it is
hardly conceivable that
any language should find such a
form necessary or useful."1
Gildersleeve agrees with Goodwin:
The Logical Condition [simple
condition] states the elements in
question. It is used of that which can be
brought to the standard
of fact; but that standard may be for or
against the truth of the
postulate. All that the logical condition
asserts is the inexorable
connection of the two members of the
sentence.2
His point is that the
factuality of the postulate is limited to its
statement, for it is presented
as something that can be considered as
fact but not necessarily is
fact. The Classical grammarians are in
agreement on this point.
Koine Grammarians
Early Koine grammarians followed this approach. Green
states,
"The conditional particle ei], if with
the Indicative in the protasis,
assumes the hypothesis as a
fact."3 Winer reflects
Gildersleeve's view
by identifying the simple
condition as the "Pure Condition."4 Even
Turner, a more recent scholar,
uses the general language of "simple
assumption."5
1 Goodwin, Mood's and Tenses, p. 140.
2 Gildersleeve, "Pinder," p. 435.
3 Samuel G. Green, Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek
Testament
(London:
The Religious Tract Society, [1886]), p. 317.
4 Winer, Grammar, p . 291.
5 Turner, Syntax,
p. 319.
100
More recent grammarians continue this same general
approach.
Blass-Debrunner states,
somewhat confusingly, "Ei] with
the indicative
of all tenses denotes a simple
conditional assumption with emphasis on
the reality of the assumption
(not of what is being assumed): the
condition is considered 'a real
case.'"1 The confusion
results from
the distinction between the
assumption and "what is being assumed."
The assumption corresponds to
the statement, "What is being assumed"
corresponds to the situation.
In Matthew 12:27, Jesus offers the
statement with an assumption
that it is a real case. He assumes it
to be true. He is not, however,
stating the situation as true. The
distinction Blass-Debrunner
draws is between these two: the statement
and the situation.
Dana and Mantey are clearer when they identify the simple
condition as the one that
"was used when one wished to assume or to seem
to assume the reality of his
premise."2 Funk expands
this description:
In
a first class condition the protasis is a simple conditional
assumption with emphasis on the reality of
the assumption (but
not on the reality of what is being
assumed) [reality of statement,
but not the situation]. It is therefore
taken to be a real case
though it may, in fact, be an unreal case
[as in Matthew 12:27].
Robertson's position is basic to this discussion, since
he is
most often quoted in support of
one position or another. To show the
development of his thought two
statements will be given, one from the
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
2 Dana and. Mantey, Grammar, p. 289.
3 Funk, Grammar,
II, p. 680.
101
first and one from the tenth
edition of his Short Grammar:
The indicative states the condition as a fact. It may or may not
be true in fact. The condition has nothing to do with that, but
only with the statement. . . . This condition does assume the
reality of the condition.1
Then, from the tenth edition:
This condition assumes the reality of the condition. The indicative
mode states
it as a fact. The condition has
nothing whatever to do
with the actual fact or truth. It is just
here that some of the
grammars have erred in failure to
distinguish clearly between the
statement
and the reality. It is the condition
taken at its face
value without any insinuations or
implications. The context, of
course, must determine the actual
situation. The indicative mode
determines only the statement.2
It is evident in the latter statement that he is trying
to avoid
the impression that he
considers the simple condition one that affirms
the reality (or actuality) of
the situation as an objective fact. It
does affirm the reality of the
speaker's assumption or statement, i.e.,
the speaker really assumes
(though he may believe otherwise) that the
condition (statement) is true.
The statements in his Historical
Grammar,
offered in response to Goodwin, are not as clear:
This condition pointedly implies the fulfilment of the condition.
It is the condition of actuality, reality,
Wirklichkeit, and not
mere "possibility" as Farrar has
it . . . a la Goodwin. This is
the crux
of the whole matter. Once see [sic]
that the first class
condition with the ind. implies the
reality of the premise, all
else follows naturally.3
1 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New
York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1908), p. 161.
2 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
the Greek Testament (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1933), p. 350.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
101
It seems, then, that the grammars present a unified view
concerning the degree of
reality in the simple condition: It presents
the statement of the condition
as true, but without affirming any-
thing about the reality of the
actual situation.
Review of the Problem
The unanimous opinion of the grammarians is not reflected
by
some writers and speakers who
claim that the simple condition
guarantees the reality of the
situation. They suggest the translation
"since," rather than
"if." In English this presents the situation
as true, both in the speaker's
statement and in objective fact. An
extreme, but by no means
isolated example of this has already been
given: "The first class
condition implies truth or reality. If . . .
and
it is true."1 Sometimes Kenneth Wuest is implicated in this
view
on the strength of translation
such as Romans 6:5 -
The Word "if" in the Greek is
not the conditional particle of
an unfulfilled condition. It is a
fulfilled condition here, its
meaning being, "in view of the
fact."2
He did not adopt this as a
uniform principle of translation, though,
and limited such renderings to
places where the context justified them.
This, of course, is at the
heart of the situation. There are several
passages where the reality of
the statement is in keeping with the
reality of the situation. But
many times it is not, e.g. Matthew 12:27.
1 Jerome Moore, "
45:1
(June, 1979), p. 11.
2 Kenneth S. Wuest, Treasures From the Greek New Testament
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1957), p. 89.
103
One cannot generalize from a
context where this is true to all uses of
the simple condition.
Objections to this view.--Several objections may
be raised to
this position. First, a little
mature reflection will cause one to be
cautious about agreeing with
Moore and others. In his example he
claims, on the basis of a
simple condition in Colossians 1:23, that
there is no need to doubt the
security of anyone's salvation. This
is not supported from
Scripture, for certainly the false teachers of
Acts 20:30 looked and acted
like believers before their true colors were
flown. Those in I John 2:19
must have looked like believers before
they went out and demonstrated
that they were not. Would Paul have
been so quick to affirm the
absolute salvation of all those in the
church where he had not visited
(Colossians 1:4, 9)? Probably not.
Second, and more significant, the pattern of translating ei]
by "since" does not
hold in all cases. James Boyer shows that Wuest
changes his translation between
John 10:35 ("since") and 10:37, 38
("assuming that"), as
required by context.1 John
Battle has listed all
simple conditions which, in his
opinion, present data in the protasis
that are contrary to fact and
known to be so by the speaker.2
It is
impossible to use
"since" in such verses as I Corinthians 15:13 and
1 James L. Boyer,
"Semantics in Biblical Interpretation,"
Grace Journal, 3:2 (Spring, 1962), p.
33.
2 John A.
Exegesis,"
unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace Theological Seminary,
1975, pp. 166-168.
104
still maintain orthodoxy.
to do is insert
"since" in place of "if" in the verses to realize the
error of this concept. J.
Harold Greenlee shows the variety of
situations one encounters in
the simple condition:
Moreover, 2) the speaker may believe that
the condition is true:
"if they have persecuted me (and they
have done so) [John 15:20a];
or 3) he may believe that the condition is
not true: "if they have
kept my word" (but they have not done
so) [John 15:20b]; or 4) he
may be uncertain as to whether it is true:
"sir, if you have
carried him away" (she does not know
whether he had or not) [John
20:15]; or 5) the speaker may even be
mistaken in his assumption:
"if he is sleeping" (but he was
in fact dead) [John 11:12].1
Justification for the translation of e]i by "since," must come
from the context, not the
condition. This is an interpretation,
not a translation.
The correct view.--The simple condition, through
the indicative
mood, offers a conditional
statement presented as real. It makes no
attempt to speak to the actual
situation. If the exegete will maintain
this distinction between statement
and situation, then he will not err
in handling this condition. A
good summary of this point of view is
found in The Bible Translator:
When ei] with the indicative is
used, it implies that the truth or
otherwise of the condition is regarded as
in principle "determined,"
i.e. is represented as a fact (although
the speaker does not commit
himself as to whether he believes the
condition is true or not.2
1 J. Harold Greenlee,
"'If' in the New Testament," The
Bible
Translation, 13:1 (January, 1962),
p. 40.
2 John Kinje, Jr., "Greek
Conditional Sentences," The Bible
Translator, 13:4
(October, 1962), p. 223.
105
Translation of the
Simple Condition
How, then, should the simple condition be translated? The
uniform rule of all grammarians
surveyed is to use the English conditional
construction, "if."
All major English versions so translate this
condition. Should one want to
paraphrase the concept, then the phrase,
"If, as I am assuming . .
." might be employed. The statement of the
simple condition may be in
accord with the reality of the situation,
it may be contrary to it, or it
may be unknown. All that can be said
is that the speaker is
presenting the condition as true in his
statement.
CHAPTER III
THE
CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION
Introduction
The
Concept
The simple condition states the matter directly by
assuming it
to be true. This, as has been
discussed, is an assumption of reality.
But the assumption can also
work the opposite way. The speaker can
present the situation and
assume it to be false or contrary to fact.
Such a condition is termed the
Contrary to Fact condition and is the
subject of this chapter.
The
Construction
These conditions follow a standardized construction: ei] with
a past (augmented) tense in the
indicative mood in the protasis, and
another past (augmented) verb
in the apodosis, usually with a@n. This
is
as would be expected, for both
the simple condition and the contrary to
fact condition are making
definite statements; the former assumes them
to be true, the latter false.
Robert W. Funk describes them so:
The assumption is taken to be untrue
in the protasis of a second
class condition [contrary to fact]; it is
considered an unreal case
(whether it is, in fact, is another
matter). The conclusion
follows from the premise.
The protasis consists of ei] plus a past (augmented)
tense of
the indicative; the apodosis also has a
past tense of the indicative,
usually with a@n.1
1 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of
Hellenistic
Greek, 3 vols. (
1973), II, p. 681.
106
107
In this format the use of the
imperfect tense in both clauses refers to
present or past time, and that
of the aorist to past time only. This
basic scheme is the same as
that of Robertson,1 Winer,2 and Goodwin.3
Blass-Debrunner recognizes
these general principles, but does not
relate the condition to time:
"The tense (imperfect, aorist, plu-
perfect . . .) retains its Aktionsart; the imperfect is temporally
ambiguous."4
List of Contrary to
Fact Conditions
Appendix II gives a Listing of the contrary to fact
conditions
in the New Testament. There are
some apparent exceptions. Buttmann
lists four which he feels
should be classed as contrary to fact condi-
tions even though they use
present tenses: John 8:39, 14:28; Luke 17:6
and Hebrews 11:15. He calls
them exceptions to the rule.5
John 8:39.—ei] te<kna
tou? ]Abraa<m e]ste, ta> e@rga
tou? ]Abqaa<m
poiei?te (if
you were Abraham's children, then you would do the works
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of Historical
Research
(Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 1013.
2 G. B. Winer, A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament,
7th
edition,
revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated by J. H. Thayer
(Andover,
Massachusetts: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 291.
3 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of Moods and Tenses (
Company,
1893), p. 147.
4 Friedrich Blass and
Albert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament and Other
Early Christian Literature, translated and revised
by
Robert W. Funk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 182.
5 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of New Testament Greek,
translated
and
edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1873),
pp. 224-225.
108
of Abraham). Buttmann observes
that
Most of the interpreters and editors,
indeed, have taken offence
at this reading [e@ste in John 8:39], and have
adopted into the
text instead the very weakly-attested h@te (and thus restored the
construction to the ordinary form),
explaining to themselves the
origin of este in
various ways . . . .1
Este is supported
by x, B, D, and L. ]Epoiei?te is
supported by
B, D, E, F, and G.2 Westcott and Hort have present tenses in
both the protasis and apodosis,3
and the United Bible Societies' text
has the imperfect in the
apodosis.4 The question, then, is not
e@ste versus
h@te, but e]poiei?te instead of poiei?te.
There seems to be little or no support for Buttmann's
claim
that this represents a contrary
to fact condition, for the present
tense in the protasis affirms
Christ's assumption that His listeners
were Abraham's children . The
imperfect indicates that He expresses
doubt as to their ability to
prove it. This is the view of Godet.5
Such an interperetation makes
this a mixed condition. The protasis
is that of a simple condition,
and the apodosis that of a contrary to
fact condition.
1 Buttmann, Grammar., p. 225.
2 W. Robertson Nicoll,
ed., The Expoisiton'is Greek Testament
(Grand
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), I, p. 778.
3 Brooke Foss Westcott
and Fenton John Anthony Hort, The New
Testament in the
Original Greek
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941),
p.
208.
4 Kurt Aland, et. at.,
eds., The Greek New Testament (
United
Bible Societies, 1966), p. 359.
5
(Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, n.d., reprint of 1893 edition),
II,
p. 112.
109
John 14:28.—ei]
h]gapa?te me, e]xa<rhte a@n (if you loved me, you would
have rejoiced). Although
Buttmann claims that there is manuscript
evidence for a present tense in
this condition, neither he nor anyone
else gives the data for it.
Luke 17:6.—ei]
e@xete pi<stin w[j ko<kon sina<pewj, e]le<gete a@n (if
you had faith as small as a
mustard seed, you could say). Here the
present e@xete is supported by x, A, B,
L, X and others, while the
imperfect ei@xete shows up in D and the rest of the
Byzantine manuscript
tradition.1 This, like John 8:39, is in reality a mixed
condition.2
Hebrews 11:15.—kai>
ei] me>n e]kei<nhj e]mnhmo<neuon a]f ] h$j e]ce<bhsan
ei#xon
a@n kairo>n a]naka<myai (if they had been remembering the country
they
had left, they would have had
opportunity to return). The only
significant problem is the
presence of mnhmoneu?ousin in the
apodosis
instead of e]mnhmo<neuon. The evidence for this present
tense is so
slight, though, that it is only
mentioned in a footnote in Lange's
Commentary.3 Thus this is taken as a regular contrary to
fact condition.
Buttmann's apparent exceptions,
then, are either non-existent or are
to be considered mixed
conditions.
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 592.
2 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1964), p. 867.
3 John Peter Lange,
editor, Commentary on the Holy Scriptures,
24
volumes reprinted in 12 (
1960), XI, p. 187.
110
Significance
of the Tense
The mood employed in the contrary to fact conditions is
the
indicative. The only variety
comes in the tenses used, and these are
limited to the augmented ones:
imperfect, aorist and pluperfect.
The
Imperfect Tense
The basic significance of the imperfect tense is to
designate
durative or repeated action in
past time.1 This tense may
appear in both
parts of the conditional
sentence, or in either part in combination with
the other augmented tenses.
Imperfect in Protasis and
Apodosis
When the imperfect is used in both the protasis and
apodosis,
it implies that the condition
and conclusion both involve durative acts.
The time of the actions,
though, is present, rather than past. Robertson
states this as a general rule
of these conditions: "An unfulfilled condi-
tion about the present time was
expressed in terms of the imperfect
must be determined from the
context: "The Imperfect denotes continued
action; the Aorist a simple
fact; the Pluperfect completed action.
The time is implied in the context,
not expressed by the verb."3 This
1 H. E. Dana and Julius
R. Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the Greek
New Testament (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 186.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1013.
3 Ernest DeWitt Burton, Syntax Moods and Tenses in New
Testament
Greek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 103.
111
is the more applicable view,
for even Robertson notes that in Hebrews
11:15 the imperfect is used of
continual action, but in past, not
present time.1 The equation of present time with the
imperfect tense,
while not an absolute rule,
does fit most of the examples in Appendix II.
Westcott summarizes:
In this case the hypothetic
unfulfilled [contrary to fact]
condition and the consequence of its
non-fulfillment are both
regarded (a) generally as present or (b),
if not as present, as
continuous and not definitely complete in
a specific incident.2
This combination is the most frequent (17 examples) type
of
contrary to fact conditions,
and a glance at those listed will confirm
Westcott's generalization. The
actions viewed are considered continual
acts, and in the present time
in most cases. The list of examples
could be expanded at the
expense of the pluperfect, for this tense
can be treated as a real
imperfect. Both Westcott3 and Robertson4
recognize this. The examples in
Appendix II conform to verb structure,
not usage, so such conditions
are listed as pluperfects.
Imperfect in the Protasis Only
Since the aorist tense is more frequent in the apodosis
than the
pluperfect (22 examples as
opposed to 9), the examples considered will
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of the
Greek Testament (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1933), p. 352.
2 Brooke Foss Westcott, The Epistle to the Hebrews (
Macmillan
and Co., 1889), p. 112.
3 Ibid., p. 113.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1015.
112
be the imperfect-aorist
combination. Again, Westcott: "The hypothetic
unfulfilled [contrary to fact]
condition is regarded as continuous
and not definitely complete in
the past, while the consequence of its
non-fulfillment is specific and
past."1 The imperfect in the protasis
emphasizes continual or
durative action while the aorist in the apodosis
indicates a specific action.
The New Testament has four examples of this
imperfect-aorist
combination, all of them in
John's Gospel: 11:21, 11:32, 14:28 and 18:30.
In 11:21 (ei] h#n w$de ou]k a@n a]pe<qanen o[ a]delfo<j mou)
Martha's sorrowful
statement illustrates these two
ideas. The presence of Jesus, considered
in a durative way, would have
prevented the specific act of Lazarus'
death. In 14:28 (ei] h]gapa?te< me e]xa<rhte a@n) the
imperfect protasis
implies failure on the part of
the disciples to be loving Jesus as they
ought to at that time ("If
you loved me"). The aorist in the apodosis
points to the expected but
lacking joy at His statement of return to the
Father. Robertson explains this
in some detail.2 18:30 (ei]
mh> h#n ou$toj
kako>n
poiw?n, ou]k a@n soi paredw<kamen au]to<n) follows the same
pattern, for
the imperfect h#n in the protasis refers to the continual
character of
Jesus as perceived by His
accusers, and the aorist paredw<kamen refers
to the specific, and
historically past act of delivering Him to Pilate.
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 117.
2 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
vols.
(Nashville: Broadman Press,
1930), VI, p. 256.
113
Imperfect in the Apodosis Only
The combination of aorist in the protasis and imperfect
in the
apodosis is one where "The
hypothetic unfulfilled [contrary to fact]
condition is placed as a
definite incident in the past, while the
result of the non-fulfillment
is regarded as continuous in the present."1
Westcott translates Hebrews 4:8
(ei] kate<pausen . . . ou]k a@n
e]la<lei) as
"if rest had been given at
the entrance into
continued to speak as He does
now."2 John 15:22—ei] mh> h#lqon kai>
e]le<lhsa
au]toi?j, a[maqti<an ou]k ei@xosan--("if I had not come and
spoken to
them, they would not have had
sin") combines an aorist in the protasis
with an imperfect apodosis,
placing the protasis in the past and the
apodosis in the present, as
Lenski explains.3
The
Aorist Tense
The basic significance of the aorist tense is to denote
"an action
simply as an event, without in
any sense defining the manner of its occur-
rence."4
Robertson terms this the basic tense of the language and says
"A statement in the
indicative would naturally be in the aorist unless
there is reason to put it in
some other tense, and so of the other modes."5
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 113.
2 Ibid., p. 113.
3 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 1060.
4 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 194.
5 Robertson and
114
Aorist in the Protasis and
Apodosis
The general concept of the aorist tense continues in the
contrary to fact conditions.
When used in both the protasis and apodosis
it speaks of "a past and
completed result which would have ensued if
the unfulfilled condition had
been realized."1 Westcott
further
emphasizes the past time
concept by describing the aorist-aorist form of
this condition as one where
"The hypothetic unfulfilled [contrary to
fact] condition and the result
of the non-fulfillment are regarded as
definite incidents wholly
within the past."2 In
Classical Greek
conditions the aorist could
refer to events in present time, but this
has not carried over into the
Koine.3
The New Testament contains nine examples of this
construction.
There are two sets of parallel
passages (Matthew 24:22 - Mark 13:20
and Matthew 11:21 - Luke
10:13). Romans 9:29 is a quote from the
Septuagint. Westcott illustrates his position by
translating I Corin-
thians 2:8 (ei] e@gnwsan . . . ou]k a@n e]stau<rwsan) as
"if at the crisis of
their trial they had known . .
. they would not have crucified."4 The
phrase "crisis of their
trial" is reading too much into the aorist, for
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 111.
2 Ibid., p. 113.
3 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 151
4 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 113.
115
it simply denotes an event
without specifying anything about the action,
especially durative or
punctiliar characteristics. But the actions
are both restricted to past
time by this tense in the protasis and
apodosis of this condition.
Of the examples listed in Appendix II, all are referring
to past
events with the possible
exception of Matthew 24:22. But here the
aorist indicative is used with
its normal force, for the point of view
is that prophetic judgments are
past. This is in keeping with "the
genius of prophecy."1
Aorist in Either the Protasis
or the Apodosis
The specific references and discussion given above
regarding
the aorist-imperfect
combinations may be repeated here. Each of these
examples follows the general
rule already stated: The aorist, whether
in the protasis or apodosis,
considers the event simply as an act in
past time without indicating
anything about how that act was carried
out. This contrasts with the
imperfect which states continual
action in the present time
(usually).
The
Pluperfect Tense
Robertson calls the pluperfect or past perfect a
"luxury in
Greek," noting that its
use in the New Testament is "current, but not
common."2 As a
tense it emphasizes a blend of aorist and imperfect
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 293.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 903.
116
concepts:
As the present perfect is a blending in
idea of the aoristic
(punctiliar) and the durative present (a
sort of durative aoristic
present combined), so the past perfect is
a blend of the aorist and
the imperfect in idea. It is continuance of the
completed state in
past time up to a prescribed limit in the
past.1
Though the usual form of the contrary to fact condition
utilizes
the aorist, the pluperfect
sometimes appears. Eight examples of this
tense in either the protasis or
apodosis or both are given in Appendix
II. Again, these examples are
listed by form, not use.
I John 2:19 may serve to illustrate the distinction
between the
aorist and the pluperfect (ei] h#san . . . memenh<keisan a@n),
"if they
were . . . they would have
remained." Westcott identifies this verse as
one "where the pluperfect
suggests a continuous state limited at a point
in the past."2
This certainly fits the context of this verse. Since
the important detail involves
the time element, and the pluperfect
as well as the aorist both
indicate actions in the past, no further
discussion of the pluperfect
will be given.
The Use of a@n in Contrary to Fact Conditions
One of the key characteristics of the contrary to fact
condition
is its use of a@n in the apodosis. This particle usually appears,
but
there are a significant number
of exceptions. Robertson, in fact,
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 903.
2 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 112.
116
rejects a@n as an essential part of any conditional sentence.1
What,
then, is the situation of this
particle?
The Classical
Usage
Since Buttmann notes that the "N.T. writers have in
the main
adhered strictly to the
grammatical model" for this condition, it seems
reasonable to begin with that
usage.2 Goodwin states the form:
“ . . . the past tenses of the
indicative are used in both protasis and
apodosis, and the apodosis
contains the adverb a@n.3
Only certain,
specific exceptions are
permitted:
A peculiar form of potential indicative
without a@n
consists of
an infinitive depending on the imperfect
of a verb of
propriety, or possibility, like e@dei,
xrnh< or
e]xrh<n, ei]ko>j h#n, or
proshke<n.4
All other forms of this
condition use a@n in the
apodosis.
The Koine Usage
As with other points of grammar and syntax, the Koine has
moved from the Classical usage
in the case of a@n.
Although the
sampling represented in the New
Testament is small compared to all of
Koine literature, most of which
has been lost, enough representation is
given to offer some detailed
observations.
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
2 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 224.
3 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 147.
4 Ibid.,
p. 151-152.
117
Verses Omitting a@n
Where does a@n occur
and where does it not? Moulton states
that
there are forty-two occurrences
of a@n with imperfect, aorist and
plu-
perfect indicatives in the
apodoses of contrary to fact conditions.1
Since he only states the number
and gives no specific references, cross-
checking is impossible. Of the
forty-nine contrary to fact conditions
listed in Appendix II, only ten
do not have a@n in the
apodosis: Matthew
26:24; Mark 14:21; John 9:33,
15:22, 15:24, 18:36, 19:11; Acts 26:32;
Romans 7:7 and Revelation
20:15. This is not an impressively long list,
but sufficient to show that
such absence is more than an accidental
phenomenon. Roberts adds to the
list by listing the following verses
which omit a@n in some manuscripts: John 8:19, 9:41; Acts
18:14; Hebrews
4:8 and 11:15.2 Unfortunately, he does not give any indication
of the
manuscript evidence, and this
author was unable to identify the variants.
Grammatical Observations
The grammars recognize that Koine Greek exhibits the
absence of
a@n far
more frequently than does Classical Greek.
this fact in passing,3
while Buttmann states:
1 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 166.
2 J. W. Roberts,
"The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as compared with Homeric, Classical and Helenistic Uses,"
unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas, 1955, p. 184.
3
119
. . . such an omission is allowable only
in fixed cases, which
are observed also in the N.T., and may be
reduced to the four
classes that follow.
That is to say, the omission of an occurs:
a) When a@n has already been
expressed previously in the same connec-
tion with another predicate. This
instance, which often occurs in
the classics and is founded in the nature
of the case, is accidentally
not to be met with in the text of the
N.T.; but it occurs once
only as a various reading of cod. A in
Luke xvii. 6.
b) When the predicate (or the copula) to
which it belongs is also
dropped, as I Cor. xii. 19 . . . .
c) Where the apodosis contains such a
predicative term as e@dei,
kalo<n h#n, h]du<nato etc
d) Lastly, a@n is dropped for
rhetorical reasons: where, though the
fact itself is impossible or improbable,
the orator in the vivacity
of his thought desires to represent it as
actually having occurred,
or at least, as almost taken place.l
Blass-Debrunner notes that
"the addition of a@n to the
apodosis is no
longer obligatory."2
Robertson summarizes the discussion:
Sometimes, again, a@n was not employed
because the context made it
plain that it is the second-class
condition, as in Jo. 15:22 . . .
So also as to verse 24. In the same way
the absence of a@n with ou]k
ei@xej in Jo. 19:11 still leaves it clear by the
following clause
that we have a second class condition. So
again verbs of fitness
or propriety like kalo<n
h#n (Matt.
26:24) and ou] kaqh<ken (Acts 26:32),
and obligation like e@dei (Matt. 23:23).3
Where does this leave the question? First of all, the
omission
of a@n is admitted by all grammarians. The particle is
not essential
for the formation of the
contrary to fact condition. Second, there are
suggested rules regarding its
absence. Buttmann lists four, Robertson
two. Do the observed examples
fit these rules? Matthew 26:24, Mark
1 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 225-226.
2 Blass-Dehrunner, Grammar, p. 182.
3 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 352.
120
14:21, John 9:33 and Acts 26:32
agree with the rules of both Buttmann
and Robertson. John 15:22 and
24 surrender to Robertson's rule that
context makes clear what condition
is intended. This leaves John 19:11,
Romans 7:7 and Revelation
20:15. Buttmann explains Romans 7:7 as an
omission for rhetorical
reasons, but does not explain the other two.1
Rather than pursue an explanatory rule for all cases, it
seems
more reasonable to admit that
there is no universal principle accounting
for the omission of a@n. Though stated in another context, Robertson's
observation that "There is
no principle involved in a@n,
simply custom"
may well describe the situation
in the New Testament.2
The
Significance of a@n
Since most of the contrary to fact conditions use a@n in the
apodosis, it is necessary to
consider the significance of this particle.
Moulton puts it this way:
The addition of a@n to an indicative
apodosis produced much the
same effect as we can express in writing
by italicising "if":
if
he had anything, he gave it. Or "if he had anything, in that
case (a@n) he gave it,"
alike suggest by their emphasis that the
condition was not realized.3
Robertson finds the New Testament in agreement with this
observation.4 @An, then, strengthens the "if" aspect of
the apodosis,
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 226.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 200.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1014.
121
and would naturally be
superfluous when the apodosis verb contained that
significance within itself.
This, then, is the basis for the grammarians
identifying certain types of
verbs as ones which are used without a@n.
The Meaning of the Contrary to
Fact Condition
General
Observations
The contrary to fact condition has been given many
different
titles as grammarians have
tried to encapsulate its significance:
"Condition Determined as
Unfulfilled,"1 "Condition with Supposition
Contrary to Fact,"2
"Condition Contrary to the Fact,"3 and "Second
Class Condition."4
Dana and Mantey give the basic meaning
of this
condition as
The premise is assumed to be
contrary to fact in this class,
and only the past tenses of the indicative
are used. As suggested
above, this condition states a thing as if
it were untrue or unreal,
although in actual fact it may be true, as
the first example below
[Matthew 26:24] shows.5
Goodwin presents his view:
When the protasis states a present
or past supposition, implying
that the condition is not or was not
fulfilled, and the apodosis
expresses what would be (or would have been)
the result if that
condition were (or had been) fulfilled,
the past tenses of the
indicative are used in both protasis and
apodosis, and the apodosis
contains the adverb a@n.6
1 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 162.
2 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 147.
3 Winer, Grammar, p. 291.
4 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 351
5 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 289.
6 Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses, p. 147.
122
Robertson elaborates:
The premise is assumed to be contrary to
fact. The thing in itself
may be true, but it is treated as untrue. Here again the
condition
has only to do with the statement, not with the actual fact . .
. .
Surely the ind. is the mode for positive
and negative statements,
for directness of statement and clarity
of expression. But one must
emphasize the words "statement"
and "expression." The ind. does
not go behind the face value of the
record.1
The actual facts of the case,
whether the supposition is true or not,
"is a more difficult
matter. This idea has to be conveyed by suggestion."2
Specific
Examples
Some examples may suffice to illustrate these concepts in
action. First, Jesus' statement
to His detractors in John 5:46
represents a contrary to fact
condition in present time: ei] ga>r
e]pisteu<ete Mwu*sei?, e]pisteu<ete a@n e]moi<. The statement refers to the
current state of affairs
concerning the belief of the Jews, and the
imperfect tense shows. Jesus'
statement assumes that they were not
believing Moses, hence they
were not believing Him. It may be para-
phrased, If you were believing
Moses, which you are not, then you would
be believing Me, which you are
not."
Galatians 4:15 uses aorist indicatives in both parts of
the
condition, and omits a@n in the apodosis: ei]
dunato>n tou>j o]fqalmou>j
u[mw?n e]coru<cantej e]dw<kate moi. Paul is reflecting upon the Galatians'
previous attitude toward him.
The contextual time is past, and the
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1013.
2 Ibid.,
p. 1014.
123
suggested action clearly
impossible. "If it were possible, which it
wasn't, you would have given my
your eyes after you took them out, which
you didn't."
Luke 7:39 is presented by Robertson as an example where
the
assumption goes contrary to the
actual facts: ou$toj ei] h#n o[ profh<th,
e]gi<nwsken
a@n.
He points out that the Pharisee was
assuming that Jesus
was not the prophet and thus
ignorant of the moral nature of the woman.1
In point of fact, Jesus was the
prophet and did know about the woman.
He was not ignorant, the
Pharisee was. This illustrates Robertson's
observation that the actual
situation must be determined by data outside
the condition. The condition
only presents the statement, not the
situation.
The Translation of the Contrary to Fact
Condition
General
Observations
Robertson termed the contrary to fact condition a
"somewhat
difficult condition."2
The difficulty to which he referred was
not the
construction, which is quite
regular, but the translation. It is hard
to communicate both the force
of the condition (the assumption that the
condition is contrary to fact)
and the tense of the verb (imperfect,
aorist or pluperfect). One of
the most concise attempts at defining
the meaning and translation of
this category of conditions is found in
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1013.
2 Ibid.,
p. 1012.
124
Westcott's commentary on
Hebrews. First, he explains the meaning of the
condition:
Two main cases arise. In one (1) the
protasis expressed by ei]
with the indicative is followed by the
imperfect indicative with a@n.
The thought here is of a present or
continuous result which would
have been seen now if the unfulfilled
supposition had been realized.
In the other (II), the protasis expressed
by ei]
with the indicative
is followed by the aorist indicative
with a@n.
The thought here is
of a past and completed result which
would have ensued if the
unfulfilled condition had been realized.1
Westcott obviously is dealing with the apodoses rather
than
the protases, but this is where
the results are stated. The key problem
in rendering the entire
sentence into English is the precise statement,
not only of the supposition,
but of the anticipated results. He
continues, noting some serious
problems confronting the translator:
No uniform rendering in English is
able to give the exact
force of these two different forms of
expression. It has become
common to translate (1) by if (he) had . . . (he) would . . .; and
(II) by if (he) had . . . (he) would have . . . . But if this
rendering is adopted, the definite
negation of the fact in the
apodosis of (I) is commonly lost or
obscured, and the statement
appears to be simply hypothetical and to
suggest a possible ful-
filment in the future. On the other hand
if (I) and (II) are
translated in the same manner, the
suggestion of the present or
continuous fact in (I) is obliterated.4
Is Westcott's observation correct? Is it impossible to
accurately
convey both aspects of the
contrary to fact condition? If one is
looking for a simple
translation formula into which the various parts
of the condition are inserted
to find the correct English equivalent,
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 111.
2 Ibid.,
p. 112.
125
then he will be frustrated.
Such a translation formula does not exist
in this case, nor in any other
situation. In some cases, the translator
may have to sacrifice either
the concept of assumed negation or the
Aktionsart of the
verb. But in others, each may be preserved through a
judicious choice of English phrasiology.
Four such examples are given in Westcott's commentary on
Hebrews:
Hebrews 8:4 (both protasis and
apodosis = imperfect), Hebrews 4:8
(protasis = aorist, apodosis,=
imperfect), John 14:28 (protasis =
imperfect, apodosis = aorist)
and I Corinthians 2:8 (protasis and
apodosis = aorist). The major
versions used for comparison of his
translations are the, Authorized Version, the New American Standard Bible,
the New International Version, and the
Hebrews 8:4
ei] me>n ou#n
h#n e]pi> gh?j, ou]d ] a}n h#n i[ereu<j
Westcott.--"if he had been now invested with
such an office . .
he would not be as he now is .
. ."1
Authorized Version.--For if he were on earth, he
should not be
a priest.
New American Standard Version.--Now if He were on
earth, He
would not be a priest at all.
New International Version.--If he were on earth,
he would not be
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 112.
126
a priest.
be a priest at all.
Hebrews 4:8
ei] ga>r au]tou>j ]Ihsou?j kate<pausen, ou]k a@n peri>
a@llaj e]la<lei
meta> tau?ta h[me<raj
Westcott.--"if
rest had been given at the entrance into
God would not have continued to
speak as He does now . . ."1
Authorized Version.--For if Jesus had given them
rest, then
would he not afterward have
spoken of another day.
New American Standard: Bible.--For if Joshua had
given them
rest, He would not have spoken
of another day after that.
New International Version.--For if Joshua had
given them rest,
God would not have spoken later
about another day.
not have spoken of another day
later on.
John 14:28
ei] h]ghpa?te<
me, e]xa<rhte a}n o!ti poreu<omai pro>j to<n pate<ra
Westcott.--"if ye had now been loving me . .
. ye would at the
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 113.
127
moment of my saying . . ."1
Authorized Version.--If ye loved me, ye would
rejoice.
New American Standard Bible.--If you loved Me, you
would have
rejoiced.
New International Version.--If you loved me, you
would be glad
that I am going to the Father.
to the Father.
I Corinthians 2:8
ei] ga>r
e@gnwsan, ou]k a}n to>n ku<rion th?j do<chj e]stau<rwsan
Westcott.--"if at the crisis of their trial
they had known . . .
they would not have crucified.
. . “2
Authorized Version.--for had they known it, they
would not have
crucified the Lord of glory.
New American Standard Bible.--for if they had
understood it,
they would not have crucified
the Lord of Glory.
New International Version.--for if they had
[understood it], they
would not have crucified the
Lord of glory.
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 113.
2 Ibid.,
p. 113.
128
crucified the Lord of glory.
Conclusion
What does this comparison demonstrate? Several things;
first,
the problems raised by Westcott
need not interfer with an accurate
translation. English
communicates a significant amount of information
by context, and that fact helps
translators handle both aspects of
the contrary to fact condition.
The clear implication of the context
of I Corinthians 2:8
underscores the negative assumption of the
condition. Further, the use of
the English pluperfect assists this
idea, as well as reflecting the
aorist verbs. Other English tenses
adequately reflect the
imperfect tense, as the examples show. Westcott's
general observation accurately
sums up the situation: "Each case there-
fore must be considered by
itself in order that the translator may
convey the truest impression of
the original with regard to the context."1
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 112.
CHAPTER IV
THE
PROBABLE CONDITION
Introduction
The next two types of conditional sentences represent the
second
half of the entire collection:
the undetermined conditions. These
present their conditions as
undetermined or doubtful, but with a varying
degree of possible fulfillment.
The previous conditions, the simple
condition and the contrary to
fact condition, enable the speaker to
communicate a definite
assumption in his conditional statement. Either
he assumed it was true, or he
assumed that it was not true.
In the undetermined conditions he states it as a
possibility,
not an actuality or an
impossibility. This distinction is accomplished
by using the moods of
possibility: the subjunctive and the optative.
"Naturally the indicative
is not allowed here."1
This large group, the undetermined conditions, may be
sub-
divided into two classes which
differ from each other in the degree of
possibility each expresses.
This difference is found in the moods
employed in them, and it is as
large as the semantical gap between
them:
The difference therefore between the
third and fourth class condi-
tions is just that between the subj. and
the opt. They are both
modes of doubtful, hesitating
affirmation, but the optative is more
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light
of Historical Research (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p.
1004.
129
remote than the subj. In this type the
premise is not assumed to be
either true or untrue. The point is in
the air and the cloud
gathers round it. But there is less mist
over the subj. than the
opt.1
This chapter will focus on the
third group in Robertson's classification:
those conditions employing the
subjunctive mood in the protasis.
The terminology involved in the analysis of this group of
conditional sentences has not
been standardized. Robertson quotes
from different grammars,
illustrating the variety found in the
literature:
La Roche prefers "objektive Molichkeit"
for the third class and
"subjecktive Molichkeit" for
the fourth class (ei] and the opt.).
This is also the language of Winer,
"objective possibility" and
"subjective possibility."
Farrar prefers the words Possibility,
Impossibility, Slight Probability,
Uncertainty. Radermacher . . .
calls ei] with ind.
"objektiv," ean with subj. "an sich objektiv,"
ei] with
past tense of ind. "Irrealitat." So it goes.2
The list could be expanded by including the terminology
suggested by modern
grammarians. Dana and Mantey provide the best
descriptive title when the call
it "the more probable future condition."3
Rather than their cumbersome
terms "more probable" and "less probable,"
it seems better to this author
to use "probable" and "possible," the
latter being reserved for ei] with the optative. If a sentence is
either probable or possible it
is obviously future. Thus the title
suggested is "The Probable
Condition."
1 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 1004-1005.
2 Ibid., p. 1005.
3 H. E. Dana and Julius
R. Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the
Greek
New Testament (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p.
290.
131
Analysis of the
Probable Condition
The probable condition is the second most frequent
conditional
sentence in the New Testament
and certainly the most debated. While
grammarians generally agree on
its basic form, they continue to debate
its meaning in terms of
implication (degree of probability or
vividness), application (particular
or general) and extent (should it
include ei] with the future indicative). These and other
matters will be
considered below. The specific
analysis of this condition will involve
the particles and verb forms
employed in both the protasis and apodosis.
The
Protasis
The general rule regarding the formation of this
condition is
well recognized: "The
protasis is usually expressed by e]a<n (or a@n) with
the Subjunctive; the apodosis
by the Future Indicative or by some other
form referring to future
time."1 In a few examples ei],
rather than e]a<n,
is used with the subjunctive.2 The discussion of the protasis, then,
begins with the particles.
@An in the
Protasis
As indicated in Appendix III, a@n in the protasis is limited to
the Gospel of John--5:19,
13:20, 16:23 and 20:23 (2 examples). In
addition to these verses,
Moulton and Geden list John 12:32; Acts 2:45,
l Ernest DeWitt Burton, Syntax of Moods and Tenses in New Testa-
ment Greek (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1897), p. 104.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1017.
132
4:35 and 9:2 as other examples
of this construction.1 However,
John 13:32
and Acts 9:2 read e]a<n in current critical texts, while Acts 2:45
and 4:35
are identified by Robertson as
the "Regular Greek idiom for comparative
clauses with a@n and imperfect indicative corresponding
precisely with
the three proceeding imperfects
(Robertson, Grammar, p. 967)."2
The use of a@n
then,
in these conditions is limited to the
Gospel of John. While
interesting, this observation does not interfere
with the basic meaning of the
condition. Indeed, a@n is
technically
part of all the others, for e]a<n is simply ei] and a@n.3
Ei] in the
Protasis
Ei] does
occur in the protasis of the probable condition with
verbs in the subjunctive mood.
While unusual, it is not unexpected,
for Koine Greek represents a
stage in the development of the language
in which the absolute
distinctions between ei] and e]a<n were beginning to
weaken. "Indeed, as we sometimes
have e]a<n and the fut.
class condition, so we
occasionally meet ei] and
the subj. in the third
class [probable]
condition."4 As might be expected, the examples are
few; only eight are listed in
Appendix III. Most of these passages may
be questioned on textual
grounds.
1 W. F. Moulton and A. S.
Geden, eds., A Concordance to the Greek
Testament (Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark, 1967), p. 55.
2 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
volumes
(Nashville:
Broadman Press, 1930), III, p. 39.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
4 Ibid.,
p. 1017.
133
Moulton finds only one absolute example:
The latter [ei] with the subjunctive]
occurs only in I Co 145,
where the peculiar phrase accounts for it
. . . . We should hardly
care to build much on Rev 115.
In Lk 913 and Phil 311
we probably
have deliberative subjunctives,
"unless we are to go and buy," and
"if after all I am to attain . . .
to apprehend."1
For the few New Testament instances
there is possibly in each
case a special reason. Thus in Luke 9:13
there is probably a
mixture of a conditional clause and a
deliberative question: unless
indeed—are we to go? i.e., unless indeed we are to go. In I Cor.
14:5 and I Thess. 5:10 a preference for
the more common ei] mh< and
e]a<nte . . .
e]a<nte
over the somewhat unusual e]a<n mh< and e]a<nte
. . .
e]a<nte may have led to the use
of the former in spite of the fact
that the meaning called for a Subjunctive
. . . . It is doubtful,
however, whether the discovery of any
difference in force between ei]
with the Subjunctive and say with the
Subjunctive in these latter
passages is not an over-refinement.2
Perhaps
sentence, for Winer does find a
distinction between the two constructions:
The distinction between ei] with the Subjunctive
and ean
or an
is
thus defined . . .: ei] puts the condition
simply, but when used ,
with the Subjunctive represents it as
depending on the result; e]a<n
also does the latter, but less
decisively, inasmuch as the a@n
represents the condition as dependent on
accidental circumstances,
if
anyhow or perhaps.3
Winer seeks to apply this to
several statements taken from Classical
Greek. He notes that in the
latter, i.e. Byzantine authors, "a fixed
distinction between ei] with the Subj. and the same particle with the
1 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume 1:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 187.
2
3 Winer, Grammar, p. 295.
4 Ibid.,
p. 295.
134
whether Paul had in view the
nice discrimination specified above."1
Winer and
true explanation is only
possible by approach from the Greek standpoint.
And that is by the mode, not by ei] or
e]a<n."2
This, then, is where the
matter rests.
The Tenses Used in the Protasis
Introductory Concepts
Before discussing the specific examples of the New
Testament
it will be advantageous to
survey the significance of the various tenses
in the subjunctive mood.
The Relationship of Tense to Time.--The concept of
tense
deals with the action of the
verb under two headings: aspect and time.
Aspect refers to the way the
action is stated, which may be undefined
(aorist), continual (present,
imperfect) or completed (perfect). It is
this characteristic which is
dominant, for "time is but a minor
consideration
in the Greek tenses.”3
Others agree: "One must dismiss
all notion of time if he wishes
to understand the Greek verb."4 "Even
in the indicative the time
element is subordinate to the kind of action
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 295.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
3 Dana and. Mantey, Grammar, p. 171. Italics theirs.
4 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar
the Greek Testament (Baker Book House, 1977
reprint of 1933 edition),
p. 293.
135
expressed."1
Greek verb tenses are employed to describe the action
involved
in terms of aspect rather than
time. All aspects of action may occur at
any time.
The Relationship of Tense to Mood.--Mood is the
term used to
describe the relationship of
the action of the verb to reality. The
indicative mood affirms the
reality of the action described. The subjunc-
tive, optative and imperative
moods present the action as "objectively
possible,"
"subjectively possible," and "volitionally possible,"
respectively.2 The subjunctive mood, of course, is the
important one in
light of this study. "if
[the action] is viewed as contingent upon
certain existing and known
conditions--being objectively possible--the
subjunctive is used."3
This is the situation with the probable
condition. It is stated as a
possibility or probability without any
implication about its actuality
or impossibility.
How does the tense relate to the mood of a verb? The main
concept of tense is aspect of
the action described, and each mood may
express each aspect without
regard to time. Potential moods must, by
definition, refer to an action
yet unrealized, i.e. future. And that
concept is uniquely common to
all the moods.4
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 825.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 166.
3 Ibid., p. 166.
4 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 293.
136
The Relationship of Tense to Time.--Absolute time
can only be
assigned to an action if it is
a real entity. Only then may it be spoken
of as past, present or future.
Absolute time, then, may be applied to
those actions described by the
indicative mood only. Potential moods
describe actions not yet
realized, hence no absolute time references may
be assigned to them. "The
time element is entirely absent from the
potential moods."1
Any concept of time connected with a subjunctive verb
will be relative, implied by
the context. There is no time in the
subjunctive.
These concepts are recognized by all grammarians.
example, discusses them in
terms of the three main tenses:
The Present of the Dependent Moods
is used to represent an
action in progress or as repeated. It may
be altogether timeless,
the action being thought of without
reference to the time of its
occurrence; or its time, as past, present,
or future, may be
involved in the function of the mood, or
may be indicated by the
context.
The Aorist of the Dependent Moods
represents the action expressed
by the verb as a simple event or fact,
with reference either to its
progress [or lack thereof] or to the
existence of its result . . . .
The
time of the action, if indicated at all, is shown, not by
the tense, but by some fact outside of it.
The Perfect of the Dependent Moods
is used of completed action.
As in the Indicative, the thought may be
directed both to the action
and its result, or only to the result.
The time of the action is
indicated, as in the Present and Aorist,
not by the tense but by the
context or by the function of the mood.2
The statistics indicate that the New Testament prefers
the
three protasis tenses in this
order: Aorist Subjunctive = 177 examples,
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 167.
2
137
Present Subjunctive = 105
examples, and Perfect Subjunctive = 7 examples.
This is what one would expect
from this "aorist-loving language."1 The
aorist is preferred by almost
two to one over the present, with the
perfect almost disappearing
from sight.
Tenses Employed in the Protasis
The Present Tense.--The present tense describes
the action of
the verb in terms of continual
or linear action. The use of this
tense in the protasis of a
probable condition states the condition or
hypothesis as a linear or
progressive action. The examples in the
New Testament should be seen in
this light. Matthew 8:2, for example,
presents the leper as
conditioning his healing upon the continual
attitude of Jesus toward him,
perhaps speaking to his abiding character
rather than a changeable aspect
of His will: e]a<n qe<lhj, du<nasai me
kaqari<sai
("if you are willing, you are able to cleanse me"). Jesus was
referring to His continual
ministry and Messianic claims when He stated
in John 5:31: e]a<n e]gw>
marturw? peri> e]mautou?, h[
marturi<a mou ou]k e@stin
a]lhqh<j. Paul speaks of the regular actions of the
church when members
have legal problems with other
believers in the same tense: biwtika> me>n
ou#n
krih<ria e]a<n e@xhte . . . tou<touj kaqi<zete (I
Corinthians 6:4).
Consideration of the mood of
the protasis throws a significant amount
of light upon the nature of the
statement, light which the English often
fails to reflect.
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 831.
138
The Aorist Tense.--The aorist tense is used to
present the fact
of an action without defining
anything about it either in terms of aspect
or time. "Action may be
regarded as simple, undefined (aoristic,
a-o]ri<stoj, from a]ori<zw, 'I do not define') action. The common
term for
this is punctiliar
action."1 Chamberlain's
statement introduces a
misconception, for the term
"punctiliar" does define the action. It
would be better to state it as
undefined and leave it at that. "The
aorist denotes an action simply
as an event, without in any sense
defining the manner of its
occurrence."2 It
communicates neither a
specific aspect (punticiliar or
continual) nor a specific time (past,
present or future). It merely
states the action.
This distinction is maintained in the probable condition.
Matthew 5:46, for example,
simply presents the act of love on the
part of Jesus' listeners
without specifying anything about that act:
e]a<n
ga>r a]gaph<shte tou>j a]gapw?ntaj u[ma?j, ti<na misqou> e@xete;
("For if
you love those who are loving
you, what reward do you have?").
A better way of seeing the present contrasted with the
aorist
is to consider several verses
which utilize both types of verbs. First,
Matthew 21:21 uses a present
and an aorist subjunctive in the protasis,
both with a single particle e]a<n: e]a<n e@xhte pi<stin kai> mh>
diakriqh<te ("if
you have faith and do not
doubt"). Lenski compares these two verbs so:
1 Wiiam
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 67.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 194.
139
The first verb is a present subjunctive,
for to have faith is a
continuous activity, the second verb is an
aorist subjunctive, for
the doubt deals with the single act
regarding which hesitation
occurs. For the moment the doubt blocks
the faith and prevents
the act faith should accomplish.1
Here Lenski, like others,
misses the point of the non-specific meaning
of the aorist and attributes
the concept of singularlity to it. Perhaps
Broadus comes closer to the
concept with his rendering of "undoubting
faith."2 Jesus does speak of their faith as a continual
thing and
states their doubt as an
action, nothing more.
I Corinthians 14:24 uses the same combination of tenses:
e]a<n de> pa<ntej profhteu<wsin, ei]se<lqh
de< tij a@pistoj h} i]diw<thj,
e]le<gxetai. ("but if all prophesy and an unbeliever
or an uninstructed person
comes it, he is
convicted"). Here the two actions are presented, the
first as a regular, continual
one, the second as an undefined one. The
context obviously assigns an
individual, particular meaning to ei]se<lqh,
but the aorist merely presents
the action. Robertson and Plummer
translate the protasis as
"Whereas, if all should be prophesying, and
there should come in some
unbeliever or ungifted person."3 Lenski is
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Matthew's Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 824.
2 John A. Broadus, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew,
volume I
of
An American Commentary on the New
Testament, Alvah Hovey, ed.
(Philadelphia:
The American Baptist Publication Society, 1886), p. 435.
3 Archibald Robertson and
Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical
Commentary on the First
Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, volume 32
of
The International Critical Commentary on
the Holy Scriptures of the
Old and New Testaments, edited by Samuel
Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer
and Charles Augustus Briggs
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), p. 318.
140
closer when he writes
The present subjunctive profhteu<wsin, like lalw?si in v. 23,
pictures the action in progress:
"suppose all are engaged in
propheysing." . . . . The aorist ei]se<lqh, like ei]se<lqwsi in
v. 34, merely marks the fact of the
entrance.1
2 Timothy 2:5 combines the present and aorist subjunctive
forms
of the same verb in the same
protasis: e]a<n de> kai> a]qlh?
tij, ou]
stefanou?tai
e]a>n mh> nomi<mwj a]lqh<sh ("And if anyone competes
as an
athlete, he is not crowned
unless he competes lawfully."). Robertson
and Lenski offer different
interpretations of this passage. First
Robertson:
Note the sharp distinction between athlei (present subjunctive,
engage in a contest in general) and athlesei (first aorist active
subjunctive, engage in a particular
contest). Not "except he have
contended," but simply "unless
he contend" . . . . 2
Lenski sees the emphasis this
way:
. . . but we cannot agree with [Robertson]
when he has the latter
mean "engage in a particular
contest." Both verbs refer to a
particular contest. The present
subjunctive = "if one engages in an
athletic event;" this does not assure
him the wreath or garland
"unless
(now effective aorist subjunctive) he lawfully (as the law
of that event prescribes) completes the
event.3
Neither one is clear in their statement, and both miss
the point
of the undefined aorist. The
present tense sets the context and the
aorist follows naturally within
that setting. There is no need to use
a second present; the naturally
employed aorist fits perfectly. No
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation I and II Corinthians
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1963), p. 603.
2 Robertson, World Pictures, IV, p. 617.
3 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
the Colossians, to the
Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to Philemon
(Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1961), p. 781.
141
special significance is
attached to the aorist.
The
Apodosis
General Observations
The apodosis of the probable condition is, according to
formed by "the Future
Indicative or by some other form referring to future
time."1 One would expect, then, that the most common
form of the apodosis
would involve future indicative
verbs. Such, however, is not the case.
The examples listed in Appendix
III indicate that the present indicative
is preferred to the future
indicative one hundred eleven to ninty-nine.
Thus the present, rather than
the future, is the dominant tense, but
not by much. Is
considerations show.
The Time of the Apodosis
First, there is no Question that the probable condition
is,
in fact, restricted to the
future time.2 It presents a
conclusion that
is conditioned on a
hypothetical situation which is "up in the air" as
the speaker presents it. Were
it referring to an objective reality or
an impossibility, as assumed by
the speaker, then it would refer to a
real time event: past, present
or future, and employ the indicative mood.
The Tenses of the Apodosis
Actually all tenses, present, aorist, future and perfect,
are
represented in the apodosis of
these conditions. The major tenses,
1
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1018.
142
though, are the present and
future. Statistically, the tables show
133 present tenses, 53 aorists,
99 futures and 5 perfects. These
verbs represent all moods:
indicative, subjunctive and imperative. In
terms of indicative verbs there
are 111 present indicatives, 8 aorist
indicatives, 99 future
indicatives and 5 perfect indicatives. Obviously
there is no general principle
for choosing the apodosis verb except
the action being described.
Do these facts create a problem in terms of the future
time
of the condition? Not at all,
when one remembers that the primary
function of tense is to
describe the aspect of the action, not the
time. One may present the
contingent act as one that is simply stated
without any defined aspect
(aorist), a progressive act (present and
sometimes future) or, rarely,
an act in a state of completion (perfect).
The same observations may be
offered regarding the mood of the verbs.
The contingent act may be
presented by the speaker as one that will be
actualized upon realization of
the stated condition (indicative), one
that may be realized
(subjunctive) or one that must be realized
(imperative). Each of these
moods makes its unique contribution to
the sense of the whole
conditional statement.
Tenses Employed in the Apodosis
Several examples of tense and mood combinations found in
the
apodoses of these conditions
will be examined to show how they communi-
cate the actions involved.
143
The Present Indicative
Although the future indicative seems like the obvious
choice
for these apodoses, it is
second to the present indicative. In light
of this fact it is interesting
that Winer should write:
Hence the consequent clause usually,
contains a Fut. . . . or,
what is equivalent, an Aor, with ou]
mh< . .
. or an Imperat. . . ,
more rarely a Pres., and then either in
the sense of a Fut. . .
or denoting something permanent . . . or
a general truth . . . .1
The wide use of the present, however, is not surprising,
for
it is frequently used with a
future implication. This "futuristic
present" is discussed by
Robertson who correctly notes that time is
not the key issue: "Since
the pres. ind. occurs for past, present and
future time it is clear that
'time' is secondary even in the
This use of the present tense
projects a progressive or durative
aspect into the future.
"As examples of the durative present in this
[futuristic] sense take paradi<dotai (Mt. 26:45), a]nabai<nomen (Mk 10:33),
u[pa<gw
a]lieu<ein and e]rxo<meqa (Jo.
21:3), die<rxomai (I
Cor. 16:5), e@xomen
(2 Cor. 5:1)."3
Dana and Mantey read more into this use
of the present
tense then is justified when
they identify it as one that "denotes an
event which has not yet
occurred, but which is regarded as so certain
that in thought it may be
contemplated as already coming to pass."4
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 293.
2 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 881-882.
3 Ibid., p. 882.
4 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 185.
144
The futuristic present, properly understood, gives the
probable
condition a progressive aspect
when used in the apodosis. Sometimes
this is spoken of as a point of
emphasis upon the speaker's present
confidence, but such statements
do not reflect the proper function of
the present tense. Robertson
follows this erroneous concept:
But ofttimes the conclusion [of the
Probable condition] is stated in
terms of the present either as a present
hope or a vivid projection
into the future (futuristic present). So
in 2 Cor. 5:1, e]a<n kataluqh?,
e@xomen.
The condition is future in conception, but the conclusion
is a present reality, so confident is Paul
of the bliss of heaven.1
Additionally, general rules or maxims often use the
present
indicative
in the apodosis. Robertson quotes Mark 3:27 (ou] du<natai
ou]dei>j
. . . e]a<n mh> prw?ton dh<sh) as an example.2 This fits the continual
aspect of the present tense.
apodosis as the mark of the
Present General Supposition.3 He makes this
a separate class of conditions,
but previous discussion has shown that
any condition may be particular
or general as the situation demands.
Two examples may be offered.
Mark 3:27 has already been identified as
a passage
statement of a general truth
and does employ the present tense.
But in contrast, consider Matthew 21:26 – e]a>n de> ei@pwmen. e]c
a]nqrw<pwn,
fobou<meqa to>n o@xlon ("but if we say, 'of men,' we fear
the
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1019.
2 Ibid., p. 1019.
3
145
the crowd"). The context
marks this conclusion as a definite conclusion,
limited to a historical
situation. Other examples could be offered to
illustrate the same point. The
suggestion of a special catagory of
probable conditions termed
"present general conditions" as a grammatical
point should be rejected. It is
valid, though, as a contextual
consideration.
The Aorist Indicative
The above discussion on the relationship of time and
moods
explains the appearance of the
aorist subjunctive verbs in these condi-
tions, but what of the aorist
indicative? What sense does this type of
verb give the conclusion of a
probable condition?
Robertson offers two explanations. First, he notes that
the
aorist may be considered
timeless in all the moods, including the
indicative. "The aor. ind.
is sometimes timeless as is always true of
the other modes . . . That may
be the explanation here."1 His
second explanation is to accept
the normal meaning of the aorist indica-
tive and see a dramatic
rhetorical shift in the sense of the condition:
It is possible also to explain it as a
change of standpoint. The
protasis looks to the future, while the
apodosis turns back to the
past. Such vivid changes in language are
due to the swift
revolution in thought.
The text of Matthew 18:15 is e]a<n sou a]kou<sh, e]ke<rdhsaj to>n
a]delfo<n
sou
("if he listens to you, you have gained your brother").
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
2 Ibid.,
p. 1020.
146
The aorist indicative may,
according to Robertson, be considering the
desired act so intently as to
see it completed at some future time in
the mind of the speaker.
Elsewhere, though, he backs off from this
position and identifies it as
"a sort of timeless aorist, a blessed
achievement already made."1
Hendriksen's translation "you have
(meaning
will
have)
won your brother" reflects this emphasis.2 Lenski stumbles
over technical terms, trying to
place the aorist in the future, but
after another future act:
Here we have a case in which the
condition looks to the future
while the conclusion turns to the past,
which R[obertson] 1020
attributes to the swift leap of thought.
But this past is a past
only to that future: "thou didst
gain" if thy brother "shall hear."
Moreover, the Greek uses the aorist to
express this past, whereas
the English would prefer the perfect
"hast gained"; yet we do not
regard this as a gnomic aorist
(R[obertson] 842).3
It seems best to the author to take the aorist indicative
in the
normal sense of undefined
aspect rather than time, as Lenski does. It
wraps up the result of the
hypothetical a]kou?sh in a
real, albeit undefined
act.
The Future Indicative
The subjunctive mood of the protasis places the probable
condition into future time, and
one would expect the apodosis to follow.
This is exactly what happens,
regardless of the tense employed in the
apodosis. The second most
common verb form is the future indicative.
1 Robertson, Word Pictures, I, p. 148.
2 William Hendriksen, The Gospel of Matthew (
Book
House, 1973), p. 699.
3 Lenski, Matthew,
p. 700.
147
Like the other tenses, the
future states the apodosis as a future act,
contingent upon the protasis.
No special significance should be read
into this combination other
than an emphasis upon the future time which
is already present in the
condition.
The Perfect Indicative
Verbs in the perfect tense describe an action in the
state of
completion. They combine the
sense of punctiliar (it is completed) with
that of continual (it remains
completed).1 These verbs are used in the
apodosis of the probable
condition to emphasize the state of completion,
that is, the continual aspect.
Winer terms the perfects "equivalent to
Presents,"2 and
Robertson agrees, especially in the precept or maxim form
of the condition, as in Romans
14:23 – o[ diakrino<menoj e]a>n fa<gh
katake<kritai
("the one who doubts is condemned if he eats").3 The four
examples of the perfect tense
apodosis fit these observations.
Verbs in the Imperative Mood
The imperative mood appears forty times in the probable
condition
apodoses: ninteen present
imperatives and twenty-one aorist imperatives.
The imperative mood, of course,
places an action in the future. This
fits the sense of the condition
as a whole, for the protasis has already
placed the entire thought in
the future through the subjunctive mood.
1 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 302.
2 Winer, Grammar, p. 293.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1019.
148
Imperative verbs are a natural
occurrence in these conditions
Meaning of the
Probable Condition
The study has proceeded to the point where the meaning of
the
probable condition may be
discussed. There has been much dissension
among the grammarians on this
subject, so the procedure will be to
review the opinions of various
scholars, evaluate their position, and
explore the meaning of this
condition as contrasted with that of the
simple condition.
Review of the
Grammarians
This review will follow the pattern of the second
chapter:
first the Classical scholars
and then the Koine scholars.
W. W. Goodwin
Writing from the Classical viewpoint, W. W. Goodwin
describes
these conditions as the
"Future suppositions in more vivid form" which
he explains so:
When a supposed future case is
stated distinctly and vividly
(as in English, if I shall go, or if I go),
the protasis has the
Subjunctive with e]a<n (epic ei
ke<),
and the apodosis has the future
indicative or some other form of future
time.l
By adding the English
"shall" or "will" Goodwin hopes to add more
emphasis to the condition.
Whether it comes across in the English
translation or not, the Greek,
in his opinion, places emphasis upon
the intensity of the statement.
1 W. W. Goodwin, Greek Grammar, revised by Charles Burton
Gulick
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), p. 300.
149
The speaker, according to Goodwin, makes no implication
about the
degree of probability assigned
to the condition. The speaker's emphasis
is upon the vividness or
intensity of the statement. As will be seen
later, Goodwin terms conditions
which employ the optative mood "less
vivid conditions."
The basis for his view lies in the futuristic use of the
subjunc-
tive mood:
In the Homeric language the
subjunctive (generally the aorist)
may be used in independent sentences, with
the force of a future
indicative. The negative is ou] . . . .
This Homeric subjunctive, like the
future indicative, is some-
times joined with ke< or a@n in a potential sense.
This enabled the
earlier language to express an apodosis
with a sense between that
of the optative with a@n and that of the simple
future indicative,
which the Attic was unable to do.1
The subjunctive mood, then,
would be making a simple statement about the
future in a way that would be
less emphatic (or vivid) than the future
indicative, but more so than
the optative.
G. B. Winer
Winer, a Koine grammarian, simply states the case of this
type
of condition as one of
probability without any other alternative being
considered:
Condition with assumption of objective possibility (where
experience will decide whether or not it
is real): if thy friend
should
come (I do not know whether he will come, but the result will
show). Here e]a<n . . . with the Subjunctive is used.2
Later he writes that this
condition is used "if an objective
1 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax Moods and Tenses (
Company,
1893), p. 97.
2 Winer, Grammar,
p. 291.
150
possibility with the
expectation of a decision is to be expressed."1 The
sense of the probable condition
as Winer sees it, then, is one of a
degree of expected (or implied)
fulfillment, rather than one of vividness
of statement.
Normally
sentences, but here he departs
from Goodwin's scheme by identifying the
probable condition as the
"Future Supposition with More Probability."
His explanation is:
The protasis states a supposition which
refers to the future,
suggesting some probability of its
fulfillment.
The protasis is usually expressed by
e]a<n (or a@n) with the
Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future
Indicative or by some other
form referring to future time.2
understanding of the sense of
this condition is the same. The words
"more probability,"
if understood from the speaker's point of view,
better describe the probable
condition than "objective probability."
Blass-Debrunner
Blass-Debrunner also supports the concept of anticipated
fulfill-
ment as the basic significance
of this condition:
(4) ]Ea<n with the subjunctive
denotes that which under certain
circumstances is expected from an existing
general or concrete
standpoint in the present: 'case of
expectation' and 'iterative
case in present time.'3
1 Winer, Grammar,
p. 293.
2
3 Blass-DeBrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
151
Here again the basic concept is
anticipation or expectation of fulfill-
ment, not vividness of
statement.
A. T. Robertson
In his Shorter
Grammar Robertson identifies this condition in
this manner:
This
condition states the condition as a
matter of doubt, but with
some expectation of realization. Hence the
subjunctive is the mode
of doubt used, not the optative, the mode
of still greater doubt.
It is undetermined and so does not use the
indicative mode, but
there is more hope and that marks it off
from the optative.l
Concerning the subjunctive mood
in particular he writes:
The chief difference between the
subjunctive and the optative can
be conveyed by our words probablity [subjunctive] and possibility
[optative].
Both are modes of doubtful assertion, but the optative
is more doubtful.2
His term "doubtful" communicates a concept of
negative
thought that the terms
"probable" or "possible" do not. They are to
be preferred. His overall
concept of the sense of the condition is
correct.
Evaluation of the
Grammarians
Vividness versus Probability
The first question involves the basic emphasis of this
condition.
Does it stress the vividness of
the condition as seen by the speaker, or
does it speak of an idea of
anticipated fulfillment? The underlying
concept, of course, is one's
view of the force of the subjunctive mood.
1 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 353.
2 Ibid.,
p. 309.
152
Goodwin lays stress upon the
vividness of the statement, locating the
subjunctive between the
indicative and the optative. This evaluation
comes from his analysis of
Classical Greek syntax.
Koine grammarians, in general, support the concept that
the
subjunctive reflects
probability or anticipation rather than vividness.
This, for example, is how
Robertson speaks of the basic meaning of this
mood. Thus his terminology
"undetermined, but with prospect of
determination" is applied
to this condition.1 Others
have followed
him: Dana and
Mantey--"More Probable Future Condition,"2 Roberts
(following
Gildersleeve)--"Anticipatory Condition,"3 and
"Future Supposition with
More Probability."4 La
Sor represents a unique
position among Koine
grammarians with his acceptance of Goodwin's concept
of vividness as the basic
meaning of this condition. Though he seems to
equate probability with
vividness in his discussion, he prefers the
former terminology in
classification:
Future conditions can only be
probable. But the degree of
probability in the speaker's mind is
variable. There is a more
probable (or "more
vivid") future condition ("If you [will] take
me, I shall go"), and a less
probable (or "less vivid") future
condition ("If you would take me, I
would go"). Because the degree
of probability exists only in the
speaker's mind, many grammarians
prefer the terms "more vivid"
and "less vivid," and avoid
reference to probability.5
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1016.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 290.
3 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 24.
4
5 William
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1973), II, p. 222.
153
Of course, the degree of vividness is also a product of
the
speaker's mind, hence the
argument could be reversed, for the condition
can and usually does have
contact with external facts. More to the
point, though, is the fact that
La Sor seems to miss the significance
of the two terms.
"Vividness" does not avoid a logical or semantic
difficulty, for it is not
interchangeable with the concept of
probability. As commonly used,
the term refers to the drama, the
intensity behind a statement.
"Probability," on the other hand, has
reference to a more hopeful,
anticipatory concept. It brings fulfillment
closer in terms of objective
reality, not dramatic impact. Among Koine
grammarians La Sor's "many
grammarians" are limited to a class of one:
himself. It seems best to this
author to keep it that way.
New Testament Examples
The deciding factor, though, is the text of the New
Testament.
What does it indicate? Three
examples will be evaluated: Matthew 18:15,
Luke 4:7 and I Thessalonians
3:8.
Matthew 18:15
The text reads e]a<n
sou a]kou<sh, e]ke<rdhsaj to>n a]delfo<n sou
("if he
hears you, you have gained your
brother"). Is this presenting a situation
in a "more vivid"
manner, or is there a degree of expectation or antici-
pation in the statement?
Although the question is beyond the grammar of
the sentence, the context and
direct implication seem clear: there is a
real hope, a definite prospect
of gaining the sinning brother. The
speaker does not give the condition
a sense of sureness, for he uses the
subjunctive mood. But he
expresses optimistic probability of restoring
154
fellowship with the sinning
brother. Willoughby Allen so interprets the
passage,1 as do
Broadus,2 and Lenski.3 Again, the point in question is
the force of the condition. It
is emphasising, not the dramatic aspect
of the situation, but the
hopeful anticipation of realizing the condition.
Thus the term "probable
condition" better describes the condition.
Luke 4:7
The text reads su> ou#n
e]a>n proskunh<shj e]nw<pion e]mou?, e@stai sou?
pa?sa
("therefore, if you will worship before me, all this will be yours").
Is the Devil making a vivid
statement, or is he speaking so as to
anticipate the probability of
Jesus' positive response? In the context
of the temptation one would
choose the latter alternative. As both
Nicoll4 and
Hendriksen5 note, the emphasis is upon the anticipated
fulfillment of the condition
rather than the vividness of it. This,
too, is a probable condition.
I Thessalonians 3:8
Paul writes o!ti
nu?n zw?men e]a>n u[mei?j sth<kete e]n kuri<&
("now we
live if you stand fast in the
Lord"). The historical context of this
1
Gospel According to S. Matthew, vol. 26 of The International
Critical
Commentary,
edited by Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles
Augustus
Briggs (Edinburgh: T. 6 T. Clark, 1907), p. 197.
2 Broadus, Matthew, p. 387.
3 Lenski, Matthew, pp. 699-700.
4 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 486.
5 William Hendriksen, The Good of Luke (
Book House, 1978), pp. 236-237.
155
passage argues for the concept
of anticipated, probable fulfillment.
Paul had received confirmation
that the Thessalonian believers were
standing firm in Christ, and he
drew significant encouragement from
their faithfulness. His
statement anticipates continued standing on
their part. The present
indicative in the apodosis reenforces this idea,
considering his future
encouragement in a dramatic form. Commentators
favoring this view include
Ellicott1 and Hendriksen.2
While some examples may be understood as vivid, dramatic
statements, it is clear that
some, if not the greater portion, imply a
probable degree of fulfillment.
Robertson's concept of the subjunctive
mood as one of expectation or
anticipation describes the text of the
New Testament better than
Goodwin's concept of vividness.
Since the basic sense of this condition is future, and
the mood
employed presents an anticipated
or probable fulfillment, this author
has selected the title
"probable condition." Probable in this sense is
contrasted with possible, as
will be seen when the optative mood is
discussed. "Probable"
also communicates some degree or amount of
expectation, which this
condition contains. All in all, this term is the
best one for a one-word
description of the significance of this type of
condition.
1 Charles J. Ellicott, Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessa-
lonians (
edition),
pp. 42-43.
2 William Hendriksen, I and II Thessalonians (
Book House, 1964), p. 88.
156
Relationship with the
Simple Condition
A final step in the discussion of the probable condition
is
to evaluate its relationship
with the simple condition.
Opinions of the Grammarians
Goodwin and those following him, it will be remembered,
classify conditional sentences
with respect to the time involved in
them: "The most obvious
natural distinction is that of (a) present
and
past
conditions and (b) future
conditions."1 Gildersleeve, Robertson
and others classify them in
terms of their relationship to reality:
those presented by the speaker
as real, and those presented as potential.
Each of these two groups may be
divided into two. The first divides
into those presented as actual
and those presented as impossible. The
second group divides into those
stated as more likely to be fulfilled
and those presented as less
likely. The suggested terms for these two
concepts are
"probable" and "possible."
Observations of the New
Testament
Enough has been said to suggest that this distinction is
main-
tained in the New Testament.
But does the text itself support such a
conclusion? The answer is Yes,
and a brief consideration of several
passages which use both
conditions will support this conclusion.
John 13:17.--Both a simple and a probable
condition are used
in conjunction with a single
apodosis in John 13:17—ei] tau?ta oi@date
maka<rioi<
e]ste e]a>n poih?te au]ta< ("if you know these
things, you will be
1 Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses, p. 139.
157
blessed if you do them").
The simple condition states the matter with
an assumption of reality, hence
Jesus is saying, "If you know these
things, and I am assuming that
you do . . . ." The last member of the
verse is the protasis of a
probable condition. The two protases are
both connected to the one
apodosis makarioi este.
What, then, can be made of this situation? Godet's terminology
is ambiguous: "Ei], if,
'if truly.' as is really the case; it is the
general supposition; e]a<n, in
case that; it is the more particular
condition."1 He seems to be using the term
"particular" in the sense
of anticipation or probability,
as his interpretation indicates. But
the specific term is misleading
at best.
Nicoll recognizes the difference: "ei] oi@date, 'if ye know,' as
you do know; e]a<n poih?te, a supposition." "The
knowing is objectively
granted, the doing subjectively
conditioned."2 This, of
course, is the
same as Godet. Lenski argues at
length for this distinction:
The first is a condition of reality:
"If you know these things,"
for Jesus rightly assumes that they do
know them . . . .
But,
of course, only "if you keep doing them." Doing is
emphatic over against mere knowing. The
condition is now one of
expectancy, "if you shall be doing
them." Jesus expects it of them,
yet it is possible that they may
disappoint him--will they? the
condition asks.3
Robertson continues this line of reasoning: "Here we
have the
first and third class
conditions happily combined with a clear distinc-
1 Godet, John, II, p. 252.
2 Nicoll, Testament, I, pp. 187-188.
3 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
(Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1961), p. 929.
158
tion. Jesus assumes the
knowledge as a fact, but the performance is-
doubtful."1 Roberts accepts this reasoning,2
but
another way. Setting aside
Robertson's comment on "doubtful," he
explains the verse so:
"Jesus regards their present knowledge as either
existing or not--that matter is
settled. But he regards their perfor-
mance as possible or probable
in the future."3 Actually,
both Battle
and Robertson are saying the
same thing. The term "doubtful" is used by
Robertson as a contrast to the
factuality assumed in the first statement.
"Doubtful" does mean
"possible or probable."
The comparison of the two conditions illustrates the way
each of them presents its
concept. The simple condition assumes that
the disciples know the facts
under discussion. The probable condition
anticipates their performance,
their application of these facts. But
the speaker does not assume
that such actions will happen.
Acts 5:38-39.--Another interesting combination of
conditions is
found in Acts 5:38-39—o!ti e]a>n h# e]c a]nqrw<pwn, h[ boulh< au!th h}
to> e@rgon
tou?to,
kataluqh<setai: ei] de> e]k qeou? e]stin, ou] dunh<sesqe katalu?sai
au]tou<j
("for if this purpose or work is of men, it will be destroyed;
but if it is of God, you will
not be able to destroy these men").
Is Gamaliel stating the first
condition as a vivid future condition and
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1019, also Word Pictures, V, p. 241.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 226.
3
159
the second as a simple
condition, or is he communicating certain assump-
tions about the infant Church?
The fact that Gamaliel, a leader of the Pharisees, offers
this
advice and employes a simple
condition in so doing has caused some
commentators to view him a
sympathetic toward Christianity. Alexander
even refers to an "old
opinion" that Gamaliel was a secret believer on
this basis, but he himself does
not hold to that view) Nicoll puts
the case cautiously:
. . . it has sometimes been thought that
the change of mood from
subjunctive to indicative, "but if it
is of God," as if indicating
that the second supposition were the more
probable (c4. Gal. i. 8, 9),
indicates sympathy on the part of
Gamaliel.2
Robertson identifies Gamaliel's motive for changing
conditions
in the politics of the
situation:
Gamaliel gives the benefit of the doubt to
Christianity. He assumes
that Christianity is of God and puts the
alternative that it is of
men in the third class. This does not, of
course, show that
Gamaliel was a Christian or an inquirer.
He was merely willing to
score a point against the Sadducees.3
emphasis of the conditions in
terms of their relationship to reality:
It seems better, rather, to view
Gamaliel's speech from the stand-
point of aspect. Whether the new sect and
its miraculous power were
from God, is a settled fact which nothing
can change. If, on the
other hand, it is of men, then future
events will show it to be so--
an alternative Gamaliel could have
considered probable, even though
he used ei] with
the indicative.4
1 J. A. Alexander, Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles
(Grand
Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1956 reprint of 1875 edition),
pp.
237-238.
2 Nicoll, Testament, II, p. 161.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1018.
4
160
two conditional clauses. The
first one, the probable condition, sets the
tone of the entire statement.
The whole statement is put into future
time. The first condition is a
probable condition; Gamaliel stated the
case so as to imply an
anticipated, probable fulfillment. It will
probably prove to be of men.
The second condition, a simple one,
considers the connection
between Christianity and God. The time is
still future, and the
indicative mood presents the situation in an
aspect of reality. All things
are known to God, and He certainly knows
the truth about this new sect.
Gamaliel does shift to the indicative
mood in his second condition,
not so much to give Christianity the
benefit of the doubt, but to
acknowledge that God certainly knows the
true situation. The simple
condition provides the means to express this
assumption.
I Corinthians 10:27-28.--The general topic of
Christian conduct
in the Corinthian culture led
Paul to discuss the proper response of a
believer if he was invited to
an unbeliever's home and then confronted
with a difficult situation.
These two hypothetical cases are discussed
in two conditional sentences,
the first a simple condition, the second
a
probable condition-- (verse 27) ei@ tij kalei ? u[ma?j tw?n a]pi<stwn kai>
qe<lete poreu<esqai, pa?n to> paratiqe<menon
u[mi?n e]sqi<ete . . . . (verse
28)
e]a<n
de< tij u[mi?n ei@ph: tou?to i[ero<qcto<n e]stin, mh> e]sti<ete. Again
the two
conditions are set side by
side, and again an opportunity is given to
evaluate the relative meanings
of the two. The difference is more than
just time. The first, the
simple condition, presents the invitation as
161
an assumed reality. Paul states
the case, at least for the sake of
argument, that believers will
be invited over to unbeliever's homes
for dinner. But in this social
setting a second situation might arise.
The believer might be
confronted with the fact that his dinner had been
offered to an idol. This
situation, Paul assumes, would be less likely
to confront a Christian than
the invitation. Not every host will raise
the idol question.
The conditions employed reflect these two assumptions.
The
first, the simple condition,
has already been discussed. The second,
the probable condition,
presents its condition, as Ellicott says, as
"a case of distinctly
objective possibility."1 Nicoll refers to it
as "a probable
contingency," as contrasted with the first, "an assumed
fact."2 Lenski describes the first as "a
condition that expresses
reality," and the second
as "a condition that expresses expectancy."3
Robertson and Plummer explain
the two conditions as: "'If any one invites
you,' a thing which is very
possible and may have happened. 'If any
one should say to you,' a pure
hypothesis and not so very probable."4
1 Charles J. Ellicott, A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on
Publisher,
1889), p. 203.
2 Nicoll, Testament, II, p. 868.
3 Lenski, I and II Corinthians, p. 421.
4 Archibald Robertson and
Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical
Commentary on the First
Epistle of
The International
Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old
and New Testaments, edited by Samuel Rolles
Driver, Alfred Plummer and
Charles Augustus Briggs
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), p. 221.
162
The context itself points to the fact that the reception
of a
dinner invitation would be a
normal course of social affairs, offering
insight into the expected
relationship between an individual Christian
and his neighbors. The
confrontation with the dinner's past history
would not be as probable, but
certainly not outside the realm of normal
experience. Thus the two
conditions: the first assumes the invitation
to be real, the second presents
the confrontation as a definite possibility.
Galatians 1:8-9.--His warnings against false
teachers and
gospels bring Paul to speak
against such in the strongest of terms in
Galatians 1:8-9, again
employing the simple and the probable conditions:
(verse
8) a]lla>
kai> e]a>n h[mei?j h} a@ggeloj e]c ou]ranou ? eu]aggeli<shtai . .
.
a]na<qema e@stw. (verse
9) w[j
proeioh<kamen kai> a@rti pa<lin le<gw, ei@ tij
u[ma?j eu]aggeli<zetai par ] o! paqela<bete,
a]na<qema e@stw. Here
the sequence
of conditions is opposite to
that of I Corinthians 10:27-28. Paul begins
with the subjunctive and moves
to the indicative. Buttmann identifies
this as an example where
The difference between [them] is plainly
to be recognized in
sentences where both are used in close
proximity; as Gal. i. 8,9,
where the hypothesis expressed in the 8th
verse by e]a<n with the
Subjunctive is resumed or repeated in the
9th with greater energy
and definiteness by ei] with the Indicative. So in Acts v. 38-39.1
This sentence [verse 9] differs from that
of v. 8 in two respects
which affect the thought: (1) the element
of concession and impro-
bability disappears in the omission of h[mei?j h} a@ggeloj e]c ou]qanou?;
l Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek,
translated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher, 1873), p. 220.
163
(2) the form of the condition that
suggests future possibility is
displaced by that which expresses simple
present supposition, and
which is often used when the condition is
known to be actually
fulfilled. The result is to bring the
supposition closer home to
the actual case, and since it was known
both to Paul and his readers
that the condition ei@
tij . . . parela<bete
was at that very time in
process of fulfillment, to apply the a]na<qema
e@stw
directly to those
who were then preaching in Galatia.1
The shift from the probable condition to the simple
condition
serves to place emphasis upon
Paul's assumption that there were those
at that present time who were
preaching a false gospel in
emphasis moves from the
probable condition with its lack of assumption
as to the reality of the case
to the simple condition which states such
an assumption.
Lenski uses inconsistent terminology when he writes:
"Note the
difference in the conditional
clauses: kai> e]a<n vividly
supposes a case;
ei] in v.
9 takes up the real case that is now occurring in
Is the first condition being
stated vividly or being stated as a
possibility? Robertson argues
for possibility, even including Paul
himself.3 The better
term would be "probability."
Summary
of conditional present exegesis
which this author has found:"4
1 Ernest DeWitt
the Epistle to the
Galatians,
vol. 35 of The International
Commentary, edited by Samuel
Rolfes Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles
Augustus
Briggs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921), p. 30.
2 Lenski, Galatians, p. 38.
3 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 277
4
164
When ei]. with the indicative is
used, it implies that the truth or
otherwise of the condition is regarded as
in principle "determined,"
i.e. is represented as a fact (although
the speaker does not commit
himself as to whether he believes the
condition is true or not).
When
can with the subjunctive is used, it implies that the truth
or otherwise of the condition is regarded
as in principle "undeter-
mined," i.e. is represented as
uncertain, either because the condition
is conceived as a future occurrence, which
may or may not ever take
place, or because the condition is a general
one which may be
realized at any time.1
This author agrees with
of the distinction between
simple and probable conditions.
A test case may be made of Acts 5:38-39. The first
condition,
e]a>n
h# e]c a]nqrw<pwn h[ boulh> au!ta h} to> e@rgon tou?to,
kataluqh<setai,
regards the source of the
Christian sect as "in principle" undetermined and open
to future evaluation. This
could be paraphrased: "If this counsel or this
work is of men (as the future
may well demonstrate) . . . ." The
second
condition, ei] de> e]k qeou? e]stin, ou] dunh<sesqe katalu?sai au]touj,
represents the situation
"as a fact," one that is presently, in theory
at least, determined. This may
be paraphrased as "but if it is of God
(as may be assumed in light of
the facts) . . . ." The
distinctions
fit the case well, and do not
put Gamaliel on either side of the debate,
for neither condition of
necessity conveys the speaker's true convictions.
By examining these examples it may be seen that a
distinction is
to be drawn between the simple
condition and the probable condition in
terms of probability or
anticipation rather than vividness. The former
states the condition as an
assumed reality, while the latter presents it
as a potential future reality.
This is the basic meaning of this
condition.
1 John Kinje, Jr.,
"Greek Conditional Sentences," The
Bible
Translator, 13:4
(October, 1962), p. 223.
165
Translation of the
Probable Condition
Are there any general principles which can be derived
from this
study to guide translators in
their handling of the probable condition?
In order to answer this question
consideration will be given to the opinion
of the grammars, then some
observations will be made from the New Testa-
ment.
The
Grammarians' Opinions
A few grammarians have ventured opinions on the
translation of
at least some types of probable
conditions. Chief among them is Moulton
who writes:
The verbs are all futuristic, and the a@n ties them up to
particular
occurrences. The present accordingly is
conative or continuous or
iterative: Mt 62 o!tan
poih?j e]lehmosu<nhn
"whenever thou art for doing
alms," 616 o!tan nhseu<hte "Whenever ye are fasting, " Jo 25 o!ti a@n le<gh
"whatever he says (from time to time)." The aorist, being future by
virtue of its mood, punctiliar by its
tense, and consequently
describing complete action, gets a
future-perfect sense in this class
of
sentence; and it will be found most important to, note this, before
we admit the less rigid translation. Thus
Mt 521 o!j a}n foneu<sh "the
man who has committed murder," 547 e]a<n
a]spa<shsqe
"if you have only
saluted him," Mk 918 o!pou
e]a<n au]to>n kataqa<bh "wherever it has seized
him;" the cast of the sentence
allows us to abbreviate the future-
perfect in these cases.1
He obviously misses the point
about the aorist. Such verbs are neither
punctiliar because of their
tense, nor are they assigned to the future
by their subjunctive mood. Were
these true, then his suggested transla-
tion might be reasonable.
Moulton does not discuss any exceptions to
this, though he does raise
Matthew 5:21 as an apparent problem. He
answers this by noting that a]polu<sh "denotes not so much the carrying
1 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 186.
166
into effect as the
determination."1
Thayer agrees with Moulton, noting that e]a<n with the aorist
subjunctive corresponds to the
Latin future perfect. He translates
Matthew 4:9. e]a>n
proskunh<shj moi, as "if thou shall have worshipped me.”2
Interestingly enough, none of
the versions checked adopted this form
of translation, including the
Douay-
Phillip's paraphrase, the New English Bible, The Revised Standard
Version, and
the New American Standard Bible. All of them translate
these verses (Matthew 4:9,
5:21, 5:47 and Mark 9:18) as English future
tenses. This lends support to
the objections raised by some against
Moulton's position.
The objections come from Robertson mainly and are
directed
against Moulton's rule of using
a future-perfect English verb to
translate the aorist
subjunctive in these conditions:
I doubt the propriety, however, of reading
a future perfect sense
a la
Latin into this aorist subj. as Moulton does. He cites Mt. 5:47,
e]a<n
a]spa<shsqe, but surely the simple aorist conception is sufficient.3
Though he does not discuss this
particular verse in Word Pictures, he
doubtless would have followed
all major versions by using the English
future and considering the act
as one simply stated by the aorist and
assigned by context to the
future time.
1 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 186.
2 Joseph Henry Thayer, Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the
New Testament, reprint of the
Corrected Edition (
The
National Foundation for Christian Education, n.d.), p. 162.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1019.
167
offers the best suggestion:
An Aorist Subjunctive after ean,
otan, ewj,
etc. is sometimes
properly translated by a Perfect or
Future Perfect., but only
because the Context shows that the action
is to precede that of the
principal verb. In the great majority of
cases a Present Subjunctive
or a Future is the best translation.1
His emphasis upon context as
the deciding factor is the key consideration,
for there are some probable
conditions where the context argues against
a future perfect translation.
As in all cases, the context is the
deciding factor.
New Testament
Observations
The examples in which the context does not fit a future
perfect
translation include John 14:3,
where the emphasis is upon the future
departure of Christ; John 19:2
where the releasing of Jesus was contemp-
lated as a future act; and
Romans 15:24 where the filling of Paul by the
Roman believers is best
understood as a simple, i.e. undefined, future
act.
The emphasis of the New Testament is that the context
should
decide the specific
translation. The English should represent as far as
possible the sense of the
specific tenses. The translator, though, has
to remember that the tenses
communicate aspect rather than time of
action, hence, any tense,
especially in the subjunctive mood, may be
considered a future act. There
is no uniform rule that will govern the
specific English verb form
selected in each case.
1
168
Summary
The best rule for translation is that of context: each
condition
must be handled on its own
merits and situation. The English should
reflect two things. First, the
aspect of the verb used in the condition.
The undefined aspect of the
aorist tense is to be directly translated
into English. The continual
aspect of the present usually comes into
English in the form of a
participle. The time considerations of the
probable condition are by definition
future. Thus the best English
combination will be a verb with
its helping verbs to communicate both
ideas.
CHAPTER
V
THE POSSIBLE
CONDITION
Introduction
The final category of conditional sentences is noticable
for its
relative absence in Koine Greek
literature, especially the New Testament.
In fact, this condition is
technically outside the scope of this study,
for no complete sentence of
this type exists in the New Testament. This
condition is included here,
however, for the sake of completeness, though
it is better thought of as a
special use of the optative mood.
Technically this condition
"is expressed by ei] with
the optative in the
protasis and a@n with the optative in the apodosis.”1
Moulton recognizes its absence when he writes that
"Neither in
LXX nor in NT is there an ex.
of ei] c. opt. answered with opt. c. a@n, nor
has one been quoted from the
papyri."2 Consequently
it is difficult to
establish firm conclusions
about its use in the New Testament. A general
survey of the few partial
examples will establish the general signifi-
cance of this condition. First,
though, a brief review of the optative
mood will be given.
1 H. E. Dana and Julius
R. Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the Greek
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 290.
2 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume 1:
Prolegomena, third
edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 196.
169
170
The Optative
Mood in General
General
Observations
All grammarians agree that the optative mood has been the
least
used of all the Greek moods.
Indeed, it has all but disappeared in
Modern Greek, save for the
stock phrase mh> ge<noito.1
Robertson observes
that Greek was the only
language to preserve both the subjunctive and
optative moods, but that the
former was by far the dominant mood in
conversation and writing.2 Moulton states that the
"optative mood
was doomed from the very birth
of the koinh< . . . ."3
Obviously it
was well on its way to its
final demise during the time of the New
Testament.
The total number of optatives in the New Testament is not
very
great. Robertson claims
sixty-seven,4 and this is accepted by Heinz.5
Although this is a
statistically small quantity, the optative mood does
make a significant contribution
to the comprehension of the New Testament.
Since some of that contribution
is in the conditional sense, the details
of the optative mood will be
explored.
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of Historical
Research
(Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 325.
2 Ibid., pp. 325-326.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 240.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 939.
5 Vincent Heinz,
"The Optative Mood in the Greek New Testament,"
unpublished Th.M. thesis,
Dallas Theological Seminary, 1962, p. 23.
170
Specific Classifications
Robertson and others identify three basic uses of the
optative
mood: Futuristic (or
Potential), Volitive and Deliberative.1 These
will be examined below.
The Futuristic (or Potential)
Optative
Grammarians who address the subject of the optative mood
in
detail agree on the
significance of the potential optative. Moulton
expresses it best: "It was
used to express a future in milder form, and
to express a request in
deferential style."2 Robertson3
and Heinz agree
with this statement. This
particular form of the optative may or may not
employ the particle a@n. New Testament examples of this type of
optative
may be found in Luke 9:46—to> ti<j a}n ei@h me<zwn au]tw?n
("which of them
might be the greatest") and
Acts 17:18—ti< a}n qe<loi o[
spermolo<goj
ou$toj
le<gein; ("What might this babbler wish to say?").
Usually the potential optative occurs with the particle an. This
is its usual form which, as
Robertson notes, is limited to Luke's
writings and is "an
evident literary touch."5 The combination implies
a conditional concept, making
"one think of the unexpressed protasis of
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
The Greek Testament (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1933), p. 311.
2 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 197.
3
Robertson, Grammar, p. 937.
4 Heinz, "Optative
Mood," p. 31.
5 Robertson, Grammar, p. 938.
171/172
the fourth-class
condition."1
The Optative with an is used to express what
would happen on the
fulfillment of some supposed condition. It
is thus an apodosis
correlative to a protasis expressed or
implied. It is usually
translated by the English Potential.2
He lists Acts 8:31—pw?j ga>r a}n dunai<mhn e]a>n mh< tij
o]dhgh<sei me ("How
can I unless someone should
guide me?") and Acts 17:18 (already quoted) as
examples. The specific details
of the optative and its conditional use
will be discussed below, but
this observation illustrates the close
link between the two.
The Volitive Optative
The most frequent use of the optative is that of an
expression
of volition or a wish, hence
the term "volitive" and the name "optative."3
Blass--Debrunner notes that
"The optative proper used to denote an
attainable wish is still in use
in the NT as it is in the the LXX and
Papyri (negative mh<)."4 This is the most
frequent use of this mood.
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 937.
2 Ernest DeWitt
ment Greek (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1897), pp. 79-80.
3 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek,
trans-
lated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
1873),
p. 214.
4 Friedrich Blass and
Albert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament and Other
Early Christian Literature, translated and revised
by Rovert W. Funk (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 194.
173
Moulton corrects to
thirty-eight: ". . . which come down to 23 when we
drop mh> ge<noito. Of these Paul claims 15 . . ., while Mk, Lk,
Ac, Heb,
I Pet and 2 Pet have one
apiece, and Jude two."2
Heinz identifies three types of volitive optatives: (a)
Optative
of Depreciation, (b) Optative
of Wishing and (c) Optative of Command. It
is also his opinion that the
volitive optative "is rare in the New
Testament in dependent
[including conditional] clauses."3 Robertson,
on the other hand, claims that
"The use of the opt. in the protasis of
[the possible] condition is probably
volitive . . .”4 This
relatively
minor problem will be discussed
later.
The Deliberative Optative
The optative mood is used in indirect discourse, and
Robertson
terms this usage the
"Deliberative Optative."5 Blass-Debrunner use the
term "oblique
optative."6 Dana and
Mantey describe this use as one in
which "indirect rhetorical
questions are expressed by the optative. In
this construction an unusually
doubtful attitude of mind is implied."7
1
2 Moulton, Prolegomena, pp. 194-195.
3 Heinz, "Optative
Mood," pp. 24-28, 42.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
5 Ibid., p. 940.
6 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 195.
7 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 174.
174
There are few examples of this
use in the New Testament, not only because
of the scarcity of the optative
mood in general, but "simply because of
the very strong overall
preference for direct discourse" shown in the
New Testament.1
Heinz questions Robertson's identification of the
deliberative
optative as a separate use. His
thesis argues that the volitive and
potential optatives may be used
in either dependent or independent
clauses. In this he is
supported by Moulton, who also speaks of only two
uses of the optative.2 Further, Heinz identifies a separate
category
which is limited to dependent
clauses and "which cannot be satisfactorily
categorized as either
volitative or potential."3 This use is termed the
oblique optative, in parallel
with Blass-Debrunner's terminology.
The ultimate resolution of the
deliberative or oblique optative
question has no effect on the
subject of conditional sentences, but it
does illustrate the difficulty
of precise analysis of relatively few
examples.
The Optative Mood in
Conditional Sentences
Having given the optative mood a brief overview, its use
in
conditional sentences will be
considered. The form of these sentences as
well as their significance will
be discussed.
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar., p. 195.
2 Moulton, Prolegomena, pp. 194-199.
3 Heinz, "Optative Mood," p. 54.
175
The
Construction
The Format Used
The protasis states a supposition which
refers to the future,
suggesting less probability of its
fulfillment than is suggested by
e]a<n with the Subjunctive.
The protasis is expressed by ei] with the Optative; the
apodosis
by the Optative with a@n.1
He then speaks of the absence
of this condition in the New Testament:
There is no perfect example of this
form in the New Testament.
Protases occur in I Cor. and I Pet., but
never with a regular and
fully expressed apodosis. Apodoses occur
in Luke and Acts, but
never with a regular protasis.2
Moulton accepts this description and adds that the
combination
of ei] with the optative by itself is exceedingly
rare:
We only note here that H[atch] and
R[edpath] give no more than 13 exx.
from LXX of ei] c. opt. (apart from 4
Mac and one passage omitted in
uncials): about 2 of these are wishes,
and 5 are cases of w!s(per)
ei]
tij while
2 seem to be direct or indirect questions.3
In spite of the absence of any
complete example, grammarians agree on
the form of this condition.
The Optatives Used
Since there are three types of optatives in the New
Testament,
it would be useful to inquire
as to which one or ones are employed in
conditional sentences. The
question, of course, is limited to the
1
2 Ibid., p. 107.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 196.
176
protasis, for the use of a@n with the optative in the apodosis marks it
as potential. The optatives in
the protasis are not so easily identified.
The Volitive Optative
Moulton identifies the optative in the protasis as a
volitive
optative, or an optative of
wish:
In hypotasis the optative of wish appears
in clauses with ei], as is
shown by the negative's being mh<, as well as by the fact
that we can
add ei], si, if, to a wish, or express a hypothesis without a conjunc-
tion, by a clause of jussive or optative
character.1
Robertson agrees: "The use
of the opt. in the protasis of this condition
is probably volitive, since the
negative is mh<,"2
But does the occurrence of mh<
automatically
indicate a volitive
optative? Heinz challenges
Robertson and Moulton on this point, for
he questions whether the
presence of this particle should be so inter-
preted. His conclusion is that
it should not. He examines the eleven
examples of ei] with the optative and concludes that "The
optative in
the protasis of a fourth class
condition is normally potential rather
than volitional."3
He grants that five times the protasis
of these
conditions has "a slightly
volitive" character, but affirms that this
"is determined by the
element of purpose involved rather than by any
demands of grammatical
structure."4 It seems
that his reasoning could
1 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 196.
2
Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
3 Heinz, "Optative
Moods," pp. 41-42.
4 Ibid.,
p. 42.
177
be reversed and a case made for
the volitive over against the potential.
The final answer, though, in no
way affects the character of the protasis
in which it is found; only the
semantical "fine tuning" is involved.
The meaning stays the same.
The Potential Optative
The potential optative, usually marked by a@n,1 is identified by
Heinz as the "usual
apodosis to the fourth class condition."2 This
agrees with Robertson.3 The use of the potential optative in
the protasis,
though, is a subject of
disagreement. Moulton identifies the usual type
as the volitive optative, since
it appears with the particle ei] and
employs mh< as its negative.4 Robertson accepts this, and adds the
observation that the potential
optative (with a@n) may
appear in the
protasis of such sentences.5
Again, the specific identification of
the
type of optative is not
essential to the meaning of the sentence. The
basic significance is the same,
regardless of how one identifies the
optative involved. The basic
constructional pattern will remain the same.
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 937.
2 Heinz, "Optative
Mood," p. 45.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
4 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 196.
5 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
178
The Significance
Exactly what is the significance of the possible
condition? Two
avenues will be explored in
answering this question. First, the opinions
of leading Koine grammarians
will be investigated. Then, the specific
examples of this condition, or
rather the fragments of it, will be
discussed.
The Grammarians
vivid" concept of
Classical Greek grammarians. He writes
The protasis states a supposition which
refers to the future,
suggesting less probability of its
fulfillment than is suggested
by ean with the Subjunctive.
The protasis is expressed by ei] with the Optative; the
apodosis
by the Optative with a@n.1
Moulton agrees with
who also holds to it:
Meanwhile we may observe that Blass's
dictum that the ei] c. opt.
form is used "if I wish to represent
anything as generally possible,
without regard to the general or actual
situation at the moment,"
suits the NT exx. well; and it seems to
fit the general facts
better than Goodwin's doctrine of a
"less vivid future" condition.2
This concept might be
paraphrased by the English term "possibility" as
contrasted with the term
"probability," which this author reserves for
the subjunctive mood. The
latter implies a greater chance of fulfillment
than does the former.
1
2 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 196, note.
179
Blass-Debrunner
This grammar states: "Ei] with
the optative presents something as
thought of, without regard for
reality or unreality, and emphasizes the
hypothetical character of the
assumption: 'a potential case.'"1 Funk,
the American editor, repeats
this terminology in his own grammar.2 Again,
as with
condition, not its vividness.
Robertson
The fullest description of the significance of this
condition comes
from Robertson:
This fourth class condition is
undetermined with less likelihood of
determination than is true of the third
class with the subj. The
difference between the third and fourth
classes is well illustrated
in I Pet. 3:13f. So Jesus draws a
distinction in Lu. 22:67. The use
of the opt. in both apodosis and protasis
accents the remotness of the
hypothesis. And yet it is not in the
category of unreality as in the
second class. It floats in a mirage, but
does not slip quite away.
It is thus suitable not merely for real
doubt, but it also fits well
the polite temper of courteous address.3
In general, then, the grammarians offer agreement on the
significance of this condition.
They identify it as one which emphasizes
the possibility of the
supposition, rather than its probability; its
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
2 Robert. W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of
Hellenistic
Greek, 3 volumes (
1973),
II, p. 685.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
180
distant potentiality, rather
than its closer anticipation. Robertson
uses the term
"remote" to describe this concept. It was an unfortunate
choice, since
"possibility" better fits the case. The next step in this
discussion is to take a close
look at a few New Testament examples of
this condition and see what may
be learned from each one.
The Specific Examples
Those with the Protasis Implied
Roberts identifies six potential optatives as ones which
imply
a protasis of the possible
type.1 Each of these will be
considered in
order.
Luke 1:62.--The first suggested conditional use of
the potential
optative is Luke 1:62—ti< a}n qe<loi kalei?sqai au]to< ("what
he would like to
call him"). The stated
apodosis (a}n qe<loi kalei?sqai) is
thought to
imply the protasis "if he
could speak." Lenski follows this view:
The indirect question retains the optative
of the direct: "what
he would wish him to be called," i.e.
if he could speak, a condition
of potentiality (ei] with the optative) in
the protasis and the optative
with a@n in the
apodosis.1
Robertson also supplies the
words "if he could speak" and calls this
"a conclusion of the
fourth-class condition."2
The conditional element may not be as obvious as these
suggest,
though. The English versions do
not translate this phrase as a condition.
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 96.
2 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
volumes
(Nashville: Broadman Press,
1930), II, p. 17.
181
The New International Version, for example, translates it as "what
he would
like to name the child."
The use of such terms as "would," "might," etc.
can communicate the concept of
potential choice, and that is what is in
view here. The implied protasis
is not "if he could speak," but "if he
had a choice." Culture,
not silence, limited his selection of a name for
his son as verses 61 and 63
indicate. It does seem fair to list this
passage as an example of an
implied condition, but to recognize the
condition as referring to a
choice. Even in English questions are
asked which imply a potential
or possible choice, but in point of fact,
no choice is possible.
Luke 6:11.--The statement in Luke 6:11—ti< a}n poih<saien to<
]Ihsou?
("what they might do to Jesus")--is identified by some as implying
the protasis "if they
could do something." The remoteness of any oppor-
tunity at this point to inflict
injury on Him points to the possible
condition using the optative.
Plummer identifies this as an optative
used with an indirect question,
though, setting aside the conditional
concept.1 Lenski argues for the conditional idea and
expands the
statement: "If we had him
in our power, what could we do to him."2
Hendriksen follows Plummer,
noting that "the deliberative optative of the
direct question is retained in
the indirect question."3
1 Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the
Gosspel According to S.
Luke,
volume 28 of The International Critical
Commentary, edited by Samuel
Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles
Augustus
Briggs (Edinburgh: T. g T. Clark, 1896), p. 170.
2 Lenski, Luke, p. 335.
3 William Hendriksen, Luke, p. 325.
182
So which is it? Does this optative represent an indirect
question without conditional
overtones, or does it represent a fragment
of a possible condition? The
answer lies in the context: they talked
to one another. This question
is one stated in indirect discourse.
Thus the optative poih<saien is not to be understood as a
conditional
statement, but one of a simple
question.
Luke 9:46.--This passage—to>
ti<j a}n ei@h me<zwn au]tw?n ("which of
them would be the
greatest")--is very similar to the one above. Again
the statement could be
understood to be a condition, implying the
protasis "if they could
be." But it is also a statement of the words
of the apostles which is
presented in indirect discourse. Lenski tries
to have it both ways, noting
that the indirect question serves as "the
apodosis of a potential
condition and the optative with an is
left
unchanged in the indirect
question."1 The
conditional interpretation
seems rather forced, since the
theoretical direct question of the
apostles would not have been
put as a condition. It is simpler and
more direct to interpret this
optative as one of indirect discourse
rather than a conditional one.
Luke 15:26.--Here there is less question about the
lack of a
condition than with the other
passages. The statement—ti< a}n ei@h
tau?ta
("what these things might
be")--implies no condition. It is just the
potential optative with no
conditional overtones at all. Roberts
1 Lenski, Luke,
p. 544.
183
identifies the optative as a
conditional and supplies the protasis
"If the fact should be
told."1 This is an
unnecessary concept.
Acts 5:24, --ti<
a}n ge<noito tou?to ("what might come of this") is
at first glance similar to Luke
15:26 and appears to be a simple potential
optative. But, as Alexander
notes, there is a future dimension to the
question here: "The
question here was not what it was that they beheld
[as in Luke 15:26], but what it
would be, if they failed to use preven-
tive measures."2
Also, unlike Luke 9:46, the original
direct question
could have been stated, in
theory at least, as a condition. Here
Robertson's explanation finds
more support than the others:
Second aorist middle optative of ginomai with a@n, the conclusion
of a condition of the fourth class
(undetermined with less likelihood
of determination), the unexpressed
condition being "if the thing
should be allowed to go on."3
Since the question has a future
concept to it and since the original
question may well have been put
as a condition, this will be accepted as
an example of the conditional
use of the optative mood.
Acts 10:17.--Here the optative phrase—ti< a}n ei@h to> o!rama ("what
the vision might
mean")--has no conditional overtones. This verse is
parallel to Luke 9:46, for it
asks a question of a present reality. In
spite of the fact that both
Robertson4 and Lenski5 identify this as an
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 237.
2 Alexander, Acts, pp. 223-224.
3 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 64.
4 Ibid., p. 138.
5 Lenski, Acts,
p. 405.
184
example of an indirect question
implying a condition.
Summary.--These six passages which Roberts
identifies as being
conditional uses of the
optative mood need to be reconsidered. One of
them (Luke 1:62) is such a
passage, one of them (Acts 5:24) might well
be one, and the rest are not
conditional statements. Examples of this
type of conditional statement
with the protasis implied are even more
elusive than is popularly
thought.
Those with the Protasis Stated
In some verses the condition is stated and the conclusion
is
either implied or stated in the
form of another type of conditional
sentence. There are no complete
examples of conditional sentences using
optative moods in both the
apodosis and the protasis.
Acts 8:31.--This sentence takes the form of a
mixed condition
wherein the apodosis used the
optative mood and the protasis the
indicative—pw?j ga>r a}n dunai<mhn e]a>n mh< tij
o[dhgh<sei me; ("How can I
unless someone guides me?”).
The protasis is that of a simple condition,
though e]a<n is used with the indicative o[dhgh<sei instead of the usual ei].
The apodosis is that of a
possible condition, employing a@n with
the
optative dunai<mhn. This phenomenon of mixed conditions is
something
that Robertson calls a
"common enough phenomenon in the Koine."1
Alexander's comments are in
keeping with Moulton's observations on
the optative as an expression
of doubt and self-depreciation:
1 Robertson, Word Picture, III, p. 110.
184
[This form] expresses in a high degree
the speaker's doubt, if not
as to the absolute intrinsic possibility,
at least as to the actual
and present practicability of the thing
in question . . . . Besides
the modest self-depreciation of this
answer, it implies a suspicion,
if no more, that the stranger who thus suddenly
accosted him was
just such a guide and helper as he
needed.1
The indicative mood in the protasis indicates the real
need
the Eunuch felt for a guide,
and the optative in the apodosis shows how
improbably he regarded his
comprehension. Doubtless Alexander goes too
far when he reads into the
indicative the man's recognition of Peter and
his role.
Acts 20:16.—e@speuden
ga<r, ei] dunato>n ei@h au]t&?, th>n h[me<ran
th?j penthkosth?j gene<sqai ei]j ]Ieroso<luma ("For he was in a
hurry to be in
writes that the phrase ei] dunato<n implies "doubt or worry
lest the sea
voyage should delay his arrival
by that time, thus the less probable
[possible] condition."2
But if this is the protasis, what is the
apodosis? Both Lenski3
and Robertson4 identify this as a possible
condition, but neither
identifies the implied apodosis. The best
answer is that there is none.
The statement is simply one expressing
doubt in light of the many
problems confronting such a voyage.5
1 Alexander, Acts, p. 345.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 244.
3 Lenski, Acts, p. 835.
4 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 347.
5 Lenski, Acts,
p. 835.
186
The optative mood fits such a
context as this, and such an author as Luke.
Acts 24:19.--This verse presents another mixed
condition which
uses an optative mood in the
protasis: ou!j e@dei e]pi> sou?
parei?nai kai>
kathgorei?n
ei@ ti e@xoien pro>j e]me< ("who ought to be before
you and accuse
me, if they should have
anything against me."). The doubt of the protasis,
emphasized by exoien, is reenforced by the contrary to fact
apodosis.
There was no charge against
Paul that was valid in a Roman court, nor
were the eye-witnesses present
to state such charges as could be
presented. Paul employed the
optative mood to underline the doubtful
nature of the whole
proceedings. Lenski objects to the identification
of the sentence as a mixed
condition, noting that e@dei may be
either "an
apodosis of present unreality"
or "the imperfect in an obligation that
has not been met."1
The only change this brings about is to identify
the apodosis as one that is
implied rather than stated. In either case,
the protasis implies doubt as
to the validity of the charge against Paul.
Acts 27:12.--The clause oi[ plei<onej e@qento boulh>n a]naxqh?nai
e]kei?qen,
ei@ pwj du<nainto katanth<santej ei]j foi<nika paraxeima<sai
("the
majority decided to sail from
there, if somehow they might reach
and winter there") is
identified by Robertson as one containing the
protasis of a doubtful
condition involving the optative du<nainto.2
This
combination "is a
condition of the fourth class with the notion of purpose
1 Lenski, Acts,
p. 974.
2 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 462.
187
implied and indirect discourse
. . . ..”1 Lenski challenges
this identifica-
tion, quoting from Robertson's Grammar to show that the shift to
optative
is accounted for by the
indirect discourse of the statement. He argues
that the optative represents
either indirect discourse or a conditional
statement, but not both: "Ei@pwj with the optative is not a condition of
potentiality . . ., because it
occurs in indirect discourse."2 Heinz does
not commit himself, noting that
this optative expresses "aim or purpose,"
but that it also contains
"an element of condition."3 Elsewhere he
speaks of this verb as one that
might be introducing indirect discourse,
but which leans "more to
the conditional use of the potential optative."4
It seems that Lenski's
observations about the optative being either
conditional or involved in
indirect discourse are valid, but it also
seems that this particular
example is hard to classify. In either case,
the general study is not
affected, for if this verb is considered
conditional, then its use is
typical: expressing mere probability about
the future outcome of a
situation.
Acts 27:39.--As Paul and his shipwrecked party
survey the
forbidding shoreline of
a small bay, a break in the
rocky coast, ei]j o!n e]bouleu<onto ei]
du<nainto
e]cw?sai
to> ploi?on ("into which, if it were possible, they decided to run
1 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 462.
2 Lenski, Acts, p. 1072.
3 Heinz, "Optative
Mood," p. 42.
4 Ibid.,
p. 68.
188
the ship"). Luke uses the
optative du<nainto either
to express an
indirect question on the part
of the sailors, "as if the sailors had
said amongst themselves e]cw?somen ei] du<nameqa,"1 or a
condition of
vague probability, i.e.
possibility. As mentioned above, Robertson
implies that both may be true
of a given optative verb, but others
question the dual function in
such cases. Which one is found here is
debatable. Moule notes that
"In Acts xxvii.39 it is not absolutely clear
in which sense ei] is used: does ei]
bouleu<onto ei] du<nainto e]cw?sai mean
they
were planning whether they
could. . ., or they were planning (if they
could),
to
. . . ?"2 He does
distinguish between the conditional and
indirect discourse usages, but
cannot classify this verse.
Were one to take the optative as that of a condition,
then the
verse represents the sailors as
viewing the possibility of their
reaching the safety of the bay
as theoretically possible at best. The
apodosis, in this case, is not
expressed. Certainly the situation was
not one to offer much
encouragement to the exhausted crew and weakened
passengers. Granting the
conditional nature of this optative, it fits
the general nature of this
condition: possibility as opposed to probability.
1 Corinthians 14:10 and 15:37.--Both passages
employ the phrase
ei]
tu<xoi which is identifies by Arndt and Gingrich as "a
formula if it
1 Nicoll, Greek Testament, II, p. 534.
2 C. F. D. Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1953), p. 151.
189
should
turn out that way, perhaps."1 This formula is used throughout the
Church Fathers, as this lexicon
indicates. Robertson observes that these
two examples are the only ones
in Paul's writing: "Paul has only the
stereotyped phrase ei] tu<xoi . . . which is a true example
of this protasis,
'if it should happen.'"2
The only other optative formula found
frequently in Pauline writings
is the familiar mh> ge<noito
("may it not
be"), but this one lacks
conditional force. Robertson and Plummer explain
the phrase in terms of
indefiniteness. In 14:10 ei] tu<xoi
"implies that
the number is large, but that
the exact number does not matter."3 In
15:37 it "indicates an
indefiniteness which is unimportant."4
I Peter 3:14.—a]ll
] ei] kai> pa<sxoite dia> dikaiosu<hn ("but even if
you should suffer") offers
one of the fullest statements of this type of
condition in the New Testament,
and even this lacks a complete apodosis.
Here makarioi ("you are blessed") is the
closest one comes. The optative
mood of pa<sxoite implies "the slight possibility that
God wills such
suffering for Christians,"
according to Roberts.5 The
context, especially
1 William F. Arndt and F.
Wilbur Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon
of the New Testament and
Other Early Christian Literature, second edition
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 829.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1021.
3 Robertson and Plummer, First Corinthians, p. 310.
4 Ibid., p. 370.
5 Roberts, "Conditional Sentences,"
p. 245.
190
verse 13 (kai> ti<j o[ kakw<swn u[ma?j e]a>n tou? a]gaqou?
zhlwtai> ge<nhste—
"and who is going to harm
you if you are zealous for the good?") provides a note
of victory, hence the suffering
of verse 14 is viewed as a possible
cloud on the horizon. It may
come about, but it is not guaranteed. This
is the emphasis of the
optative. Lenski expresses this idea well when he
writes:
Peter states it thus in the hope that the
readers may, after all,
despite the threatening clouds that are
arising in
special suffering. To say that he
indicates an improbability is not
exact. What he has in mind is not a
balancing of probability and
improbability. When he looks at the future
he expresses his own
desire that the readers may be spared;
yet, if this should not be
the case, it is really of no moment since
any suffering that might
come would be only blessedness. One always
speaks subjunctively
when using conditional clauses. In this
connection Peter wants his
readers to think of suffering only as
something that might come.1
Winer charts a singular course when he uses this verse to
prove
that ei] with the optative is used to denote subjective
possibility "when
a condition is regarded as frequently
recurring . . . as I Pet. iii.14 . . ."2
Most grammarians, though, limit
the sense of the optative to the basic
concept of possibility rather
than a repeated situation.
I Peter 3:17.--The other conditional statement
which comes the
closest to a complete statement
of the possible condition is also found in
I Peter—krei?tton ga>r a]gaqoroiou?ntaj, ei] qe<loi to>
qe<lhma tou? qeou?,
pa<sxein
h} kakopoiou?ntaj ("It is better, if the will of God should
be so, to
suffer for doing good than for
doing evil."). Here again the optative qe<loi
1 Lenski, I Peter, p. 148.
2 Winer, Grammar,
p. 293.
191
communicates the same basic
concept as in 3:14--a potentiality, a possibility
of suffering. These two
passages, I Peter 3:14 and 17, are considered to be
the fullest expressions of this
type of conditional sentence, yet both
are incomplete.
Translation of
the Possible Condition
The possible condition uses the optative mood to
communicate the
sense of possibility rather
than probability. The English language
approaches this by the use of
such adverbs as "should," "might,"
"maybe," etc. The use
of such terms in the common "if . . . then"
formula of conditions can
communicate the improbability, the possibility
of the condition.
Conclusion
The possible condition expresses a situation about which
the
speaker has significant doubt.
The degree of doubt is sufficient to place
the concept in the realm of the
less probable, but insufficient to classify
it as impossible. This is
accomplished by placing the thought in the
optative mood. Though rare in
the New Testament, this mood expresses
the verbal idea as one which is
stated as potential. Though the specific
type of optatives in the New
Testament are classified differently by
different grammarians, the
basic concept is the same.
The possible condition is as removed from the probable
condition
as the optative mood is from
the subjunctive. Although the optative
mood and its possible condition
were on their way out of Greek when the
New Testament was written, they
are still a part, albeit a small part, of
192
its pages. An understanding of
the significance of this mood and its
condition helps the interpreted
in those passages where the existing
fragments occur.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The historical survey of Classical Greek grammarians
shows that
the majority of them recognize
nine types of conditional sentences. As
the language developed into the
Hellenistic phase and then the Koine
of the New Testament, the
number of conditional sentences decreased.
Today most Koine grammarians
recognize four types of conditions. Of
these, one type is represented
only by fragments, for no complete
example of it exists in the New
Testament. Thus there are only three
complete types of conditional
sentences to deal with in the Greek New
Testament.
Various systems of classification have been suggested for
analyzing
conditional sentences. Among
Classical grammarians four such systems have
been used. Goodwin argues for
time as the basic principle of classifica-
tion. Smyth arranges them
according to their fulfillment. Sonnenschein
argues that their form should be
the basis of classification. Gilder-
sleeve puts forth the concept
of determination as identified by the mood
of the protasis verb as the
guiding principle. Gildersleeve's system,
through Robertson, has been
accepted by most Koine grammarians.
As applied to the New Testament, Gildersleeve's system
identifies
four types of conditional
sentences. These are classified according to
the determination implied by
each sentence. This implication is based
193
194
upon the mood of the verbs
employed in the protasis. The four types of
determination are (1)
determined as real, (2) determined as unreal,
(3) determined as probable, and
(4) determined as possible.
Simple Conditions
Conditions determined as real are called Simple
Conditions. They
consist of a protasis which
contains the particle ei] and
any tense of the
indicative mood. The apodosis
may contain any form of the verb. By using
the indicative mood the speaker
is presenting the condition from the view-
point of assumed reality. There
is no guarantee, absolute or implied, as
to the objective reality of the
condition. It is merely stated as
though it were true. Its
conclusion naturally follows and is as valid
as the condition upon which it
is based.
One common fallacy of students is to read the concept of
objective
reality into this condition.
There is no warrant for such an interpre-
tive step, for any proof of
such objective reality must come from the
context of the statement and
not the statement itself. Although some
grammarians have made
statements which could be interpreted as supporting
this view, no one accepts it.
This condition is called the Simple Condition because it
presents the
condition-conclusion relationship in its simplest form.
The condition is stated as an
assumed reality, and the conclusion
naturally follows. The latter
is as true, and only as true, as is the
former.
195
Unreal
Conditions
Conditional sentences which are determined as unreal or
unfulfilled are those which
state the condition with an implication of
unreality. Rather than implying
that the condition is true, these imply
that it is not true. Such
conditions use an augmented form of indicative
verbs in the protasus and the
apodosis. They usually employ the particles
ei] in the
protasis and a@n in the
apodosis. The indicative mood is the
correct mood, for the
assumption is that the statement is actually unreal.
There is no probability or
possibility about it.
As with the simple condition, this condition presents
only an
implication, an assumption, not
a direct statement about the condition and
its reality or lack of it. The
speaker presents his case as one that he
assumes to be unreal. There is
no guarantee in the statement of its
actual or objective unreality.
Such objectivity has to come from the
context, not from the sentence.
This condition is thus termed the
Unreal Condition, since it
presents the condition as one with an
assumption of unreality.
Probable
Conditions
Conditional sentences which are determined as probable
consist of
a protasis containing any form
of the subjunctive mood, usually with e]a<n,
in the protasis and any form of
verb in the apodosis. The subjunctive
mood is one which presents an
action as potential, rather than actual,
and probable, rather than
possible. A subjunctive verb is one which could
well take place in the future,
but about which no guarantee or even
196
implication of reality can be
made. It cannot be stated as having
happened, or as one that should
not happen, but as one that could
happen. An alternative title
might be "conceivable," though it seems
that the term
"probable" is sufficient to describe the concept.
The subjunctive mood enables the speaker to present the
condi-
tion as one with a significant
degree of probability. This act could
well take place, but there is a
chance that it might not. The most
concise title for this concept
is Probable as contrasted with Possible.
Thus this condition is termed
the Probable Condition.
Possible
Conditions
The fourth type of conditional sentence exists only in
fragments.
Its complete form is a protasis
consisting of ei] with
an optative mood
and an apodosis with a@n and an optative mood. The use of the optative
mood presents the condition in
the realm of potentiality, but a realm
that is less probable than the
subjunctive mood. The speaker does not
present the condition as one
that cannot happen, but as one that he does
not expect to happen. The
English term employed for this concept is
"possible," as
contrasted with the "probable" of the subjunctive mood.
Hence this condition is termed
the Possible Condition.
Summary
In summary, then, the New Testament presents three
complete
types of conditional sentences
and fragments of a fourth. This author
has termed these (1) the Simple
Condition, (2) the Unreal Condition,
(3) the Probable Condition, and
(4) the Possible Condition. In more
197
expanded form these conditions
are:
1. Stated as though assumed real--the Simple Condition
2. Stated as though assumed unreal--the Unreal Condition
3. Stated as though assumed probable--the Probable Condition
4. Stated as though assumed possible--the Possible Condition
If one wished to consider the Possible Condition as a
special use
of the optative mood rather
than a type of conditional sentence, then
Moulton's classification becomes
eminently usable: Simple Conditions,
Unreal Conditions and Future
Conditions with the optative being a special
case of the third catagory. In
either case, the optative condition
exists as fragments in the New
Testament, reflecting the changing
pattern of Koine as opposed to
Classical Greek.
Anyone who hopes to give an accurate presentation of the
content
of the New Testament must take
care to handle these conditional
sentences properly. He must not
read too much into them, nor fail to
recognize the fulness of their
content.
APPENDIX I
OCCURRENCES OF THE SIMPLE CONDITION
In the following lists, * indicates that the verb has
been
supplied and # indicates a
textual problem. Unless otherwise noted,
the United Bible Societies'
text has been followed.
Protasis Using ei] with
Present Indicative
(221
examples)
Apodosis Using Present
Indicative (91 examples)
Matthew 6:23*
6:30*
11:14
12:27
19:10
22:45
Mark 9:42
Luke 6:32
11:19
12:26
14:26
17:2
John 1:25
3:12
7:23
8:46
13:17
15:18
199
Acts 19:38
25:11
26:8*1
Romans 2:17-19*2
7:16
7:20
8:9
8:10*
8:13
8:17*
8:25
8:31*
11:6*
11:16*
11:18
12:18*
13:9
14:15
I Corinthians 6:2
9:2
9:12*
9:17
10:30
11:16
14:38#
15:2
15:29
15:44
2 Corinthians 2:2*
4:3
4:16
5:17*
8:12*
1 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictunes in the New Testament, 6
vols.
(Nashville,
Tennensee: Broadman Press, 1930), III, p. 445; W. Robertson
Nicoll,
editor, The Expositor’s Greek Testament,
5 vols. (
Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), II, p. 503; and R. C. H. Lenski,
The Interpretation of
the Acts of the Apostles (
Publishing
House, 1961), p. 1030, all identify this as a simple condition.
2 Nicoll, Testament,
II, p. 599 indicates a textual problem.
200
2 Corinthians 11:4
11:6*
11:15*
11:20
12:15#
Galatians 2:14
3:18*
3:29*
4:7*
5:11
5:18
6:3
Philippians 1:221
2:17
3:4*
Colossians 2:5
I Timothy 1:10
3:1
5:8
2 Timothy 2:13
Hebrews 7:15
12:8
James 1:26*
2:8
2:9
3:2*
3:3#
4:11
I Peter 1:6*
2:19*
3:17*
4:4*
2 Peter 2:6
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
Galatians, Ephesians and
Philippians
House,
1961), p. 744 identifies this as a simple condition. Robertson,
Grammar,
p. 1023 identifies it as anacoluthon and in his Word Pictures,
IV,
p. 440 as a condition.
201
I John 5:9
Revelation 11:5
13:10
14:11*
Apodosis
Using Present Subjunctive (1 example)
Galatians 5:25
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (40 examples)
Matthew 16:24
19:171
19:21
Mark 4:23
7:16#
8:34#2
11:25
Luke 9:23
John 10:24#
10:37
10:38
Acts 4:9
13:15
19:38
25:5
I Corinthians 7:12
7:15
7:36
10:27
11:6*
11:34
14:35
14:37
16:22
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 249 notes minor
evidence [B,D] for
the
present tense th<rei in the apodosis. Nestle's and the United
Bible
Societies'
texts give no discussion of the problem.
2 Ibid., I, p. 398 indicates that ei@ tij is found in x,B,C,D,
L
and D.
202
2 Corinthians 13:5
Galatians 1:19
5:15
Ephesians 4:29*
Philippians 4:8*
2 Thessalonians 3:10
3:14
I Timothy 5:4
5:16
Philemon 18
James 1:5
3:14
I Peter 4:11*
4:16
I John 3:13
2 John 10
Apodosis
Using Imperfect Indicative (2 examples)
Luke 17:61
John 8:39#
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (6 examples)
Matthew 12:26
12:28
Luke 11:20
I Corinthians 8:2
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 592 identifies this as
a first class
condition;
R. C. H. Lenski The Interpretation of St.
Luke's Gospel
types
of conditions; and Robertson, Word
Pictures, II, p. 226 calls it
a
mixed condition.
203
Galatians 2:21*
Colossians 1:21
Apodosis
Using Aorist Subjunctive (6 examples)
Mark 14:351
15:362
Luke 23:31
I Corinthians 8:13
15:32
2 Corinthians 2:9
Apodosis
Using Aorist Imperative (36 examples)
Matthew 4:3
4:6
5:29
5:30
8:31
14:28
16:24
18:8
18:9
18:28#3
19:17
19:21
26:39
26:42
27:40
27:43
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Mark’s Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 636 identifies this
as
a first class condition.
2 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 450 identifies this as
a future
supposition.
3 Ibid., I, p. 243 shows some evidence for o!
ti as found
in
T.R.
instead of ei# ti
in the modern texts.
204
Mark 8:34
9:22
Luke 4:3
4:9
9:23
22:42
22:67
23:35
23:37
John 7:4
13:7
18:8
1 Corinthians 3:18
7:9
7:21
11:6
Philippians 2:1*
Philemon 17
I Peter 1:17
Revelation 13:9
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (29 examples)
Matthew 17:4
17:11
19:21
Mark 9:35
Luke 11:13
11:36*
12: 28*
16:31
John 3:12
5:47
Acts 5:39
18:15
19:39
205
Romans 3:5
8:11
11:12*
11:15*
I Corinthians 3:12
3:14
3:17
2 Corinthians 11:30
Philippians 3:15
I Thessalonians 4:14
I Timothy 3:5
2 Timothy 2:12
Hebrews 9:14
I Peter 4:17*
4:18
Revelation 14:9
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (10 examples)
Romans 4:14*
I Corinthians 8:3
9:17*
15:13
15:16
I Timothy 5:8
6:3
James 1:23
2:11
2 Peter 2:20
206
Protasis Using ei] with Aorist Indicative
(56
examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (17 examples)
Mark 3:26
Luke 19:9
John 10:35
13:14
18:23*
Romans 3:7
4:2
6:8
15:27
I Corinthians 4:7
9:11*
15:32*
2 Corinthians 3:9*
3:11
Galatians 2:17*
Colossians 2:20
I John 4:11
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (3 examples)
Colossians 3:1
1 Timothy 5:10
Philemon 18
Apodosis
Using Imperfect Indicative (6 examples)
Matthew 26:24
Mark 14:21*
John 15:24
207
Acts 11:17
Galatians 3:21
Hebrews 4:8
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (8 examples)
Matthew 11:21
11:23
Luke 10:13
Romans 5:15
11:17
I Corinthians 2:8
2 Corinthians 7:12
Revelation 20:15
Apodosis
Using Aorist Imperative (3 examples)
John 18:23
20:15
I Peter 2:3
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (16 examples)
Matthew 10:25*
Luke 11:18
16:11
16:12
John 3:12
13:32#
15:20
(contains two examples)
Romans 3:3
5:10
5:17
11:21
11:24
2 Corinthians 3:7*
208
Hebrews 2:2
12:25*
Apodosis Omitted (3 examples)
Luke 19:421
Acts 17:272
23:93
Protasis Using ei] with Future Indicative
(22
examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (5 examples)
I Corinthians 9:11*
2 Corinthians 5:3
I Peter 2:20* (contains two
examples)
Revelation 13:10
Apodosis
Using Imperfect Indicative (1 example)
Mark 3:2
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (4 examples)
Matthew 26:33
I Corinthians 3:14
3:15
2 Timothy 2:12
1 Lenski, Luke, p. 967.
2 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 288.
3 E. W. Bullinger, Figures of Speech Used in the Bible
(Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1968
reprint of 1898 edition), p. 154.
209
Apodosis
Using an Infinitive
(2 examples)
Matthew 24:24
Mark 13:22
Apodosis
in an Elliptical Condition (5 examples)
Mark 11:131
Acts 8:222
Romans 1:103
11:14
Philippians 3:11
Apodosis
Omitted Due to Hebraisms (5 examples)
Mark 8:124
Hebrews 3:11
4:3
4:5
6:14
Protasis Using ei] with Perfect Indicative
(12
examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (5 examples)
Mark 9:42
Luke 17:2
1 Robertson, Word Pictures, p. 359.
2 Ibid., I, p. 359; also Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 218.
3 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 325.
4 Ibid.,
I, p. 331; also Nicoll, Testament, I,
p. 394.
210
Acts 25:11
I Corinthians 15:14
15:17
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (2 examples)
Acts 16:15
2 Corinthians 10:7
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (1 example)
2 Corinthians 10:7
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (3 examples)
John 11:12
14:7#
Romans 6:5
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
2 Corinthians 2:5
APPENDIX II
OCCURRENCES OF THE CONTRARY TO
FACT CONDITION
In the following lists, * indicates that the verb has
been
supplied, # indicates a textual
problem and + indicates that an is
omitted in the apodosis. Unless
otherwise noted, the United Bible
Societies' text has been
followed.
Protasis with ei] and
Imperfect Indicative
(21
examples)
Apodosis
using Imperfect
(15 examples)
Matthew 23:30
Luke 7:39
John 5:46
8:42
9:33+
9:41
15:19
18:36#
19:11+
Acts 18:14
I Corinthians 11:31
Galatians 1:10
Hebrews 8:4
8:7
11:15
211
212
Apodosis
using Aorist
(4 examples)
John 11:21
11:32
14:28
18:30
Apodosis
using Pluperfect
(2 examples)
Romans 7:7+
I John 2:19
Protasis with ei] and Aorist Indicative
(16 examples)
Apodosis
using Imperfect
(7 examples)
Matthew 6:5+
26:24+
Mark 14:21*+
John 15:22+
15:24+
Galatians 3:21
Hebrews 4:8
Apodosis
Using Aorist
(9 examples)
Matthew 11:21
11:23
24:22
Mark 13:20
Luke 10:13
Romans 9:29
I Corinthians 2:8
Galatians 4:15+
213
Revelation 20:15+1
Protasis with ei] and Pluperfect
Indicative
(6
examples)
Apodosis
Using Imperfect
(1 example)
Acts 26:32+
Apodosis
using Aorist
(4 examples)
Matthew 12:7
24:43
Luke 12:39
John 4:10
Apodosis
using Pluperfect
(1 example)
John 8:19
Other
Forms
Matthew 25:27 - protasis implied2
Luke 17:6 - mixed condition3
19:23 -
protasis implied4
19:42 –
aposiopesis5
John 14:2 - protasis implied6
1 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
vols.
(Nashville:
Broadman Press, 1930), V, pp. 464-465 identifies this as a
first
class or simple condition.
2 Ibid., I, p. 200.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1022.
4 Robertson, Word Pictures, II, p. 243.
5 Ibid., II, p. 246.
6 Ibid.,
VI, p. 248.
214
I Corinthians 12:19 - protasis = ei] + imperfect, apodosis =
question
Hebrews 7:11 - protasis = ei] + imperfect, apodosis =
question
APPENDIX III
OCCURRENCES OF THE PROBABLE
CONDITION
In this list of the occurrences of the probable condition,
all verbs were classified in
terms of their form, rather than function.
In periphrastic constructions
classification was made on the basis of
the main verb, and the
participle was regarded as a "supplimentary"
participle. * means the verb
has been supplied, and # indicates a
textual variant.
Protasis with e]a<n and Present Subjunctive
(105
examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (53 examples)
Matthew 8:2
Mark 1:40
Luke 5:12
6:23
John 3:2
3:27
5:31
6:65
8:16
9:31
11:9
11:10
13:17
13:35
15:4
15:6
15:14
21: 22*
21:23*
21:25
215
216
Acts 26:5
Romans 2:25
14:8
(contains 4 examples)
I Corinthians 4:15
5:11
6:4
9:16
11:14
11:15
13:2
13:3
14:14
14:24
I Thessalonians 3:8
I Timothy 1:8*
3:25
2 Timothy 2:5
James 2:14*
2:15
2:17
I Peter 3:13*
I John 1:7
1:9
2:1
2:3
2:15
3:20
3:21
4:12
5:14
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (8 examples)
Matthew 5:23
John 7:37
10:38
12:26
Romans 12:20
13:4
217
I Corinthians 7:36
14:28
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (4 examples)
John 15:6
I Corinthians 7:28 (contains 2 examples)
I Thessalonians 2:7
Apodosis
Using Aorist Subjunctive (3 examples)
Matthew 26:35
Luke 20:28
Acts 13:41
Apodosis
Using Aorist Imperative (8 examples)
Matthew 5:23
10:13 (contains
2 examples)
Mark 9:45
9:47
John 10:38
15:7
Colossians 3:13
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (26 examples)
Matthew 6:22
6:23
15:14
17:20
21:21
24:48
(contains 2 examples)
Luke 10:6
13:3
19:31
218
John 6:62*
7:17
12:26
13:35
14:15#
14:23
Acts 5:38
Romans 2:26
9:27
I Corinthians 14:16
14:23
14:24
16:4
Galatians 5:2
Hebrews 13:23
James 4:15
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (2 examples)
Romans 2:25
I Corinthians 13:1
Apodosis
Using a Participle
(1 example)
Colossians 3:13
Protasis with e]a<n and Aorist Subjunctive
(177 examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (52 examples)
Matthew 5:46
5:47
12:29
18:12
18:13
21:26
219
Mark 3:24
3:27
7:3
7:4
7:11
10:12
Luke 6:34*
12:38
15:8
John 3:3
3:5
6:44
7:51
8:31
8:54
12:24
12:47
13:8
14:3
19:12
Acts 15:1
27:31
Romans 7:3
11:22
15:24
I Corinthians 7:8*
7:39
7:40
8:8
(contains 2 examples)
12:15
12:16
13:3
15:36
16:7
2 Corinthians 5:1
Hebrews 3:6
10:38
James 2:15*
I Peter 3:13*
220
I John 1:6
1:8
1:10
2:1
2:29
4:20
Apodosis
Using Present Subjunctive (3 examples)
Hebrews 3:7
3:15
4:7
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (11 examples)
Matthew 5:23
18:15
18:17
Mark 13:21
I Corinthians 7:11
10:28
14:30
15:10
Galatians 1:8
6:1
James 5:19
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (4 examples)
Matthew 18:15
I Corinthians 7:28 (contains 2 examples)
James 2:2
Apodosis
Using Aorist Subjunctive (20 examples)
Matthew 5:20
16:26
18:3
24:23
24:26
221
Mark 12::19
16::18#
Luke 20:28
22:67
22:68
John 4:48
8:51
8:52
9:22
11:57
16:7
20:25
Acts 9:2
Romans 10:15
2 Corinthians 9:4
Apodosis
Using Aorist Imperative (13 examples)
Matthew 5:23
18:15
18:16
18:17
26:42
Mark 9:43
11:3
Luke 17:3
(contains 2 examples)
22:68
John 15:7
I Corinthians 7:11
Colossians 4:10
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (72 examples)
Matthew 4:9
5:13
6:14
6:15
9:21
12:11
222
Matthew 18:2
18:19
18:35
21:3
21:21
(contains 2 examples)
21:24
21:25
22:24
24:48
28:14
Mark 3:35
5:28
6:23
9:50
11:31
Luke 4:7
12:45
13:5
14:34
16:30
16:31
17:4
20:5
20:6
John 3:12
5:43
6:51
8:24
8:55
10:9
11:25
11:40
11:48
12:32
14:3
14:14
15:7
15:10
16:7
Romans 7:3
10:9
11:23
223
I Corinthians 4:19
8:10
14:6
14:7
14:8
14:9
14:23
14:24
2 Corinthians 10:8
12:6
13:2
I Timothy 2:15
2 Timothy 2:21
Hebrews 12:20
James 4:15
I John 2:24
3:2
5:16
3 John 10
Revelation 3:3
3:20
22:18
22:19
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (2 examples)
Romans 7:2
14:23
Protasis with e]a<n and Perfect Subjunctive
(7 examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (3 examples)
I Corinthians 13:2
14:11
I John 2:29
224
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (1 examples)
I Corinthians 14:11
Apodosis
to be Supplied
(2 examples)
2 Corinthians 11:16
2 Thessalonians 2:3
Apodosis
in Aposiopesis
(1 example)
Luke 13:91
Protasis with a@n and Present Subjunctive
(4 examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (3 examples)
John 5:19
13:202
16:233
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
John 20:23b
Protasis with a@n and Aorist Subjunctive
(1
example)
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
John 20:23a
1 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
volumes
(Nashville:
Broadman Press, 1930), II, p. 187.
2 Ibid., V, p. 242.
3 Ibid., V, p. 271 discusses the condition and Frederick Louis
Godet,
Commentary on the Gospel of John, 2
volumes, (
Zondervan
Publishing House, n.d., reprint of 1893 edition), II, p. 317
discusses
a minor textual variant.
225
Protasis with ei] and Aorist Subjunctive
(8 examples)
Luke 9:131
Romans 11:142
I Corinthians 9:11#3
14:5
Philippians 3:114
3:125
I Thessalonians 5:106
Revelation 11:5#7
1 Robertson, Word Pictures, II, p. 126.
2 Ibid., IV, p. 395.
3 W. Robertson Nicoll,
ed., The Expositor’s Greek Testament,
5
volumes
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman's Publishing Co., 1967), II, p.
849
and John Peter Lange, ed., Commentary on
the Holy Scriptures, 24
volumes
reprinted in 12 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1960),
X,
p. 180.
4 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 455.
5 Ibid., IV, p. 455.
6 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1017.
7 Lange, Commentary, XII, p. 215.
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